Ohio History Journal

HARDING ADMINISTRATION

HARDING ADMINISTRATION

AND RECOGNITION

OF MEXICO

by EUGENE P. TRANI

A long period of turmoil in Mexico temporarily came to an end in December

1920 with the assumption of the presidency by General Alvaro Obregon. It

thus seemed to be a ripe time for the reopening of diplomatic relations be-

tween Mexico and the United States and settlement of American claims

against the Mexican government. President Woodrow Wilson, however, by

this time in his lame-duck period in office, reacted as William Howard Taft

had done eight years earlier. He left the problems of recognition and claims --

which arose from policies embodied in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 -- to

his successor Warren G. Harding.

The problem of recognizing Obregon was, of course, tied to previous diffi-

culties. After the fall of General Victoriano Huerta in 1914, Venustiano

Carranza had come to power. Although recognized conditionally in 1915,

Carranza became quite a problem. Trouble became serious over application

of provisions of the 1917 Constitution, and in the United States some Repub-

lican Senators led by Albert B. Fall of New Mexico began to look carefully

into relations with Mexico. The Fall Committee in a long report of May 28,

1920, indicated that Mexico under Carranza was no safe place for American

citizens or investments. The United States, it remarked, should withdraw

recognition until a government capable of stability and willing to comply

with international obligations came to power. Obligations included responsi-

bility for American lives and property, understanding that certain provisions

of the 1917 Constitution did not apply to Americans, and immediate appoint-

ment of commissioners to decide claims and solve disputes concerning the

international boundary. Only after these stipulations were satisfied should

NOTES ARE ON PAGES 190-192

138 OHIO HISTORY

the United States extend recognition. If unfavorable conditions continued,

the report recommended the American government should issue a warning

that it proposed to terminate the conditions the Mexicans were unwilling

or unable to stop, though it had no plans to make war on the Mexican

people.1

Before the Fall Committee had completed its investigation and delivered

its recommendations, the United States was relieved of further contention

with Carranza. There had been increased Mexican dissatisfaction with him;

and Mexico's popular military hero, General Obregon, gained control of

Mexico City in early May 1920. Carranza fled to the mountains and was

slain in the state of Puebla. Obregon's supporter, Adolfo de la Huerta, became

Provisional President.

At this juncture there was some consideration of recognition by the Wilson

Administration. De la Huerta appointed Fernando Iglesias Calderon as

Mexico's confidential agent in Washington, and Calderon approached the

State Department; but Obregon, the obvious successor to de la Huerta, told

the American Charge d'Affaires in Mexico City, George T. Summerlin, that

Calderon could not speak for the Mexican government.² Roberto Pesqueira

succeeded Calderon in October. Later that month Secretary of State Bain-

bridge Colby announced conditions for recognition of de la Huerta's regime,

which included a mixed claims commission to determine damages caused by

the Mexican revolution, nonenforcement of apparent retroactive provisions

of the 1917 Constitution, and recognition and servicing of the Mexican

foreign debt.³ Both de la Huerta and Obregon stated that Mexico would pay

all it owed to citizens of the United States and would not apply the retro-

active aspects of the Constitution, but they also felt that their government

should be recognized without any prior agreements. With approval from

Obregon, de la Huerta turned down Colby's offer for recognition. Wilson

followed the negotiations closely, eager for an opportunity to settle the crisis.

But the State Department fell into hesitation, and the Mexican government,

convinced by Republican politicians that it could not afford to deal with the

out-going President -- Harding seemed assured of election in November --

issued a statement depriving Pesqueira of authority to continue the discus-

sions.4

Though de la Huerta did not obtain American recognition, his administra-

tion had prepared the way for internal peace. He suppressed the revolts of

General Pablo Gonzalez and Pancho Villa. With the country at peace and at

the tasks of rehabilitation, an election was held on September 8, 1920.

Obregon won an overwhelming majority for a four-year term as president,

beginning December 1. His inauguration increased pressure on Wilson to

recognize Mexico. The ceremony was attended by the governors of Texas

and New Mexico and other Americans favoring renewal of relations. Wilson

received messages from the governors of Arizona, California, Illinois, Michigan,

and Oklahoma requesting recognition, as well as letters from Chambers of

Commerce of such major cities as St. Louis, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.5

All were concerned with trade and were alarmed at the possibility of further

confiscations by the Mexican government.

RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 139

Wilson, and for that matter Obregon, refused to reconsider their positions.

Mexican Foreign Minister Alberto J. Pani later said, in April 1923, as he

looked back at the situation, "Wilson's term of office was already nearing its

end.... It is not surprising, therefore, that during the short lapse of three

months ... nothing important was done, or even attempted, to normalize the

diplomatic relations between the two countries."⁶ Mexico waited patiently

for Harding to become President. In November 1920, after Harding's election,

Obregon announced his pleasure with the results and declared American-

Mexican problems at an end. He described Wilson as Mexico's "most terrible

enemy" and March 4, 1921, as a "day of deliverance."7

The day of deliverance from nonrecognition did not come so quickly. The

Mexican problem that confronted Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans

Hughes, was compounded by Harding's announcement that the new Secretary

of the Interior was to be none other than Albert B. Fall, whose name was

hated throughout Mexico. During the Huerta era, Fall had proposed the

occupation of Mexico by an army of 500,000 men to open and maintain

communications between the seaports and Mexico City and to assist in

establishing constitutional government. Fall indicated that no change of

policy would come from the Harding Administration. He said that so long

as he had anything to do with the Mexican question, no government would

be recognized which did not first enter into a written agreement to protect

American citizens and their property rights in Mexico.⁸ Fall boasted that

Obregon would have to "sign on the dotted line" regarding a claims commis-

sion, boundary commission, the non-retroactive effect of certain articles of

the 1917 Constitution, religious liberty for Americans, protection of American

citizens and property, and inclusion of the above in a formal protocol.⁹ Many

observers claimed these proposals were tantamount to asking for a rewriting

of the Mexican constitution. There seemed little doubt Fall's ideas would

influence the new President of the United States, a close friend of the former

New Mexican Senator.

Recognizing that he had been too hopeful for immediate improvement of

relations, Obregon attempted to take away the causes of complaint. He set

aside many of Carranza's decrees, issued oil permits, and announced that

Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution would have no confiscatory or retroactive

application.10

To the new Secretary of State there was something more important and

necessary than Obregon's pledge to protect American interests, and for that

matter than Fall's demand for immediate indemnity for losses and injuries

since 1910. Secretary Hughes felt that the proposed program of reform in

Mexico, instead, constituted a threat to American interests and therefore

decided that the Mexicans had to sign a pact furnishing stipulated safeguards.

With this in mind Charge Summerlin presented Obregon with a Draft Treaty

of Amity and Commerce on May 27, 1921, that was intended to regulate and

promote commercial intercourse and remove all causes of difference. It pro-

vided that America would not recognize the Mexican government until

guarantees, necessary to safeguard rights legally acquired by American

citizens prior to the 1917 Constitution, were offered.11 The proposed treaty

140 OHIO HISTORY

contained eighteen articles; sixteen were the usual formalities; the first two,

concerned the major difficulties between the United States and Mexico. They

provided that nationals of either country living in the other should enjoy all

rights and privileges accorded to native citizens, offered reciprocal assurances

against confiscation and expropriation except for public purposes and then

only with prompt payment of just compensation, and guaranteed that

neither the 1917 Constitution, which included the right to impose on private

property such limitations as the public interest might demand, nor the

Carranza agrarian decree of January 6, 1915, would apply retroactively.

The United States also asked for restoration, where possible, of all that

Americans had lost since 1910, compensation for that "which it is not

possible to restore," and reciprocal guarantees for nationals of either country

of freedom to worship.

This devastating diplomatic shot fired across the border preceded the

following announcement by Hughes:

The fundamental question which confronts the Government of the

United States in considering its relations with Mexico is the safe-

guarding of property rights against confiscation .... Whenever Mexico

is ready to give assurances that she will perform her fundamental

obligation in the protection both of persons and of rights of property

validly acquired, there will be no obstacles to the most advantageous

relations between the two peoples .... Accordingly this Government

has proposed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce . . . in which Mexico

will agree to safeguard the rights of property .... The question of

recognition is a subordinate one, but there will be no difficulty as to

this, for if General Obregon is ready to negotiate a proper treaty it is

drawn so as to be negotiated with him and the making of the treaty

in proper form will accomplish the recognition of the Government

that makes it.12

When Mexico proved willing to discharge its international obligations,

Hughes continued, recognition would take place. He withheld recognition

because he contended that the Mexican government was founded on violence,

the country was too unsettled for security without guarantees, and assur-

ances on retroactivity of the 1917 Constitution were necessary.

