MONROE BILLINGTON
AND CAL CLARK
Ohio Clergymen, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
and the New Deal
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was
inaugurated President on March 4,
1933, the United States was in the
deepest economic depression in its his-
tory, a crisis which brought the
economic and political systems to the edge
of breakdown and threatened social
chaos. Worsening conditions had
forced numerous banks to close before
the new President and Congress or-
dered a banking "holiday." The
stock market was at low ebb. Industrial
production was down to 56 percent of the
1923-25 level. Out of a labor
force of 52 million, one wage-earner in
four did not have ajob to support
himself or his family. Another 5.5
million laborers were only partially em-
ployed. In farming areas conditions were
hardly better. Unable to sell corn
for a profit, midwestern farmers burned
the previous year's crop to keep
away winter's cold. Essentially no
markets existed for southern income
crops such as cotton, tobacco, and peanuts.1
Under such conditions, at the new
President's initiative, Congress
passed dozens of major bills and
hundreds of lesser ones to attack the prob-
lems the Great Depression had created.
Compared to the previous Herbert
Hoover administration, the Democrats
appropriated unusually large sums
of money to attack Depression woes. The
nation's political leaders cre-
ated a vast bureaucracy to administer
the multiplicity of agencies and pro-
grams which sprang up in response to
economic need. A flurry of activi-
ty occurred as the government's leaders
inaugurated and implemented a
"New Deal for the forgotten
man."
Monroe Billington is Professor of
History at New Mexico State University. Cal Clark is
Professor of Government at the
University of Wyoming. They thank the College of Arts and
Sciences Research Center at New Mexico
State University for providing funds (minigrant
no. 1-3-43543) to research this essay.
1. Maurice L. Farrell, ed., The Dow
Jones Averages, 1885-1970 (New York, 1972);
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1931-1940 (New York,
1963), ff.; Frank Freidel, The New
Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, 1959), 1 ff.;
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis
of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Cambridge, 1957),
248-56.
22 OHIO HISTORY |
These momentous political events, in turn, stimulated questions con- cerning the impact of the New Deal. How effective were the New Deal measures? How did Americans respond to them? What else could gov- ernment do to help? On September 23 and 24, 1935, the President mailed a form letter to members of the clergy in the United States. The letter read as follows:
Reverend and dear Sir:
Your high calling brings you into intimate daily contact not only with your own parishioners, but with people generally in your community. I am sure you see the problems of your people with wise and sympathetic understanding. Because of the grave responsibilities of my office, I am turning to representative Clergymen for counsel and advice,-feeling confident that no group can give more accurate or unbiased views. I am particularly anxious that the new Social Security Legislation just enacted, for which we have worked so long, providing for old age pensions, aid for crippled children and unemployment insurance, shall be carried out in keeping with the high purposes with which this law was enacted. It is also vitally important that the Works Program shall be administered to provide employment at useful work, and that our |
Ohio Clergymen
23
unemployed as well as the nation as a
whole may derive the greatest possible ben-
efits.
I shall deem it a favor if you will
write me about conditions in your community.
Tell me where you feel our government
can better serve our people.
We can solve our many problems, but no
one man or single group can do it,--we
shall have to work together for the
common end of better spiritual and material
conditions for the American people.
May I have your counsel and your help? I
am leaving on a short vacation but will
be back in Washington in a few weeks,
and I will deeply appreciate your writing
to me.
Very sincerely yours,
[signed] Franklin D. Roosevelt2
The number of clergymen in the United
States in 1935 was about
200,000. The White House staff mailed
the President's letter to 121,700
of the nation's clergymen, apparently to
every minister, priest, and rabbi
whose addresses were available. Slightly
more than 100,000 letters
reached the addresses, and approximately
30,000 clergymen from all sec-
tions of the nation responded to the
President's query.3 Letters poured in
from representatives of all major
religions and denominations as well as
many small religious groups in the
United States. Since Roosevelt him-
self had a religious background and was
a church member,4 many cler-
gymen identified with him and felt
obliged to give their honest, personal
responses to the presidential inquiry.
