Ohio History Journal

DAVID G. THOMPSON

 

Ohio's Best: The Mobilization of the Fourth

Infantry, Ohio National Guard, in 1917

 

In World War I, the United States created and sent to France a massive

army which effectively turned the tide of the conflict against Germany.

Although the American forces were built up from an indispensable cadre

of Regular U.S. Army troops and professional officers, the National

Guard also played an important part. Two of the first four American di-

visions to reach France in 1917 and, eventually, 40 percent of the entire

American Expeditionary Forces were made up of National Guard units.

There can be no doubt that the National Guard made a major contribution

to the Allied victory in 1918. Nevertheless, the American mobilization en-

countered many difficulties, and the forces in existence at the outset were

by no means ready for immediate combat.

One relatively well-prepared National Guard unit was Ohio's Fourth In-

fantry Regiment, redesignated the 166th Infantry while in federal service.

Based in the Columbus area, the Fourth probably was the best regiment

in the Ohio Guard in 1917. Due to its strong qualifications in several cat-

egories, it received the distinction of joining the prestigious 42nd "Rain-

bow" Division organized by Douglas MacArthur. This led to its landing

in France in November 1917, well before the main American forces were

ready. But the Fourth still fell short of professional standards, demon-

strating the training problems inherent in the militia system.

Several important reforms had begun to increase the military value of

the National Guard since the turn of the century, but these had not yet tak-

en full effect in 1917. Until this period the states had held exclusive au-

thority over their militia organizations in peacetime, retaining some con-

trol even when they were mobilized for federal service. Critics such as

Emory Upton argued that the Guard would never attain adequate standards

of military efficiency under state control and would be unready for use-

ful war service without extended periods of remedial preparation. The

chaotic results of the Spanish-American War mobilization in 1898 un-

derlined this position. In theory, the division of military authority between

 

 

 

 

David G. Thompson is a Ph.D. candidate in military history at The Ohio State University.

• 1
 

38                                                      OHIO HISTORY

 

the states and the national government appeared to be little more than an

"undesired bequest from the political thought of the eighteenth century."1

The National Guard jealously guarded its independence, however, exer-

cising considerable influence in Congress through its own lobby, the Na-

tional Guard Association of the United States, founded in 1879. In par-

ticular, it resisted attempts to create a separate federal reserve force

which might have taken over the role of reinforcing the small regular army

in wartime.²

Finally recognizing that some form of change was both desirable and

inevitable, the National Guard sought to make the best of it by accepting

greater voluntary cooperation with the War Department. The first major

step in this process was the 1903 Dick Act, named for its sponsor, Ohio

congressman General Charles Dick. It provided for increased federal sup-

port of the Guard in states which requested it, including drill pay when the

Guard participated in exercises with the Regular Army. The string at-

tached, however, was that federally supported Guard units must undergo

periodic inspections and conform to War Department standards such as

uniform tables of organization. This represented a victory for "serious"

elements of the Guard who wanted to distance themselves from others who

merely enjoyed the militia as a sort of social club with uniforms. By im-

proving the Guard, the Dick Act also helped to forestall proposals for a

federal reserve.³

The landmark National Defense Act of 1916 further established feder-

al control by requiring Guardsmen to swear a dual oath to both the state

and the nation, and by giving the President authority to draft Guardsmen

into federal service. This act shifted the constitutional basis of the National

Guard from the Second Amendment, which protected the people's right

to maintain a militia, to Article I, Section 8, which granted Congress the

power to regulate it. Henceforth, state governments had no authority over

their militia while it was in federal service, finally ending the dual chain

of command which had hampered operations in all of the nation's previ-

ous wars. This change also took precedence over a provision of the Mili-

 

 

1. Such was the later conclusion of William Riker, Soldiers of The States: The Role of

the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C., 1957), 116.

2. For an introduction to American military reform in this period, see Allan R. Millett

and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of

America (New York, 1984), 248-49, 299-327. On the general role of the Guard from a po-

litical scientist's viewpoint, see Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Harvard,

1965).

3. Millett and Maslowski, Common Defense, 313. James K. Mahon, History of the Mili-

tia and the National Guard, The Macmillan Wars of the United States, ed. Louis Morton (New

York, 1983), 139-40. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington,

Indiana, 1967), 320-22.

• 2
 

Ohio's Best                                                        39

tia Act of 1908 which would have prevented the War Department from sim- ply breaking up Guard units in federal service for use as individual re- placements. Although the National Guard still amounted to a potent po- litical interest group, the War Department had established its legal predominance in wartime.4 Despite the long-term significance of the congressional acts, legislation alone could not produce improvements at the unit level. Few Guardsmen understood the implications of the National Defense Act of 1916, for ex- ample, and for the time being it was a matter of business as usual. The Fourth Ohio's routine was typical of Guard units at the time, which meant that the regiment was far from ready for immediate combat duty. When a Regular Army officer inspected the Fourth at its summer camp in 1915, he noted serious deficiencies. As a consequence, the War Department with- drew recognition from three companies and placed five others on proba- tion. Yet another company had disbanded temporarily, with the result       4. Mahon, History of the Militia, 148.

