Ohio History Journal

DAVID L. PORTER

 

 

Ohio Representative John M. Vorys

and the Arms Embargo in 1939

 

 

 

 

During the last few years, Congress increasingly has favored a reduction in Ameri-

can commitments to foreign nations. This action has reversed a long-standing pol-

icy of globalism stemming from World War II. Congress probably has not wit-

nessed such widespread noninterventionist sentiments since shortly before World

War II, when the legislative branch refused to repeal the arms embargo or permit

munitions sales to belligerent nations. Numerous historians have analyzed the con-

troversial attempt to repeal the arms embargo at the regular 1939 session, but have

devoted surprisingly little space to the significant role of freshman Republican John

M. Vorys of Ohio in leading a determined movement to cling to the bastions of non-

interventionism.' This study investigates the crucial role played by this Ohio Con-

gressman in preventing Congress from removing the arms embargo before the out-

break of World War II.

Vorys, a member of a prominent Ohio family, rose quickly in the world of poli-

tics. The second of four sons, he was born June 16, 1896, in Lancaster and began

his education in the public schools there. His father, Arthur, who practiced law and

served as city solicitor of that upper Hocking Valley industrial center, later joined

the law firm of Sater, Seymour and Pease in Columbus. Arthur also served as a

State Superintendent of Insurance and as a Republican national committeeman.

After the family had moved to the capital city, young Vorys graduated in 1914 from

East High School and entered Yale University. Following the outbreak of World

War I, he enlisted in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps, saw action overseas as a

fighter pilot, and rose to the rank of Second Lieutenant. Returning to Yale to earn

a B. A. degree in 1919, he taught the next year in Changsha, China, and spent 1921

and 1922 as an assistant secretary for the American delegation at the Washington

Naval Disarmament Conference. Vorys received a law degree in 1923 from Ohio

State University and joined his father's firm. He then began dabbling in politics,

serving in 1923-24 as a representative from Franklin County in the Ohio General

Assembly and sitting the next two years for the Tenth District in the Ohio senate.

An aviation enthusiast and author of an article on airplane supervision, he was ap-

 

 

 

1. The most comprehensive work on neutrality revision is Robert Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality

(Chicago, 1962).

 

Mr. Porter is Assistant Professor of History, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York.

• 1
 

pointed in 1929 as Ohio's first Director of Aeronautics and then resumed his private law practice.2 After Democrat Franklin Roosevelt entered the presidency in 1933, the conserva- tive Vorys became increasingly disenchanted with events in the nation's Capitol. He disliked the growing tendency of the Federal Government to infringe upon states' rights, protested the rapid growth of executive power under a Democratic President, and consistently disapproved of Roosevelt's New Deal programs. A critic of Roosevelt's pro-labor policies, he opposed the Wagner Act of 1935 estab- lishing collective bargaining, favored an investigation of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, and advocated reducing funds for the Works Progress Administration and other federal relief agencies. In addition, he denounced the President's at- tempt in 1937 to enlarge the Supreme Court.3 Impatient at remaining on the sidelines, Vorys aspired to holding a national elec- tive office. He capitalized in 1938 on what the New York Times classified as a "ti- dal wave of anti-New Deal and anti-CIO sentiment" in Ohio and captured a seat in the United States Congress as a Representative from the state's Twelfth District (Franklin County). Ohio Republicans fared remarkably well in the 1938 elections, as John Bricker and Robert A. Taft replaced Democratic incumbents for governor and United States Senator, respectively, and nine other Republicans joined Vorys in unseating Democratic Congressmen. Shortly after the Seventy-sixth Congress con-       2. U. S. Congress. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, 1961); "John M. Vorys," Current Biography, 1950, p. 588. 3. For these views, see folders on the subjects in Boxes 3 and 4, John Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society. There is no biography of Representative Vorys.