These clergymen were cognizant of
public opinion about and reaction to the
governmental attempts to respond
to myriad problems during the Great
Depression. Their responses mani-
fested wide varieties of socioeconomic,
political, ethnic, and regional
interests.
Deeply involved in the day-to-day lives
of the members of their con-
gregations, clergymen in the Midwestern
states were peculiarly qualified
to respond to the President's letter.
Since Ohio serves well as a microcosm
2. A slightly edited version of this
letter is Printed in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The
Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols., New
York, 1938-1950),
vol. IV, 370.
3. Organized by states, these letters
are housed in eighty-one archival boxes in the Cler-
gy File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York.
4. For information on Roosevelt's
association with and membership in the Protestant
Episcopal Church, as well as his
religious thought, see Frank Freidel, Franklin D Roosevelt:
The Apprenticeship (Boston, 1952), 20, 81 ff.; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:
The Lion
and the Fox (New York, 1956), 29,237,452ff.; Rex G. Tugwell, The
Democratic Roosevelt:
A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), 30-33, 502; Thomas H.
Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The
Social and Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt (East
Lansing, Mich., 1958), 3-11,24.
24 OHIO HISTORY
both of the Midwest and the nation, how
Ohio clergy viewed the New Deal
should reveal much about how Ohioans,
Midwesterners, and Americans
viewed it.
The Ohio Clergy File in the Roosevelt
Library contains 470 letters. Of
this number 217 letters did not indicate
the religion or denomination of
the writer. Four other letters were
statistically insignificant in regard to
the writer's religion, since each of
them represented a different denomi-
nation. Table 1 lists the breakdown of
the remaining 249 clergymen in re-
gard to their religious affiliation.
Also, it lists the percentages of these nine
major religions or denominations in
regard to the total number of the 249
respondents. Methodists and
Presbyterians together comprised 55 percent
of the total number of these known
respondents, while 11 percent of the
total was Episcopalians. Baptists,
Congregationalists, and Roman
Catholics constituted 9, 8, and 7 percent
of the total, respectively. Luther-
ans and ministers of the Disciples of
Christ each made up 4 percent of the
total. Rabbis of Jewish congregations
were 2 percent of all the respond-
ing clergymen.
In 1936, 2,934,248 persons were members
of Ohio's 8,864 religious
congregations.5 Assuming an
average of one clergyman per congregation,
the 470 clergymen who responded to FDR's
letter constituted slightly more
than 5 percent of the total number of
clergymen residing in Ohio at that
time, a statistically significant
portion of the total.
Each of the Ohio letters has been coded
as to its general tone toward
Roosevelt and the New Deal: (1) very
unfavorable, (2) unfavorable,
(3) neutral, (4) favorable, and (5) very
favorable. Table 2 shows that these
clergymen were supportive of the New
Deal by a margin of 51 percent to
29 percent, with 20 percent neutral.
This favorable percentage was some-
what lower than FDR's nationwide support
in the 1932 and 1936 presi-
dential elections in which he received
57 percent and 61 percent, respec-
tively, of the total votes cast.6 However,
it was quite indicative of the state
of Ohio. In 1932 Ohioans cast 50 percent
of their votes for FDR, and that
percentage rose to 58 in 1936.7
The relatively low approval rate among
Ohio clergymen to some extent
reflected the fact that Ohio was a
largely Republican state. But many Ohio
clergymen approved the New Deal because
of their intellectual and pro-
fessional commitment to social services
and because of their firsthand ex-
5. United States Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Religious Bodies,
1936. Vol. I. Summary and Detailed Tables (Washington,
1941), 264.
6. See Richard M. Scammon, comp. and
ed., America at the Polls, A Handbook of Amer-
ican Presidential Election
Statistics, 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh,
1965), 7, 9.
7. See Presidential Elections Since
1789 (Washington, 1975), 90.
