Ohio History Journal

MICHAEL SPEER

 

 

The "Little Steel" Strike:

Conflict for Control

 

 

 

Historically, strikes in the American iron and steel industry have been bloody

affairs. The 1892 Homestead strike and the 1919 steel strike stand as outstanding

examples of industry's militant refusal to share the power of decision-making with

labor representatives; for steel management such strikes provided what amounted

to an opportunity for crushing an incipient union movement. By the mid-1930's,

however, the conflict between labor and management was complicated by such

New Deal legislation as the Wagner Act which theoretically guaranteed the right

of collective bargaining. In this new framework steel management was again chal-

lenged by a young union. The resulting "Little Steel" strike of 1937 was a two-

fold conflict in which steel executives were striving to destroy a union as well as

reacting against the New Deal's apparent support of organized labor. Management

appeared just as eager to realize the general goal of demonstrating the new union-

ism to be "un-American" as they were to secure an immediate victory over the

striking steelworkers. As a result, the strike became a national issue, and the

company-inspired debate over the question of union lawlessness ranged from the

President of the United States down to local officials directly affected by the strike.

The efforts of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) of the Congress

of Industrial Organization (CIO) to unionize the iron and steel industry in the

United States began in the summer of 1936.1 By spring of the following year the

campaign had its first success: after secret discussions with the CIO's John L.

Lewis, U.S. Steel's president Myron Taylor agreed to recognize the SWOC as the

bargaining agent for its members. The agreement further provided a five dollar

a day minimum for steel workers, established a forty-hour week, and set up an

institutionalized grievance procedure.² Taylor's decision won approval from the

liberal press, but the business community was divided as to its merits, and the

officials of the Little Steel companies did not like Taylor's "capitulation." Tom

Girdler, president of Republic Steel and defacto spokesman for all the Little Steel

companies, announced he "was bitter about this" and called recognition of SWOC

a surrender to the CIO, harmful to both the steel industry and the nation.³

 

1. The events of the strike are recounted in most histories of the American labor movement. Unless

otherwise noted, the following general discussion is taken from Donald G. Sofchalk, "The Little Steel

Strike of 1937" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1961).

2. Vincent D. Sweeney, The United Steelworkers of America (n.p., n.d.), 28.

3. Tom Girdler, Bootstraps (New York, 1943), 226; Girdler was also president of the American

Iron and Steel Institute.

Mr. Speer is a doctoral candidate at Ohio State University.

• 1
 

Although SWOC had won recognition from U. S. Steel, the job of organizing the entire industry was far from complete.4 Following the initial success in Big Steel, union workers began to concentrate their efforts on the Little Steel companies. In late March, Clinton Golden, SWOC's northeastern regional director, sent identical letters to the presidents of the four firms: Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. Golden asked simply for negotiations with representatives of the new union. Sheet and Tube answered that it would be willing to talk, but the resulting April 28 conference ended in strife. The overt disagreement concerned procedure-the Youngstown firm would negotiate with the union but would not commit any agree- ment to a written and signed form. Philip Murray, SWOC national chairman, 4. Walter Galenson, "The Unionization of the American Steel Industry," in Jack Barbash, ed., Unions and Union Leadership, Their Human Meaning (New York, 1959), 126. SWOC attorney Lee Pressman announced after U.S. Steel's recognition of SWOC that the union could not have won an election among the steelworkers for collective bargaining. "This certainly applied not only to Little Steel but also to Big Steel." Quoted in ibid.

• 2
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                   275

 

retorted that the union men would not be satisfied with only verbal assent to a

contract; if the company was actually bargaining in good faith, it would not refuse

to sign an agreement. At this impasse the conference ended. During the final days

before the strike commenced representatives of all the Little Steel companies met

with union officials and gave them the same answer: "No signed contract." Man-

agement's position was presented to the employees in a series of letters and notices.

The message from Republic was typical:

 

The C.I.O. made no complaints . . . relative to hours or wages of Republic employees. In

spite of this the Union demanded that the Company sign their Contract.

This is the only matter at issue, and the Company at the May 11 meeting informed the

C.I.O. representatives that it still believes it inadvisable to sign such a contract from the

standpoint of the employees and the Company itself.

The company circular explained the reasons for Republic's refusal to sign a

contract. It would be unfair to those not interested in joining a union; the contract

would not improve wages or working conditions; the CIO was working toward the

check-off and the closed shop. So far as Republic was concerned, "MEMBERSHIP

OR NONMEMBERSHIP IN ANY ORGANIZATION IS NOT A REQUIRE-

MENT FOR EMPLOYMENT." Though not so outspoken as Republic, the other

companies concurred.⁵

Why did the managers of Little Steel decide to fight the union at a time when

it appeared that settlements of the Big Steel type were acceptable? Just what did

the company officers think they could gain by forcing a stand-off with the union?

