Ohio History Journal

PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET   by ROBERT K. MURRAY       Among the many controversial facets involving the life of the twenty-ninth president of the United States, few have prompted more conjecture and analysis than the choosing of his cabinet. The fact that one of his selections achieved the distinction of being the only cabinet officer to go to jail, that another resigned under a cloud of suspicion, and still a third narrowly missed criminal conviction, places Warren Gamaliel Harding in a unique position as a cabinet-maker. With this record it is little wonder that Harding's skill as a judge of men has been consistently downgraded both by historians and popular writers. Early observers, such as William Allen White, Frederick Lewis Allen, Mark Sullivan, and Samuel Hopkins Adams, all agreed that the Harding cabinet was a crazy quilt of both good and bad, with the bad far outweighing the good.1 Later writers, such as Frederick L. Paxson and Andrew Sinclair, soften the emphasis somewhat but basically arrive at the same conclusion.2 Thus, despite the recognized excellence of certain cabinet choices, the poor selections have captured the lion's share of popular and scholarly attention and have brought down upon the whole selection process a verdict of failure. But this verdict is based largely on the later scandals and not on the actual process of cabinet-making itself. Lost to view is Harding's personal wrestling with the alternative choices, the demands of the contemporary political situa- tion, and his own commitment to certain goals and principles. Until these factors are fully examined, the verdict of failure is at best incomplete and at worst erroneous.     NOTES ARE ON PAGES 185-188

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                               109

 

With the taste of a stunning election victory still in his mouth, President-

elect Warren Harding announced from the front porch of his Marion, Ohio

home on November 5, 1920, that he intended to leave the next day for a

month's vacation trip to Texas and Panama, but that immediately upon his

return he would consult the "best minds" of the country about his cabinet

and his future course of action. He warned that all speculation in the interim

about cabinet selections would be unfounded because he did not propose to

name anyone until he returned to Marion, which he now dubbed "the Great

Listening Post."3

No sooner had Harding's special train pointed southward than the press

was filled with intense speculation. Each issue brought forth new names "on

the highest authority" or eliminated old ones on the basis of the latest infor-

mation from "someone close to Harding during the campaign." On the very

day Harding left, the New York Times contained an editorial which prophe-

sied that Frank O. Lowden and General Leonard Wood would be in the

cabinet.⁴ Others picked Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Harry S. New as

sure bets, while speculation for Secretary of State centered around Charles

Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, or Senator Philander C. Knox.5

Harding returned from Panama to Washington on December 5. He was

aware of the newspaper comment and was amused by most of it, but not by

the constant inference that the cabinet would be packed with senators and,

indeed, that a "senate oligarchy" would dictate the choices and set adminis-

tration policy. A hang-over from press coverage of the Republican convention

and popularized by Democratic Governor Cox during the campaign, this

charge of senate control was much on the President-elect's mind when, on

December 5, the opening day of the third session of the Sixty-sixth Congress,

he delivered a brief farewell address to his senate colleagues. Expressing his

regret at leaving, he added this interesting declaration:

Something has been said about the "Senatorial oligarchy." Of course

everyone here knows that to be a bit of highly imaginative and harmless

fiction...When my responsibilities begin in the executive capacity, I

shall be as mindful of the Senate's responsibilities as I have been jealous

for them as a member; but I mean at the same time to be just as insistent

about the responsibilities of the executive. Our governmental good

fortune does not lie in any surrender at either end of the Avenue.6

Harding came into the presidential office under obligation to no one. True,

he owed his Ohio supporters and a few close friends, such as Harry M.

Daugherty, a debt of gratitude, but he had received the nomination and

achieved final victory without "deals" or promises. This gave him a freer

hand in selecting his official family than most presidents have enjoyed.

He avowedly set out to acquire an independent-minded, first-class cabinet.

His hope was to attract equals and not echoes or rubber stamps. He hoped

to follow the tradition of Washington and Lincoln in this respect, and not

Wilson. But he recognized there were, necessarily, some restraints. Said he

to reporters, when lecturing them once on the problems of cabinet-making:

Three things are to be considered in the selection of a Cabinet. First,

there is the man's qualification for public service. That is the most

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110                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

important consideration of all. Second, there is the attitude of the public

concerning the man under consideration. Third, there is the political

consideration. As to that--well. This is going to be a Republican

Cabinet.7

Despite having certain definite views on cabinet selections, Harding was

no dictator. Indeed his political career had been based on the adjudication

of differences and compromise. Always attracted to party solidarity and a

firm believer in collective party wisdom, Harding by choice, and not by force,

elected to consult widely -- the "best minds" -- before making final decisions.

As a result, never had there been such a pilgrimage of the party faithful

to a president-elect as occurred at Marion, "the Great Listening Post," after

December 10. For the next month, as high as six or seven leaders per day

funnelled through Harding's makeshift office, being asked and giving advice

on a variety of matters, including cabinet selections. No shade of opinion

was excluded. Once, when it came to Harding's attention that Republican

house members were disgruntled because of the preponderance of senators,

he ordered Will Hays, who was in charge of the invitations, to include more

congressmen. Indeed, Hays found his guest list constantly expanding as one

after another of the party's leaders were requested to appear at Marion.8

At the same time, Harding consulted and relied on "unofficial" representa-

tives in the field who reported to him, especially on matters relating to the

cabinet. From time to time he gave them specific assignments, and they

always sent their impressions directly to him. The five most important of

these men were Harry M. Daugherty, Charles D. Hilles, Senator Joseph

Frelinghuysen, Senator Harry S. New, and Senator Frank Brandegee.⁹ Hard-

ing also sought the independent advice of his running mate, Calvin Coolidge,

but Coolidge's cold personality made his effectiveness minimal. Having made

a campaign promise that if elected he would break precedent by bringing

the vice-president into cabinet meetings, Harding believed it wise to consult

with him on cabinet choices. There is no evidence, however, that Coolidge

ever played a significant role. In fact, Brandegee took such a dim view of

Coolidge's contributions and talents in general that he once wrote Harding:

"None of us here think much of the idea of making the V.P. a Cabinet

officer 'Emeritus.'"10

There is no question that Harding was the focal point of all discussions

on cabinet selections and was always in command. The reins of decision he

held tightly in his own hands. He rapidly became discouraged, however, by

the lack of advisory unity he discovered among the "best minds." Worse,

he found himself suddenly the vortex of subtle intrigues and cabals designed

to sway him one way or another. He soon learned that the "big men" he

wanted for his cabinet also possessed "big enemies" and that political con-

siderations often were used to cancel out superior qualifications. Once, in the

midst of discouragement, he wrote to his Ohio friend, Malcolm Jennings:

"What a job I have taken over. The man who has a Cabinet to create has

one tremendous task."¹¹ To another friend he confided, "My cup is full."12

And the agony that he suffered he never wholly forgot. Later when seeking

presidential clearance for an essay about the Administration for the Saturday

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                               111

 

Evening Post, H. H. Kohlsaat wrote Harding: "I did not think it wise to use

any of the stories you have told me of your Cabinet making -- it might

embarrass." The President wholeheartedly agreed.13

Despite his inner turmoil, Harding weathered the ordeal of selecting a

cabinet quite well. Insiders were amazed at his patience and tact, his cor-

diality and sincerity. William Howard Taft came away from his Marion

interview convinced that Harding was trying to "do the right thing," and

Nicholas Murray Butler left with a solid impression of "his good judgment

and sound common sense." Butler's talks with Harding convinced the Co-

lumbia University president that the Ohioan possessed a "perfect familiarity

with the various troublesome elements in his political party."14

The marathon discussions, confusing as they were, soon convinced Hard-

ing of several things: the Secretary of State had to be a man universally

respected by the country yet able to work with all elements in Congress;

the Secretary of Agriculture should be a practical farmer and not merely a

professor of farming or an agricultural lobbyist; the Labor post should go to

someone identified with labor, possibly a union member, but not of the

"radical element;" and the Treasury position should be filled from the Middle

West and not from New York or the Northeast. Harding was also convinced

that one, if not two, positions in the cabinet should be reserved for his

friends -- men to whom he could turn for personal advice and whose loyalty

he could absolutely trust.15

These convictions provided the basic framework for Harding's subsequent

cabinet-making and were reflected almost immediately by his action in filling

the first position -- that of Secretary of State. Much foolishness has been

written about this appointment. White, Sullivan, and Adams all contend

that Harding really wanted to give the post to his friend, Albert B. Fall,

but that visitors to Marion shook him out of this notion with their sharp

opposition. It was claimed that he next considered George Harvey and finally

turned to Root before deciding on Hughes.¹⁶

There is little question that Harding wanted Fall in the cabinet, but there

is no indication in any of Harding's correspondence that he ever seriously

pushed Fall as Secretary of State. The truth is that Harding offered the

position to Hughes on December 10 when the New Yorker appeared in

Marion as one of his first visitors. Three days later, Hughes wrote

Harding that he had talked the matter over with his partners and "was glad

to say that I have arranged to be free to assume the responsibilities of which

you spoke."¹⁷ On December 22, Harding replied that he was "delighted" with

Hughes's decision and regarded the matter closed. They both agreed that no

announcement would be made until later. Such an announcement -- the first

regarding a cabinet selection -- was made on February 19, 1921.18

In the meantime, ignorant of this decision, the press continued its specula-

tion while the politicians argued. Anti-League Republicans, such as William

E. Borah, championed the cause of Senator Knox. Senator Brandegee, another

"bitter-ender," contended that if Harding could not appoint Knox, he should

at least nominate Lodge.19 A few, such as Senator James W. Wadsworth,

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112                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Jr., and Charles Hilles of New York, clamored for the selection of Root;

and, when Harding invited Root to come to Marion in mid-December, specu-

lation soared that he was about to be chosen.20 Since no offer to Root was

apparently forthcoming, press interest shifted back again to Hughes. At the

same time, the Old Guard, frightened by increasing rumors of Hughes's

appointment, quickly closed ranks behind Root even though they still wanted

Knox. Senator Boies Penrose made an eleventh-hour fight in late January in

a futile attempt to block Hughes's selection by dangling Root before Hard-

ing's eyes.²¹

But Harding, as noted, had already made his decision back in early

December and he stuck with it. Moreover, it was his decision and Hughes

was his choice -- his first choice. It was a fearless act of cabinet-making

statesmanship.²²

Another early decision which stemmed from a strong Harding conviction

was the appointment of Henry C. Wallace (father of Henry A. Wallace) as

Secretary of Agriculture. He felt Wallace fulfilled the requirement that the

holder of this post should be a "dirt" farmer. During the campaign, he and

Cox had jousted verbally over this matter, with Harding charging that the

Wilson Administration had appointed only university presidents and pub-

lishers to the position while the Republican party traditionally had selected

bona fide farmers.²³ By a curious twisting of the definition, Harding classified

Wallace as a "dirt" farmer; but in so doing he did violence to the truth. Born

into a farming family in Adair County, Iowa, Wallace, after attempting farm-

ing for five years, ultimately found more interest in teaching -- he was for a

time an assistant professor at Iowa State -- and in farm journalism than

in plowing.

Wallace had been invaluable to Harding during the campaign. One of the

best known agriculturalists in the United States because of his editorship

of Wallaces' Farmer, he had helped write the 1920 Republican farm plank

and had been Harding's chief advisor and speech writer on farm matters.