Ohio Clergymen 25 |
|
perience with deadening poverty in both rural and urban areas. A careful reading of the letters for both their tone and specific comments reveals that Ohioans' support mainly devolved from the reality of economic depriva- tion, not social theory or political preference. A number of Ohio clergymen were effusive in their support for the Pres- ident. A Cleveland minister confessed to be "thoroughly in sympathy with the program of the New Deal. ..."8 A minister from Canton reported: "Your aims and purposes have ... my hearty approval. The majority of my congregation appreciate what has been accomplished thus far and hope and pray that New Deal measures may continue and be strengthened."9 But
8. F.H. Groom to FDR, Sept. 27, 1935, Ohio Clergy File, Roosevelt Library. (All sub- sequent letters referred to in this essay are in the Ohio Clergy File.) 9. R.W. Blemker to FDR, Sept 27, 1935. |
26 OHIO HISTORY
Roosevelt had severe critics.
Representative of those hard on the Presi-
dent and the New Deal was a Dayton
minister who wrote, "I hope you are
not so far removed from the common
people that you think us a bunch of
ignorant people. ... ."10
The fact that the Ohio clergymen as a
group were slightly more inclined
to favor rather than oppose the New Deal
is admittedly hardly astonish-
ing. What is more significant is their
relative interest in the various issues
associated with the New Deal and FDR and
the quite substantial variations
which occurred in the clergymen's degree
of support for or opposition to
specific issues. Thus, each of the Ohio
clergymen's letters has been sub-
jected to analysis in terms of the
specific issues mentioned in them. For
this analysis, each response on each
issue has been coded (1) highly un-
favorable, (2) unfavorable, (3)
favorable, or (4) highly favorable.
The subjects of these letters were
surprisingly concentrated in a few is-
sues. Of the twenty-three issues which
one or more Ohioans specifically
mentioned, five were cited by so few
respondents that they were statisti-
cally insignificant. Six of the
remaining eighteen issues were mentioned
by more than one-fifth of the responding
clergy. These most salient issues
were social security (54 percent),
prohibition repeal (38 percent), public
works programs (30 percent), agricultural
programs (27 percent), bu-
reaucracy and corruption (26 percent),
and relief (22 percent).
Six other issues ranged from 12 percent
to 6 percent saliency. In order
of saliency they were: budgets and debt,
taxes, the constitutionality of the
New Deal, the munitions embargo during
the Italian-Ethiopian war, the
National Recovery Administration, and
bank closing laws. The final six
salient issues were: the Civilian
Conservation Corps, government re-
strictions on business, arms
expenditures, the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, activities of the President's
family, and the diplomatic recognition of
Russia.
Another interesting result of the
analysis of the specific issues is that
only one of them (the National Recovery
Administration) evoked any-
where near an even division of opinion.
Six of the eighteen issues evoked
approval rates of 66 percent or more,
while eleven of them evoked approval
rates of 33 percent or less. In other
words, the clergymen perceived neg-
atively eleven of the eighteen issues
which drew statistically significant
comments, despite their overall support
of the New Deal. Only the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, the munitions
embargo, social security, the
Civilian Conservation Corps, public
works programs, and bank closing
10. A.H. Gulledge to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935.
11. The five statistically insignificant
items were: Roosevelt's stand against the veter-
ans' bonus, the regulation of public
utilities, the devaluation of the dollar, the United States
taken off the gold standard, and the
National Youth Administration.
Ohio Clergymen
27
laws elicited positive responses from
the Ohio churchmen. These re-
sponses revealed that while the Ohioans
generally approved the principal
policy thrust of the New Deal, they
leveled substantial criticisms at a ma-
jority of the particular facets of the
Roosevelt program.
A better appreciation of this can be
gained by considering the issues in
four specific groupings. The first group
includes government programs
aimed at helping particular sectors of
the American population; the sec-
ond group concerns issues of morality;
the third group focuses on per-
ceived governmental abuses; and the
fourth group touches on foreign pol-
icy issues. Tables 3 through 6 summarize
the Ohio clergy's positions on
these subjects by presenting the number
and percent of clergymen com-
menting on an issue and the percent of
these comments which could be con-
sidered favorable.
At the most general level, the New Deal
aimed to restore the American
socioeconomic system to normal operating
order and particularly to pro-
vide immediate aid to those suffering
from the severe dislocations of the
Great Depression. The Ohio clergymen who
wrote to FDR commented on
eight specific topics concerning
governmental programs attempting to im-
plement these goals: social security,
public works programs, agricultur-
al policies (especially the Agricultural
Adjustment Act), relief programs,
the National Recovery Administration,
bank closing laws, the Civil-
ian Conservation Corps, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority. The data in
Table 3 indicate that the clergymen had
quite different perceptions of these
issues, strongly favoring five, strongly
disapproving two, and dividing
equally on one.
