Ohio History Journal

CHARLES A. PECKHAM

 

 

The Ohio National Guard

and Its Police Duties, 1894

 

 

 

 

During the depression year of 1894, Ohio, like other states, experienced a number of

severe labor disturbances caused by unemployed or striking workers, the most

serious being the coal miners strike during April, May, and June. In addition to

these disturbances, there were severe fires in Springfield and Toledo, and three

times lynch mobs attempted to short cut the system of justice. These crises made

demands upon city and county law enforcement agencies which they often were

unable to meet, and as a result the Ohio National Guard was called out repeatedly

during 1894 to preserve public order. At one time 3,647 guardsmen were on active

duty, patrolling the greatest area under military occupation since the Civil War.¹ In

spite of the strain placed upon often inexperienced young men, the Ohio National

Guard performed its duties effectively with loss of life in only one incident.

The Ohio National Guard in 1894 was the third largest in the country, consisting

of 6,039 men enlisted for five year terms.² Its purpose, according to the revised stat-

utes of Ohio, was ". . . to aid the civil officers, to suppress or prevent riot or insur-

rections, to repel or prevent invasions .. ." Units of the Guard could be called up

by the governor, the sheriff of any county, the mayor of any municipal corporation,

or any state or federal judge "whenever .. . there is a tumult, riot, mob, or any body

of men acting together with intent to commit a felony, or to do or offer violence to

person or property, or by force and violence to person or property, or by force and

violence to break or resist the laws of the State, or there is a reasonable apprehen-

sion thereof...."³ Guard units were required to respond immediately to these calls

and place themselves under the orders of civil officials. However, the Code of

Regulations for the National Guard required that all instructions be in writing and

stated that local officials were not to interfere with the tactical arrangement of

troops.⁴

The Ohio National Guard was organized into eight three-battalion infantry regi-

 

 

 

 

1. Ohio, Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio, 1894, p. 16.

2. Ibid.; New York had 13,254 men and Pennsylvania had 8,959. U.S. Department of War, Annual

Report of the Secretary of War, 1894, I, 24.

3. Ohio, Revised Statutes (Bates, 1897), 3054, 3096.

4. Ohio, Code of Regulations for the Government of the Ohio National Guard, 1887, pp. 90-95. This was

the code in force in 1894.

 

Mr. Peckham is currently serving with the United States Air Force.

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52                                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

ments of nine to twelve companies, a black battalion of three companies,⁵ a light ar-

tillery regiment of ten batteries, two troops of cavalry, and an unattached bicycle

company, the Toledo cadets from the Toledo Military Academy. There were a total

of 104 units. These units were stationed in sixty-one counties over the state, the

poorest coverage being in the coal mining area of eastern Ohio. Units varied

greatly in size from twenty to fifty-seven enlisted men.⁶ The governor was the com-

mander in chief, but his power of appointment was limited to the adjutant general,

the quartermaster general and the state staff. All other officers were elected by the

men, the field grade officers being chosen by battalions and regiments, and com-

pany grade officers by their company or battery. They were elected for a term of

five years and were commissioned by the governor after their election. Non-commis-

sioned officers and regimental staff were chosen by the regimental commanders.⁷

State support was limited but had increased from $81,900 in 1891 to $119,150.50

in 1893; the subsidy for 1893 averaged just under $19.30 a man. In addition,

$20,000 was received each year from the Federal Government. Each company re-

ceived $300 a year for its armory and $100 a year for maintenance of equipment.

Additional funds came from the guardsmen themselves or from the cities and towns

where units were located.⁸

This limited support meant that the equipment of the Ohio National Guard was

 

 

5. Although Negroes did not gain full legal equality in the Ohio National Guard until 1878 (when the

word "white" was removed from the 1866 statute requiring "all white male citizens" between eighteen

and forty-five be enrolled in the militia), they had been associated with the National Guard since 1870.

In that year the General Assembly passed legislation allowing for the formation of independent militia

companies from among the enrolled militia, provided this was at no expense to the state. Within a

month after passage of this statute Cincinnati Negroes under the leadership of William Travis, a black

Navy Civil War veteran, organized in May 1870 an infantry battalion of four companies. Five more

black infantry companies were organized in the early 1870's: one at Zanesville in the summer of 1870;

one at Portsmouth in 1871; one at Springfield in 1874; and two at Cleveland in 1875. Black militia units,

like their white counterparts, however, suffered from a high rate of turnover, apathy, and lack of funds;

by the end of 1877 only the Springfield company remained. After the 1878 law was passed, a black com-

pany was organized in Columbus, and within two years was praised by the adjutant general for its dis-

cipline and proficiency in drill. In 1881 the two black companies then in force were organized into the

Ninth Battalion (nearly all the white companies were organized into regiments), and in 1884 the batallion

was expanded to three companies, with the organization of a company at Xenia.

Although detail is lacking, the black companies appear to have been treated much the same as the

other companies. They were subject to the same regulations, received equipment and arms from the

state, and several times conducted summer encampments with white units. Because of the issue of race,

the use of black units was more restricted than that of white. However, black units played an important

role in the Cincinnati riot of 1884. The battalion commander at one time had several white companies

under his command in addition to one of his own companies, and the captain of the Columbus company

won praise from the commander of the Fourteenth Regiment for his coolness and presence of mind.

For laws affecting the legal position of Negroes in the National Guard, see Laws of Ohio, LXIII (1866),

70, and LXXV (1878), 3. The major reorganization laws of 1870, 1876, and 1877 make no mention of

race. Ibid., LXVII (1870), 170; LXXIII (1876), 173-181; LXIV (1877), 227-239. Some details concerning

the formation of the first black unit can be found in the Cincinnati Enquirer, April 25, May 11, 13, 19,

June 1, 2, 1870, and Cincinnati Commercial, April 22, 23, 1870. The annual reports of the adjutant gen-

eral during the 1870's and 1880's provide little data beyond the number of units and the time and place of

encampments. The Adjutant General Report, 1879, pp. 24-25, sheds some light on black units during the

1870's; the Report, 1884, pp. 230, 264-265, contains reports concerning black units in the Cincinnati riots.

6. Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 7-8, 25 105; see also Revised Statutes, 3036, 3037, 3038.

7. Code of Regulations, 192-195.

8. Adjutant General Report, 1891, pp. 13-14; 1893, p. 13; 1894, p. 113; Revised Statutes, 3085. By law,

companies could enlist contributing members who paid yearly dues fixed by the company council of ad-

ministration. These dues could not be less than $5.00 a year. Contributing members received the same

exemptions as active members, but not the responsibilities. Each company was limited to 150 contrib-

uting members, and they could not exceed 15 percent of the voting population of the county where the

company was stationed. Adjutant General Report, 1892 in Ohio Executive Documents, 1892, 1, 1499-1500.

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usually old and often in poor condition. The infantry were armed with Model 1873 .45-70 caliber Springfield rifles, many of them in poor condition. The artillery con- sisted of twelve Gatlings, ten 3-inch rifles, and six old bronze pieces. Proper sights, harnesses, and horses were lacking. One thousand rounds of small arms ammuni- tion was kept in each armory and a reserve of 90,000 rounds in the state arsenal in Columbus; the 400 rounds of mixed artillery ammunition was divided between the batteries and the state arsenal. Some armories were excellent, but many were too small to drill in and/or provided no security for arms. The men's personal equip- ment was worn but serviceable, and all companies had basic cooking equipment, though all of the state's tents were kept centrally in Columbus. The Guard was not equipped for an extended campaign, but its equipment was adequate for limited service in the state where it could be moved rapidly and if necessary supplied by the state's excellent railway system.9 The National Guard was trained according to the offical United States Army drill regulations. Company drill was conducted weekly at each armory, and battalion, regiment, and extended order drill along with guard duty and rifle practice were conducted at summer encampments. The encampments paid for by the state were too short (only six days) to permit much practice, but many regiments stayed an ad- ditional two to four days at their own expense. In addition, theoretical training was provided for officers and non-commissioned officers through a correspondence school. Captain H. O. S. Heistand, the regular Army officer assigned to the Guard, was pleased by the interest shown by most officers in preparing themselves to meet their responsibilities. To be sure, a number of companies were persistently criticized during inspections for poor drill, discipline, and care of equipment, but Heistand observed a marked improvement in performance from 1891 to 1893. He further-       9. Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 112-113, 114, 116-117, 119-120.

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more stated in 1893 that the First, Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth regi- ments had attained the highest state of efficiency for state troops on the basis of their high state of drill discipline and their smart appearance.10 One of the persistent problems of the Ohio National Guard was the rapid turn- over of personnel. According to an 1891 survey, members of the Guard were mostly young, unmarried men under twenty-five years of age. Nearly half were from outdoor occupations (farmers, laborers, mechanics) with the rest being teach- ers, clerks, accountants, and business and professional men. According to Heis- tand, 98 percent were native born and only a few were miners.11 In spite of the five year enlistment, early discharges were easy to obtain, and personnel turnover aver- aged about one-third of the National Guard per year. Officer turnover was equally as rapid, though there was relative stability in the higher grades.12 The training and composition of the National Guard also had certain short- comings for crowd control and riot suppression, its major duties during the 1890's. Little or no attempt was made during the limited training time available to deal spe- cifically with the problems presented by riot control,13 and what practical experience was gained was often lost by the failure to reenlist and the election of new offi- cers.14 Furthermore, an individual company was often too small to deal with a riot     10. Ibid., 1891, pp. 19-30; 1892, pp. 1494-1522; 1893, pp. 33-88; 1894, pp. 118-119. 11. Ibid., 1891, pp. 26-27. 1894, p. 118. 12. In 1894, 1,841 men were enlisted and 2,431 discharged; 158 commissions were issued, 79 to new of- ficers, making a total of 454 officers. Ibid., 6. 13. Only five pages in the Code of Regulations were devoted to the Guard's responsibilities during civil disturbances. Ibid., 1893, p. 6; Code of Regulations, pp. 90-95. 14. From 1888 through 1893 the National Guard was called upon to deal with civil disorders only three times, in all cases for lynch mobs. The greatest number called up was 105 men. However, some offi- cers, such as Colonel A. B. Coit of the Fourteenth Regiment, had served in the Cincinnati riot of 1884. Major Winthrop Alexander, "Ten Years of Riot Duty," Journal of the United Military Service Institution of the United States, XIX (July 1896), 16, 25.

• 4
 

situation, and its members could not help but be influenced by the emotions and ac- tions of their fellow townsmen when dealing with local disorders. These defects, however, were often overcome by a number of positive factors. The National Guard's wide dispersal meant that most areas of the state had an emergency force of twenty-five or thirty armed men available on a few hours notice, and the Guard's central control meant that units from all over the state could be rushed to the scene of major trouble. The regulation drill of the National Guard included close order and skirmishes' drill and guard duty which were useful in the control of crowds and the suppression of riots. When called to active duty, the Na- tional Guard was under military law, which carried stringent penalties against dis- obedience of orders. Furthermore, the fact that the National Guard was locally re- cruited and drilled as a company meant that the men knew each other and drew mutual trust from this fact. In most situations the use of the National Guard was preferable to the other alter- natives. A guard unit was organized and ready while deputies, whether federal or local, had to be recruited from the general citizenry. Guardsmen were also more reliable. Local deputies lacked training and discipline and were hard to recruit when needed most, especially during violent strikes and for lynch mobs.15 Federal marshals, having jurisdiction over a larger area, had little trouble recruiting depu- ties, but most of these came from the unemployed and were often reluctant to en-       15. In all cases where the National Guard was called in to aid local officials, difficulty was encountered in getting deputies. In several cases during the Wheeling Creek campaign it is questionable if the sheriffs made a real effort to recruit deputies before calling for aid.

