Book Reviews The Howe Brothers and the American Revo- lution. By IRA D. GRUBER. (New
York: Athe- neum, 1972; notes and index, $14.95.) Why, some twenty years after it had won the world's greatest empire, did Great Britain have to admit military defeat to a small number of colonists on the periphery of that empire? This question has perplexed histo- rians for generations and the literature ex- plaining the reasons fills library shelves. Current historiography points to a com- bination of an ideological clash (the British concept of King-in-Parliament contrasted with the American one of imperial feder- alism) and a bungling generation of English leadership. Into this schematic system, Pro- fessor Ira Gruber of Rice University brings his investigation of the two brothers who conducted the military campaigns in North America during the critical years 1776-78. By the time they returned to London, dis- missed but not disgraced, Britain's chances for victory were considerably reduced. Admiral Richard Lord Howe and General Sir William Howe were peaceniks as far as the use of force to suppress the colonies was concerned. But they used their influence (which was considerable since their mother was thought to be the illegitimate daughter of George I and she was a member of George III's household) and their acknowl- edged military competence to secure the naval and army commands in America plus positions on the peace commission that was to resolve some of the differences arising be- tween the colonies and Mother Country. The result was a carrot and stick approach to the conduct of the war. There seems little doubt the brothers received enough military support to destroy the Continental Army in 1776. They failed to do so. Lord Howe did little to blockade colonial ports and instead spent most of his effort supporting his |
brother's command or issuing peace procla- mations. Even though Washington jeopardized the whole Revolution in his defense of New York, General Howe failed to exploit the opportunity.
He completely out- maneuvered the American commander and then let him escape. Why? In part, be- cause the brothers felt they had accom- plished the essence of eighteenth-century military tactics-maneuver your opponent until he is in such a disadvantageous posi- tion that logic compels him to surrender. Unfortunately for Sir William, neither George Washington nor the American sol- dier fought along such rational lines. Gruber feels the carrot and stick approach might have worked had not Washington de- stroyed the "illusion of British
invincibility" at Trenton and Princeton. This terminated the brothers "delicate experiment in mixing force and persuasion." For 1777, the Howes and the ministry con- trived a number of plans which eventually worked at counterpurposes. There was a lack of comprehensive direction from Lon- don and an acceptance of a piecemeal recov- ery of the middle colonies by the brothers. Not only that, Sir William became so ena- mored with holding land, utilizing loyalist support, and redeeming his loss of prestige after Trenton and Princeton, that he failed to support the expedition from Canada led by General John Burgoyne. All this re- sulted in the taking of Philadelphia and the surrender at Saratoga. It would take the ministry another year to secure the Howes' resignations, by which time the French al- liance turned a civil war into a world conflict. The extraordinary research effort which Professor Gruber has put into this project (he investigated dozens of obscure archives in England) makes it less a study of battles and more an analysis of the interaction of |