ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR.
William Medill's War with the Indian
Traders, 1847
William Medill's tenure as Commissioner
of Indian Affairs in the Polk administra-
tion came at the critical time of
continental expansion which resulted in forceful
removal of the Indian from lands desired
by white settlers. Soon after he took
office Medill attempted to make some
basic reforms in policy governing relations
with the Indians. One of the most
controversial aspects of his reforming activities
as commissioner revolved around his
determination to crack down on the rampant
abuses in the Indian trade. The
difficulties he encountered demonstrate the grip
private trading firms held on
governmental policy relative to Indian affairs.
Medill's background was typical for a
politician of his day. Born in New Castle
County, Delaware, in 1802, he studied
law at Newark Academy (Delaware Col-
lege) in 1825 before leaving for
Lancaster, Ohio, where he was admitted to the
bar in 1830. From here the handsome,
full-bearded, ambitious young man entered
Ohio Democratic politics. Serving first
as a state representative between 1835 and
1838, he then won election to two terms
in the United States House of Representa-
tives (1839-1843).1 Because of his
radical attitudes on money and the bank issue,
Medill became known in the state as a
follower of the Van Buren wing of the
Democratic party.2
After James K. Polk's victory in the
presidential campaign of 1844, Ohio
political bosses managed to have Medill appointed
second assistant postmaster
general, a job that would allow him to
funnel a large amount of patronage toward
Ohio. Nevertheless, the Ohio Van Buren
faction, like all of Van Buren's followers,
remained perturbed over Polk's
inclination to support the conservative, pro-bank,
1. Medill also gained some note for
presiding over the Ohio Constitutional Convention in
1850, as governor 1853-1856, and serving
as the first comptroller of the federal treasury in
Buchanan's administration, 1857-1861.
There is some controversy over the exact date of Medill's
birth. Several dates, ranging from 1801
to 1805, have been used, and it is probable that the exact
date is lost to history. The most
commonly used date, however, appears to be 1802. Biographical
Directory of the American Congress,
1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), 1397;
Charles B. Gal-
breath, History of Ohio (Chicago,
1925), II, 59; Dwight L. Smith, "William Medill, 1853-1856,
in Governors of Ohio (Columbus,
1954), 68-71.
2. Edgar Allen Holt, Party Politics
in Ohio, 1840-1850 (Ohio Historical Collections, I, Colum-
bus, 1930), 173.
Mr. Trennert is Assistant Professor of
History, Temple University. Part of the research for
this article was made possible through a
summer research grant from Temple University.
paper money wing of the party led by Lewis Cass of Michigan.3 This approval seemed a deliberate attempt by the President "to favor the conservative faction in his appointments and . . . to keep down the men who stood firm in the support of Gen. Jackson and Martin Van Buren."4 As a result, when Polk decided to replace the existing Indian Commissioner, T. Hartley Crawford, some Ohio Demo- crats actively promoted Medill for the job as a means of demonstrating that the President harbored no hostile attitude toward Van Buren men. This move would also place a representative from Ohio in high councils of government.5 The President responded favorably to this request, and on October 28, 1845, Medill
3. Ibid.; Francis P. Weisenburger, The Passing of the Frontier, 1825-1850 (Carl Wittke, ed., The History of the State of Ohio, III, Columbus, 1941), 441-443. 4. W. Ewing to Medill, November 1, 1845. William Medill Papers, Library of Congress. 5. Thomas L. Hamer to Medill, October 8, 1845, Medill Papers. Hamer, a Jacksonian Demo- crat, urged Medill to accept the appointment. "The continuous presence in Washington of one or two gentlemen of experience with whom the President is personally acquainted and in whom he has confidence, could be of great advantage to our State and her citizens. I think therefore you will accept it if you have already not done so." |
48
OHIO HISTORY
received the top post in the Indian
Bureau.
At the time of the appointment, William
L. Marcy, Polk's Secretary of War,
technically headed the Office of Indian
Affairs. Although Marcy was a man of
ability, the Mexican War and the
political duties of a Cabinet member diverted
his attention to other matters, leaving
responsibility for determining Indian policy
to the new commissioner. Medill had
absolutely no prior experience in dealing
with Indians, but he soon proposed
numerous reforms in Indian policy based on
his experience as an officeholder, such
as strengthening the education and civiliza-
tion programs, cutting expenses in the
department, and improving the caliber of
men employed by the bureau.6 His
most ambitious and controversial project was
the struggle to reform trade relations
with the Indians.
From the first contact between white and
Indian, abuses, frauds, and debauchery
had been characteristic of their
relations, with the private trader often contributing
more than his share to the difficulties.
With the Jacksonian removal policy of the
1830's, when all eastern tribes were
moved west of the Mississippi River, many
persons hoped a permanent solution to
the "Indian problem" had been discovered.
The basic premise of this policy
revolved around the belief that white contact with
the Indian was degrading to the native
and was the cause of the inter-racial con-
flicts. The goal of the Government was
to end such problems peacefully. This
seemed best accomplished by civilizing,
educating, and assimilating the red popula-
tion. The lands west of the Mississippi
seemed ideally suited to this purpose.7
When the actual process of removal began
in the mid-1830's, Congress tried to
establish permanent trade and
intercourse regulations to protect the Indians from
all the evils of the white man's world
until the slow process of civilization was
completed. Consequently, in 1834
Congress completely revised the laws regulating
trade and intercourse with them,
incorporating the new policies. This legislation
defined the unorganized territory west
of the Mississippi as "Indian Country," and
set regulations and penalties to
safeguard the Indian in his new home. Most of
the provisions simply reiterated past
laws, but taken together, they show the intent
of Congress. Liquor was forbidden; the
licensing system for traders was tightened;
no whites were permitted to hunt or trap
in the Indian country; no persons could
settle or inhabit any land guaranteed to
the Indians, and the Government would
forcibly remove anyone violating these
laws.8 The intent of these provisions,
clearly, was to benefit the Indian, not
the settler.
In the decade following removal, the
Government attempted to live up to what
it considered was beneficial for the
Indian and renewed attempts to foster civilza-
6. For some of Medill's reform
proposals, see Medill to Marcy, December 30, 1846, in
"Changes in the Public
Service," House Executive Documents 70, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 500;
Medill to Thomas H. Harvey, Indian
Superintendent at St. Louis, January 7, 1847, Records of
the Office of Indian Affairs, Letters
Sent, Vol. 39, Record Group 75, National Archives; "Annual
Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
1846," Senate Executive Documents 1, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 493, pp. 214-228.
7. Francis P. Prucha, "Indian
Removal and the Great American Desert," Indian Magazine
of History, LIX (1963), 309-322.
8. For a complete discussion of the
reasons behind the revisions of the 1830's see Francis
P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in
the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse
Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). The congressional testimony
concerning the 1834
bills is contained in "Regulating
the Indian Department," House Report 474, 23 Cong., 1 Sess.,
No. 263.