First of all, the executives thought they could win the strike, especially since they

virtually had the power to decide when and if it should take place. Also, any vio-

lence that might occur could work to their advantage. The steel officials could have

negotiated either for longer or shorter periods than they did. When management

stopped talking, the strike had to come whether the union organizers were ready

or not; growing strike fever among the ranks of the unionists would necessitate

this. Through the use of company spies, management had good reports on the

strength of the union movement, and the steel officials must have known that the

organizers had not finished their job when the strike occurred.⁶ Management also

apparently reasoned that since the SWOC made no immediate wage or hour

demands, the strike would not arouse much sympathy for labor. Also, the desire

to fight the union was further strengthened by a business downturn in May.⁷

Besides these immediate factors, company resistance was hardened by the long-

standing tradition of anti-unionism in the Little Steel companies. Though Republic

Steel had been organized only in 1930, its president, Tom Girdler, was an old steel

man, and in the company town of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, he had pursued such

a strong anti-union policy that "Girdlerism" had become synonymous with rigid

anti-unionism. The other Little Steel presidents were as firm as Girdler in their

conviction: they knew they were right; they thought they could win.

But the fight against the new steel workers' union was more than an ideological

struggle. Girdler, in particular, was an ambitious man. He hoped to make the

 

5. National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Orders (Washington, 1939), IX, 247-249.

6. See Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Reports pursuant to Senate Resolution 266,

74th cong., 1st sess., Report No. 46, Part 3, Industrial Espionage (Washington, 1938).

7. Walter Galenson, The C.I.O. Challenge to the A.F.L. (Cambridge, 1960), 100-101.

• 3
 

276                                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

Republic Steel Corporation so large that it would be able to rival U. S. Steel. For

his projected merger schemes and for maintenance of cheap production, he abso-

lutely needed a docile labor force. Commitment to a signed contract would not

allow him sufficient room for economic maneuvering.⁸

Though the other presidents of the Little Steel companies may not have shared

Girdler's zeal for building a mammoth steel company, they were just as anxious

as he to be rid of the "union menace." The action of the steel executives, the com-

pany espionage, and the purchase of great arsenals by the firms can lead only to

the conclusion that Little Steel was preparing for a violent confrontation with the

workers.⁹ A defeat at this critical moment might crush the SWOC and have reper-

cussions throughout the labor movement. Business Week warned, "C.I.O.'s Fate

Hinges on Steel Strike." If management were successful in riding out the strike,

other companies might be tempted to follow this lead, and the C.I.O. which boasted

it had never lost a strike would lose its "ever victorious" psychology; business would

regain the initiative.10

In their efforts to break the steel strike the companies employed the Mohawk

Valley formula. This scheme had originally been used by Republic to break a

strike in Ohio in 1935, but the name for the tactic as well as nationwide atten-

tion was gained in a 1936 strike against Remington Rand Corporation in Ilion,

New York.11 At the conclusion of the strike in Ilion, the National Association of

Manufacturers published an account of the struggle clearly setting forth the "for-

mula" for all who wished to use it. The scheme provided a logical set of steps to

inflame public opinion against the strikers. First, under company tutelage a citi-

zens committee of respected local business and civic leaders, ostensibly with no

company connections, should be established. This committee should then dissem-

inate information stating that local labor leaders were not local at all but were

"outside agitators" determined to destroy community prosperity. This step should

be followed by company efforts to provoke violence on the part of the strikers and

to instill a fear of union-produced anarchy in the local citizenry. Next, a back-to-

work movement, again ostensibly initiated by loyal workers and patriotic business

leaders, should be organized while the striking union was condemned for abridg-

ing the American right-to-work. Finally, with community spirit outraged against

the union, an important public official should declare a state of emergency; troops

should be called in to break up picket lines and enable those who wished to return

to the factory under armed protection. The strike would then be over.12

Overall, it was important that management always retain the initiative and keep

the back-to-work movement growing. Crucial was the necessity that troops or local

police act to favor the companies' program. Any attempt to use troops to maintain

the status quo indicated a set-back for the companies. In addition, successful exe-

 

8. Copy of undated memorandum from Pierce Williams to Franklin D. Roosevelt; microfilm in

possession of David Brody. Speaking to the Federal mediation board appointed by President Roosevelt,

Girdler later stated that he "would not consent to a . . . signed contract because he believed it neces-

sary for the proper operation of his company that he should be in a position to meet the fluctuating

price of steel by wage variations if they became necessary. . ."Quoted in Philip Taft, Organized Labor

in American History (New York, 1964), 519.

9. Jerold Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal (Indianapolis,

1966), 101.

10. Editorial, Business Week, June 12, 1937, p. 13; Sofchalk, "Little Steel Strike," 379.

11. Committee on Education and Labor, Report 151, Labor Policies of Employers' Associations,

Part 4, The "Little Steel" Strike and Citizens Committees (Washington, 1940), 90.

• 4
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                              277

 

cution of the formula required that communications media present news and edi-

torials that described the companies and "loyal" workers as victims of union

violence and intimidation. Such pro-company coverage would help create a climate

of opinion necessary for successful functioning of the formula.

The pro-union journalists feared that Tom Girdler and his fellow steel presidents

might have hit upon a winning combination. The New Republic, for example, noted

"the Girdlers" had chosen war by their refusal to sign the contract and were thus

obviously in the wrong. But the magazine added that the companies' campaigns

for law and order and the right-to-work seemed to be convincing not only busi-

nessmen, but the general public as well. Citizens were urging state and national

officials to take the "American side," the company side.13

On the union side, the SWOC leaders were faced with the necessity of proving

their organization useful to the rank and file. Impelled by the demand that SWOC

act, the union's leaders dared delay no longer--though they were aware that a

strike call in late May would be premature. As a result SWOC headquarters per-

mitted individual local unions to issue strike calls.14 On May 25 three companies

were struck, and a strike at Bethlehem's Johnstown, Pennsylvania, plant followed

in early June.