Wallace, himself, was an able stump speaker; and his slashing attacks on

the Wilson Administration, together with his personal influence among

agricultural organizations, were important factors in swinging a massive

farm vote to Harding.²⁴

Even before the election, Harding had his eye on Wallace as a potential

Secretary of Agriculture. On November 1, 1920, Harding wrote to Wallace:

"If the verdict on Tuesday is what we are expecting it to be I shall very

much want your assistance in making good the promises which we have made

to the American people."²⁵ After the election, when other names were brought

forward as candidates, such as Senator Arthur Capper and Marion Butler,

Harding barely gave them consideration. Wallace was still his man even

though press speculation did not center on the Iowan until late December.

By that time, Harding was subjected to extreme pressure regarding the

Wallace selection. Some conservative leaders and certain vested interest

groups objected strongly. Wallace's liberal tendencies unsettled Old Guard

members while his editorial assaults against the malpractices of the packing

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                                  113

 

and food processing industries earned him the hatred of these powerful

elements. Delegations, headed by no less than Everett C. Brown of the

National Live Stock Association and C. B. Stafford, President of the Chicago

Live Stock Exchange, hastened to Marion to protest his nomination. The

packers and millers also had their spokesmen present. But Harding did not

waver, and Wallace joined Hughes on the cabinet list.26

The Hughes and Wallace appointments were not to the liking of the

President-elect's senate cronies or close political friends. This was all the

more true of still a third selection -- Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Com-

merce.

It is clear from the Harding correspondence that from the very beginning

he was attracted to Hoover as a cabinet candidate. It is equally clear that

certain elements in the party, close to Harding, lived in constant fear that

Hoover might be selected. From the day that Hoover arrived in Marion

(December 12) to confer with Harding, a bitter campaign was conducted to

keep Hoover out of the cabinet. On the other hand, Hoover, even more than

Hughes, had a "good press," and there was wide support in the country at

large for his appointment.27

The opposition to Hoover was both impressive and articulate. Frank

Brandegee stated the anti-Hoover position succintly: "Hoover gives most

of us gooseflesh."²⁸ Too liberal in his social philosophy, too internationally-

minded, too popular, and too ambitious for the Old Guard, Hoover was not

opposed for a particular cabinet post, but for any. Senators Philander Knox,

Charles Curtis, and Reed Smoot voiced immediate opposition, and warned

Harding that Hoover was non-party oriented and would not "get along well"

with other cabinet officers.²⁹ Not only the Old Guard, but even Insurgent

senators, such as Hiram Johnson, were skeptical. Harry New, one of Hard-

ing's "trouble-shooters" on cabinet appointments, wrote to Marion shortly

before Christmas: "Many senators have expressed the hope that Hoover

may be omitted. [They] fear the effect of this [selection] in the Senate ...

[Johnson] says it [Hoover's nomination] would be personally so offensive

to him that he hoped from that standpoint that it might not be found neces-

sary."³⁰ Harry Daugherty reported essentially the same information: that

there was little support for Hoover among congressmen, that the Hearst

papers were against him, and that even such Progressives as Raymond

Robins, Gifford Pinchot, and George W. Norris did not endorse him.31

Indeed, there was little enthusiasm for Hoover in the Republican party

leadership. Among Harding's close advisers, only Frelinghuysen supported

Hoover's appointment as "politically wise" and believed him superior to other

suggested candidates, such as Albert Lasker of Chicago and Eugene Meyer,

Jr., of New York City.³²

Harding's attitude toward Hoover remained unshaken throughout this

debate. On January 12, 1921, in reply to a letter from Hoover in which the

humanitarian had strongly endorsed Wallace's appointment as Secretary of

Agriculture, Harding wrote: "Your opinion concerning [Wallace] is important

to me. Indeed, I hold you in such esteem that your opinion on any matter

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114                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

is of real importance."³³ Under the fierce attacks, "such esteem" grew even

stronger. On February 9, Harding wrote Daugherty: "The more I consider

[Hoover] the more do I come to think well of him. Of course, I have no

quarrel with those who do not think as I do, but inasmuch as I have the

responsibility to assume, I think my judgment must be trusted in the matter.

The main thing to consider at the present is whether Mr. Hoover will accept

the post which I am prepared to offer to him."³⁴

Several days later on February 12, Harding offered him the post of Secre-

tary of Commerce. The precise position was really immaterial to Harding;

he simply wanted Hoover in the cabinet. Hoover, on the other hand, was not

so anxious. On December 22 he had already indicated to Harding (in rela-

tion to overtures about a cabinet position made by Harding at their meeting

in Marion on December 12) that he did not desire to enter public service,

and had requested the Ohioan to "dismiss from your mind all thought of

my appointment."³⁵ In view of certain subsequent opposition, Hoover was

even less inclined to accept. Hence, considerable persuasion was necessary.

At this point Harding asked Hughes to intercede, and the New Yorker invited

Hoover to his Sixty-fourth Street apartment to talk matters over.³⁶ Will

Hays was also sent by Harding to convince Hoover of the wisdom of entering

the cabinet. On February 22, in a phone call from St. Augustine, where he

sought some relaxation prior to his inauguration, Harding, himself, reaffirmed

to Hoover his deep desire to have him join his official family and assured him

that he could have free rein in running the Commerce Department if he

accepted.* In a final show of determination, Harding wrote Hiram Johnson

a personal note acknowledging the Senator's bitter opposition to Hoover,

but indicated that he believed Johnson's fellow Californian would be an

excellent choice and requested Johnson "to accept my judgment on this

particular matter."³⁷ In the face of such sincerity, Hoover wavered and the

next day, February 23, wired Harding that although he much preferred to

remain out of public life, "I have no right to refuse your wish and I will

accept the Secretaryship of Commerce." Formal announcement was made

to the press a day later.38

Hoover's appointment as Secretary of Commerce was intimately connected

with that of Andrew W. Mellon as Secretary of Treasury. Contrary to later

assertions, Harding, in this instance, not only displayed his independence but

also his political shrewdness. Mellon was not Harding's first choice for the

Treasury post. Indeed, his name was not even mentioned among the early

candidates: John Weeks (Massachusetts), Charles Dawes (Illinois), Frank

Lowden (Illinois), and Charles Hilles (New York). Of these men, Dawes

was Harding's favorite. During his visit to Marion in mid-December, the

Chicago banker was asked by Harding if he could be enticed into the cabinet,

and Dawes replied probably not, but no final decisions were reached one

way or the other.³⁹ Dawes possessed some attractive advantages: the Chicago

and the Midwestern banking fraternity strongly endorsed him; he was re-

nowned for his tenacity and ability to effect efficiency and economy; and he

was fearless, frank, and unpledged to any particular faction in the party.