William Medill 49
tion. During the 1840's a reforming
spirit pervaded the Indian Bureau and this
produced some advances toward
assimilation, particularly in the form of manual
labor schools.9 Yet as the
decade wore on evidence shows that many of the Indians
were not being reached by the civilizing
effort, or did not care to be. One of the
major reasons for this failure seemed to
be that the private traders continued to
operate without much concern for the
welfare of the Indian.
By the 1840's the Indian trade was
pretty much of an unglamorous shell of
what it had been. The great days of the
fur trade had ended with the extermination
of the beaver a decade earlier. About
the only remaining way for traders to make
a profit was to supply the wants of the
tribesmen in return for their annuity money
(federal payments due for lands
relinquished) and for other valuables, such as
buffalo robes. Competition between
traders for this patronage was stiff. Often
traders used unscrupulous methods, as
getting the Indians drunk in order to obtain
a share of their business.10 The
major firm dealing with the Indians was the Pierre
Chouteau, Jr. & Co.--still commonly
called the American Fur Company.
The Chouteau family, by reason of its
long history in Missouri, was extremely
prestigious and influential. Chouteau's
respectability, however, did not prevent him
from engaging in unsavory practices in
order to retain domination of the trade.11
In this regard he often found it
necessary to join with other leading traders, par-
ticularly George W. and William G. Ewing
of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to change or
evade undesirable regulations. Thus the
traders, big and small, only adhered to the
Indian intercourse laws when their
convenience was served and profits were gained.
Agent Thomas P. Moore, describing the
operation of these men on the Missouri,
presents an excellent picture of the
problem:
The agent is charged with the duty of
resisting and punishing infractions of the inter-
course law, whether committed by a large
and powerful trading company, or a band of
unlicensed traders. The first have the
power, from their extensive intercourse with the
Indians, and the number of their
employees, to counteract every move adverse to their
schemes, and to render his [the agent's]
stay in the country impossible by denying him
shelter or aid of any kind; while the
second travel in small armed bands, prepared to resist
the execution of the law.12
When Medill took office he rapidly
became aware of the difficulties in enforcing
the trade and intercourse laws. At the
same time Congress began one of its periodic
investigations of Indian policy, and on
August 10, 1846, the House of Representa-
9. Francis P. Prucha, "American
Indian Policy in the 1840's: Visions of Reform," John G.
Clark, ed., The Frontier Challenge (Lawrence,
Kan., 1971), 81-93.
10. Such methods, of course, were not
new to Indian trade. Writing about some of the
unsavory trading tactics during the
colonial period, Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the Amer-
ican Indian (New York, 1972), 33, states that "Rum was in fact
one of the main reasons for
the traders success with the Indians..
.the trader could easily induce his warriors to have a free
'dram' of rum before the business of
barter began...one dram called for another, and before
long the tribesmen were thoroughly
drunk. The trader could then literally steal the skins and
furs.... "
11. Hiram M. Chittenden, The American
Fur Trade of the Far West (New York, 1936), I,
365-368, 381-382. The American Fur
Company, John Jacob Astor's economic giant, had
actually passed out of existence in
1834. At that date Chouteau acquired the company's western
operations. Chittenden discusses
Chouteau's background and states that "He made no attempt
to introduce a higher standard of
business morality in the trade than it was accustomed to....
In short his code of business was
sufficiently elastic to fit the situation with which he had to deal."
12. Moore to Harvey, September 21, 1846,
in "Annual Report.. .1846," p. 292.
50 OHIO
HISTORY
tives called upon the Secretary of War
to give them suggestions for reform.13 Marcy
turned the responsibility for gathering
the information over to Medill. This enabled
the new commissioner to make a thorough
investigation of Indian policy.
Two chronic problems drew much of
Medill's attention. The first was the illegal
liquor trade. Under the existing laws a
fine of $500 and forfeiture of goods were
the only penalties imposed upon anyone
convicted of introducing liquor into Indian
country. These restrictions were
notoriously weak. So much whiskey made its
way to the frontier that a national
scandal had developed. British traders smuggled
liquor down from Canada, Mexicans brought
it up from Santa Fe, and, more
significantly, American frontiersmen
imported it from the adjoining states. For
nearly ten years almost every official
along the frontier had noticed the prevalence
of whiskey sellers and the resultant
effect on the Indians. In 1846 things seemed
worse. "Some efficient steps should
be taken," pleaded subagent Robert B. Mitchell
at Council Bluffs, "to prevent the
frequent use, and the ease of obtaining and
introducing whiskey to this nation. This
article is kept in great abundance near the
[Iowa] State line, where squaws and
young men exchange horses, guns, blankets
and other articles that they can get on
credit from the traders, for whiskey."14
Such activities angered Medill and he
minced no words when it came to the use
of alcohol among the Indians. His main
concern was that whiskey was under-
mining the Government's attempt to
improve the condition of the Indians. "I
cannot too strongly impress on
you," he wrote to one agent, "the importance of
the duty imposed upon you. The
prevention of the use of strong drink has almost
been the one thing needful to ensure the
prosperity of the Indian race and its
advancement in civilization. The use of
it has tended more to the demoralization
of the Indians than all other causes
combined."15 In his annual report for 1846,
Medill stated, "Whiskey is the
greatest obstacle to their rapid moral and social
elevation, and no means should be spared
to break up the traffic in it, now and
heretofore so extensively and
injuriously carried on among the Indians, principally
by the descriptions of persons
[unscrupulous white men] above mentioned." One
means of making improvements seemed to
be that of changing the law:
Under the present laws, the only penalty
for introducing liquor into the Indian country,
and selling or bartering it to the
Indians, is, in the former case, a forfeiture of the article
if found, and in the latter a fine if
convicted of the offense. The profits of the trade are
so great that the risk of detection and
loss of the article is, and will be incurred without
hesitation.16
Similar problems arose in connection
with annuity payments. These payments,
often in cash, were compensation for
past treaties and agreements. In 1834 Con-
gress decided to stop giving funds to
heads of families and began the practice of
supplying annuities to the chiefs for
distribution. Supposedly this system would
end the perpetration of fraud and allow
the chiefs to apply the funds "to the
13. Congressional Globe, 29
Cong., 1 Sess., 1221; Medill to Marcy, December 30, 1846, in
"Changes in the Public
Service." The Senate was also looking to changes in Indian policy, par-
ticularly in relation to the addition of
new agents, see Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess.,
1198.
14. Mitchell to Harvey, September 11,
1846, in "Annual Report . .1846," p. 301.
15. Medill to Moore, April 1, 1846.
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 38.
16. "Annual Report.. .1846,"
p. 228.
William Medill 51
expenses of their Government, to the
purpose of education, or to some object of
general concern."17 But
paying annuities to the chiefs and headmen failed to
improve the condition of the Indians.