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56                                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

force the law against fellow workers.¹⁶ National Guardsmen, though less well

equipped and trained, were more numerous and more readily available than federal

troops, whose use had to be authorized by the President. More importantly, state

troops were less dangerous politically since a call for federal troops was an admis-

sion of the state's inability to cope with the situation; and federal troops were, more-

over, not under the governor's direct control as was the National Guard.17

In addition to these basic alternatives there were two other organizations which

could perform police duties: independent companies and the Sons of Veterans.

Under state law independent companies could bind themselves to perform the same

duties as the National Guard when called in return for receiving the privileges

granted members of the National Guard.18 At no time did they receive state sup-

port and they were only under the control of the state when called to active duty.

All but one of the seven major independent companies were in Cleveland, and, with

the possible exception of the "Cleveland Grays," they were of questionable value.l9

Captain H. O. S. Heistand wrote that the independent organizations:

Serve no useful purpose and are hurtful to the interests of the State forces. There is no legal

provision which controls their methods of instruction, administration, discipline, or equip-

ment, and they "sap" the support which is due to those who do the work. Their practical ef-

ficiency is exhausted in their appearance.

The Sons of Veterans, armed and equipped and organized into one regiment and

ninety-five unattached companies and one cavalry troop, had only a self-imposed

obligation to support the constitution.²⁰ Their value was even more questionable

than that of the independent companies, but on at least one occasion they per-

formed police duties effectively.²¹ At best, the Sons of Veterans and the independ-

ent companies were emergency supplements to the National Guard.

During 1894 the Ohio National Guard's police responsibilities involved three

kinds of duties: control of crowds during fires, lynch mobs, and labor troubles. The

first call for the National Guard came on January 3 when a major fire swept through

downtown Toledo, causing $600,000 damage. The National Guard was called out

by the mayor at 6 P.M. and by 7 P.M. had cleared the streets of crowds and potential

looters and then stood guard during the night. The National Guard's second fire

duty came on February 19 when the three units stationed in Springfield were called

out to control the crowds at the Arcade Hotel fire. Twelve men from Battery E ar-

 

 

16. Little use was made of federal deputies during the Wheeling Creek campaign. Thirty-five were

sent to Massillon and twenty-five to Wheeling Creek. Federal marshals several times attempted to move

trains but failed without National Guard support. Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 7, 12-16, 1894;

Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 11, 13, 18, 1894.

17. There were 427 federal troops in Columbus barracks in 1895; no figure was given for 1894. Gover-

nor McKinley apparently gave no thought to requesting these troops though the Canton Repository re-

ported that Attorney General Richard Olney had given Marshal Hacket authority to call out federal

troops. U.S. Department of War, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1895, I, 83; Canton Repository,

June 14, 1894.

18. Revised Statutes, 3040. The Cleveland City Guards were a special company supported by the city

and organized under a special statute. Their prime duty was to suppress disorders in the city. Ibid.,

3056-1 to 3056-5.

19. Heistand inspected the Cleveland Grays in 1895 at their request and praised them for their excel-

lent discipline, esprit de corps, drill, high intelligence, and "cordial good feelings" with the Ohio National

Guard. Adjutant General Report, 1895, pp. 71-74.

20. Ibid., 1893, pp. 60-61.

21. In July 1894 the Sons of Veterans drove "Count" Bylakorrski's industrial army from the Sandusky

county seat. Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 211.

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Ohio National Guard, 1894                                                       57

 

rived within twenty minutes and with the aid of guardsmen arriving later were able

to push back the crowd only minutes before a wall of the hotel collapsed on the area

where the crowd had stood.²²

The second major activity of the Ohio National Guard was the protection of pris-

oners against lynch mobs, a duty which it was called upon to perform three times in

1894. The first call came on April 15 at Rushsylvania where a black man was ac-

cused of raping a white woman. After the Negro was arrested an angry crowd gath-

ered and the sheriff, who had been called by the local constable, telegraphed for the

Bellefontaine company. After a delay of two hours, caused by the difficulty of as-

sembling men on Sunday, nineteen guardsmen and one officer arrived by train.

The company was guided to the jail through vacant lots in order to avoid the mob.

As the company approached the jail, one guardsman seized a man who was lighting

a fuse leading to six sticks of dynamite placed under the jail. The arrival of the Na-

tional Guard only made the mob more angry, and the sheriff, wanting to avoid a

bloody clash, agreed to send the Guard home after conferring with a group of citi-

zens who promised to guarantee the prisoner's safety until he could be tried the fol-

lowing day. The National Guard company obeyed the sheriffs orders and returned

with the sheriff to Bellefontaine. Shortly after the guardsmen left, a group of men

assaulted the jail. The citizens guard vanished, and the jail was knocked from its

foundations. The constable, who alone remained to protect the prisoner, was

quickly overpowered and the prisoner was dragged to the center of town where, af-

ter a delay of fifteen minutes, he was hanged. A grand jury was called a month

later to investigate the lynching. The judge instructed it that those who had partici-

pated in or abbetted the lynching were guilty of murder, but it did not return any

indictments.²³

The next time the National Guard was called to protect prisoners it was more suc-

cessful. Following the arrest of men accused of the brutal murder of a popular New

Lexington citizen, rumors circulated that an attempt would be made to lynch the

prisoners. In order to forestall this, the local company was called out on July 27.