• 2
 

John M. Vorys                                                               105

 

vened in January 1939, Vorys joined the prestigious Foreign Affairs Committee and

worked hard in his new position.⁴

Congressman Vorys rapidly won popularity among a majority of his Franklin

County constituents. Representing farmers, businessmen, and many employed in

state government and at the educational institutions in the county, he was reelected

easily in November 1940, and even returned 25 percent of his campaign funds to the

donors. His supporters generally criticized the tendency of the New Deal to favor

organized labor over big business, protested the rapid expansion of the Federal

Government bureaucracy, and believed that the 3,000 mile Atlantic Ocean ade-

quately protected the United States from any foreign invasion.5

Between 1918 and 1938, the United States had pursued largely isolationist poli-

cies. Preoccupied with the economic depression, Congress had concentrated on do-

mestic affairs in enacting relief, recovery, and reform measures to eliminate the ling-

ering unemployment problem. In foreign affairs, a Senate committee, headed by

isolationist Republican Gerald Nye of North Dakota, charged that bankers and mu-

nitions makers had drawn the United States into World War I for financial profits

and drafted numerous proposals designed to prevent American involvement in any

future war. Revisionist scholars and journalists also denied that American security

had been at stake in World War I and cautioned that interventionist actions should

be avoided in the future. In response to these pressures, Congress approved the

Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934 prohibiting loans to any foreign country default-

ing on debt payments, and between 1935 and 1937 enacted a series of neutrality

laws preventing the United States from exporting arms, ammunition, and imple-

ments of war to any belligerent country. All warring nations wishing to purchase

non-military goods in the United States were required to pay cash for such items

and to transport them in their own vessels.6

By late 1938 the Roosevelt administration began advocating a revision of isola-

tionist policies. After Hitler pledged to Great Britain and France at the Munich

Conference of September 1938 not to seek any additional European territory, the

German dictator within two months intensified both Nazi rearmament and per-

secution of the European Jews. In response, Roosevelt promptly requested $300

million for national defense and recalled the American ambassador to Germany,

Hugh Wilson; State Department officials recommended that Congress revise the ex-

isting neutrality laws at the next session by repealing the arms embargo and placing

all trade on a cash-and-carry basis. In his annual message to Congress in January

1939, the President complained that American neutrality laws "may actually give

aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim." He also intimated that he favored

neutrality revision, but did not make any specific recommendations about legisla-

tion and left the issue in the hands of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair-

man Key Pittman of Nevada.⁷

Pittman, however, delayed acting on the neutrality question for over two months.

Besides being more interested in western silver legislation than in foreign affairs

 

 

4. New York Times, November 1938; Current Biography, 1950, p. 588; John Vorys to Author, May 2.

1968. For election, see Milton Plesur, "The Republican Comeback of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV

(October 1962), 525-562.

5. For constituent views, see Boxes 3 and 4, Vorys Papers.

6. See John Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge,

1963); Warren Cohen, The American Revisionists (Chicago, 1967); Divine, Illusion, 81-228.

7. Robert Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York, 1965),

55-57.

• 3
 

106                                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

measures, the moderate internationalist did not press for action principally because

isolationists controlled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Roosevelt also re-

mained silent on the issue until German forces on March 15 suddenly violated the

Munich Pact by conquering all of Czechoslovakia. The President then publicly

urged Congress to act, prompting Pittman on March 20 to introduce a bill repealing

the arms embargo and putting all commerce on a cash-and-carry basis. Pittman's

Foreign Relations Committee again disappointed the President by holding lengthy

hearings from early April to mid-May and by failing to reach any agreement on

neutrality, thus letting the cash-and-carry provision expire on May 1.8

The German annexation of Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, alarmed Great Britain

and France. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who had made territorial

concessions to Hitler at the Munich Conference, particularly was dismayed by the

latest German action and indicated for the first time determination to stand up to

the Nazis. Fearing that Poland might be the next target of expansion, Chamberlain

on March 30 promised that Great Britain and France would provide assistance to

the Polish Government in case Hitler attacked that East European nation. The

guarantee, though, meant little in reality because Great Britain and France would

face geographical barriers in providing direct assistance to Poland and lacked mili-

tary personnel to open up a second front against Hitler.⁹

Congressman Vorys, meanwhile, strongly favored continuing American neutrality

policies toward Europe. Besides claiming that European developments did not en-

danger American security, he insisted that the 3,000 mile Atlantic Ocean would pre-

vent Germany from launching an effective air or land assault upon the United

States. Protesting that New Deal programs had enhanced Roosevelt's power con-

siderably, he hoped to maintain strict congressional control over the President's

movement into European affairs. The Ohio Republican particularly opposed

granting Roosevelt broad authority either to determine aggressors or to sanction the

selling of arms to belligerent nations in Europe because such leeway would permit

him to declare war, a privilege which the Constitution specifically gives to the legis-

lative branch.