Entrusting a large amount of money to a
few individuals only proved to be a
windfall for unscrupulous traders. The chiefs,
finding the temptation to run up huge
personal debts too much to resist, charged
their purchases to tribal funds, leaving
little or no money for the rest of the tribe.
These debts thus became the nation's
debts, and the United States Government
soon found itself making annuity
payments directly to the traders to satisfy the
personal accounts of a few tribesmen.
Then, too, once the chiefs and principal
men became indebted to the traders, they
were forced to act as the traders desired
or lose their credit.18 The
trading companies consequently held enormous power
over the tribes--a power that could be used
against the Indian Office if
necessary.19
Numerous reports reached the
commissioner's office enumerating the abuses
perpetrated under the annuity system.20
By early 1847, Medill decided on the
necessity of several changes. First,
annuities must be kept under tight control to
prevent the degradation that accompanied
the accumulation of too much money
in the hands of a few tribesmen. From
the commissioner's viewpoint, the Indian,
"who is naturally improvident and
has little regard for money when it comes into
his possession, after supplying his
temporary wants, has the means of living for a
time, independent of industry or
exertion, in idleness and profligacy, until the
indisposition to labor or the habit of
intemperance becomes so strong, that he
degenerates into a wretched
outcast." Two other proposals were made at the same
time. One suggestion would have made a
cut in the size of the annuity should the
tribe decrease in number, and the other
proposed that "goods and provisions"
should be furnished in lieu of cash if
the tribes would agree.21 These changes were
all intended to reduce the amount of
money available to the tribes and thus elimi-
nate the temptation for whiskey sellers
and traders to cheat and debauch the Indian.
Medill discovered also that some trading
companies were actively working
against the efforts of Indian agents to
help the tribes. He found that if agents were
overly zealous in trying to protect the
Indians from fraud, the traders used their
political power in Congress to have the
objectionable men replaced. One corre-
spondent wrote Medill to warn him that
"the most active representatives of the
Indian traders" were presently
using such threats to force Thomas H. Harvey,
Indian Superintendent at St. Louis, to
tone down his attempts to prosecute several
17. "Regulating the Indian
Department," 9-10, 27-28.
18. An excellent account of the
activities of the traders is contained in a report by Capt.
J. R. B. Gardiner, who witnessed the
annuity payment of the Sac and Fox in 1843, printed in the
Washington Daily Union, October 20, 1847.
19. Ordinarily the traders used their
power to get the chiefs to oppose changes in depart-
mental practices that might hurt
profits. Also it was not beyond the realm of possibility for the
traders to actually excite hostilities.
"These people," wrote one observer, "would not hesitate
to get up a.. .war even at the sacrifice
of a few lives provided it offered any inducement in the
way of profit." See D. D. T.
Grant to General P. Whitmore, October 27, 1847, Office of Indian
Affairs, Letters Received,
Miscellaneous, 1847.
20. See, for example, an office
memo by Medill dated July 27, 1846, Medill Papers. Other
indications of the situation appear
later in Harvey to Medill, June 5, 1847, Office of Indian
Affairs, Letters Received, St. Louis
Superintendency, and Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847,
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent,
Vol. 40.
21. "Annual Report...1846," p.
217; Medill to Robert B. Mitchell, January 22, 1847, Office
of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol.
39.
52
OHIO HISTORY
companies for fraud and liquor
smuggling. The traders, continued the letter, "are
men of great means, activity, and
determination in procuring the removal of agents
of the Government connected with Indian
affairs; and although not seen often in
such efforts are generally prime movers
in asking a change when the government
agents unite energy and high character
for integrity."22 Such information un-
doubtedly upset Medill. He soon
determined to correct the situation, and this
resolve developed into a crusade against
the traders.
Until Congress could be urged into
taking legislative action, Medill's ability to
change the system was severely limited.
He, however, did all in his power to
reduce the abuses. Agents were directed
to be especially active in halting the
liquor trade. "There are but few
whites residing in the district of the country
referred to," noted one of his
instructions, "except at distant and widely separate
trading points: and over these traders
and their employees it will be your duty to
keep a watchful eye."23
Although traders were occasionally
caught and prosecuted as a result of this
surveillance, the illegal activities
continued much as before--the vastness of the
Indian country and the paucity of agents
assured the traders relative immunity.
Quite a few cases of fraud were also
uncovered, but the larger trading outfits
usually managed to evade punishment.
Even though companies such as Chouteau's
and the Ewing's were often found to be
cheating the tribesmen out of annuities,
charging unfair prices, and smuggling
liquor, their effective lobby in Washington,
especially among the Missouri
congressmen, was usually successful in clouding the
issue sufficiently for them to escape
conviction.24 Such methods as appealing to the
President, the Secretary of War, and
Congress, and if necessary bribing witnesses
were used. Clearly, then, new laws and
impartial enforcement were necessary if
the tribes were to be protected.
Upon the urging of the Indian Office,
Congress began consideration of the revi-
sion of Indian policy early in 1847. On
February 9 the House committee on Indian
affairs reported a bill making major
amendments in the laws of 1834.25 The com-
mittee proposed changes in the trade and
intercourse regulations generally in line
with Medill's recommendations, and on
March 3, 1847 they became law. By far
the most significant features of the
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1847 came
in the modification of the annuity
provisions and a tightening up of the liquor trade.
Sections II and III of the act provided
that
Any person who shall sell, exchange or
barter, give, or dispose of, any spirituous liquor
or wine to an Indian, in the Indian
country, or who shall introduce, or attempt to intro-
22. T. P. Andrews to Medill, December
24, 1846, Medill Papers. There are indications that
Medill was aware of the pressure of
traders as soon as he came into office in 1845. See George
W. Ewing to Medill, November 19, 1845,
in the George W. Ewing Papers, Indiana Division,
Indiana State Library.
23. Medill to Moore, April 1, 1846.
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 38.
24. Medill to Harvey, October 31, 1846,
March 27, 1847, and Medill to G. W. Ewing, July 17,
1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters
Sent, Vols. 38 and 39. One outstanding example of the
trader's power to evade prosecution
comes to light in Medill's attempt in 1846 to prosecute
Pierre Chouteau, Jr. & Co. for
smuggling liquor up the Missouri. Despite practically an ironclad
case, Chouteau managed to delay the
trial long enough (two years) to buy off the witnesses and
persuade the Government not to revoke
his license. The final result was a small fine and no
inconvenience to Chouteau's operations.
Much of the correspondence relating to this case is
found in Office of Indian Affairs,
Letters Received, St. Louis Superintendency, 1846-1849.
25. Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 366.
William Medill 53
duce, any spirituous liquor or
wine in the Indian country,. . shall in the former case be
subject to imprisonment for a period not
exceeding two years, and in the latter case not
exceeding one year.