Secretary Hughes had not determined this policy on the spur of the

moment. As a lawyer, he dealt with recognition in a logical manner. He

did not judge by traditional European standards, but by American standards.

He recognized the right of revolution and maintained he was not attempting

to interfere with internal concerns of any country. He quoted Thomas

Jefferson who, when Secretary of State in the 1790's, wrote that America

could not deny any nation the right "whereon our own government is

founded" -- to govern by whatever form it pleases and change forms at will

and transact business with nations through whatever organ it thinks proper:

king, convention, assembly, committee, president or anything else. To Jeffer-

son, the will of the nation was the only essential. Hughes saw this policy

used throughout the history of United States recognition of governments.

He quoted Secretary of State James Buchanan to the effect that the

United States always had recognized de facto governments. Buchanan had

maintained that all nations had the right to reform political institutions

RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 141

according to their will and pleasure, but a government had to be capable

of maintaining itself and "then its recognition on our part inevitably

follows."13

Hughes's ideas of recognition came from these precedents as well as others.

Secretary of State William H. Seward had introduced the idea that the

United States would not recognize a government established by force in

violation of constitutional principles, until the people approved the regime.

Seward had declared that a new administration had to be "sanctioned by

the formal acquiescence and acceptance of the people." Hughes admitted

it was difficult to determine the will of the people which could be manifested

by continued acquiescence. In any case, he stated, a wise precaution was

to give time to enable any new regime to prove its stability and the apparent

acquiescence of the people.

William McKinley's Secretary of State, John Hay, had added to the

recognition policy of the United States the ability of the proposed country

to fulfill international obligations. Hay felt it insufficient that a government

be only in control of the machinery of administration. David Jayne Hill,

Acting Secretary of State in 1900, had written that the rule of the United

States was to defer recognition until a government was in possession of the

machinery of the state, with assent of the people, "in a position to fulfill

all the international obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon a

foreign State under treaties and international law."

Hughes agreed that ability to perform international obligations was im-

portant, though not enough. For him there had to be both ability and

action. Harding's Secretary cited a precedent. Wilson's government had

refused to recognize the Soviet regime in Russia on ground that it had

repudiated international obligations. Wilson had justified his position, accord-

ing to Hughes, by stating that "American property held in Russia under valid

titles had been confiscated without prospect of indemnification, and that

those in control of the regime at Moscow were intent upon doing all within

their power by insidious propaganda and the promotion of strife to destroy or

embarrass existing governments throughout the world."¹⁴ Turning to Mexico,

Hughes noted that the United States had refused to recognize Huerta; and

although it had conditionally recognized Carranza, Mexican assurances with

respect to international obligations had not been satisfactorily fulfilled. Con-

sequently, Wilson withheld recognition of Obregon. Hughes thus adopted the

adamant position of his predecessor, Colby. Mexico would have to agree to

specific conditions before receiving recognition by the United States.

When attacked, Hughes defended his position vigorously. Before the

Chamber of Commerce in Washington on May 26, 1922, he declared no state

is entitled to a place within the family of nations if it destroyed the foundation

