Ohio History Journal

BRIAN M. LINN

 

Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National

Guard and the Railroad Strike of 1877

 

The employment of the Ohio National Guard at Newark during the

railroad strike of 1877 represents an effective use of military force dur-

ing a potentially explosive labor dispute. In contrast to West Virginia,

Maryland, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana, the state au-

thorities of Ohio did not have to call on federal troops to enforce civil

authority. During the strike, relations between the militia and strikers

were not characterized by the violence that occurred in such cities

as Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Martinsburg between strikers and Na-

tional Guardsmen. Historian Robert W. Bruce, whose book is one of

the few treatments of the 1877 strike, attributed this lack of violence

to factors outside the state itself:

Ohio got off lightly for two reasons. Tie-ups to the east made it pointless to

break the freight blockage by force. And the examples of Baltimore, Read-

ing, Buffalo, and above all, Pittsburgh, made it seem wise not to try.1

Such an explanation gives inadequate recognition to the part played

by the Ohio National Guard in reducing domestic disorder. In Balti-

more, Reading, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh the use of state troops to re-

store order led to bloody street battles between soldiers and strik-

ers. In Ohio, the very opposite appears true. Called up on July 20,

within a day of the strike at Newark, the Guardsmen showed "an in-

telligent appreciation of the delicate circumstances" in which they

were placed.² As one Guardsman noted:

Our policy has been to keep in the back as much as possible .... We under-

stand our duty as "citizen soldiers" and we return to our homes with the

 

 

Brian M. Linn is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The Ohio State University. An

earlier version of this paper was presented at the spring 1984 conference of the Ohio

Academy of History.

 

1. Robert W. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (Indianapolis, Ind., 1959), 203.

2. Ohio, Executive Documents, Annual Reports for 1877 Made to the Sixty-Third

General Assembly of the State of Ohio at the Regular Session Commencing January 7,

1878, Part 2, "Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the Governor of the State of

Ohio," 465. Hereafter cited as "Adjutant General's Annual Report."

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172                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

consciousness of having done our duty, shown more forcibly by the fact that

we have prevented bloodshed, which is the best evidence of our power.³

In Ohio the strike of 1877 began on Wednesday, July 18, when fire-

men and brakemen stopped the 10 P.M. freight out of Newark. New-

ark was the headquarters of the Baltimore and Ohio R.R.'s Trans-

Ohio Division and a central point for the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and

St. Louis Railroad (better known as the "Panhandle" line) as well as

several trunk lines. The Newark railroad yards covered some ten

acres and contained a variety of repair shops, roundhouses, and slid-

ing tracks. About 10 percent of Newark's population were employed

either in the yards or on the train lines and the strikers could count

on strong community support throughout the strike.⁴ Like strikers in

other areas, the Newark men hoped to avoid federal intervention to

protect the mails. They thus allowed passenger and mail cars to go

through, but ran all freight trains onto sidings.

By early Thursday morning, July 19, railroad officials in Ohio were

attempting to enlist both local and state authorities to break the

strike. The railroads argued, and the authorities agreed, that while it

was legal for employees to refuse to work at reduced wages, it was not

legal for them to occupy railroad property or prevent other men from

working. The problem was whether this legal technicality could be

observed in the face of the determined strikers at Newark.

It soon became apparent that the local authorities in Newark could

not break the strike or even protect men who wanted to work. The

strikers controlled the railroad yards at Newark and ignored Samuel

H. Schofield, the sheriff of Licking County, when he ordered them

to disperse. The railroad officials who called at the State House in

Columbus had little better luck. Neither Governor Thomas Young

nor Adjutant General Charles Karr were in Columbus, and the offi-

cials had to talk with Rodney Foos, the Governor's secretary. Foos

telegraphed the Governor for instructions, but Young refused to do

anything beyond returning to Columbus that night.⁵

 

 

3. Ohio State Journal, 27 July 1877.

4. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 572; "Memorandum Taken From the Dia-

ry of Frank Dennis, Engineer, at Newark Divison-for the year 1877," Garret Hayes

Coleman Collection, MSS 105, Ohio Historical Society, henceforth referred to as

"Dennis Diary"; Columbus Dispatch, 19 July 1877; Ohio State Journal, 20 July 1877;

Dayton Daily Journal, 23 July 1877.

5. Rodney Foos to Governor Young; Governor Young to Rodney Foos, Telegraphic

Correspondence 19 July 1877, MSS 158, Ohio Historical Society. This collection con-

sists of copies of telegraphic correspondence, often without proper identification or

time noted, dealing with the strike of 1877. Referred to hereafter as MSS 158. See also

Columbus Dispatch, 19 July 1877.