* *
*
All annuities or other moneys, and all
goods, stipulated by treaty to be paid to or furnished
to any Indian tribe, shall, at the discretion
of the President or Secretary of War, instead
of being paid over to the chiefs, or to
such persons as they shall designate, be divided and
paid over to the heads of families and
other individuals entitled to participate therein, or,
with the consent of the tribe, be
applied to such purposes as will best promote the happi-
ness and prosperity of the members
thereof, under such regulations as shall be prescribed
by the Secretary of War.
Annuities, where sufficiently large,
might be paid semi-annually. In an attempt
to dampen the Indian's thirst, annuity
money could also be withheld from those
natives under the influence of alcohol
or those refusing to cooperate with the
Government in preventing the use of
ardent spirits.26
Medill was pleased with the text of the
reforms. "It is probably one of the most
salutary laws affecting our Indian
relations that has ever been passed," he wrote
to Thomas Harvey. The new annuity
provisions seemed to promise great improve-
ments for the Indians. In the past
"it was too often the case that the upright and
well disposed reaped little or no
benefit . . . whatever; the idle and profligate
recklessly incurring large debts on the
faith of them, which through improper
influences [of traders] the chiefs would
be induced to recognize and sanction as
national or binding on the whole tribe,
and order to be paid out of their annuities,
thus robbing the better class to make
good the improvidence of the worse."27
The trading companies reacted violently
to the provisions of the 1847 act; and
Medill, as the author of the
legislation, received most of their fury. Aiding the
companies' own powerful lobbyists were a
number of influential politicians, includ-
ing his own party colleague, Missouri
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, and Daniel
Webster, a new England Whig.28 Because
the traders knew they lacked moral
grounds for attacking the liquor
restrictions and there was little chance for repeal,29
they concentrated on blocking the
annuity provisions. In spite of the opposition
being mobilized against him, Medill
showed no inclination to be swayed from his
determination to break the hold of the
traders over the Indians. Whenever lobbyists
approached him asking that some
provision of the law not be enforced lest the
companies lose money, he turned them
down with ill-disguised hostility.30 The
traders, consequently, attempted to go
over the commissioner's head. Chouteau,
26. U. S. Statutes At Large, IX,
203-204.
27. Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847,
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 40. See
also, "Annual Report, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, 1847," Senate Executive Documents 1,
30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 503, p. 476.
28. Both Benton and Webster were very
close to the Chouteau firm; Benton from his Missouri
background and interest in the fur
trade, and Webster from holding financial interests in the
company. See Bernard DeVoto, Across
the Wide Missouri (Boston, 1947), 24; and Elbert B.
Smith, Magnificent Missourian, The
Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia, 1958), 66-67,
80-82.
29. Traders generally gave lip service
to the desirability of keeping alcohol from the Indians.
However, a few times they had tried to
convince the Government to ease restrictions. Their
argument was always the same, they
wanted liquor only to meet British competition. They were
always flatly refused. See Chittenden,
American Fur Trade, I, 356.
30. Charles Findlay to P. Chouteau, Jr.
& Co., August 22, 1847, Chouteau Papers, Missouri
Historical Society.
54
OHIO HISTORY
Ewing, and others fired off strong
letters to Secretary of War Marcy defending the
old system of annuities on economic and
humanitarian grounds. The traders
claimed the law would ruin business. A
number of tribes had run up substantial
debts and the companies feared they
would not be collectable according to the new
annuity provision: "If the payment
of annuities are to be made, not as usual to
the Chiefs, but to 'heads of families,'
it follows that the Chiefs, head men and
braves, whose obligations we hold, can
never meet them, and the traders must
bear consequences enormously injurious
to them."31
Unable immediately to postpone the
implementation of this new provision, the
traders turned their attention to making
sure that existing debts were not declared
null and void. Several of the companies
held large claims dating prior to the
enactment of the 1847 law; the
Potawatomies, for example, were said to owe
$74,000.32 Should the notes be held
invalid, the traders said, the Government would
be in a position of imposing ex post
facto laws. At least one firm contended that
the trading companies were doing more
than the Government to insure the survival
of many tribes. George W. Ewing wrote to
Secretary Marcy that while "trade with
the border tribes has been adverse and
even disastrous," his company had gen-
erously continued to serve the natives
because "during the long interval between the
payment of annuities these destitute
people fall back on their traders and demand
credit and have always got it. Without
it they would perish & suffer."33 Using such
reasoning, the traders asked the
Government to suspend the act of 1847 until such
a time as injustice would not be worked
against them. In essence they wanted
payment of all claims on the books prior
to March 3, 1847. Benton hinted to
Medill that such would be prudent
policy.34
Still the commissioner refused to be
influenced by the trading companies or his
colleagues. The feud, of course, soon
became public knowledge. Medill hastened
to assure all interested parties that no
injustice would result and that the law did
not operate retroactively. But he also
made it abundantly clear that the Indian
Office had no intention of paying any
fraudulent claims, no matter when they were
incurred. On August 30, 1847, the
companies were instructed to submit all claims
to the bureau before April 1848 for a
decision as to whether the debts were of a
truly tribal character or had been
incurred by individual Indians. Only those claims
found to be valid would be paid out of
tribal funds.35 The companies readily sub-
31. P. Chouteau, W. G. and G. W. Ewing,
and S. S. Phelps to Marcy, [1847?], Office of
Indian Affairs, Letters Received,
Miscellaneous, 1847. Medill wrote to Harvey on August 30,
1847, reporting, "Since the passage
of the law, letters have been received by the President and
this Department from some of the traders
& alleged creditors of the Indians against per capita
payments, which they represent as an
innovation upon past usage, & a consequent invasion of
their vested rights."
32. Report of subagent Alfred J.
Vaughan, September 29, 1847, Chouteau Papers. In 1848
the traders finally claimed $64,000 due
from the Potawatomies. See Petition to the President,
November 20, 1848, George W. Ewing
Papers.
33. George W. Ewing to Marcy, May 8,
1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received,
Miscellaneous, 1847.
34. On May 8, 1847, Benton wrote to
Medill, enclosing a letter from Chouteau, urging that
"the law of the last session,
declaring void contracts made by the Indians for money or goods,
not be made to operate
retroactively." See Medill to Benton, May 18, 1848, Office of
Indian
Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 39.
35. W. G. and G. W. Ewing to Medill,
October 26, 1846, George W. Ewing Papers; Medill to
W. G. and G. W. Ewing, November 20,
1847, and Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847, Office of
Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 40.
William Medill 55
mitted their claims. At the same time
realizing that Medill held the key to their
success, they also launched an attack on
the commissioner, denouncing him in the
press, working to convince members of
Congress that he was prejudiced against the
traders, and attempting to have him
removed from office.36
William G. Ewing, senior partner of W.
