Ohio History Journal

JOHN OFFNER

 

President McKinley's Final Attempt to

Avoid War With Spain

 

By April 1, 1898, war between the United States and Spain seemed

certain. Rebellious Republican congressmen had forced President

William McKinley's diplomatic pace by threatening to join Democrats

in declaring war, and were kept in line only by promises that the pres-

ident would shortly turn over the Cuban issue to Congress. McKinley

had informed the Spanish government of his terms for a settlement,

and Madrid's March 31 response was unsatisfactory. Although dip-

lomatic relations were not yet ruptured, negotiations on both sides

were suspended, as McKinley prepared to ask Congress to authorize

military intervention. During the first ten days of April, however,

there was a final attempt to maintain peace. By April 5 McKinley was

working with the Vatican, the Spanish Queen Regent, Great Britain,

and the Cuban Junta to find a means to calm the American public

and stave off congressional action. An examination of McKinley's last

effort to keep the peace sheds light on his Spanish diplomacy, his re-

lations with the Cuban Junta, and the role of Congress in the crisis.1

 

 

 

 

John Offner is Professor of History at Shippensburg University.

 

1. Because the McKinley administration decided on April 1 to intervene militarily

in Cuba, historians have provided a variety of explanations for the diplomatic events

which occurred during the following ten-day period. Authors have usually explained

the initiatives of the Vatican, the appeals of the European powers, and the last-minute

Spanish proclamation of a suspension of hostilities as only tangentially associated with

McKinley's diplomacy. Philip Foner also included the Cubans, but he did not see

them as playing a meaningful part. For contemporary interpretations of this period, see:

Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, 1959), 178-87; Ernest R. May, Im-

perial Democracy; The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York, 1961),

151-58; H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Over-

seas Expansion (New York, 1965), 54-60; Julius W. Pratt, "The Coming War with

Spain," in Paola E. Coletta, ed., Threshold to American Internationalism: Essays on the

Foreign Policies of William McKinley (New York, 1970), 56-62; Philip S. Foner, The

Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902, 2

vols. (New York, 1972), 1:254-61; Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of Ameri-

can Foreign Relations, 1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 262-74; Lewis L. Gould, The Presi-

dency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980), 81-86; and David F. Trask, The

War with Spain in 1898 (New York, 1981), 40-52.

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126                                                 OHIO HISTORY

 

The initiative for a new attempt to keep the peace came from Eu-

rope. In late March, while negotiations between the United States

and Spain were at a crucial stage, Pope Leo XIII requested Archbish-

op John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota, to go to Washington, D.C., to

try to arrange arbitration of the U.S.S. Maine incident and to prevent

the United States from intervening in Cuba. Cardinal Rampolla, Vati-

can Secretary of State, informed Ireland that the Pope would use his

influence in Madrid for peace. The Vatican chose Ireland for this

important mission because he was the most prominent Republican

Catholic leader.² Coming from Minnesota, Ireland was also known to

Cushman K. Davis, Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Re-

lations Committee, and having been educated in France, Ireland was

a friend of Jules Cambon, France's ambassador to the United States.

By the time Ireland got to the White House on April 1, McKinley's

aides were already preparing a message to Congress, tentatively

scheduled for delivery April 4, requesting authority to use force.

Nevertheless, the president reviewed for Ireland his peace propos-

als, which Spain had just rejected. He said that Spain must either

sell Cuba for a large price or offer an armistice to the Cubans. If

Madrid granted an armistice, negotiations must follow between Spain

and the Cuban insurgents to bring peace; and if direct talks failed,

Spain must accept McKinley as the final arbiter, relying upon his

sense of justice and honor to end the dispute. Failure by Spain to act,

McKinley concluded, would result in war with the United States.³

Because the White House was under constant press surveillance, it

was decided that in the future Ireland would meet with an interme-

diary representing the McKinley administration. Republican Senator

Stephen B. Elkins of West Virginia was chosen as Ireland's contact,

and many of the following meetings took place at his home.