 

* Harding granted a similar freedom to and demonstrated an equally cooperative attitude

toward Henry C. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture. See "Disharmony in the Harding

Cabinet" below, pp. 126-136.

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                              115

 

But many in the East did not like Dawes, considering him too erratic for

their tastes. Temporarily these elements united behind John W. Weeks as

their candidate and urged his selection on Harding. The Ohioan, however,

was not impressed by eastern arguments against Dawes and, further, indi-

cated that he did not wish the post to go to a New Englander or a New

Yorker because of "Wall Street" connotations. As late as Christmas, Harding

still inclined toward the Chicagoan, despite eastern opposition.⁴⁰

The first mention of Mellon was made by Senator Knox. Mellon had been a

heavy campaign contributor and had close contacts with the party leader-

ship through Senators Knox and Penrose. Once, in early December, while

Harding was wrestling with the Treasury problem and weighing the pros and

cons of the Midwest versus the East, Knox remarked that if he wanted a neat

geographic solution as well as experience and competency in the job, Pennsyl-

vania could provide the Pittsburgh multi-millionaire. It was agreed that Mel-

lon should be invited to Marion for a talk.⁴1

A short time later, Knox happened to be lunching with Mellon and Henry C.

Frick, and he indicated to Mellon that his name had been mentioned in

connection with the Treasury post. Mellon said he absolutely did not want it,

but both Frick and Knox urged him to go to Marion and consider it if an

offer were made. But no direct offer was made. Mellon journeyed to Marion,

had lunch with Harding, and chatted for about an hour. Harding did mention

the Treasury position and inquired if Mellon were interested. The financier

did not give a flat "no," but he did remind Harding of his vast holdings and

the impropriety of making such a wealthy man Secretary of the Treasury.

Harding asked him to keep the matter open.⁴²

The President-elect still wanted Dawes as the Treasury Secretary but

was forced to recognize the logic of a Mellon appointment. Besides, the

Pennsylvanian rapidly garnered the support of both eastern and midwestern

banking elements, as well as the heavy endorsement of Old Guard stalwarts.

Senators Knox and Penrose, Pennsylvania's Governor William Sproul, offi-

cials of the Carnegie Institute, and innumerable others attested to his "un-

excelled judgment and ability in matters of finance." Charles H. Sabin,

President of Guaranty Trust of New York, indicated solid eastern support

by writing Harding that "no wiser choice could be made." Meanwhile,

Daugherty's soundings in the field were likewise enthusiastic.⁴³

This turn of events presented Harding with an unexpected opportunity.

He was in the midst of fighting off the bitter attacks on Hoover and badly

needed something to assure Hoover's confirmation if that selection were

made. At the same time, he was juggling simultaneously his preference for

Dawes and a desire to placate certain members of the Old Guard, including

the eastern money "establishment." In late January at St. Augustine, Hard-

ing met a second time with Dawes and explained this complex situation to

him. Dawes stated again that he really did not want the Treasury post and

indicated his own willingness to endorse Mellon. Harding then requested

that Dawes not let it be known that he was withdrawing his name from

consideration because the President-elect wanted to outflank Penrose, Knox,

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116                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

and others who were bitterly opposed to Hoover. Harding told Dawes that he

intended to make Mellon Secretary of the Treasury in exchange for Hoover

for Commerce. Shortly thereafter, Harding sent Daugherty to Washington to

indicate to Senators Knox and Penrose that Mellon was a possibility, but

only if their attacks on Hoover ceased. Reluctantly, they agreed -- and Mel-

lon was appointed.⁴⁴

In his talk with Dawes, Harding had commented: "Mellon probably has

too much money for a Secretary of the Treasury. I may get as much criticism

over his appointment as I would if I put J. P. Morgan in that place."⁴⁵ He

almost did, but Harding was fully aware of what he was doing and was pre-

pared to live with it. Mellon was not so sure about himself. The multi-

millionaire did not relish the personal sacrifices he would have to make or

the criticism he would have to endure. At the same time, encouraged by

Senator Knox, Mellon was intrigued by the thought of entering the strange

world of politics. As Mellon, himself, later described his ambivalent feelings:

"I really didn't want to come to Washington [but] I did not want absolutely

to refuse."⁴⁶ He finally capitulated, and an announcement was made to the

press in the last week in February.

The financier's appointment was a curious blend of politics, chance, wisdom,

and clever calculation. It was shrewd cabinet-making at its best. In the end,

everyone won -- the Old Guard, both midwestern and eastern banking in-

terests, Hoover and Hoover supporters, and most of all, Harding. Not every

President could boast that one of the wealthiest men in the world was in his

cabinet. Bernard Baruch once remarked to Clarence W. Barron, publisher

of the Wall Street Journal, that when he had refused in 1912 to take the

Treasury position, President Wilson had protested with tears in his eyes:

"I have no objection to wealth." Obviously, neither had President-elect

Harding.⁴⁷

While these four cabinet selections were based, to a large extent, on

Harding's own desires as well as the superior qualifications of the candidates,

four other appointments represented the normal surrender to simple political

expediency. In these cases, the President-elect merely followed the advice of

his political advisers or the dictates of party necessity. Immediately after

the election, there was press speculation that both General Leonard Wood

and Frank O. Lowden, the main contenders for the Republican nomination

in 1920, would find their way into the Harding cabinet. Although the election

result demonstrated that there was no great need to sacrifice cabinet positions

to the Wood faction, Harding and his advisers were nevertheless aware of

the General's personal popularity and newspaper support. The "Great Listen-

ing Post" was bombarded by requests that Wood be made Secretary of War

in order to "salve his disappointment" over losing the nomination. In a

Literary Digest poll, two hundred forty-two of three hundred Republican

editors endorsed him for this cabinet position.⁴⁸

Within Harding's advisory circle there was considerable opposition to the

General. The charge was made that Wood's appointment would disrupt the

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                               117

 

Army and cause intense internal friction because of his controversial career

as a professional soldier. Moreover, it did not seem wise to have him pass

on the promotions of senior officers under whom he had served or with whom

he had been in school. Some of Harding's advisers were opposed to Wood

because of his popular appeal and the fear of his future ambitions. Besides,

old wounds still remained from the pre-convention campaign fight in Ohio

in which the General's forces had taken several favorite-son votes away from

Harding. Also damaging was the fact that Wood had not worked enthusiastic-

ally for Harding during the campaign. Interestingly enough, Harding found

less validity in most of these reasons than did his advisers, but agreed that

political necessity precluded Wood's appointment. He expressed the hope,

however, of using Wood's talents elsewhere and later appointed him governor-

general of the Phillipines.⁴⁹

Political and geographic requirements pointed ultimately to John W. Weeks

of Massachusetts for the War cabinet post. An early contender for the post

of Secretary of the Treasury, he had been supported by New England banking

interests. Senator Lodge was one of his primary backers and relinquished his

drive to place him in the Treasury position only after receiving assurance

that Weeks would secure a slot "somewhere" in the cabinet. At one time or

other, he was considered for Postmaster General and Secretary of the Navy.50

His credentials for both these latter positions were rather impressive.

Weeks had been a member of the House from 1905 to 1913 and then had

served six years in the Senate. While in the House, he had been chairman of

the Committee on Post Office and Post Roads; in the Senate, he had been

a member of the Military Affairs Committee. In addition, Weeks had a naval

record. In 1877, at age seventeen, he had enlisted as a cadet midshipman

and, four years later, graduated from the Naval Academy. He served in the

regular Navy for two years and was honorably discharged. During the

Spanish-American War he again donned his naval uniform, signing on as a

lieutenant for the duration.51 Thereafter, he returned to Boston and to his

banking business, which expanded so rapidly that it made him one of the

major bankers in the New England area by World War I. His defeat for

reelection to the Senate in November 1918 was a surprise to the Republicans,

especially to some of his close Senate friends, such as Lodge. But Weeks

continued his political service in other ways -- along with Mellon, he was

one of the chief financiers of the Republican campaign of 1920.

Harding and Weeks had been friends in the Senate, and Harding was more

than willing to have him represent the Northeast in the cabinet. The logical

place seemed to be Secretary of the Navy. But through friends, Weeks re-

vealed that he did not want the Navy position for the same reasons which

were being discussed against General Wood for War: it would not be wise

for him to pass on the qualifications and promotions of those with whom he

had served or attended school. Just prior to Christmas, therefore, feelers

were extended from Marion as to whether Weeks would accept the post of

Secretary of War. The Boston banker then contacted his Senate friend,

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118                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

Harry New, currently serving on the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and

asked him if he should take War if offered. New replied: "absolutely" -- and

quickly wrote Harding that he was confident Weeks would accept the War

post.⁵²

On January 15, 1921, Weeks was summoned to Marion to talk with Hard-

ing, and, as the New York Times phrased it, "cabinet matters were brought

up."53 Rumors circulated that Weeks had been tapped for Secretary of War

because, by now, it was an open secret that he had an aversion to the Navy

post. But more than a month elapsed before Harding made an official an-

nouncement to the press. The reason for the delay was not because of any

latent opposition on the part of Harding, or anyone else, but simply because

he wished to wait until announcements could be made about other cabinet

choices as well. Indeed, Weeks's appointment was a popular one with the

party and also with the military. Senator Wadsworth, chairman of the Senate

Military Affairs Committee, wrote to Harding just after the decision had

been made: "I would like a dollar for every Army officer and every member

of Congress who during the last two months has expressed the hope that

Weeks could put his hand to this great big task."⁵⁴

The job of Secretary of Labor posed a particularly thorny political problem.

Continuing labor disturbances in the immediate postwar period focused

unusual attention on government-labor relations, and the Republicans were

anxious to placate the rank and file of labor if possible. The strategy in

selecting a person to head Labor had already been outlined by Harry L.

Fidler, special labor affairs representative of the Republican National Com-

mittee, in a lengthy twelve-page letter to Chairman Will Hays on November

24, 1920. Fidler, who was a staunch Republican and a member of the Brother-

hood of Locomotive Engineers, pointed out the fact that the whole Gompers

clique in the American Federation of Labor had fought Harding in the cam-

paign and that it would be a mistake to reward them in any way. But,

warned Fidler, while the Secretary of Labor "must be an anti-Gompers

man ... he must also be a practical labor man." Fidler may have hoped that

the lightning would strike him, and Hays did later mention his name for the

post. Fidler, however, was never seriously considered for Secretary of Labor,

although his recommended course of action was endorsed.⁵⁵

Among the persons most mentioned for the position were James Duncan,

William L. Hutcheson, T. V. O'Connor, and James J. Davis. Head of the

Stone-Cutters' Union and a vice-president in the A. F. of L., James Duncan

was Gompers' personal candidate who, interestingly enough, was also sup-

ported by Lodge -- Duncan was from Massachusetts. Despite Lodge's bless-

ing, Gompers' support proved the kiss of death.⁵⁶ Hutcheson, as General

President of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, possessed con-

siderable rank and file labor support but had no one in the Republican party

leadership strongly pushing him.57

T. V. O'Connor, however, was another matter. As president of the Interna-

tional Longshoremen's Association, he was vigorously championed by strong

elements in organized labor. He also had the backing of numerous New York

businessmen as well as the support of Nicholas Murray Butler. Originally

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                                119

 

O'Connor had been a Democrat, but had bolted that party because of Presi-

dent Wilson's postwar labor policy. Moreover, he was solidly anti-Gompers,

a "conservative," and had voted for Harding in 1920. But his earlier advocacy

of the closed shop and low tariffs had created suspicion. And when Harding

requested that Charles Hilles check into the record, he received some highly

adverse reports.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, attention for the Labor Secretary shifted to James Davis.