Social security was by far the most
salient of all the eighteen issues, be-
ing mentioned by over one-half of the
Ohioans, and it was an extremely
popular program as it elicited an 86
percent approval rating. Clearly, the
clergy deemed its potential
beneficiaries, particularly children, the aged,
and the disabled, well worthy of
solicitude. From a practical standpoint,
these groups often represented the
clergymen's own parishioners hardest
hit by the Depression. The ministerial
approval closely reflected general
public opinion. Between 1936 and 1940
repeated surveys showed that over
90 percent of the citizenry supported
social security and old age pen-
sions.12
Referring to the recently-passed Social
Security Act, a minister em-
ployed by the Cincinnati Good Will
Industries wrote: "We ... wish to ex-
press our high appreciation for this
splendid legislation looking towards
social justice for the masses of the
people."13 Another Protestant minis-
12. Rita James Simon, Public Opinion
in America, 1936-1970 (Chicago, 1974), 25, 27.
13. R.E. Scully to FDR, Oct. 12, 1935.
28 OHIO HISTORY |
|
ter referred to the legislation as "a very good piece of work which will prof- it the people greatly."14 Despite the overwhelming support for the social security legislation, positive reaction to it was not unanimous. Some writ- ers were concerned about possible abuses in the program, while others wondered how it could be kept nonpolitical. A Methodist minister in Dunkirk expressed these concerns this way: "A law of this kind is sure to be abused by persons who would not try to provide for the 'rainy day' but would look forward to the pensioning age as their only hope [and] . . . it is next to impossible to keep measures of this kind out of partisan politics."15 Nearly one-third of the Ohio clergymen made references to the New Deal's public works programs, and 71 percent of those expressed support. Most of these favorable comments focused upon the provision of aid to and regained dignity for the participants, rather than the broader economic impact of the project. From Petersburg came this response: "Your Work Program in which you seek to employ usefully all needy and able-bodied men, meets with our hearty approval. We believe that when America shall be at WORK, there shall be less time for evil."16 The majority views expressed by the Ohio clergy on public relief pro- grams were quite different from the majority views expressed on public works programs. Relief programs were quite salient since over one-fifth of the clergymen mentioned them, ranking them sixth in overall impor-
14. Samuel S. Isa to FDR, Oct. 22, 1935. 15. A.L. Vandegriff to FDR, Oct. 11, 1935. 16. Joel C. Krumlauf to FDR, Nov. 2, 1935. |
Ohio Clergymen 29
tance. But relief was not at all
popular: 85 percent of the clergymen who
commented on it did not approve.
Evidently most of these churchmen were
imbued with a strong work ethic. They
believed that the dole would make
people lose their initiative and that
easy government money would en-
courage indolence and laziness. A
Presbyterian minister from Morrow
wrote: "Many people who do not
deserve relief and who could work are
merely living off the Government."17
A Catholic priest serving a south-
ern Italian parish in Cleveland had
mixed feelings about relief: "That the
poor have been helped on a large scale
by the various relief plans is ob-
vious, but whether the nation has been
benfited [sic] permanently by them
I think is open to question. Something
of the independent spirit that char-
acterised the poor boy in years gone by
has definitely disappeared-a loss
of a very precious though intangible
commodity."18
Fifteen percent of the clergy commenting
on relief were acutely aware
that government handouts had prevented
many Americans from starving
to death; they favored temporary relief
measures for moral and humani-
tarian reasons. A minister teaching at Oberlin
College reminded the Pres-
ident that "Direct Relief is
essential for many people who, by reason of
age, sickness or other incapacity,
cannot render service of any kind to the
community."19
The New Deal directed much attention to
the problems associated with
agricultural regions. Since Ohio had its
share of rural areas, surprisingly
only one-fourth of the state's clergy
mentioned agricultural policies or
problems in their letters to the President.
