ANDREW BIRTLE
Governor George Hoadly's Use of the
Ohio National Guard in the Hocking
Valley Coal Strike of 1884
During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the
United State experienced a large number
of labor strikes that in-
volved outbreaks of violence. While the
causes of this violence are
both numerous and varied, some students
of labor history cite the
intervention of police forces as a major
catalyst.1 Indeed, the list of
clashes between police and labor during
this period is long. In many
studies of strikes and industrial
violence, the police and military
forces called in to protect life and
property are depicted as partisan
forces which worked to aid industry
against labor. The extent to
which the police are viewed in this
manner varies from author to
author. Some, such as H. M. Gitelman and
John Fitch, argue that
while police forces often acted as
adversaries of labor, they were also
at times neutral and completely non
partisan. Others, such as
Samuel Yellen and Sidney Lens, tend to
view government and its
police forces as having been actively
allied with business against
labor. Lens goes so far as to make the
accusation that
In reality, however, the lawlessness was
usually created by the troops and
by the government's own denial of civil
liberties. The real purpose, thinly
disguised in phrases of
"impartiality," was to aid management in emascu-
lating unions.2
Andrew J. Birtle is a Ph.D. candidate in
American Military History at The Ohio
State University.
1. Philip Taft and Philip Ross,
"American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character
and Outcome," The History of
Violence in America, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and
Ted Robert Gurr, (New York, 1969), 281
(hereafter cited as Taft and Ross. "American
Labor Violence"); H. M. Gitelman,
"Perspectives in American Industrial Violence,"
Business History Review, 47 (Spring, 1973), 10, 17, 19, 20.
2. Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars, (Garden
City, N.J., 1973), 6; See also Samuel
Yellen, American Labor Struggles, ((New
York, 1936).
38 OHIO HISTORY
Even Fitch, who mentions in passing that
there were many cases
in which police forces remained neutral,
concentrates his study on
several cases in which the police acted
as a partisan force against
labor.3 That violence and
police/military intervention generally
weakened labor's position is fairly
evident. It is also true that gov-
ernors during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries
sometimes called out the National Guard
in order to suppress
strikes rather than to maintain peace
and order.4 However, it is a
misconception to view the intervention
of state forces solely as an
act designed to subvert labor.
Unfortunately, those who write on the
history and causes of violent strikes in
America recount only those
instances in which the arrival of the
National Guard led to blood-
shed, while they ignore those cases
where the militia was employed
successfully as a nonpartisan force. The
Hocking Valley Coal Strike
of 1884 is one such example of a strike
in which the National Guard
was not merely a pawn of industry.
Ohio's coal fields in the Hocking Valley
region have long been the
site of violent confrontations between
labor and management. Dur-
ing the nineteenth century, poor working
conditions, low pay, and
exploitative company stores often
sparked violent strikes in the
Hocking Valley. One of the worst strikes
to hit the valley occurred
between June 23, 1884, and March 18,
1885, when miners refused to
accept a reduction in wages amounting to
ten cents for every ton of
coal mined. When violence erupted in
late August 1884, Governor
George Hoadly reluctantly decided to
send in the National Guard to
restore order and to protect life and
property. The Guard was quite
successful in achieving these goals.
Governor Hoadly's use of the
Ohio National Guard deserves to be
studied in order to counterba-
lance the all too prevalent view of the
National Guard as an instru-
ment to break strikes rather than to
preserve peace.5
The Hocking Valley is located
approximately sixty miles south-
east of Columbus and extends through
parts of Hocking, Athens,
and Perry counties. The central coal
mining area lies along a twen-
ty-mile long and fifteen-mile wide
stretch of the Hocking River.
During the early 1880s, a depressed
national economy reduced the
demand for coal, causing prices to
drop.6 This, in turn, led to signifi-
3. John A Fitch, The Causes of
Industrial Unrest, (New York, 1924), 243-44.
4. Taft and Ross, "American Labor
Violence," 297, 317, 382.
5. Frank R. Levstik, "The Hocking
Valley Miner's Strike, 1884-1885: A Search for
Order," The Old Northwest, 2 (March, 1976),
55, 61.
6. Delmer Trester, "Unionism Among
Ohio Miners in the Nineteenth Century"
(M.A. thesis, The Ohio State University,
1947), 18 (hereafter cited as Trester,
"Unionism Among Ohio Miners").
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 39
cant levels of unemployment in the
valley, and by 1884 most miners
worked only three days a week. In
addition to the overall depres-
sion, stores owned by the mine operators
persisted in charging min-
ers prices 10 to 20 percent higher than
those of local stores not
owned by the operators. These unfair
practices of the company
stores were a major cause of discontent
among miners.
Responding to the difficulties of the
early 1880s, both miners and
mine operators organized. In 1882 the
Ohio Miners' Amalgamated
Association was founded, with John
McBride as president. The fol-
lowing year several operators responded
by forming an association
whose goal was to eliminate costly price
wars and present a strong,
united front to the newly organized
miners. This organization, enti-
tled the Columbus and Hocking Coal and
Iron Company and often
referred to as the
"Syndicate," consisted of the owners of 18 mines, 5
furnaces, 570 houses (company-owned
housing for miners), and 12
company stores.8. The
Syndicate was further augmented by the crea-
tion of the Ohio Coal Exchange, a
marketing organization for inde-
pendent coal operators. Thus, by 1884
both miners and operators
were organized.