of honorable intercourse by confiscation and repudiation.15 In addition to

public defenses, Hughes and his department worked to keep the President's

support. Under Secretary of State Henry P. Fletcher in November 1921 wrote

President Harding that difficult as the Mexican problem appeared, it was one

of "common honesty and fair dealing, and should be squarely met." Harding,

content at this time to leave the State Department in charge of foreign policy,

142 OHIO HISTORY

agreed, and nothing arose for a time to change his mind about the proper

American attitude toward Mexico. In fact, the President replied, current

policy was "quite in harmony with all that I said during the political campaign

of 1920, and it is quite in harmony with everything which has been said

directly or indirectly to President Obregon."¹⁶ Later, in March 1922, public

demands for a change in policy induced Hughes to write the President that

the United States was "simply insisting that, as a sine qua non of international

intercourse, property rights and obligations shall be secure and when it

appears that a regime is adopting a confiscatory policy, we cannot enter into

relations with it until we are satisfied that valid titles and rights acquired

under its own laws will be respected." Hughes thought it a simple operation,

but important. Harding again agreed.17

One must note that the two fundamental criteria -- present and future

stability (including acceptance by the people), as well as ability and willing-

ness to fulfill international obligations -- were part of American recognition

policy before Hughes took control of the State Department. And while Hughes

could not help but regard material interests of American citizens, his in-

sistence on a preliminary treaty before recognition did not depart from

American practice, as has been shown. He never went so far as Albert Fall

desired, demanding changes in the Mexican constitution, but asked only for

a commercial treaty.

The Mexican President was in sharp disagreement with the Harding

Administration. Obregon had agreed with de la Huerta's refusal of Colby's

conditions for recognition. Although the Mexican government did not imme-

diately reply to the draft Treaty of Amity and Commerce, he let his opposi-

tion be known. The day after Summerlin presented the treaty, Obregon

announced that acceptance and signing of a convention to obtain recognition

would place in doubt the rights Mexico had to privileges established by

international law.18 Foreign Minister Pani informed Summerlin that Mexico

was over a hundred years old and that many nations had recognized the

Obregon government. Therefore, Pani said, it was neither possible nor

expedient for Mexico to sign a convention or treaty before being fully recog-

nized. He maintained that "the priority of the convention or treaty with

respect to recognition, or the simultaneity of these two acts or their fusion,

considering that the signing of the former could imply or signify at the same

time the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries, would

give recognition a conditional character and would gravely injure the

sovereignty of Mexico."19

Obregon, throughout the year 1921, refused to accept the treaty, but did

announce his intention to settle all claims and protect American investments

in Mexico. To President Harding on June 11, 1921, he wrote concerning the

three main American points of worry -- application of Article 27 of the 1917

Constitution, procedure to settle and determine claims for damages caused

by the revolution, and payment of the external debt.20 All three would be

solved, he wrote, in accordance with American wishes, though not by signing

RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 143

a treaty. He directed his representatives to make known that Mexico would

enter into agreements with all governments to adjust claims for damages

incurred during the revolution.

Harding publicly showed little change of heart. The President said he

approved of the draft treaty and believed such an agreement necessary.

Privately he was beginning to feel more at ease in foreign affairs and showed

a surprising understanding of the Mexican position. Because "the Mexican

Government professes a desire to do everything we have asked except that

they are seeking to avoid the appearance of submission to our dictation,"

he wondered if the United States should arrange for a special envoy to bring

"a speedy conclusion of the arrangements which are so essential to the

welfare and concord of both governments."²¹ He left the problem with Secre-

tary Hughes, who decided to accept Harding's suggestion. Obregon's reaction

to this new American approach was only to reply that his statement had

called for a mixed claims commission and he hoped the United States would

participate.22

To the Mexican congress in September 1921, Obregon restated his posi-

tion, noting the impossibility of accepting the draft treaty regardless of how

it was presented. Since the Mexican government was a legally constituted

government, it would be humiliating to have to sign a treaty before recogni-

tion, especially one which contained stipulations contrary to some of the

precepts of the Mexican Constitution.23

There was some basis for Obregon's assertion. His government had restored

peace and order, was of proven stability, and his domestic reforms were

stimulating the economy. If he accepted the treaty, his enemies could have

called up Mexican pride against him.

From the beginning of negotiations until November 1921, the two govern-

ments maintained positions assumed at the outset. American Charge d'Affaires

Summerlin in mid-November submitted a convention to the Mexican Foreign

Office to be signed after the ratification of the Treaty of Amity and Com-

merce, to create a mixed commission to examine claims. Mexican Foreign

Minister Pani countered by reiterating Obregon's policy concerning recogni-

tion. Pani reproposed creation of a mixed commission to handle claims of

American citizens resulting from the revolution, which would bring about

the desired renewal of diplomatic relations. Claims to be considered by the

commission would extend from November 10, 1910 to May 3, 1920. After

recognition, the countries would then sign a general convention for settlement

of claims arising since July 4, 1868.24 Pani would go no further. He would

not agree to limit his government's control over Mexican natural resources

and domestic policies, as the American proposal seemed to indicate to the

Mexican policy makers.