G. & G. W. Ewing Company, even made
an unsuccessful bid for election to Congress
which was at least partly based on his
desire to give the company more
political influence.37 Medill retaliated by allowing
the Washington Daily Union, the
administration paper, to print from his files "a
few specimens of the dealing of traders
with the Indians." These letters were par-
ticularly critical of the Chouteau and
Ewing operations, stating among other things
that the old annuity system had
"left the way open, if it did not offer, inducements
to their [chiefs] being bribed to allow
unjust and unfounded claims against the
tribe."38 As a result,
by the end of 1847 the Indian Commissioner and the private
trading companies were at loggerheads.
By April 1848 pressure on the
commissioner had become intense for him to act
favorably on the debts allegedly owed
the companies. According to previous
instructions, the firms had submitted to
the Indian Office for adjudication claims of
$163,000, which they classified as
"national debts."39 The Ewing brothers as well
as lobbyists for Chouteau and several
other companies flocked to Washington to
see that the claims were paid in full.
This they intended to accomplish by pressur-
ing the President and Secretary of War
for a favorable decision. They also used
any other means at their disposal to
coerce the administration. In one instance, for
example, they convinced Governor James
Whitcomb of Indiana and that state's
entire legislature (where the Ewings had
considerable sway) to petition the Presi-
dent to act favorably on their claims.40
Trader criticism of the commissioner
made its way into congressional debate during
the 1848 session. At that time Congress
was discussing a general reorganization of
the Indian Bureau. Although the
reorganization plan had nothing to do with
Medill's enforcement of the trade and
intercourse laws, several western congress-
men used the opportunity to castigate
the commissioner's activities. Whig Con-
gressman Richard F. Thompson from
Indiana, who was speaking for the com-
panies, repeated everything the traders
were saying. He charged Medill with im-
properly enforcing regulations, using
the new law to drive legitimate traders out
of the Indian country, and attempting to
put the companies that opposed him out
of business. The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, observed the Indiana politician,
"exercised a power which should be
confined to no man under our free govern-
ment." Robert W. Johnson from
Arkansas attacked the annuity system by charging
that the new mode of payment tended to
destroy tribal government and the power
36. An indication of the activities of
the traders can be seen in Findlay to Chouteau, October
1, 1847, and Willard P. Hall to R. W.
Cummins, November 4, 1848, Chouteau Papers.
37. Joseph Sinclair to Medill, August 7,
1847, Medill Papers.
38. Washington Daily Union, October
20, November 2, 1847. That Medill intended to give
the companies no aid in satisfying the
department is clearly indicated in a letter to George W.
Ewing, November 20, 1847, George W.
Ewing Papers.
39. "Annual Report, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 1848," House Executive Decuments 1,
30 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 537, p. 400.
40. Joseph Sinclair to Medill, April 5,
8, and May 11, 1848, Medill Papers. In the April 8th
letter, Sinclair wrote that "Both
the Ewings I suppose are now in Washington[;] they hope to
tire you out with their importunities,
so that to get rid of them, you will grant them what they
ask for."
56 OHIO
HISTORY
of the chiefs, obliterated their
national existence, worked against the Federal
Government by weakening the influence of
agents over tribal leaders, and actually
did nothing for the individual Indian
whose portion of the annuity might be as
low as a dollar and a half. Medill was
defended in these debates by William
Rockhill of Indiana (the man who
defeated William Ewing for Congress). Rock-
hill reviewed some of the documents
involved in the case against the Ewings and
then asked if perhaps Thompson had
"some personal and pecuniary interest" in
the matter.41
Even though criticism against him
continued, Medill was determined to persist
in the matter, and he was not without
support from reform-minded friends.42
When he began examining the claims
submitted by the traders, he listened to the
advise of men like Joseph Sinclair, an
ex-agent from Ft. Wayne who had long
favored a per capita annuity system.43
As a result Medill was tough on the traders,
placing upon them the absolute burden of
proving that the debts were legitimate.
In most instances the traders came up
short. For example, in the case of the claims
of the Ewings and James Clymer against
the Potawatomies for $4,773, Medill
rejected nearly the entire sum. His
justification was "There is no data upon which
to judge whether the charges are
reasonable, as in many cases quantities and dates
are not stated, and there is nothing to
indicate the particular kinds of quantities
of articles. . . . Thus, of the whole
amount charged, there is only some $830 of
which there is any specification or
explanation whatever." Nearly all of the other
thirty-two cases were rejected for the
same basic reasons; the companies either
failed to prove the debts were
legitimate or were of a national character. In
announcing these decisions Medill also
noted that over the last few years "the
enormous sum" of $721,066 had been
paid to traders from annuity funds. It
seemed incredible to him how, "in
any just and proper system of trade," the
traders could still be asking for more
money.44
Although most of the commissioner's
decisions were undoubtedly just and
earned him a great deal of respect in
some quarters, they provoked the trading
companies into more opposition. William
G. Ewing, who had just lost his license
to trade with the Sac and Fox as well as
his claims against the Potawatomi, Sac
41. Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 904-905; Appendix, 773-774. Upon
Rockhill's
election to Congress, Joseph Sinclair
described him as a good Democrat, a strong supporter to
Medill, and a man who would not engage
in any business with Ewing and gang. See Sinclair to
Medill, August 7, 1847, Medill Papers.
42. Besides the support of Marcy and
Polk, Medill's actions received approval from several
newspapers. The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote
on June 3, 1849, that "A more faithful, capable
and honest man... has never filled that
post [Commissioner of Indian Affairs].... Under-
standing the acts made use of by agents
representing Indian claims to swindle the government,
or the Indians out of their treaty
funds, he saved both to some extent from robbery; though in
doing so he had to sustain attacks that
a man of ordinary nerve could not have resisted." A
letter in the Pennsylvanian (Philadelphia),
February 25, 1848, praised Medill for his reforms
and warmly suggested that he should be
the next Democratic vice presidential candidate. See
also the Ft. Wayne Sentinel, April
8, 1848, and the St. Louis Daily Union, July 22, 1847.
43. Sinclair had been subagent at Ft.
Wayne (1845-46) and had overseen the removal of the
Miami Indians to the Osage River in
1847. He had long favored paying annuities to heads of
families and in this connection had come
into conflict with the Ewings. There was no love lost be-
tween Sinclair and the traders. See, for
example, George W. Ewing to Medill, November 19,
1845, George W. Ewing Papers, wherein
Ewing called Sinclair a "blaggar and rascal," unfit for
office. Sinclair had warned Medill that
the traders would submit fake bills of purchase, Sinclair
to Medill, April 8, 1848, Medill Papers.
44. The decisions of all thirty-three
cases are listed in "Annual Report ... 1848," pp. 418-429,
401.