No attempt was made, and the company was released three days later when the

prisoners were transferred to Columbus.²⁴

The third use of the National Guard to control a lynch mob resulted in death for

some of the participants. At Washington Court House on October 16 the sheriff

called out the local company after a Negro accused of raping a white woman was ar-

rested. As the crowd continued to grow, he asked for sixty reinforcements from Co-

lumbus. Colonel A. B. Coit with two companies of the Fourteenth Regiment were

sent early the next morning, and at 2 P.M. the prisoner was safely rushed through the

seventy feet separating the jail and the courthouse between a double line of guards-

men. Several members of the mob managed to break through the end of one line

 

 

 

22. Toledo Blade, January 4, 5, 1894; Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 13, 14, 186, 187-189.

23. Ibid, 189-191; Logan County Index, April 19, 26, 1894; Bellefontaine Examiner, April 17, 19, May

17, June 7, 1894; Bellefontaine Republican, April 17, 1894. The leaders of the lynch mob seem to have

momentarily lost their nerve when it came to the point of actually hanging the victim. The Republican

noted that "the hesitation that was shown on the part of those who did the hanging convinced many that

if a few decided men, well organized, had appeared upon the scene, while they were under the tree, the

man could have been rescued." Also, editorial opinion was divided concerning the lynching. The Index

supported the lynching and the Republican opposed. The Examiner praised the performance of the Na-

tional Guard and stated that the evidence against the man was "purely circumstantial," but it also ap-

plauded the failure of the grand jury to indict anyone.

24. Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 212.

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of guardsmen. They knocked the sheriff and his prisoner down momentarily, but were beaten off by the officers. Once inside the courthouse, the prisoner pleaded guilty and was immediately given the maximum sentence of twenty years. Rather than risk bloodshed by escorting the prisoner to the train and sending him to Co- lumbus, the sheriff called for additional troops. The crowd meanwhile became in- creasingly turbulent. At 7:30 P.M., ignoring repeated warnings that the troops would fire if a door was broken in, some members of the mob battered down a door with a large timber. The guard at the door fired, killing five and wounding over a dozen more. This scattered the mob, although repeated threats were made that the courthouse would be dynamited. The crisis ended when four companies of the Fourteenth arrived, followed by the First Regiment, Company M of Third, Com- pany H of Seventeenth, and Battery B. The Fourteenth then escorted the prisoner to the state penitentiary while the other troops remained at Washington Court House until they were ordered home at 10:50 A.M.25 This action caused a furor in the state, but all newspapers except the local one supported the guardsmen, pointing out that law and order must be preserved, even at heavy cost. The mayor of Washington Court House charged that the National Guard had knowingly fired into streets filled with innocent women and children, and the local coroner found "there was no justification for the shooting . . ."26     25. Ibid, 292-301; Cyclone and Fayette Republican, October 18, 25, 1894; Ohio State Journal (Colum- bus), October 17, 18, 1894; Cincinnati Enquirer, October 19, 1894; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 19, 1894. The Plain Dealer sharply criticized McKinley for being out of state making speeches when the tragedy occurred. To some extent this criticism is justified, but McKinley did strongly support Colonel Coit in public statements. 26. Ohio State Journal (Columbus), October 19, 1894; Cyclone and Fayette Republican, October 25, November 22, 1894. The Journal stated that "never before . . . has the fair fame of the buckeye state been so disgraced," but that the guardsmen had no other course. The Republican, on the other hand, termed the shooting "cowardly."

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Ohio National Guard, 1894                                                           59

 

Colonel Coit was cleared of any wrong doing by a board of investigation composed

of National Guard officers, but he was nevertheless charged with manslaughter by

the prosecutor of Fayette County. Coit's lawyers obtained a change of venue, but

Coit was forced to undergo a prolonged trial lasting from October 7, 1895 to Febru-

ary 7, 1896, in which the jury found him innocent after deliberating for fifty hours.

In April the state legislature passed a bill granting Coit $17,500 for legal expenses

and passed a joint resolution instructing the Attorney General to enter a nolle prose-

qui on the two remaining indictments unless citizens posted $50,000 bond for trial

expenses.²⁷

The most common reason for calling out the National Guard in 1894 was violence

arising from labor conflicts. Four times during the year guardsmen were called out

and held in their armories in case of need. Fifteen guardsmen were detailed to pro-

tect the armory in Cincinnati during February and March following disturbances in

that city. On May 3 six companies of the National Guard, in addition to the six in-

dependent companies and special deputies, totalling 1,000 men in all, were called

up to deal with rioting laborers in Cleveland. This riot, however, was quelled by

policemen, and the National Guard and the independent companies were relieved

after several days. A few days later, on May 9, Company B of the Eighth Regiment

and Battery F were called up in Akron to deal with a threatened riot by the unem-

ployed. Although the National Guard was popularly credited with cooling the situ-

ation, no duty was performed other than guarding the armory and restraining

crowds during a fire on May 12. Most of the National Guard were released on May

15 with the exception of a few who were retained to guard the armory until May 17.

The National Guard was again called on in Cincinnati when the mayor ordered

thirty guardsmen to guard the armory on July 7 during the railroad strike, releasing

them on July 18.28 Meanwhile Governor William McKinley had put the

Fourteenth on an hours notice due to a strike on the Columbus, Hocking Valley and

Toledo Railway, but no action was taken as the strikers won a favorable settlement

on July 17.29

The Ohio National Guard was also involved with two "industrial armies" during

1894. The first clash with such a group occurred on April 18 at Mt. Sterling, where

 

 

27. This trial appears to have been one of the first in Ohio, if not in the United States, concerning the

legal responsibility of guardsmen for causing the deaths of citizens in carrying out their duty. The attor-

ney for the state argued that Coit had no authority to order the crowd to disperse or to fire into it and that

he had illegally assumed the powers of a civil magistrate. In addition, in his opening argument he al-

leged that Coit and his men had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the shooting, but he

did not try to prove this during the trial. Coit's defense attorneys, led by George Nash and Harry M.

Daugherty, argued that Coit was present at the order of the adjutant general, that he had reported to civil

authorities, that a riotous situation had existed, and that therefore Coit's actions were covered by statutes

6893, 6894, and 6895 which held civil authorities guiltless in case of death during a riotous situation.

Much time was spent arguing legal issues, and the judge's charge to the jury occupied seventy-seven type-

written pages. For information on the trial see the accounts in the weekly Democrat and Watchman (Cir-

cleville), January 31, February 7, 1896, and the Circleville Union Herald, February 6, 1896. See also Dau-

gherty's view in H. M. Daugherty to Ray Baker Harris, June 7, 1936, in Ray Baker Harris Collection,

Warren G. Harding Papers, Ohio Historical Society. For the legislation reimbursing Coit, see Laws of

Ohio, XCII (1896), 135-136, 790-791.

28. Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 195-197, 189-202, 302; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 3, 1894;

Akron Beacon and Republican, May 10, 1894; Akron Times Democrat, May 9, 1894; Cincinnati Enquirer,

July 8, 1894. Earlier the mayor had requested 200 rifles from the state arsenal, but Governor McKinley

refused this request on grounds that the rifles were not available. John A. Caldwell to McKinley, July 4,

5, 1894, McKinley Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

29. Mary Aldora Deibel, "William McKinley as Governor of Ohio, 1892-1896" (unpublished M.A.

thesis, The Ohio State University, 1939), 65.

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Galvin's Army had been holding a train for two days demanding transportation to Columbus. McKinley, after first sending Adjutant General J. C. Howe to in- vestigate the situation and getting a statement from the sheriff stating he had ex- hausted all his resources, ordered the First Battalion and Company L of the Fourteenth plus Battery H to the scene.  Within six hours of the first alarm, the troops reached Mt. Sterling, and in less than an hour they had cleared the train after first setting up Gatling guns to command the train. After a conference, Galvin's Army was given uncooked rations, and later the National Guard and the army re- turned to Columbus on the same train, after Galvin succeeded in raising the $45 de- manded by the railroad to take his people to Columbus. Later, on July 27, a smaller industrial army under "Count" Bylakorrski invaded Clyde demanding that they be fed but withdrew when confronted by the hastily mobilized local National Guard Company.30 The greatest challenge the Ohio National Guard faced during 1894 was the maintenance of order and suppression of violence during the 1894 coal strike. Con- ditions for miners in Ohio had steadily deteriorated following the onset of the de- pression of 1892, and the Ohio mine owners had been forced to reduce wages from $.70 a ton to $.50 a ton, after cheap coal from Pennsylvania and other states caused the collapse of the price system they had established in Ohio.31  Mine worker lead- ers reluctantly accepted these cuts, but in the national convention of the United Mine Workers in April, they were thrown out and more militant leaders, headed by     30. Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 192-194, 210-211. See the McKinley Papers for the telegrams exchanged between the sheriff and McKinley. The Ohio State Journal stated that McKinley had no choice but to "send the Ohio guard in sufficient numbers to compel obedience" and that his act "will be universally commended." Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 29, 1894. 31. Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New York, 1970), 234-238.

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Ohio National Guard, 1894                                                    61

 

John McBride, took over. McBride advocated a series of short strikes designed to

reduce the supply of coal without exhausting the union war chest, but the confer-

ence instead voted for a general strike to restore pre-depression wages. More than

120,000 miners nationwide joined the strike when it began on April 21.32 Though

McBride and other leaders repeatedly urged that the strike be conducted peacefully,

instances of violence occurred in Ohio even before the strike began. The number of

these instances increased as the miners, who had little funds at the beginning of the

strike, became increasingly desperate to halt the flow of coal into Ohio.³³ Coal tip-

ples and bridges were burned, stones were thrown at trains hauling coal, and miners

who continued to work were attacked.

One of the focal points of disorder was Athens County, where a railroad bridge

was burned on May 14 and stones were thrown at trains. On May 28 armed miners

attempted to stop a train at Glouster, demanding that the cars loaded with coal be

dropped. That train got through but a second train on May 29 was stopped. M.

M. Riley, the sheriff, unable to deal with the situation, telegraphed Governor

McKinley for the National Guard. McKinley immediately ordered units of the

Seventeenth Infantry to converge on Glouster, but in the meantime railroad offi-

cials had agreed not to carry any more coal. Riley then cancelled his call. Com-

pany A of New Lexington, Captain C. B. Arnold commanding, however, was al-

ready en route. When the company detrained at 6:10 P.M. it found that the sheriff

and other officials had left the scene. The guardsmen were soon surrounded by a

large threatening crowd of an estimated 1200 miners, but Arnold gained some work-

ing room by backing his men against the wall of a building and having them load.

After finding the mayor, who confirmed that the call had been cancelled, Arnold

marched his men 300 yards to a vacant lot and then to a schoolhouse, losing some of

his supplies to a rush of the mob in the process. He was later able to get a special

train to take his command to Athens and then to Lancaster where his company

spent the night until arrangements could be made to return to New Lexington. The

performance of the National Guard under these conditions met with well-deserved

praise from the Athens Journal and the sheriff, but it apparently made McKinley

more cautious not to call out the National Guard until he was certain that all local

resources had been exhausted.³⁴

Incidents of violence continued during the first days of June, and McKinley

showed his concern by summoning Adjutant General Howe from his home in

Kenton to Columbus. At the same time, whether at their own initiative or at

McKinley's command is unclear, some regimental commanders made arrangements

for food and rail transportation.35

These preparations were justified, for on June 6 McKinley received a telegram

from the sheriff of Guernsey County stating that crowds of over 500 miners had

 

 

 

32. David J. McDonald and Edward A. Lynch, Coal and Unionism: A History of the American Coal

Miners Union (Silver Spring, Maryland, 1939), 38-39.

33. The United Mine Workers had a treasury balance of $10.368 going into the strike. Moreover, most

miners had only been working part time for months before the strike. Ibid., 38.

34. M. M. Riley to McKinley, June 1, 2, 1894, McKinley Papers; Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp.

202-210; Athens Journal, May 31, 1894.

35. Ohio Stale Journal (Columbus), June 4, 1894. Colonel H. S. Bunker of the Sixteenth Regiment,

for instance, ordered his quartermaster to make arrangements for transportation and his commissary offi-

cer to get three days rations several days before the regiment was called up on June 8. Adjutant General

Report, 1894, pp. 272-274.

