RICHARD T. FARRELL
Internal-Improvement Projects in
Southwestern Ohio, 1815-1834
During the first three decades of the
nineteenth century, merchants, farmers, and
manufacturers successfully established
Cincinnati's economic prominence in the
West. Taking advantage of the city's strategic
location, pioneer merchants supplied
the increasing number of immigrants from
Europe and the eastern states with the
goods they needed before they moved up
the valleys of the Great Miami and
Little Miami rivers. As farmers
gradually settled this region, agricultural production
increased. Merchants began collecting
farm surpluses and providing farmers with the
merchandise they could not produce for
themselves. The availability of agricultural
surpluses helped to promote milling,
brewing, distilling, and packing industries,
and these in turn created new demands
for products from the fields and forests.
The resultant increase in farm
production encouraged manufacturers to produce
tools, machines, and other items for
households and farms. Together, the growth
of industries and expansion of
agriculture stimulated trade.1
The city prospered as a result of the
combined efforts of merchants, manufac-
turers, and farmers.2 Responding
to the demands for locally made goods, manu-
facturing interests played an
increasingly important role in the city's economy.
The value of products manufactured in
Cincinnati in 1819 was $1,059,459, and
1,238 of the city's total population of
over 9,000 were engaged in manufacturing
or related service industries. By 1830
the value of manufactured products had
reached $2,800,000, and more people were
involved in manufacturing than in com-
mercial or service occupations.
Commercial transactions followed a
similar pattern. In 1819 the city's exported
products, consisting chiefly of flour,
pork, bacon, hams, lard, whiskey and tobacco,
were valued at $1,334,080. By 1829 the
value and quantity of export items ex-
ceeded three million dollars.
Agricultural products still headed the list, but such
items as hats, cabinet furniture,
printing materials, clothing, casting machinery,
and tin and copperware appeared with
greater frequency. Taking into account
1. For general discussions of the
economic development of Cincinnati, see Richard C. Wade, The
Urban Frontier, the Rise of Western
Cities, 1790-1830 (Cambridge, 1959);
William F. Gephart, Trans-
portation and Industrial Development
in the Middle West (New York, 1909);
Randolph C. Downes,
"Trade in Frontier Ohio," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XVI (March 1930), 467-494.
2. The following evidence of economic
growth in Cincinnati is taken from Richard T. Farrell,
"Cincinnati, 1800-1830: Economic Development
Through Trade and Industry," Ohio History, LXXVII
(Autumn 1968), 111-129.
Mr. Farrell is assistant professor of
history at the University of Maryland.
price fluctuations and changes in transportation charges, it is still evident that the volume of goods imported into the city also increased during this period. In 1818 the value of imported goods was placed at $1,619,030. By 1830 imports were valued at $3,800,000. Salt, sugar, tea, dry-goods, and hardware dominated the list, but raw materials--iron (pig, bar, and sheet), lumber timber, raw cotton, and similar items which could be used in manufacturing and construction--appeared with greater frequency. Other statistics also suggest the degree of economic development occurring in the city. The urban population, for example, increased from 9,642 in 1820 to 24,831 in 1830. Transportation rates, both upstream and downstream, dropped substantially between 1815 and 1830 while land value increased. The city's com- mercial facilities were improved, and wholesalers and commission agents became more active in the economy. Cincinnati's business community encountered several problems in its rise to economic prominence, the most basic probably being transportation. Economic growth and rising standards of living as well as the political stability and cultural progress which generally accompany prosperity were all dependent upon improved transportation facilities. As a frontier agrarian community, the city needed contact with coastal trade centers for essential goods which were not available locally. With an isolated, debtor society anxious to make the city a major commercial- manufacturing center, it was imperative that new and improved trade routes be developed to export surpluses and reduce the unfavorable balance of trade with the |
6
OHIO HISTORY
East. Recognizing the crucial importance
of transportation to long-term economic
development, business and political
leaders knew that the city's future depended
upon the completion of an
internal-improvements program that would insure routes
to eastern and southern markets and
provide access routes to main transportation
arteries.3
Efforts by these leaders to complete
such a program provide a model study of
how the business community responded to
obstacles to economic development.
Internal-improvements advocates
approached the transportation problem with op-
timism, perseverance, and ingenuity, but
their plans were often frustrated by a
lack of funds and inadequate
governmental assistance. Through determination and
prudent use of the limited funds
contributed by the state and national governments,
however, they were able to construct a
transportation system which stimulated
immediate economic development and laid
the groundwork for future growth.
Between 1815 and 1834 all segments of
Cincinnati's economy depended on the
Ohio River.4 Most residents, therefore,
recognized the importance of removing
obstructions on this essential trade
artery so that the city could attain and secure
its position as the commercial and
industrial center of the Ohio Valley. Two proj-
ects designed to improve navigation on
the Ohio particularly interested the com-
mercial leaders of the city. These were,
one, the removal of obstacles along the
entire course of the river that made
navigation treacherous, and the other, the
construction of a canal around the Falls
at Louisville.
Popular river guides testify to the
dangers boatmen encountered in navigating
the Ohio. In addition to the more or
less anticipated obstacles--a shifting main
channel, sand bars, and ice--over which
man had little control, snags, sawyers,
rapids, and submerged rocks created the
greatest hazards.5 Men who knew the
river were convinced that many of these
obstacles could be removed easily and at
little expense. Encouraged by the
national government's interest in internal im-
provements during the first decade of
the nineteenth century, they urged Congress
to begin such a program. One editor
succinctly suggested that,
Western waters are OUR canals, and from
the simplicity of their wanted improvements,
are entitled to the first application of
moneys and subscription and appropriation from the
national government. How great would be
the folly to undertake other works, the labor
of years, however useful, and neglect
those of equal or tenfold more national importance,
which can be completed almost at any
moment in which they are undertaken.6
3. Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era:
A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820-1861
(Athens, Ohio, 1969); Jacob H.
Hollander, The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Study in Municipal
Activity (Baltimore, 1894), 10. For general discussions of
transportation problems in the Old North-
west, see Charles H. Ambler, A
History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley (Glendale, Calif., 1932);
R. Carlyle Buley, The Old Northwest:
Pioneer Period, 1815-1840 (Indianapolis, 1950), I, Chapter 7;
William T. Utter, The Frontier State,
1803-1825 (Carl Wittke, ed., The History of the State of Ohio,
II, Columbus, 1942), Chapters 4, 7; John
G. Clark, The Grain Trade in the Old Northwest (Urbana,
Ill., 1966), 1-7; George R. Taylor, The
Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951), Chap-
ters 2, 3, 4.
4. For a general history of
transportation in the Ohio Valley, see Ambler, Transportation in the
Ohio Valley.
5. Zadok Cramer, The Navigator,
Containing Directions for Navigating the Monongahela, Allegheny,
Ohio, and Mississippi Rivers . . . (Pittsburgh, 1821); Samuel Cumings, The Western
Pilot, Containing
Charts of the Ohio River and of the
Mississippi . . . (Cincinnati, 1829);
"Copy of Captain Chase's
Journal of Observations on the Manner in
Which the Contract with Mr. Bruce Has Been Executed
. . . Nov. 21 to Dec. 1825," in Senate
Executive Documents, 19 cong., 1 sess., No. 14; Buley, Old
Northwest, I, 432-435.
6. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati
Gazette (cited hereafter as Liberty
Hall), March 18, 1916.
Internal Improvement Projects 7 In 1817 commercial interests persuaded the state legislature to petition the Federal Government for funds to help finance river improvements. But Congress had not yet found a justification in the Constitution for Federal assistance, and it refused aid. Members of the Congress were deeply involved at this time in a constitu- tional debate over internal improvements that centered primarily on the division of powers between the state and Federal governments. The rights of corpora- tions and private citizens were apparently not involved. The presidential vetoes of internal-improvement bills in 1817 and 1822 and the congressional debates be- tween 1816 and 1824 suggest that the main issue was the right of Congress to ex- pand its powers beyond those specifically stated in the Constitution. Among the arguments for and against Federal assistance, the most significant were sectional interests, the factional split in the Republican party, and the fear that strengthening the powers of the government in one area would carry over into other areas.7 The congressional debate over this issue and the Panic of 1819 further delayed financial aid until May 1824. In that year Congress allocated funds to remove de- bris from the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Six months later, the chief engineer for the War Department signed a contract with John Bruce of Vanceburg, Kentucky, and work began on the Ohio River. Area residents were elated and confident that Bruce would succeed since he had devised a revolutionary "machine boat" which 7. Cincinnati Western Spy (cited hereafter as Western Spy), January 10, 1817; Carter A. Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York, 1960), 44; See also ibid., Chapter 2 for a discussion of constitutional debates; George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815-1828 (New York, 1965), 18-21; Taylor, Transportation Revolution, 19; Ambler, Transportation in the Ohio Valley, 395. |
8
OHIO HISTORY
was said to operate so efficiently that
even the largest trees offered "but a trifling
resistance."8
The river improvement bill of 1824 was
of considerable importance to residents
of the Ohio Valley. It established a
precedent by which the national government
could participate in
internal-improvement projects of limited scope that were
planned by private or state enterprise.
During the next decade Congress received
numerous requests for additional
appropriations to clear the river, the majority of
which were approved. Moreover, the
national government soon increased its con-
tributions by subscribing to the stock
of private companies chartered by state gov-
ernments for specific improvements.9
Partly as a result of this change in policy,
residents along the Ohio River were able
to proceed more rapidly with internal
improvements.
One project which benefited from the
government's new policy was the canal
around the Falls at Louisville. As
communities developed along the river, the Falls
became a matter of mounting concern.
Except for a few months each spring and
again in the autumn, this obstruction
usually created a natural barrier blocking
direct passage to New Orleans and forced
the transshipment of goods at Louisville.
Several proposals had been considered
between 1800 and 1815, but all proved too
expensive or impractical. Commercial
interests in Cincinnati believed that a canal
was the obvious solution, and they
attempted to obtain the assistance of other
communities along the river. Much to
their chagrin, however, towns below the
Falls (Louisville being the most
important) refused to cooperate. Because of its
strategic location, Louisville's economy
was largely dependent on the transshipment
business, and its merchants were
unwilling to risk the loss of their advantage. Other
communities below Louisville rejected
the suggestion at this time because the
Falls did not block their passage to New
Orleans.10
Civic leaders in the Queen City,
however, were persistent, dedicated, and pug-
nacious. Infuriated by Louisville's
chronic procrastination and especially by a report
that business interests on the Kentucky
side of the river favored a canal just wide
enough for keelboats, they accepted the
fact that a joint effort was impossible and
resolved to act independently of
Kentucky. Cincinnati businessmen then turned to
the Jefferson and Ohio Canal Company
which the Indiana legislature incorporated
in 1817 to construct a canal on the
Jeffersonville side of the river. Although the
directors of the company encouraged the
general assemblies of Ohio and Indiana
to contribute, they considered it
inadvisable in 1817 to depend too heavily on state
assistance. Instead they tried to
finance the venture through private investments
and a lottery. The Cincinnati directors
called frequent public meetings to arouse
interest and appointed two representatives
in each ward to solicit support, but all
their fund-raising efforts were of no
avail.11
8. Senate Executive Documents, 19
cong., 1 sess., No. 14. A more effective "snag boat" was designed
by Henry M. Shreve, superintendent of western river
improvements for the topographical engineers.
It went into operation in 1829 but was
used primarily for major projects and on other western rivers.
Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on
Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History (Cambridge,
1949), 193-200.
9. Goodrich, American Canals and
Railroads, 40; Hunter, Steamboats on Western Rivers, 190-191;
Ambler, Transportation in Ohio
Valley, 396.
10. Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early
Settlement of the North-Western Territory (Cincinnati, 1847),
401-402; Louis C. Hunter, "Studies
in the Economic History of the Ohio Valley," Smith College Stu-
dies in History, XIX (October 1933-January 1934), 6-23.
11. Liberty Hall, January 20, May
26, 1817, January 5, February 11, 25, March 15, 18, May 20,
November 3, 1818; Western Spy, May
9, 23, 1817, January 3, May 9, 16, July 25, 1818, November 6,
1819; Cincinnati Inquisitor and
Advertiser (cited hereafter as Advertiser), October 13, July 7,
1818.
Internal Improvement Projects
9
Plagued from the beginning by financial
problems and construction difficulties,
the Jeffersonville and Ohio Canal
Company was soon doomed. Promoters in Cin-
cinnati began to lose interest in the
Indiana project by 1819, but not in a canal.
Realizing that private enterprise alone
could not succeed, they sought state assis-
tance.12 They were partially
motivated by recent discussions in the Ohio legislature
of plans to construct a canal from Lake
Erie to the Ohio River. If it allocated any
funds for internal improvements, they
reasoned, then preference ought to be given
to the canal at the Falls. A local
editor probably expressed the opinion of many
when he wrote that,
Whatever improvements may be meditated
for the benefit of commerce, either in clearing
out the beds of lesser streams, or in
connecting the Lakes with the waters of the Ohio, they
are all of much less importance to the
vital interests of the country, than a free and un-
interrupted passage to New Orleans.13
Several public-spirited citizens in the
Queen City suggested that the legislature
could not be expected to pay the entire
cost of constructing the canal. With con-
siderable justification, they pointed
out that it should be financed by all states
bordering the river. Since it would
benefit the country at large, the national gov-
ernment should also contribute.14 Aroused
by appeals from Cincinnati, merchants
and farmers on both sides of the Ohio
showed renewed interest in a joint project.
In 1819 the state assemblies of
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio ap-
pointed commissioners to study the
proposed sites and to recommend the one
offering the greatest advantages.
Indiana, however, did not participate in the pro-
ceedings because it was already
committed to the Jeffersonville project. Optimism
was so great in Indiana that the
legislature had agreed to subscribe two hundred
shares of the Jeffersonville Company's
stock and had set aside $10,000 from the
state's three percent fund for this
purpose.15 These actions seemed to mean that
Indiana would not participate in
competitive schemes.
Although the joint commissioners
completed their survey in 1820 and reported
favorably on the Louisville site, plans
to construct the canal did not materialize.