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Pretty Scaly Times                                              173

On Friday, July 20, Sheriff Schofield again attempted to clear the strikers from the railroad yards at Newark. The strikers ignored Schofield's reading of the Riot Act and stopped another freight train. Consequently, just before noon Schofield telegraphed Gover- nor Young: Striking brakemen of B. & O. have gathered in crowds and refuse to allow trains to depart. They intimidate willing men with threats and if this fails use force. I have no forces of militia under my control and assistance I have is to- tally inadequate to preserve peace and property. I must beg you at once to send troops to this point and disperse the mob.6 Governor Young acquiesced and at 1:00 P.M. ordered the captains of four Ohio National Guard companies to mobilize their commands         6. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 582; Columbus Dispatch, 20 July 1877. There are conflicting accounts of whether violence was actually used to prevent freights from going out. An affidavit by the strikers denied any force: see Notarized Telegram to Governor Young, 20 July 1877, MSS 158. In retrospect some journalists con- cluded that the Sheriff's call had been premature, Ohio State Journal, 21 July 1877; Zanesville Daily Courier, 20 July 1877.

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174                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

"armed and equipped for duty to aid the civil authorities in preserv-

ing life and property."⁷

The decision to call out the militia quickly revealed a problem that

would play a key part in determining which Ohio National Guard

units could be called up to handle civil disturbances. The Guard

was in the process of rearmament and many companies, including the

ones immediately around Newark, were still equipped with obsolete

and inadequate weapons. The Governor's decision to use single com-

panies from Springfield, Mount Vernon, Circleville, and Zanesville

was based chiefly on the fact that these 170 soldiers would all have

modern breech-loading rifles.⁸ These militia companies, once assem-

bled, encountered another problem that hampered the Ohio Na-

tional Guard throughout the strike. The Guardsmen waited at the

stations for railroad officials to arrange transportation on the strike-

bound lines. At last, all four companies were united at Columbus

and, accompanied by Governor Young and Adjutant General Karr,

they arrived in Newark at 12:30 A.M. After a large breakfast at the De-

pot Hotel the troops formed up and marched through town to the

railroad yards where they were quartered in a repair shop for the re-

mainder of the night.⁹

The following day brought strikers and guardsmen close to fight-

ing. At 10 A.M. Governor Young, his staff, railroad officials, and the

Guard's company commanders met to discuss the situation. The rail-

road officials announced that they had obtained firemen and brake-

men willing to work at reduced wages and that all that remained was

to clear the railroad yard. The group then drew up a plan to clear the

yards, using the companies in the repair shop. Captain Alden Steele's

Champion City Guard and Captain David Wood's Mount Vernon

Guard were assigned to remove strikers from the central railroad

yard. The Circleville Guard under Captain Charles Gorce and the

Zanesville Guard under Captain Frederick Geiger were to form a line

along the western tracks to protect westbound trains. Governor

Young instructed his officers that in carrying out these orders they

were to avoid violence if possible. Having received these instruc-

 

 

 

7. Adjutant General Karr to Captain Steele, Adjutant General Karr to Captain

Wood, MSS 158; "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 582-83, 618-20; Springfield Dai-

ly Republic, 20 July 1877; Zanesville Daily Courier, 20 July 1877.

8. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 618-22. One of the benefits of the strike

was that the Ohio National Guard was given modern equipment by the federal govern-

ment.

9. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 572; Columbus Dispatch, 21 July 1877;

Springfield Daily Republic, 21 July 1877.

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Pretty Scaly Times                                        175

 

tions, the officers returned to the railroad yards, assembled their

companies, and attempted to carry out their mission.¹⁰

It soon became clear that the Guardsmen available were unequal to

the task. By now the Newark yard was crowded with freight cars

and engines, cutting the companies off from each other and pre-

venting them from coordinating their effort. The Zanesville Guard

had to thread its way in a narrow column to get to the western tracks.

