John A. Bingham
and Reconstruction:
The Dilemma of a Moderate
by DONALD
C. SWIFT
Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio was
one of the foremost Republi-
can politicians in the period following
the Civil War. Yet he is almost un-
known to historians and students not
primarily concerned with the Re-
construction era. The names of Thaddeus
Stevens, Benjamin Butler, Charles
Sumner, or Benjamin Wade more readily
come to mind. As a spokesman
for moderation, Bingham occupied a place
of equal importance to that of
the Radical leaders. Until recently,
moderate Republicans have not received
much attention. A study of Bingham's
career underscores tile importance
of their role in shaping early
reconstruction legislation and demonstrates
the difficulties encountered by those
politicians who endeavored to avoid
extremism in a period of rapidly
changing political conditions.
Rivaled only by General Robert C.
Schenck, Bingham was the most prom-
inent member of the Ohio delegation in
the House, to which Rutherford B.
Hayes also belonged, 1865-67. In broad
outlines, his background was al-
most a composite of the typical
midwestern politician. He was the son of a
Mercer, Pennsylvania, carpenter and
moved to Ohio with his family at an
early age. After attending elementary
school and serving a few years as a
printer's apprentice, he attended
Franklin College in New Athens, Ohio.
Having completed two years of college,
Bingham read law and was ad-
mitted to the bar in Cadiz. According to
his license to practice law, he was
admitted on October 14, 1841, by state
supreme court judges Ebenezer Lane
and Reuben Wood (a future governor). The
previous year saw Bingham
taking the stump for William Henry
Harrison and engaging in a debate
with Edwin Stanton, who was then
practicing law in Steubenville. In his
twilight years, Bingham stated that he
had known Stanton since 1837 when
the latter was residing in Cadiz.
Bingham's first public office was prose-
cutor in neighboring Tuscarawas County.
He was first elected to the United
States House of Representatives in 1854
and was reelected seven times,
suffering one defeat in 1862.1 As a
Judge Advocate Bingham came to na-
tional attention in January 1864. His
first important case was the court
martial of Surgeon General William
Hammond. Edwin Stanton, whom
Bingham assisted in becoming Secretary
of War, entrusted the prosecution
to his Ohio friend. The rising young
attorney subsequently served as first
assistant to Judge Advocate General Joseph
Holt in the trial of Mary Sur-
ratt and seven others accused in the
conspiracy to murder Abraham Lin-
NOTES ON PAGE 192
JOHN A. BINGHAM 77 coln.2 He gained a reputation as a shrewd and eloquent lawyer and be- came known as the "Cicero of the House."3 A popular stump speaker, he often had more invitations to speak than he could conveniently fill. On one occasion, a small Ohio village publicly scheduled his appearance for its rally before issuing the invitation in an effort to pressure him into accept- ing.4 In 1864 he was a major contender for a Senate seat when John Sher- man sought reelection to that body. Only by gaining the votes pledged to |
Bingham in the General Assembly was Sherman able to overcome the third contender, Robert Schenck, who had the backing of those who considered themselves Radicals. There is some evidence to suggest that Bingham con- templated another attempt to enter the Senate six years later.5 Bingham's prominence as a congressman rested upon the role he played in the framing of basic reconstruction legislation. A recent study refers to him as "the most thoughtful exponent of the Moderate position in the |
78 OHIO HISTORY
House."6 He often led
Republican moderates in efforts to prevent the pas-
sage of legislation they considered
unwise or oppressive. Not only did this
Ohio Representative have great influence
on the House floor, he was also
a member of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction--a group of fifteen
given the task of recommending
reconstruction legislation for the South.
Like other moderates, Bingham insisted on
the supremacy of Congress
in establishing Reconstruction policy.
Although he desired the process of
reestablishing normal relationships to
be as rapid as possible, he insisted
that it be accompanied by firm
guarantees of the results of the war. As a
politician, he naturally expected the
proposed legislation to be conducive
also to the maintenance of Republican
ascendancy. To him, constitutional
safeguards of civil liberties and rapid
restoration naturally complemented
each other, for without them the Negro
would either be oppressed or res-
toration of southern home rule would be
long delayed. Negro suffrage was
not included in these guarantees. Though
accepting the principle, Bingham
felt that suffrage could not be realized
until public sentiment clanged in
its favor. As a member of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen he voted to block
early efforts to make voting rights for
the Negro a condition for restored
representation and home rule.7
An example of his desire to hasten the
reconstruction process can be
found in his advocacy of early
restoration of representation to Tennessee.
As the home of President Andrew Johnson
and the center of considerable
loyalist sentiment, this state merited
special consideration. Tennessee's res-
toration would be an encouraging sign to
the other ten Confederate states
and might serve to improve relations
between Congress and the Chief Ex-
ecutive.8 But Bingham's most enduring
contribution to our history is the
very heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment--its guarantee of civil rights in
clause two of section one. In an obvious
overstatement of tile Ohioan's
role, Benjamin Kendrick wrote:
And it is not too much to say
that had it not been for his untiring
efforts the provision for nationalizing
civil rights would not lave found
a place in the fourteenth amendment.9
Bingham originally hoped to empower
Congress "to secure to all persons
in every State of the Union equal
protection in their rights, life, liberty,
and property."10 When his proposal,
initially offered as a separate consti-
tutional amendment, came up for debate
it assumed a somewhat different
form from the omnibus proposal that was
finally ratified, namely:
That Congress shall have power to make
all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the
citizens of each State all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the
several States; and to all persons
in the several States equal protection
in the rights of life, liberty, and
property.11
He secured the endorsement of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen for this
amendment but encountered considerable
resistance on the House floor.
