LARRY D. O'BRIEN
The Ohio National Guard
in the Coal Strike of 1932
"You don't have to be drunk,"
they said
"To get throwed in the can;
The only thing you needed be
Was just a union man."1
--Harlan County Blues
This verse from the Harlan County Blues
illustrates a recurrent theme in the his-
tory of the American labor movement in
the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. The resistance which
unionization met in the mining industry was perhaps
even more severe than in other
industries, and the violence which often resulted
was undoubtedly the most sanguinary. The
role of state militias in labor dis-
orders is a parallel theme in the
history of the American workers' struggle for the
right to organize. Very often National
Guard intervention in labor disorders was
unconscionably partisan. Yet, while
there is a firm basis for the "strikebreaking"
image of the National Guard in many
labor disputes, that image is not valid in
every instance.2 The role of
the Ohio National Guard (ONG) in the coal strike of
1932 is a case in point. The most
interesting characteristic of the National Guard's
participation in the 1932 strike was the
balance which existed in the attitudes of
guard officers and the mediating influence
they exercised upon the opposing
forces in the dispute.
The coal industry collapsed during the
Great Depression. Nationwide produc-
tion fell to the lowest level since
1904. Production capacity far outstripped de-
mand, and prices fell sharply. In an
effort to cut costs, operators slashed wages,
thus contributing to the spiral of
economic deterioration in the mining districts.
In the worst areas of the Southern and
Appalachian coal fields, poverty and out-
right destitution were the lot of the
miner and his family. Malnutrition and dis-
ease were common. Economically
discriminatory practices (such as scrip wage
payments and forced patronage of company
stores) together with violation of
miners' civil rights in some areas
further contributed to the desperate conditions
1. George Korson, Coal Dust on the Fiddle (Philadelphia,
1943), 316.
2. William H. Riker, in his historical
analysis of the National Guard, Soldiers of the States: The
Role of the National Guard in
American Democracy (Washington, 1957),
argues that state militias
were revived in the late 1870's
primarily as an industrial police. However, Riker also points out that
after the passage of the Dick Act in
1903 the National Guard's value as a national military reserve be-
gan to replace its function of
industrial police and also mitigated the harshness of its anti-labor bias.
Mr. O'Brien is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University.
128
OHIO HISTORY
of the coal miner's life. In the early
years of the Depression the miners' unions
were weak, almost dying organizations.3
Despite the weakness and factionalism of
the United Mine Workers Union
(UMW), conditions in the coal industry
sparked an outbreak of violent strikes in
1931 and 1932. Outside of Ohio, the
National Guard played a partisan role in
breaking most of these disorders. The
notorious Harlan County strike of March
1931 was ruthlessly suppressed by
operators and local officials with the cooper-
ation of the Kentucky National Guard.
Strikes in Indiana and Illinois in March
and April 1932 were also defeated with
the help of state troops.4
In May 1931 a wage cut precipitated a
strike in eastern Ohio, where vicious
competition within the coal industry had
caused the average monthly wage of
miners to fall nearly fifty percent
since 1928. National Guard observers were dis-
patched to the scene, but the strike
which was led by the radical National Miners
Union (NMU) did not erupt into serious
violence and finally collapsed at the end
of the summer.5 The Trade
Union Unity League (TUUL), a communist organi-
zation with which the NMU was
affiliated, staged a statewide Hunger March on
Columbus during May to emphasize its
demands for unemployment insurance
and work relief.6 These
events in 1931 only presaged a more intense outbreak the
following year.
On January 23, 1932 mine operators in
the Hocking Valley of southeastern
Ohio announced a twenty-five per cent
cut in the wage scale effective the first of
February. During the week that followed
seven thousand miners voted to stop
work rather than accept the cut, and a
strike call was issued. Initially, the strike
was a spontaneous reaction to the wage
cut, and its objective was simply to re-
store the scale. With the early
emergence of UMW leadership in the strike, the
right to organize and bargain
collectively soon replaced the wage cut as the over-
riding issue between miners and
operators.7
Although the strike was virtually one
hundred percent effective by February
10, mine operators steadfastly refused
to deal with the strikers or their UMW
leadership. Efforts by local community
leaders to bring about a compromise were
unsuccessful. Even the personal
intercession of Governor George White could not
overcome the intransigence of the mine
owners.8 In late February several oper-
3. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years:
A History of the American Worker (Boston, 1960), 360-377.
Two other valuable accounts of the coal
industry and miners' unions before World War II are David J.
McDonald and Edward A. Lynch, Coal
and Unionism (Indianapolis, 1939), and McAlister Coleman,
Men and Coal (New York, 1943).
4. Bernstein, Lean Years, 377-383;
The United Mine Workers Journal, August 15, 1932, pp. 8-9.
5. Howard G. Brunsman, Employment and
Payroll Fluctuations in Ohio, 1926-1932 (Columbus,
1934), 16. A statement released in
October 1931 by James Berry, Chief of the Ohio Division of Mines,
laid the blame for economic conditions
in the state's coal industry on the "system of unbridled com-
petition" and price cutting. Memo,
James Berry, October 30, 1931, Ohio Adjutant General Records,
Series 155, Ohio Historical Society,
Columbus, Ohio (hereafter cited as AG Rec), Box 1, Folder 6.
Reports and correspondence, ONG
observers to AG, June 14-October 1, 1931, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder
4.
6. Cleveland News, April 30, 1931; Cleveland Press, April 30, 1931;
Columbus Dispatch, May 12,
1931; Rpts., ONG observers to AG, May
4-9, 1931, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 2. The TUUL was an off-
shoot of William Z. Foster's Trade Union
Education League (TUEL) which was a branch of the Red
International of Labor Unions (RILU or
Profintern). Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Com-
munism (New York, 1957), 321; Labor Research Association,
Labor Fact Book (New York, 1931), I,
135-138.
7. Athens Messenger, January 24,
28, 29, 31; February 1, 1932. The wage scale offered was $0.38/
ton for machine cut coal and $3.00/day
wage. Athens Messenger, February 2, 1932; UMW Journal,
February 1, 1932, p. 9. For a statement
of strike objectives see UMW Journal, April 15, 1932, pp. 3-4
and Athens Messenger, March 15,
1932.
8. Athens Messenger, February 10,
15, 19, 27, 1932. Operators refused to attend a meeting with
Governor White, community leaders, and
UMW representatives on February 23. UMW Journal,
March 1, 1932, p. 5.
1932 Coal Strike 129 |
|
ators attempted to reopen their mines in spite of the strike, and the first outbreaks of violence occurred. Five hundred strikers picketed the Black Diamond Coal Company mine near Lathrop when it reopened on February 25. The few miners who dared report for work were greeted by an angry, rock throwing mob, and the mine was promptly reclosed.9 At the outset of the strike Governor White dispatched National Guard officers to the Hocking Valley as his personal observers. The senior guard officer, Lieu- tenant Colonel John S. Shetler, was well known to the miners and enjoyed their confidence. With headquarters at Nelsonville, Colonel Shetler's observer group ranged throughout the district reporting conditions there directly to Adjutant General Frank Henderson.10 By mid-March the situation in the Hocking Valley had begun to ferment. On the sixteenth Black Diamond was declared opened once more. The following day seven hundred demonstrators attempted to rush the mine entrance but were driven off with tear gas by Sheriffs deputies and National Guard observers on
9. Athens Messenger, February 25, 1932. 10. LTC Shetler had been present in the Hocking Valley since October 1931 when UMW Local President Fred Hasman had specifically asked Governor White that Shetler be assigned to the area. Telegram, F. Hasman to Governor White, October 16, 1931, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 6. |
130
OHIO HISTORY
the scene. After an impromptu conference
between the union scale committee
and the mine superintendent, arranged by
guard officers, the mine was reclosed
in order to avoid further incidents.11
Events were moving toward a crisis.