Citing poor economic conditions and low
coal prices, the operators
in the spring of 1884 asked the miners
to consider a wage reduction
from 70 cents to 60 cents for each ton
of coal mined. On April 30, the
Ohio Miners' Amalgamated Association
rejected the reduction. The
Syndicate and the Exchange responded by
unilaterally cutting
wages to 60 cents a ton on Friday, June
20. The following Monday
the miners went out of strike.9
The first month of the strike was
relatively quiet. The introduc-
tion by the operators in mid-July of 250
strikebreakers, many of
whom were foreign-born, and 100
Pinkertons raised tensions, but
not to an appreciable extent. The
striking miners peacefully per-
suaded many strikebreakers to leave,
while the local inhabitants
took pity on those strikebreakers who
were European immigrants
and whom they considered ignorant and
exploited.10 Confident that
the unskilled laborers brought in by the
operators would fail to run
7. John W. Lozier, "The Hocking
Valley Coal Miners' Strike, 1884-85" (M.A.
thesis, The Ohio State Univesity, 1963),
11, 19 (hereafter cited as Lozier, "Hocking
Valley Strike"); Ohio General
Assembly, 1885. Proceedings of the Hocking Valley
Investigation Committee (Columbus, 1885), 36-40 (hereafter cited as the Proceedings
of the Hocking Valley Investigation
Committee).
8. Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 36.
9. Ibid, 54.
10. Ibid., 61.
40 OHIO HISTORY
the mines efficiently, the miners were
content to sit back and bide
their time. The valley was so peaceful
that the operators even re-
duced the number of Pinkertons.11
As July faded into August, however, the
strikers' attitude began
to change. The number of strikebreakers
remaining in the mines
steadily increased, while the union's
strike fund steadily dimin-
ished. Consequently, the initial
sympathy for the exploited foreign
laborers soon changed to disgust towards
the "vagabonds" and "dis-
ease producing wretches."12 Further
inflaming the situation was the
fact that by September the operators had
hired 113 Pinkertons plus
an unknown number of local civilians to
act as guards.13 As early as
July, local authorities protested the
arrival of the Pinkertons to
Governor Hoadly. They charged that the
Pinkertons had "invaded"
the valley, disregarded civilian
authorities, and blocked public
roads where they crossed mine property.14
While Governor Hoadly
demanded that the roads be reopened, he
conceded that the Pinker-
tons were a legal organization and thus
could not be expelled as long
as they stayed within the law.15
The Columbus, Hocking Valley, the Toledo
Railroad (CHV&T)-
the major carrier of Hocking Valley
coal-hired its own guards
along with a private detective, John T.
Norris, to patrol and protect
railroad property in the valley.
Unfortunately, Norris was also dep-
utized by county authorites, and he soon
became the most notorious
and hated man in the valley. Without
regard for legal procedure,
Norris single-handedly arrested more
people during the strike than
anyone else. None of Norris's victims
were convicted, but he did
manage to arouse much ill will and anger
in the valley.16
As tensions increased, stray shots were
fired at guards and fights
occasionally broke out between miners
and strikebreakers. On Au-
gust 25 a mob of 400 miners almost
rioted at Buchtel following a
court ruling which allowed the eviction
of strikers from company-
11. George Cotkin, "Strikebreakers,
Evictions and Violence: Industrial Conflict in
the Hocking Valley,1884-85," Ohio
History, 87 (Spring, 1978), 143-44 (hereafter re-
ferred to as Cotkin,
"Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence").
12. Hocking Sentinel, August 28,
1884.
13. Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 63.
14. See Henry Spurrier to Governor
Hoadly, July 14, 1884, and Elias Boudinot to
Hoadly, July 14, 1884, both in The
Papers of Governor George Hoadly, 1884-86, MS
Coll. #314, The Ohio Historical Society
(hereafter cited as Hoadly Papers); Lozier,
"Hocking Valley Strike," 64; New
York Times, July 16,1884.
15. Governor Hoadly to Elias Boudinot,
July 15, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
16. Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 66, 72; Proceedings of the Hocking Valley
Investigation Committe, 314.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 41 |
|
owned housing, and the arrival of more strikebreakers. George Carr, superintendent of the CHV&T, took the opportunity to ask the governor to send in the National Guard. Governor Hoadly, however, did not feel the situation was serious enough to send in the militia.17 Realizing that violence would only aid the operators and turn the public against the miners, union president John McBride and the pro-labor Logan Hocking Sentinel urged miners to avoid violence.18 Unfortunately, these pleas for peace and order failed to stem rising passions, especially after another court decision on August 28 up- held the right of mine operators to evict striking miners and their families from company-owned housing. A flood of evictions followed this decision in late August and early September. It was this event, coupled with the growing number of strikebreakers, that proved to be the catalyst of violence in the Hocking Valley.19 On August 30, two days after the court approved the first eviction notices, the Republican and pro-business Ohio State Journal con- fidently predicted that the strike was almost broken and reassured its readers:
A number of detectives of the secret service are now at work in the valley, and any plots that may be made for violence will be known in time and the parties concocting them will be promptly arrested.20
17. Columbus Evening Dispatch, August 25, 1885; Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 74. 18. Hocking Sentinel, August 28, 1884. 19. Cotkin, "Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence," 147; Columbus Evening Dis- patch, August 28, 29, 1884. 20. Ohio State Journal, August 30, 1884. |
42 OHIO HISTORY
Whether or not this story was true, the Journal's
assertion that
"calmness now prevails among the
striking miners" was
premature.21 Late that
evening and during the early morning of
August 31, striking miners organized
several attacks on mine prop-
erty. The miners cut telephone and
telegraph lines at several places
in Hocking, Perry and Athens counties,
raided a camp of
strikebreakers at Murray City, destroyed
a coal hopper at Straits-
ville worth $4,000, and assaulted a mine
at Snake Hollow, near
Nelsonville.22 The attack on
Snake Hollow was the most violent
event. Twenty-two local citizens from
Logan guarded the mine.