After four days the most notable event of the strike occurred--the Memorial

Day riot, known in the annals of the CIO as the Memorial Day "Massacre." In an

effort to disperse a peaceful parade of pickets near the Republic mills in Chicago,

police killed ten men. Law officials and company spokesmen called the occurrence

tragic, but added that the law would have to be enforced in the face of "armed

union activists." The subsequent call for law and order elicited by the Memorial

Day riot permeated all areas affected by the strike. In Chicago the Daily Tribune

noted that the police had behaved with "scrupulous correctness" and that the

strikers were "a well-trained revolutionary cadre." Even after congressional investi-

gation had shown that the police had attacked without provocation, the Tribune

refused to believe the facts, arguing that the Senate committee was so prejudiced

toward labor that its findings were "beneath notice."¹⁵ Most of the newspaper in

other cities did not take so extreme a position in condemning the strikers. The

sentiments of the editors of the Youngstown Vindicator, published in one of the

towns hardest hit by the strike, were more typical:

 

12. Richard C. Wilcock, "Industrial Management's Policies Toward Unionization," in Milton Derber

and Edwin Young, eds., Labor and the New Deal (Madison, 1961), 293; see also Louis G. Silverberg,

"Citizens Committees: Their Role in Industrial Conflict," Public Opinion Quarterly, V (March 1941),

17-37. Before the Little Steel strike had begun the NAM improved on the original technique by pro-

viding anti-union speakers and propaganda in those towns where unions appeared likely to spring

up in the future. In the autumn of 1936 such speakers were featured in most of the towns the SWOC

had selected for organization drives. See Committee on Education and Labor, The "Little Steel" Strike,

302-303.

13. "The Girdlers Choose War," New Republic, June 30, 1937, p. 207.

14. In addition to the SWOC agreement with U.S. Steel and the futile negotiations with the repre-

sentatives of Little Steel, other events were causing union members to favor a strike. On April 12 the

Supreme Court had declared the Wagner Act constitutional (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and

Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. I), and on the same day a thirty-six hour strike began at the

Jones and Laughlin plants. The result of this short-lived SWOC effort was a union victory in which

the firm signed an agreement similar to that made with U.S. Steel and also went a step farther granting

the SWOC exclusive bargaining rights with the company. See Taft, Organized Labor, 516.

15. The details of the riot are fully recounted in Committee on Education and Labor, Report No.

46, Part 2, The Chicago Memorial Day Incident (Washington, 1937); Chicago Daily Tribune, June 1, 7,

9, 25, 1937.

• 5
 

Since the beginning of the year strikers in one place and another have put their rights above those of the public. Indeed . . . it has seemed that the public has no longer had any rights. Unfortunately the authorities in Washington have too often given labor cause to assume that any lawbreaking on their part would be condoned. What happened in Chicago proves that the government is still supreme and that the people want it so. . . . True Americans . . . regret the loss of life, but they condemn men who assert their will is supreme and who defy the world to restrain them.16 In assessing the success of the utilization of the Mohawk Valley formula by the steel companies, it is important to remember the climate of opinion in which the strike was conducted. The sentiment that labor, abetted by New Dealers, was going too far too fast was widespread in 1937. The early months of the year had brought a series of crippling sit-down strikes to the automobile industry.17 Although public reaction to the settlement in Big Steel had been favorable, it should be noted that union gains were minimal and that a contract was signed without any work stop- page or violence. In the Little Steel strike, after the violence on Memorial Day, the companies were able to capitalize on the American myths of law and order, 16. Youngstown Vindicator, June 1, 1937. 17. Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor, 1969).

• 6
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                            279

 

the right-to-work, the sanctity of private property, and the chronic American fear

of Communist subversion, as successful employment of the Mohawk Valley for-

mula required.

In Massillon, Ohio, for example, where public officials were determined to re-

main neutral, Republic Steel was, nevertheless, able to utilize the formula. The

original position of the city fathers had been that local law enforcement agencies

would be used neither to intimidate workers nor to break the strike, and local

opinion supported this decision.18 When the strike began, a local law and order

league, independent of company support, was established, but gradually with com-

pany prodding and financial aid, the league came to espouse only the company

position. The management ruse which had the most influence on local thought

was the threat that if the strike were not halted, if Massillon could not provide

the kind of protection afforded in Chicago, the company would move out. One

company official warned, "Massillon would be a prairie." "Must Republic," he

asked, "submit to the communistic dictates and terrorism of the C.I.O.?"¹⁹ The

Massillon strikers were exceptionally well disciplined, but such company pressure

was telling, and the local league soon initiated a back-to-work movement. Work-

ers were asked to sign a petition to reopen the plant if they wished to have their

old jobs back. Many did.