Union Republicans were agreed that civil
rights should be protected, but
JOHN A. BINGHAM
79
they were not in accord on the need for
a constitutional amendment that
might impinge excessively upon the
rights of the states, and they feared
the political results of such a
proposal. Moreover, its passage might shatter
the last hope of restoring harmony with
the President--a desire Bingham
likewise shared. Rather than risk the
defeat of his proposal, the Ohioan
permitted it to be recommitted.12
When the amendment was discussed again
in late February 1866, Bing-
ham still encountered considerable
opposition from within Republican
ranks. Consequently, he played down the
proposed grant of power to the
federal government and argued that the
amendment would force the states
to recognize their primary
responsibility to protect civil rights. Central to
the continuing controversy over the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was his assertion that the states
were obliged to respect the Bill of
Rights. His idea as to what constituted
the Bill of Rights was by no means
unique for his era since it was deeply
rooted in the antislavery tradition, to
which he subscribed. The constitutional
basis for required application of
these rights by the states, Bingham
argued, was to be found, first, in the
comity clause in the body of the
Constitution to the effect that citizens of
each state should be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the several states, and, second,
in the Fifth Amendment with its
provision that no person should be
deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. Bingham's
arguments have been called the best
synthesis of the theories advanced by
antislavery men to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states.13
Bingham's amendment did not expressly
make the Bill of Rights legally
binding upon the states, but he thought
that its ratification would have
that effect, since the states, to
forestall federal action, would have to em-
brace his view of their
responsibilities. Doubtlessly aware of the importance
jurists would attach to his speeches if
the amendment became part of the
basic law, Bingham bent every effort to
make it appear that Congress as-
sumed that the Bill of Rights was
already binding upon the states. If the
Constitution were not binding in this
respect, he reasoned that it then
would not be the fundamental law of the
land. He asked those who denied
this responsibility if the states had
the right to violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Viewed in this light, his pro-
posed civil rights guarantee did little
more than enforce the basic law as
it stood. By clothing the federal
government with power to protect civil
rights, the states would be forced to
heed their primary responsibilities. If
the United States government possessed
power to protect the rights of its
subjects abroad, it should have the same
power within its territorial limits.
The framers of the Constitution would
have granted such authority had
slavery not existed. Since slavery was
dead, he believed there was no reason
why Congress should not be authorized to
enforce civil equality.14
Postponed, the amendment did not
reappear in its original form. In the
closing moments of the debate Giles
Hotchkiss, a New York Republican,
spoke for many of his colleagues in
asserting that he was unwilling to place
80 OHIO HISTORY
"the power to establish uniform
laws throughout the United States, in re-
gard to life, liberty, and
property" in the hands of Congress. The New York-
er suggested that the amendment would be
acceptable if it were presented
as a direct prohibition against state
interference with the rights of persons
within state boundaries. This plan would
have the added advantage of
guarding civil rights through court action
in years when Congress was in-
disposed to action.15 Bingham
subsequently redrafted the civil rights guar-
antee in line with this suggestion.
Still reluctant to enlarge the powers of
the federal government to the ex-
tent proposed by Binghamn, the legislative
branch attempted to secure the
liberties of Negroes and Unionists in
the South by passing the Civil Rights
Bill of 1866. The Ohioan led the effort
to pass the bill in its least objec-
tionable form. Having previously
insisted upon a constitutional change giv-
ing Congress clear jurisdiction to
legislate in civil rights matters, it was
natural that he should question the
power of that body to pass the bill be-
fore receiving authorization by an
amendment. Citing the Tenth Amend-
ment, he pointed out that Congress
lacked the power to punish offenses
against the rights of citizens in the
states; but in passing the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, he argued, it recognized
this point by providing that the bu-
reau's power to protect civil rights
would lapse in any state that was re-
stored to representation and home rule.
Bingham therefore wanted the Civil
Rights Bill shorn of its most
questionable features so that its chances of
passing a court test would be improved.
His main demand was that its en-
forcement provisions be of a civil and
not of a criminal character. Fearing
that the bill could be interpreted to
grant Negro suffrage, he wanted an
explicit provision precluding this
possibility. Finally, he felt that it should
refer to "persons" rather than
to "inhabitants" because the latter word
could be used to justify encroachments
upon the rights of aliens. During
this debate, Bingham made several
comments upon the subject of amend-
ing the Constitution to give Congress
the power he felt it lacked in passing
civil rights legislation. He indicated
that he had shifted his approach to
"expressly prohibiting the States
from any . . . abuse of power in the fu-
ture." Unable to obtain the changes
he desired, Bingham voted against
the bill and sought a veto, which was
subsequently overridden.16
Meanwhile the Joint Committee of Fifteen
began considering an omni-
bus constitutional amendment designed to
insure the results of the war. It
combined such diverse provisions as a
civil rights guarantee, an apportion-
ment of representation section that
encouraged but did not require Negro
suffrage, political disabilities for a
number of former Confederates, and a
guarantee of the federal war debt and
repudiation of the Confederate debt.
Its work produced the prototype of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For a time
the committee considered a plan offered
by Robert Dale Owen. The Owen
Plan's most controversial section provided
for Negro suffrage. Its civil
rights section read:
No discrimination shall be made by any
State, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of
persons, because of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude.17
JOHN A. BINGHAM
81
Owen showed his proposal to Bingham who
gave only qualified approval
by suggesting that "he thought the
first section ought to specify, in detail,
the civil rights which we propose to
assure."18 In committee Bingham pro-
posed to add to Owen's statement a more
specific definition and, after re-
wording the section, he secured its
approval for his changes. In its final
form Bingham's civil rights guarantee
was worded precisely like the second
clause of tile first section of tile Fourteenth
Amendment as it now stands.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
By borrowing the language of tile Fifth
Amendment, Bingham intended to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states
and to comprehend under its provi-
sions both citizens and aliens; the Owen
proposal used the term "civil
rights" only in the sense of
protecting Negroes from abuse. Although some
doubted that the Negro was a citizen,
Bingham had repeatedly affirmed
that emancipation had automatically
conferred citizenship upon the freed-
men. Hence, he saw no need to add a
definition of citizenship to his civil
rights guarantee.
Three lays later, the committee dropped
the Bingham proposal and per-
mitted the weaker statement in tile Owen
Plan to stand alone as a guaran-
tee of civil rights. When knowledge
spread of the committee's action in ac-
cepting the Owen Plan, with its
provision for Negro suffrage, a number of
state caucuses made it plain that
advocacy of such a principle endangered
the Republican party's chances of
success in the fall elections. Divisions
over the proposed revision appeared so
great that it was predicted that
Congress would adjourn without having
offered a definite plan for restor-
ing representation and home rule to the
eleven former Confederate states.19
Without an alternative to offer,
congressional Republicans would have
considerable difficulty in making a case
before constituents for their op-
position to President Johnson's efforts
to establish reconstruction policy.