Upon arrival, these Guardsmen found themselves confronted by a

crowd of about 300 strikers who refused to budge. Captain Geiger at-

tempted to placate the strikers by telling them that he personally

had no quarrel with their actions but that he had to follow his or-

ders. When the Zanesville and Circleville troops tried to form a line

down the track, they were quickly outflanked by the crowd, render-

ing the whole exercise futile. After the captains had reported the sit-

uation to Governor Young by messenger, the Governor decided that

"if trains were moved out a fight between troops and strikers would

break out."¹¹ Wishing to avoid violence, especially with the Guards-

men so outnumbered, the Governor and the Adjutant General decid-

ed to send the companies back to quarters and call up new Guard

units. As one striker noted, it had been "pretty scaly times."¹²

The decision to bring in more Guardsmen necessitated another

day's wait. Moreover, the lack of adequate weapons imposed limita-

tions; the 15th Regiment from Cleveland had to be sent home be-

cause only two companies had rifles. Eventually, five companies of

the 1st Regiment from Cincinnati and two companies of the 4th Regi-

ment from Dayton were able to leave for Newark on Saturday, July

21.13 After uniting at Xenia, the seven companies passed through Co-

lumbus, suffering some abuse from a crowd gathered at the depot,

and arrived in Newark at 2 A.M. After consultation, the Guard officers

decided they would go off to a hotel to sleep, leaving their men on

the trains. The forsaken soldiers spent an uneasy night, for they had

heard rumors that the Newark railroaders were "fierce and bloody

minded" and that the Springfield Guardsmen had "given up their

guns and played baseball with the strikers."¹⁴

By Sunday, July 22, there were approximately 530 Ohio National

 

 

 

 

10. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 621; Ohio State Journal, 21 July 1877.

11. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 573.

12. "Dennis Diary."

13. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 573, 601-09; Ohio State Journal, 23 July

1877; Dayton Daily Journal, 23 July 1877.

14. Dayton Daily Journal, 23 July 1877.

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176                                            OHIO HISTORY

 

Guard troops on duty in Newark. With adequate forces at his dispos-

al, Young ordered all unauthorized persons out of the railroad yards

by 6 A.M. in preparation for clearing them of strikers. Following the

Governor's orders, the newly arrived companies marched down to

the yard. As the troops crossed over the bridge giving access to rail-

road property, Colonel Samuel Smith of the 4th Regiment ordered a

small detachment under Lieutenant Maurice Holden to remain and

prevent anyone from following the Guardsmen over the bridge. Colo-

nel Charles Hunt, the ranking officer, then organized the militia into

two commands. Hunt kept his own 1st Regiment and put the Dayton

companies and the four other units under Colonel Smith. The com-

panies then further divided into clearing and guarding parties.

While this reorganization was taking place, Lieutenant Holden's

force was coming under increasing pressure. Holden's men faced a

large crowd that had assembled at the bridge, demanding their

right of public access over the bridge to the railroad yard. At the

same time, a substantial number of strikers, estimated at about 200,

had crossed into the railroad yard and now outflanked Holden. At

this point Assistant Adjutant General Daniel Grosvenor almost precip-

itated a major tragedy. Arriving at Holden's station, Grosvenor de-

manded that the strikers leave the yard. When they defied him, he

raced off to the Surgeon's quarters near the repair shop to announce

that bandages should be made up for "blood must be shed."¹⁵

Fortunately, Grosvenor's panic did not prove contagious and beyond

sending Captain Steele's unit to reinforce Holden there was no precip-

itate action.

Captain Steele, when he arrived at Holden's outpost, had no more

luck than Grosvenor in convincing the strikers to leave the railroad

yard. However, he did not think the situation was as serious as

Grosvenor had believed. His superior, Colonel Smith, agreed with

Steele and noted, "no acts of violence had been committed, nor suf-

ficient provocation given to justify a resort to arms."16 Smith then or-

dered Steele's company to remain at the bridge, but not to attempt to

clear the strikers. After a few hours the strikers dispersed, perhaps

aware that by 11 A.M. railroad officials had abandoned plans to move

trains that day.

The confrontation at the bridge marked a crucial point in the

Newark strike. As Colonel Hunt remarked, "for a short time collision

appeared inevitable but by the cool behavior of both officers and

 

 

15. Ibid.

16. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 608-09, 572.

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Pretty Scaly Times                                          177

 

men, what promised to be a desperate encounter at close quarters

was avoided."17 As it was, both sides could claim a victory. A strik-

er commented that "the soldiers made a charge at the railroad boys

but they stood firm and dared them to touch them."18 The sol-

diers, for their part, had stood their ground against a much larger

group of strikers.

The dispersal of the strikers left the Ohio National Guard in con-

trol of the railroad yards, but the strike continued. The troops had

fulfilled the initial reason for their mobilization - the "preservation

of life and property." It was now up to the B&O and Panhandle offi-

cials to make good their promise to supply the trains with firemen

and brakemen willing to work at reduced wages. It soon became ap-

parent, however, that "all the employees had either joined the strike

or become so intimidated that it was not possible for the railroad to

furnish men."¹⁹ The prospect of an immediate confrontation be-

tween strikers and Guardsmen receded when this became known.