While Davis thought of himself as a laboring man and had been an iron

"puddler" and an active union member, he had long since become better

known for his lodge work. Director-General of the Loyal Order of Moose and

one of the founders of Mooseheart (a city of fatherless children in the Fox

River Valley, thirty-seven miles west of Chicago), he was sometimes called

the "Napoleon of Fraternity" and allegedly could call ten thousand men by

their first names.⁵⁹ This ability was a decided political asset as hundreds of

Moose lodges sent their endorsements of "Puddler Jim" Davis to Marion.

When support also came from such labor organizations as the Street Carmen's

Union and the Iron Moulders' Union, Davis seemingly possessed an unbeat-

able combination -- especially since he was also anti-Gompers, a hard-working

Republican party member, and had been a staunch backer of Harding in

1920.60

The decision regarding the Labor post was allowed to simmer until after

the Christmas holidays, while more pressing cabinet business was settled.

Then, on January 7, Harding telegraphed Davis to come to Marion to discuss

the "labor policy" of the new Administration. Three days later he offered

Davis the position and Davis accepted.61 No announcement was made, how-

ever, and therefore press and labor speculation continued regarding the

ultimate selection.

Sensing a decline in interest at Marion in other potential candidates after

the Davis interview, many labor leaders voiced concern over the possible

appointment of Davis. Indeed, the various proponents of O'Connor, Hutche-

son, and Duncan joined forces after mid-January to oppose Davis and threw

their combined weight behind O'Connor. They did not consider Davis enough

labor-oriented to hold the post and feared that his interest lay more in

Mooseheart than in the shops and mines. In a last minute effort, without

mentioning names, Gompers sent a lengthy telegram to Harding on February

7 stating that "no man is fully capable to fill the position of Secretary of

Labor who lacks the sympathy, respect and confidence of the wage workers

of our country."⁶²

If Harding needed a reason to re-enforce his earlier decision to appoint

Davis, Gompers' antipathy provided it. Davis's selection was purely political

and designed to offset the various forces within the laboring groups, while

at the same time denying control of the office to Gompers. As Senator

Wadsworth later recalled: "The appointment was regarded as suitable. I do

not think any of us had the idea that the appointee was a great statesman."⁶³

Of the final two political appointments, the selection of the Postmaster

General was the easier. While a number of candidates existed, there was

never any doubt that Will Hays, chairman of the Republican National Com-

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120                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

mittee, could claim it if he wished. This action was traditional. Strangely

enough, Hays did not relish the thought of supervising the nation's mail and

really preferred the Commerce post. But, Harding made it clear that the

latter position was beyond his reach (it had already been reserved for

Hoover), and on January 17 he gave Hays his choice either of the Post

Office or chairman of the Commission to Reorganize the Government. Three

weeks later, after weighing the various possibilities, Hays told Harding that

he would accept the cabinet job.⁶⁴

The selection of Secretary of the Navy was almost an afterthought and

came at the very end of the wearisome process of cabinet-making. After

ex-senator Weeks dropped out of the running for the post in late December,

it was decided to offer it to Frank Lowden. Unlike their feeling toward the

Wood element, Harding's advisers expressed a belated desire to reward the

Lowden faction and Lowden, himself, for supporting Harding during the

campaign. When, on January 17, Lowden received an invitation from Hard-

ing to join his official family as Secretary of the Navy, he was surprised.

Frankly, he had nursed a hope of becoming either Secretary of Treasury or

Secretary of Agriculture and felt qualified to hold either post. But he hardly

knew the bow of a battleship from the stem. Hence, after some soul-searching,

he telegraphed Harding his refusal. But Harding persisted and reaffirmed

the offer not simply as a courtesy, but because of a genuine desire for him to

enter the cabinet. When Lowden again demurred, Harding attempted a third

time to get him to reconsider. Harding's last telegram of February 14 read:

"I think a great public approval awaits your acceptance. If you insist once

more on the impossibility, I will accept its finality."⁶⁵ Lowden insisted;

another candidate had to be found.

Edwin L. Denby's name had first been mentioned to Harding by Weeks

at the time the latter had expressed his preference for War rather than

Navy. Lowden had also mentioned Denby during his series of refusals of

the Navy position.⁶⁶ Almost in desperation, Harding then turned in Denby's

direction, too.

Actually, on the basis of apparent qualifications and availability, Denby

was an excellent choice. He had served as a gunner's mate in the Spanish-

American War; and in 1917, although forty-seven years old had dropped a

civilian law practice and enlisted as a private in the Marines and was dis-

charged as a major at the end of War I. Previously he had served six years

in Congress where, among other assignments, he had been a member of the

House Naval Affairs Committee. Although a "Big Navy" man, he was

regarded as being too conservative by followers of Theodore Roosevelt and

lost his seat in the election of 1910. After World War I he returned to Detroit

and made a fortune manufacturing automobiles. In the pre-convention days

of 1920, he had been a Lowden man, but worked diligently for Harding in

the regular election.⁶⁷

On Washington's birthday, February 22, Harding offered him the Navy

post. Denby could not have been more amazed. Said he: "The invitation

took me off my feet. I was overwhelmed." Certainly he was no less surprised

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                               121

 

than the press. Reporters at St. Augustine greeted the announcement of his

acceptance with: "Denby, Denby -- who is Denby?^"68

Much mystery and drama has been written into the relatively simple story

of Harding's selection of two of his personal friends for cabinet positions.