• 3
 

40                                                OHIO HISTORY   that only 25 percent of the Fourth's line companies met federal standards. The following table indicates the regiment's home stations and status in 1915-16:5

The Fourth may have found some consolation in the fact that few of the other Ohio regiments fared any better, but it was still a poor showing. Before the next normal summer inspection could take place, President Woodrow Wilson mobilized the National Guard in June 1916 for service on the Mexican border. The National Defense Act had passed into law only a few days before the call-up began, and as the Chief of the Militia Bu- reau pointed out, ". . . no time was afforded for the adequate study of the new law and the determination of its exact application."6 The Ohio Na- tional Guard experienced serious problems in preparing for departure from the state, mostly because of delays in the construction of its mobilization camp. There also was a high rate of attrition when the Guardsmen were screened by federal medical officers, which left many companies seriously understrength.7 The main body of the Ohio Guard, comprising two infantry     5. War Department, AnnualReports, 1916, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1916), 1084. Ohio National Guard and Ohio Naval Militia: List and Directory, January 15, 1915 (Columbus, Ohio, 1915), 15. Ohio National Guard and Ohio Naval Militia: List and Directory. Septem- ber 1, 1916 (Columbus, Ohio, 1916), 15. 6. War Department, Annual Reports, 897. 7. Ohio actually suffered the highest rate of rejection, 25.2 percent, among the 14 states

• 4
 

Ohio's Best                                                           41

 

brigades, finally reached Texas in August, several weeks behind most of

the other state contingents.⁸

The Ohio Guardsmen remained at Camp Bliss, near El Paso, until

February 1917, undergoing sporadic training exercises but fulfilling no

obvious function. There were some morale problems, and the men's gen-

eral opinion was that they should either be sent into Mexico to fight the

villista (guerrillas) or else be sent home. Nevertheless, the extended pe-

riod of active duty did serve to familiarize the troops with field service in

ways which the normal summer camps in Ohio had not. It also provided

opportunities for the Regulars and Guardsmen to observe each other and

to form opinions of their relative effectiveness. Not surprisingly, many

Regulars found the Guardsmen below par, although there were occasion-

al exceptions.⁹

The War Department released most of the Ohio units from federal ser-

vice in February and March 1917. The Fourth arrived back in Ohio on Sun-

day, March 4, after undergoing a mustering-out inspection at Fort Wayne,

Michigan. Citizens had organized homecoming ceremonies and hoped to

see the complete regiment parade in Columbus. But the Fourth's com-

mander, Colonel Byron L. Bargar, considered it necessary to caution the

public ahead of time that they must not expect much. He published the fol-

lowing notice on the morning before their arrival:

 

In the process of muster out of United States army service we have lost our enti-

ty as a military unit [present author's italics], [and] parts of our equipment, worn

out in desert service, have been discarded while at Fort Wayne, on order of the

United States mustering officers; also, under their orders, each individual of the

regiment has been ticketed direct to his home. Our heavy baggage ... [is] packed

for storage.

 

We are therefore returning home, not as soldiers, but as citizens who have un-

dergone a period of intensive military training . . .

 

 

of the administrative Central Division; the average was 15.5 percent. Marvin A. Kreidberg

and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States army, 1775- 1945,

Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, D.C., 1955), 200.

8. Cole Christian Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness: The Ohio National Guard and the Mex-

ican Border Mobilization, 1916-1917" (M.A. thesis, Ohio State University, 1980), 74-75.

See also David A. Niedringhaus, "Dress Rehearsal for World War I: The Ohio National Guard

Mobilization of 1916," Ohio History, 100 (Winter-Spring, 1991), 35-56.

9. Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness," 74-75. The War Department General Staff also must

share responsibility for the lack of preparation. See Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace

and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1964), 233, 237-38.

The standard work on the Army's role in the border crisis is Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood

on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York, 1969). On

the particular experience of the Fourth Ohio, see Raymond Minshall Cheseldine, Ohio in the

Rainbow: Official Story of the 166th Infantry, 42nd Division in the World War (Columbus,

Ohio, 1924), 42.

• 5
 

42                                                        OHIO HISTORY

 

In condemning our unserviceable equipment at Fort Wayne, the men's individu-

al kits were largely broken up and the new articles have not been issued for their

use. Some men still carry full equipment, including rifles, blankets and rolls. Oth-

ers, whose belts and shelter tents were worn out, carry rifles only. Others appear

without rifles, as their arms are undergoing repair and replacement. From a mili-

tary point of view we will present a somewhat motley appearance on our return

home. But we believe the welcome from our home is extended to the men and not

to a military unit clothed in accompanying pomp and panoply and it is hoped that

no hypercriticism will be forthcoming from military experts. 10

 

Thus, while the experience almost certainly had some positive effects,

the service on the border left the Fourth with serious material deficiencies.