With bitter memories of the World War I experience, Vorys hoped to avoid a re-

currence of similar American involvement in future European affairs. In addition

to stressing that the United States had spent $33 billion and suffered 116,000 deaths

in the conflict, he asserted that the American crusade to save the world for democ-

racy had not prevented the rise of European dictatorships. A midwesterner sus-

picious of the influence of the eastern establishment upon the Federal Government,

the Ohio Republican alleged that bankers and munitions makers had drawn the

United States into World War I for their financial profits against American interests.

Vorys feared that idealism and profiteering might embroil the nation in another Eu-

ropean conflict, leaving similar legacies of massive spending, heavy casualties, and

unfulfilled ambitions.10

On the other hand, Vorys had no sympathy for Hitler or Mussolini. He criticized

the Axis leaders for pursuing dictatorial tactics and violating fundamental individ-

ual liberties, and particularly for promoting themselves as peacemakers. "Hitler

 

 

 

 

8. Fred Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln, 1963), 131; Divine, Illusion, 241-251.

9. Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, 63-64.

10. For Vorys' views on foreign policy, see Boxes 3 and 4, Vorys Papers.

• 4
 

John M. Vorys                                                                   107

 

has the ability," the Congressman contended, "by eloquent and plausible mis-

statements of fact, law and history, to convince his own people that he is peaceful

when he isn't, truthful when he isn't." Although acknowledging that Hitler might

attempt to move into Western Europe, Vorys intensely desired to keep the United

States out of foreign wars, opposed taking punitive action against Hitler, and in-

sisted that "we have no assurance that the threat of our force will be sufficient to

stop war."11

From the outset, Vorys criticized three specific Senate proposals for changing the

neutrality laws toward Europe. Opposed to allowing the President "a free hand in

assisting France and Great Britain," Vorys denounced a controversial amendment

proposed by interventionist Elbert D. Thomas (Democrat-Utah) designed to

empower the Chief Executive to send arms and raw materials to attacked nations.

The Thomas amendment specifically was designed to assist China, but Vorys

warned that it "might affect some other situation we haven't thought of." On the

other hand, he disapproved of a proposal sponsored by isolationists Gerald Nye

(Republican, North Dakota), Joel Bennett "Champ" Clark (Democrat, Missouri),

and Homer T. Bone (Democrat, Washington) to remove existing neutrality legisla-

tion and to return to traditional principles of international law. Finally, he criti-

cized the portions of the Pittman bill intended to repeal the arms embargo. Vorys,

though, liked certain features of that bill, especially the sections preserving the exist-

ing neutrality law and prohibiting the President from defining an aggressor.¹²

Even though Europe seemed more important to the administration, Vorys pre-

ferred more active American responses on the Asian front. Following in the Re-

publican tradition, he warned, "our interests are not involved in Europe the way

they are in the Orient" and claimed that Japanese expansion in Asian countries

posed a greater threat to American security than did German or Italian activity at

that moment. Vorys contended that Japan had disobeyed the Nine Power Treaty

of 1922, which outlawed aggression in the Far East, by attacking China in 1937 and

by establishing puppet regimes in Inner Mongolia, North China, and Nanking. He

remarked, "We have no treaty in Europe comparable to the nine power Pacific

treaty that is being violated daily, with increasing affrontery."¹³

In practical terms, the Ohio Republican urged that the United States cease imme-

diately shipping scrap iron, oil, and other war materials to Japan. An arms em-

bargo, Vorys insisted, would force Japan to stop attacking China within six months

and would aid American defense policy by "preventing a possible triumph of a fu-

ture potential enemy in the Pacific." If munitions sales to Japan were terminated,

Vorys contended that Congress would not be surrendering additional authority to

 

 

 

11. Vorys to Joseph McGhee, September 26, 1939, Box 3. Vorys Papers; Congressional Record, 76

Cong., 1 Sess., 8151. For views toward Hitler, see Boxes 3 and 4, Vorys Papers.

12. Vorys to Miss Elizabeth Jones, March 24, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers; Vorys to Mrs. Harold Kauf-

man, April 22, 1939, Box 4, ibid. For Thomas amendment, see Congressional Record, 76 Cong.. I Sess..