Spain's handling of McKinley's initial message relayed through the

Vatican further diminished prospects for peace. Ireland's cable to

the Vatican stated that McKinley wished "peace and help to obtain

it." Cardinal Rampolla passed this to the Spanish government which

 

 

2. John T. Farrell, "Archbishop Ireland and Manifest Destiny," Catholic Histori-

cal Review, 33 (October, 1947), 269-301. Farrell stated that Ireland destroyed his corre-

spondence with the Vatican and other papers relating to his mission to Washington.

The John Ireland Papers, Archdiocesan Archives of St. Paul, Minnesota, however,

contain a complete set of telegrams exchanged between Ireland and Cardinal Rampol-

la, as well as other documents, the most important of which is a journal kept by Sena-

tor Stephen Elkins. These papers have recently been microfilmed by the Minnesota

Historical Society. See also James H. Moynihan, The Life of Archbishop John Ireland

(New York, 1953), 162-68.

3. Ireland to Rampolla, Washington, April 1, 1898, Ireland Papers.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                                  127

 

publicly announced on April 3 that the American president had peti-

tioned the Pope to request Spain to provide an armistice in Cuba. Al-

though the Spanish ministry welcomed the Pope's mediation, it

added the qualification that the United States must agree to with-

draw its fleet from Cuban waters which would signal that it was not

supporting the Cuban insurrection either "voluntarily or involuntar-

ily."⁴ Madrid's public posturing must have provided further evi-

dence to McKinley that the Spanish government was neither serious

nor could be trusted.

Nevertheless, Ireland was building up momentum for renewed

negotiations. In a busy round of Washington calls, Ireland visit-

ed Chairman Davis and other senators, Ambassador Cambon, and

Spanish Minister Luis Polo de Bernabe. In every instance, Ireland

was greeted with pessimism, but the outcome of all these talks was a

decision to place additional pressure on the Madrid government to is-

sue an armistice. During the first meeting between Ireland, Elkins and

the Spanish minister, Sunday morning, April 3, Polo de Bernabe ob-

jected to all aspects of McKinley's diplomatic program, but especial-

ly to the president's serving as an arbiter between Spain and the Cu-

ban insurgents. At Polo de Bernabe's insistance, Ireland and Elkins

dropped this point. The Spanish minister then agreed to urge his

government to propose a six-month armistice. Ireland promised to ask

Pope Leo XIII to make a similar appeal to Madrid, and in a later meet-

ing Combon consented to have Paris also request Spain to grant an ar-

mistice. In addition, Ireland counseled the Vatican to urge Spain to

separate the U.S.S. Maine issue from that of Cuba by offering third-

party binding arbitration and promising complete satisfaction of all

legitimate costs. Having done this, the Spanish government should

appeal to Washington in the name of humanity to accept these con-

cessions.⁵

Initially, McKinley did not have much hope for Ireland's efforts.

Elkins reported that the president thought time had run out and

 

 

 

4. Stewart L. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April 3, 1898, Department of State,

Foreign Relations, 1898 (Washington, D.C., 1901), 732; Ireland to John J. Keane, St.

Paul, May 28, 1898, Denis J. O'Connell Papers, Diocese Archives, Richmond, Va.

Ireland stated that after Rome mishandled his first telegram, McKinley became more

cautious in his relations with Ireland.

5. Stephen B. Elkins Journal, April 3, 1898, Stephen B. Elkins Papers, West Virginia

University Library, Morgantown, W. Va.; Luis Polo de Bernabe to Pio Gullon, Wash-

ington, April 4, 1898, Documentos presentados a las cortes en la legislatura de 1898 por

el ministro de estado, 3 vols., (Madrid, 1898), 1:163; Cambon to Gabriel Hanotaux,

Washington, April 4, 1898, Documents diplomatiquesfrancais, 1871-1914, 41 vols., (Par-

is, 1929-59), ie serie (1898), 14:196-97.