Governor White augmented the observer
force on March 19. The following
afternoon four thousand miners attended a
mass strike meeting in Millfield to make
plans for the announced reopening of
Sunday Creek and Manhattan Coal Company
mines. Late that night and during
the early morning hours of the
twenty-first, five hundred rock throwing miners
closed the road to the Sunday Creek
Millfield mine #6.12
Meanwhile, nervous Athens County authorities
wired Governor White ur-
gently requesting troops be sent into
the area. After conferring with union offi-
cials on the twenty-first, the governor
issued a strong statement warning against
continued disorders but did not call out
troops. Instead, he asked the Sunday
Creek and Manhattan Coal Companies not
to resume operations at their mines.13
Despite pressure from local officials
and mine operators, Governor White and
Adjutant General Henderson were
convinced that conditions did not warrant the
commitment of troops. A lengthy report
by Brigadier General Ludwig S. Con-
elly from the scene on March 23, and a
personal inspection by the Adjutant Gen-
eral on the same day, confirmed their
conviction. Following another visit to the
area on March 24, General Henderson made
a statement to the press in which he
emphasized that conditions in the
Hocking Valley did not require the use of
troops and that "the Governor's
attitude was that he would not employ the Na-
tional Guard in anticipation of disorder
on the mere opinion of individuals that
disorder would occur."14
White's refusal to commit troop units to
the Hocking Valley was based solely
upon the recommendations of Adjutant
General Henderson and guard observers
on the scene. Political considerations
played no perceptible part in the decision.
Although White had reason to be
unimpressed with the cooperation of mine own-
ers, he had no political grudges to
satisfy. Nor was the governor swayed by pos-
sible voter disapproval in the mining
districts, as subsequent events evidenced.
General Henderson's experienced judgment
was almost certainly the deciding
factor for White. The principle of not
committing troops in "anticipation" of
major violence which had not yet
occurred was clearly Henderson's. The Ad-
jutant General had applied that
rationale under similar circumstances during the
labor unrest of 1931.15
During the week following March 24,
General Connelly unsuccessfully at-
tempted to arrange a "truce"
between strikers and operators. The mine owners
11. Rpt., MAJ John A. Blount to AG,
March 17, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 1; Athens Messenger,
March 17, 1932.
12. Columbus Dispatch, March 20,
21, 1932; Athens Messenger, March 21, 1932; Rpt., MAJ Blount
to AG, March 20, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2,
Folder 1; Rpt., LTC L. P. Wolfford to AG, March 21, 1932,
AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 1. A group of
National Guard observers was forced to retreat when their ve-
hicle was stoned at a roadblock early on
March 21; Rpt., ILT Donald P. Whiting to AG, March 21,
1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 1.
13. Telegrams, Athens County Sheriff
Wayne Wingett and Athens County Prosecutor J. W. Bolin
to Governor White, March 20, 1932,
Governor George White Papers, Collection 338, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus, Ohio (hereafter cited
as White Papers), Box 13, Folder 2; Columbus Dispatch,
March 21, 1932; Athens Messenger, March
21, 25, 1932.
14. Rpt., BG Ludwig S. Conelly to AG,
March 23, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 1; press release
issued by Adj. Gen. Frank D. Henderson,
n.d., AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 28. Henderson also emphasized
for the benefit of operators that the
Governor "would not countenance the importation of strike break-
ers...." Henderson's statement was
occasioned by severe criticism of Governor White by mine owners.
Their pressure for the commitment of
troops was unrelenting. Union officials charged that mine own-
ers resorted to provocation to induce
the commitment of troops. See statement of Miners' Scale Com-
mittee Chairman, Herman Theisen, Athens
Messenger, March 27, 1932.
15. Letter, General Henderson to B. F.
Higdon, April 29, 1931, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 1.
1932 Coal Strike 131
remained adamantly opposed to dealing
with union organizers. A direct appeal
for a joint conference between strike
representatives and mine operators issued
by UMW District #6 President Lee Hall on
March 27 was simply ignored by the
owners. 16
Despite the stubbornness of mine
operators, tensions eased perceptibly in the
Hocking district during the last week of
March. A new crisis, however, was de-
veloping in eastern Ohio where a wage
cut had been announced by mine oper-
ators in Belmont and Jefferson counties
on March 22. When miners refused to
accept the new scale, the larger mine
companies began closing down their oper-
ations. When the owners refused to agree
to a UMW request for a joint confer-
ence, a general strike call was issued
for April 1. On that day eight thousand
miners, many wearing their American
Legion uniforms, marched through the
streets of Bellaire (Belmont County)
carrying banners proclaiming: "The UMW
has come to stay."17
During the following week tensions
increased in eastern Ohio. On April 2
Governor White dispatched Colonel Donald
L. Caldwell to St. Clairsville to take
command of National Guard observers.
After an initial inspection, Colonel Cald-
well established headquarters at Cadiz
on April 11.18 In the meanwhile, three
thousand strikers forced the closing of
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
Somers mine in Harrison County near
Adena on April 17. National Guard ob-
servers, however, were able to reach an
accommodation with the strikers, and
Colonel Caldwell reported troops would
not be required for the time being.19
General Henderson also hoped to avoid
committing troops, but the Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company insisted on
reopening the Somers mine on April 12.
This provoked mass demonstrations by
eight hundred to a thousand miners on
April 12 and 13.20 The crisis exploded
on the fourteenth. Following a strike meet-
ing in Bellaire, eight thousand strikers
mobbed the Somers mine. Guard officers
and Harrison County Sheriffs deputies
fired over the heads of the miners and
drove them off with tear gas. In the
melee one demonstrator was shot and killed.
Colonel Caldwell telephoned Adjutant
General Henderson from the scene with
the Harrison County Sheriffs request for
troops.21
General Henderson flew into Yorkville
(Jefferson County) later that afternoon
where he conferred with Colonel
Caldwell, the Sheriffs of Jefferson, Harrison,
and Belmont counties and Mr. John
Cinque, Eastern Ohio UMW Sub-district
President. General Henderson asked Mr.
Cinque for some assurance that vio-
lence would not continue. When the UMW
official was unable to make such as-
surances, General Henderson determined
it was necessary to call in state troops
to maintain order. Mr. Cinque concurred.22
The Harrison County Prosecutor,
16. Statement of BG L. S. Conelly, n.d.,
AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 1; Steubenville Harold-Star, March
26, 1932; Athens Messenger, March 27,
30, 1932.
17. Steubenville Harold-Star, March
22, 30, 31; April 1, 1932. The April 1 strike call in eastern
Ohio coincided with a National UMW
declaration of a general strike throughout the mid-West.
18. Ibid., April 6, 1932; Rpt.,
COL Caldwell to AG, April 11, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 13.
19. Rpt., COL Caldwell to AG, April 7,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 13; Steubenville Harold-Star,
April 7, 1932.
20. Ibid., April 11, 12, 13,
1932; Rpt., COL Caldwell to AG, April 12, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder
13.
21. Rpt., COL Caldwell to AG, April 14,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 13. Who fired the fatal shot
was never determined. Strikers accused
National Guard officers of firing the shot. Steubenville Harold-
Star, April 14, 1932. Colonel Caldwell who was on the scene
denied any of his officers were respon-
sible. The fact that no one else was
killed or wounded indicates that shots were not aimed deliberately
at demonstrators.
22. Steubenville Harold-Star, April
14, 15, 1932; Rpt., COL Caldwell to AG, April 14, 1932, AG
Rec, Box 1, Folder 13; "Statement
by Brigadier General Frank Henderson Concerning the Coal Situ-
ation," n.d., AG Rec, Box 2, Folder
27.