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62                                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

blocked traffic on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. After consulting with Howe

and J. L. Locke, an attorney of Guernsey County, McKinley ordered the Fourteenth

and Eighth Regiments, seven companies of the Seventeenth, and Battery H to as-

semble. These troops were concentrated at Zanesville on June 7 and then moved

under command of Howe to Cambridge and Mineral Siding, dispersing the miners

with little trouble. Calls were received from Belmont County on June 7, and

McKinley ordered the assembly of the Second Regiment and then sent it to Howe at

the latter's request. On June 8, Howe moved the Eighth and Second into Belmont

County and occupied Barnsville, St. Clairsville, and McClainsville Cut. On the

same day McKinley had the Sixteenth Regiment and the Toledo Cadets assemble

and ordered them to join Howe. Before they arrived, Howe left early on June 9 for

Wheeling Creek in response to urgent calls for help. Though crowds of upwards to

600 miners had gathered there, guardsmen cleared the areas with little trouble. On

the following morning Howe distributed garrisons along the track and trains were

again able to move to Cleveland, which was suffering severely from a shortage of

coal. Meanwhile McKinley had on June 9 ordered three companies of the Third

Regiment to assemble and report to Columbus in order to establish a ready re-

serve.³⁶

By June 11 conditions appeared to have stabilized. Miners and mine owners had

resumed negotiations on June 9 and were nearing a compromise agreement.37

Furthermore Howe had reported on the night of June 10 that:

A better feeling towards the troops by the strikers is manifested on all hands ... no disorder

of any kind has been reported to these headquarters. The strikers seem now to appreciate

that troops were sent here for no other purpose than to substain the civil authorities in main-

taining peace and order, the enforcement of law, and protection of life and property.38

The guardsmen began to hope for an early return home, but these hopes were

ruined by more calls for help, this time from Stark and Tuscarawas counties. After

a long exchange of telegrams, McKinley ordered the Fifth to assemble and report to

Stark County while Howe ordered the Fourteenth and two Gatling guns to Tusca-

rawas County. Companies B, C, and I of the Third were sent to replace them, and

on June 12 the rest of the Third was ordered to assemble. Little resistance was en-

countered in Stark County, but the situation in Tuscarawas County appeared to

McKinley to be ". . . as critical as any we have had, requiring the utmost vigilance

and greatest precaution." On the following day McKinley was guardedly optimis-

tic, and on June 14 he relieved the Third while Howe, at McKinley's suggestion, in-

quired of the sheriffs whether troops could be spared. Following this meeting,

Howe suggested that the Seventeenth in Guernsey County be relieved, but before

this could be carried out the sheriff of Caroll County telegraphed that 200 miners

were trying to burn a railroad depot at Sherrodsville. After confirmation, all but

one company of the Sixteenth was sent to deal with this situation.³⁹

 

 

 

36. Ibid., 134-143, 144-149, 150-154.

37. Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 10-12, 1894.

38. Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 155.

39. Ibid., pp. 156-161, 164, 168-169, 170-172, 301; McKinley to J. C. Howe, June 13, 1894, William

McKinley Manuscripts, Series 2, Vol. 87, Library of Congress microfilm. In addition, Troop A, which

was scheduled to go on a practice march on June 12, postponed its march and camped in an old fair-

ground just outside the city limit of Cleveland. A train was held in waiting until June 15, when they re-

ceived authorization from general headquarters to continue their march. They received no pay for this.

• 12
 

Ohio National Guard, 1894                                                        63

 

Though incidents continued, this was the last time the National Guard was de-

ployed to stop violence resulting from the coal strike as miners were reluctantly go-

ing back to work following the achievement of a compromise $.60 a ton settlement

on June 11. McKinley was able to begin relieving troops on June 15, when the Sev-

enteenth was relieved. On June 16, the Eighth and Companies B, G, and I of the

Third were relieved while Howe made quick trips to the garrisoned areas to pressure

the sheriffs for early release of troops. The Second was relieved on June 17 and the

Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Regiment were relieved on June 19, and on June 20

Sheriff Doll of Stark County reluctantly released the Fifth Regiment. By this time,

the strike had nearly collapsed. Only 4,000 of the 27,000 miners in Ohio were still

out on strike, and the convention called by state president A. A. Adams to oppose

the compromise settlement voted to accept it, though under protest.40

In spite of the size and scale of the campaign, no deaths or serious injuries directly

resulted to the strikers from actions of the National Guard.41 The Guard itself suf-

fered two deaths; one from cerebral hemorrhage and the other from a skull fracture

suffered when a guardsman hit a log while driving into the Tuscarawas River. Sev-

eral other guardsmen and a black cook suffered minor injuries from accidents. The

good health of the command was regarded as phenomenal, with only two men being

sent home on account of sickness.⁴²

The conduct of the campaign was characterized by caution and massive use of

force. Before sending troops, McKinley conducted extended telegraphic corre-

spondence with local authorities, all of which was published in the Columbus Ohio

State Journal, to ensure that troops were indeed needed and to make it clear that it

was the local authorities who were calling in troops. Once he had decided to send

troops, he sent them rapidly by rail in at least regimental strength to the major

trouble spots, the purpose being to overawe the miners and thus avoid bloodshed.⁴³

With the assistance of Heistand and Colonel W. L. Curry, the Assistant Adjutant

General, he coordinated the movement of troops, using Columbus as a central ship-

ping point. McKinley also kept in constant telegraphic communication with Howe

and relied heavily on his advice, but he nonetheless made the basic decisions on

how the campaign was to be conducted.

The National Guard proved to be a reliable and effective instrument. Individ-

uals responded rapidly and loyally to the call-up of their units; most companies had

90 percent of their men assembled in heavy marching order within two hours of the

first alarm and were in the riot area within twelve hours of receiving marching or-

 

 

 

 

40. Adjutant General Report. 1894, pp. 174-184; Cincinnati Enquirer, June 19, 1894; Cincinnati Com-

mercial Gazette, June 20, 1894. The Massillon miners continued to strike. They had been locked out

since February 19 when they had refused to accept the abolishment of the $.15 a ton premium previously

given them. They finally agreed to arbitration and returned to work on October 10. The arbitration

board decided in favor of the mine owners and they were forced to accept the $.60 a ton rate. Ohio, An-

nual Report of the State Board of Arbitration of Ohiofor the Year 1894, pp. 47-55.