Even more surprising was that
FDR's agricultural initiatives were
quite unpopular: they received only a
15 percent level of support. The great
majority of the writers on this sub-
ject, including some from urban areas,
simply could not fathom the moral-
ity or economic efficacy of killing pigs
and plowing under crops at a time
when widespread hunger and even
starvation stalked America.
Among those who disliked the President's
agricultural efforts was a pas-
tor from Chagrin Falls who wrote,
"I regret to state that many people here
are thinking dam and some [are]
quite hot ... over the monumental hog
killing spree. .."20 Typical of the
minority voices regarding the gov-
ernment's agricultural programs to
combat the heartbreaking conditions
in rural areas was a minister in
Wilmington who was happy New Dealers
recognized that "our basic
industry, farming, is as worthy of the protec-
tion and encouragement of the government
as is manufacturing."21
17. Joseph D. Ryan to FDR, Oct. 8, 1935.
18. W. O'Donnell to FDR, Sept. 27, 1935.
19. Robert E. Brown to FDR, Oct. 5,
1935.
20. Thomas D. Henshaw to FDR, Sept. 28,
1935.
21. A.H. Wilson to FDR, Sept. 26, 1935.
30 OHIO HISTORY
The Civilian Conservation Corps, a
program to put unemployed young
men to work helping to conserve the
nation's natural resources, received
the attention of a small portion of the
Ohio clergy. The combination of the
CCC's employing young men who otherwise
could not find jobs, of mas-
sive and effective conservation
programs, and of an agency that was well
administered caused it to receive an approval
rating of 76 percent, mak-
ing it the fourth highest program
approved by the clergy. Expressing the
favorable opinions of others as well as
himself, a Presbyterian minister
from Westerville wrote: "I am ...
of the opinion that the Civilian Con-
servation Corps are rendering a valuable
service to our youth and the na-
tion."22 A
Congregationalist from Covington expressed reservations
when he stated that "the C.C.C.
work is clothed with more Military interest
than I can approve of."23
The New Deal's efforts to correct faults
in the nation's banking system
and to restore the public's confidence
in that system and in the economy
in general caused 6 percent of the Ohio
clergymen to comment on the ad-
ministration's bank closing laws, 66
percent of these respondents ex-
pressing approval. A minister from
Gahanna expressed these positive
thoughts this way: "The folks in
this section will always remember your
decisive and courageous way in dealing
with the bank situation at the very
beginning of your administration and the
subsequent security assured de-
positors through insurance.24
The National Recovery Administration,
designed to provide temporary
government regulation of the nation's
businesses in order to speed national
economic recovery, drew comments from 7
percent of the clergymen, one-
half approving, one-half disapproving.
Even though the NRA had been de-
clared unconstitutional and had been
disbanded, some clergymen were sor-
ry the program was no longer operative.
A favorable comment came from
a minister serving in a rural area near
Bethel: "The NRA helped to cut
down unfair competition and to give a
better deal to the laboring people.
I regret its removal."25 A
minister from West Elkton expressed a contrary
position when he wrote: "It seems
to me good that the NRA is gone. The
weight of the device was on the wrong
end of the social scales of justice."26
The Tennessee Valley Authority was not
particularly salient (3 percent),
but it received only favorable comments
from those who mentioned it.
Even though Ohioans did not reside in
the Tennessee Valley, they saw the
positive benefits coming from that great
regional rehabilitation program.
22. Alonzo Alden Pratt to FDR, Oct. 9,
1935.
23. Cecil Leek to FDR, Oct. 16, 1935.
24. William F. Wolfe to FDR, Oct. 8,
1935.
25. Theron A. Zimmerman to FDR, Oct. 21,
1935.