132
OHIO HISTORY
Victor Rowland, formally requested the
governor to send troops that same after-
noon.23
On the authority of Governor White,
General Henderson ordered a battalion
of the 145th Infantry (ONG, Akron),
comprising 320 officers and men, into Har-
rison County under the command of
Colonel William L. Marlin. Troop head-
quarters were established at Cadiz on
the evening of the fourteenth, and strong
detachments were sent to Adena
(Jefferson County) and the Somers mine in the
early morning hours of April 15. The
troop detachments met no opposition. Mo-
torized patrols were established to
cover the general area.24 During the next week
an additional battalion of the 145th
Infantry was brought in, and troop strength
was increased to a peak of 671 officers
and men on April 21. Colonel Caldwell's
observer group remained on the scene.
Operating under the command of Colonel
Marlin, observers coordinated the
activities of National Guard troops and local
authorities.25
Governor White's decision to introduce
troop units in eastern Ohio was not
politically motivated. As in his
decision not to commit troops to the Hocking
Valley in March, the governor was guided
solely by the advice of senior guard
officers and the requirements for
maintaining order. Governor White repeatedly
justified his decision of April 14 on
that basis in a variety of correspondence with
critics of the troop commitment.26
Conditions remained tense but peaceful
for several days after the introduction
of troops, but the continued operation
of mines under National Guard protection
rankled striking miners. A mob of four
hundred strikers attacked the Somers
mine on April 18. National Guard troops
opened fire on part of the crowd, wound-
ing three of the demonstrators.27 After
the eighteenth the situation began to cool.
Picketing continued but was peaceful.
General Henderson conferred with Col-
onel Marlin and Colonel Caldwell at
Cadiz on April 22, and a decision was
reached to pull out most of the troops.
By May 4, when General Henderson toured
the area again, less than two hundred
troops remained on duty.28
Several mines were operating in the
eastern Ohio fields by the first of May.
While National Guard officers assured
operators of protection, they emphasized
that Governor White would not condone
the use of strike breakers. General Hen-
derson reiterated this attitude in a
memorandum circulated among guard ob-
servers in both the Hocking Valley and
eastern Ohio mining districts in mid-May.
The memorandum pointed out that it was
the policy of Governor White and the
Adjutant General that mines which
resumed operations hold jobs of miners previ-
ously employed for a "reasonable
period." Following that "reasonable period"
only "bonafide residents of the
community, living within reasonable distance of
23. Steubenville Harold-Star, April
14, 1932.
24. Rpt., COL Marlin to AG, April 20,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 13; Consolidated Morning Re-
port, 3-145 Inf, April 14, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 28; Radio Message, Somers Mine Detachment
to ONG HQ, Cadiz, April 16, 1932, AG
Rec, Box 1, Folder 26; "Patrol Assignments, April 15-May 17,
1932," 3d Bn, 145th Inf, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 31. On April 15 an employee of the Harmon mine
(near the Somers mine) was found dead.
He had apparently died of a heart attack while trying to es-
cape from angry strikers who attacked
the Harmon mine that day. Cadiz Republican, April 21, 1932.
25. Consolidated Morning Report, 145th
Inf, April 21, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 28; Rpt., COL
Caldwell to AG, April 23, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 13.
26. See for example, Letters, Governor
White to B. L. McGarry, April 23, 1932; L. B. Smurthwaite,
May 3, 1932, and J. F. Lewis, May 5,
1932, White Papers, Box 13, Folder 2.
27. Rpts., COL Caldwell to AG, April
15-18, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 13; Steubenville Harold-
Star, April 18, 1932. One of the wounded was so severely
injured that his arm required amputation.
Memo for AG, n.d., White Papers, Box 13,
Folder 2.
28. Rpt., COL Caldwell to AG, April 22,
1932; Rpt., COL Marlin to AG, April 26, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 13; Consolidated Morning
Report, 145th Inf, April 22-May 4, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1,
Folder 28; Cadiz Republican, April
28, 1932.
1932 Coal Strike 133
the mine" should be hired. A
"bonafide resident" was defined as one who had
lived in the area before the strike
began. Definition of "reasonable distance" was
left to the discretion of county
sheriffs.29
Troop withdrawals continued through
early and mid-May. While picketing
continued, conditions were clearly
stabilizing. At a meeting on May 5, UMW of-
ficials apparently convinced Governor
White of their ability to keep the lid on.
The governor issued a statement on May
19 saying "the disorder has been stopped
and there no longer remains serious
danger to life and property which cannot be
met by local authorities." After
May 20 only a small detachment of troops (ap-
proximately 60-75) remained in eastern
Ohio under the command of veteran
trouble shooter Colonel John S. Shetler.30
Governor White was deeply concerned with
the continued economic disrup-
tion and hardship created by the strike,
but his desire to see the situation reme-
died as quickly as possible was tempered
by a genuine sympathy for the miners.
The governor was a progressive Democrat
of somewhat more conservative tem-
per than his party's soon-to-be
Presidential nominee, Franklin Roosevelt. While
a member of Congress, White served on
the House Mining Committee and pos-
sessed more than a passing knowledge of
the coal industry.31
In an effort to reopen the mines on a
basis acceptable to both miners and oper-
ators, Governor White proposed a Ten
Point Plan on May 17. The plan was vol-
untary and rested on the assumption that
a settlement could be reached only if
both parties in the dispute were
prepared to discuss and compromise their dif-
ferences with one another. White
asserted his belief that a permanent solution
to the problem required recognition of
the principle of collective bargaining be-
tween operators and employees, but he
frankly admitted his inability to force
such a policy on Ohio mine owners. The
ten points of the governor's plan may be
summarized briefly:
First. Miners employed at the beginning
of the strike were to be reem-
ployed without prejudice.
Second. The job of each man employed at
the beginning of the strike
was to be held open for a
"reasonable length of time."
Third. Scrip wage payments would be
abolished. (Scrip payments were
illegal in Ohio in any case.)
Fourth. No pressure would be brought
upon employees to trade at com-
pany stores.
Fifth. Mine operators would allow the
employment of checkweighmen.
Sixth. A minimum of $0.38/ton would be
paid for machine cut coal. A
minimum of $3.28/day wage would be paid
motormen and similar
workers.
Seventh. Dead work and other work
requirements would remain as
29. Steubenville Harold-Star, April
21, 1932; Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, April 26, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 13; "Memorandum to
National Guard Observers Assigned to Duty in the Mining Dis-
tricts of Ohio," signed by General
Frank D. Henderson, May 12, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 28.
30. Steubenville Harold-Star, May
5, 1932; "Statement of Governor White Concerning Removal of
Troops from Mining District," May
19, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 26; Rpts., LTC Shetler to AG,
May 21-31, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 14;
Consolidated Morning Reports, Provisional Detachment, May
9-21, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 28.
Colonels Marlin and Caldwell departed at the end of April.
31. Robert L. Jones, "George
White," in Governors of Ohio (Columbus, 1954), 172-175. Before his
election to the Governorship of Ohio in
November 1930, White had served three terms in the U. S.
House of Representatives (1910-1914,
1916-1918). He was a close associate of former Ohio Governor
and presidential candidate James Cox and
acted as Democratic National Committee Chairman from
1920 to 1921. Reelected governor in
November 1932, White firmly supported President Roosevelt's
domestic economic programs, although he
was never closely tied to the "New Deal" inner circle.
134 OHIO HISTORY
they were before the strike.
Eight. Differences in the wage scale
established by point six due to
peculiar conditions of any mine would be
agreed upon by the "rep-
resentatives of the employees" of
that mine and the mine manage-
ment, and irreconciable differences
would be submitted to the gover-
nor for arbitration.
Ninth. Thirty days notice would be given
the Office of the Governor
of any further wage cuts. Such wage cuts
would be investigated by the
governor.