Most Republicans charged that the
President's program was characterized
by extreme leniency. They were alarnmed
by the prominent roles played by
former Confederate leaders in the new
state regimes which were formed
under executive auspices. It was also
claimed that, beyond insisting that
the new regimes accept the Thirteenth
Amendment, little was done to
protect Negro rights in the South.
To assure a more favorable reception of
the omnibus amendment in
Congress, the committee rejected the
provision for Negro suffrage and sub-
stituted Bingham's civil rights
amendment for the Owen proposal. Perhaps
the committee hoped to compensate for the exclusion of the
franchise clause
by adopting a stronger guarantee of
rights. Bingham's civil rights guarantee
did not expressly give the federal
government direct power to legislate in
such matters. Althoutgh the Ohioan
changed the thrust of his civil rights
guarantee because he had discovered that
his original proposal could not
82 OHIO HISTORY
be passed, he stated, in 1871, that he
redrafted it because he had initially
misunderstood the scope of the Bill of
Rights. He explained that after the
debate of February 1866, he reexamined
the case of Barron vs. Baltimore
and "apprehended as I never did
before, certain words in that opinion of
Marshall." In this 1833 case the
plaintiff charged that the City of Baltimore
violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving
him of property for public
use without adequate compensation. Chief
Justice John Marshall ruled that
neither the Fifth Amendment nor the
other parts of the Bill of Rights
could be applied to state or local
governments. Congressman Bingham
singled out the passage in this Marshall
decision which he found particu-
larly striking.
Had the framers of these amendments [the
Bill of Rights] intended
them to be limitations on the powers of
the State governments they
would have imitated the framers of the
original Constitution, and have
expressed that intention.20
Consequently, Bingham rewrote his
amendment expressly to forbid the
states from interfering with the civil
rights of citizens or persons living in
their jurisdiction. He left the
inference that he had originally understood
the Bill of Rights to be legally binding
upon the states. When he discovered
his error, he corrected it. In his
notable work, The Framing of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Professor Joseph James accepted this explanation for
the shift in emphasis on Bingham's civil
rights proposal.21
Although James's explanation is
plausible, the facts lend themselves at
least as well to another interpretation.
Judging by the Ohioan's defense of
his original amendment, it seems that he
plainly understood that the Bill
of Rights was not considered
legally binding upon the states. Indeed, he
cited Barron vs. Baltimore to
underscore this point--a fact also noted in the
James study. Bingham did not go beyond
saying that the states were obliged
morally to respect the Bill of Rights
but that the obligation did not have
legal force. Rather than remedy this
seemingly contradictory situation by
placing a limitation upon the states, he
first close to give the federal gov-
ernment a direct grant of power over the
states in civil rights matters. In
view of the fact that Bingham, even
before the Civil War, had taken the
same view of the scope of the Bill of
Rights, it is difficult to accept his con-
tention that he abandoned this long-held
position after simply rereading
John Marshall's judgment in Barron vs.
Baltimore"22 To have admitted in
1871 that expediency dictated that he
redraft the amendment would have
lent substance to the contention that
Congress, in passing the Fourteenth
Amendment, only intended to give itself
corrective powers to remedy state
abuse of civil rights. By claiming he
had misunderstood the meaning of the
Bill of Rights, Bingham instead was
attempting to give Congress, through
the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
positive powers expressly provided in
his first proposal.
When the proposed amendment was being
debated on the House floor
in May 1866, Bingham made it clear that
his interpretation of the Bill of
Rights had not changed, as he also
claimed in 1871. He argued that this
JOHN A. BINGHAM
83
guarantee of individual liberties was
binding upon the states; passage of
the amendment would only make this
obligation enforceable. The Ohioan
avoided emphasizing the new direction of
his proposal. To affirm, on the
one hand, that the new wording in no way
changed the powers he wished
to bestow upon Congress would endanger
passage. To state the opposite
would possibly impair the future
usefulness of the clause. Realizing that
the nation was not yet prepared for
Negro suffrage, Bingham attempted to
win support for the amendment by
pointing out that it did not force this
upon the states. The third section of
the proposed amendment provided
that ex-Confederates could not vote in
federal elections until July 4, 1870.
Bingham did not quarrel with the justice
of this provision, but he argued
that it was virtually unenforceable and
would make ratification much more
difficult. He thought that if such
disenfranchisement took place, it should
be by act of Congress, not by a
constitutional amendment.23 Events were to
prove that the Ohio Congressman's
misgivings were justified, as ten of the
eleven former Confederate states did
reject the Fourteenth Amendment,
partly because of a similarly punitive
provision. This provision resulted
from the replacement by the Senate of
the disenfranchisement clause with
a somewhat less severe section that
barred from state and local office those
ex-Confederates who had taken an oath to
uphold the Constitution of the
United States before the Civil War. This
disability could be lifted by a two-
thirds vote of both houses of Congress.
A definition of citizenship was also
added by the Senate to tile civil rights
guarantee. Most Republicans shared
Bingham's view that this addition merely
reaffirmed existing law. The
question seemed of so little importance
to William H. Fessenden, son of
the chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, that when he sub-
sequently answered Bingham's request for
a copy of the committee's pro-
ceedings, he added as an afterthought:
I suppose the clause defining
citizenship at the lead of the amend-
ment as it finally passed was added in
the House.24
The use of the word "person"
in the due process clause has been tile sub-
ject of much controversy. Some have claimed that
it was placed there as a
capitalist joker" to protect
corporations from state regulation. There is
little evidence to suggest that this was
Bingham's
intention in 1866. He used
the word to include aliens as well as
citizens and because tills wording ap-
peared in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.25
Having moved to guarantee tile liberties
of freedmen, Bingham pro-
ceeded to work for rapid restoration of
tile secessionist states to home rule
and representation in Congress. He
assumed leadership of the moderate Re-
publican effort to commit the party to
the Fourteenth Amendment as final
terns for the South, since he believed
in this commitment on principle and
thought that such an approach might win
President Johnson's endorsement
to the amendment. When the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction was
drafting tile omnibus amendment, he attempted
to persuade his colleagues
to recommend a measure making
readmission to Congress automatic for-
any state that accepted tile Fourteenth
Amendment. When the
committee
84 OHIO HISTORY
recommended readmission only after the
amendment had become part of
the Constitution, Bingham carried the
battle to the House floor. In the
end, Congress refused to back either
Bingham's plan for automatic re-
admission, the committee's more guarded
recommendation, or a radical
reconstruction bill offered by Thaddeus
Stevens of Pennsylvania on July
20, 1866. This proposed that universal
male suffrage be required before
southern representatives were admitted.