1347. For Nye-Clark-Bone amendment, see New York Times, March 29, 1939.

13. Vorys to Miss Ellen Benbow, April 28, 1939, Vorys to Charles Seymour, April 27, 1939, Vorys to

Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, June 3, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers. The Nine-Power Treaty

was an international recognition of the Open Door in China, first stated by the United States at the turn

of the twentieth century. The United States, Japan, Britain, France, China, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and

Portugal agreed to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and to refrain from taking ad-

vantage of China's weakened position to seek special commercial rights or privileges at the expense of

other signatory powers. The treaty did not commit its signers to any kind of action if one of them vio-

lated the treaty. David Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941 (Boston, 1965), 51-52.

• 5
 

108                                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

Roosevelt because "the President [already] has power to declare an embargo in the

Chinese-Japanese War."¹⁴

During April and early May, the freshman Vorys received his official baptism on

the neutrality issue. He participated actively in exploratory House Foreign Affairs

Committee hearings and interrogated various witnesses, ranging from Congressmen

to pressure group spokesmen, who typically detected flaws in the existing law but

usually refrained from supporting any particular neutrality bill. In response to his

vigorous campaign for a "straight out Japanese embargo," Vorys encountered a

stormy reception from most witnesses, and lamented, "I am discouraged at the ex-

perts who say that this would be provocative, bad economics, etc."15

In the meantime, President Roosevelt was upset that Pittman's committee had

procrastinated on the neutrality issue and turned to the House of Representatives

for assistance. At a White House conference held on May 19, Roosevelt personally

urged prominent Representatives to repeal the arms embargo by the middle of July

(when the British royalty were scheduled to visit Washington) and prompted the

State Department to draft legislation for House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair-

man Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York). Within ten days Bloom proposed the State

Department measure to the Democratic-controlled committee. The Bloom bill

sanctioned arms sales to belligerents, permitted American ships to transport cargoes

abroad, authorized the President to designate combat zones, and otherwise dupli-

cated the earlier Pittman proposal.16

With the President's measure directly before the House Foreign Affairs Com-

mittee, Vorys became further embroiled in the neutrality controversy. When

Bloom ordered the committee to conduct hearings in early June on his measure,

Vorys engaged the chairman in tactical warfare over which proposals should have

top priority. The Ohio Representative did not favor giving immediate consid-

eration to the Bloom bill and demanded that the committee first give attention to

various proposals designed to place arms embargoes upon Japan. Bloom naturally

advocated quick approval of the State Department proposal and, fearing that hear-

ings on the Japanese bills might take several days or even weeks, used his authority

as chairman to prevent Vorys from speaking in the committee. After failing to in-

fluence Bloom, Vorys wrote a candid letter on June 3 to his committee colleagues

stating directly what he had not been permitted to say in person:

I feel we are making a great mistake trying to determine our possible conduct as to future

wars in Europe before we determine our present conduct as to an existing war in the Orient;

we have let our excitement about what may happen to our remote interests in Europe blind

us to what is now happening to our immediate interests in the Pacific. We have no treaty in

Europe comparable to the nine power Pacific treaty that is being violated daily, with increas-

ing affrontery. The people back home don't want us to interfere in Europe; but they are de-

manding that we stop supporting Japan in this uncivilized, immoral conquest that violates

our treaty rights and threatens our national interests.

I do not insist on any particular bill and am committed to no specific proposals, but I feel

certain that if we solve this immediate Far Eastern problem first it will go far toward solving

 

 

 

14. Vorys to Jones, March 24, 1939, Vorys to Seymour, April 27, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers.

15. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, "American Neutrality Policy,"

April-May, 1939 (Washington, D.C., 1939); Vorys to Kaufman, April 22, 1939, Vorys to H. Schuyler Fos-

ter, Jr., April 17, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.

16. Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, 58-59.

• 6
 

John M. Vorys                                                               109

 

the rest of our international problems, and that until we decide this immediate problem, we

cannot reach any very satisfactory conclusion on the general problem... .