At least in the opinion of the inspectors, the Guardsmen had not maintained

their equipment properly, a plausible charge in light of the numerous oth-

er references to low morale. Although not necessarily as a result of these

problems, Colonel Bargar relinquished his command shortly thereafter,

replaced by his former deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Benson W. Hough. 11

It was only a few weeks before elements of the Fourth were called out

again in response to the imminent declaration of war on Germany. On

March 27, Hough issued a "riot call" for B, I, and the Machine Gun com-

panies to assemble at the state arsenal in Columbus. In fact there was no

riot, and the real mission was to secure the arsenal and several key bridges

and other installations against possible sabotage by German sympathiz-

ers. The effort at deception was apparently quite effective, however, for

some members of the other companies in Columbus also turned out,

thinking there really was a public disturbance.12

No significant fifth column activities developed, and the main focus of

the Guard's activity soon shifted to preparing for service overseas. On

April 17, Ohio Adjutant General George Wood issued a general order for

all units to recruit to full authorized strength. He and Governor James Cox

knew that the Guard would be called into federal service within about three

months, and their goal was to have the Ohio Guard mustered in as a com-

plete division rather than assigned piecemeal to Regular units as would

be the case for most state forces. The following months were therefore a

 

 

 

 

10. Ohio State Journal, 4 March 1917.

11. Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness," 68. Hough had served as Ohio Adjutant General

from January 1915 to June 1916, and remained in command of the regiment throughout its

World War I service. In 1923 he rose to the rank of Major General, commanding the entire

Ohio Guard. Hugh L. Nichols, Memorial of the Life, Character and Public Services of Ben-

son W. Hough, [n.p., 19361, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. On Hough's direc-

tion of the Guard after the war, see Robert Lee Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace: The

Ohio National Guard, 1919-1940" (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1974).

12. Ohio State Journal. 28 March 1917.

• 6
 

Ohio's Best                                                        43

 

period of intense and often chaotic activity, as the various units strove to

fill their ranks as quickly as possible.13

The Fourth was actually closer to full strength than any of the other Ohio

infantry regiments, having mustered out in March after its Mexican bor-

der duty with 54 officers and 977 men. This still left a considerable mar-

gin to fill, however, for the authorized total was 1348. The gap suddenly

widened when the War Department issued new tables of organization.

Whereas the previous authorized strength of an infantry company had been

only 100 men, the new plan called for 153, and machine gun companies

also had to expand from 53 to 78. This made the goal of a separate Ohio

division more difficult, and the Guard redoubled its recruiting efforts.14

All Ohio National Guard units not already in federal service were mo-

bilized at their home stations on Sunday, July 15, 1917, at which time they

effectively passed from state to federal control. The War Department per-

mitted recruiting to continue, however, until the units were officially draft-

ed into federal service on August 5, according to the provisions of the re-

cent National Defense Act. By this time, enough of them were at least close

to full strength so that Cox and Wood succeeded in their quest for an all-

Ohio division. This became the 37th "Buckeye" division according to the

Army's new system of unit designations, and it departed for Camp Sheri-

dan, Alabama, in mid-August. After nearly a year of additional training,

the division eventually reached France in the summer of 1918.15

Hough's Fourth, however, followed a different and shorter path to war.

When the rest of the Ohio Guard departed for Alabama, the Fourth received

orders instead to proceed to Camp Perry, the Ohio National Guard's sum-

mer training camp on Lake Erie. As the troops and the public learned on

August 15, the regiment had received the distinction of forming Ohio's

contribution to the newly created 42nd "Rainbow" Division, a composite

formation of National Guard contingents from 26 different states. Ac-

cording to the War Department's plans at that point, the 42nd would be

among the very first American divisions in France, behind only the Reg-

ular Army's 1 st Division.

 

 

 

13. Ohio Adjutant General, General Order No. 12, 17 April 1917, State Archives Series

30, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Wood hoped to command the Ohio division

personally, but the War Department eventually assigned a Regular officer instead. Lawrence

M. Kaplan, "The Mobilization of the Ohio National Guard in World War I" (M.A. thesis,

Ohio State University, 1980), 8-9, 42, 48.

14. Kingseed, "A Test of Readiness," 69. Historical Section, U.S. Army War College, Or-

der of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary

Forces: Divisions (Washington, D.C., 1931), 446. Ohio Adjutant General, General Order

No. 12, 17 April 1917.

15. The official history of the "Buckeye Division" is Ralph D. Cole and W.C. Howells,

The Thirty-Seventh Division in the World War, 1917-1918 (Columbus, Ohio, 1926).