26. Gordon Lang to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935.
Ohio Clergymen 31 |
|
Indeed, the positive response in a large degree stemmed from the hope that a similar future project might affect Ohio. Forthright advice went to the President from a minister in Lakewood: "Plan to use T.V.A. to start a sim- ilar development along the Ohio River or the Mississippi."27 Table 4 shows that the Ohio clergy, as their calling would suggest, were concerned about moral issues. This was obvious in their comments about the repeal of Prohibition and the divorces of the President's children. Many religious leaders and organizations, especially Methodists and Baptists, had a long tradition of opposition to the drinking of alcoholic beverages, and over the years those and other denominations had established com- mittees and commissions to work against that practice. When Prohibition was ended, the occasion brought forth a great outburst from the clergy. In Ohio the subject of liquor was the clergymen's second most salient issue, over one-third of them referring to it. Ninety-eight percent of them were critical of FDR's support of repeal, many not only opposing repeal but also blaming the return of legalized alcohol for all manner of social problems on the American scene. For them the President was directly responsible for these undesirable developments. A minister from Oxford wrote: "The administration forfeited the confidence of the evangelical clergy ... by its support of repeal .... Liquor advertising, drunken driving, and polit- ical corruption are increasing, while there is little evidence of any seri- ous effort to check the ravages of this social curse. No amount of social security legislation can overcome this major evil of the return of this liquor traffic."28 A Methodist minister from Zanesville was equally critical, in- cluding an implied threat in his comments: "It is entirely unnecessary for me to remind you, Mr. President, of the moral results of the melancholy legislation that repealed the eighteenth amendment .... But righteousness is not dead, and what is to be seen since liquor was permitted to flow will make every decent American pause, think, consider, and remember, when
27. John Sommerlatte to FDR, Oct. 14, 1935. 28. Cecil Daniel Smith to FDR, Oct. 1, 1935. |
32 OHIO HISTORY
the next presidential election comes
round. Good citizens everywhere are
determined that liquor shall not rule
this country and shall not continue
to debauch mankind, corrupt our morals,
prostitute our politics, buy our
newspapers, and turn our boys into
drunkards and our girls into drunkards
wives."29
Like other clergy across the nation,
Ohio's religious leaders considered
themselves the moral guardians of
American society, and those in this sam-
ple expressed concern about the divorces
of the President's children. Not
one clergyman approved of these
highly-publicized actions of FDR's sons,
more than one reminding Roosevelt that
his children were violating God's
law and that the President's family
members were obliged to set an ex-
ample for the general population.
Representing these clergymen was a
Lutheran from Alliance who wrote:
"The righteous people of this Nation
were shocked when two members of your
family received divorces with-
in a year, . . . none of them founded on
Scriptural Authority."30
This moral ire carried over into intense
opposition against what the re-
ligious leaders perceived as
governmental abuses and excesses. On the five
issues of bureaucracy and corruption,
larger government budgets and debt,
excessive taxation, perceived violations
of the Constitution, and govern-
ment restrictions on private businesses,
the Ohio clergy were strong in their
opposition, as indicated by the data in
Table 5.
Concerns about bureaucracy/corruption
caused that issue to be ranked
fifth in salience among the eighteen
issues which the Ohioans mentioned.
Perhaps these concerns about corruption
reflected a displeasure with
state politics, since Ohio had long
traditions in machine politics and ques-
tionable patronage practices.31
A Catholic priest from Barnesville warned
the President of a possible danger to
the administration of the "Works pro-
gramme," namely that some part of
it "may find its way into unjust and
unscrupulous hands in its particular
administration thereof."32 A Protes-
tant minister from Middletown made this
suggestion: "If a social program
is to be really human, the
administrators should not be nominated by po-
litical organizations but by men with
human interests, i.e. school super-
intendents and principals, heads of
ministerial associations and Y.M. and
Y.W.C.A. secretaries. These people would
not graft from the fund .. ."33
Despite Roosevelt's promise in his 1932
presidential campaign to bal-
ance the nation's budget, the New Deal
programs drained the national trea-
29. Thomas Adshead to FDR, Oct. 19,
1935.
30. S.D. Myers to FDR, Oct. 10, 1935.
31. For example, see Peter W. Porter, Cleveland:
Confused City on a Seesaw (Columbus,
1976), chaps. 3-5.
32. M.J. Sullivan to FDR, Oct. 8, 1935.
33. Jerome C. Schulz to FDR, Oct. 16,
1935.