Committee Democrats, led by Chairman Bloom and Luther A. Johnson of Texas,

seized the initiative from Vorys and strongly defended a Europe-first policy. Fol-

lowing the approach advocated by the Roosevelt administration, they asserted that

German and Italian aggression in Europe posed a greater threat than Japanese ac-

tions in the Pacific to American interests and advocated repeal of the arms embargo

to assist victims of Axis expansion in Europe. They also hoped to aid Great Britain

and France in defeating Nazi Germany before these countries were themselves

overrun. Exhibiting little concern about increasing presidential power in foreign

affairs, the Democrats favored designating authority to Roosevelt to discriminate in

favor of attacked nations and to discourage potential aggressors from provoking

war. Since the administration controlled fifteen of twenty-five seats, the committee

turned deaf ears to Vorys' pleas and opened hearings June 5 on the Bloom bill as

scheduled.18

Unable to sway the committee to delay hearings, Vorys vowed to cripple the

chairman's measure. The Ohio Republican attempted to restore part of the 1937

Neutrality Act by introducing an amendment to prohibit the export of arms and

ammunition to all belligerents. He again encountered insurmountable resistance,

and blamed ultimate committee rejection of the embargo on "the New Deal major-

ity." Vorys, falling a few votes short (12-8) of preventing the committee from re-

porting the Bloom bill, promptly denounced the action in a minority report. He

feared the President might commit the United States to assist attacked nations mili-

tarily and denounced giving him authority to declare combat zones. Cognizant of

Roosevelt's earlier attempts to dominate Congress, Vorys warned colleagues, "We

should not evade our responsibility by granting the President additional power" and

vowed to wage an intensive battle in the House against the Bloom bill. Besides

planning to utilize extensive debate to delay voting, he hoped to arouse American

public opinion so as to encourage congressional defeat of the measure and to secure

House approval of amendments "keeping us out of war entanglements with foreign

conflicts."19

Boldly challenging several veteran Representatives, Vorys battled vigorously

against neutrality revision on the House floor. Administration officials selected

Democrat Luther Johnson of Texas, an effective debater, expert tactician, and excel-

lent organizer, to direct floor strategy for the advocates of arms embargo repeal.

Also chosen was Majority Leader Sam Rayburn of Texas, an industrious and

shrewd Representative, to assist in the struggle for approval of the Bloom bill. In

another move, the administration wisely persuaded Foreign Affairs Committee

Chairman Bloom to play a subordinate role because he possessed only mediocre

speaking talents and often told off-beat jokes at improper times.

 

 

17. Divine, Illusion, 266-268; Sol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York, 1948), 233;

Vorys to Foreign Affairs Committee, June 3, 1939, Box 3, Vorys Papers; New York Times, June 6, 1939.

Republicans Fred Crawford of Michigan and Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, along with Democrat

John Coffee of Washington had introduced bills to place arms embargoes upon Japan.

18. See majority report of U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 856,

"Neutrality Act of 1939," June 17, 1939 (Washington, D.C., 1939).

19. New York Times, June 7, 8, 17, 1939; Vorys to Mr. and Mrs. John 0. Gockenbach, June 30, 1939,

Vorys to Henry Durthaler, June 14, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers; House Foreign Affairs Committee Report

856, "Neutrality," 21-24.

• 7
 

110                                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Although freshmen Congressmen rarely steal the limelight, Vorys delivered a ma-

jor floor address on June 28 for the noninterventionist forces, criticizing the pro-

posed repeal of the arms embargo as a step toward involvement in European affairs

and cautioning "the way to peace is not to promise or threaten to fight anybody."

Despite conceding that Roosevelt desired to keep the United States out of bellig-

erent conflicts, Vorys warned "if you threaten enough you get into war" and admon-

ished, "we should furnish to no nation the means of murder in wartime." Greeted

with widespread applause at the end of the speech, Vorys later explained, "Some of

the members told me that I was persuasive because I didn't claim too much for my

position and didn't criticize too much those who had other views."²⁰

In hopes of outmaneuvering administration forces, Vorys sought to rescue victory

from the throes of defeat. The Ohio Republican adeptly assumed the offensive the

next evening by introducing his committee amendment to prohibit the sale of arms

and ammunition to all belligerents, but, in an attempt to attract support from some

vacillating Democrats, did not include aircraft and other possible implements of war

on the embargo list. After the House rejected this plan, Republican Hamilton Fish,

Jr., of New York, a Foreign Affairs Committee colleague of Vorys, the same night

arranged a deal with wavering Democrats and promised that he and other Republi-

cans would support the Bloom bill in exchange for their approval of the Vorys

amendment. Several Democrats either swallowed Fish's bait or left the floor tem-

porarily when he requested a teller vote, thus enabling the House to reverse its ear-

lier decision and narrowly (159-157) approve the arms embargo amendment.