If President Johnson could have
been induced to recommend the Fourteenth
Amendment to the South,
Bingham's plan for automatic readmission
probably would have been ac-
cepted.26
The proposed constitutional amendment
was the central issue in the con-
gressional campaign of 1866. A coalition
of Johnson Republicans and Dem-
ocrats assailed it as an assault upon
states' rights because it had been passed
while the secessionist states were not
represented in Congress and because
it proposed a fundamental alteration in
the federal-state relationship. South-
erners were disturbed by the proposed
amendment's definition of citizen-
ship and by its section which gave the
South the choice of accepting either
diminished representation or Negro
suffrage. But the most serious southern
objection was that the enforcement of
the amendment's third section would
deprive the South of much of its
leadership by deposing many officers in
existing state governments and by making
certain other ex-Confederates in-
eligible to hold public office. With
considerable justification, it was charged
that the Radicals viewed the proposed
constitutional amendment as a half-
way house to more extreme ends and that
they had no intention of making
its acceptance the only condition for
restoration of representation. If the
majority of congressional Republicans
did not agree with the Radicals, it
was asked, why did they fail to pass a
bill guaranteeing readmission upon
acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Most Republican congressmen
probably accepted the Fourteenth
Amendment as final terms for the South,
but they disagreed on how to implement a
guarantee of readmission. Some
favored Bingham's plan for automatic
readmission for each state upon rati-
fication, while others would delay
readmission until the secessionist states
had accepted the amendment and until it
had become part of the Consti-
tution. In view of these disagreements
and the feeling of many Radicals
that the amendment was too lenient to
represent final terms, the party chose
to enter the 1866 canvass with the question of restoration
of representation
unsolved.27
Nevertheless, most Republicans presented
tile Fourteenth Amendment as
final terns for the South.28 Bingham
told Edwin Stanton that the election
centered on its acceptance by the South
and "the speedy restoration of the
late insurrectionary States upon that
basis" and, in accepting renomination
to Congress, he also made it clear that
this was his position.29 Senator John
Sherman, who agreed with his fellow
Ohioan, warned that southern failure
to embrace the amendment would result in
harsher terms, most likely Negro
suffrage. Cincinnati's Representative
Rutherford B. Hayes, though not men-
tioning Negro suffrage, voiced a similar
warning to a friend in Texas.30
JOHN A. BINGHAM
85
The campaign demonstrated that the
supporters of Johnson had taken few
votes from the Republican fold. Indeed
it convinced fence-sitters that polit-
ical wisdom lay in pursuing a somewhat
more radical course. As one Ohio
state senator put it:
Doubtless the brethren are all right
now. Big majorities greatly
strengthen weak backs.31
Yet many Republicans felt bound to the
Fourteenth Amendment as final
terms for the South when Congress
reconvened. Even Senator Benjamin
Wade, Ohio's ranking Radical, felt this
obligation for a time. But hopes of
southern acceptance rapidly evaporated
as ten of the former Confederate
states refused to ratify the amendment.
Equally important in generating
sentiment in favor of a more rigorous
settlement was the frequency of out-
rages against Negroes and former
Unionists in the South. Negro leader
Frederick Douglass sensed the growing
indignation over southern outrages
and urged that events in the South could
only be viewed as "one unbroken
chain of argument in favor of a radical
policy of reconstruction."32 Capi-
talizing on the rising tide of
indignation, Thaddeus Stevens presented a bill
calling for military rule in the South,
Negro suffrage, and disenfranchise-
ment of many former rebels.
Again leading the moderate Republican
opposition, John A. Bingham
found himself in a difficult position as
the tide of events swept forward. It
was becoming larder for him to maintain
an independent position without
being forced into a stand very similar
to that taken by Andrew Johnson. In
opposing the Stevens Bill, Bingham went
to great lengths to register his
conviction that Congress had tile power
to legislate for the ten unrecon-
structed states. While clearly
disassociating himself from Johnson and his
followers, the Ohioan denounced Stevens'
view that the Confederate states
could be treated as conquered provinces.
Bingham submitted that they pos-
sessed a certain quasi-legal status
because they were founded on the wrecks
of legitimate state governments and
because they were tle expressions of
the right of citizens to organize and
petition. Rather than impose military
regimes on the South, Bingham would
permit the people of the secessionist
states to reorganize themselves along
lines acceptable to Congress. The
Ohioan raised no objection to proposed
Negro suffrage. But he did argue
that tile plan to force the rebel states
to retain Negro suffrage after they
had regained representation and home
rule was unconstitutional and would
produce vassal states. Congress, Bingham
objected, was still committed to
the Fourteenth Amendment as final terms
for the South. Passage of the
Stevens Bill would only delay southern
acceptance of the constitutional
amendment.33
Bingham's arguments were powerful on a
purely legal plane, but in the
light of hard realities they were less
than convincing. Only Tennessee, of
the Confederate eleven, had accepted the
Fourteenth Amendment and was
subsequently restored to representation
in Congress. Nor could moderates
find much solace in Tennessee's action
since this was only accomplished
through the use of irregular tactics,
including the use of stringent voter
OHIO HISTORY
registration legislation and the temporary jailing of two
state representa-
tives who opposed ratification. If such
measures were necessary to bring
about compliance in the one
ex-Confederate state which, due to its strong
Unionist element, was considered the
most promising candidate for early
restoration, little could be expected
from the other ten secessionist states.