Tenth. The plan, characterized as a
"truce," would continue in effect
for one year, i.e., until May 17,
1933.32
Reaction to the governor's Ten Point
Plan was mixed. The plan was far too
vague to appeal positively to either
side. The wage scale proposed was barely
more than the operators had offered in
their wage cuts of February 1 and March
23. The questions of union recognition
and collective bargaining were carefully
skirted, thus alienating the miners who
had fought for those very objectives. The
vague implication in point eight that
changes in scale or work conditions would
be settled between "representatives
of the employees" and mine management
was unacceptable to the operators. Clearly,
the governor could not force a settle-
ment on either side. Opposition was
strongest in eastern Ohio where both miners
and operators rejected the formula.
According to Eastern Ohio UMW Sub-
district President John Cinque, the plan
simply did not provide for the minimum
objectives of the strike. Operator
reaction was more complex. Most small oper-
ators in eastern Ohio rejected the plan
as economically unrealistic. Many of the
larger operators represented by the Ohio
Coal Operators Association accepted
the plan in word, if not in spirit.33
In the Hocking Valley miners also rejected the
governor's formula, but operators were
more amenable to the plan, if for no other
reason than it obligated the governor to
provide protection for their mines.34
As a peace formula the governor's plan
was a disappointing failure. Within a
week of the plan's announcement a new
crisis flared in the Hocking Valley and
state troops were brought in to maintain
order. On May 22 the Manhattan Coal
Company's Lick Run mine was reopened
ostensibly on the basis of the Ten Point
Plan. A large crowd of rock throwing
strikers gathered at the mine harassing and
intimidating miners who reported for
work. The disorder continued on the twenty-
third and twenty-fourth.35 Lieutenant
Colonel Herman Doellenger, who had re-
placed Colonel Shetler as senior
observer in the Hocking district, conferred with
General Henderson in Columbus on the
evening of May 23, and a tentative de-
cision to commit troops was reached.
After a conference between Doellenger
and Athens County authorities on the
next day, a formal request for troops was
sent to Governor White by County
Prosecutor J. W. Bolin.36 The available evi-
dence does not provide a full picture of
the decision to commit troops to the
32. "Message to the Coal Miners and
Operators of Ohio," May 17, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 24.
33. Steubenville Harold-Star, May
17, 1932; Letter, R. L. Ireland, President, Ohio Mine Operators
Association to Governor White, May 18,
1932, White Papers, Box 13, Folder 4.
34. Athens Messenger, May 17,
1932.
35. Rpt., LTC H. Doellenger to AG, May
22, 1932; unsigned memo (probably written by Doellen-
ger), May 23, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2,
Folder 2. See also Athens Messenger, May 23, 1932.
36. Rpt., LTC Doellenger to AG, May 23,
1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 2. LTC Doellenger re-
placed LTC Shetler as senior observer in
the Hocking district in late March when Shetler became ill.
Telegram, Athens County Prosecutor, J.
W. Bolin to Governor White, May 24, 1932; Letter, J. W.
Bolin to Governor White, May 24, 1932,
AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 11; Rpt., LTC Doellenger to AG, May
24, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 2.
1932 Coal Strike 135
Hocking Valley. Probably, General
Henderson had expected the possibility to
arise. Also Governor White apparently
felt obliged to protect mines opened
under his recently proclaimed Ten Point
Plan.
A battalion of the 148th Infantry (ONG,
Toledo), comprising 314 officers and
men, was mobilized and trucked to
Nelsonville on May 24. Troops were placed
under the command of Colonel Doellenger.
Arriving at the Nelsonville head-
quarters in the late evening, troops
were deployed directly to the Lick Run mine.
They were greeted by three to five
hundred jeering strikers, but no incidents oc-
curred.37
The intervention of troops had a
sobering effect, but to insure against further
violence Athens County Sheriff Wayne
Wingett issued a proclamation on May
25 prohibiting mass picketing or large
public meetings within a two mile radius
of area mines.38 Peaceful
picketing under the conditions of the sheriffs procla-
mation continued during the next few
weeks. No major incidents occurred, but
the situation remained unsettled.
In early June mines began to reopen
throughout the Hocking Valley under the
Ten Point Plan. On June 8 the Sunday
Creek Coal Company Millfield mine #6
and the New York Coal Company mine #25
near Chauncey reopened with the
protection of National Guard troops. The
solidarity of the strike was still intact
at that time, and both mines were forced
to operate with only a handful of em-
ployees. However, the introduction of
troops (which reached a peak of 449 offi-
cers and men on June 10) placed the
strike in a precarious position. Increasing
resentment among miners toward the
National Guard's presence soon became
evident.39
Minor disturbances continued through the
month of June. The most serious
incident occurred on the twentieth when
a disturbance at Millfield #6 ended in
the accidental wounding of a woman
picket by one of her comrades. The fol-
lowing day, June 21, the Athens County
Sheriff closed the Millfield picket camp
with the assistance of National Guard
troops. Tear gas was used to disperse a
small group of strikers who refused to
leave the area peacefully.40
In early July, as more and more miners
were giving up the struggle and re-
turning to work, the UMW increased its
efforts to maintain strike solidarity.
UMW International organizer Percy Tetlow
spoke at a meeting at the Lick Run
picket camp on July 3. The rhetoric of
his speech indicated the building resent-
ment against the National Guard and the
increasing frustration of strike leaders.
Tetlow attempted to put a good face on
the miners' resolve to stick it out, but the
modest size of the gathering indicated
that the strike was beginning to lose mo-
mentum.41
During late June and early July a
disagreement between strike leaders and
National Guard officers arose over the
issue of "scab" labor. Governor White's
Ten Point Plan expressly condemned the
importation of outside workers. How-
ever, the vagueness of the governor's
plan allowed mine operators to avoid this
prohibition. The major problem was that
the area from which new employees
might be hired had not been well enough
defined in the governor's announce-
37. Consolidated Morning Report, 3-148
Inf, May 24, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 19; Rpt., LTC
Doellenger to AG, May 24, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 2, Folder 2.
38. Athens Messenger, May 25,
1932.
39. Ibid., June 2, 1932;
Consolidated Morning Report, 148th Inf, June 10, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2,
Folder 19.
40. Report of conversation with Lee Hall
by 1LT D. R. Maxwell attached to Rpt., LTC Doellenger
to AG, June 28, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2,
Folder 2. Before June 21 Sheriff Wingett had allowed the picket
camp to remain within the two mile limit
established in his Proclamation of May 25. Athens Messen-
ger, June 20, 21, 1932.
41. Rpt., CPT F. T. Balke to LTC
Doellenger, July 3, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 14.
136 OHIO HISTORY
ment of May 17. The policy outlined in
General Henderson's memorandum of
May 12 (which anticipated the governor's
plan) left the definition of a "reason-
able" hiring radius to the
discretion of individual county sheriffs. There is no
evidence, however, that any of the
sheriffs in the mining districts actively exer-
cised that prerogative. Union officials
continued to pressure guard observers for
clarification.42
In a memorandum to Colonel Doellenger on
July 8, General Henderson ex-
plicitly defined the "zone of
employment for Hocking Valley mines." He wrote
that "miners employed should be
limited to those resident in the county in which
the mine is located and to the adjoining
counties."43 The inability of the National
Guard to enforce compliance with that
policy, and the apparent unwillingness of
county officials to bring pressure on
operators to accept it voluntarily, continued
to create problems between National
Guard observers and strike leaders in the
Hocking Valley. This illustrated a
principal problem faced by National Guard
officers in their attempts to mediate
miner-operator differences. The National
Guard's legal obligations and
limitations often conflicted with its own policy
preferences. In this case National Guard
officers were not legally able to pro-
hibit employment practices which were
likely to provoke disorder.