William Medill 57
and Fox, and Miami, launched a further
attack on Medill, charging prejudice
against the companies and proposing that
all claims should be removed from his
jurisdiction and be given to an
impartial committee.45 Ewing also agreed to act for
several other trading houses in
encouraging the Secretary of War or the President
to override the Indian Commissioner's
decisions. If Ewing's tactics proved suc-
cessful, as Medill well knew, the
"Scoundrels" had things so shaped that a reversal
could be claimed as a confirmation of
the commissioner's unfitness, and that he
might be removed from office.46 In
the field the traders worked to make the whole
annuity system inoperative by persuading
the tribes to reject individual payments
and, in some cases, by bribing agents to
continue paying tribal funds directly to
the traders.47 Despite these
tactics Medill remained firm, and he was upheld by
his superiors. All the traders could
then do was await the upcoming election of
1848 and hope the present administration
was replaced by one more responsive to
their monetary interests.
In regard to the halting of the liquor
trade, the Indian Office experienced mixed
success. Medill had anticipated that the
addition of imprisonment to the fines
already in existence would produce the
desired result, and in some cases this
appears true. Yet reports continued to
stream in from the field that the law was
ineffective and the prevalence of
alcohol was as great as ever. The trading com-
panies, of course, had continued to
smuggle alcohol; but part of the problem, as
Thomas Harvey explained to Medill in his
report for October 1848, was not only
with whites taking liquor into the
Indian country but also with the close proximity
of white settlers to Indian lands.
Indians were able to slip into the adjoining states
of Missouri and Iowa where numerous
stills operated right on the border and
purchase all the whiskey they could
carry home. Such procedures meant that
whites were not guilty of taking liquor
into the Indian country. And, said Harvey,
"the existing laws of the State of
Missouri [and Iowa] on this subject of selling to
Indians are so ineffective that it is
difficult to convict the seller, or to punish him
effectually if convicted."48
Any attempt by the Federal Government to
prevent the production and sale of
liquor in the border states immediately
incited the sensitive question of state
sovereignty. The Indian Bureau did
attempt to use its influence to persuade the
border states to reform their laws.
Secretary Marcy in July 1847 wrote a pointed
letter to three frontier governors
intimating that greater vigilance was required.49
Medill, in his 1848 report, again
brought the matter to attention. Liquor, he
wrote, "can never be checked until
the States adjoining the Indian country come
foreward and cooperate in the general
effort against this unholy and iniquitous
traffic, by passing stringent laws,
restraining the evil disposed among their citizens
on the frontier from engaging in it with
the Indians."50
45. Petition to the President, November 20, 1848, George W. Ewing Papers.
46. Sinclair to Medill, May 11, 1848,
Medill Papers.
47. John Miller to Harvey, September 15,
1848, in "Annual Report . . . 1848," p. 465;
Willard D. Hall to Richard W. Cummins,
November 4, 1848, Chouteau Papers.
Hall, a Missouri
congressman, actually urged the
Potawatomi agent Cummins to disobey the commissioner and
aid the traders in collecting their
debts.
48. Prucha, "Indian Policy in the
1840's," 101; Harvey to Medill, October 4, 1848, in "Annual
Report . . . 1848," p. 441.
49. Marcy to the Governors of Missouri,
Iowa, and Arkansas, July 14, 1847, in "Annual
Report . . . 1847," pp. 767-769.
50. "Annual Report . . .
1848," p. 402.
58
OHIO HISTORY
As long as frontier citizens saw no
pressing need to limit the activities of whiskey
sellers, the Indian Office had no
cooperation in enforcing the law, only apathy.
Faced with the obvious state inaction,
Superintendent Harvey recommended
attacking the problem where the bureau
possessed some authority with the Indians.
He, therefore, suggested arresting all
intoxicated Indians and putting them to hard
labor. Those who did not learn their
lesson the first time and continued to pur-
chase liquor should then be prosecuted
under the law of 1847 and sent to prison.
Medill saw some definite merit in this
procedure and recommended it to Marcy.51
A few weeks later, however, Zachary
Taylor and the Whigs swept the national
elections and the plan died.
On March 4, 1849, the mantle of Indian
responsibility was handed over to the
Whig party. The most important question
as far as Indian policy was concerned
was whether the new administration would
retain Medill and allow him to continue
his strict enforcement of the trade
laws. The answer came soon.
One of the changes that occurred with
the inauguration of Taylor was the
creation of the Department of the Interior
and the transfer of the Indian Office to
that department.52 The
selection of Thomas Ewing, also from Lancaster, Ohio, as
the first Secretary of the Interior
placed a forceful personality in charge of Indian
affairs. Ewing, a long time Whig
Senator, was one of the President's most trusted
advisors. Obese and somewhat fearful
looking, he fully believed in the spoils
system. "In his eyes," noted
one authority, "the substitution of deserving Whigs
for Democrats was no casual order of
business, but a transcendent preoccupation."53
Not only would he personally direct
Indian policy, but he would do it with his own
men.
Secretary Ewing's attitude toward the
Indians is somewhat difficult to ascertain
with any degree of certainty. As a
Senator in the 1830's he had on at least one
occasion opposed some of the removal
treaties engineered by the Jackson adminis-
tration.54 This case,
however, involved a small group of Ohio tribes, and on the
more significant congressional debates
over the morality of Indian removal, Ewing
largely remained silent. He expressed
general sympathy for the lot of the Indian
51. Harvey to Medill, October 4, 1848,
in ibid., 441. In approving Harvey's plan, Medill
optimistically stated that if
"authority were given to the Department to punish the Indians
themselves, in the manner recommended in
the report of the superintendent at St. Louis, . . . this
moral pestilence would soon be driven
from the confines of the Indian country, which would be
followed by the dawn of a brighter day
upon the condition and destiny of our colonized Indians."
Ibid., 402.
52. Act of March 3, 1849, U. S.
Statutes at Large, IX, 395. Section 5 of the act provided that
the Secretary of the Interior would
assume all duties in relation to Indian affairs formerly held
by the Secretary of War. See also
Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 680; and Ruth A.
Gallagher, "The Indian Agent in the
United States before 1850," Iowa Journal of History and
Politics, XIV (1916), 54-55.
53. Ewing, born in 1789, had practiced
law in Lancaster; Ohio, before entering politics. He
was twice United States Senator (1831-37
and 1850-51). In 1841 he served as Secretary
of the Treasury during the brief
administration of William Henry Harrison. For a general study
of Ewing see Paul I. Miller,
"Thomas Ewing, Last of the Whigs" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Ohio State University, 1933); and for
Ewing as Secretary of the Treasury, see Abby L. Gilbert,
"Thomas Ewing: Ohio's Advocate for
a National Bank," this number, Ohio History. Ewing's
closeness to Zachary Taylor is discussed
in Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Soldier in the
White House (Hamden, Conn., 1966), 153, 163-164. In connection with
the patronage issue,
see Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 473-474,
and Albert D. Kirwin, John J. Crittenden:
The Struggle for the Union (Lexington, 1962), 248, who states that "the party
faithful had
developed a ravenous appetite during
their long exclusion from federal patronage."