41. There were a number of unconfirmed reports of deaths resulting from clashes between National

Guardsmen and strikers, and a wife received a telegram stating her husband had been shot while on

guard duty, but these reports proved erroneous. For examples see Cincinnati Enquirer, June 8, 1894;

Canton Repository, June 12, 1894; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 15, 1894: Dayton Daily Journal,

June 19, 1894.

42. Adjutant General Report, 1894, pp. 219-220, 231, 253, 260, 267-268.

43. This policy was in part based on McKinley's Civil War experiences in which he had noticed that

there was no fight when a brigade met a division. Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York,

1959), 54.

• 13
 

64                                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

ders. Upon arrival, the immediate area was cleared when necessary by a skirmish

line with fixed bayonets, the miners usually fleeing before a physical clash occurred.

Once the area was cleared, a regimental command post was set up and companies

distributed along the track to guard bridges, depots, and other points. Guard de-

tails varied in size from four men and a non-commissioned officer during the day to

twenty-five or more men and an officer at night. Weapons were unloaded as stand-

ard procedure though guards were authorized to fire if they were physically endan-

gered or fired upon. Shots fired at guardsmen were returned, though no known cas-

ualties resulted from this. In many areas, particularly during the first few days, at

least half of the men were on duty at all times.44 Target practice, hunting, and other

activities which might cause a commotion were prohibited.⁴⁵   A number of persons

were stopped for attempting to sell whiskey to the troops, possessing guns, or wan-

dering into the guard lines. Most were detained for a short while and then released,

although those involved in selling whiskey or firing on guardsmen were turned over

to local authorities.⁴⁶

The National Guardsmen were generally well supplied and fed during the cam-

paign though a number of individual companies suffered temporary shortages.

Some commanders had made advance arrangements for food and transportation,

nevertheless most companies arrived with only their basic cooking utensils and

some without even these. They were housed in tents shipped from Columbus or in

railroad cars, but some were forced to spend several nights out in the open. Where

possible, supplies were bought locally, but some merchants refused or were unable

to provide the quantity needed. Where necessary, supplies were shipped from

headquarters at Wheeling Creek, and special supply trains were run between there

and Columbus. Rations were supplemented by foraging and buying pies and other

foods from local farmers' or miners' wives, and some companies reported that they

had fruit at each meal and steak at least once a day.⁴⁷

The Ohio National Guard's relationships with the immigrant miners was surpris-

ingly good, particularly in view of the anti-foreign bias of many newspapers and

some guardsmen. Great hostility was initially encountered, but the guardsmen ig-

nored the threats and taunts hurled at them and some made deliberate efforts to re-

duce tensions. Once it became clear that the National Guard was only there in or-

der to preserve peace, a measure of fraternization and cooperation developed. At

Wheeling Creek, a company's gift of their oranges to miners' children the day after

the National Guard's arrival led to a singing contest between the miners and the

guardsmen, and by the end of the campaign, miners were allowed to freely circulate

 

 

 

44. Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 130, 215, 216, 235, 236, 251, 265, 269, 271, 277, 314-315. Ohio

State Journal (Columbus), June 7-20. 1894, provides the best reporting on the conduct of the campaign.

See also the Canton Repository, June 7-18, 1894. for accounts of camp life. Colonel G. R. Gyger of the

Sixteenth made the policy explicit in the following general order issued on June 11: "Battalion com-

manders will at once issue orders to their commands . . . that no pieces be loaded except upon express

orders, and then only in cases of danger. Guards must be instructed to fire only in self-defense, as many

of the persons having the right to pass near our lines are foreigners, who do not understand our language,

and would not know the meaning of nor obey the command 'halt' and their failure to obey should be no

excuse for a sentinel to fire on them. The country is not under martial law, and any unjustifiable killing

or injuring of any person would subject the soldier to arrest and trial in the civil courts; it is therefore nec-

essary that instructions to the sentinels be very explicit." (p. 216)

45. Canton Repository, June 13, 14, 1894.

46. Ohio Stale Journal (Columbus), June 19, 1894.

47. Canton Repository, June 11, 1894; Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 132, 221. 231. 273-274; Ohio

State Journal (Columbus), June 11, 1894.

• 14
 

through the camp until 9 P.M. and guardsmen were taken on tours of the mines. In Stark County, the major clash which occurred was a softball game between the min- ers and the guardsmen, and at McClainville miners cheered on some guardsmen when the latter, tired of the taunts of some local toughs, piled into them with their fists.48 Even though general good relations prevailed, until near the end it was not uncommon for guard posts to be fired on or stoned at night. During the Wheeling Creek campaign, the National Guard benefitted from al- most unanimous public support. With the exception of Canal Dover in Tuscarawas County, where a company's train was delayed for a day by angry miners, the troops were given a warm and friendly send-off. To show public support, old veterans of- fered their services to KcKinley if needed, and the Sons of Veterans did the same.49 More importantly, various banks in Ohio volunteered to pay the local guard units upon presentation of vouchers signed by McKinley; otherwise the National Guard would have had to wait nearly two years until the state legislature met again to re- ceive their pay. Newspaper opinion was highly favorable to McKinley and the Na- tional Guard, praising his decisive use of the Guard and the courage and exemplary performance of the "brave boys in blue." Only two major papers opposed McKin- ley's policies. The Cleveland Plain Dealer charged that McKinley was too soft on the miners. The Cincinnati Enquirer reversed an initially favorable stand by sug- gesting that McKinley had not only expended money illegally by failing to get the     48. Some officers, along with the popular press, blamed foreigners for the violence associated with the strike, but one Guard officer maintained it was the American miners who were the most hostile. Dayton Daily Journal, June 15, 16, 1894; Zanesville Daily Signal, June 16, 1894; Canton Repository, June 9. 17, 1894; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 8, 11, 13, 15, 1894; Adjutant General Report, 1894, p. 280. 49. Ibid., 231-234, 242-243; McKinley to M. J. Lovett, June 14, 1894, McKinley Papers; Zanesville Daily Signal, June 11, 1894.