When Stevens reminded Bingham that only
one of the eleven had accepted
the proposed constitutional amendment,
the Ohioan could only lamely re-
ply that the other ten might still
follow Tennessee's example. Earlier, he
had maintained that if the South
remained obdurate, the ratification of
three-fourths of the organized states
would be sufficient to make the Four-
teenth Amendment part of the
Constitution.34
The New York Times took Bingham
to task for this chance remark, but
felt he occupied strong ground in
insisting upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as final terms for the South. In the
editors' view, he more closely re-
flected the sentiments of the northern
people than Mr. Stevens. The Cin-
cinnati Commercial agreed and
added that his speech "will be read through-
out the country with more than ordinary
interest."35
Bingham succeeded in having the Stevens
Bill recommitted, but he found
the substitute almost equally as
objectionable since the provision for super-
vision of elections by "loyal"
men was made stronger. He prepared to
launch a vociferous attack on the bill
on February 7. No doubt his attack
would have paled by comparison with his
earlier remarks since he felt that
Stevens had blackened his honor by
calling him a liar.36 When he replied to
Stevens, he began by heatedly assailing
the heart of the latter's approach to
reconstruction--the conquered provinces
theory. Recognizing that the Cadiz
Representative was building up steam for
a speech that might make the
breach between Republican moderates and
the Radicals all but irreparable,
Speaker Schuyler Colfax ruled that a
recess must be taken unless tile House
voted to extend Bingham's time. The
angry Ohioan retorted, "I will not
submit to this gag; I know all about
it."37 While the motion was being
moved to extend his time, Republicans fled
tile chamber to prevent a
quorum.
During the dinner recess, Bingham was
apparently persuaded that his
efforts to kill the bill would only harm
the party. Moreover, he no longer
possessed sufficient support to achieve
his objective. Resuming his speech,
Bingham announced that his new aim was
to pass the measure in its least
objectionable form. The language of the
bill should be altered so that it
did not appear to endorse the conquered
provinces theory. By giving United
States courts authority to issue writs
of habeas corpus when federal
law was
violated, safeguards would be erected
against arbitrary actions on the part
of the proposed military regimes. Most
important, the speaker held, was
the indispensable guarantee that
military rule would not be indefinite.38
The Ohioan must have found it mortifying
to beat so hasty a retreat. In
order to retain his influence, he found
it necessary to abandon some of his
constitutional objections to the
measure.
James Garfield, James Blaine, and other
moderates echoed Bingham's de-
JOHN A. BINGHAM
87
mands. With the assistance of moderates
in the Senate, these changes were
effected, and the bill's other
provisions were softened somewhat. During
the remainder of the debates on the
military reconstruction measure, Bing-
ham continued to take an active part.
His role won him high marks from
the Cincinnati Commercial, which
proclaimed his "record through this
stormy session . . . a glorious
one."39 In his partly successful effort to retain
the substance of his initial proposal,
Thaddeus Stevens charged Bingham
with "most unparliamentary and
discourteous tactics." The Ohioan was
advocating a:
Step toward universal amnesty and
universal Andy-Johnsonism. If
this Congress so decides, it will give
me great pleasure to join in the
io triumpe of the gentleman from Ohio in leading this House, pos-
sibly by forbidden paths, into the
sheepfold or the goatfold of the
President.40
The famed Radical was probably alluding
to the rumored agreement be-
tween the President and leading
moderates to effect a compromise on the
basis of Bingham's proposals.41 The
alleged rapprochement did not ma-
terialize. Gloating over his opponent's
hasty retreat on the Military Recon-
struction Act of March 2, 1867, Stevens
told a New York Herald reporter
that such men as Schenck and Bingham
were spineless and predicted that
they would likewise "twist and
squirm . . . and shrink" on the current im-
peachment efforts before eventually
supporting official action.42
Stevens' prediction proved correct. This
was not because Bingham and the
moderates were weak men but because the
course of events--as the Pennsyl-
vanian well knew--placed them in an
impossible position. They could not
follow a reasonably consistent course
without running the risk of losing their
ability to influence the course of
legislation. The reconstruction debate of
1866-67 well illustrates the dilemma
moderates faced. Urged on by an in-
flexible and obstinate President, the
South refused to accept reasonable
terms, and thus strengthened the
position of the Radicals in Congress. Events
in the South seemed to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the solutions ad-
vanced by those trying to keep in the
middle-of-the-road. A similar pattern
can be found in the impeachment debate
during the same period. Bingham
and the moderates resisted the demand
for impeachment so long as a reason-
able case against the President could
not be established. Radicals complained
of his "abuse" of the veto and
suggested that he had exceeded his pardoning
powers in returning property to rebels
that had been seized under confisca-
tion
legislation enacted during the war. Andrew
Johnson also continued to
exasperate Congress by demonstrating a
lack of sympathy with the goals of
reconstruction legislation. His removal
of Radical military governors and
his executive orders aimed at
strengthening civilian authorities at the ex-
pense of military regimes in the South
led Republicans to believe that he
was unwlilling to carry out in good
faith tile Reconstruction Act of March 2,
1867, and the supplemental measures.
Radicals viewed these actions as a basis
for impeachment and removal from
office, while other Republicans deplored
them but found strictly legal
88 OHIO HISTORY
grounds for removal lacking. Bingham and
the moderates, however, had
little choice but to support impeachment
when President Johnson finally
supplied his accusers with a plausible
case. This occurred when he took an
action that seemed to constitute a
violation of the Tenure of Office Act of
1867, a measure that prohibited the
removal of officials who had been ap-
pointed with the consent of the Senate
without the approval of that body.
Fearing the political results of
impeachment and perhaps still hoping that
a reconciliation with the President
could be achieved, Bingham vigorously
resisted the demand for impeachment in
its initial stages. In early 1868 the
matter was in the hands of the House
Committee on Reconstruction. The
majority of the committee followed
Bingham's lead in rejecting impeach-
ment, even though the President's
attempt to replace Secretary of War Stan-
ton with General Ulysses S. Grant may
have constituted a violation of the
Tenure of Office Act. Bingham assured
his wife that the great majority of
Republican leaders told him that his
course was wise.43 The proceedings
against Johnson were accentuated when he
tried to replace Stanton with
General Lorenzo Thomas in a manner that
left less question to his accusers
as to the violation of the Tenure of
Office Act. In the first effort at removal,
Stanton was suspended while Congress was
not in session, and General
Grant resigned as ad interim Secretary
when the Senate refused to accept
Stanton's ouster. In the second attempt,
the
removal was made while Con-
gress was in session, and the Chief
Executive persisted in efforts to be rid of
Stanton after the Senate denounced the
dismissal. The House quickly voted
for impeachment and elected Bingham to
the committee of managers en-
trusted with prosecuting the President
before the Senate. But when the
committee met, George Boutwell of
Massachusetts was chosen chairman.