Vorys understandably rejoiced over the deal and the sudden turn of events which

temporarily negated the Bloom bill and seemingly doomed the prospects for Ameri-

can military intervention in European affairs.²1

Although stunned, administration leaders soon struck back with a rare parlia-

mentary device. Before crowded galleries and a packed House floor, Luther John-

son surprised the Vorys forces the next day by proposing, in effect, the removal of

the arms embargo amendment and thereby nearly (180-176) defeated the con-

troversial restriction on munitions sales. Visibly angered, Johnson forces increased

the drama by refusing to concede defeat and by insisting upon a roll call to reverse

the outcome. Both sides expected another close tally and watched the suspense in-

tently. Republican Clifford Hope of Kansas remarked, "It is going to be a close

fight" because the "Administration is straining every nerve to get this bill through,"

while Democrat J. Hardin Peterson of Florida labeled the situation as "a tug of war

from the start."  To the astonishment of most present, however, Vorys' supporters

registered a smashing victory over the bewildered administration forces and, ex-

ceeding even Vorys' wildest expectations, easily (214-173) restored the arms em-

bargo.22

A formidable bipartisan coalition had rallied behind the Ohio Republican's

cause. Over one-fourth of the Democrats, afraid of being tabbed publicly as inter-

 

 

20. Divine, Illusion, 269; "Washington Correspondents Name Ablest Members of Congress in Life

Poll," Life, March 20, 1939, 13-17; Congressional Record, 76 Cong.. I Sess., 8151-8152; New York Times,

June 30, 1939: Vorys to Edward Hume, July 18, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.

21. For developments, see Congressional Record, 76 Cong., I Sess.. 8320-8321, 8325; New York Times,

June 30, 1939.

22. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 8502-8503, 8511-8512; New York Times, July 1, 1939;

Clifford Hope to Herman Rome, June 30, 1939, Legislative Correspondence, Box 150, Cliford Hope Pa-

pers, Kansas State Historical Society; J. Hardin Peterson Newsletter, July 6, 1939, Box 20, J. Hardin Pe-

terson Papers, University of Florida Library.

• 8
 

John M. Vorys                                                                   111

 

ventionist, followed the safer route by supporting the Vorys amendment and were

joined by an overwhelming 95 percent of the Republican Representatives. Vorys

promptly labeled the measure as nonpartisan because "it would have been impos-

sible for the Republicans to have put through the amendment for a modified arms

embargo without Democratic support" and also since "distinguished Republicans,

such as [James W., Jr.] Wadsworth and [Bruce] Barton of New York, spoke and

voted against it." Further discounting political motivations, Vorys observed, "I

know of no measure that has come up since I have been down here where there was

more searching of hearts and attempting to vote our real convictions as to the ulti-

mate best way to keep America out of war."23   As a result of the sudden alliance, ad-

minstration forces again had failed to remove the controversial restriction against

munitions sales or to sanction American military assistance to belligerent nations.

Bolstered by their resounding victory, the Vorys forces took even bolder steps.

Republican George H. Tinkham of Massachusetts, an isolationist colleague of

Vorys, sought to send the measure back to the Foreign Affairs Committee and thus

kill all efforts at the 1939 session to repeal the arms embargo. But Democratic

whips reformed their shattered batallions just enough (196-194) to reject the Tink-

ham proposal, as twenty-six of their party members, who had voted for the Vorys

amendment, rejoined the administration forces and turned the tide against the isola-

tionist forces this time.²⁴

After the exciting maneuvering and tallies, the House anticlimactically (201-187)

gave the seal of approval to the modified Bloom bill. Vorys, thankful that numer-

ous Democrats had supported his embargo amendment earlier, abided by Fish's

pledge and supported the revised measure. He had made concessions regarding

munitions sales and presidential discretionary authority, but actually had sacrificed

little because he already had appended the arms embargo amendment and had suc-

ceeded in retaining most of the 1937 Neutrality Act. Republican Hope of Kansas

aptly summarized the situation for the Vorys forces by remarking, "The bill, as

passed, was much less harmful than the one which was originally introduced [be-

cause] the House adopted a number of good amendments."²⁵

In letters to constituents, Vorys portrayed vividly the impact of the House out-

come. The Congressman considered the approval of his amendment as a major

step toward keeping the United States out of war and out of foreign alliances. He

particularly praised international law experts and "the overwhelming majority of

just plain American people" for facilitating the retention of the arms embargo.