• 15
 

66                                                                  OHIO HISTORY

 

approval of the Emergency Board for his actions, but that the calling out of the Na-

tional Guard had only made the situation worse.50 The major opposition came

from the miners and their sympathizers. One group of miners returned a charity do-

nation, claiming that McKinley's antipathy for labor was now clear, and the citizens

of Crystal Springs sent a public letter to McKinley, stating:

 

We, the citizens of Crystal Springs, were surprised to see a company of home guards sent to

our village on the morning of June 12, and we condemn the action of Sheriff Doll and Gov-

ernor McKinley for sending home guards to our village without first making an in-

vestigation. We, the citizens, think it unjust in placing the expense on the county when it is

unnecessary. Where the eight companies are now encamped is the most peaceable village in

Stark County.51

Dissatisfaction in a few quarters should not obscure the fact that the Ohio Na-

tional Guard in 1894 fulfilled its obligations effectively (though not flawlessly) and

with relative impartiality. On a local level, it had responded promptly to the

requests of local authorities to control crowds during fires, to protect prisoners, or to

suppress riots. On a statewide basis, it had responded with little confusion to an

unprecedented call-up and had been able to halt the spread of violence arising from

a major strike without bloodshed or serious clashes. It is true that the intervention

of the National Guard did favor business interests by hastening the end of the

strike, but this was basically a by-product of McKinley's overriding concern with

public order; the National Guard was not mobilized to smash the strike, and the

agreement which resulted from the miner-mine owners meeting was a compromise,

not a complete victory for the mine owners.

The relative success of the Ohio National Guard was primarily due to its own ca-

pabilities, the situations in which it operated, and McKinley's leadership. The

training, equipment, and leadership of the Guard, while of varying quality, proved

adequate for the task. The policy of rapid response and the use of troops in mass

overawed the strikers with force and lessened the possibility that the guardsmen

might panic. The guardsmen had acted with restraint, both because many of them

sympathized with the miners and had experienced unemployment and because

some of the commanders made it clear they were operating under civil law and were

responsible for their actions in court. In all cases, the opposition was not well or-

ganized, and in the case of the Wheeling Creek campaign, the miners were gathered

in relatively open spaces where the discipline and tactics of the National Guard

could have the greatest effect and where there were few hiding places from which to

fire or throw rocks. In two cases, Glouster and Canal Dover, the possibility of panic

appeared as small companies of guardsmen were surrounded by large, angry mobs,

but though weapons were loaded in both cases, the guardsmen kept cool and no

bloodshed ensued.

Not the least factor in the success of the Ohio National Guard in 1894 was the

 

 

 

50. The total cost of the Wheeling Creek campaign was $143,000. Correspondence relating to this can

be found in the McKinley Papers. This support compares quite favorably with that in other states. In

Illinois, the state had to pay 6 percent on the money advanced to the troops and in West Virginia, the

governor had to sign a personal note. Illinois, Biennial Report of the Adjutant General for 1893 and 1894,

p. 29; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 10, 20, 1894; Cincinnati Enquirer, June 15, 1894. To the Enquirer's

charge McKinley replied: "We will preserve peace first and arrange for the meeting of expenses after-

ward." Ibid. June 16, 1894.

51. Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 10, 13, 1894.

• 16
 

Ohio National Guard, 1894                                                  67

 

leadership of McKinley. The governor, though making extensive use of profes-

sional advice, nevertheless kept close control over the movements of the Guard and

its actions. Throughout the Wheeling Creek campaign he showed not only a deep

concern for the preservation of peace and the welfare of the guardsmen, but also a

concern and understanding of the miners as well. With the exception of the Glous-

ter incident, he used the National Guard cautiously and removed the troops as

swiftly as possible. He can perhaps be criticized for using too many guardsmen,

particularly in Stark County, but the situation in Ohio was very tense, and it was

probably better to err by sending too many rather than too few. Furthermore, in

making extensive use of the National Guard he was well within the mainstream of

public opinion. A comparison with the actions of other public figures is instruc-

tive. Governor J. P. Altgeld of Illinois, who lacked McKinley's business support,

responded immediately to reports of disturbances, sometimes before local author-

ities had formally requested aid, and several times the Illinois guardsmen arrived to

find there had been no disturbance nor any threat of one. In a more extreme case,

Attorney General Richard Olney pushed President Grover Cleveland into sending

federal troops to Chicago without bothering to notify the governor and with the de-

liberate intent of breaking the strike.52

The major failures of the Ohio National Guard were not due so much to the lead-

ership of McKinley or its own faults as to decisions made by local authorities. The

sheriff of Logan County was the one who decided to send the National Guard

home, and the sheriff of Athens County was the one who decided to call for help

and then cancelled his call. The case of Washington Court House is more complex.

McKinley was out of state making a series of political speeches in preparation for

his 1896 presidential bid when the call for help arrived, and it was Colonel Coit who

gave the order to fire if the doors were broken in. Still, much of the responsibility

must be born by the sheriff, who requested only sixty reinforcements for the local

company. With the local company Coit had only eighty-five men, and eighty-five

men were not enough to overawe an enraged and emotionally charged crowd or to

clear the courthouse square or even, as it proved, to defend the courthouse without

using their weapons. Still, even in this tragic case, the Ohio National Guard, as in

the other cases, met its responsibility to assist civil authorities in maintaining the su-

premacy of the law.

 

52. Harry Barnard, Eagle Forgotten: The Life of John Peter Altgeld (Indianapolis, 1938), 277-278;

Kleppner, Cross of Culture, 245-247; Bennette Milton Rich, The President and Civil Disorder (Washing-

ton, D. C., 1941), 93-101. In fairness to Altgeld it must be noted that when he found that he had acted

too quickly, he issued a general order stating that the Illinois National Guard would not be used as

guards for private property.

• 17