Armed with rifles, shot guns, and
revolvers, a force of approximate-
ly 100 miners attacked and routed the
Snake Hollow guards at
about 1:30 A.M. August 31, killing one guard and wounding several
others.23
Wild rumors of the assault spread
rapidly during the following
day.24 Governor Hoadly, who
was in Cincinnati, was informed of the
rioting by his secretary Daniel
McConville. Throughout the day of
August 31, the governor was in constant
communication with
McConville about the situation. Hoadly
issued instructions en-
couraging the sheriffs of Hocking,
Perry, and Athens counties to do
all they could to preserve the peace
before calling upon the state for
aid. In addition, he ordered Colonel
George Freeman, commander of
the National Guard's Fourteenth Regiment
in Columbus, to begin
quiet preparations for a movement into
the Hocking Valley.25
While the governor made preparations to
return to Columbus,
mine operators spent the day
telegraphing him for aid, recruiting
civilian guards, and buying weapons in
Columbus amid new rumors
of violence in the valley. Meanwhile, an
alleged participant in the
Snake Hollow raid was arrested and jailed
at Logan.26 An angry mob
seeking the prisoner's release
reportedly gathered around the jail,
and when Governor Hoadly arrived in
Columbus late in the evening
of August 31, he received a formal
request for state aid from Sheirff
T. F. McCarthy of Hocking County:
21. Ibid.
22. Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 74; Ohio, Adjutant General's Report, 1884
(Columbus, 1885), 73 (hereafter cited as
AG Report).
23. Ohio Eagle (Lancaster),
September 4, 1884; AG Report.
24. Athens Messenger, September
4, 1884; Ohio State Journal, September 1 and 3,
1884; Hocking Sentinel, September
4, 1884; Ohio Eagle, September 4, 1884; Co-
lumbus Evening Dispatch, September 1, 1884.
25. AG Report, 268; Governor
Hoadly to Daniel McConville, Hoadly Papers.
26. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
1, 1884; Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 76; Hocking Sentinel, September 1,
1884.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 43
All means in my power are entirely
exhausted to repress disorder and to
protect life and property. The strikers
are cutting the telegraph wires. I am
worn out; have been going day and night
for two months. Please send
militia immediately and stop further
bloodshed. Jail is threatened.27
Upon the receipt of this note, Hoadly
telegraphed back around
midnight that troops would be sent and
asked Sheriff McCarthy how
many men he thought he needed. McCarthy
responded that he
needed ten men immediately that night to
guard the jail and 350
men to secure the valley.28 To reinforce
McCarthy's appeal, mine
operators kept up their barrage of
appeals for troops, warning that
their hired guards were demoralized and
would desert unless mili-
tary aid was forthcoming.29
Having made the decision to send in the
Guard, Governor Hoadly
sounded the riot alarm in Columbus and
sent orders for National
Guard units stationed in Columbus to
assemble. But after having
aroused the city's populace in panic and
confusion, the governor
suddenly had second thoughts. To begin
with, Superintendent Carr
of the CHV&T telegraphed him that it
was unwise to move the
militia in at night when it could be
ambushed. Carr suggested that
if the governor would ask his officers,
they would verify this fact.30
More importantly, State Legislator Allen
0. Myers paid a late night
call upon the governor and purportedly
advised him of the political
costs of sending the Guard into the
valley. When the governor
emerged from this private meeting, he
announced that he would
personally go to the valley and inspect
the situation before deciding
whether to employ the militia. Hoadly's
decision to travel through
the strike region was wise. Since most
of his information came from
rumors or mine operators and railroad
men, he needed to form his
own opinion of the situation. Moreover,
his inspection tour might
help defuse the situation. Finally, the
trip might eliminate adverse
portrayals of him as a heartless,
pro-industry and anti-labor gov-
ernor.
27. AG Report, 269; Sheriff T. F.
McCarthy to Governor Hoadly, August 31,1884,
Hoadly Papers.
28. Governor Hoadly to T. F. McCarthy,
August 31, 1884, Hoadly Papers; McCar-
thy to Hoadly, September 1, 1884, AG Report, 271.
29. W. B. Brooks to Governor Hoadly,
September 1, 1884; M. M. Greene to Hoadly,
September 1, 1884; T. F. McCarthy to
Hoadly, September 1, 1884. All of the above
telegrams are in AG Report, 272.
30. George Carr to Governor Hoadly,
September 1, 1884, Hoadly Papers. The units
called to arms in Columbus were the Fourteenth
Regiment, the Governor's Guard,
and the Duffy Guard.
44 OHIO HISTORY
While this was a sensible policy,
Hoadly's vacillation did not go
without criticism in the press. The
politically independent Co-
lumbus Evening Dispatch commented:
People can not see the necessity of
calling the men out at that hour of the
night and throwing the whole city into a
state of confusion and excitement
by sounding the alarm if their services
in quelling the riot were not needed;
and if there was sufficient cause to
call them out why they were not sent to
the point of trouble instead of being
quartered in this city, a considerable
distance from the riotous district ...
Many members of the National Guard
expressed their indignation this
afternoon at being called out at midnight
and forced to remain in the Armory
during the day.31
Party politics, however, played an
important role in press apprais-
als of Governor Hoadly's actions,
especially since 1884 was a pres-
idential election year. The Republican
press criticized Governor
Hoadly, a Democrat, for his indecision
during the early stages of the
"reign of terror," feeling
that he should not have delayed at all in
sending the troops. The Cleveland
Herald opposed Hoadly's trip into
the valley and queried, "Who is
Governor of Ohio, George Hoadly or
Allen O. Myers? The impression gains
ground that Hoadly is Gov-
ernor de jure and Allen O. Myers de
facto."32
The Democratic and pro-labor press, on
the other hand, praised
Governor Hoadly for his compassion and
wise decision in personally
examining the valley before committing
the militia. The Democra-
tic press even launched its own
political offensive by claiming that
James G. Blaine, the Republican
candidate for President, was a
major investor in Hocking Valley mines.
All in all, some criticism of
Hoadly's vacillation seems justified.
However, as the New York
Times pointed out, Hoadly's ultimate decision was prudent
rather
than cowardly.33
At 2:00 A.M on September 1, Governor Hoadly left on a special
train for the Hocking Valley. He
travelled throughout the day and
stopped to address an assembly of
citizens at Nelsonville. He stated
that no person-miner or operator-had the
right to violate the law,
31. Allen O. Myers was a Franklin County
Democratic member of the Ohio House.
For both the meeting and criticism of
it, see Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
1,1884; Cleveland Herald, September
3,1884; Logan Republican Gazette, September
4,1884.