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128                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

Spain would neither respond to the Vatican nor to the European pow-

ers. The president was "fatigued" and not "much interested" in

Ireland's activities. When Elkins informed McKinley during the eve-

ning of April 3 that the Pope had requested the Spanish Queen Re-

gent, Maria Cristina, to grant an armistice, the president responded

that the Cuban insurgents would refuse it, and the war would contin-

ue. McKinley explained that John J. McCook, a New York attorney

who was associated with the Cuban Junta concerning a possible float

of Cuban bonds, had already assured him that the Cubans would

reject an armistice. Elkins replied that if the United States entered a

war as a result of Cuban intransigence, it should annex the island,

and promised to meet McCook the next day.⁶

On Monday morning, April 4, Elkins repeated to McCook the

tough line which he had laid before McKinley. He warned that

without an effective armistice, Congress would declare war, and the

Cuban revolutionaries would bear the consequences of American mil-

itary intervention. If the Cubans rejected a Spanish armistice and a

costly war with Spain ensued, the United States would annex Cuba,

Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands. For the Cuban insurgents to

gain recognition of their provisional government, they should choose

peace over war. McCook replied that the Cubans only asked the

United States to recognize the independence of Cuba and that they

would not accept a Spanish armistice. He agreed, however, to relay

Elkins' warning to the Cuban leaders.⁷

On Monday evening, events for the first time took a positive turn.

Cardinal Rampolla cabled Ireland that the Queen Regent had con-

sented to the Pope's request and had agreed to a "suspension of

arms." At the same time she wanted the Pope to persuade McKinley

to withdraw the United States fleet from Cuban waters, which

would facilitate Madrid's action by helping to calm Spanish public

opinion.⁸

Ireland immediately took Rampolla's message to Assistant Secre-

tary of State William R. Day, whom McKinley had designated to

handle the Cuban issue. Following White House discussions, Ire-

land replied to the Vatican that he had obtained "all possible in-

formation," but warned Rampolla that he could not speak for the

 

 

 

 

6. Elkins Journal, April 3, 1898, Elkins Papers. Paul S. Holbo, "The Convergence of

Moods and the Cuban-Bond 'Conspiracy' of 1898," The Journal of American History,

55 (June, 1968), 63-66.

7. Ibid., April 4, 1898.

8. Rampolla to Ireland, Rome, April 4, 1898, Ireland Papers.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                         129

 