His friendship for Albert Fall and his friendship and gratitude to Harry

Daugherty gave them both a high priority on his list of available candidates.

In the case of Fall, Harding simply liked him. He was not alone. Fall had

an attractive personality. Born in Frankfort, Kentucky in 1861, Fall had

worked in a cotton mill in Nashville when he was only eleven years old;

at eighteen, he had studied enough law to become a lawyer. Shortly thereafter

he set out for the Red River country and for three years was a United States

marshal in the Panhandle area. Turning next to prospecting in Mexico, he

worked the region around Zacatecas as a mucker, ore sorter, and drill

sharpener. The year 1885 found him back in the United States digging for

riches in the mountains of New Mexico. During the Spanish-American War

he rode with Roosevelt and the Rough Riders, and finally settled down in

Las Cruces, where he served in the legislature of New Mexico territory for

three terms. He was elected to the New Mexico Senate in 1902 and then to

the United States Senate in 1912. There, wearing his broad-rimmed Stetson,

flowing black cape, and handle-bar mustaches, he occupied an adjoining seat

to Senator Harding and became a poker-playing crony of the future president

of the United States.⁶⁹

But friendship was not the sole factor in Fall's selection. Harding had

respect for his ability. So did others. Fall was considered an expert on western

matters and also on Mexican and South American affairs. He wrote the

Mexican plank into the 1920 Republican platform. He had served on the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Harding and had been a strong

opponent of Wilson's League of Nations. A ruthless gut-fighter, Fall was at

his best in the kind of give-and-take political debate which automatically

endears a politician to party stalwarts.

Harding wanted Fall in the cabinet and mentioned him casually in con-

nection with a number of positions. Yet, he apparently considered him

seriously only for Secretary of the Interior, and even then only after it

became clear that Hoover wanted Commerce and not the Interior post. For

Harding, it was a marriage of his desire with geography and expediency

rather than with any need for dispensing spoils. Fall was from the West and

the Interior post generally went to a westerner, just as Agriculture tradi-

tionally went to a midwesterner. That Fall was basically anti-conservation in

his views evidently did not play a part in Harding's calculations. Fall, in

turn, did not know definitely until late January that he was to become

Secretary of Interior; hence later talk of this appointment being the con-

summation of "deals" made with oil interests at the 1920 nominating con-

vention is so much nonsense. His appointment was the last to be officially

announced -- March 1.70

At no time was there any opposition to Fall on ethical grounds. Indeed,

he was regarded as so far above suspicion that on March 4 the Senate did

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122                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

not even send his nomination to committee but confirmed him by acclama-

tion, an honor never before granted to a cabinet member. A few rabid conser-

vationists, such as Gifford Pinchot, maintained a drum-fire of opposition to

the rumored Fall appointment during the month of February, but they were

in a very small minority.⁷¹ From virtually every point of view, the appoint-

ment was a perfectly logical one. As Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of

Reviews, commented in 1933; "The Senator from New Mexico was recom-

mended for a cabinet place by almost every public man in Washington . . .

His appointment was made by Mr. Harding in entire good faith."⁷²

The selection of Harry Daugherty as Attorney General, on the other hand,

was unquestionably the most controversial appointment made by Harding.

From the Harding correspondence, it becomes evident that Harding and

Daugherty were not "buddies" in any sense of the term. They were friends,

but not to the exclusion of others. Daugherty was not one of Harding's close

golfing or poker-playing companions. Theirs was not a Damon-Pythias

relationship. Moreover, there was certainly no subservience of Harding to

Daugherty. If anything, the relationship was the other way around. Harding

showed him respect, but not deference; Daugherty constantly deferred to

Harding. Of all the party leaders, Daugherty had been absolutely loyal to

Harding and, more than any other man, was responsible for Harding's eleva-

tion to the presidency. The President-elect had a natural feeling of tremen-

dous gratitude for this man and in appointing him simply desired to liquidate

his largest political debt.

From the outset, it was rumored that Daugherty would be made a member

of the cabinet -- probably Attorney General. His questionable Ohio past,

together with the host of extremely high-placed enemies he had made as

Harding's political manager, caused immediate cries of protest. From among

the stream of callers who visited Marion, there was barely heard a kind word

for Daugherty. But Harding would not be budged, any more than he would

be on the selection of Hoover. In mid-December, to a protesting Senator

Wadsworth, he exclaimed: "I have told him [Daugherty] that he can have

any place in my Cabinet he wants, outside of Secretary of State. He tells

me that he wants to be Attorney-General and by God he will be Attorney-

General!"⁷³ When Dawes met with the President-elect in Florida in January

and remarked that it would be a bad appointment, Harding replied: "Well,

I wouldn't be here but for him. He has asked me for the place, and I am going

to give it to him . . . I would not be right with myself if I did not appoint

Harry."⁷⁴ In answer to a letter from William F. Anderson, Bishop of the

Methodist Episcopal Church, expressing hope that he would not appoint

Daugherty, Harding stated bluntly that he could not be "so much an ingrate

that I would ignore a man of Mr. Daugherty's devotion to the party and to

me as an aspirant and a candidate."75

In his Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy, Daugherty claims that he did

not want to be Attorney General and urged upon Harding the appointment

of former Senator George Sutherland of Utah instead.76 But whether he

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PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                             123

 

formally asked for it or not, Harding was determined to give him the post.