Pressure on city officials was just as constant as that on the league and the work-

ers. Almost daily, representatives of the company and the law and order league

demanded the appointment of extra policemen. Although there were fewer arrests

in the city during the strike period than in other comparable times, Chief of Police

Stanley Switter finally agreed to deputize extra men. He testified to the National

Labor Relations Board that, worn down physically by constant harassment, he

agreed to the company plan, though he could "see what was coming."²⁰ Republic

paid the bond fee for the new policemen, and on July 11 a "neutral" deputy led

an unprovoked attack on the CIO headquarters. Three men were killed. The strike

in Massillon, already severely crippled by Governor Martin L. Davey's use of the

National Guard, was effectively broken though in some areas men did not return

to work until late summer.²¹

The editorials in the Massillon Evening Independent show how the local press

was used to support the company position. Before the strike actually began, the

paper observed that Massillon was a steel town and that a strike should be avoided

because everybody would be hurt.22 This in itself was leaning toward the company

position; and by the time the strike actually started, the paper sounded like a

mouthpiece of the pro-company law and order league. By the first week of June

 

 

18. National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Orders, IX, 252. The following events of the

strike are more vividly summarized in Robert R. R. Brooks, As Steel Goes . . . Unionism in a Basic

Industry (New Haven, 1940), 131-134, 139-149.

19. National Labor Relations Board, Decisions and Orders, IX, 267, 256.

20. Ibid., 259, 265-266.

21. The Mohawk Valley formula was also successful in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where officials never

made any attempt at neutrality. Bethlehem Steel contributed generously to the mayor and to the local

citizens committee, and the strike was broken. Bethlehem's victory in Johnstown was surpassed only in

Monroe, Michigan, site of a Republic plant. After a series of company threats to leave town, local

vigilantes armed with deer rifles marched on the mill and dispersed the pickets. See Frank H. Blumenthal,

"Anti-Union Publicity in the Johnstown 'Little Steel' Strike of 1937," Public Opinion Quarterly, III

(October 1939), 676-682.

22. Massillon Evening Independent, May 15, 22, 1937.

• 7
 

280                                                            OHIO HISTORY it was attacking the Wagner Act because of its inability to prevent the outbreak of strikes. Shortly thereafter the editor noted that he was not taking sides but that the strike was an absolute tragedy for all concerned. This was precisely the "feigned neutrality" stand of law and order leagues and citizens committees in other strike areas. As the strike at Massillon continued, the paper moved more and more to the company side, until at the end it praised Governor Davey's use of the National Guard to enable the mills to reopen.23 A similar situation prevailed in Youngstown where editorial coverage of the strike was much more extensive than in Massillon. In that city where the SWOC had organized six locals in the plants of Republic and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Police Chief Carl Olsen and Sheriff Ralph Elser were both recipients of arms from Sheet and Tube. These arms--rifles, tear gas, and ammunition--were donated to the law enforcement agencies for the purpose of keeping company-dominated peace in Youngstown. The police forces of Youngstown were also expanded during the strike period with one hundred fifty-two new deputies being sworn in; of this num- ber at least ninety-four were "loyal" company employees. In spite of this official favoritism toward the companies, the back-to-work campaign spread slowly in Youngstown, and it appeared that the strike might be successful. However, the constant pressure from the companies and from their business and civic represen- tatives again eventually succeeded. Violence in Youngstown was attributed solely to the strikers, and back-to-work sentiment was strong by late June.24 Once again change in opinion toward the strike can be seen by following the editorials of the local newspaper, the Youngstown Vindicator. On May 26 the edi- tors commented on a SWOC election victory in Lowellville, Ohio. It was noted that 23. Ibid., June 4, 23, 26, 1937. 24. Committee on Education and Labor, The "Little Steel" Strike, 165-183.

• 8
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                     281

 

the CIO could be built into an effective and responsible union--the winning of

democratic elections proved this. The paper stated that it was imperative that the

CIO win the reputation of acting responsibly and that orderly conduct of strikes

was a necessity. After the strike had begun in Youngstown, the Vindicator stated

the SWOC should have held an election there to determine worker sentiment

before calling the strike, but went on to say the demand for a signed contract

appeared "reasonable." Workers, warned the paper, must remain peaceful.²⁵ Thus

the Vindicator initially took a stand that could be interpreted as favoring SWOC.

Such support, however, was posited on the base that the strike would be non-

violent and that the companies would soon see the reasonableness of signed contracts.

The reaction in Youngstown to violence could be predicted from the Vindica-

tor's report that praised the police before the facts of the Memorial Day strife in

Chicago were fully known.²6 But so far as Youngstown was concerned, the Vindica-

tor continued to maintain a neutral position until the second week in June. At this

time editorials began moving to support the company position. Although the paper

maintained the companies should sign and management should face the realities

of new labor organizations, an editorial on June 11 stated that companies were

within their rights to arm when it appeared local officials were unable to keep

order. The next day editorials stated that even if the majority of the steel workers

favored the strike, those who wished to work should be permitted to do so.²⁷ Prob-

ably such a position was not intended as support for the companies, but this was

its effect. Management was in such a position that any call for "law and order"

or for the "right-to-work" was interpreted against the union. There were rarely any

calls for the companies to be less violent; apparently no one thought of that. These

slogans were useful grist for the citizens committee of Youngstown.²⁸ By the end

of June the editorials of the Vindicator were coinciding nicely with the advertise-

ments of the Youngstown citizens committee; both deplored Governor Davey's

use of troops to maintain the status quo in the strike zone while the Federal media-

tion board met, and both held striker violence the main cause of SWOC's defeat.²⁹