The states concerned then began
deliberations on their own improvement programs
and gave them first priority. Likewise,
the national government failed to provide
any tangible assistance. Indiana, whose
participation was desirable, if not essential,
not only boycotted the commission but
also continued to thwart the venture. At
the same time the commissioners' report
was made public, the Jeffersonville Com-
pany announced that its survey proved a
canal on the northern side of the river
would cost less than one on the southern
side. Finally, the Panic of 1819 prostrated
the West and delayed the completion of
all internal-improvement projects.16
Residents of Cincinnati were confused by
the conflicting reports of construction
costs at the two sites. They were also
disgruntled with the charters held by the
Kentucky and Indiana companies. In 1820
they asked the Ohio legislature to allo-
cate funds for a survey of both sides of
the river to determine whether a canal was
12. Liberty Hall, January 11, May
17, 1820.
13. Advertiser, February 16,
1819.
14. Cincinnati Directory for 1819 (Cincinnati,
1819), 71; Liberty Hall, April 25, 1819.
15. Ibid., May 27, 1820; Logan Esarey, "Internal Improvements
in Early Indiana," Indiana His-
torical Society Publications, V (1912), 67.
16. Liberty Hall, January 11,
April 4, July 5, 1820, January 3, 1824; John P. Foote, Memoirs of the
Life of Samuel E. Foote (Cincinnati, 1860), 170-173.
10
OHIO HISTORY
feasible and to resolve the question of
costs. Although funds were authorized for
the survey, Governor Jeremiah Morrow did
not employ an engineer until 1823. His
delay was apparently justified since
competent engineers were. scarce and those
who were qualified were working
elsewhere. Wasting no time, the legislature for-
warded the engineer's report to Congress
along with a request that the Federal
Government construct the canal. A House
committee recommended appropriating
$100,000 to help with construction
costs, but Congress refused to allocate the
money.17
Leading merchants in Louisville finally
succumbed to the inevitable. In 1825
they applied for a new charter for the
Louisville and Portland Canal Company.
Convinced that the company's intentions
were genuine, investors in Cincinnati
immediately subscribed nearly $200,000
in stock. But their enthusiasm was not
enough, and, as usual, actual
construction was delayed by financial problems. In
1826 and again in 1828 the national
government purchased stock. With this assis-
tance the company opened the canal to
traffic in December 1830. It was completed
the next year at a total cost of
$1,000,000. Of this amount the Federal Government
contributed $230,000.18
During the next decade the venture was a
success. The number of boats passing
through the canal rapidly increased, and
the company made money. By 1840 stock-
holders had received cash and stock
dividends amounting to ninety-nine percent
of their original investments. Moreover,
between 1831 and 1840 the canal satisfied
the immediate needs of farmers and
merchants above the Falls. Although its de-
fects soon became apparent, few
individuals complained. Gradually, however, mer-
chants and farmers who used the canal
regularly could no longer restrain their
irritation with the company. In their
opinion rates were excessive, and delays
caused by one-way traffic, low water,
and landslides and debris that blocked the
passage were inexcusable. In addition,
as the size of steamboats increased, the
utility of the canal was reduced. These
inconveniences, the result of poor construc-
tion and lack of planning, stimulated
demands for improvements. Again, Cincin-
nati residents led the campaign for
action, but results were slow in coming. Delayed
by legal, political, and financial
difficulties in addition to the Civil War, the enlarged
canal was not opened to traffic until
1872.19
Although the Ohio River was the city's
main trade artery, residents of Cincin-
nati did not devote all their efforts to
its improvement. Transportation routes to
the back country were also important to
the people of southwestern Ohio. Major
navigation projects would have a limited
effect on the economic development of
Cincinnati unless farmers could get
their products and purchases to and from the
city. Most businessmen, therefore, not
only supported such improvements but also
were determined that the projects should
terminate at the Queen City. Area resi-
dents investigated three separate
projects designed to facilitate the flow of agri-
cultural produce into the city:
developing navigation on the two Miami rivers,
building roads into the city, and
constructing a canal through the Miami Valley.
A few miles west of the city the Great
Miami River empties into the Ohio.
17. Liberty Hall, December 18,
1822, January 14, August 29, November 7, 1823, February 3, 1824;
Cincinnati National Republican and
Ohio Political Register (cited hereafter as National Republican),
May 27, 1823; House Reports, 18
cong., 1 sess., No. 98.
18. Liberty Hall, March 15, 1825;
Review of the Report of the Board of Engineers on the Improve-
ment of the Falls of the Ohio (Washington, 1834), 4.
19. House Miscellaneous Documents, 40
cong., 2 sess., No. 83; Hunter, Steamboats on Western
Rivers, 184-186.
Despite frequent disruptions by rapids, flatboats and other small boats could ascend the Ohio River for a distance of seventy-five miles from the mouth of the Great Miami. Farmers in the immediate vicinity of Cincinnati, nevertheless, did not ac- tively encourage improvements on this river. They apparently preferred spending money on roads which would provide a more direct route to the city. Likewise, merchants in Cincinnati showed little interest since farmers who used the Miami River route generally continued down the Ohio rather than coming upstream to the Cincinnati Market.20 The Little Miami River, emptying into the Ohio a few miles east of Cincinnati, was also a potential access route to markets. In 1816 farmers in Warren County initiated a project to improve navigation on the Little Miami, and they solicited support from Cincinnati and Hamilton County. Recognizing that traffic on the river would bypass the city, local merchants also opposed this project, but some farmers in the country offered assistance. Petitions were sent to the legislature in 1816 and again in 1817, but both times the General Assembly refused to act.21 Although the state government made numerous attempts to improve river naviga- tion between 1807 and 1830, no evidence was found indicating that Cincinnati residents actively encouraged these improvements. Without their help, local proj- ects had little chance to succeed since the city dominated the county both politi- cally and financially.22 This parochial attitude, apparently common among business and civic leaders, did not apply to road improvements. Roads throughout the West during the first 20. Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development, 66. 21. Western Spy, May 3, 1816, July 4, 1817; Liberty Hall, June 30, 1817. 22. Wade, Urban Frontier, 336-338. For a discussion of improvements on state rivers, see Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development, Chapters 4, 11. |
half of the nineteenth century were notoriously bad. Although not always by choice, most local roads were secondary in importance. They were chiefly built to connect with rivers which then became the main trade routes. Since Cincinnati was located between two navigable rivers, merchants considered road improvements essential. Radiating in a half circle from the city, roads were laid out to give farmers direct routes to Cincinnati markets. By 1816 six extended into the back country: the Co- lumbia road to the east, the Lebanon road to the northeast, the Dayton road to the north, the Hamilton and Lawrenceburg roads to the northwest, and the North Bend road to the west.23 As settlers advanced further into the Miami Valley, roads were extended and attempts were made to improve those already laid out. Following the War of 1812 turnpike companies increased in popularity, and many people were confident that at last a means of financing road construction had been found. But before actual improvements could be made, the Panic of 1819 disrupted the city's economy, forcing companies into bankruptcy. A typical example was a company chartered in 1817 to build a turnpike between Cincinnati and Dayton. Apparently the project was at first enthusiastically supported, but lack of capital and experience delayed construction until the company was ruined by the panic.24 Thus, even though con- struction was encouraged between 1816 and 1820, few roads were actually built. During the years immediately following the panic, interest in turnpike companies temporarily subsided. This can be partially explained by the absence of capital, but other factors were equally significant. In a letter to a constituent, Andrew Mack, a representative from Hamilton County, complained of the legislature's failure to 23. Buley, Old Northwest, I, 444-481; Utter, Frontier State, Chapter 8; Beverley W. Bond, Jr., The Civilization of the Old Northwest (New York, 1934), 364-386; Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development, Chapters 3, 8; Samuel R. Brown, The Western Gazetteer, or Emigrant's Directory . . . (Auburn, N. Y., 1817), 280. 24. Acts Passed at the First Session of the Fifteenth General Assembly of the State of Ohio . . . (Columbus, 1817), XV, 84-92; Advertiser, September 14, 1819. |