president or the United States government. Ireland explained that

McKinley had to be extremely careful in his relations with Congress

which threatened the peace. He could not at this time recall the

navy, since this would be certain to irritate Congress. If Spain granted

an armistice, however, Washington then could withdraw the ships

since they would not be needed. An additional reason for transfer-

ring the fleet was exposure to yellow fever. Ireland urged Spain to

trust the American government and to issue an immediate and uncon-

ditional armistice. Moreover, Washington would take steps to get the

Cuban insurgents to accept the armistice. McKinley was preparing to

deliver his message to Congress on Wednesday, April 6, and al-

though he would detail the continuing conflict in Cuba and Spain's

failure to end it, he would not ask for Cuban independence. The

president believed that Congress would debate his message, which

would provide some additional time to arrange a settlement. If Spain

proclaimed an armistice, McKinley promised to inform Congress. In a

quick follow-up message to Rampolla, Ireland added that the United

States Navy was stationed in Key West, an American harbor, not Cu-

ban waters, and that Spain was unreasonable in asking the American

government to recall naval ships from its own ports.⁹

The next day, April 5, Stewart L. Woodford, United States Minis-

ter to Madrid, asked McKinley if the president would sustain the

Queen Regent by preventing "hostile" congressional action if she ac-

ceded to the Pope's request to "proclaim [an] immediate and uncon-

ditional suspension of hostilities." Fighting would end as soon as the

Cuban insurgents accepted the armistice which would last for six

months. The Queen's request did not provide for McKinley to arbi-

trate differences at the end of the six-month period, but it did fore-

see discussions between the Spanish government and the Cuban in-

surgents to achieve "permanent and honorable peace."10

McKinley's reply to the Queen Regent was guarded. Appreciative

of her efforts to maintain peace, he refused to "assume to influence

the action of the American Congress" beyond transmitting the issue

to it the next day and recommending "necessary and expedient" ac-

tions. If Spain offered an armistice, he would inform Congress. 11

Having responded cautiously to Madrid, McKinley began a major

effort to attempt to use the impending armistice to prevent war. The

first sign that McKinley was taking new steps came during the after-

 

 

 

9. Ireland to Rampolla, Washington, April 5, 1898, Ibid.

10. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April 5, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 734-35.

11. Day to Woodford, Washington, April 5, 1898, Ibid., 735.

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130                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

noon of April 5 when Assistant Secretary Day met with British

Ambassador Julian Pauncefote to approve the test of a joint note

which the six Great Powers (Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia,

Austria-Hungary, and Italy) would present to the president. The pos-

sibility of joint diplomatic action had been considered for some time,

but some European nations were unwilling to act unless the United

States government approved in advance. Day now agreed to a joint

note and explained to Pauncefote that a collective message from the

Great Powers would help to calm public opinion. The note, which

Day edited, requested American moderation, humanity, and contin-

uation of negotiations.¹² Day expected the European powers to pres-

ent it to McKinley on the next day, April 6, but due to a delay in

getting authorization from St. Petersburg, the diplomats actually read

their message to McKinley at noon on April 7.

With the European powers concerting their action, McKinley on

the evening of April 5 met with several key cabinet advisers, includ-

ing Day, Attorney General John Griggs, Secretary of the Navy John

Long, and Secretary of the Interior Cornelius Bliss. To prepare them

for the renewal of negotiations with Spain, he showed them

a telegram from Woodford, indicating that the Queen Regent was

about to proclaim an immediate and unconditional suspension of hos-

tilities.13

The next morning, April 6, McKinley received a message from Fitz-

hugh Lee, United States consul general in Havana, asking for a delay

until April 11 in submitting the presidential message to Congress. Lee

cautioned that Americans in Cuba were in danger and needed time

to leave the island. McKinley again gathered several cabinet officers,

this time including Day, Griggs, Long, and Russell Alger, Secretary of

War. After deciding to honor Lee's request, McKinley sent for six key

congressional figures: Senators Davis, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Wil-

liam Frye, all Republicans from the Foreign Relations Committee,

and Nelson Dingley, Joseph Cannon, and Robert Adams, all Repub-

lican House leaders. Surrounded by the key cabinet and congres-

sional members, McKinley declared flatly that he would hold his

message until April 11. There was no hint that the president had any-

thing else in mind other than the safety of American citizens. Since

Secretary Long argued against the delay, reasoning that American

 

 

 

12. Julian Pauncefote to Lord Salisbury, Washington, April 5, 1898, Foreign Office 5,

2365, Public Record Office, London.

13. John D. Long, Journal, April 5, 1898, John D. Long Papers, Massachusetts His-

torical Society, Boston.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                              131

citizens would have ample time to leave the island while Congress debated the message, it appears that McKinley kept his cabinet members as much in the dark as the congressional leaders about the negotiations which were already in progress. The congressional delegation returned to Capitol Hill and secured the delay McKinley wanted. 14 At the same time that McKinley was dealing with the Queen Re- gent, the European Powers, his cabinet, and Congress, the president was placing pressure on the Cuban Junta. There is no record of the messages he sent, but from the sharp and angry reactions, one may infer what was said. In New York City, Horatio S. Rubens, legal rep- resentative of the Cuban Junta, called in newspaper reporters on April 5 and emotionally denounced "peace-at-any-price" "financial men" who proposed United States action without recognizing Cuban inde- pendence. The United States, he charged, would intervene in Cuba     14. Ibid., April 6, 1898; John L. Offner, "President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-American War," (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1957), 327-28; George B. Cortelyou, Diary, April 6, 1898, George B. Cortelyou Papers, Library of Con- gress, Washington, D.C.