32. Ohio State Journal, September
2, 1884; Athens Messenger, September 4, 1884;
Cleveland Herald, September 2, 3, 1884; Logan Republican Gazette, September 4,
1884.
33. Hocking Sentinel, September
4, 1884; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
1, 1884; New York Times, September
2, 1884.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 45
and that he would rather rely upon the
good behavior of the citizens
themselves than to call in the militia.
When a member of the crowd
asked, "What's to become of the
people turned out of houses?" Hoad-
ly responded, "I will send them
tents." Tents were sent in early
September, although most of them were
returned as evictees had
taken shelter with friends and family.34
After viewing the strike situation,
however, Hoadly felt compel-
led to deploy three companies of
Guardsmen in the region. The units
employed were probably chosen for their
proximity to the valley and
had been notified on August 31 of
possible operations. They con-
sisted of companies from Lancaster,
Circleville, and New Lexington.
Sheriff McCarthy stationed these units
on September 1 at Logan,
Sand Run, and Longstreth,
respectively.35 On the following day the
Lancaster Company was moved from Logan
to Snake Hollow. Once
in place, all units established
defensive perimeters around the des-
ignated mines. The units had been
mobilized hastily, and conse-
quently some of the men had only two or
three rounds of ammuni-
tion each on the first night.36
The Guard's first night in the valley
was spent quietly. In fact, the
situation seemed secure enough that
Governor Hoadly dismissed
the troops being held in readiness in
Columbus the following day.
Throughout September 2, however, mine
operators kept up a bar-
rage of telegrams requesting more
troops.37 Even Captain James
Teal of the New Lexington unit at
Longstreth requested two to three
companies of reinforcements out of fear
that his small company of
thirty-three men might be surrounded. In
light of these appeals,
Governor Hoadly decided to send an
additional company to the
Hocking Valley. Since Adjutant General
Ebenezer Finley was ill,
34. On August 30, George Snowden, a
prominent local citizen, had requested that
Governor Hoadly send tents to
house-evicted miners at Buchtel. Several other
appeals followed on September 8 and 15.
See George Snowden to Governor Hoadly,
August 30, 1884; Hoadly to Snowden,
August 30, 1884; Snowden to Hoadly, Septem-
ber 8, 1884; Adjutant General Finley to
Snowden, September 15, 1884. All of the
above are in Hoadly Papers; also see Hocking
Sentinel, September 4, 1884; Trester,
"Unionism Among Ohio Miners,"
22; Ohio Eagle, September 4, 1884; Columbus
Evening Dispatch, September 1, 1884.
35. The companies involved were Company
E, Sixth Regiment, Company F, Sixth
Regiment, and Company A, Seventeenth
Regiment. See AG Report, 74.
36. Lieutenant L. O. Anderson to
Governor Hoadly, September 1, 1884, Hoadly
Papers.
37. The units in Columbus were the
Fourteenth Regiment and the Duffy and
Governor's Guards. Colonel Thomas T.
Dill to Colonel George Freeman, September 2,
1884. AG Report, 273; M. M. Green
to Governor Hoadly, September 2, 1884, and J. R.
Buchtel to Hoadly, September 2, 1884,
both in Hoadly Papers. Also see Ohio State
Journal, September 2, 1884; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
2, 1884.
46 OHIO HISTORY
Colonel Thomas T. Dill, the assistant
adjutant general, was sent
with the company and was given command
of all Ohio Guard units
in the Hocking Valley.38
Governor Hoadly's instructions to
Colonel Dill clearly indicated
the moderate tone that would
characterize the Guard's occupation.
Dill's primary task was to protect life
and property, and he was to
act only under the direction of the
civil authorities and in close
consultation with the county sheriffs.
While the Colonel could re-
quest reinforcements whenever needed,
the governor impressed
upon him that the troops should be
withdrawn as soon as possible.39
The Guard was to be neither a long-term
garrison nor a private
police force for the operators, but
rather an intermediary through
which peace and order could be quickly
restored. To reinforce his
desire that the Guard act solely as a
nonpartisan peacekeeping
force, Hoadly expressly forbade the
Guard to fire weapons unless
fired upon first.40
Tension was high the first several days,
but rumors of violence
usually proved to be false. Railroad and
mine executives often re-
ported "information" on
impending riots in efforts to maintain the
National Guard's presence in the valley,
but these riots never
occurred.41 As early as
September 3, the Columbus Dispatch sum-
med up the situation with the headline
"No Work for Troops," while
Guard Captain Albert Getz described the
situation at Snake Hollow
as being "quiet as a
graveyard."42 Sporadic gunshots at night at or
near National Guard pickets were quite
common but posed no se-
rious threat. Such gunfire became so
commonplace that eventually
it was not even recorded in the daily
reports - in part so that those
at home would not be unnecessarily
anxious for the safety of their
friends and relatives in uniform.43
Despite the general calm, pressure from
the Syndicate and
CHV&T to maintain and increase
militia strength in the valley
38. The new unit was Company K,
Fourteenth Regiment. Captain James Teal to
Governor Hoadly, September 2, 1884, AG
Report, 274.
39. AG Report, 274, 275; Governor
Hoadly to Colonel Thomas Dill, Hoadly Papers.
40. Ohio. Records of the Ohio Adjutant
General's Office, Hocking Valley Coal
Strike, 1884, Vol. 154, Ohio Historical
Society (hereafter cited as Records of AG).
41. AG Report, 75; George Carr to
Colonel Thomas Dill, September 3 and 4, 1884,
in AG Report, 276.
42. Captain Albert Getz to Colonel
Thomas Dill, September 6, 1884, Records of
AG; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
3, 1884.