If enthusiasm for the strike was
beginning to wane among many miners by
early July, the mood of a desperate
minority grew meaner, and the potential for
spontaneous violence increased. A week
after the Lick Run strike meeting major
violence flared. In violation of their
pledge to adhere to Governor White's Ten
Point Plan, the New York Coal Company
brought in a trainload of "strike
breakers" on July 11 to work in
their #25 mine at Chauncey. A mob of about three
hundred miners attempted to stop the
train at the Chauncey depot, but the "scabs"
managed to reach the mine unharmed.44
In the early morning hours of the twelfth,
the railroad trestle at Chauncey was
blown up. On this signal a large number of
armed men hidden in a cemetery on the
hillside above mine #25 opened fire on
National Guard troops stationed at the
site. A ninety minute gun battle ensued
when troops returned the fire with
automatic weapons. The exchange ended only
when a National Guard armored car
summoned by radio arrived from Nelsonville.
One of the gunmen, an eighteen year old
high school student, was killed; several
others were reported wounded. There were
no National Guard casualties.45
The following day Brigadier General H.
M. Bush was dispatched to the scene
by Adjutant General Henderson to survey
the situation in the Hocking Valley.
Troop strength had been progressively
reduced during July, and only 169 officers
and men remained in the district on the
twelfth. Apparently General Bush was
convinced that the battle at Chauncey
was only an isolated incident for no sig-
nificant increase was made in troop
strength after his inspection.46
In the first weeks of June mines began
reopening in eastern Ohio. Only a few
did so in accordance with Governor
White's Ten Point Plan. Strike solidarity in
the area remained high. When the Ohio
and Pennsylvania (O & P) mine opened
in Harrison County on June 1, no miners
reported for work. Picketing continued
42. See, for example, Rpt., LTC
Doellenger to AG, June 28, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 2 and
Rpt., LTC to AG, July 5, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 2, Folder 3.
43. Memo, AG to Commander of Troops,
Nelsonville, Ohio, July 8, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder
28.
44. Athens Messenger, July 11, 1932.
45. Statement, 1LT D. R. Maxwell,
September 28, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 14; see also, Letter,
Sheriff Wayne Wingett to BG H. M. Bush,
July 16, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 11; Athens Messen-
ger, July 13, 1932. The actual number of gunmen involved was
undetermined.
46. Consolidated Morning Reports, 148th
Inf, July 12-31, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 19.
1932 Coal Strike 137
throughout the district but was for the
most part peaceful. Only a few minor in-
cidents of disorder were reported.47
Despite the reduction of guardsmen
during May, resentment toward the con-
tinued presence of troops increased as
more mines reopened. At a strike meeting
in Bayesville (Guernsey County) on June
5, John Cinque charged Governor
White with reopening the mines at
"bayonet point."48 Around mid-June the in-
tensity of picketing increased as many
mines began hiring new or imported labor.
On June 21 twenty-three strikers were
arrested after a disturbance in Steuben-
ville in which tear gas was used to
disperse demonstrators. On June 22 a disor-
derly crowd of eight hundred pickets
turned out for the reopening of the Provi-
dent mine in Belmont County. They were
finally dispersed without serious inci-
dent, but only after being warned by
National Guard observers that troops would
be called to the scene.49 On
June 28 a striker was accidentally shot to death by a
Wolf Run mine guard on a road near
Bergholz in Jefferson County when the car
in which the mine guard was riding was
stopped at a roadblock.50
As was the case in the Hocking Valley,
the importation of outside labor was
the principal issue of contention
between National Guard officers and strike
leaders. Lee Hall and Percy Tetlow
addressed a strike meeting at Cadiz on June
17 where they accused the O & P and
other mines of importing strike breakers
with the protection of the National
Guard.51 It was clear, however, that guard
officers scrupulously supported Governor
White's policy against the impor-
tation of labor in their dealings with
mine operators. In at least one case ob-
servers even exceeded their legal
authority to force compliance with the policy.
On June 22 Colonel Shetler pointedly
told the operators of the Powhatan mine
in Belmont County that he would withdraw
National Guard troops from their
property if "scab" labor was
recruited. The owners conceded.52
Resentment toward the guard did not
lessen among area strikers. No matter
how unbiased, the guardsmen posed a
threat to the success of the strike. Never-
theless, National Guard relations with
the community at large in eastern Ohio
were quite good. With only one exception
relations between guard officers and
local officials were cooperative.53
On June 23 Tuscarawas County Sheriff Harry
Smith publicly charged National Guard
patrols with overreacting to demon-
strators. He also charged that guard
observers were allowing the operators of
the Wolford mine at Urichville to employ
strike breakers. There was no evidence
that National Guard patrols in
Tuscarawas County were overzealous. The matter
of Wolford mine employment practices was
apparently rooted in personal ani-
mosity between Sheriff Smith and the
mine owners.54 The Wolford mine had
47. Cadiz Republican, June 2,
1932; Rpts., LTC Shetler to AG, June 1-10, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1,
Folder 15.
48. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, June 5,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 15.
49. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, June 21,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 17.
50. Rpt., CPT W. Shively to AG, June 28,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 18; Steubenville Harold-
Star, June 29, 1932.
51. Cadiz Republican, June 23,
1932.
52. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, June 22, AG
Rec, Box 1, Folder 17. In an exchange of letters between
Governor White and Powhatan Mining Company
President, Robert T. Atkinson, the Governor reiter-
ated his position of May 17, adding only
that it was his policy that county sheriffs set the local hiring
radius. Letter, Governor White to R. T.
Atkinson, July 4, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 29. Clearly LTC
Shetler had gone beyond the point where
he could expect legal support from the governor.
53. Letter, Governor White to Harrison
County Sheriff Maurice Wooster, May 12, 1932; Letter,
Governor White to Jefferson County
Sheriff William Yost, June 6, 1932; Letter, Governor White to
Belmont County Sheriff Howard Duff, June
22, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 23; Letter, Belmont
County Sheriff H. Duff to Governor
White, June 22, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 12.
54. Rpts., CPT J. R. Rea and 1LTE. K.
Black to LTC Shetler, June 23, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Fold-
er 17.
138
OHIO HISTORY
been a local trouble center since
mid-February before the general strike began
in eastern Ohio. Minor shooting
incidents had occurred on several occasions at
the mine, but National Guard observers
spent a good deal of energy to keep the
situation under control.55
National Guard reaction to Sheriff
Smith's charges illustrated a natural sensi-
tivity to criticism in a delicate
situation. Unfortunately several junior guard offi-
cers, apparently at the personal
instigation of General H. M. Bush, attempted
privately to discredit Smith.56 General
Bush had no official status in eastern Ohio,
and senior guard commanders on the scene
refused to participate in this effort
which only threatened to undermine the
moral authority which conscientious
guard officers, particularly Colonel
Shetler, had managed to accrue over a period
of time.
By early July, clear evidence existed
that the strike in eastern Ohio was be-
ginning to break down. The radical
National Miners Union which had led the
1931 walkout appeared to be making
inroads into UMW leadership of the strike,
particularly in Jefferson and Guernsey
counties. The NMU held a mass meeting
in Dillonvale on July 3 which attracted
two thousand strikers. At about the same
time it became evident that dissension
was growing between UMW officials and
more radical miners over strike policy,
particularly picketing methods. By mid-
month some elements among the miners had
apparently broken with Hall and
Cinque over the issue and were prepared
to adopt more radical methods.57
Several incidents occurred during
mid-July, but these were more the last gasps
of the strike than anything else. Troops
used gas to disperse about eight hundred
pickets at the Provident mine on July
12. On the same day twenty-nine men were
arrested after a disturbance at the
Piney Fork mine in Jefferson County.58 On
July 15 an official of the O & P
mine was seriously injured at St. Clairsville when
his car was blown up by a bomb wired to
the ignition. Two men, casually identi-
fied as "Reds," were
subsequently arrested for the attack.59 Such violence did not
typify the mood of area miners. Not only
were more mines reopening by mid-
July, but also more and more miners were
drifting back to work. In late June
there were around 2500 active pickets in
the five county area of the eastern coal
district. Only half that number were
active during the first two weeks of July,
and on July 13 less than two hundred
appeared on the picket lines.60 By July 21
the strike had completely collapsed in
eastern Ohio.