• 7
 

44                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

The creation of the "Rainbow" Division, with all its consequences for

the Fourth Ohio, resulted from a combination of domestic political con-

siderations and personal ambitions. Once the general outline of the mo-

bilization had taken shape, it fell to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to

determine which National Guard units should be the first in France. Be-

cause of the Guard's political significance, he was anxious to avoid

charges of favoring or overburdening any particular state. Douglas

MacArthur, at that time a major serving as Baker's press officer, was the

one who conceived the idea of a composite division and originated the

"Rainbow" nickname. Chief of the Militia Bureau Brigadier General

William A. Mann also supported the proposal, which Baker quickly ac-

cepted as the solution to his problem. But MacArthur and Mann were not

merely trying to be helpful; they were exploiting a chance for their own

professional advancement. Benefitting from the connection with Baker,

MacArthur received a wartime promotion to Colonel and became the new

division's chief of staff, and Mann, promoted to Major General, became

its first commander. MacArthur probably had been thinking in this di-

rection for some time. He already had built up some political capital among

the National Guard lobby by defending the Guard's performance in 1916,

and after the declaration of war on Germany he had helped to convince

President Wilson to reject a mobilization plan which would have exclud-

ed the Guard.¹⁶

MacArthur and Mann, together with their artillery commander Brigadier

General Charles P. Summerall, now had the authority to select the units

which would form the Rainbow Division. Two major reasons compelled

them to locate the best units possible. One was the importance of the di-

vision's intended mission. Arriving in France as a symbolic vanguard of

the main weight of American forces to follow, it would have to help bol-

ster the Allies' flagging confidence in the meantime. Therefore, it would

be important to make a good first impression which could have dispro-

portionate effects, whether positive or negative. The second reason again

was personal. Having obtained the division's top positions, Mann,

MacArthur and Summerall would bear responsibility for its success or fail-

ure in battle. Clearly it was in their own interest, as well as the nation's,

to choose the best National Guard units available. Therefore, in selecting

the Fourth Ohio they paid the regiment a significant compliment.

One factor which may have worked to the Fourth's advantage was unit

lineage. MacArthur appears to have sought formations with long and dis-

tinguished histories, and all four of the infantry regiments included in the

 

 

16. Hill, Minute Man, 242. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume 1: 1880-

1941 (Boston, 1970), 133-35.

• 8
 

Ohio's Best                                                     45

 

Rainbow Division certainly satisfied this criterion. Each had been formed

prior to the Civil War, and the Fourth Ohio could trace its existence back

to the Mexican War, in which it took part in the Battle of Buena Vista.

Among the regiment's Civil War honors were the battles of Antietam,

Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Spotsylvania and Peters-

burg. In 1898 the unit had participated in the occupation of Puerto Rico,

fighting a brief skirmish with the Spanish. There was an active veterans

association which still included some Civil War survivors in the years be-

fore World War I, giving the regiment's current members a sense of be-

longing to an entity which transcended any single generation.¹⁷

It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare the Fourth in detail with

units from other states, but several additional factors probably helped to

distinguish it from the other Ohio infantry regiments. One of these was its

record of service on the Mexican Border. Despite the problems with morale

and equipment, the Fourth seems to have made a good impression on at

least one occasion. In October 1916 it had carried out a challenging ex-

ercise known as the Las Cruces Hike.¹⁸ Raymond Cheseldine, who was

first lieutenant of C Company at the time, later described it as "a gruelling

march of about [S]eventy-seven miles made under a burning sun through

deep sand and clouds of alkali dust that burned the eyes and parched the

throat." He concluded that "[t]he excellent showing made on this hike and

in all the other service was undoubtedly responsible for the regiment be-

ing honored later by being made a part of the 42nd Division."¹⁹

MacArthur and the other planners may also have noted the Fourth's su-

perior record of marksmanship. Like the Regular Army, the Ohio National

Guard emphasized target practice, and it held inter-unit competitive

matches each year during summer camp. In the last normal season before

the 1916-17 mobilizations, the Fourth had taken first prize in the regi-

mental matches, with an overall "figure of merit" considerably above its

nearest rivals. This figure was based on the total numbers of "experts,"

"sharpshooters," and other ratings of the various units, not merely on the

performance of a selected team. Given the importance in U.S. Army doc-

trine of aimed fire by the individual rifleman, the Fourth's achievement

must have carried some weight.²⁰

 

 

17. The Army Lineage Book, Volume II: Infantry (Washington, D.C., 1953), 477-90. By-

laws and Rules for Government of Veterans Corps, 14th-4th Infantry, Ohio National Guard,

Adopted May 16th, 1909 (Columbus, Ohio, [1909]), Ohio Historical Society, Columbus,

Ohio, 1-12.