The State Department hesitated, and so Pani's note went unanswered until

February 1922. Summerlin, on instruction, then informed the Mexican

government that the United States would decline Pani's proposal "unless the

rights of American citizens acquired prior to the adoption of the 1917 Consti-

tution are adequately safeguarded." Summerlin restated that the proposed

144 OHIO HISTORY

draft Treaty of Amity and Commerce provided the prerequisite guarantees.

Moreover, after study, the State Department still could see nothing in the

treaty opposed to the fundamental laws of Mexico, unless the present regime

planned to enforce the retroactive and confiscatory powers of Carranza's

constitution; to make progress toward recognition the Mexican government

should indicate its objections to the treaty, and then Obregon should put

it into a form acceptable to both parties. Otherwise, Summerlin concluded,

"it would be futile to engage in any discussions of the claims conventions

themselves."²⁵ Clearly Hughes deemed guarantees against confiscatory and

retroactive action more important than adjudication of existing claims. He

continued to insist on the passage of the proposed Treaty of Amity and

Commerce before any claims convention could be called.

Pani continued also to reiterate earlier counterproposals: a convention to

settle claims of the revolutionary period, then implicit recognition of Obregon

by the United States, and then a convention to settle claims since July 4,

1868. Turning to rights legitimately acquired before the 1917 Constitution,

the Foreign Minister noted lack of agreements did not mean no guarantees.

Article I of the proposed Treaty of Amity and Commerce was not necessary,

for guarantees existed because of policies adopted by his government. Pani

answered the American request to list objections to the proposed treaty by

noting that if Obregon accepted it, he would violate the Mexican Constitution

by invading the prerogatives of the legislative and judicial branches and

would disrupt proper government in Mexico. Pani felt a constitution "would

have to be respected above treaties."26

While each side continued to pay tribute to the "high purposes" of the

other, hope for a quick end of difficulties disappeared. The United States

government again publicly insisted on the signing of the Treaty of Amity

and Commerce, while the Mexicans continued adamantly to state they could

not agree to such a treaty as a condition of recognition, especially since its

provisions were unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal.27

The Mexicans meanwhile had made a careful attempt to improve the faith

of foreign investors. Two days before President Obregon delivered his annual

message to his congress in September 1921, the Mexican Supreme Court

handed down the first of five decisions relating to injunction proceedings of

oil companies to prohibit the utilization of decrees made by the former

Carranza government. These decisions stated "that petroleum properties

in the process of development before May 1, 1917, when the present constitu-

tion took effect, are protected from a retroactive application of the fourth

paragraph of Article 27."28 Although concerned only with cases where owners

had transformed privileges into acquired rights by some productive act, the

decisions applied to many disputed claims and gave oil concessionaires a

feeling of security. And another act soon brought Obregon closer to the

demands of financial circles. In July 1922, the Mexican Financial Minister,

former President de la Huerta, and the International Committee of Bankers

signed an agreement in New York City. Mexico recognized important financial

RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 145

conditions -- a foreign debt principal of $517,000,000 from government bonds

and railroad debts, plus interest in arrears to the amount of $207,000,000.

Bankers under leadership of Thomas W. Lamont waived the accrued interest.

They spread payments, with low interest rates, over forty-five years. The

Mexican government also made a solemn pledge to restore railways to private

ownership in as good condition as when seized.29

At first glance the concrete acts by the Mexican government did not seem

to convince Washington. Secretary of State Hughes still considered the

international situation unsatisfactory; he had received new complaints about

retroactive application of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution. He continued

to see no constitutional objection to the proposed treaty but felt Mexico

would not agree because "signing of such a treaty would not be in harmony

with the public sentiment of Mexico and that it would not be ratified by the

Mexican Senate." Hughes also noted the main concerns of the American

government: need of agreement on the foreign debt and oil deposits, lack

of validation of land titles issued to Americans before 1917, and the inade-

quacy of the Mexican Supreme Court rulings as protection against retroactive

and confiscatory application of the Mexican constitution in land seizure cases.