54. Weisenburger, Passing of the
Frontier, 36-37.
when he became Secretary of the Interior. Like all government officials he publicly favored the attempts to educate and civilize the tribes. He also expressed hope that annuities might be continued because dependence on annuities was a means of preventing hostilities: By these means we may gain their good will, and have a guaranty for their good conduct in their dependence upon us, which will soon become habitual, for the annuities, and the fear of their loss in case of transgression. And by these means, and with the aid of religious and benevolent societies, they may be, perhaps, turned from their roving habits, their thirst for war and bloodshed allayed, and they may be gradually won over to agri- culture, and ultimately civilization.55 Ewing found himself under great pressure to make the "right" appointments for Indian offices. Representatives of the trading companies were in Washington to
55. "Annual Report, Secretary of the Interior, 1849," Senate Executive Documents 1, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., II, No. 550, pp. 14-15. |
60 OHIO HISTORY
see that men favorable to their
interests were employed.56 Most of the concern
centered around Medill's replacement,
but men such as Superintendent Harvey at
St. Louis were also on the Whig's black
list. In fact, Ewing immediately appointed
David Dawson Mitchell, an old trader and
a momentary favorite of the companies,
to Harvey's position.57 But
Ewing did not act on Medill's case at once. "The
Scamp Medill is not yet removed,"
wrote George Ewing from Washington in dis-
gust.58 With the Whigs in
control Medill's continuation in office was a matter of
little significance since Interior
Secretary Ewing (he was distantly related to the
Ewing brothers) intended to set policy
for the Indian Office and not allow the
commissioner the full responsibility he
had enjoyed under the Secretary of War.
Therefore, Medill, whose job President
Taylor wanted to keep open for political
reasons,59 had the experience
of remaining in office while Ewing began overturning
his reforms.
The first item on Ewing's agenda was the
reopening of all the claim cases that
Medill had declared null or fraudulent.
On April 7, 1849, Ewing ordered Medill to
deliver for additional investigation all
papers and evidence concerning the claims of
Pierre Chouteau, G. W. & W. G.
Ewing, James Clymer, and the rest.60 The
Secretary of the Interior himself
reviewed these cases.61 His decision in nearly
every case was to overturn Medill's
ruling and pay off the traders.62 Within a year
all of the claims were settled. The
exact amount of the settlement is difficult to
determine. In April 1850, when
Democratic Congressman William A. Richardson
of Illinois initiated an investigation
of Secretary Ewing on charges of corruption in
office, some of the figures came out.63
One of the complaints was that "Thomas
56. G. W. Ewing to John B. Sarpy, March
14, April 10, 1849, Chouteau Papers; J. N.
Reynolds to Thomas Ewing, March 31, 1849,
Thomas Ewing Papers, Library of Congress.
There can be little doubt of the
traders' influence with the administration. Agents even wrote
to the traders for favors. One subagent
wrote of George Ewing asking for a better job, stating
that "I am well aware of your Great
influence in Indian Affairs and those controlling at head-
quarters." Thomas Mosely to G. W.
Ewing, December 6, 1849, Folder 36, Orlando Brown
Papers, The Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.
57. Medill to Mitchell, March 30, 1849,
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 41.
Mitchell was well qualified, having
served both as Indian agent and superintendent at St. Louis
(1841-43). However, he also had long
been in the employ of the American Fur Company.
George Ewing strongly supported Mitchell;
"I am ready to help him all I can," Ewing wrote to
Sarpy, March 14, 1849, Chouteau Papers. See
also Roy H. Mattison, "David Dawson Mitchell,"
in LeRoy Hafen, ed., The Mountain Men
and the Fur Trade of the Far West (Glendale, Calif.,
1965), II, 241-246.
58. G. W. Ewing to Sarpy, April 10,
1849, Chouteau Papers.
59. Taylor wanted to use the position to
reward one of his political backers. Eventually he
nominated Orlando Brown, a favorite of
John J. Crittenden. See Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, 64;
and Kirwin, Crittenden, 253.
60. T. Ewing to Medill (copy), April 7,
1849, George W. Ewing Papers. Orlando Brown,
the new commissioner, remarked in this
regard "that the change of political sentiments in the
present administration has brought back
nearly all the old rejected claims of the past twenty
years." See Brown to Thomas
Ewing, February 28, 1850, Orlando Brown Papers, Kentucky
Historical Society.
61. See the Frankfort (Ky.) Commonwealth,
October 9, 1849; and C. Glenn Clift, ed., "The
Governors of Kentucky, 1792-1824, The
Old Master, Colonel Orlando Brown, 1801-1867,"
Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society, XLIX (1951), 17.
62. Many of the claims were paid very
rapidly. See Medill to George Ewing, April 18, 1849,
George W. Ewing Papers, paying a claim
of $4,541.18 against the Council Bluffs Potawatomi;
and George Ewing to J. B. Sarpy, April
19, 1849, Chouteau Papers, noting that Sarpy's claim
of $750 would be paid.
63. Washington Daily Union, February
21, April 26, 1849. The initial resolution for the
investigation is discussed in Congressional
Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 1, pp. 783-791.
William Medill 61
Ewing, Secretary of the Interior,
reopened and paid to G. W. & W. G. Ewing a
claim against the United States of
$77,000, after the same had been adjudicated
and rejected by proper officers of
Government before said Ewing was inducted into
said office of the interior."64
Although these charges were fundamentally correct,
the figure quoted by the Democrats may
have been exaggerated. The Secretary
defended his actions before the Senate
in 1851, having since resigned his office to
assume a Senate seat. At that time he
produced some previously unpublished
correspondence with Congressman
Richardson. In these letters he denied the
specific charges of paying the Ewings
$77,000, but did admit to paying claims of
$28,883.67 on other occasions. It is
also known that the department paid nearly
$16,000, the entire Sac and Fox claim,
to Chouteau and Ewing in March 1850.65
In regard to the mode of paying
annuities, Ewing appears to have made little
attempt to enforce the provisions for
payment to heads of families. In May 1849
he issued orders that tribes could have
their annuities paid directly to the traders
upon request. Although the Indian Office
did occasionally state that its policy was
to continue paying annuities to
individuals, in actual practice the old system in
many cases was put back into operation.
In several instances Indian agents imme-
diately started paying the traders out
of annuity funds.66 That these activities were
leading back to the same situation that
existed before the passage of the law of
1847 was clearly stated in a report by
David Dawson Mitchell in 1850:
It too frequently happens that the first
information the Indians receive of the existence of
certain claims against them, is from the
agents and sub-agents when their annuities are
about to be paid. They are then told
that so many thousand dollars of their money have
been retained, and paid over to
individuals who presented claims of a national character
against them at Washington City.