Adamantly defending noninterventionist policies toward European nations, he still

cautioned that the United States should not sell any belligerent "things with which

 

 

 

 

23. Roll Call Data, 76th Congress, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of

Michigan; Vorys to Hume, July 18, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers. For further substantiation of the biparti-

san nature of the neutrality issue, see J. Wilburn Cartwright Washington Newsletter, July 3, 1939, Box

168, J. Wilburn Cartwright Papers, University of Oklahoma Library. On the Vorys amendment, 61 of

225 Democrats, 149 of 156 Republicans, and 4 of 6 third party members favored restoration of the em-

bargo.

24. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., I Sess., 8512-8513; New York Times, July 1, 1939. On the Tink-

ham vote, 35 of the 228 Democrats, all 156 Republicans, and 3 of 6 third party members favored re-

commital. Data, Consortium.

25. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., I Sess., 8513-1814; Hope to Stanley Esser, July 3, 1939, Box 150,

Hope Papers. On the final roll call, 193 of the 226 Democrats, 5 of the 156 Republicans, and 3 of the 6

third party members approved neutrality revision. Data, Consortium.

• 9
 

112                                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

to kill each other." He advised instead "of attempting to arm victims of aggressors

we ought to stop arming aggressors"-meaning Japan.²⁶

The Roosevelt administration, Vorys contended, exaggerated the seriousness of

the European situation. He claimed that American tourists returning from abroad

and stock market leaders both pictured Europe as "apparently settling down to a so-

lution of her problems without war" and that the only European war cloud he could

see appeared in "the American newspapers." Besides doubting that the retention

of the arms embargo "would have any substantial military effect on the situation in

Europe," Vorys quickly reminded repeal advocates that the United States still could

furnish many supplies to belligerent nations and promised that "if and when the

struggle in Europe becomes our struggle, we will do our part."27

European events, Vorys maintained, still continued to sidetrack congressional at-

tention from more critical Far Eastern problems. He intensified his campaign to se-

cure House action on Japanese embargo legislation and finally induced Chairman

Bloom to open hearings on July 18, but complained that Secretary of State Cordell

Hull "intends to do nothing about the Japanese situation at this time." To Vorys'

pleasant surprise, however, Secretary Hull in late July seized the initiative from

Congress on the Japanese issue and warned Japan the United States would termi-

nate the commercial treaty of 1911 within six months.²⁸ The Vorys forces in the

House seemed to be gaining support for a prompt consideration of the Japanese

threat. The executive branch, still zealously campaigning for repeal of the arms

embargo, had lost another bruising battle with the Vorys group. Roosevelt priva-

tely denounced the House action toward Europe as "a stimulus to war" and

prompted Secretary Hull to complain that the embargo jeopardized American

peace and security.

Alarmed by the state of affairs, Roosevelt urged Pittman's Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee to reconsider the neutrality question and even threatened to delay

congressional adjournment until munitions sales were sanctioned to European na-

tions.²⁹ Administration advocates, though, fared no better in the Upper Chamber.

Several leading noninterventionists conferred in early July, determined that at least

thirty-four members opposed selling munitions to belligerents, and vowed to cam-

paign intensively for postponement of neutrality revision "by every honorable and

legitimate means" including filibuster. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on July 11, after shrewd behind-the-scenes maneuvering by isolationist Democrat

Bennett Clark of Missouri, narrowly (12-11) approved a motion to delay consid-

eration of all neutrality legislation until 1940. Roosevelt still advocated immediate

action and summoned congressional leaders to another White House conference on

July 18. According to Vorys, the conference showed that Roosevelt had wanted a

chance to make "another of his sabre-rattling speeches." A confrontation between

Secretary Hull and isolationist Borah of Idaho broke up the meeting and doomed

any chances for revising the neutrality laws. Congress, unaware that Germany was

 

 

 

26. Vorys to Mrs. Doris Foster, July 11, 1939, Vorys to Carl A. Norman, July 12, 1939, Vorys to S. P.

Bush, July 22, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.