On the national level the Memorial Day "Massacre" elicited a general call for

more law and order. Though perhaps not calculated to do so, this fear of anarchy

served company purposes well. The editors of the Washington Post represented the

majority of Americans when they editorialized, "If the deplorable events of a week

ago should be repeated in other parts of the country, the blame will have to be

laid at the door of local law-enforcement agencies that have either been too weak

or too cowardly to put an end to the state of anarchy existing in a number of

supposedly law-abiding communities."³⁰ William Green, president of the American

Federation of Labor and advocate of the signed contract, criticized the "destruc-

tive tendencies" of the SWOC.³¹ Editors who had sympathized with the aims of

the strikers claimed that though the strike was legitimate, the CIO was apparently

condoning illegal strong-arm tactics. Most persons who took this position usually

 

25. Youngstown Vindicator. May 19, 26, 27, 1937.

26. See quotation above.

27. Youngstown Vindicator, June 13, 11, 12, 1937.

28. Committee advertisement, ibid., June 19, 1937.

29. Ibid., June 22, 23, 1937.

30. Washington Post, June 6, 1937.

31. New York Times, June 22, 1937; see also Editorial by William Green, American Federationist

(August 1937), 809.

• 9
 

282                                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

also believed that the companies were within their legal rights in refusing to sign

the contract. They did maintain, however, that the spirit of the Wagner Act

appeared to require a written agreement.³²

Though a truly national sample of public opinion on the Little Steel strike

itself is not available, surveys indicate that many Americans at the time shared the

sentiment of the Post editorial quoted above. For example, 47.4% of those polled

in a Fortune survey in October 1937 felt that plants should be kept open for those

who wished to work during a strike. Such a view may have been partially a result

of traditional American individualism, but it was also an integral part of manage-

ment's strategy of strike-breaking. Opinion further supported the company position

when 44.6% of those interviewed agreed that the CIO forced workers to join its

unions. (The "factory labor" segment of the sample agreed 34.5% and disagreed

31.6%.) In June of the strike year 50% of those interviewed by the Gallup Poll

stated their attitude toward organized labor had changed in the last six months,

and of this number 71% were less in favor of unions, especially CIO unions. In

more general terms, 45% of the respondents felt President Roosevelt was "too

friendly" toward unions against only 14% who believed the administration should

give more support to labor. Only 38% favored the Wagner Act as it stood, many

apparently urging its amendment to equalize the power of labor and management.³³

Such a state of opinion indicated an apparent sympathy for the steel companies'

efforts to assert their power and made the immediate company goal of breaking

the strike much simpler than if opinion had tended in the opposite direction.

If there was any single incident on which management was able to capitalize,

it was that of non-delivery of mail in the Warren and Niles, Ohio, strike areas.

This episode, along with the Memorial Day riot, had the effect of making the

Little Steel strike a national issue with ramifications far wider than that of a local

industrial conflict. The mail problem provided apparent proof that a dangerous

union movement, ostensibly sanctioned by the Federal Government, was leading

to anarchy--an idea that management constantly reiterated.

In Warren and in Niles, the SWOC had volunteered to place maintenance men

in the struck plants, but the company insisted that non-striking workers who had

remained inside the plants since the beginning of the strike tend the idle machin-

ery. Should these men leave the building, however, they would be unable to re-

cross the picket line. Republic Steel was thus left with the dilemma of supplying

the non-strikers inside the mills. After a scheme of parachuting food to the plants

had gone awry, the company hit upon the idea of mailing in supplies. Union pres-

sure was brought to bear on local postal authorities, and they decided that since

the delivery of foodstuffs across picket lines would provoke violence, only "reg-

ular" mail would be delivered. The New Republic lauded the decision of the Post

Office and explained it was reasonable for the government to refuse to let its

facilities be used for strike-breaking.³⁴ But this was a small voice drowned by all

 

32. The Wagner Act required only that companies "bargain in good faith." Not until the 1941

case of H. J. Heinz Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 514, did the Supreme Court

declare that actual signing of a contract was part of this "good faith." In this year the NLRB forced

Little Steel to recognize SWOC.

33. "Survey," Fortune, October 1937, p. 160, 162, 167; Public Opinion Quarterly, II (July 1938),

380, 382. An analysis of newspaper editorials for October 1935-October 1937 reveals a similar trend of

opinion against the CIO; See George S. Cree, "A.F. of L. Versus C.I.O., Labor News in Five News-

papers" (unpublished M. A. thesis, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1940), 81.