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132                                           OHIO HISTORY

 

and annex or sell the island, as well as Puerto Rico and the Philip-

pines, to cover the costs of war with Spain and an indemnity for the

Maine. In a highly charged scene, Rubens reminded the reporters of

Cuba's sacrifices in blood and money. Vowing that the Cuban people

would not be treated like cattle and passed along as property with

the title of the island, he said Cubans would rather be exterminated

fighting for independence than "betrayed and sold like slaves." Cu-

bans would not cooperate, and Rubens predicted that the American

people would not volunteer to fight for such a program. The next af-

ternoon Rubens told reporters that the McKinley administration was

attempting to get the Junta to give up independence and to accept an

armistice to be followed by autonomy under the Spanish flag. Mc-

Kinley, Rubens explained, would ask Congress for power to intervene

in Cuba, but not to direct him to do so, which would provide time

for Cuba to come to terms with Spain, thus allowing Washington and

Madrid to keep the peace. Rubens warned that the Cuban govern-

ment and army "would reject absolutely intervention by the United

States unless it should be preceded by a recognition of the inde-

pendence" of Cuba. If the United States interfered without recogni-

tion, Rubens predicted, the United States army sent to Cuba would

have to fight the Cuban army. Rubens ended on a calmer note by

saying that he did not believe this would happen, since the Ameri-

can people would not deprive the Cubans of their independence

against their will.¹⁵

The Junta's representatives in Washington were more cautious than

Rubens, since they did not want to alienate congressional support.

Tomas Estrada Palma, Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party,

and Gonzalo de Quesada, charge d'affaires of the Cuban gov-

ernment approved, Ruben's position, but toned down the language.

Palma explained to reporters that since the Cubans already were free

of Spanish control, all they wanted was recognition of their inde-

pendence. They would resist any "interference intended to compel

them to pay a new allegiance to the sovereignty of Spain." Should

Spain grant an armistice, and if this were coupled with an American

recognition of Cuban independence and the Cuban Republic, Palma

believed that the Cubans would accept it.¹⁶ In effect, it was up to the

American government to provide conditions which would enable the

Spanish initiative to bring peace to Cuba.

 

 

15. New York Times, April 5, 6, 1898; Horatio S. Rubens, Liberty: The Story of Cuba

(New York, 1932), 332-38.

16. New York Times, April 7, 8, 1898.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                            133

 

Cuban resistance to McKinley's plans came at the same time that

his diplomatic representative in Spain blundered, resulting in a delay

in Madrid. On the evening of April 6 Prime Minister Praxedes M.

Sagasta called his cabinet together to approve the granting of a sus-

pension of hostilities. While the cabinet was in session, Woodford

sent a note into the meeting demanding action by midnight. He erro-

neously believed that McKinley had already sent his message to

Congress. Woodford was trying to speed up the Spanish process, but

instead his ultimatum placed the Spanish ministry in an untenable

position. Meeting to honor the Pope's appeal, it suddenly found that

if it proclaimed a suspension of hostilities, it would appear to be sur-

rendering to an American ultimatum. Angered, Sagasta's cabinet dis-

banded and haughtily declared that Spain's policy remained un-

changed. Cardinal Rampolla characterized Woodford's ultimatum as

an "unpardonable indiscretion," and Ireland reported that further

Spanish delay produced "great anxiety" in the White House. Cam-

bon speculated that if the Spanish armistice and the European joint

note had coincided on April 7, that McKinley could have prevented

war. In Madrid, Woodford tried to undo the damage, and on April 7,

he withdrew his note from the record.¹⁷

Despite the delay, McKinley continued to pressure the Cubans.