Having been elected to the committee by
the largest margin, the disap-
pointed Bingham indicated his intention
of withdrawing from it, and Bout-
well subsequently yielded the place of
honor to him.44 The other managers
were James Wilson of Iowa, Thomas Williams
of Pennsylvania, Benjamin
Butler of Massachusetts, and Thaddeus
Stevens of Pennsylvania. Bingham
and Butler had crossed swords in the
past. On one occasion, the former
mocked the Bay State Radical's military
record and recalled Butler's sup-
port of Jefferson Davis for the
Democratic nomination in 1860. "The Hero
of Fort Fisher" then replied that
Bingham had not served in the army and
that "the only victim of the
gentleman's prowess ... was an innocent woman
hung upon the scaffold, one Mrs.
Surratt." The Ohioan, feeling that lie
nevertheless had triumphed over Butler
in this affair, advised his daugh-
ters, then attending a Philadelphia
school, to follow the quarrel in the
Globe.45 Speaker Colfax chose Bingham and Stevens to notify the
Senate
when the House had impeached Johnson. No
better choice could have been
made to demonstrate the new-found unity
of the House Republicans than
to send these former antagonists to tile
bar of the Senate.
Of the eleven articles of impeachment, the
first eight dealt with the re-
placement of Stanton with Thomas. The
ninth centered on the alleged
attempt of Johnson to circumvent the
Command of the Army Act. Article
JOHN A. BINGHAM
ten charged the President with making
statements that were disrespectful
to Congress. The final catch-all article
included the accusation that Presi-
dent Johnson had endeavored to prevent
the execution of acts of Con-
gress. The latter was drafted by Stevens
and presented by Bingham in his
capacity as chairman of the managers.46
In view of the latter's previous posi-
tion on impeachment, he could hardly
have approved of either the tenth
or eleventh articles. The trial to
depose the President began in March and
dragged on until mid-May, when it ended
in failure. Bingham told his
daughters in early April that he
"hoped to be safely & successfully through
with it in two weeks."47 As chief trial manager, he presented the final argu-
ment for the prosecution. A friendly
eye-witness. Albert Riddle, said his
speech suffered from being
over-prepared. Lasting from May 4 to May 6,
it was a mixture of an erudite plea and
a stump speech. On the first day,
his presentation fell short of the
standard for eloquence and forcefulness
that he had so often demonstrated
in the other chamber. On the two suc-
ceeding days, it improved greatly. Most
of his time was devoted to refuting
the central defense contention that the
President had a right to challenge
the constitutionality of a law by
violating it. Understandably, the Ohioan
did little more than his duty in
defending articles ten and eleven, both of
which presented charges that Bingham had
initially rejected as grounds for
impeachment and removal. With only a few
exceptions, he kept his argu-
ments on a level befitting the
importance of the trial. He did, however,
allude
to Johnson's supposed drunkenness on the occasion of his inaugura-
tion as vice-president. On another occasion, he charged that the President
was conspiring to revive the "Lost
Cause."48 When Bingham concluded his
speech, spectators began clapping their
hands and stamping their feet in
approval.
It very quickly spread through the
entire galleries, increasing in
violence as it went around, until it
amounted to a disorderly uproar.
Even the ladies were quick to catch tile contagion and
give vent to their
enthusiasm as earnestly as those of the
other sex.49
Lacking the required two-thirds majority
in the Senate by one vote, the
effort to remove Andrew Johnson failed.
Seven Republicans joined the
twelve Democratic senators in voting to
acquit the President. These votes
were based on the doubtful constitutionality of the Tenure of
Office Act,
a belief in the right of the President
to test the legality of the measure, and
--especially in the case of
the Republican septemvirate--an interpretation
of the act that left the Chief Executive free to remove
cabinet members ap-
pointed by Abraham Lincoln. It has also
been contended that some voted
for acquittal in order to prevent Senate
president pro tern Benjamin Wade,
whose views on
labor-management questions were considered decidedly
radical, from becoming Chief Executive.
The House managers hinted that
they possessed evidence indicating that
corrupt means had been used to ob-
tain the verdict. Securing passage of a
resolution empowering them to in-
vestigate, Bingham hinted at the impeachment of some of the seven Re-
publican Senators who had the temerity to
ignore party discipline. Alter a
OHIO HISTORY
shamelessly sordid investigation, the
managers produced nothing to verify
their charges.50
What explanation can be offered for Bingham's part in an
investigation
that paid so little attention to the
rights of the investigated? His behavior in
the Mary Surratt trial represented a
similar lapse into irresponsibility. No
doubt he was engulfed in the excitement
of the hour. Many were willing
to believe that Andrew Johnson was capable of any foul deed,
including
bribing United States Senators. Ambition
must also have played a role. By
investigating the seven outcast
Republican Senators, Bingham may have
hoped to regain some of the renown a
successful prosecution of the Presi-
dent might have brought him. With the
civil rights guarantee in the Con-
stitution and with the impeachment
controversy ended, Bingham then
turned his attention conspicuously to
suffrage regulations. His position on
the proposed Fifteenth Amendment
reflects a desire both to give the ballot
to the freedmen and to correct other
standing abuses in the franchise.