Internal Improvement Projects
13
charter any new companies in
southwestern Ohio. In his opinion opposition came
from the back country which depended on
Cincinnati for a market. The farmers
in this region were opposed to turnpikes
because of tolls.25
But most people agreed that poor roads
impeded the development of the city
and should be improved. Since capital
was limited, numerous "do-it-yourself"
projects were considered. One of these
designed to improve the Mill Creek road
attracted attention. This road was the
main artery into the city from the north. All
of the city's newspapers urged the
public to attend a meeting called by local busi-
nessmen to discuss the project, and one
editor even went so far as to suggest that
individuals without "an
accommodating disposition" should stay at home. After a
lengthy debate those attending the
gathering decided to rebuild the road to meet
turnpike standards and then macadamize
it with rocks and crushed stone. All work
would be done by local residents, and a
board of managers would oversee con-
struction and determine the value of
work performed by other residents. Again
nothing practical was accomplished. A
few individuals opposed raising money for
materials by open subscriptions. They
argued that property owners along the route
should contribute more than other
citizens. When their suggestion was rejected,
they withdrew their support and the
project collapsed.26
There were numerous basic problems which
frustrated local efforts to build roads
prior to 1825; and although there is
abundant evidence to indicate general, en-
thusiastic support, few actual
improvements were made. Road-building advocates
had to depend almost exclusively on
local capital, and money was scarce. Further-
more, individuals were reluctant to
contribute money when they could not antici-
pate direct benefits. They wanted either
a dividend from their investment or a road
through or by their property. Dissension
between city and county residents, dis-
agreements over the priority of
projects, and lack of experience in construction
were also significant factors in
delaying local road building.27
Although financial assistance was
limited, the Federal Government tried to en-
courage road construction in Ohio. In
addition to appropriating funds for the Na-
tional Road, numerous post roads were
built in the state. Over these routes stage
lines ran between major towns, at least
during the summer and autumn, carrying
mail and passengers. In some cases mail
routes opened up outlying areas to stage
and wagon traffic, but generally mail
was still carried by horseback.28
The Federal Government also encouraged
road construction in other ways.
Probably the most significant was the
three percent fund. In Ohio's Enabling Act
Congress included a provision to return
to the state three percent of the net pro-
ceeds from the sale of public lands in
the state. The money was to be used ex-
clusively for surveying and constructing
roads. Although the fund undoubtedly
provided some valuable assistance, it
had several drawbacks. In the first place, the
amount received was not large. Including
supplementary contributions from the
state, total expenditures between 1804
and 1830 from the fund were only $342,-
814.15. Moreover, distribution of the
money was left to the discretion of the legis-
25. Andrew Mack to Isaac Bates, January
8, 1819, Box 1, Bates Papers, 1789-1873, Cincinnati His-
torical Society.
26. Advertiser, February 26,
March 19, 22, 29, April 5, 9, 19, May 17, 1823; National Republican,
March 18, 1823; Liberty Hall, March
14, April 4, July 22, 1823, January 23, 1824.
27. For examples of some of these
problems, see Liberty Hall, August 5, September 2, 12, Novem-
ber 28, December 5, 1823.
28. See Archer B. Hulbert, The
Cumberland Road (Cleveland, 1904), 77-78; Buley, Old Northwest,
I, 464-471.
14 OHIO HISTORY
lature. This proved to be an unfortunate
arrangement. It fostered political logrolling
and meant that much of the fund was
wasted on salaries for special commissioners
who were appointed each time a new road
was proposed. In addition, the arrange-
ment meant that small sums of money were
widely distributed over settled areas
of the state rather than concentrated on
a few major projects.29
Nevertheless, the three percent fund
provided some needed capital, and Cin-
cinnati was one of the first towns to
benefit. In 1804 the legislature appropriated
part of the Federal money for the
construction of two roads into the settlement.
Other appropriations were made from time
to time for road surveys, bridge con-
struction, and improvements on existing
roads. Through this fund the state's road
system advanced much more rapidly than
it would have if left to its own resources.30
The state government was not as generous
in appropriating its own money for
road improvements as it was with the
three percent fund. In general, it encouraged
projects between 1815 and 1834 but left
the financing to local enterprise. In 1817
Governor Thomas Worthington tried to
persuade the legislature to assume the
responsibility for building north-south
and east-west through roads, but he was un-
successful. Some money was added to the
three percent fund, but by this time it
was also used for bridge construction
and improvements on existing roads. The
legislature, however, facilitated actual
construction of new roads by granting liberal
charters to turnpike companies,
establishing construction standards, requiring able-
bodied males to work on the roads, and
levying a special state tax that was re-
turned to the counties for construction
purposes.31
The charters granted to turnpike
companies illustrate in part the willingness of
the legislature to encourage road
construction. In 1828 civic leaders from south-
western Ohio obtained charters for the
Cincinnati, Lebanon, and Springfield Turn-
pike Company with an authorized capital
of $150,000, and the Cincinnati,
Columbus, and Wooster Turnpike Company
with an authorized capital of $200,000.
Following a standard practice, both
charters established routes, set construction
specifications and toll rates, divided
managerial responsibilities among stockholders
in towns concerned, and included
provisions by which the legislature could pur-
chase the company. Although later
charters granted more liberal terms, these com-
panies also received some concessions
from the legislature. They were given the
right of eminent domain, exclusive
rights to construct roads over described routes,
and permission to sell stock to the
county commissioners. Companies such as these
were only a beginning. Within ten years
the legislature had chartered eight turn-
pike companies, some of which were to
build roads in southwestern Ohio.32
Appeals urging support for road companies
were eloquent and optimistic. In a
speech pointing out advantages of
improved roads, the engineer for the Cincinnati,
Columbus, and Wooster Company exhorted:
Are you a philanthropist, and delight in
the improvement of your race? Improve, then,
your roads. Are you humane and take
pleasure in seeing the condition of your faithful
animals ameliorated? Improve your roads.
Are you religious, and aim to attend the house
29. Gephart, Transportation and
Industrial Development, 131-134.
30. Acts Passed at the Second Session
of the First General Assembly of the State of Ohio . . . (Chil-
licothe, 1803), I, 136-145; Gephart, Transportation
and Industrial Development, 134.