The president and Elkins met repeatedly with McCook, who prom-

ised McKinley that he would do all he could to influence the Cubans

to accept the armistice. Elkins characterized these sessions as Mc-

Kinley placing "his hand upon [McCook] gently and firmly ... to get

the insurgents to agree to the armistice." Although McKinley

thought the Cubans would cooperate, he refused to guarantee their

position to Madrid. Ireland was more forthcoming, telling Rampolla

that Washington believed the "insurgents [would] accept the armis-

tice."¹⁸

On April 9 the Papal Nuncio in Madrid cabled Rampolla that Spain

had granted an armistice. When the news reached the White House

that evening, McKinley was "delighted." Both Elkins and McCook

went to the White House where they discussed with McKinley the

"probabilities" of the Cubans accepting it.19

 

17. Woodford to Day, Madrid, April 6, 7, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 743-44;

Rampolla to Ireland, Rome, April 8, 1898, and Ireland to Rampolla, Washington, April

7, 1898, Ireland Papers; Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington, April 9, 1898, N. S. 21,

Espagne, Archives, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris.

18. Elkins Journal, April 8, 1898, Elkins Papers; Ireland to Rampolla, Washington,

April 9, 1898, Ireland Papers.

19. Elkins Journal, April 9, 1898, Elkins Papers; Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington,

April 10, 1898, N. S. 21, Espagne, Archives, Paris.

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134                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

Easter Sunday, April 10, was a day of intense administration activi-

ty. Throughout the entire day and even after midnight McKinley met

with advisers in a last-minute attempt to prevent war. Day was at the

White House early in the morning and was the last person to leave

that night. McKinley met with his full cabinet twice, once in the af-

ternoon and again in the evening, the total time of the cabinet meet-

ings coming to nearly six hours. The length of these meetings sug-

gests that the cabinet had difficulty reaching a consensus on how to

treat the Spanish move and especially what to recommend to Con-

gress.²⁰

One of the problems that occurred during the day was a Spanish

request for guidance on the terms to end hostilities in Cuba. The

Spanish ministry had authorized General Ramon Blanco in Havana

to make a proclamation but left the details up to him. Blanco in turn

asked Polo de Bernabe for instructions and if the United States gov-

ernment had any views which might guide him. Blanco was prob-

ably puzzled about how to stop the fighting and was seeking Amer-

ican assistance. Polo de Bernabe presented this request in the

morning to Day, who replied that he had no authority other than the

telegram sent to Madrid on March 29. This asked for an armistice to

last until October 1, and if there was no settlement, the president

would arbitrate. Angrily, Polo de Bernabe replied that Spain had al-

ready rejected that procedure. After Polo de Bernabe left the State

Department, Day immediately wrote a memorandum of conversation

which he sent to the Spanish legation, and showed to McKinley,

who approved his stand. Polo de Bernabe later bitterly complained

to Elkins that the State Department wanted every concession but did

nothing but disappoint Spain. He characterized Day's position as "all

wrong, undiplomatic" and putting him "in a wrong position before

his government." Elkins got Day to withdraw his memorandum of

conversation, which calmed Polo de Bernabe, but did nothing to an-

swer Blanco's request.²1

During the rest of the day Polo de Bernabe prepared a long mes-

sage which he gave to Day that evening. In it he set forth all the posi-

tive steps Spain had taken to meet United States demands culminat-

ing in the issuance of an immediate suspension of hostilities. As for

the future, the Cubans could expect to obtain "whatever changes

they may justly desire, within the bounds of reason and of the na-

 

 

20. New York Times, April 11, 1898.

21. Day, Memorandum, April 10, 1898, William R. Day Papers, Library of Congress,

Washington, D.C.; Elkins Journal, April 10, 1898, Elkins Papers.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                         135

 

tional sovereignty."²² In effect, Spain still clung to sovereignty over

Cuba and autonomy for the island.