On August 1 General Henderson met with
Colonel Shetler and the sheriffs of
Belmont, Guernsey, Harrison and
Jefferson counties at St. Clairsville. They de-
cided that the remaining National Guard
troops (amounting to only 52 officers
55. See for example, Rpts., MAJ Blount
to AG, February 20; March 24, 1932; Rpt., LTC Doellen-
ger to AG, April 2, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1,
Folder 13.
56. See Memo for AG, 1LT Ben F. Brown,
August 19, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 24. Lieutenant
Brown was an officer in General Bush's
62d Field Artillery Brigade. He was sent to eastern Ohio on
the personal authority of General Bush
and was not officially assigned to the observer force in the
area. His report was submitted to the
Adjutant General, somewhat irregularly, through General Bush.
LTC Shetler did not endorse it.
57. Rpt., CPT G. Cooper to AG, July 2,
1932; Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, July 5, 1932, AG Rec, Box
1, Folder 19. NMU organizers had been in
the area since mid-March but apparently had not attracted
much attention or support before July.
See for example, Steubenville Harold-Star, March 24, 1932;
Rpt., CPT H. Johnson to LTC Shetler,
July 14, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 20.
58. Rpt., 1LT J. S. Thompson to LTC
Shetler, July 12, 1932; Rpt., CPT W. B. Havlin to LTC Shet-
ler, July 13, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1,
Folder 20; Steubenville Harold-Star, July 12, 1932.
59. Steubenville Harold-Star, July
15, 1932; Cadiz Republican, July 21; August 4, 1932; Memo for
AG, 1LT Brown, August 19, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 24. Lieutenant Brown participated with
Belmont County authorities in the
investigation of this incident.
60. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, June 22,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 17; Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG,
July 13, 1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 20.
1932 Coal Strike 139
and men) could be withdrawn from the
area.61 Colonel Shetler and four other
officers remained on duty in the area
until late August. While the strike was still
not settled officially, few problems
required the intervention of National Guard
observers. For all practical purposes
the National Guard role was at an end in
eastern Ohio.62
With the collapse of the strike in the
eastern fields, the strike rapidly lost mo-
mentum in the Hocking Valley as well.
Nevertheless, late June and early July
had marked a particularly violent period
in both areas. Following the gun battle
at Chauncey on July 12, a second man was
shot to death in a strike related inci-
dent near Athens on July 14.63
Altogether three men were killed in the space of
three weeks in Ohio, but the violence
was more the product of misadventure than
a radical turn in strike tactics.
During the last two weeks of July the
strike began to crumble in the Hocking
district. By the first of August roughly
half of the area's work force had returned
to the mines, although active picketing
continued for about three more weeks.64
A minor incident at the Lick Run picket
camp on August 22 prompted Sheriff
Wingett to order the camp closed. The
pickets offered no resistance when Na-
tional Guard troops removed their camp
tents and ordered them to disperse.
On that same day National Guard troop
strength was reduced to less than one
hundred officers and men, and Colonel
Shetler returned to command in the area.65
As was the case in eastern Ohio,
National Guard relations with local authori-
ties were quite good in the Hocking
district. There was evidence, however, that
the community at large looked upon the
presence of state troops as an inconveni-
ence, particularly after mid-July. Over
1300 residents of Nelsonville (where
troops were headquartered) signed a
petition circulated in late July requesting
guard troops be removed. Outside of
striking miners who naturally resented the
guardsmen, other elements of the
community apparently felt the presence of
troops and guard vehicles on their
streets and roads was simply a nuisance. An-
other petition requesting the removal of
troops was sent to Governor White from
the citizens of Chauncey on August 18.66
Probably these petitions had some ef-
fect on the decision to reduce troop
strength in late August.
For all practical purposes the strike
was over. Sporadic picketing continued,
but it was not impressive. Accepting the
inevitable, UMW officials agreed to meet
with Governor White in Columbus on
September 14 to discuss a settlement. On
that day and the next, Governor White
held separate conversations with union
officials and representatives of mine
owners from both the Hocking Valley and
eastern Ohio districts. On September 16
the governor announced a tentative
agreement on the basis of the Ten Point
Plan with some minor adjustments. The
61. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, August 1,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 23; Consolidated Morning Re-
port, 145th Inf, August 1, 1932, AG Rec,
Box 1, Folder 28. Sheriff Smith of Tuscarawas County re-
fused to attend the meeting with General
Henderson, but sent a representative.
62. Rpt., LTC Shetler to AG, August 4,
1932, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 23. After August 1, the Na-
tional Guard observers' major
preoccupation was with providing for the transportation and feeding
of Bonus Army marchers traveling across
Ohio on their way to Washington, D. C. Memo, LTC Shet-
let to AG, August 2, 1932, AG Rec, Box
1, Folder 23.
63. Athens Messenger, July 14,
1932. The National Guard was not involved in this incident.
64. Ibid., August 1, 1932.
65. Rpt., CPT W. B. Havlin to AG, August
22, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 14; Consolidated Morn-
ing Report, Provisional Detachment,
August 22, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 19; Special Order 211,
August 22, 1932, by AG, AG Rec, Box 2,
Folder 16.
66. Rpt., CPT W. B. Havlin to AG, August
20, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 14. The Nelsonville
petition is still preserved in the White
Papers, Box 13, Folder 2. In regard to the Chauncey petition
see Rpt., 1LTJ. S. Thompson to AG,
August 19, 1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 14.
140
OHIO HISTORY
agreement was ratified by the miners in
a vote taken on September 18. They had
little choice. Most of the large coal
operators concurred in the September 16
agreement. Some of the smaller
operators, especially in eastern Ohio, did not.67
Disputes over interpretation of the
September 16 settlement continued through
October and November. But despite the
fact that many of the problems which
had provoked it in the first place had
not disappeared, the Ohio coal strike was at
an end. The last National Guard troops
were removed from the Hocking Valley
on October 5, although Colonel Shetler
remained in the area until November 17
as Governor White and Adjutant General Henderson's
personal representative.68
The consequences of the strike for
Governor White's political fortunes were
minimal. He was reelected governor in
November 1932 by a very comfortable
margin, leading even Franklin Roosevelt
on the state's Democratic ticket. White's
policies toward the strike were not made
an issue by Republican challenger David
S. Ingalls during the election campaign,
nor did they emerge as an issue in the
Republican press. Some miners and union
leaders, especially in the Hocking
Valley, campaigned against the governor.
Nevertheless his reputation with the
voters of the mining districts was only
slightly affected. In the counties of the
Hocking district where guard troops were
most prominently employed during the
strike (Athens, Hocking, and Perry),
White ran well behind his state-wide average
of fifty-three percent of the vote. The
fact that White had carried these counties
in the 1930 election reinforces the
inference that his strike policies were political-
ly damaging in that area. Yet in the
more populous counties of the eastern coal
district (Belmont, Guernsey, Harrison,
Jefferson, and Tuscarawas), the governor
attracted over fifty-eight percent of
the vote, considerably improving his suc-
cessful performance in that area in the
previous election. Undoubtedly, the gu-
bernatorial contest of 1932 was settled
on broader economic issues than those
involved in the coal strike, but
Governor White's conduct during the strike evi-
dently did him no serious political
injury.69
Ohio National Guardsmen played a complex
role in the coal strike of 1932.
Had National Guard activities been
limited to purely police or law enforcement
duties, their participation in this
episode would be of less interest or significance.