31. For a discussion of turnpike
charters and road building, see ibid., Chapter 8.
32. Cincinnati, Lebanon, and Springfield
Turnpike Company Charter; Cincinnati, Columbus, and
Wooster Turnpike Company Charter, Ohio
Turnpikes and Canals [n. d.]; miscellaneous pamphlets and
documents on internal improvements
collected by the Cincinnati Historical Society Library; William D.
Gallagher, "Ohio in 1838," The
Hesperian, I (May 1838), 8.
Internal Improvement Projects
15
of God in time, and with your passions
unruffled? Improve your roads. Do you belong to
a civilized community in any capacity,
and wish to increase and extend the blessing of
civilization? The same answer applies
with equal force.33
Similarly, but with less verbosity,
newspaper editors encouraged their readers to
support the companies. Their appeals
brought results and construction began, but
the roads were not completed for several
decades.34
Lending impetus to the demands for new
roads after 1825 was the state's deter-
mination to construct a canal system.
The two main branches of the system, the
Ohio Canal and the Miami Canal, were not
completed until 1834, but sections of
both were opened to traffic beginning in
1827. As new sections were completed,
local residents rushed to build access
routes to the artificial waterways. Rarely
could these be classified as improved
roads, but they were essential and improve-
ments came with time.35
The construction of the canal system
connecting Lake Erie with the Ohio River
was by far the most ambitious and
significant internal-improvement project under-
taken by the state between 1815 and
1834. Such a canal had been suggested early
in the state's history, but in the
absence of traffic and capital the project was not
seriously considered until after the War
of 1812. During the next decade business
and political leaders repeatedly urged
the General Assembly to appropriate funds.
In their opinion a canal would not only
provide an outlet for the interior regions
of the state but also would facilitate
the flow of trade between the East and West.36
Opposition to the plan in different
sections of the state was difficult to overcome.
Some individuals opposed it because
their area of the state would not benefit, and
others favored the more traditional road
and river improvements. Some feared the
state would incur too large a public
debt, and still others opposed an increase in
taxes. Governor Ethan A. Brown observed
in 1821 that,
The magnitude and novelty of the
enterprise and the dread of incurring a debt of so con-
siderable [an] amount as might be
required to complete the work, was sufficient to deter
many; but some local opposition, and
particularly no surplus of money . . . induced the
friends of the measure not to press the
step of authorizing a survey and estimates this year.37
Agitation for a canal system brought
results in February 1825. At that time the
legislature authorized the construction
of the two main lines of the system. The
most ambitious of these was the Ohio and
Erie Canal. It was to run from Ports-
mouth on the Ohio River to Cleveland on
Lake Erie using stretches of the Scioto,
Licking, Muskingum, and Cuyahoga rivers.
The second part of the system was
the Miami Canal from Cincinnati to
Dayton through the Great Miami River Val-
ley. These routes were selected to gain
the support of the most heavily populated
area of the state and were not, because
of terrain features and an inadequate water
supply, the most desirable. In 1822 the
canal commissioners had authorized surveys
33. John S. Williams, Address to an
Enterprising Public upon the Improvement of Roads, and the
Introduction of Track Roads (Cincinnati, 1833), 4-5.
34. Charles Cist, Cincinnati in 1841:
Its Early Annals and Future Prospects (Cincinnati, 1841), 80-82.
35. Buley, Old Northwest, I, 450.
36. Chester E. Finn, "The Ohio
Canals: Public Enterprise on the Frontier," Ohio State Archaeo-
logical and Historical Quarterly, LI (January 1942), 38-39.
37. Ethan A. Brown to Jonathan Dayton,
February 4, 1821, Brown Papers, Ohio Historical Society.
See also P. Beecher to [?], January 15, 1825,
Beecher-Trimble Collection, 1817-1892, Cincinnati His-
torical Society Library; [C. C.
Huntington and C. P. McClelland], History of the Ohio Canals: Their
Construction, Cost, Use, and Partial
Abandonment (Columbus, 1905), 7-14.
16
OHIO HISTORY
for five different river systems: the
Mahoning and Grand route; the Cuyahoga,
Tuscarawas, and Muskingum route; the
Black, Killbuck, and Muskingum route;
the Scioto and Sandusky route; and the
Maumee and Great Miami route. Engi-
neers considered each of these
alternatives practical, but as frequently happened,
practical considerations were ignored
for political expediency.38
Canal advocates not only sacrificed the
most desirable routes but also agreed
to other sectional demands to win votes.
The same act allocated funds for road
improvements in the northwestern part of
the state and included a promise from
the legislature to consider at a later
date the question of extending the Miami
Canal to Lake Erie. To placate other
areas of the state, the assemblymen agreed
to support legislation requiring all
counties to levy a tax for public education and
to revise the state's system of
taxation.39
Letters and editorials in Cincinnati
newspapers suggest that at first some
internal-improvement advocates in the
Queen City only reluctantly supported the
state's canal project. With some
justification they feared it would divert capital
needed to construct the canal at the
Falls on the Ohio River. In their opinion the
state should ask the national government
for assistance in building the canal from
Lake Erie to the Ohio River. If Congress
agreed, local and state funds could be
used for other projects.40
In 1820 the legislature approved a
resolution requesting the state's congressional
representatives to obtain a Federal land
grant for this trans-state canal. Congress,
however, was not inclined to make such a
concession at this time. The next year
the Ohio delegation asked Congress to
authorize a survey for an Ohio-Erie canal,
but again met refusal. Further attempts
to obtain Federal assistance were tempo-
rarily abandoned, and advocates of the
project accepted the fact that the state
would have to assume the initiative.41
Some local opponents of the proposed
canal argued that it would reduce the
commercial importance of Cincinnati if
the canal terminated west of the city. A
few business leaders believed that once
completed, farmers would use the canal
to by-pass the city and continue down
the river. Or, worse yet, merchants and
wholesalers could go to the farmer,
purchase produce, and ship it directly to New
Orleans. At the same time, farmers
living near Cincinnati contended it would bring
more produce to the city and lower
prices. To the editor of the Liberty Hall, these
fears were not justified:
Nay, we assume it as a position not to
be disputed, that the canal will increase the com-
merce of the city; that the produce of
the country will increase, that a wider and more
extensive scope of country will be made
tributary to the city; and that, so far from being
a detriment, the canal will make
Cincinnati more flourishing than it was ever known to be
before.42
When it became apparent that the state
government was actually going ahead
38. Huntington and McClelland, Ohio
Canals, 15-19.
39. Caleb Atwater, A History of the
State of Ohio, Natural and Civil (Cincinnati. 1838), 262; Hunt-
ington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 16-18;
Buley, Old Northwest, I, 493-494; Francis P. Wisenburger,
The Passing of the Frontier,
1825-1850 (Carl Wittke, ed., The
History of the State of Ohio, III, Columbus,
1941), 92-94.
40. Advertiser, February 16,
September 28, 1819; Liberty Hall, March 16, 1819, February 22, 1820.
41. John Kilbourn, comp., Public
Documents Concerning the Ohio Canals . . . from Their Com-
mencement down to the Close of the
Legislature of 1831-1832 (Columbus,
1832), 12, 15; Liberty Hall,
January 24, 1821.