27. Vorys to Bush, July 22, 1939, Vorys to Hume, July 18, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.

28. Vorys to Bush, July 22, 1939, Vorys to Foster, July 11, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers; Cordell Hull, The

Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I, 637-638; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Prince-

ton, 1950), 23.

29. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York, 1950), II, 900-901; Hull,

Memoirs, I, 646-649.

• 10
 

John M. Vorys                                                                      113

 

preparing to attack Poland, adjourned within three weeks.30

In the 1939 session of Congress, Vorys contributed substantially to the demise of

the arms embargo repeal forces. An advocate of federal concentration on Far East-

ern problems, he lobbied extensively for his arms embargo amendment in the For-

eign Affairs Committee, carried his struggle to the House floor, made two important

floor speeches, and astonished some colleagues by securing approval of his con-

troversial amendment. Historians may debate whether Vorys or Fish played the

more dominant role in the fight for the noninterventionists, but the neutrality

struggle definitely had brought a new face to the forefront.

In the final analysis, Vorys left a mixed record on the neutrality issue. Even

though he had been a member of Congress for only a few months, the Ohio Re-

publican exhibited unusual leadership throughout the conflict with the adminis-

tration, displaying an uncanny ability to rally bipartisan support behind the nonin-

terventionist cause. He also correctly warned about the gravity of the Far Eastern

situation and recognized more than most Representatives the dangers posed both by

Japanese expansion and by American insistence upon sending arms to aggressors.

Although fulfilling the wishes of many Americans desiring to keep the United States

out of a European foreign war, Vorys incorrectly assumed more popular backing for

nonintervention than actually existed on this extremely controversial issue.31 While

invoking the consequences of World War I as motivation for avoiding future Ameri-

can commitments to Europe, he also underestimated the nature of the German

threat to Western Europe and the United States.³² With Vorys and other isolation-

ists carrying the day in Congress, the United States nearly waited too long before

sending military supplies to Western European nations. As subsequent events

showed, Hitler was planning to attack the Low Countries, France, and Great Britain

at the same time he was reassuring a gullible world that his intentions were

peaceful.

30. Clyde Reed to William Allen White, July 13, 1939, Box 222, William Allen White Papers, Library

of Congress; "³⁴ in a Lair," Time, July 17, 1939, p. 13; "Neutrality Bill," Newsweek, July 17, 1939, pp.

17-18; Divine, Illusion, 277-278. Clark persuaded two conservative Democratic members, Walter

George of Georgia and Guy Gillette of Iowa, the night before to vote for postponement of the neutrality

question. See T.R.B., "Politics at the Water's Edge," New Republic, August 2, 1939, p. 360. For the July

18 White House conference, see Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper (New York,

1940), 43-44 and especially Warren Austin Memorandum, July 19, 1939, Folder 10, Box 20, Warren Aus-

tin Papers, University of Vermont Library. For the reaction of Vorys to the conference, see Vorys to

Bush, July 22, 1939, Box 4, Vorys Papers.

31. One large group that favored repeal of the arms embargo and was against the Vorys amendment

was the Franklin County League of Women Voters. See Vorys to Mrs. Wilson Hoge, July 11, 1939 for

the Congressman's reprimand to the group and his statement: "I derive considerable comfort from the

fact that my own views, which I reached after months of hearings, study and discussion, are in accord

with the mass of ordinary Americans and also the overwhelming majority of experts on international

law." Box 4, Vorys Papers.

32. Samples of Vorys' statements indicating that he underestimated Hitler's threat to Europe appear in

a letter written on July 22, 1939 to S. P. Bush: "I don't think that an arms embargo would have any sub-

stantial military effect on the situation in Europe. I think the insistence for its repeal is for diplomatic

and political effect.... Europe is apparently settling down to a solution of her problems without war ... I

believe that America can contribute more to world peace by threatening to stay out of Europe than by

threatening to go in ... I think that instead of attempting to arm victims of aggression we ought to stop

arming aggressors .. ." Box 4, Vorys Papers.

• 11