Despite these reservations, however, there was a definite softening of the

American position. With respect to the proposed treaty, Hughes wondered

"if the Mexican authorities will not enter into an appropriate treaty binding

Mexico to respect the valid titles which have been acquired under Mexican

laws prior to the Constitution of 1917, the question remains in what manner

shall such assurances be given."30

By early 1923 there were rumors of impending recognition. States such

as New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Illinois, Colorado, as well as cities--Detroit,

Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco--sent delegations to Mexico City,

attempting to encourage commerce. Thus pressure mounted on the Harding

Administration to recognize Obregon. In March 1923, Senator William E.

Borah of Idaho, a leading spokesman on foreign policy, spoke in favor of

recognition to a huge gathering in Jersey City. Foreign governments were

also a cause of concern, because of their demands on the State Depart-

ment for a change in policy. In response to all of these pressures, the

Administration prepared to adjust its position.

Harding, aware of the public clamor for recognition and of Mexican refusal

to accept any of the proposals by Secretary Hughes, seemingly then took

negotiations from the State Department. He appointed General James A.

Ryan, a retired army general who was the representative of the Texas Oil

Company in Mexico, as intermediary. The sequence of events was probably

in this order. Ryan had returned to Washington in late March from Mexico,

had received Harding's permission for an informal conference, and then had

cleared the proposal through the State Department. Ryan then issued an

invitation for direct negotiations to President Obregon. His friendship with

both Presidents as well as his interest in settling the difficulties between the

two countries made him the natural mediator.³¹

146 OHIO HISTORY

Another factor speeded Harding's new approach -- the resignation of a

strong advocate of nonrecognition, Albert B. Fall. Evidence regarding the

Teapot Dome scandals was beginning to appear.

To General Ryan on April 9, Obregon said he was pleased with the sug-

gestion for direct negotiations and if Harding would appoint two delegates,

he would also. The Mexican President even offered Mexico City as the logical

place for negotiation, close to the source of the disputes. In a first draft of

his reply to the State Department, he stated that representatives were not

to "broach a discussion of the Mexican legislation in force, or touch the point

of whether an agreement prior to the renewal of diplomatic relations . . . is

relevant or irrelevant." In the letter that Obregon finally signed these stipu-

lations, at the request of General Ryan, were omitted. Ryan, however,

promised Obregon that "the commissioners would adjust their conduct to

what was expressed in the deleted part of the letter."³²

The State Department accepted Ryan's proposal, hoping news of the

meeting would be released at the same time in both countries. Washington

agreed with the Mexican proviso that delegates should meet and report

conclusions. Pani proposed an identic statement:

With a view to hasten the reaching of a mutual understanding between

the Governments of the United States and Mexico, two American com-

missioners and two Mexican commissioners will be appointed to meet

for the purpose of exchanging impressions and of reporting them to their

respective authorities. The hospitality of Mexico City has been offered

to the American commissioners as the city's guest of honor, and the

commission will convene there. The names of the commissioners will

be announced later.33

RECOGNITION OF MEXICO 147

The two countries publicly announced the meeting and shortly listed

their delegates. President Harding named as delegates Charles Beecher

Warren, former Ambassador to Japan, and John Barton Payne, former

Secretary of the Interior and at the time the president of the American Red

Cross. Mexican representatives were Senor Ramon Ross, the General Director

of Public Benevolence, and Licentiate Fernando Gonzalez Roa, former Sub-

secretary of the Interior. The meetings were to take place in the Foreign

Affairs Ministry at No. 85 Avenida Bucareli, in Mexico City, and thus became

known as the Bucareli Conference.³⁴

In a long instruction to Payne and Warren, Secretary Hughes pointed out

that the fundamental issue between the United States and Mexico was "the

safeguarding of American property rights in Mexico, especially as against

a confiscatory application of the provisions of the Mexican Constitution of

1917." Principal questions were restoration or proper reparation for lands

taken from American citizens prior to May 1, 1917, satisfactory assurances

against confiscation of subsoil interests in lands owned by Americans, and a

claims commission.³⁵

The attempt to force Mexico to sign a treaty of amity and commerce had

failed. All the United States now sought were guarantees for property rights

and a satisfactory claims commission.