18. Apparently in the area of Las Cruces, New Mexico, on the Rio Grande about 45 miles

northwest of El Paso.

19. Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 42.

20. Ohio Adjutant General, General Orders 4 and 15, 1915, State Archives Series 30, Ohio

Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

• 9
 

46                                                    OHIO HISTORY

 

A further and more basic reason for the selection of the Fourth proba-

bly was simple troop strength. The Fourth had been closer to full strength

than any of the other Ohio regiments during the Mexican border duty and

also came nearest to fulfilling its recruiting goals in the summer of 1917.

By the time it entered federal service on August 5, the Fourth had reached

a strength of 1895 men, which was not far short of the required 2020. Larg-

er deficits in the other regiments were soon made good by wholesale re-

organization and infusions of draftees, but it would take time to overcome

the resulting disruption. For rapid deployment, the highest proportion of

original volunteers was clearly desirable.²¹

Despite the Fourth's relative proximity to authorized strength, man-

power was still one of the most pressing problems facing the regiment be-

fore it could join the Rainbow Division. Throughout the summer, U.S.

Army planners had been experimenting with various tables of organiza-

tion for the AEF, and they finally resolved on a divisional structure

which reduced the number of infantry regiments from nine to four. In com-

pensation, each infantry company was to expand again-this time to 256

men, for a regimental total of over 3600. Thus, the Fourth Ohio once again

found itself far below the new authorized strength. By the time this

change took effect on August 8, however, recruiting was no longer a state

responsibility, and the War Department resolved on a simple and direct

expedient to bring the Fourth in line with the new system of organization.

On August 17, orders went out transferring 16 men from each line com-

pany in the other Ohio infantry regiments to the equivalent lettered com-

pany in the Fourth. The regiment thus became a sort of "rainbow" within

the Rainbow Division, representing the entire state of Ohio in addition to

its original base around Columbus.²²

However logical this may have been, the transfers were not popular

among the troops involved, many of whom had volunteered with the un-

derstanding that by doing so they would remain among friends rather than

being drafted into a unit of complete strangers. "Some men did not want

to leave their old outfits," Cheseldine reported. There were also many com-

plaints from the original members of the Fourth, where existing units had

to be broken up even at the squad level. The reorganization clearly in-

volved a great deal of frustration and improvisation. Nevertheless, Chesel-

 

 

21. Ohio State Journal, 5 March 1917. Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Gov-

ernor of the State of Ohio for the Year Ending June 30, 1919 (Columbus, Ohio, 1921), 43.

22. Army War College, Order of Battle, 446. Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 46-47.

Kaplan, "Mobilization," 24. The present author questions Kaplan's assertion that the trans-

fer orders came from Adjutant General Wood, because the Guard units were no longer un-

der state authority after August 5, and there is no record of such orders coming from his of-

fice. Ohio Adjutant General, Special Orders, 1917, State Archives Series 117, Ohio

Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

• 10
 

Ohio's Best                                                        47

 

dine concluded, ". . after a few days the strain ended and there was no

cause for complaint." Most of the men were proud that they would be

among the first overseas, and they appreciated the need to pull together

quickly.²³

Despite the influx of new enlisted men, there had been relatively few

changes in the regiment's leadership. Excluding the chaplain and medi-

cal personnel, the original Fourth had 51 officers. Of these, 34 had held

their commissions since 1915 or earlier; seven others had been commis-

sioned in 1916, for the most part as replacements for those rejected by fed-

eral examiners at the time of the Mexican border mobilization; and the re-

maining ten were commissioned in 1917. Thus, precisely two-thirds of the

regiment's officers had held commissioned rank since before the period

of crisis, and of the less experienced third, many had at least grown ac-

customed to their responsibilities in Texas.²⁴

One must question, however, whether the National Guard system ef-

fectively prepared officers for command in battle. To become an officer,

a Guardsman had to await a vacancy within his unit and then be elected

by his peers. The election was in effect a nomination, for the candidate then

had to be confirmed by state-administered examination. But standards

were extremely liberal in comparison to officers in the Regular Army.

Apart from consideration of their "general efficiency, adaptability and ser-

vice record," candidates for second lieutenant were examined simply on

the basis of their knowledge of state geography, basic arithmetic (including

long division, the order was careful to note), and the first 66 pages of the

Infantry Drill Regulations.²⁵

Admittedly, the Ohio National Guard had launched a new program of

officer education in 1913. Adjutant General Wood created the Academic

Board of Instruction for Infantry Officers, consisting of four officers head-

ed by Colonel Bargar, who at that time still commanded the Fourth. The

Board's main function was to administer a progressive series of corre-

spondence courses. All lieutenants were required to begin with the "ba-

sic course," which dealt with "those subjects whose mastery is essential

to the proper performance of [a Junior officer's] ordinary duties with

 

 

23. Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 46-47. The present author unfortunately was not

able to determine whether the other regiments chose which men they lost, or whether the or-

ders specified certain personnel. In the former case, the transferees almost certainly would

have been green recruits.