At the same time that McKinley was dealing with the Spanish

minister, he made a final attempt to get the Cuban Junta to cooper-

ate. Rubens later explained that just before McKinley's message went

to Congress, the president's emissary told him that if the Cubans

agreed to the armistice, McKinley would place a reference to Cuban

independence in his message. If they refused, there would be no

mention of independence, and Rubens rejected this half measure.

McCook reported to Elkins that the Junta had decided to wait to see

what Congress would do, for it might recognize Cuban independ-

ence as well as declare war on Spain. If war came, the United States

would expel the Spanish and give Cuba its independence. If Con-

gress took no action on McKinley's message, McCook explained, the

Junta would then attempt to come to terms with Madrid and was

considering paying Spain an indemnity of up to $200 million to obtain

its independence.²³ Thus, the Cubans at this time would accept

nothing less than independence, while Spain still provided only au-

tonomy.

The major question before McKinley's cabinet was whether to ask

Congress for an additional delay in order to determine what effect

Blanco's action would have on Cuban events, an issue highlighted

by Woodford, who cabled McKinley recommending continuation of

negotiations. Woodford believed the Spanish government had gone

as far and as fast as it could and predicted that if Spain were not

humiliated, it would provide before August 1 a settlement either

through autonomy acceptable to the insurgents, complete independ-

ence, or cession of the island to the United States.²⁴

McKinley's cabinet labored through the afternoon and evening at-

tempting to reach consensus. First it took up the draft message to

Congress which Day and Griggs had authored and which had been

agreed upon earlier. This was reapproved without any change of text.

The cabinet divided, however, over how to treat Spain's ending of

hostilities. At one point McKinley's cabinet decided to ask Congress

to delay action. McKinley then met with a delegation of Republican

senators, among them Chairman Davis. When the senators learned

that the president planned to request a delay, they argued strenuous-

 

 

 

22. Polo de Bernabe to John Sherman, Washington, April 10, 1898, Foreign Rela-

tions, 1898, 747-49.

23. Rubens, Liberty, 337-38; Elkins Journal, April 11, 1898, Elkins Papers.

24. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April 10, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 747.

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136                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

ly against it. They asserted that his action would divide the Repub-

lican Party, and that failure to act now would lead to a Republican

defeat in the coming November elections. After a long discussion,

McKinley gave ground and modified his message so that Congress

would have the responsibility of deciding how to respond to the

Spanish armistice.²⁵ The president finally settled on these addition-

al words for his message to Congress: "The Queen Regent of Spain

[has directed] General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate

peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities .... [which] will, I am

sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations

upon which you are about to enter.^"26 In essence, McKinley's at-

tempt to keep the peace had ended. Unable to bring the Spanish

and Cubans together, he was unsuccessful in convincing the congres-

sional leadership that he should continue his efforts.

This day-to-day account shows that during April McKinley made

a serious and coordinated effort to keep the peace. When he came to

believe that the Queen Regent might issue an armistice, he moved

quickly on a broad front to encourage her. He tried to stop the fight-

ing in Cuba, which he thought would keep Congress from declaring

war on Spain. It is remarkable that he entrusted highly confidential

and potentially damaging messages to the Vatican, particularly since

the Pope favored Spain, and Madrid used his first message to em-

barrass him. Nevertheless, through the Vatican backchannel, Mc-

Kinley dropped his demand for presidential arbitration, gave assur-

ances about transferring the fleet, promised not to recognize Cuban

independence, and volunteered to pressure the Cuban Junta.

Although McKinley asked Spain to provide an armistice, the Span-

ish government spoke of ending hostilities, and eventually pro-

claimed a suspension of them. The difference in wording between an

armistice and a suspension of hostilities may be seen as a substantive

issue dividing the American and Spanish governments.²⁷ Madrid's

suspension suggested continued non-recognition of the Cuban insur-

gents, while Washington's armistice implied negotiation and agree-

ment with the rebels upon the terms of ending the rebellion. Al-

though Spain announced as early as April 5 that it was considering

 

 

 

25. Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington, April 11 and 12, 1898, N. S. 22, Espagne, Ar-

chives, Paris; Polo de Bernabe to Gullon. Washington, April 10, 1898, Documentos

presentados de 1898, 1:171-72.