42. Ibid., March 1, 8, September
20, 1825.
Internal Improvement Projects
17
with its plans, another group of
Cincinnati residents voiced its disapproval. These
persons did not object to the canals but
believed the role of the state was only to
"foster and encourage public
improvements"; private citizens should be allowed
"to enjoy the profits arising from
those improvements." In 1822 several political
leaders in Cincinnati had called a
public meeting to discuss the possiblity of or-
ganizing a private company to build a
canal to Dayton, but they went no further
than appointing a committee to raise
money for a survey. No further evidence was
found to indicate that local residents
seriously considered building the canals by
chartered companies.43
The lack of interest in any private
undertaking can be explained, perhaps, by
the opposition of the state's canal
commissioners. They argued that chartered com-
panies were monopolies which had been
granted "intangible and irrevocable" privi-
leges, and experience had demonstrated
that they frequently disregarded the
public's interest for the sake of
profits. Therefore, the commissioners concluded,
"It would be extremely hazardous
and unwise, to entrust private companies with
making those canals, which can be made
by the state."44
At the state level Governor Ethan A.
Brown, frequently called the "Father of
Ohio Canals," and Micajah Williams,
a state representative from Hamilton County
and later a canal commissioner, were
dynamic and tireless leaders in the campaign
for a canal system. In Cincinnati such
men as Jacob Burnet, Peyton S. Symmes,
Nathan Guilford, Daniel Drake, Ethan
Stone, and Samuel W. Davies endorsed the
plan and worked diligently persuading
others that a canal system would bring
numerous advantages to the city and
state. Moreover, public antagonism dimin-
ished after the legislature agreed to
finance the surveys for a canal at the Falls.
With the assurance of state aid for the
city's project, residents of the Queen City
began to take active interest in the
state canal system.45
Between 1820 and 1825 Cincinnati editors
printed numerous articles and edi-
torials pointing out the economic and
political importance of canals. At first some
of them attempted to use the Ohio-Erie
project to coerce Louisville and other river
towns into building a canal at the
Falls. The editor of the Liberty Hall hinted that
the Ohio River was not the city's only
route to the East, and that if Louisville con-
tinued to procrastinate, an alternative
would be built. Besides, he continued, with
two outlets,
The farmer's hopes would be doubled, and
a large part of the western population, instead
of looking only to the forlorn hope of a
damp, sickly town [New Orleans], remote from
the ocean and from Europe, with little
solid capital, where produce is often spoiled before
it arrives, or devoured by charges
before it is sold, would have access to the surest and
best supplied market in America.46
Other writers pointed out that the
canals would provide employment, put money
into circulation, and help the state's
economy recover from the Panic of 1819. Using
as examples similar projects in other
states, notably New York, they demonstrated
how canals increased land values and
created water supplies that could be used
43. Advertiser, June 11, 1822,
December 22, 1824, February 5, 1825; Western Spy, June 8, 15, 1822.
44. Third Annual Canal Commissioners'
Report, January 8, 1825, in Kilbourn, Public Documents,
138-139.
45. Liberty Hall, February 18,
December 6, 1820, June 12, 1822; Advertiser, January 11, February
15, 1820.
46. Liberty Hall, November 18,
1820.
to supply power for manufacturing. To those who wanted road improvements, they hinted that toll revenues would produce a surplus in the treasury for road construc- tion. With typical western optimism, they failed to question the economic sound- ness of the project. To them, there was little doubt that canals brought "happiness and prosperity, wealth and population."47 After the Ohio legislature approved the act of 1825, most residents in Cincinnati apparently focused their attention almost exclusively on the Miami Canal. Beyond periodic progress reports, the city's newspapers printed few references to the main branch of the system. Developments in the Miami Valley were of much greater interest to their subscribers. Ground-breaking ceremonies were held on July 21, 1825, with all the pageantry common to western celebrations. But the festivities were quickly concluded. "The next morning five teams and a large number of hands were at work on the very spot where the first earth was removed." Four months later, 750 men and 360 teams were working on different sections of the canal, and more laborers were "flocking in" every day. Many of these were farmers who lived near the construction sites; others were workers from the East Coast and newly arrived immigrants, particularly the Irish.48 47. Ibid., February 6, 1822, August 27, September 3, October 12, 1824, January 7, 1825; National Republican, September 14, 1824. 48. Liberty Hall, July 26, 1825; National Republican, December 6, 1825; Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 95-96. |
Internal Improvement Projects
19
In addition to the usual financial
difficulties and problems created by lack of
experience in construction techniques,
irresponsible contractors caused further de-
lays. The state commissioners let
contracts for specified jobs to the lowest bidder.
Unfortunately, too many individuals
suddenly considered themselves canal engi-
neers, and they submitted bids without
accurately estimating costs. Then, when
they realized they could not make a
profit, they abandoned the job.49 Even though
other problems continued to delay
construction, on November 28, 1827,
three fine boats, crowded with citizens,
delighted with the novelty and interest of the occa-
sion, left the basin six miles north of
Cincinnati, and proceeded to Middletown with the
most perfect success. The progress of
the boats was equal to about three miles an hour,
through the course of the whole line,
including the detention at the locks and all other
causes of delay, which are numerous in a
first attempt to navigate a new canal, when masters,
hands and horses are inexperienced, and
often the canal itself in imperfect order. The boats
returned to the basin with equal
success, and it is understood they have made several trips
since, carrying passengers and
freight.50
With the exception of the connecting
locks, the entire length of the Miami Canal
(sixty-seven miles) from Dayton to
Cincinnati was completed by January 1829 at
a reported cost of $746,852.70. The
question of a southern terminus had long cre-
ated dissension. Area farmers preferred
the cheaper route, following the course of
the Miami River. But this meant the city
would be by-passed, and local merchants
had no intention of letting this happen.
The merchants won their point, and the
canal was temporarily terminated less
than a mile from the river. Once the deci-
sion was made some business leaders
petitioned the legislature to make this the
permanent terminal point. Although they
were unsuccessful, they blocked further
construction until 1832, and the
connecting locks were not completed until 1834.51
The legislature discussed the
possibility of extending the Miami Canal to Lake
Erie at the same time it passed the
original act. It did not, however, authorize the
extension until 1831. At first Ohio
residents were reluctant to support the northern
extension. Canal advocates in Indiana
were as anxious as their counterparts in
Ohio to complete a transportation link
between the Ohio Valley and Lake Erie.
Early in the 1820's they formulated
plans to construct the Wabash Erie Canal via
the Wabash and Maumee rivers to Lake
Erie. To help cover construction costs,
Congress in 1827 gave the state of
Indiana a land grant amounting to all lands
along the entire route of the canal, on
an alternate section pattern ten miles wide.
This meant, in effect, that Indiana was
given jurisdiction over some of Ohio terri-
tory since the Maumee cut through the
northwestern section of the state. Ohioans
were not pleased with this development.