24. Ibid., 49-50. List and Directory, 1916, 29-37.

25. Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the

Year Ending November 15, 1913 (Springfield, Ohio, 1914), 28-29. Although state governors

remained the formal source of militia commissions, the National Defense Act of 1920 lat-

er gave the War Department effective control over examination standards even in peacetime.

Hill, Minute Man, 310-11.

• 11
 

48                                                   OHIO HISTORY

 

troops." Initially these included infantry drill and field service regulations,

small unit tactics, militia regulations, map reading, and the manual of

guard duty, to which the Board added military correspondence in 1914.

After a season of individual study, each lieutenant was judged on the ba-

sis of written examinations in each category and had to repeat any which

he failed. There was no immediate penalty for failure other than having

to retake the course, but a general order warned that ". . . continued fail-

ure or neglect will result in severe measures being taken."²⁶

Lieutenants who completed the basic course and all other officers be-

low the rank of lieutenant colonel were required to undergo a more ad-

vanced course, structured as a four-year sequence. The first year dealt with

infantry drill, military hygiene, and the care of feet; the second concerned

field service regulations and tactics; the third was to focus on small arms

firing and maintenance, field fortification, and military sketching. The fi-

nal year would have dealt with administration and military law. In addi-

tion, all officers were to prepare a written solution to two tactical map

problems.²⁷

The officer education program promised to bring Ohio Guard officers

closer to professional standards, but unfortunately it was cut short by the

mobilizations of 1916-17. It is also true that many officers failed theirex-

ams, and the curriculum essentially was a catalogue of what they ought

to have mastered, not necessarily what they had. Although the courses were

a sure sign of movement in the right direction, there was as yet no real guar-

antee that an officer knew his business well. The basic obstacle was that

for most Guard officers, military study demanded difficult sacrifices of

time and money, placing practical limits on their efforts. Bargar's board

of instruction had hoped initially to complete the advanced courses in

two years, not four, but Captain Harry Tebbetts, the federal Inspector-

Instructor assigned to Ohio in 1914, concluded that the "... attempt to cov-

er the number of subjects outlined for a two years course . . . involved

somewhat more of an effort on the part of the average officer than his time

and often his inclination would permit."²⁸

Nevertheless, other factors helped to compensate at least partially for

Guard officers' lack of formal military education. One was that they al-

most always had served a number of years in the ranks of their units be-

fore receiving commissions, and the election mechanism apparently tend-

ed to favor seniority. Earl W. Fuhr, for example, had joined the Fourth in

 

 

26. Annual Report, 1913, 129. Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of

the State of Ohio for the Year Ending November 15, 1914 (Springfield, Ohio, 1915),

131-32.

27. Ibid. Annual Report, 1913, 129, 365-66.

28. Annual Report, 1914, 161.

• 12
 

Ohio's Best                                                   49

 

1909 and distinguished himself as a noncommissioned officer during the

Mexican border service before becoming a second lieutenant in 1917.

Thus, new officers often did enjoy a practical familiarity with the orga-

nization, as well as a direct mandate from the men they would lead.²⁹

Some Guard officers also benefitted from transferable skills and prior

experience. Lieutenants Robert S. Beightler (who later rose to command

the 37th Division in World War II) and William F. Busch, for example,

were both civil engineers employed by the Franklin County Surveyor's Of-

fice. Lieutenant Henry H. Grave, serving as 1st Battalion adjutant in 1917,

normally worked as Superintendent of Subsistence at the state penitentiary

in Columbus. Grave had never served in the Ohio Guard prior to being

commissioned in 1913, but he was a thirty-year veteran of the Regular

Army, having retired as Post Quartermaster Sergeant the previous year.30

Certain officers also cultivated specialized military skills on their own

initiative. One example of this in the Fourth Ohio was Lieutenant George

E. Graff, commissioned in the Machine Gun Company in 1915. Colonel

Hough wrote that Graff was "excellently qualified in the specialty . . .

which he has been following for a number of years. He is not only a ma-

chine gun expert but is very able to impart this knowledge to others . . ."

Graff eventually became a machine gun instructor at one of the AEF's

training camps in France.³¹

Unfortunately, fewer details are available concerning the quality of the

Fourth's NCOs. It is apparent, however, that there had been some serious

deficiencies in this regard prior to the war. In 1912, for example, Adju-

tant General George H. Wood noted that individual instruction in many

companies was poor, and called for increased attention to the responsi-

bilities of NCOs as squad leaders. Many units, he said, were not utiliz-

ing the services of the six Regulars assigned to the state as Sergeant-

Instructors, who would attend company drill nights if requested by com-

pany commanders. Even if fully engaged, however, these instructors

would have been spread thinly among more than 100 companies, and they

were no real substitute for seasoned unit NCOs. This seems to have been

one of the Ohio National Guard's important weaknesses.³²

Another area where the Fourth fell short of ideal standards was the ac-

tual training prescribed for the troops. Apart from mobilizations in time

of need and ceremonial functions such as parades, National Guard units

 

 

29. Ibid., 379-87. Alison Reppy, Rainbow Memories: Character Sketches and History of

the First Battalion 166th Infantry, 42nd Division American Expeditionary Force [sic]

(n.p., 1919), 54.