The National Guard's role, however,
involved several levels of participation
which influenced not only the outcome of
the strike, but its character and severity
as well. In addition to their
fundamental law enforcement duties, National Guard
officers acted as third party investigators
in their capacity as representatives of
67. Athens Messenger, September 14, 15, 16, 18, 1932;
Steubenville Harold-Star, September 14,
15, 16, 1932; "Statement of
Governor White Concerning the Agreement for Settling of the Mine
Strike," September 16, 1932, AG
Rec, Box 2, Folder 26; UMW Journal, October
1, 1932, p. 10.
68. In regard to disputes arising over
interpretation of the settlement, see for example, Letter, Lee
Hall to Governor White, October 24,
1932, AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 29; Consolidated Morning Report,
Provisional Detachment, October 5, 1932,
AG Rec, Box 2, Folder 19.
69. In regard to election statistics see
State of Ohio, Office of the Secretary of State, Report of the
Secretary of Slate, Part III: Ohio Election Statistics, 1932 (Cleveland,
1933), 106-108 and State of
Ohio, Office of the Secretary of State, Annual
Report of the Secretary of State, 1930-1931 (Cleve-
land, 1931), 358-359. In the 1930
election White carried Athens, Hocking and Perry counties by 54%
of the vote. He polled only 40% in 1932.
In Belmont,. Guernsey, Harrison, Jefferson, and Tuscarawas
counties, White polled 54% of the vote
in 1930 and 58.4% in 1932. Political and demographic patterns
were complex in the five counties in
eastern Ohio. Therefore, the governor's large majorities in those
counties in 1932 do not imply specific
approval of his strike policies, although there was clearly no
widespread disapproval of them either.
The less complex political and demographic patterns of the
three counties of southeastern Ohio,
together with the abrupt reversal of Governor White's political
fortunes in that area, reinforces the
conclusion that the strike was a decisive election issue in the Hock-
ing district. In regard to active
political opposition to White among Hocking Valley miners and union
leaders during the 1932 campaign see for
example, Columbus Dispatch, November 2, 1932.
1932 Coal Strike 141
the governor, and on some occasions
senior guard officers even acted as policy
makers. Most importantly, guard officers
acted as a mediating influence upon
miners and operators alike. The legal
constraints within which guard officers
were obligated to act often favored the
mine operators. The various roles which
they assumed occasionally conflicted,
and individual officers were not wholly
free from personal biases. However, it
is quite clear that the majority of guard
officers, particularly those senior
officers in authority, took their responsibilities
seriously and scrupulously avoided
prejudice toward either party in the strike.
The mediating role assumed by the
National Guard was most evident among
those officers assigned to observer
duties. During the 1920's and 1930's the prac-
tice of assigning officer observers to
areas where a potential for civil disturbance
existed was frequently adopted by Ohio
governors as a less provocative alterna-
tive to the premature commitment of
troop units.70 National Guard observers
displayed a notable balance between
their obligation to enforce the law and their
desire to keep violence and disruption
at a minimum. Guard observers were in-
strumental in controlling the situation
in the Hocking Valley in March and April.
Even though General Connelly's attempt
to work out a modus vivendi between
miners and operators in late March was
snubbed by the mine owners, his efforts
contributed to the relative peace which
prevailed until mid-May. Colonel Cald-
well's effort to mediate the crisis in
eastern Ohio in early April was defeated only
by the insistence of the Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company that the Somers
mine be reopened.
The decision to commit troop units to
the strike scene was a difficult one for
both Governor White and Adjutant General
Henderson. Despite tremendous
pressure from local officials and mine
operators, both men refused to use troops
until it was absolutely clear that
public order and safety could not be maintained
otherwise. Senior guard observers
consistently recommended against the use of
troops until it was clear that
circumstances required their presence. Once com-
mitted to the strike areas, troops
behaved in a disciplined and restrained manner.
Although two persons were killed in
incidents involving troops, there is no evi-
dence of National Guard culpability in
those deaths. The first case which oc-
curred at the Somers mine in Harrison
County on April 14 appeared to have been
the result of an accident, although
responsibility could not be fixed. Clearly, the
National Guard shared no culpability in
the shooting death which occurred at
Chauncey on July 12. Altogether four
persons met violent deaths in Ohio during
the strike; far fewer than the number in
other states experiencing labor disorders
during 1931 and 1932. It seems likely
fatalities in Ohio may have been higher had
guard troops and observers not been on
the scene.
National Guard relations with strike
leaders and miners were naturally strained
by the introduction of troops in the
coal fields. Regardless of their motives, the
presence of troops placed the strike in
a precarious position. But despite the
strike meeting rhetoric of UMW
officials, no irreparable schism occurred in the
relationship of strike leaders and guard
officers. In fact they conferred with one
another frequently throughout the
strike. Lee Hall, John Cinque, and Percy Tet-
low among other UMW officials accused
Governor White and guard officers of
undermining the strike, but their
rhetoric was never unreasonably inflammatory.
Indeed, it was in many ways less menacing
than might have been expected. With
70. For a survey of Ohio National Guard
participation in civil disturbances in the period 1919-
1940, see Robert L. Daugherty,
"Citizen Soldiers in Peace," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1974.
142 OHIO
HISTORY
the exception of the gun battle at
Chauncey on July 12, serious strike violence
was never directed specifically at the
National Guard. Even in this case it is evi-
dent that the incident was provoked by
the obstinacy of mine operators rather
than any deep seated animosity toward
the National Guard.
With the exception of Sheriff Smith of
Tuscarawas County, National Guard
relations with local officials in the
mining districts were wholly amicable. Close
cooperation between the two groups was
established by National Guard observ-
ers during the abortive NMU strike of
1931. Throughout the strike in 1932 Na-
tional Guard officers and local
officials maintained close contact. During the
period in which troops were assigned in
the mining districts, officers detailed to
the observer groups ordinarily managed
the day to day relations of the National
Guard and local officials, but senior
guard commanders were usually in daily
contact with local authorities as well.
The National Guard was in an ill-defined
legal position in regard to its police
authority. While county police agencies
were clearly unable properly to ensure
public safety and orderly enforcement of
state and local laws, their inability to do
so was never complete, and the local
court system continued to function with
normal efficiency. Since martial law was
never declared in the mining districts
(apparently its declaration was never
even considered), National Guard police
powers depended upon the legal authority
of local law enforcement officials.
While the legal aspects of National
Guard authority to make arrests, detain
prisoners, or disperse disorderly gatherings
was never seriously questioned, it is
evident that guardsmen adhered as
scrupulously as possible in their police and
riot control duties to the principle of
acting in the name of, and with the cooper-
ation and consent of, local authorities.
Even in Tuscarawas County where re-
lations between the National Guard and
the sheriff became strained after late
June, National Guard police activities
were pursued on the basis of this prin-
ciple. The breakdown in relations with
Sheriff Smith was a potentially serious de-
velopment which was only compounded by
the interference of General Bush. It
was, however, an isolated case and did
not lead to similar misunderstandings
with other local officials.
The National Guard was not without its
own internal divisions. Although the
evidence for such "political"
problems is fairly speculative, it does offer a clue
to what extent differences existed in
the attitudes of individual National Guard
officers toward the strike. After the
gun battle at Chauncey, General H. M. Bush
was assigned to command in the Hocking
Valley. Bush promptly relieved Colonel
Doellenger as troop commander,
apparently because of a disagreement over
guard tactics in mediating the dispute.
This incident created much ill-feeling
among guard officers in the area. In
late July Bush relieved two observers for
what he described as
"insubordination." Bush was himself relieved of command
in the Hocking Valley on July 28.71
The reasons for Bush's replacement after
only sixteen days as commander in
the Hocking district are not entirely
clear. Perhaps Adjutant General Henderson
was dissatisfied with the internal
disruption caused by General Bush's actions.