The conflict, however, was resolved through
legislative negotiations. Ohio agreed to
construct that part of the Wabash-Erie
Canal which lay within its borders and
Indiana gave up its claim to the land in
49. Micajah Williams to Alfred Kelly,
April 12, 1826, in "Letters to Ohio Canal Commissioners,"
Cincinnati Historical Society Library. See
also Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 22-29;
Weisenburger, Passing of the
Frontier, 94-97.
50. Sixth Annual Canal Commissioners'
Report, January 17, 1828, in Kilbourn, Public Documents,
284.
51. See Kilbourn. Public
Documents: Seventh Annual Canal Commissioners' Report, January 6,
1829, 333-334; Fourth Annual Canal
Commissioners' Report, December 10, 1825, 187-188; Special
Report of Canal Commissioners, February
16, 1830, 389-390; Tenth Annual Canal Commissioners'
Report, January 11, 1832, 2-5;
Cincinnati Saturday Evening Chronicle (cited hereafter as Chronicle),
January 31, 1829; Liberty Hall, July
29, August 5, 1829.
20
OHIO HISTORY
Ohio that Congress had included in the
1827 grant. Thereupon, Ohio residents
showed renewed interest in completing
the Miami extension.52
Actual construction on the northern
extension of the Miami Canal did not begin
until 1837. By 1845 the 114 mile canal
from Dayton to Toledo was completed.
Indiana began work on the Wabash and
Erie Canal several years earlier (1832).
By 1842 the junction with the Miami
Extension was completed, and a year later
the Wabash Canal was opened from Lake
Erie to Lafayette, Indiana. Although
the Miami Extension had almost no effect
on Cincinnati during the period of this
study, it was significant because it was
financed in part by a land grant from the
national government. This marked a
precedent whereby Congress could increase
its involvement in internal
improvements.53
As soon as the Miami Canal was opened to
traffic, newspaper editors assured
the public that the project was a
success. They pointed out that it had reduced
freight rates and increased the volume
of produce brought to the city not only
from the immediate vicinity but also
from the whole Miami Valley. As an example
one editor pointed out that in one week
in March 1829, more than 575 tons of
produce had been brought to the city.
The cost of transporting the whole amount
for a distance not exceeding twenty-five
miles was $2,800, and it only took ten
boats, sixty horses, sixty men, and
thirty boys three days to do the job. By com-
parison, to bring a similar amount by
wagon the same distance, it would take 575
wagons, 2,340 horses, and 575 men. And
then the cost would have been $7,200.
Moreover, toll receipts indicated the
canal would pay for itself in a short time.54
Such optimism was only partially
justified. Transportation costs declined, and
the volume of produce brought to
Cincinnati increased. Toll receipts, however, re-
mained disappointingly low. In 1828 the
state's entire canal system collected only
$8,570.69 in tolls. By 1832 the amount
had increased to $50,974.73, but this was
not enough to pay the interest on the
debt the state had incurred in constructing
canals. Although toll receipts continued
to increase between 1832 and 1840, they
did not reach the totals that advocates
of the program had promised. This can be
explained in part by the fact that
traffic remained primarily local.55
By 1835 neither the Miami nor the other
Ohio canals had made any significant
impact on the flow of exports from the
area served by Cincinnati. The city still
depended almost exclusively on the Ohio
River for sending flour, pork, whiskey,
corn, and tobacco--the main exports of
the region--to the New Orleans market.
Likewise, imports received in the city
continued to follow established trade routes.
Salt and sugar were brought up the river
from New Orleans. Iron came down the
river from Pittsburgh. Manufactured
items, depending on their weight, came from
both the eastern and southern routes.
One authority concluded that:
In short, the northern part of the Old
Northwest and the southern part each had its own
commercial outlet or gateway. In fact,
the southern part had two, the eastern and southern.
While the two parts of the Old Northwest
were now connected by a canal that ran from
52. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era, 99.
53. For a discussion of the extension of
the Miami Canal and the means by which it was financed,
see Huntington
and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 34-38; Burnet, Notes, 455-460.
Burnet was largely re-
sponsible for getting the bill
authorizing the grant through Congress. Documentary evidence of at-
tempts to obtain Federal assistance can
be found in Kilbourn, Public Documents.
54. Chronicle, March 21, 1829. See
also National Republican, April 4, May 6, 1827; Chronicle,
March 22, 1829.
55. Cist. Cincinnati in 1841, 84;
Eleventh Annual Canal Commissioners Report, January 22, 1833,
in Kilbourn, Public Documents, 37;
Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 43, 78.
Internal Improvement Projects
21
the Ohio river to Lake Erie, neither
part was making any considerable use of the outlet
of the other part.56
Although railroads belong to a later
era, some internal improvements advocates
claimed that they were superior to other
forms of transportation even before the
state's canal system was developed
enough to meet the expectations of its support-
ers. No one went so far as to suggest
that railroads should replace the canals al-
ready under construction. Rather, they
wanted them to supplement the system and
provide new routes to the coastal
cities, bypassing the river route through New
Orleans. Speaking for some railroad
promoters who were in the city, one writer
maintained that,
We are heartily tired of a Louisiana
Monopoly; it cannot be possible that the immense
productions of the almost boundless
regions of the West, are to be doomed always to be
filtered through the commission houses
of Orleans, or subject to the precarious market of
that city.57
One of the first proposals for a
railroad connecting Cincinnati with the East
Coast was made in the fall of 1827. At
this time a few prominent citizens discussed
the possibility of building a line from
Cincinnati to Charleston, South Carolina,
but they took no action.58 Eight
years later, in 1835, railroad advocates revived
the plan and formed a committee to
promote the project. Although it was to be a
cooperative venture among several
states, Daniel Drake, William Henry Harrison,
James Hall, and Edward D. Mansfield from
Cincinnati played important roles in
the proceedings. In its entirety the
project was quite comprehensive:
The proposed main trunk, from Cincinnati
to Charleston, would resemble an immense
horizontal tree extending its roots
through, or into, ten states, and a vast expanse of unin-
habited territory, in the northern
interior of the Union, while its branches would wind
through half as many populous states of
the southern sea-board.59
The Kentucky legislature chartered a
company in 1837 to build this railroad,
but the Panic of 1837 forced plans to be
temporarily abandoned.60
The Ohio legislature chartered the first
railroad company in the state, the Ohio
Canal and Steubenville Railway Company,
in February 1830. This company, with
a capital stock of $500,000 was to
construct a single or double lane track from
Steubenville to the Ohio Canal. Other
companies soon followed. The next year
the legislature chartered the Richmond,
Eaton, and Miami Railroad Company to
build a line from Richmond, Indiana, to
the Miami Canal. In 1832 it chartered
the Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad
Company to build an alternative route to
the Miami Canal Extension. Two other
companies, the Franklin, Springborough,
56. A. L. Kohlmeier, The Old
Northwest as the Keystone of the Arch of American Federal Union:
A Study in Commerce and Politics (Bloomington, Ind., 1938), 19-21; see also
Gephart, Transportation
and Industrial Development, 118-119. In a more recent study, Clark suggests that
"this division of Ohio
into two more or less separate market
structures is of little importance before 1835, . . ." He points
out that most traffic from the state
moved south before 1835 and that railroads significantly altered
trade patterns during the 1850's. Clark,
Grain Trade in the Old Northwest, 19.