43. Captain Charles Brown to Colonel
Thomas Dill, September 3, 1884, 275; Dill to
Governor Hoadly, September 4, 1884, 276,
and September 7,1884, 277, all in AG
Report; Lieutenant
L. O. Anderson's Report, September 5,1884, Records of AG; Co-
lumbus Evening Dispatch, September 9, 15, 17, 19, 1884.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 47
continued throughout September.44
Stevenson Burke, vice president
of the CHV&T, sent repeated letters
to Governor Hoadly warning
that Ohio's reputation for
"lawlessness" would drive business out,
including the CHV&T. Burke
criticized Hoadly's "dallying" and
"armed neutrality" and called
for an end to mob rule in Ohio.45
Republican papers picked up on this
theme. The Ohio State Journal
reported that the miners cursed the
military and would rejoice as
soon as it was withdrawn, while the Athens
Messenger warned that
violence was still possible "in the
absence of a sufficient military
force." Interestingly, the Messenger
was not above performing an
about-face in the interest of scoring
some political points, for it
reminded miners that it had always been
Democratic governors who
had called in troops against strikers.46
The local civil authorities were also
apprehensive. Sheriff McCar-
thy and his deputies were easily
frightened and constantly feared a
renewed outbreak of violence. Governor
Hoadly soon began to dis-
trust McCarthy's judgment. Upon
receiving reports from McCarthy
that many railroad bridges in the area
were threatened, Hoadly
asked Colonel Dill to give his own
assessment of the situation, bear-
ing in mind that "I do not desire
troops to remain longer than it is
necessary to preserve order and sustain
civil authorities." In reply,
Dill reported that the bridges were not
in danger and that the pre-
sent number of troops was adequate.47
However, according to Co-
lumbus newspapers, even Colonel Dill
believed that while things
currently remained calm, the miners
would quickly drive off the
strikebreakers as soon as the troops were
removed.48 Nevertheless,
Governor Hoadly was anxious to remove
the Guard as soon as possi-
ble. As early as September 3 he
indicated his desire to withdraw the
company at New Lexington. He left the
decision up to Colonel Dill's
judgment, and on September 9 the unit
was pulled out.49
44. President of the Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, and St. Louis Railroad to Governor
Hoadly, September 6, 1884, Hoadly
Papers.
45. Stevenson Burke to Governor Hoadly,
September 7 and 8, 1884, Hoadly Pa-
pers.
46. Ohio State Journal, September
3 and 4, 1884; Athens Messneger, September 1
and October 9, 1884.
47. Governor Hoadly to Colonel Dill, and
Dill back to Hoadly, September 3, 1884,
AG Report, 275;
Dill to Hoadly, September 9, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
48. Deputy Sheriff W. E. Hamblin to
Sheriff T. F. McCarthy, September 19, 1884,
Hoadly Papers; McCarthy to General
Ebenezer Finley, September 11, 1884, Records
of AG.
49. Governor Hoadly to Colonel Thomas
Dill, AG Report, 276; Hoadly to Dill,
September 7, 1884, Records of AG; Dill
to Hoadly, September 9, 1884, Hoadly Papers;
Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 8, 1884.
48 OHIO HISTORY |
|
By the second week in September company commanders reported that the troops, growing weary of their arduous duties, were re- questing relief.50 Fearing that the militia might be completely with- drawn, Sheriff McCarthy warned General Finley that he could not assume responsibility for peacekeeping in such an eventuality.51 In a report on September 11, Colonel Dill expressed fear of renewed conflict once the troops were pulled out and agreed with Sheriff McCarthy that the valley was not yet ready for the removal of the Guard. While acknowledging that a large force of civilian guards could protect life and property equally well, Dill felt that replacing the troops with civilian guards would result in greater antagonisms and renewed violence, and thus, in the light of already-present ten- sions, such a move was not advisable.52 Finley, who had recovered from his illness and was now in the Hocking Valley, concurred with Dill's assessment of the situation. Finley reported, "it is not the
50. Captain Albert Getz to Colonel Thomas Dill, September 9, 1884, Records of AG; Dill to General Finley, September 11,1884, AG Report, 278. 51. Sheriff McCarthy to General Finley, September 11, 1884, Records of AG. 52. Indeed, many of the disturbances after the arrival of the National Guard were due to unruly Pinkertons or trigger-happy civilian guards who nervously discharged their guns on the slightest pretense. One striker even claimed that he welcomed the militia since it protected the people from the provocations of the operator's hired guns. See George Snowden to Governor Hoadly, September 8, 1884; W. Dalrymple to Hoadly, September 9, 1884; and Andrew [?] to Hoadly, September 18, 1884, all in Hoadly Papers; Report of Colonel Dill to General E. Finley, September 11, 1884, Records of AG; Hocking Sentinel, September 11 and 18, 1884; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 8, 1884. |
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 49
number but the moral effects of the
soldiers in the valley is what
preserves the peace."53
As a result of these recommendations,
Governor Hoadly decided
to keep a force in the valley by
withdrawing the three companies
presently there and replacing them with
three other companies. On
September 12, companies from Upper
Sandusky, Bucyrus, and Co-
lumbus replaced the garrisons at Snake
Hollow, Longstreth, and
Sand Run, respectively.54 The
rotation of troops went smoothly, and
the new units settled down to the
monotonous routine of guard duty.
The valley was now so quiet that
marksmanship competitions and
baseball games seem to have been the
Guard's main occupation.
Rumors and stories of impending riots
were the only things that
broke the monotony.55 The
tranquility of the valley, however, raised
the difficult question of when the
troops could be withdrawn. If the
region was once again stabilized, why
should the Guard remain? On
the other hand, a premature withdrawal
might precipitate renewed
violence and the embarrassment and
expense of having to return
troops to the area. Throughout
September, pro- and anti-labor forces
endeavored to pressure Governor Hoadly
into making a decision
favorable to their position.
On September 28 a large sympathy rally
was held for the miners
at the Columbus City Hall. The meeting
passed a resolution that
denounced the employment of militia in
the Hocking Valley as not only
without justification but a perversion
of our constitution and laws and
'calculated to subvert our free
institutions and hand our state over to the
keeping of a corporate oligarchy whose
only idea of right is its power to
compel obedience to its monstrous
demands'; and demands, in the name of
the laboring masses of Ohio, the
immediate withdrawal of the militia from
the valley . . .56
The Columbus Dispatch reported a
"deep disgust" among the
population in the valley towards the
needless presence of the militia
and wondered, considering the reported
cost of $400 per day, how
long the idle Guardsmen would be
employed, while the pro-labor
53. General E. Finley to Governor
Hoadly, September 11, 1884, Records of AG.