In fact, fraternization between Guardsmen and strikers increased,

causing the Columbus Dispatch to note sourly that the Guardsmen in

Newark had "nothing better to do than play baseball and draw 2

dollars a day.^"20

The relative tranquility that existed in Newark was shattered the

next day by the report that a mob of Shawnee miners had captured a

train and was heading into Newark to "clean out the military." The

troops were marched out Monday evening, apparently oblivious to

the approaching danger and being showered by bouquets from the

Newark ladies. The "mob" turned out to be a citizen's committee

from Shawnee investigating a report that Newark itself was held by a

mob. After a consultation with a Newark citizens' committee com-

posed of strikers and townspeople, the miners returned home. The

whole episode had a vaguely comic-opera air to it. Captain Gorce was

heard to instruct his Circleville Guard not to shoot any "children,

women, or freight cars."²¹

After this notable victory, the Guardsmen found themselves "be-

ing cheered by the populace as they march to dinner."²² The sol-

diers, in turn, entertained the citizens, and themselves, with base-

 

 

 

17. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 606-07.

18. "Dennis Diary."

19. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 573; Circleville Union Herald, 27 July 1877.

20. Columbus Dispatch, 23 July 1877.

21. Circleville Union Herald, 27 July 1877; Springfield Daily Republic, 24 July 1877;

Dayton Daily Courier, 24 July 1877; "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 606-07, 621.

22. Dayton Daily Journal, 27 July 1877.

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178                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

ball games, drilling demonstrations, singing, and plays. One of the

few sources of unhappiness was the lack of spare clothing. Few of the

men were issued knapsacks and even fewer had thought to bring ex-

tra clothing. After a week in the hot July sun their clothes were dirty

and torn.

With a stalemate existing in Newark, the B&O's Trans-Ohio Divi-

sion manager, W. C. Quincey, believed the Guardsmen might as well

go home. Colonel Hunt, probably speaking for all the Guardsmen in

Newark, telegraphed Governor Young: "Send us home; we are not

needed here."²³ Young agreed with these suggestions and ordered

all troops except Captain Steele's company to return home on July 28.

Steele's men, somewhat disappointed at being left alone in Newark,

organized a glee club, staged a "very natural can-can," and played

more baseball. On July 29 the Governor made a brief visit to Newark

and praised the Springfield troops for their service, promising that

they could soon go home.²⁴

On July 30, Governor Young decided that an attempt to force the

issue at Newark would not result in violence. He ordered the 1st and

3rd Regiments to Newark and the 4th Regiment and two other com-

panies to Columbus. Numerous other units of Guardsmen were or-

dered to remain ready in case their services should be needed. Five

companies of the 1st left Cincinnati at 8:30 A.M., July 31, and joined

Captain Steele's lone company at Newark at 2 P.M. After organizing his

men, Colonel Hunt learned that a freight train from Dennison would

arrive shortly. When the expected train failed to arrive, Hunt sent a

detachment up the track to look for it. The men found the missing

freight a mile from Newark. Strikers had boarded it, pulled the en-

gine onto a siding, and extinguished its fires. This ended any ideas

Hunt might have had about breaking the strike that day and the sol-

diers returned to Newark to await the arrival of Ullery's 3rd Regi-

ment.

By the morning of August 1 over a thousand militia had assembled

in Newark. B&O officials in Newark announced that all employees

should report for work that morning and urged Ullery to protect

strikebreakers from possible harm. Ullery and William C. Quincey,

the manager of the B&O's Trans-Central Division, quickly estab-

 

 

23. Hunt to Karr, 27 July 1877, Quincey to Governor Young, 26 July 1877, MSS 158.

For the Ohio National Guard's activities in Newark, Columbus Dispatch, 27 July 1877;

Springfield Daily Republic, 26 July 1877, 28 July 1877; Ohio State Journal, 27 July 1877;

Zanesville Daily Courier, 27 July 1877; Circleville Union Herald, 27 July 1877.

24. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 618-20; Springfield Daily Republic, 28 July

1877.

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Pretty Scaly Times                                               179

lished that they had conflicting views of how best to break the strike. Ullery wanted to concentrate his forces in the railroad yard and maintained that his orders "were to protect the yard and start trains only, and not to detail any force to go with the trains."25 Quincey wanted troops to escort the trains and for some units to trav- el east and protect trains running through Bellaire. Young supported Quincey, and Ullery had to order his men to bring the frightened employees down to the yard and escort trains. He also sent two companies to Bellaire. Within a few hours, B&O officials had sent fourteen trains out of Newark. The railroad strike in Ohio ended on August 2. Most of the sol- diers withdrew from Newark within a week and the last company left on August 15. On August 16, Governor Young declared the "public emergency" over and praised the promptness of the Ohio National Guard's response and its "firmness of behavior in the presence of im-     25. W. C. Quincey to Governor Young, 1 August 1877, MSS 158.