26. McKinley, Message to the Congress of the United States, April 11, 1898, Foreign

Relations, 1898, 760.

27. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley, 83.

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McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War                         137

 

ending hostilities and did not use during the following days the

word armistice, American officials never objected. Woodford, who

was closest to the Spanish, did not draw any distinction between an

armistice and a suspension of hostilities, and in his cables used the

terms synonymously. Day also made no objection, and there was

none recorded from McKinley or his cabinet officers. Rampolla also

used the term armistice to describe Spain's suspension of hostilities,

and Ireland always referred to Spain's action as an armistice. Since

American officials did not rebuke Madrid for its proposal and even

welcomed the announcement when it came, it appears that a differ-

ence of substance over Madrid's means of terminating hostilities in

Cuba did not exist. After all, the essential point for McKinley was to

stop the fighting in Cuba, which he hoped would prevent a congres-

sional declaration of war; the diplomatic realities and final arrang-

ements would follow in direct talks between the Spanish and the Cu-

bans over the future of the island.

Having encouraged Spain to provide an armistice, the president

became committed to seeing that Madrid's action brought peace in

America, which was a more difficult task. A major problem for Mc-

Kinley was trying to persuade the Cuban insurgents to stop fighting.

From the start he realized that an armistice would succeed only if

the Cubans accepted it, and that the Cuban price for cooperation

was United States recognition of the island's independence. Never-

theless, McKinley refused recognition and chose instead to threaten

the Cuban leaders, a stance quite in contrast to his sympathetic sup-

port of the Spanish Queen Regent. Underlying McKinley's hard-line

was his conviction that the Cubans were unfit to govern the island.

He believed the insurgents lacked a government as defined by inter-

national practice and that they could not restore order which was es-

sential to protect and promote American interests. Moreover, he op-

posed placing United States armed forces in the position of

intervening on the island as an ally of Cuba or subject to Cuban sov-

ereignty.²⁸ The president's low opinion of the Cubans and his policy

of coercion rather than recognition foreshadowed a troubled future

in Cuban-American relations.

McKinley delayed congressional action as long as he could. He en-

couraged the Great Powers to present a joint appeal to continue nego-

tiations in an effort to calm public opinion. Due to Woodford's inept-

ness, the Spanish ministry postponed suspending hostilities. By April

 

 

28. Ibid., 756-59.

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138                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

10, even though the details were still unknown, the Cuban insurgents

had rejected Madrid's initiative. As a result McKinley gained little

support in Congress, and although the president believed that Spain

should be given more time, he no longer could prevent congressional

action. Actually, the struggle between the president and Congress

over Cuban policy was rooted in the constitutional system. Congress

had the power to declare war, and at this turn in foreign affairs, it was

prepared to do it. By April 11 the control of policy passed from

McKinley to Congress, and the Spanish suspension of hostilities

made little difference.

Thus, McKinley's last attempts to prevent war failed. Spain's initia-

tive did not come soon enough or go far enough to win over either

Congress or the Cubans; and the former asserted its constitutional

right to vote for war. It is ironical that Spain gained international sym-

pathy and moral support for its actions, while the president has been

criticized for going to war after Madrid ordered a suspension of hos-

tilities in Cuba. After all, without McKinley's efforts there would

have been no Spanish proclamation prior to his message to Congress.

Moreover, he could have refused to work with the Vatican or cut his

ties with Archbishop Ireland when the Spanish cabinet on April 3

sought to embarrass him through his association with the Pope. It

would have been easy on April 6 for McKinley to have turned over

the Cuban issue to Congress and never have had to worry about

Madrid's last-minute suspension of hostilities. It is remarkable that

McKinley's strenuous attempts to keep the peace, after many around

him had given up, resulted in lasting criticism of his presidency.

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