• 10
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                           283

 

those raised in protest. After all, "the mail had to go through."³⁵

The Cleveland Plain Dealer, which formerly had taken a neutral position and

favored mediation of the strike, stated angrily, "The crowning evidence of govern-

ment ineptitude will be seen if the Postoffice [sic] Department upholds the ruling

of its spokesmen in Warren and insists that mail addressed to a beleaguered steel

plant cannot be accepted . . . because it is 'irregular'."³⁶ The St. Louis Post Dispatch

was similarly inclined: "We hold no brief for the Republic Steel Corporation; its

tactics are out of place in this day and age. But the Postoffice [sic] Department

should scrupulously avoid everything that even suggests paying back John L. Lewis

for the money he collected for the Roosevelt campaign last year."³⁷ Both papers

praised President Cleveland's breaking the Pullman strike of 1893 to get the United

States mail through. Rumors that the strikers had a formal agreement with the

Post Office and that union members were regularly examining mail shipments grew.

Both were unfounded. Though there were a few instances of union men tampering

with the mails, there was never a policy of allowing them to censor what went into

the plants, and those persons involved in the tampering were prosecuted by Fed-

eral authorities.³⁸

But the protestors were actually not so concerned about the alleged mail tam-

perings as they were about the government's apparent support of the CIO by not

accepting the food packages for delivery into the struck plant. This sentiment put

President Roosevelt in a precarious position. On the one hand, there were those

who urged him to intervene and force the companies to sign a contract with the

steel workers.³⁹ The most common opinion, however, was that government was

doing too much to aid the strikers. A sample of what the President could expect

if he made an unpopular move was experienced when Pennsylvania's pro-labor

Governor George H. Earle used the National Guard to maintain the status quo

and prevent violence in Johnstown, a move many interpreted as favoring the incip-

ient union. Committees which had formerly advocated the use of the Guard to

reopen the plants now made an abrupt about-face and began to harp on the expense

of maintaining the troops. The national papers were one in their condemnation of

the governor's action. "Chooses Easiest Way Out," "Supports Gangsterism," "Brings

in Fascism," "Right to Labor Denied," and "Surrendered to C.I.O." were typical

editorial titles.40

The Federal Government stayed out of the strike until June 16 when Roosevelt

received a telegram from Ohio's Martin L. Davey requesting help. Governor Davey's

mediation attempts had solved nothing, and he was forced to ask for Federal inter-

vention. Before this date Roosevelt's only utterance on the strike had been that he

 

 

34. "The Week," New Republic, July 16, 1937, p. 142.

35. The United Mine Workers Journal, usually strongly favoring the SWOC made no editorial

comment on the postal question. The Youngstown Vindicator agreed with the New Republic that the

Post Office should not be used as a strike-breaker, but added that the union should refrain from mail

tampering (May 30, 1937). Both the Canton, Ohio, Repository (June 10, 1937) and the Massillon Evening

Independent (June 24, 1937) castigated the Federal Government for failure to act impartially, stating

that the strike was becoming a battle over law and order and the sanctity of private property.

36. Cleveland Plain-Dealer, June 5, 1937.

37. Quoted in Sofchalk, "Little Steel Strike," 266.

38. U.S. Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, 75th cong., 1st sess., Hearings . . .

Regarding Delivery or Nondelivery of Mail in Industrial Strife Areas (Washington, 1937), 1-17.

39. Thomas L. Stokes, "Washington Looks at Steel," Nation, June 19, 1937, p. 696.

40. New York Times, June 22, 1937.

• 11
 

284                                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

was no lawyer, but it seemed logical to him that the companies should sign. He

had made it very clear, however, that this was his personal opinion.⁴¹

At Davey's request the President took the next step and appointed a Federal

mediation board. The nation's press generally supported the move with many

editors stating such action was tantamount to admitting the Wagner Act was a

failure; they suggested the move could signal an administration desire to equalize

the power of unions and management.42 From the Little Steel officials, however,

this meek presidential move provoked cries of anguish. Their back-to-work cam-

paigns were in full swing, and the President had requested them to maintain the

status quo while negotiations were in progress. The companies claimed this was a

government effort to halt their plans for reopening the plants. It was not. It would

have been impossible to carry on any sort of negotiations while police were break-

ing up the picket lines.⁴³ But the Federal mediation board met the same fate as

that of Governor Davey's: Girdler and his fellow managers once again refused to

agree to a written contract with the CIO.⁴⁴

After the failure of Federal mediation, Roosevelt made the statement that marked

the beginning of his alienation from John L. Lewis. Speaking at a press conference

on June 29 the President said he thought he represented a majority of American

opinion when he said to management and labor, "A pox on both of your houses."⁴5

Roosevelt did not expatiate on his remark, but he waived the usual rule and allowed

reporters to quote him directly. Lewis reportedly retorted, "Which house, Hearst

or DuPont?"⁴⁶ In September, when the animosity between the two men was assum-

ing larger proportions, Lewis added grandly, "It ill behooves one who has supped

at labor's table . . . to curse with equal fervor and fine impartiality both labor and

its adversaries when they become locked in deadly embrace."47

Perhaps Roosevelt's statement was the best he could do at the time. First, as

he himself had said, the quotation represented American opinion, but it would

have been more accurate to say that this opinion demanded that the President

curse labor. Second, though the executive department had been notably silent on

the steel strike issue, Congress had not. Labor found few active supporters in the

chambers where congressmen from every section of the country were denouncing

labor's "anarchy," "violence," and "communism." Given the growing alienation of

Congress from the President, it is evident he could not have emerged from those

violent days without angering someone. It appears that Roosevelt chose the favor

of Congress and the public at the expense of John L. Lewis.