30. Annual Report, 1914, 386. List and Directory 1916, 38-39.

31. George E. Graff Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

32. Annual Report 1913, 21.

• 13
 

50                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

normally assembled on two occasions. One was the weekly drill night at

each company's local armory, and the other was a week-long regimental

summer camp held each year, usually at Camp Perry. In practice, only

about one hour of each weekly drill was available for instruction, and out

of necessity it dealt only with the most basic subjects, such as target prac-

tice and tent pitching. The main object of the weekly drills was to prepare

the men for more advanced exercises at summer camp, when the entire reg-

iment would assemble for marching and field problems.

Although the summer exercises provided some valuable experience in

essential matters such as movement and feeding of troops in the field, they

did not amount to realistic training for combat. In August 1914, for ex-

ample, the Fourth carried out an eight-day exercise in the vicinity of Chil-

licothe and Washington Court House. Colonel Bargar' s report to Adjutant

General Wood emphasized the disappointing effects of bad weather on the

regiment's plans. "During [Tuesday's] march," Bargar wrote, "a maneu-

ver was outlined but not carried out in detail, owing to the ground being

flooded." He went on to describe the imaginary tactical situation, even

though it clearly had played no real part in the day's activities. The weath-

er cleared on Wednesday, but the regiment spent the day simply making

camp and drying out. On Thursday it carried out "open order drills with

blank cartridges ... and administrative work." Bargar and his subordinates

had planned "an extensive maneuver" for Friday and Saturday which ought

to have been the climax of the program. "But unfortunately," the Colonel

wrote, "it rained all day Friday and the creeks were so swollen that the

ground could not be reached, as the fords were impassable. An attempt at

a short maneuver in the afternoon resulted in the entire regiment getting

soaking wet before it could return to camp."³³

The account of this exercise helps to illustrate why the Regulars tend-

ed to view Guardsmen as half-hearted amateurs with a low tolerance for

the necessary hardships of soldiering. Excuses about the weather would

count for little in real combat, particularly in the face of an enemy who

might turn conditions such as flooded streams to his own advantage. But

at the same time, even the Regular Army's training was out of touch with

some important aspects of modern warfare. Even the 1st Division, orga-

nized as a showcase unit, later required extensive preparation with assis-

tance from the British and French before it was ready to fight the Germans

on anything like even terms. Almost none of the American troops were fa-

miliar with the specialized implements of trench warfare, such as hand

grenades, trench mortars and barbed wire, to say nothing of tanks or so-

phisticated artillery tactics. Thus, Regulars and Guardsmen faced essen-

 

 

33. Annual Report, 1914, 190-92.

• 14
 

Ohio's Best                                                           51

 

tially the same challenges in France, and the distinction between them lost

much of its practical meaning.³⁴

The different components of the Army persistently clung to their own

identities, however, a fact which points toward the area of the National

Guard's greatest advantage: unit cohesion. Each Guard organization's pe-

culiar traditions and association with its home geographic region served

as a source of strength. Other armies clearly have benefitted from com-

parable arrangements, such as the British regimental system and the Ger-

mans' cantonment recruiting. In contrast, the U.S. Army sometimes has

tried to handle its men and units as interchangeable parts, as though they

were completely homogeneous. A prime example of this was Army Chief

of Staff General Peyton C. March's precipitous "One Army" manifesto of

August 1918, with which he attempted to abolish all distinctions between

the Regular Army, the National (wartime) Army, and the National Guard.

This approach tended to simplify administration and allowed maximum

freedom for reorganization and transfer of replacements, but it ignored the

more intangible value of esprit de corps.³⁵

The Fourth Ohio was relatively lucky with respect to its unit integrity.

Despite its redesignation as the 166th Infantry, it retained a large measure

of its prewar identity and consciousness of tradition. Admittedly, many

of the men who formed the wartime regiment were not members of the Old

Fourth, having come instead from the other Ohio regiments, as federal re-

serve officers who joined the unit at Camp Mills, or even, among the lat-

er replacements, as draftees. But Ohioans always considered the regiment

their own and the association with a specific home region undoubtedly

helped to sustain the unit's morale in France.³⁶

Most importantly, the Fourth retained a large enough proportion of its

original personnel, particularly its officers, to absorb the new men with-

out being overwhelmed. This was the real value of a National Guard unit:

regardless of unexpected reorganizations or shortfalls in recruiting, it pro-

 

 

34. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 374-75. For more details on the unex-

pected tactical and operational problems the AEF faced, see Allan R. Millett and Williamson

Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness Volume 1: The First World War, Mershon Center Se-

ries on Defense and Foreign Policy (Boston, 1988), 135-52.