Ohio Clergymen 33 |
|
sury and plunged the nation deeper into debt. Twelve percent of the cler- gymen commented upon the government's policy in regard to budgets and debt, and 95 percent of these respondents were critical of the trend toward unbalanced budgets and a burdensome national debt. A Lutheran minis- ter in Lindsey reported the beliefs of the members of his congregation: "We ... no longer believe in Santa Claus, nor in the Easter Rabbit; and yet we are asked to believe that the spending of five billion dollars . . . will re- turn prosperity to this country. How that is possible is beyond our under- standing. And the result will be that our children and our children's chil- dren will receive unbearable burdens."34 A Methodist minister in New Lexington expressed similar sentiments: "I strongly deprecate and de- nounce the many unwise, unholy, foolish and asinine policies you have championed ... [including] the spending of countless billions ... ."35 Since government spending was resulting in these massive deficits, the New Dealers proposed new taxes to help the government pay for some of its expenses. Eighty-five percent of the Ohio clergy who commented on the taxation policies were critical. A Bible teacher reported that there were "few happy taxpayers" in East Liverpool,36 while a respondent from Cleveland reminded the President of the "sorrowful fact" that "the con- sumer is taxed directly and indirectly and can buy less and less from a dwindling income."37 A few clergymen were more concerned about acquiring needed services than in worrying about how to pay for them. A Columbus minister assumed such an attitude when he wrote, "We urge you and the Congress at once
34. Alwin J. Prange to FDR, Oct. 2, 1935. 35. L. I. Hart to FDR, Oct. 5, 1935. 36. B.H. Shadduck to FDR, Oct. 22, 1935. 37. J.J. Kennedy to FDR, Oct. 23, 1935. |
34 OHIO HISTORY
to levy such additional taxes as may be
necessary to meet our necessary
expenses. Let's pay as we go."38
The question of the constitutionality of
the New Deal measures con-
cerned thirty-six of the Ohio clergy.
Among the 67 percent who opposed
the New Deal's apparently
unconstitutional approach to solving the na-
tion's problems was a minister from
Toledo who wrote: "Any tampering
with the fundamental law of our land,
the Constitution, will be resent-
ed .... Our nation schooled in the
sacredness of this document will not
easily be influenced to forsake its
guarantees."39 But not all clergymen
were critical in this issue. A Jewish
rabbi from Youngstown supported
FDR as he tried to solve economic woes,
arguing that his actions in regard
to the Constitution were justified. He
wrote: "We must have an interpre-
tation of our Constitution in keeping
with our growing industrial life and
social progress. Our Constitution must
be an ever-living force, not a dead
letter. The Constitution was made for
the people, not the people for the
Constitution. The spirit and purpose of
our Constitution are important, not
its letter."40
Even though several clergymen made
specific comments about the Na-
tional Recovery Administration, others
expressed their opinions about the
general trend of government restrictions
on business. The vast majority
of these (88 percent) were unhappy with
such developments. A Congre-
gational minister from Cleveland made a
point of expressing this unhap-
piness this way: "While people
generally are agreed that the stimulation
which was given our life by the steps
which were taken by the Government
in 1933 and successive months were
necessary and commendable, the time
has now come, on the other hand, to
permit private enterprise a greater re-
sponsibility in building a new
prosperity in our industrial life."41
A number of Ohio clergymen showed
interest in foreign affairs.
Thirty-seven discussed Roosevelt's
munitions embargo in the Italian-
Ethiopian war and twenty-one mentioned
the nation's arms expenditures.
Several clergymen who referred to the
munitions embargo and arms ex-
penditures related them to the general
themes of neutrality and peace. The
munitions embargo almost surely
attracted attention because it was im-
posed during the same week that most of
the clergy were receiving their
letters from President Roosevelt. Table
6 shows that the respondents who
commented on the munitions embargo
almost universally approved it, that
issue receiving the second highest
approval rate of all eighteen subjects
38. Arthur R. Leonard, Oct. 6, 1935.
39. S.C. Michelfelder to FDR, Sept. 26,
1935.
40. I.E. Philo to FDR, Oct. 18, 1935.
41. Ferdinand Q. Blanchard to FDR, Sept.
26, 1935.