Dissent in Congress, however, was only one cause for the President's statement.

Tom Girdler demanded that Roosevelt rout the terrorists and get the mails de-

livered. Also, indirect pressure came from business journals and organizations which

constantly appealed to a public sympathetic to management. These statements

 

41. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 (New

York, 1941), 264-265.

42. Washington Post, June 18, 1937.

43. Sofchalk, "Little Steel Strike," 304-306.

44. A few weeks later Girdler reiterated his position while testifying to the Senate Post Office Com-

mittee: "I am trying to tell this distinguished committee that I won't have a contract, verbal or written,

with an irresponsible, racketeering, violent, communistic body like the C.I.O., and until they pass a law

making me do it, I am not going to do it." Hearings, 244.

45. New York Times, June 30, 1937.

46. Sofchalk, "Little Steel Strike," 384.

47. Quoted in Taft, Organized Labor, 520.

• 12
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                           285

 

seem to have been prompted by two apprehensions. In the first place, business

clearly shared with many persons the fear that labor was becoming "too powerful,"

"too radical," and "too lawless." Second, the deep-seated antipathy to organized

labor which had always existed in the steel industry was spreading in direct pro-

portion to the growth of the CIO.

One reason the Mohawk Valley formula worked so well during the Little Steel

strike was that many important business men misconstrued the impact of the New

Deal and were afraid that Roosevelt was trying to destroy business power and

perhaps even capitalism.⁴⁸ Consequently, they gave strong support to the besieged

steel managers. In a Fortune poll taken after the strike, most business leaders

praised Girdler for his "gallant stand" against the union and for "driving home

the point of the right to work."⁴⁹ Businessmen who were afraid that they saw a

complete change in the American power structure in the offing considered the new

unions as one important aspect of the revolution. Business Week was especially

vitriolic: "This is really a new deal . . . ! Troops are used not to protect property

and the right of willing workers to work, but to violate property rights and to force

unionization! Business can expect more of this sort of thing unless it puts up reso-

lute resistance."⁵⁰ The editorial castigated President Roosevelt and Governors Earle

and Davey, warning that the President wanted the unions to win so he could

redistribute the wealth. Comparing the 1937 strike to that of 1919, Steel stated

that conditions were essentially the same except that in 1919 "Law enforcement

agencies were neutral and gave no aid to the lawless element, federal and state

troops being used to assure workers safety in their employment."⁵¹ The pro-business

journals also expressed the more immediate grievances that the CIO was violent,

red, and undemocratic.⁵²

These ideas of business editors were fully articulated in Congress. Representative

E. E. Cox of Georgia was especially concerned over the "red menace." After a

long speech contrasting the virtues of the American Federation of Labor with the

vices of the CIO, he concluded, "the difference . . . between the AFL and the CIO

is the difference between American Constitutional Government and the commu-

nistic concept of government in Soviet Russia." Representative Cox urged Ameri-

cans to support a "voluntary, democratic labor organization," not a coercive one

like the CIO.⁵³

Representative Cox's fears were echoed by a fellow congressman. Arthur P.

Lamneck of Columbus, Ohio, told his colleagues that the country was experiencing

a "testing" during the steel strike. "I feel that the very foundations of our National

Government are threatened by the sinister implications which these strikes carry."

Like Cox, Lamneck admitted the right of labor to organize and to strike, but strikes

should involve economic problems only; a man who struck only for a signed con-

 

 

48. Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York, 1967), 74-75, 77-79. Such a view was very logical if

one assumed the American economy had reached maturity and that future growth would be slight.

If such were the case, Roosevelt's programs might have actually curbed business power considerably and

effectively redistributed the wealth of the nation.

49. "In Our Own Experience," Fortune, November 1937, p. 110, 180.

50. "Business Can Expect This," Business Week, June 26, 1937, p. 64.

51. "Same Issue in 1919, But Law Enforced," Steel, June 28, 1937, p. 19.

52. ". . . CIO Ruthlessness is Censured," ibid., June 21, 1937, p. 22; Washington Post, June 14, 1937;

"In Our Own Experience," Fortune, November 1937, p. 180.

53. Congressional Record, 75th cong., 1st sess., 6634-6636.

• 13
 

286                                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

tract was apparently not interested in the future of his country. Guided by wrong-

headed leaders, the growth of the CIO would bring anarchy to America.54

The solution most advocated by those who feared CIO's "irresponsibility" was

amendment of the Wagner Act. Few advocated the act's outright repeal; most saw

this was impossible. A Fortune poll revealed that less than 10% of management

favored the act--though they made the most of it by noting it required no agree-

ment whatsoever, only bargaining. About two-fifths of the executives said they

thought some act was needed, but they favored a law which would require labor

to incorporate, which would allow employers to call National Labor Relations

Board elections, and which would make the closed shop and check-off illegal.⁵⁵ In

its only official statement on the strike the National Association of Manufacturers

observed that strikes crippled production and set back recovery gains. The associa-