57. Chronicle, March 17, 1827. See
also ibid., February 20, 1830, January 1, 22, February 12, 1831,
February 18, 1832; Cincinnati
American, May 27, 1831.
58. Ebenezer S. Thomas, Reminiscences
of the Last Sixty-Five Years ... (Hartford, 1840), I, 104-111.
59. Rail-Road from the Banks of the
Ohio River to the Tide Waters of the Carolinas and Georgia
(Cincinnati, 1835), 7.
60. Hollander, Cincinnati Southern
Railway, 10-11.
22 OHIO
HISTORY
and Wilmington Railroad Company and the
Chillicothe and Lebanon Railroad
Company, were chartered the same year to
build feeder lines to the Miami Canal.
The Cincinnati, Harrison, and
Indianapolis Railroad Company and the Cincinnati
and St. Louis Railroad Company, also
chartered in 1832, planned to build lines
that would open new territories to trade
with Cincinnati.61 This was only a beginning,
for during the next decade the
legislature chartered many additional companies.
All of these charters contained similar
provisions. Capital stock varied from
$500,000 to $1,000,000 depending upon
the size of the project. Likewise, the num-
ber of directors varied, nine or twelve
being the most common. The directors had
the right to select the "best
route" between the specified cities, and most charters
provided for the right of eminent
domain. A few included a provision authorizing
the use of construction materials along
the route. In all cases the state retained
the right to purchase the company.
Although several leading citizens tried to stim-
ulate interest in railroad construction,
none were actually built in the Cincinnati
region before 1834.
By expanding the city's trade area, most
of these developments contributed
significantly to the economic growth of
Cincinnati. But other factors were also in-
volved. Perhaps the most significant was
the rapid decline in transportation costs.
Statistical information on
transportation rates for the years covered in this study
is meager, and economic conditions and
seasonal variations caused rates to fluctuate
considerably. Nevertheless, rates
apparently dropped substantially between 1816
and 1834. They were "fairly
high" before the Panic of 1819, then "declined dras-
tically" during the subsequent
depression. After the economy began to recover,
they continued the downward trend, but
the decline was less severe.62
Between 1815 and 1834 Cincinnati became
a major trade entrep??t within the
Old Northwest. To achieve this
distinction local merchants supported improved
transportation facilities with markets
in the East and New Orleans. Equally as
important was the development of access
routes to the back country which brought
farmers to the city's markets. Business
and political leaders realized that the po-
tential expansion of the city's economy
was limited unless the market area was
expanded. Consequently, they favored
extending and improving existing trade
routes and quickly endorsed those
projects which furthered the expansion of trade.
Residents of the.city, however,
frequently disagreed with farmers in the back
country over proposed routes. Both were
motivated by their own interests. City
residents, merchants in particular,
wanted all projects to terminate at Cincinnati,
and many citizens refused to support
those that did not. Most farmers, on the
other hand, tended to favor cheaper,
more direct routes to the river. With the ex-
ception of roads, they were indifferent
to the fact that a proposed improvement
might by-pass the Cincinnati markets. In
most cases the city won out. It had a
greater supply of capital and more
influence in the state legislature than the rural
areas of the county.
City rivalries, inexperience in proper
construction methods and political logroll-
ing delayed the completion of most
internal-improvement projects. Equally serious
61. Acts of Local Nature Passed at
the First Session of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly of the
State of Ohio . . . (Columbus, 1830), XXVIII, 184; Acts of a Local
Nature Passed at the First Session
of the Thirtieth General Assembly of
the State of Ohio . . . (Columbus,
1832), XXX, 11-14, 15-22,
41-45, 103-109, 117-120, 161-167.
62. Thomas S. Berry, "Western
Prices Before 1861: A Study of the Cincinnati Market," Harvard
Economic Studies, LXXIV (1943), 44.
Internal Improvement Projects 23
obstacles were a lack of capital and an
unwillingness to increase taxes. To solve
these problems, internal-improvements
advocates turned to the state and national
governments. Committed, as were most
Americans to the principles of laissez faire,
they nevertheless were willing to seek
governmental assistance to solve problems
which blocked economic progress. Both
levels of government responded favorably
to local demands for help even though
the amount of assistance was often limited.
Money was received from both the state
and national governments for canal con-
struction, river improvements, and road
building and improvements. Private citi-
zens also invested money and labor in
these projects, and they assumed the major
responsibility for local construction.
The perseverance and ingenuity of local
internal-improvements advocates com-
bined with the financial assistance
provided by the state and national governments
helped to remove a major obstacle to the
city's economic development. Improved
transportation facilities made possible
the establishment of a firm economic base
for the city and stimulated long-term
economic growth.
RICHARD T. FARRELL
Internal-Improvement Projects in
Southwestern Ohio, 1815-1834
During the first three decades of the
nineteenth century, merchants, farmers, and
manufacturers successfully established
Cincinnati's economic prominence in the
West. Taking advantage of the city's strategic
location, pioneer merchants supplied
the increasing number of immigrants from
Europe and the eastern states with the
goods they needed before they moved up
the valleys of the Great Miami and
Little Miami rivers. As farmers
gradually settled this region, agricultural production
increased. Merchants began collecting
farm surpluses and providing farmers with the
merchandise they could not produce for
themselves. The availability of agricultural
surpluses helped to promote milling,
brewing, distilling, and packing industries,
and these in turn created new demands
for products from the fields and forests.
The resultant increase in farm
production encouraged manufacturers to produce
tools, machines, and other items for
households and farms. Together, the growth
of industries and expansion of
agriculture stimulated trade.1
The city prospered as a result of the
combined efforts of merchants, manufac-
turers, and farmers.2 Responding
to the demands for locally made goods, manu-
facturing interests played an
increasingly important role in the city's economy.
The value of products manufactured in
Cincinnati in 1819 was $1,059,459, and
1,238 of the city's total population of
over 9,000 were engaged in manufacturing
or related service industries. By 1830
the value of manufactured products had
reached $2,800,000, and more people were
involved in manufacturing than in com-
mercial or service occupations.
Commercial transactions followed a
similar pattern. In 1819 the city's exported
products, consisting chiefly of flour,
pork, bacon, hams, lard, whiskey and tobacco,
were valued at $1,334,080. By 1829 the
value and quantity of export items ex-
ceeded three million dollars.
Agricultural products still headed the list, but such
items as hats, cabinet furniture,
printing materials, clothing, casting machinery,
and tin and copperware appeared with
greater frequency. Taking into account
1. For general discussions of the
economic development of Cincinnati, see Richard C. Wade, The
Urban Frontier, the Rise of Western
Cities, 1790-1830 (Cambridge, 1959);
William F. Gephart, Trans-
portation and Industrial Development
in the Middle West (New York, 1909);
Randolph C. Downes,
"Trade in Frontier Ohio," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XVI (March 1930), 467-494.
2. The following evidence of economic
growth in Cincinnati is taken from Richard T. Farrell,
"Cincinnati, 1800-1830: Economic Development
Through Trade and Industry," Ohio History, LXXVII
(Autumn 1968), 111-129.
Mr. Farrell is assistant professor of
history at the University of Maryland.