35. Hill, Minute Man, 298. Mahon, History of the Militia, 158. March's order actually had

no legal basis, and served only to confuse the public and to antagonize partisans of both the

Regulars and the Guard.

36. The Fourth received a steady stream of letters and packages from supportive citizens,

which occasionally provided unintentional amusement. One woman sent a bundle of mag-

azines after carefully clipping out all the advertisements for lingerie. According to the reg-

imental chaplain, she ". .. evidently wasn't familiar with the best-sellers in the way of French

periodicals." The Ohio Rainbow Reveille, Overseas Edition, 24 November 1917, Ohio His-

torical Society. The troops were urged to send home copies of this unit newspaper after they

had read it, and after the war it became the organ of their veterans association.

• 15
 

52                                                     OHIO HISTORY

 

vided a cadre which could receive additional men without starting from

scratch. As Jim Dan Hill, a staunch defender of the Guard, put it, "[W]hen

there is an emergency, it is not individuals, even though they be highly-

trained and their specialties indexed, that are most needed. It is military

teams of men, organized into units that can function without delay."³⁷

Hill's assertion is borne out by the fact that, on the average, National Guard

divisions in World War I were able to commence their training six to eight

weeks faster than those of the National Army.³⁸

The subsequent performance of the Fourth Ohio supports Hill's view

as well. After the redesignation and reorganization period at Camp Per-

ry, the regiment entrained for Camp Mills, Long Island, on September 7.

There it joined the rest of the Rainbow Division and began intensified

training under the scrutiny of MacArthur and the other senior officers. Al-

though still short of parade ground perfection, on October 18 the division

embarked at Hoboken, New Jersey, for the passage to France. After fur-

ther training under Allied instructors, the 166th Infantry eventually took

over its first sector of the front line in February, 1918-one of the earli-

est American units to do so.³⁹

One might argue that the Fourth Ohio was an exceptional case, and that

it was able to reach France so quickly only by cannibalizing the rest of the

Ohio infantry regiments, an expedient which hampered those units' or-

ganization efforts at the same time it helped the Fourth. But one must con-

sider that the transfers resulted only from the unforeseen expansion of in-

fantry companies to 250 men. This decision came directly from the War

Department and was something over which the state organizations had no

control. It is more significant that the Fourth almost met the earlier re-

cruiting goals for 150-man companies, which also had come down from

Washington as an unpleasant surprise. One also should note that while the

Fourth probably was the best Ohio regiment, it was not vastly superior to

the others, most of which probably could have fulfilled the 166th's role

almost as well. Thus, the Fourth's performance remains relevant to a more

general analysis of the Guard.

Although the Fourth looked good among other Guard units, it appears

less so in comparison with European reserve forces-particularly the Ger-

 

 

 

37. Hill, Minute Man, 231-32.

38. Mahon, History of the Militia, 167.

39. James, Years of MacArthur, 141-45. Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 44-65, 112.

Ironically, another unit robbed the 42nd of its intended distinction as the first National Guard

division in France. The 26th "Yankee" Division's commander, Major General Clarence R.

Edwards, deliberately violated the War Department's plans by cutting short his men's train-

ing and moving them into embarkation areas ahead of schedule. Hill, Minute Man, 269-71,

297-98.

• 16
 

Ohio's Best                                                53

 

mans'. Although the Fourth beat out most of its rivals by departing the U.S.

within about three months of the initial mobilization, German reserve di-

visions in 1914 had marched directly to the front. Nevertheless, the com-

parison is a misleading one. Unlike the Germans, whom American mili-

tary reformers such as Upton idealized, National Guardsmen were

volunteers motivated by their own interest in military training rather than

by coercion. Particularly for officers, National Guard service involved sac-

rifices of time which often outweighed the limited financial compensation.

If the Guard had pressed its personnel too hard, they might simply have

resigned. Any great improvement of the National Guard before World

War I would have required conscription or, at the very least, substantial-

ly greater funding in order to support a higher level of training activity.

Neither was forthcoming until after the nation actually found itself at war.

In theory, the United States could have had more capable reserve

forces, ready to fight effectively on shorter notice, but the necessary po-

litical will simply was not present. Instead, the nation had to make do with

what basis for mobilization did exist. The Fourth Ohio showed how much

the National Guard could accomplish even with limited means. In help-

ing to form the Rainbow Division, which went on to fight so valiantly in

France, the regiment demonstrated the continuing viability of America's

Minute Man tradition.

• 17