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180                                             OHIO HISTORY

 

pending danger."²⁶ Governor Young, as did the editors of many

Ohio newspapers, took pride in the fact that Ohio had been spared

both bloodshed and federal intervention during the strike. One

newspaper, pointing to the potential for violence between Guardsmen

and strikers at Newark and the bloody clashes which had occurred

in other parts of the country, noted "it is a most serious thing for mili-

tia to fire upon their fellow citizens organized as disturbers of the

peace under exasperations for which even the severest of us have

pity."27

Several times during the events of July and August, clashes be-

tween the Ohio National Guard and demonstrators appeared not

only possible but likely. That domestic violence did not occur in

Ohio was the result of several factors. As noted earlier, Robert W.

Bruce believes that outside factors determined that there would be

no violent confrontation between militia and strikers. Bruce points to

the existing total blockage of freight lines to the east and the caution

inspired by the riots at Pittsburgh and elsewhere as a reason why

"Ohio got off lightly" during the strike.²⁸ Bruce thus suggests that

neither the state government nor the Ohio National Guard played a

substantial role in preventing violence within the state of Ohio in

1877. However, most of the evidence suggests a more likely conclu-

sion - that events in Newark were at least potentially violent and that

bloodshed was avoided primarily due to the actions of Ohioans.

One of the most important elements in preserving peace was the

conduct of Governor Thomas Young. Young, upon learning of the

strike in Newark, immediately went there to view the situation him-

self. He consulted railroad officials, Guard officers, and Newark citi-

zens, refusing to panic. There is evidence that he exerted a moderat-

ing influence during the attempts to clear the Newark yards on July 21

and 22. Young and Adjutant General Charles Karr also refused to al-

low the formation of independent vigilante committees or to enlist the

aid of private companies offering to "put down this infamous riot and

insurrection."²⁹ Young's orders to his officers stressed "the best

discretion and judgment," and he refused to sanction violent solu-

tions. At Newark residents conceded that while "there had been

too much haste in calling out the troops . . . Governor Young has

handled matters well.^"30

 

 

26. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 495.

27. Dayton Daily Journal, 6 August 1877.

28. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence, 203.

29. J. B. Phillips to Governor Young, 24 July 1877, MSS 158.

30. Ohio State Journal, 23 July 1877.

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Pretty Scaly Times                                       181

 

The violence was also limited by the behavior of the original strik-

ers at Newark. Unlike Pittsburgh, or even Columbus, Newark con-

tained no large group of urban unemployed. The quiet and deter-

mined actions of the strikers, their earnest desire to explain their

cause, and the strict discipline they maintained impressed both sol-

diers and correspondents. The strikers also enjoyed strong and

peaceful support from the populace of Newark. After the controlled

behavior of strikers and soldiers during the confrontations of July 21

and 22, both townspeople and strikers were on excellent terms with

the Guardsmen. The strikers offer to help feed the Guardsmen, the

crowds who witnessed the Guard's drills and amateur theatricals,

and the soldiers' admiration for the Newark "belles," all made for

mutual friendships.

In the last analysis, however, the behavior of the militia itself

played the key role in preventing violence. Most of the Guardsmen

called into service were young men who had little previous experi-

ence with domestic disorder. Hastily organized, neither officers nor

men had a clear idea of what to expect at Newark when they arrived.

Rumors of mob violence, riots, and Guardsmen sympathizing with

strikers were common among the troops. When they arrived in New-

ark, the Guardsmen found the town united behind the strikers and

unwilling to sell the Guardsmen "even a paper of tobacco."³¹ The

Guard's ability to not only secure the railroad yards without violence

but to win over the populace speaks well of the militia's discipline

and tact.

Thus the presence of the Ohio National Guard played a major role

in the absence of domestic violence in Ohio during the strike of 1877.

The lack of violence was not entirely due to "outside" influences.

While soldiers and civilians were aware of the disturbances in other

states, there is no indication in official correspondence, officers' re-

ports, or newspaper articles that knowledge of these events influ-

enced decisions within Ohio. Indeed, the confrontations at Newark

occurred before news of the clash between Pennsylvania troops and

strikers was well known. The available evidence points to the conclu-

sion that events in Ohio were peaceful chiefly because "the policy

from the first was to avoid bloodshed.^"32 This policy and the skill

with which the Ohio National Guard implemented it were the chief

reasons Ohio escaped violence during the strike of 1877.

 

 

 

 

31. Circleville Union Herald, 27 July 1877.

32. "Adjutant General's Annual Report," 581.

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