When Ewing was questioned by Congress on
this matter in 1851, he defended his
actions on grounds that the law of 1847
gave the President or Secretary of War
(now the Secretary of the Interior)
discretion in such matters and he simply used
that option in the method of paying
annuities.67 Although such an interpretation
was not in the spirit of the law of
1847, it was technically correct.
The Whigs did not publicly abandon the
crusade against the liquor trade.
64. A general review of what occurred in
the House is given in Congressional Globe, 31 Cong.,
2 Sess., 653-658.
65. T. Ewing to Richardson, May 6 and
May 15, 1850, quoted in ibid., 654. The outcome
of the House investigation was somewhat
anticlimatic. The House passed an amended resolution
stating that any violation was a legal
question and not a crime or misdemeanor, Congressional
Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 2, p. 1811; G. Ewing to
Chouteau, March 28, 1850, Chouteau
Papers.
66. Medill to Mitchell, May 16, 1849,
Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 42; Luke
Lea to A. H. H. Stuart, [1851?], quoted
in Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 653; P.
Sappington and H. H. Jamison to Orlando
Brown, November 4, 1849, Office of Indian Affairs,
Letters Received, Council Bluffs Agency.
Sappington and Jamison made quite specific charges
against agent John E. Barrow: "We
charge him (Barrow) with a wilful and intentional violation
of his duty and the law, in the manner
in which the late Otoe payt was made, for the law and
regulations require that the payment of
annuities Shall be made to the head of families & not
to Chiefs or Indian traders[;] we are
also able to Show the department that Maj. Barrow at the
late payt assumed and paid to traders at
least one third of the money due Said Indians to the
traders."
67. Mitchell to Luke Lea, September 14,
1850, in "Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 1850," Senate Executive
Documents 1, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., I, No. 587, p. 48; Congressional
Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 653-654.
62 OHIO
HISTORY
From time to time they continued to
denounce whiskey sellers and the unfortunate
effects of alcohol on the Indians. Yet
for the next several years the Indian Office
largely ignored any means to effectively
enforce the liquor laws. Seemingly other
things were more important, and the
tribes continued to receive as much alcohol
as they could pay for.68
The final culmination of the reversal of
the reforms came with the removal of
Medill from office. In June 1849,
President Taylor named Orlando Brown of
Kentucky as the new Commissioner of
Indian Affairs. Medill probably departed
with a combination of relief and sorrow.
Upon his retirement he received words
of praise from some Democrats. The
Cincinnati Enquirer, in particular, lauded
Medill and expressed hope that Brown
would be able to withstand "the brow-
beatings of members of Congress, who are
shameless enough to act as agents for
claims against the Bureau." The
feelings of the traders are summed up in a letter
from George Ewing to Pierre Chouteau,
Jr., stating, "the villain Medill is kicked out,
good--He & the hypocrite Harvey can
now console each other in their retirement."69
In retrospect, Medill deserves
recognition for his attempt to reform some
aspects of the Indian trade while at the
same time keeping his bureau free from the
corrupting influences of the traders. It
is also quite clear that he was concerned
with helping the Indians; whereas the
actions of the traders, regardless of their
public statements, indicated their
desire to retain a system which allowed them
freedom to exploit the Indians.
Unfortunately, the private trading companies were
too powerful for the Indian Commissioner.
While Medill was in office, the traders
frustrated or evaded many of his
reforms, and as soon as the Whigs came to power
persuasion was used to undo the reforms.
As a result, by 1850 the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1847 had become a
dead letter. Medill's political contribution,
however, was not lost in his home state
where he continued in public service,
serving with distinction until shortly
before his death in 1865.
68. "Annual Report, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 1849," Senate Executive Documents 1,
31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 551, p. 939.
Reports continued to come in from the field about the con-
tinued use of alcohol, and the files of
the Indian Office are full of such material. Yet the reports
of the commissioner for 1850 and 1851 do
not even mention the liquor trade. By this time the
department was again considering
removing the tribes and all their attention was devoted to
that matter. See "Annual
Report... 1850," pp. 35-45; and "Annual Report, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 1851," House
Executive Documents 2, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 636, pp. 265-274.
69. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 13,
1849. See also Washington Daily Union, June 3, 1849; G.
Ewing to Chouteau, June 13, 1849,
Chouteau Papers.
ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR.
William Medill's War with the Indian
Traders, 1847
William Medill's tenure as Commissioner
of Indian Affairs in the Polk administra-
tion came at the critical time of
continental expansion which resulted in forceful
removal of the Indian from lands desired
by white settlers. Soon after he took
office Medill attempted to make some
basic reforms in policy governing relations
with the Indians. One of the most
controversial aspects of his reforming activities
as commissioner revolved around his
determination to crack down on the rampant
abuses in the Indian trade. The
difficulties he encountered demonstrate the grip
private trading firms held on
governmental policy relative to Indian affairs.
Medill's background was typical for a
politician of his day. Born in New Castle
County, Delaware, in 1802, he studied
law at Newark Academy (Delaware Col-
lege) in 1825 before leaving for
Lancaster, Ohio, where he was admitted to the
bar in 1830. From here the handsome,
full-bearded, ambitious young man entered
Ohio Democratic politics. Serving first
as a state representative between 1835 and
1838, he then won election to two terms
in the United States House of Representa-
tives (1839-1843).1 Because of his
radical attitudes on money and the bank issue,
Medill became known in the state as a
follower of the Van Buren wing of the
Democratic party.2
After James K. Polk's victory in the
presidential campaign of 1844, Ohio
political bosses managed to have Medill appointed
second assistant postmaster
general, a job that would allow him to
funnel a large amount of patronage toward
Ohio. Nevertheless, the Ohio Van Buren
faction, like all of Van Buren's followers,
remained perturbed over Polk's
inclination to support the conservative, pro-bank,
1. Medill also gained some note for
presiding over the Ohio Constitutional Convention in
1850, as governor 1853-1856, and serving
as the first comptroller of the federal treasury in
Buchanan's administration, 1857-1861.
There is some controversy over the exact date of Medill's
birth. Several dates, ranging from 1801
to 1805, have been used, and it is probable that the exact
date is lost to history. The most
commonly used date, however, appears to be 1802. Biographical
Directory of the American Congress,
1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), 1397;
Charles B. Gal-
breath, History of Ohio (Chicago,
1925), II, 59; Dwight L. Smith, "William Medill, 1853-1856,
in Governors of Ohio (Columbus,
1954), 68-71.
2. Edgar Allen Holt, Party Politics
in Ohio, 1840-1850 (Ohio Historical Collections, I, Colum-
bus, 1930), 173.
Mr. Trennert is Assistant Professor of
History, Temple University. Part of the research for
this article was made possible through a
summer research grant from Temple University.