54. The units involved were Company B,
Second Regiment, Company A, Eighth
Regiment, and Company B, Fourteenth
Regiment; see AG Report, 75.
55. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
18, 19, and 20, 1884; the Hocking
Sentinel made
fun of the army of "war correspondents" that had descended upon the
valley eager for action, but who were
now disappointed. See Hocking Sentinel,
September 11, 18, and 25, 1884.
56. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
29, 1884.
50 OHIO HISTORY
Hocking Sentinel assured its readers that all would remain quiet if
the militia were withdrawn.57 Even
the Republican Ohio State Jour-
nal, which had strongly attacked Hoadly for his delay in
sending
troops, and then praised him for keeping
the troops in the valley,
now turned about once again to question
Hoadly's policy. On
September 24 the paper stated that men
of the Guard unit at Sand
Run felt that their presence was no
longer needed and that many of
them were losing valuable work days
while on duty. Three days
later the Journal reported that
while Syndicate representatives
were asking the governor for the
retention of troops in the valley,
many people were beginning to wonder if
the troops were still neces-
sary. Thus even one of the Syndicate's
strongest supporters was
beginning to question the value of
maintaining troops in the valley.
The Journal stopped short of
actually calling for a withdrawal, but
demanded that the governor soon make up
his mind so that those on
duty could return to their homes.
Meanwhile, the Republican New
Lexington Tribune went so far as to accuse the governor of main-
taining a standing army in the valley
"because of the fearful soul of
the Democratic Sheriff down there that
imagines that deviltry of
some kind or other will be perpetrated
unless he has an army at his
heels."58
On September 17 General Finley informed
Hoadly that he felt all
the troops could be withdrawn within the
next two days. The gener-
al wrote, "There must come a time
when we must leave, and in my
judgment a week or two weeks hence will
find affairs in the same
condition as they are now, if the soldiers
remain."59 Finley admitted
that violence might reemerge once the
soldiers left, but with no end
to the strike in sight, he questioned
how long the retention of troops
could be justified when there was no
longer any disorder. Rather
than the operators utilizing the state,
Finley felt that they should
pay for their own protection.60 Finally,
he recommended that all
three Guard companies be removed at the
same time-withdrawing
one unit at a time would tend to cause
dissatisfaction in the remain-
ing units, without offering any greater
security. Since the Guard's
four outposts-Murray City, Sand Run,
Snake Hollow, and Long-
57. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
23,1884; Hocking Sentinel, September
25, 1884.
58. Ohio State Journal, September
2, 10, 14, 24, and 27, 1884; New Lexington
Tribune, September 25, 1884.
59. General Ebenezer Finley to Governor
Hoadly, September 17, 1884, Records of
AG.
60. Ibid.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 51
streth-were not mutually supportive, the
withdrawal of one com-
pany would leave that particular area
exposed to attack. That
Snake Hollow had no Pinkertons, and Sand
Run only three, meant
that the removal of one company would
effectively undermine the
entire defense of the valley. Thus, if
withdrawal were to be the
policy, Finley recommended withdrawing
all of the units simul-
taneously.61
Governor Hoadly, whose policy had always
been to remove the
troops as soon as possible, did not
accept Finley's last suggestion.
Perhaps out of caution, or in
consideration of the appeals from the
mine operators, the governor chose to
withdraw the Guard in
piecemeal fashion. When the Guard
company from Bucyrus, after
fourteen days service, heard rumors that
it would be held in the
valley for an extra week, both the
Guardsmen and businessmen
from Bucyrus lodged a formal protest
with the governor. In re-
sponse, the governor immediately
replaced the Bucyrus company
with one from Chillicothe on September
23.62
The permanent withdrawal of units began
on September 27, when
General Finley returned the Guard
detachments at Murray City to
their respective companies and removed
the troops from Sand Run.
Two days later the garrison at Snake
Hollow was relieved. Finally,
on October 3 the last National Guard
unit, the Chillicothe unit
which had replaced the Bucyrus company
on Setember 23, was re-
moved from Longstreth.63 The
occupation of the valley had lasted
slightly over one month.
The strike, however, dragged on. As many
had feared, the miners
renewed their campaign of violence two
weeks after the National
Guard withdrew. On October 12, strikers
set a mine at Shawnee
ablaze, and three days later six more
mines and a hopper were set on
fire. Then on November 5, three railroad
bridges were destroyed and
three hundred miners unsuccessfully
attacked mine property at
Murray City.64 Sheriff
McCarthy wired the governor and requested
the return of the militia. Governor
Hoadly, familiar now with
McCarthy's excitability, refused to
believe that the sheriff had done
all in his power to prevent disorder.
Instead, Hoadly made another
appeal to the local citizens to restrain
themselves and foresake vio-
61. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September
15, 1884; General Ebenezer Finley to
Governor Hoadly, September 17, 1884, Records of AG.
62. The new unit was Company A, Sixth
Regiment; See AG Report, 75.
63. Ibid., 76.
64. Lozier, "Hocking Valley
Strike," 79; AG Report, 79; Athens Messenger, Novem-
ber 13, 1884.
52 OHIO HISTORY
lence, threatening that if they did not,
the Guard would indeed
return.65
The last major acts of violence, which
included another attack by
strikers at Murray City, occurred in
December and January, result-
ing in the destruction of some mining
and railroad property. In
mid-December Sheriff John Boden of
Athens County requested two
militia companies in response to this
violence, but once again the
governor denied that the situation was
serious enough to warrant
the introduction of state troops.66
These attacks, by and large the last
desperate acts of a few trou-
blemakers, were aimed mostly at
property, and few injuries re-
sulted. Much more common were acts of
petty larceny committed by
miners who were now destitute after
months without work. While
there was some criticism of the
governor's refusal to send military
aid, most people clearly saw that the
situation was moving steadily
against the strikers.67 By
November, 1500 strikebreakers were at
work in the Hocking Valley, and by
January 1885 all the Syndicate
mines but four were back in operation.