And there is little doubt that Daugherty realized that a public offer would

give him increased prestige in the legal profession and would help wipe out

the curse of dubiety on his past career. To Ohio friends, he once confided

that one of the main reasons he might take the position was so he could walk

down Broad Street in Columbus and tell his arch-enemy and newspaper

man, Robert F. Wolfe, "to go to hell."⁷⁷ But it is also plain that Daugherty

was perfectly willing to abide by Harding's decision and at no time put

pressure on him for the position. The initiation of the offer certainly belonged

with Harding and not with his campaign manager. Finley Peter Dunne,

writing in 1936, correctly gauged the relationship: "I believe that if Harding

had refused him the appointment he would have gone into a corner and

cried. But then he would have wiped away the tears and come back and

served as faithfully as ever."⁷⁸

Up to the moment of the formal announcement, certain elements of the

press maintained bitter opposition to Daugherty. This was especially true

with Louis Seibold of the New York World, who was covering the political

scene at St. Augustine. His continuous assaults on Daugherty stung Hard-

ing, and on February 21, seeing Seibold in the crowd of reporters, the Presi-

dent-elect angrily stated: "I am ready today to invite Mr. Daugherty into

the cabinet as my Attorney-General; when he is ready there will be an

announcement, if he can persuade himself to make the sacrifice."⁷⁹ Later that

very day, Daugherty issued the statement: "No man could refuse to serve

a friend and his country under the circumstances.^"80 Seeing Daugherty a short

time later, Mark Sullivan, another reporter who also had questioned his

qualifications, extended his hand in congratulations: "Well, you're going to be

Attorney-General!" In apparent good humor, Daugherty growled: "Yes, no

thanks to you, goddam you.^"81

In the midst of all this emotion, the immediate merits of the appointment

were lost to sight. Daugherty was a lawyer, and contrary to the opposition

propaganda, a shrewd one. True, he had spent more of his time being a

lobbyist than a practicing attorney; yet, that also had its advantages. He

knew lobbying tactics and was now in a position to use such talent, if he

desired, for the protection of the common good. As he once told Sullivan:

"I know who the crooks are and I want to stand between Harding and them."82

Also, he was a consummate politician and ace trouble-shooter. His potential

value to Harding in handling matters of patronage was incalculable. But more

importantly, he was a proven and loyal friend on whom the President-elect

could absolutely rely.

Later events, however, might cast doubt on the validity of this assessment

as of March 1921. But even some of Daugherty's contemporary detractors

ultimately mellowed their views. In 1935, in his book, Our Times, Sullivan

claimed that Daugherty was "high-minded" about his fellow Ohioan and

"would not himself deliberately do anything that might reflect on Harding."⁸³

In that same year, Louis Seibold wrote: "I have always believed that

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124                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

Daugherty really wanted to protect Harding."⁸⁴ Writing in 1932, Daugherty's

own assessment of the situation was far less charitable: "In a moment of

mental aberration I accepted the post of Attorney-General in the Harding

Cabinet and made the tragic blunder of my life.^"85

This was Harding's cabinet: two Pennsylvanians, and one each from Cali-

fornia, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, and New

Mexico. There were two bankers, an automobile manufacturer, a lodge

director, a humanitarian, a rancher, a farm-editor, an international lawyer,

and two professional politicians. The cabinet was relatively young: Hays 41,

Hoover 46, Davis 47, Denby 51, Wallace 54, Hughes 58, Fall 59, Weeks 60,

Daugherty 61, and Mellon 65. There was even a spread of religious affiliations:

Mellon and Hays were Presbyterian; Hughes and Davis were Baptist; Weeks

was Unitarian; Daugherty was Methodist; Hoover was Quaker; Wallace was

United Presbyterian; Denby was Episcopalian; and Fall was unaffiliated.

Later, during the period of the oil scandals, it was the vogue to sneer at

the "best minds" and depreciate these selections. Journals such as the

New Republic and The Nation spoke of Hughes and Hoover as mere

"deodorizers" for Daugherty and Fall. Thus are myths born. In actuality, the

vast majority of the nation's press and of its political observers had

greeted the final cabinet with approval in 1921. Their chief reservation had

concerned only Daugherty. As the New York Times put it: "From Hughes

to Daugherty is a pretty long step." But aside from this, they appeared

content. Editorial comment used such phrases as "high caliber" and "a

guarantee of success."⁸⁶ Mark Sullivan, writing in May 1921, called it

"one of the strongest groups of Presidential advisors and department heads

in a generation."⁸7 Another contemporary observer, writing at the same

time, although skeptical of Harding's own ability, admitted he had "sur-

rounded himself with able associates."⁸⁸ In an article for Atlantic Monthly

in March 1923, William B. Munro simply stated a widely held belief: "No

presidential cabinet during the past half-century has been better balanced,

or has included within its membership a wider range of political experience."⁸⁹

Only against this background can Harding and his cabinet selections

be viewed with proper perspective. There were no machinations of evil

intent; there were no "deals" except the one to assure Hoover's place in

the cabinet; there were no long-range plans for plunder and booty. Except

for Lowden, the persons whom Harding really wanted, he got. Five of the

selections were his own (Hughes, Wallace, Hoover, Fall, and Daugherty),

and four (all except Fall) were secured in direct conflict with his advisers

or the party leadership. Mellon represented no "sell-out" to Big Business,

but was a shrewd move in cabinet-making. Except for the peculiar circum-

stances surrounding Hoover, Mellon would probably not have been appointed.

Similarly, the Denby selection was the result of chance and would not

have been made if Harding's own choice, Lowden, had accepted.

Harding was not simply a cipher in the selection process but was the

key figure in every critical instance. His penchant for consultation may have

• 17
 

PRESIDENT HARDING AND HIS CABINET                                125

 

made him appear weak and floundering. It is true he was subject to occas-

sional fits of indecision. But these periods were not debilitating, and in

the end he made the decisions and got his way. Harding did a careful,

conscientious, and independent job of choosing his cabinet. History's verdict

to the contrary has been unjust.

 

 

THE AUTHOR: Robert K. Murray is

Chairman of the Department of History

at The Pennsylvania State University.

• 18