Henderson may also have lacked
confidence in Bush's objectivity toward strik-
ing miners. In April, while he was
assigned as "senior observer" in Muskingum
County, General Bush had created a minor
incident when he attempted to in-
71. Special Order 172, July 12, 1932, by
AG; Special Order 178, July 18, 1932, by AG; Special Or-
der 188, July 28, 1932, by AG, AG Rec,
Box 2, Folder 16; Rpt., BG H. M. Bush to AG, August 1, 1932,
Ag Rec, Box 2, Folder 14.
1932 Coal Strike 143
timidate UMW officials with threats that
local vigilantes "just might lynch
them."72
General Bush's personal influence was
never strong in National Guard com-
mand circles during the strike, nor did
his attitudes toward the strikers prevail
among guard officers. That officers with
more reasonable and balanced attitudes
did, in fact, represent the National
Guard throughout the dispute accounts very
much for the ability of guardsmen to
limit the severity of crises. Senior guard
officers such as Colonels Shetler,
Doellenger, and Caldwell were consistently
fair minded in their relations with
striking miners and union leaders. The personal
reputation and integrity of Henderson
was unquestioned. He was without a doubt
a soldier of unusual quality and
experience. He had been a decorated battalion
commander in the "Rainbow"
Division during the Great War and later served
as a General Staff Corps officer. His
long tenure as Adjutant General afforded
him much personal influence among
National Guard officers.73
National Guard relationships with mine
operators may be characterized as
proper. Mine operators were clearly not
satisfied with the policies of the gover-
nor and the Adjutant General toward the
strike, especially in the period before
troops were committed. Governor White
and Adjutant General Henderson's re-
fusal to send troops into the Hocking
Valley in March prompted bitter criticism
by mine owners.
Mine operators must share much of the
responsibility for the violence which
occurred during the strike, particularly
before late May. The operators' adamant
refusal even to discuss their
differences with strike leaders and their insistence
on reopening mines despite the tenseness
of the situation provoked major violence
in both the eastern Ohio and Hocking
Valley districts. Clearly, Governor White
could not force the operators to keep
their mines closed, although he did request
that they do so in the Hocking Valley
during late March. Neither National Guard
officers nor even the governor could
force the terms of a settlement upon the
operators. This was evidenced by the
reaction to the Ten Point Plan. The plan
clearly favored the operators. While
White was convinced a permanent settle-
ment could only derive from recognition
of collective bargaining, his plan did
not include the principle. The only real
concession to the miners was the prohi-
bition of strike breakers, and that was
only voluntary. While Governor White
certainly wanted to see a quick
settlement of the strike, he probably did not
expect miner approval of the plan when
he first announced it. Instead, he only
hoped to avoid the kind of violence which
had occurred in other states when
large numbers of strike breakers were
imported by mine operators.
In many cases, the mining companies
which resumed operations, ostensibly
under the terms of the White formula,
did not feel constrained to abide by the
ban on imported labor. The vagueness of
the governor's plan, particularly in re-
72. Log, BG H. M. Bush, entry for April
11, AG Rec, Box 1, Folder 33. General Bush's "com-
mand" at Zanesville was apparently
created especially for him. He had no officers under his oper-
ational control. He could, however, call
upon officers of the 62d Field Artillery Brigade which he com-
manded, but only on a personal rather
than an official basis. There is also reason to believe that Bush
was involved with the Muskingum County
"Vigilantes Committee." See for example, Bush Log,
April 11, 1932. Although Bush was
subordinate to the Adjutant General, he was by longevity the
senior general officer of the Ohio
National Guard. Perhaps Bush's independent nature was a result
of personal rivalries.
73. State of Ohio, Adjutant General's
Department, Historical Annual, 1938 (Baton Rouge, La.,
1938), 195. General Henderson served as
Adjutant General from January 1923 to January 1929. He
was reappointed by Governor White in
January 1931 and served until January 1935. Before World
War I, Henderson served as a battalion
commander in the 166th Inf (ONG) when it was mobilized
for Federal service in the Mexican
Expedition of 1916.
144 OHIO HISTORY
gard to the definition of legitimate
hiring criteria, allowed considerable margin
for avoidance by mine operators. The
issue of hiring practices was potentially
explosive. Had mine operators resorted
to massive importation of labor, which
they did not, the strike might have gone
completely out of control. The issue
definitely posed a delicate problem for
National Guard officers in the mining dis-
tricts. Legally the guard officers were
unable to require compliance with the ban
on strike breakers, and their task was
not made easier by White's policy of leav-
ing the definition of the zone of
employment to the discretion of local sheriffs.
Continually pressured by strike leaders
to clarify the issue, General Henderson
and National Guard observers took direct
responsibility for interpreting and
even expanding the governor's policy.
The guidance provided for observers in
the field by General Henderson before
and after the Ten Point Plan was an-
nounced tended to restrict the margin
available to operators for avoiding the ban
on imported labor. Guard observers,
particularly Colonels Shetler and Doellen-
ger, spent a great deal of energy
attempting to ensure compliance with the policy.
On at least one occasion, Shetler
threatened mine owners with the removal of
troops from their property if they did
not comply.
The objectives of the National Guard in
the strike were to maintain peace and
order and protect the lives and property
of the residents of the mining districts.
Although complete impartiality is a
difficult attitude to fix, it must be concluded
that the behavior of National Guard
officers and troops during the 1932 strike was
exemplary. Admittedly the gains of the
miners were few in the final settlement,
but the balancing influence of the
National Guard in its role as mediator between
the opposing forces in the strike
contributed to what gains the miners could claim.
Clearly, the energy of National Guard
officers contributed to reducing the se-
verity of violence during the strike.
LARRY D. O'BRIEN
The Ohio National Guard
in the Coal Strike of 1932
"You don't have to be drunk,"
they said
"To get throwed in the can;
The only thing you needed be
Was just a union man."1
--Harlan County Blues
This verse from the Harlan County Blues
illustrates a recurrent theme in the his-
tory of the American labor movement in
the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. The resistance which
unionization met in the mining industry was perhaps
even more severe than in other
industries, and the violence which often resulted
was undoubtedly the most sanguinary. The
role of state militias in labor dis-
orders is a parallel theme in the
history of the American workers' struggle for the
right to organize. Very often National
Guard intervention in labor disorders was
unconscionably partisan. Yet, while
there is a firm basis for the "strikebreaking"
image of the National Guard in many
labor disputes, that image is not valid in
every instance.2 The role of
the Ohio National Guard (ONG) in the coal strike of
1932 is a case in point. The most
interesting characteristic of the National Guard's
participation in the 1932 strike was the
balance which existed in the attitudes of
guard officers and the mediating influence
they exercised upon the opposing
forces in the dispute.
The coal industry collapsed during the
Great Depression. Nationwide produc-
tion fell to the lowest level since
1904. Production capacity far outstripped de-
mand, and prices fell sharply. In an
effort to cut costs, operators slashed wages,
thus contributing to the spiral of
economic deterioration in the mining districts.
In the worst areas of the Southern and
Appalachian coal fields, poverty and out-
right destitution were the lot of the
miner and his family. Malnutrition and dis-
ease were common. Economically
discriminatory practices (such as scrip wage
payments and forced patronage of company
stores) together with violation of
miners' civil rights in some areas
further contributed to the desperate conditions
1. George Korson, Coal Dust on the Fiddle (Philadelphia,
1943), 316.
2. William H. Riker, in his historical
analysis of the National Guard, Soldiers of the States: The
Role of the National Guard in
American Democracy (Washington, 1957),
argues that state militias
were revived in the late 1870's
primarily as an industrial police. However, Riker also points out that
after the passage of the Dick Act in
1903 the National Guard's value as a national military reserve be-
gan to replace its function of
industrial police and also mitigated the harshness of its anti-labor bias.
Mr. O'Brien is a Ph.D. candidate in
history at The Ohio State University.