The first meeting of the Bucareli Conference took place on May 14, 1923.

After words of welcome by Ramon Ross, Charles Warren stated the United

States desired no special privileges, but only what was justly due any nation.

Gonzalez Roa then agreed "to exchange impressions about the Mexican-

American situation in order to reach a mutual understanding between the

two countries, and inform their government for a definite conclusion." Dis-

cussions covered a variety of subjects: American claims against Mexico,

interest on the foreign debt, restoration of railroads to their owners, partition

of large estates, taxation of oil exports, and retroactive features of Article 27

of the Constitution in regard to land and subsoil resources. That month,

May, saw discussion of nationalization of subsoil deposits, but no agreements.

Delegates turned to the agrarian problem in June. Part of July was taken

up with informal meetings to draft the special and general claims conventions,

and on July 19 and 20 the commissioners agreed on the agrarian problem.

Settlement of the petroleum problem occurred on August 2. Meantime, on

July 27, the commissioners formally approved the text of the general and

special claims conventions.³⁶

There were only minor troublesome issues. The Americans were bothered

by the drinking of Ross and the long digressions of Gonzalez Roa. After

complaints to Obregon, both difficulties ceased. The conferences recessed on

August 3, in observance of the death of President Harding, but the tragedy

had no effect on the outcome of the meetings.

The Mexicans made few concessions; the claims conventions could have

been signed two years earlier. The Mexican commissioners supported the

view of the Mexican Supreme Court that a positive act was necessary to

transfer the privilege of extracting petroleum into an acquired right and per-

148 OHIO HISTORY

sons who had not made such an act "would be conceded preferential rights to

the fuel products beneath the surface which they owned and, upon application

to the Mexican national government, would be granted permission to avail

themselves of these rights." The Americans dissented. On the land question

the Americans accepted the Mexican proposal to pay land claims in twenty-

year, five percent bonds, with notation that this was no precedent in respect

to lands otherwise expropriated. But the Americans opposed the Mexican

conclusion that ten percent added to the value of these lands for revenue

purposes would be the amount to be paid back. The special claims convention

covered damages through revolutionary acts within the period November 20,

1910 to May 31, 1920. Claims were to be judged by a commission of three:

an American, a Mexican, and a person selected by the two nations or by

the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Claims had to be filed

within five years of the commission's first meeting -- all decisions were final

and the Mexican government would pay in gold. The general claims con-

vention, proposed by Pani in 1921, covered both countries since July 4, 1868.

A procedure similar to the special claims settlement was set up.37

In late August 1923, both governments approved the conventions, and the

United States formally accorded recognition to the Obregon government on

August 31.38

Secretary Hughes derived great satisfaction from settlement of this long-

standing feud and in the next year, 1924, was willing to respond to Mexican

pleas for arms and munitions to put down the revolution of General de la

Huerta on the eve of election of Obregon's close comrade, Plutarco Elias

Calles, to the presidency. The long-drawn-out settlements of the claims

commissions were disappointing to the United States. With a Panamanian

umpire for the general commission and a Brazilian for the special commission,

settlement -- disadvantageous to American interests -- was delayed until

1941. This is another question, beyond the scope of the present essay, as

are dissents of the American delegates to Mexican decisions on the oil and

agrarian controversy. Recognition, however, came long before these disputes

were cleared.

In final analysis the Americans backed down in 1923. The Mexican govern-

ment from the outset said it would never buy recognition at the cost of

dignity, and did not. As pressure in favor of recognition increased, the

American government had to abandon its position. A legal-minded Secretary

of State was temporarily by-passed by a President, conscious of public

opinion, who sought to end the controversy. Warren Harding accepted the

idea of a conference to discuss all problems, and his successor Calvin Coolidge

accepted its decisions although it left many problems unresolved.

THE AUTHOR: Eugene P. Trani is

Assistant Professor in the History Depart-

ment at Southern Illinois University, Car-

bondale.