Throughout the debate, he played a
leading role in the fight for a broad
guarantee of voting rights. The Ohioan
wanted much more than a simple
statement forbidding states to deny the
vote on the basis of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. He
offered an amendment that forbade
states to deny the vote to adult made
citizens on grounds other than having
been convicted of a crime or inability
to meet a residence requirement that
could not exceed one year. This proposal
would have served others as well
as the Negro. It would, by inference,
have struck down voting tests based
upon education, property, religion, or
nationality. Negroes would have
been better served by the Bingham
proposal than by the amendment as it
was finally drafted, since his version
would have made the literacy test and
the poll tax illegal. The Ohioan's
suggestion would also have barred states
from disenfranchising those who
participated in rebellion. When he slowed
the amendment to the members of the Ohio
caucus, only James Garfield
supported it.51 Without such a
constitutional principle as his, Bingham told
the House:
An aristocracy of property may be
established, an aristocracy of in-
tellect may be established, an
aristocracy of sect may be established; in
short, what has been done in New
Hampshire . . . may be done in every
State of the Union.52
As the debate progressed, Bingham
modified his proposal in an effort to
attract support. At the end he backed a
proposal that set no limits on edu-
cational or residence requirements but
guaranteed the right to hold office
as well as vote against
restrictions based on "race, color, nativity, property,
creed, or previous condition of
servitude."53 As finally enacted the Fifteenth
Amendment forbade the federal government
or any state to deprive any
citizen the right to vote "on account of race, color,
or previous condition of
servitude."
In a recent study, Professor William
Gillette has suggested that this
amendment took a more limited form
because most Republicans were more
interested in enfranchising the Negro in
the North, where party strength
JOHN A. BINGHAM
91
seemed to be declining, than in
strengthening the position of the Negro in
the South. There was little prospect of
accomplishing the ratification of the
type of voting guarantee suggested by
Bingham. Although this overall in-
terpretation appears to be valid,
Gillette's contention that the Ohioan's
advocacy of a broader suffrage was
perhaps motivated by a desire "to kill
the amendment altogether" is questionable.54
If the House had insisted
upon tile Ohio Representative's
guarantee of voting rights, this might have
been the result. But Professor Gillette
does not ascribe this motive to those
identifiable Radicals who backed
Bingham's proposal. In view of the Ohio-
an's stubborn insistence upon a broad
civil rights guarantee in 1866--which
also could be called willful
obstructionism--and the absence of positive evi-
dence to the contrary, a wise course
might be to take Bingham's stated in-
tentions at face value.
Why equality of the law is the very rock
of American institutions,
and the reason why I desire to amend
this proposition of the Senate is
that as it stands it sweeps away that
rock of defense by providing only
against State usurpation in favor of
colored citizens, to the neglect of
equal protection of white citizens.
While colored citizens are equal in
rights . . . I am unwilling to set them
above every other class of citizens
in America by amending the Constitution
exclusively in their in-
terest.55
Perhaps Profesor Gillette based his
reasoning on evidence that Bingham,
as a member of the conference committee,
opposed inclusion of an office
holding guarantee which he had embraced
in the last minutes of the House
debate in order to gain votes for
his other proposals. This does not consti-
tute proof of his insincerity in
advocating voting for non-black minorities.
The Ohioan's course in committee may
simply have been motivated by a
view of what seemed within reach.56
By 1870, all eleven Confederate states
had been restored to representa-
tion. As control of some of these
states passed to the Democracy, many Re-
publicans were inclined to
"re-reconstruct" them by imposing new condi-
tions for representation in Congress.
Proposed new requirements included
rigid test oaths designed to exclude
ex-Confederates from state offices. John
Bingham stood in the forefront of those Republicans who opposed the im-
position of additional conditions. His
efforts to prevent the "re-reconstruc-
tion" of Virginia failed, but his
attempt to prevent the imposition of
crippling new requirements for
readmission upon Georgia was largely suc-
cessful.57
The use of terror and intimidation by
the Ku Klux Klan and similar
groups to restore white conservative
rule in the South was met with the en-
actment of three "force" bills
in 1870-1871, the passage of which was de-
signed to give Congress sweeping
enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth amendments. Again, the course of
events in the South had forced
Bingham and a number of other Republican
moderates to broaden their
definition of reasonable reconstruction
legislation. The first of these force
acts, enacted May 31, 1871, prohibited
states and individuals from violating
92 OHIO HISTORY
the rights of citizens under the recent
amendments to the Constitution. The
act of February 28, 1871, placed
national elections under the supervision of
federal marshals. The third and most
far-reaching measure, enacted April
20, 1871, was commonly known as the Ku
Klux Klan Act. It listed crimes
in violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth amendments and prescribed
fines and/or imprisonment up to $5,000
and six years. Supporters of the
Confederate cause were barred from
federal juries in cases involving this
legislation, and the President was
empowered to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and to use troops in areas affected by violence. With
the aid of this
legislation, the federal government was
able to break the power of the
Klan and similar malevolent groups.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has
voided vital sections of these acts on
the ground that enforcement of the
amendments does not empower the federal government to punish viola-
tions of them on the part of
individuals, but only when the violation oc-
curs as a result of state action.58
Some moderate Republicans like Carl
Schurz of Missouri questioned the
desirability of the force bills and made
the Liberal Republican movement
an instrument of their protest. On the other hand, men like James A. Gar-
field and John A. Bingham were alarmed
by widespread terrorism in the
South and saw a need for the enforcement
legislation. As in 1866-67, some
moderates found it necessary, in order
to protect the Negro and the Re-
publican party in the South, to move
closer to their Radical brethren. In
that much of the new
reconstruction legislation rested upon a broad in-
terpretation of the civil rights clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment which
he had drafted, Bingham often sounded like
a Radical in defending the
force acts. The Ohioan again played a
role in framing the first two measures
and was consequently able to defend them
without reservation.59 The Ku
Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, was the
most sweeping of the three mea-
sures and was the subject of
considerable debate within the ranks of con-
gressional Republicans. In addition to
the provisions listed above, the
original bill included provision for the
declaration of martial law in areas
where law and order had broken down.
Bingham vigorously defended the
principle of the bill and the power of
Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact it, but he joined
other moderates in efforts to elim-
inate the legislation's most
objectionable features. In final form, the Ku
Klux Klan Act passed without a clause
empowering the use of martial law.