Ohio Clergymen 35 |
|
mentioned. A Methodist in Canton had only praise: "Your prompt action regarding the Italian-Ethopian situation was decisive and must be regarded .. as one of the several courageous stands you have taken."42 General- ly the clergymen were unhappy with the nation's armament expenditures. A Presbyterian minister expressed these sentiments when he reported that he "sincerely disapprove[d] of all militaristic tendencies of the adminis- tration, the increased appropriations for army and navy, [and] the im- pending naval building program ...."43 Fourteen ministers commented upon the Roosevelt administration's de- cision to extend diplomatic recognition to Russia, 86 percent of these re- ligious leaders disapproving that action. A Baptist minister in Lockland responded: "It is my candid opinion that the present administration made a collosal [sic] blunder in the recognition of Godless and communistic Russia."44 Underlying these foreign policy comments were anti-communism sen- timents militating against diplomatic relations with the USSR and a paci- fism causing support for the arms embargo and opposition to increased de- fense spending and war. More importantly, the somewhat small number of respondents in the area of foreign affairs pointed up the fact that im- mediate economic problems were more central to the clergymen and their flocks than issues "out there." In conclusion, Ohio clergymen displayed a remarkable consensus about the New Deal. They realized that the grave economic and social disrup- tions accompanying the Great Depression called for the American gov- ernment to take radical remedial actions. Thus, they strongly supported several key elements in the New Deal which attacked the Depression at the local level and helped the recovery of many destitute Americans. These
42. C.W. Danford to FDR, Oct. 21, 1935. 43. John P. McConnell to FDR, Nov. 2, 1935. 44. B.H. Hillard to FDR, Sept 28, 1935. |
36 OHIO HISTORY
clergymen, however, were far from blind
or unthinking New Deal loyal-
ists. They deplored policies which they
perceived as promoting personal
immorality among their parishioners such
as the repeal of Prohibition,
"easy money" from the dole,
official immorality (e.g., corruption and war-
mongering), and mismanagement (e.g.,
financial irresponsibility and bu-
reaucratism). They supported the New Deal
but not without significant
reservations. Ohio clergymen of the
1930s were pragmatic and undoctri-
naire about the New Deal and the role of
government in the daily lives of
individual Americans.
MONROE BILLINGTON
AND CAL CLARK
Ohio Clergymen, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
and the New Deal
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was
inaugurated President on March 4,
1933, the United States was in the
deepest economic depression in its his-
tory, a crisis which brought the
economic and political systems to the edge
of breakdown and threatened social
chaos. Worsening conditions had
forced numerous banks to close before
the new President and Congress or-
dered a banking "holiday." The
stock market was at low ebb. Industrial
production was down to 56 percent of the
1923-25 level. Out of a labor
force of 52 million, one wage-earner in
four did not have ajob to support
himself or his family. Another 5.5
million laborers were only partially em-
ployed. In farming areas conditions were
hardly better. Unable to sell corn
for a profit, midwestern farmers burned
the previous year's crop to keep
away winter's cold. Essentially no
markets existed for southern income
crops such as cotton, tobacco, and peanuts.1
Under such conditions, at the new
President's initiative, Congress
passed dozens of major bills and
hundreds of lesser ones to attack the prob-
lems the Great Depression had created.
Compared to the previous Herbert
Hoover administration, the Democrats
appropriated unusually large sums
of money to attack Depression woes. The
nation's political leaders cre-
ated a vast bureaucracy to administer
the multiplicity of agencies and pro-
grams which sprang up in response to
economic need. A flurry of activi-
ty occurred as the government's leaders
inaugurated and implemented a
"New Deal for the forgotten
man."
Monroe Billington is Professor of
History at New Mexico State University. Cal Clark is
Professor of Government at the
University of Wyoming. They thank the College of Arts and
Sciences Research Center at New Mexico
State University for providing funds (minigrant
no. 1-3-43543) to research this essay.
1. Maurice L. Farrell, ed., The Dow
Jones Averages, 1885-1970 (New York, 1972);
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1931-1940 (New York,
1963), ff.; Frank Freidel, The New
Deal in Historical Perspective (Washington, 1959), 1 ff.;
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis
of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Cambridge, 1957),
248-56.