By the second week of Febru-
ary the last Pinkerton left the valley,
and on March 18, 1885, the
miners' union officially accepted the 60
cents a ton rate. After nine
months, the strike was finally over.68
With the end of the strike in early 1885
the Ohio Assembly
launched an investigation to determine
both the causes of the strike
and the possible means of preventing
such a calamity in the future.
The committee conducting the
investigation also endeavored to give
both sides a chance to explain their
positions to the public. During
the investigation, union president John
McBride testified that he
believed that the operators hired
Pinkertons to provoke the mines
into a riot, hoping that this would lead
to state military interven-
tion. In McBride's opinion, the
operators desired the military's pre-
sence in order to demoralize the miners
and break the strike.69
Whether or not the operators sought to
provoke an incident that
would invite military action, there is
no doubt that they eagerly
sought large numbers of troops to
protect their mines and
strikebreakers. The operators and the
CHV&T lobbied for a forceful
reaction from Governor Hoadly after the
Snake Hollow assault, and
65. AG Report, 79.
66. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike,"
84; Athens Messenger, December 25, 1884.
67. H. B. Payne to Governor Hoadly,
November 6, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
68. Lozier, "Hocking Vslley
Strike," 61, 83, 87, and 89.
69. Proceedings of Hocking Valley
Investigation, 314.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 53 |
|
the Republican press, led by the Ohio State Journal, queried, "Have we a Governor? Have we protection for life and property in Ohio?" when Governor Hoadly hesitated in sending troops into the Hocking Valley. The Journal added that state troops should have been pro- vided from the beginning of the strike, and that it was wrong for private citizens (ie., mine operators) to be forced to hire Pinkertons to do what the state had an obligation to do. This, claimed the Journal, was an "outrage."70 Claiming that the governor's delay in sending troops during an 1884 Cincinnati riot-a riot caused by a court's acquital of an ac- cused murderer-led to increased bloodshed and property destruc- tion, the Republican press attacked the governor: first, for delaying the introduction of troops into the valley, and second, for sending only 180 of the 350 men Sheriff McCarthy requested. Responsibility
70. Ohio State Journal, September 2 and 3, 1884; Cleveland Herald, September 3, 1884; Logan Republican Gazette, September 4, 1884. |
54 OHIO HISTORY
for any loss of life or property due to
inadequate troop strength,
warned the Athens Messenger, rested
solely with Governor Hoadly. 71
Except for Governor Hoadly's initial
indecision whether to send
the Guard and his premature mobilization
of the Guard at Co-
lumbus during the night of August 30-31,
he responded effectively
to the situation in the valley.72 The
manner in which he inter-
vened-both his trip to the valley and
his subsequent judicious use
of the Guard-demonstrated to the miners
that he was not a tool of
big business, but rather a man of
moderation whose primary goal
was to restore peace and order. The
governor's actions during the
strike, including his providing tents
for evicted families, indicate
that he was in fact sympathetic to the
plight of the miners.
Although the miners protested the
Guard's presence, they seemed
satisfied with the individual conduct of
the Guardsmen. Indeed, the
very absence of press coverage of the
Guard's activities during the
occupation indicates that the Guard
acted prudently. Not once did
the Guard openly clash with strikers,
nor did it injure any miners.
The Guard itself, however, suffered
three casualties during its
month-long occupation-one trooper died
of typhoid, a second was
accidentally shot and killed by another
Guardsman, and a third shot
himself in the leg.73
Commenting on the conduct of the Guard,
the pro-labor Hocking
Sentinel praised the departing Lancaster company on September
25:
They are friendly fellows and performed
not very agreeable work with
kindness. Though sympathizing with the
strikers, yet allegiance to their
State compelled them to erect
breastworks to protect life and property, and
the miners, realizing their situation,
treated them respectfully.74
Upon the withdrawal of the last troops
from the valley in October,
the Sentinel reiterated this
theme:
The soldiers acted as mild conservators
of the peace, protecting life and
property, respecting alike the rights of
miners and operators. They did no
harm. They imposed upon no one. They
insulted nobody ... they did their
duty in orderly, gentlemanly style,
leaving a kindly opinion upon the minds
of all with whom they came in contact.75
71. Ohio State Journal, September
2, 1884; Athens Messenger, September 4, 1884.
72. Ohio Eagle, September 11, 18,
1884; New Lexington Herald, September 11,
1884.
73. AG Report, 76.
74. Hocking Sentinel, September
25, 1884.
75. Hocking Sentinel, October 9,
1884.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 55
The Guardsmen, many of whom were common
workers, artisans,
and farmers, generally sympathized with
the plight of the strikers.
In fact, there were some fears that the
troops would perhaps be too
sympathetic. On September 1,
Superintendent Carr informed Gov-
ernor Hoadly that deputy Sheriff W. E.
Hamblin of Hocking County
desired two companies of reinforcements
from Columbus because
the troops the governor had sent were
largely from coal mining
regions, the implication being that they
would not be reliable. Carr
remarked, "I would add that
ex-Governor Young had bad results
during the RR Riots in 1877 with
companies from large RR
centers."76 On the same
day, a group of New Lexington citizens
telegraphed Governor Hoadly, suggesting
that the New Lexington
company be excused from service because
many of its members were
coal miners, including its commanding
officer, Captain James
Teal.77 Governor Hoadly
disregarded these warnings and decided to
employ the New Lexington company.