Restrictions were also placed on the
power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. Bingham
and other Republican moderates were also successful in
warding off a Radical-backed amendment
that would have required com-
munities to pay damages for property
destroyed by mob activities.60
The years 1866-71 saw great changes in
the attitudes of Republican poli-
ticians on reconstruction. In the former year,
Bingham and like-minded
Republicans would have been dumbfounded
to hear that they would even-
tually support a bill as sweeping as the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871--a mea-
sure that surpassed the demands of
Radicals in 1866. Differences within the
party on reconstruction policy centered
on matters of degree but not on
JOHN A. BINGHAM
93
principle. Reports of southern outrages
against Negros and resultant north-
ern indignation brought moderates like
Bingham and Senator William Pitt
Fessenden to support military
reconstruction in 1867, a program they had
previously opposed. Since this process
repeated itself several times more, it
is not surprising that Democrats called
almost all Republicans "Radicals"
or that many historians shared this
judgment. Following this line of reason-
ing, historian Howard K. Beale ranked
Bingham among the Radicals as
early as 1866.61 The violence
perpetrated by the Klan and similar groups
again confronted moderates with the dilemma of adhering to
their previous
position on the limits of reconstruction
legislation or respond to the de-
mands of their consciences and
constituents to support more rigorous poli-
cies in an effort to safeguard the Negro
and the Republican party in the
South. Again, the line between moderates
and Radicals became more dif-
ficult to draw. Yet to label all
Republicans who supported the three force
acts of 1870-71 as Radicals, as William
A. Dunning has done,62 ignores tile
dynamics of events in these years and
obscures the considerable differences
that existed between men like Butler and
Bingham. For example, the Ohio
Congressman vigorously opposed the
attempts to re-reconstruct Virginia
and Georgia while he gave full support
to the first two force acts. The na-
ture of the proposed third force act or
Ku Klux Klan Act, however, was
such as to permit a reasonably clear
differentiation between moderate and
Radical Republicans.
Recent years have seen the long overdue
rehabilitation of Radical Re-
publicans. Today they appear as men of
principle while the moderates are
often cast as political trimmers. Not
long ago, the opposite view was in
vogue. Radicals were accused of
inflaming sectional passions so that they
could retain power and enact economic
legislation desired by their masters
in "business." Using John A.
Bingham as an illustration, David Donald has
suggested that Republicans from close
districts followed a moderate course
out of a desire for political survival
rather than out of principle. Examining
Donald's data, C. Vann Woodward found
reason to question the usefulness
of this mechanistic approach to
reconstruction history, particularly as it
applies to the Middle West.63 Although
Bingham did feel that Radicalism
was not a political asset, there is
insufficient evidence to warrant the as-
sumption that this position was not at
least equally founded in principle.
To suggest that men like John A. Bingham
were motivated primarily by
political considerations seems as unjust
as to charge the Radicals with using
the Negro primarily to accomplish dark economic aims.
Examples of op-
portunism can be found in Bingham's
career, but his policy of insisting
on a moderate approach to reconstruction
policy was not always an easy one
to practice. Often he was accused of
being "soft" on rebels. His positions in
the debates on the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth amendments certainly did not
reflect a lack of principle. Indeed the
positions of some Radicals--though
not a majority--on these amendments
could be taken as an indication that
they desired legal equality for Negroes
but not for other minorities. It
would be difficult to claim greatness
for Bingham, but his role as a mod-
94 OHIO HISTORY
erate leader was important. It
underscores the fact that the Radicals were
seldom able to obtain passage of
legislation without gaining, through sub-
stantial concessions, the cooperation of
moderates.
John Bingham's career in Congress ended
when he was defeated for re-
nomination in 1872 on what appeared to
be purely local issues. Two years
before, his renomination was enough in doubt that he covered his
quest
for another term with repeated disclaimers of candidacy.64
His last days in
Congress were difficult ones. It was
revealed that he was one of those who
had accepted free shares in the Credit
Mobilier, a construction company
that built the government-assisted Union
Pacific Railroad, Bingham escaped
formal reprimand by freely admitting
taking the stock as an investment.
Despite this revelation, President Grant
appointed him minister to Japan
where he remained twelve years. He died
in Cadiz at the age of 85.65
THE AUTHOR: Donald C. Swift is
Associate Professor of History at
Edinboro
State College.
John A. Bingham
and Reconstruction:
The Dilemma of a Moderate
by DONALD
C. SWIFT
Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio was
one of the foremost Republi-
can politicians in the period following
the Civil War. Yet he is almost un-
known to historians and students not
primarily concerned with the Re-
construction era. The names of Thaddeus
Stevens, Benjamin Butler, Charles
Sumner, or Benjamin Wade more readily
come to mind. As a spokesman
for moderation, Bingham occupied a place
of equal importance to that of
the Radical leaders. Until recently,
moderate Republicans have not received
much attention. A study of Bingham's
career underscores tile importance
of their role in shaping early
reconstruction legislation and demonstrates
the difficulties encountered by those
politicians who endeavored to avoid
extremism in a period of rapidly
changing political conditions.
Rivaled only by General Robert C.
Schenck, Bingham was the most prom-
inent member of the Ohio delegation in
the House, to which Rutherford B.
Hayes also belonged, 1865-67. In broad
outlines, his background was al-
most a composite of the typical
midwestern politician. He was the son of a
Mercer, Pennsylvania, carpenter and
moved to Ohio with his family at an
early age. After attending elementary
school and serving a few years as a
printer's apprentice, he attended
Franklin College in New Athens, Ohio.
Having completed two years of college,
Bingham read law and was ad-
mitted to the bar in Cadiz. According to
his license to practice law, he was
admitted on October 14, 1841, by state
supreme court judges Ebenezer Lane
and Reuben Wood (a future governor). The
previous year saw Bingham
taking the stump for William Henry
Harrison and engaging in a debate
with Edwin Stanton, who was then
practicing law in Steubenville. In his
twilight years, Bingham stated that he
had known Stanton since 1837 when
the latter was residing in Cadiz.
Bingham's first public office was prose-
cutor in neighboring Tuscarawas County.
He was first elected to the United
States House of Representatives in 1854
and was reelected seven times,
suffering one defeat in 1862.1 As a
Judge Advocate Bingham came to na-
tional attention in January 1864. His
first important case was the court
martial of Surgeon General William
Hammond. Edwin Stanton, whom
Bingham assisted in becoming Secretary
of War, entrusted the prosecution
to his Ohio friend. The rising young
attorney subsequently served as first
assistant to Judge Advocate General Joseph
Holt in the trial of Mary Sur-
ratt and seven others accused in the
conspiracy to murder Abraham Lin-
NOTES ON PAGE 192