tion criticized the abdication of public authority to "organized mobs" and urged

amendment of the Wagner Act to put an end to violence and to provide "adequate

protection for the employer, the intimidated worker, and the public."⁵⁶

On the other hand, the CIO and the SWOC had no direct national media for

molding opinion. The union appeared more concerned with winning the strike by

fighting the steel companies than with winning the struggle on all fronts as man-

agement was doing. The CIO position was, in the main, supported by traditionally

liberal magazines such as the Nation and New Republic, by publications of various

local CIO unions, and by a few members of Congress. One member of the Senate

told his peers, "In every form of business enterprise throughout the civilized world

there is an instrument known as the written contract. No honest man hesitates to

use it."⁵⁷ With only slight elaboration this was the theme pursued by the pro-

unionists. Representative Jerry J. O'Connell of Montana called Girdler a "parasite"

and a "gangster" and added all that was needed for quick settlement of the strike

was the signatures of four men. From Youngstown, Ohio, Representative Michael

J. Kirwan launched his congressional career speaking in support of the SWOC.

Kirwan maintained that labor had received a "raw deal" for 160 years. Labor was

only demanding its long-neglected rights. The companies should sign.⁵⁸

In the Nation and the New Republic Girdler was featured as the bete noir. The

magazines were of the opinion that a signed contract could be made flexible enough

to satisfy company officials and that management's refusal to sign was only a

subterfuge for breaking the union.⁵⁹ In one article the New Republic reported:

Mr. Girdler and his allies are revolting against that constitutional victory of labor. They

are doing so by rendering new laws ineffectual, mobilizing all the reactionary forces at their

command, and stimulating violence, responsibility for which they attribute to their oppon-

ents. . . . If enough of us become dupes of the reactionaries, we can help along the devel-

opment of an essentially fascist counter-revolution.⁶⁰

 

 

 

 

54. Ibid., 5749-5753.

55. James A. Rowan, "Closed Shop and Checkoff," Iron Age, October 7, 1937, p. 92; Wilcock,

"Industrial Management's Policies," 309-310; Edwin Young, "The Split in the Labor Movement," in

Derber and Young, Labor and the New Deal, 72.

56. Quoted in the New York Times, June 1, 1937.

57. Senator Joseph F. Guffey of Pennsylvania; Congressional Record, 75th cong., 1st sess., 5522-5523.

58. Ibid., 5524, 5753, 6767, 6955.

59. "Steel Bargaining and Agreement," New Republic, June 23, 1937, p. 171-172.

60. "Girdler's Counter-Revolution," ibid., July 7, 1937, p. 237.

• 14
 

"Little Steel" Strike                                                           287

 

The Nation gave an account of the Memorial Day "Massacre" which was very

close to what the LaFollette Committee would later disclose. The magazine noted

that none of the policemen were harmed and that the actual shooting occurred one

and one half blocks from company property. Other articles and editorials rehashed

the same ideas.

Similar ideas were expounded in labor publications during this period. The

United Mine Workers Journal found Girdler "stupidly adamant" and said the com-

panies were infringing upon the civil rights of the strikers. This journal went further

than the other pro-union magazines in calling the Chicago melee "planned mur-

der," but this was its only deviation from typical liberal statements. The journal

maintained that if steel's management were really bargaining in good faith, it would

be willing to sign a contract. If a written agreement would lead to the closed shop,

why would not an oral contract do the same? Why, since so many other steel firms

had signed contracts with the SWOC, did Little Steel refuse? The obvious answer

was that the companies were acting illegally.⁶¹

In the long run the unionists and their allies were vindicated, but their efforts

during the strike were unavailing. The liberals had maintained that a written and

signed contract was the key issue of the strike and in doing so they neglected other,

very important facets of the conflict. Though a signed contract had been the orig-

inal issue, the questions of law and order and of government favoritism to union

labor eclipsed the union demand early in the strike. In part this refocusing had

resulted from management's propaganda efforts and from use of the Mohawk

Valley formula, but it was also a consequence of many conservatives' dissatisfac-

tion with the New Deal, facts the unionists did not recognize sufficiently. Presented

in pro-management terms, the strike necessarily became a moral confrontation

without a middle ground for compromise. In fact, the situation was such that offi-

cials in all levels of government were led to give some support to the companies,

and management--for a few more years--was able to convince many important

Americans that the CIO represented malignant unionism and should not share con-

trol of industrial decisions.

 

61. See also New Republic: "The Week," June 9, 1937, p. 114; Mary Heaton Vorse, "The Tories

Attack Through Steel," July 7, 1937, p. 246-248; "The Right to Work," August 4, 1937, p. 350; Nation:

"The Shape of Things," June 5, 1937, p. 633; Meyer Levin, "Slaughter in Chicago," June 12, 1937, p.

671-672; Rose M. Stein, "Republic Sticks to Its Guns," June 12, 1937, p. 668-669; "Settling Strikes:

Law and Reality," June 19, 1937, p. 692-693; Rose M. Stein, "It's War in Youngstown," July 3, 1937,

p. 12-14; Allen Grobin, "O Little Town of Bethlehem," July 10, 1937, p. 37-39.

United Mine Workers Journal, news items and unsigned editorials, May 15, 1937, p. 12; July 1,

1937, p. 4-5: August 1, 1937, p. 4. See also C.I.O. News and Steel Labor for similar arguments.

• 15