In fact, an examination of the available
Ohio National Guard
rosters for the years before or during
the strike shows that the New
Lexington company was actually the only
company out of the eight
that saw service in the valley that had
any miners at all. Even the
roster of the New Lexington company
listed only four miners, be-
sides Captain Teal.78 Eight other men
were listed as "laborers," a
title that could possibly include men
who worked at mines. Since the
company reported a strength of
thirty-three officers and men on
September 1, this would mean that miners
and mine workers could
have comprised, at most, 40 percent of
the company.79 Thus the fears
seem groundless. However, for some
unknown reason Governor
Hoadly was anxious to remove the New
Lexington company from
service as soon as possible. Despite its
excellent performance, the
company was relieved several days before
the withdrawal of any
other troops from the initial
contingent. Whether the governor
selected the New Lexington company for
early withdrawal because
of pressure from operators concerned
with its composition, or merely
by random choice in his urge to bring
the troops home as soon as
possible, is not known.80
76. George Carr to Governor Hoadly,
September 1, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
77. John W. Free, JF. McMahon, [?]
Thacker, [?] Hoffman to Governor Hoadly,
September 1, 1884, Records of AG.
78. Ohio. Records of the Ohio Adjutant
General's Office. Roster, 17th Ohio Nation-
al Guard Regiment, 1870-1904, Vol. 162,
Ohio Historical Society.
79. Morning Report, Company A,
Seventeenth Regiment, September 1, 1884. Re-
cords of AG.
80. Colonel Dill to Governor Hoadly,
September 4, 5, and 6, 1884, AG Report,
56 OHIO HISTORY
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the
Guard's intervention was
the decision concerning its withdrawal.
The longer the troops re-
mained, the greater their financial cost
to the state. On the other
hand, a premature withdrawal might lead
to renewed violence and
the necessity of once again committing
troops, with the risk of yet
another confrontation and perhaps even
greater expense. By the
time the Guard departed in early
October, the occupation had
already cost the state $14,575.78.81 In
addition, the Guardsmen, who
traditionally never enjoyed strike duty,
wearied quickly of service
and lamented lost wages they would have
earned on their civilian
jobs. Many of them began to petition for
relief after about two weeks
service. Since the Guardsmen received
full pay only during the first
seven days of service, after which they
received only half pay, they
naturally desired to return home to job
and families as soon as
possible.82 According to the Ohio
State Journal, the state, on the
other hand, preferred to maintain
individual units in the valley as
long as possible rather than rotate them
more frequently; because
fresh units would have to be given full
pay for their first seven days
of service, it was less expensive for
the state to retain an already
emplaced unit on service for more than
seven days.
Whether to remove the troops was not an
easy choice. The valley
was quiet and union officials promised
that it would remain so.
Military and police officials, on the
other hand, believed that vio-
lence might occur anew after the removal
of the militia, and the
events of the following months verified
their judgment. But as
General Finley had queried, how long
could the Guard remain in
the peaceful area? By mid-September,
newspapers of both political
parties were beginning to report the
cost the state had to bear in
order to keep idle soldiers in the
Hocking Valley.
Governor Hoadly, who had repeatedly
informed civilians and sol-
diers alike of his desire to make the
Guard's intervention as brief as
possible, decided to pull out the Guard
gradually in late September
and early October. This was probably the
wisest decision. The vio-
lence and destruction of property that
occurred from October 1884
through January 1885 was sporadic and
largely at a level that could
be controlled by local officials.
Considering the desperation of the
miners and their hostility towards the
operators, as well as the large
276-77; See also Hoadly to Dill,
September 3, 1884, Records of AG.
81. Ohio, Adjutant General's Report, 1885,
(Columbus, 1886), 55.
82. Colonel John C. Entreken to General
Ebenezer Finley, October 1, 1884, Re-
cords of AG.
Hocking Valley Coal Strike 57
number of potential targets, only a
long military occupation could
have prevented such attacks, an option
neither politically nor
economically feasible.
The proper function of the National
Guard in strike situations is
to restore peace, order, and civil
authority. Under the leadership of
Governor Hoadly, the Ohio National
Guard accomplished this quite
effectively. The Guard's intervention
resulted in the immediate res-
toration of peace and order and
succeeded in keeping violence and
property damage to a minimum. After an
uncertain start, Governor
Hoadly managed the Guard efficiently;
under his direction, its in-
volvement was brief and its
peacekeeping efforts moderate. Unlike
many publicized instances in which
civil authorities blatantly used
state forces to crush strikes, Ohio's
Governor Hoadly did an admir-
able job of utilizing the Ohio National
Guard in an impartial man-
ner in the Hocking Valley strike of
1884.
ANDREW BIRTLE
Governor George Hoadly's Use of the
Ohio National Guard in the Hocking
Valley Coal Strike of 1884
During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the
United State experienced a large number
of labor strikes that in-
volved outbreaks of violence. While the
causes of this violence are
both numerous and varied, some students
of labor history cite the
intervention of police forces as a major
catalyst.1 Indeed, the list of
clashes between police and labor during
this period is long. In many
studies of strikes and industrial
violence, the police and military
forces called in to protect life and
property are depicted as partisan
forces which worked to aid industry
against labor. The extent to
which the police are viewed in this
manner varies from author to
author. Some, such as H. M. Gitelman and
John Fitch, argue that
while police forces often acted as
adversaries of labor, they were also
at times neutral and completely non
partisan. Others, such as
Samuel Yellen and Sidney Lens, tend to
view government and its
police forces as having been actively
allied with business against
labor. Lens goes so far as to make the
accusation that
In reality, however, the lawlessness was
usually created by the troops and
by the government's own denial of civil
liberties. The real purpose, thinly
disguised in phrases of
"impartiality," was to aid management in emascu-
lating unions.2
Andrew J. Birtle is a Ph.D. candidate in
American Military History at The Ohio
State University.
1. Philip Taft and Philip Ross,
"American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character
and Outcome," The History of
Violence in America, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and
Ted Robert Gurr, (New York, 1969), 281
(hereafter cited as Taft and Ross. "American
Labor Violence"); H. M. Gitelman,
"Perspectives in American Industrial Violence,"
Business History Review, 47 (Spring, 1973), 10, 17, 19, 20.
2. Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars, (Garden
City, N.J., 1973), 6; See also Samuel
Yellen, American Labor Struggles, ((New
York, 1936).