NOEL FISHER
Groping Toward Victory: Ohio's
Administration
of the Civil War
The American Civil War posed a vast
challenge to the limited administra-
tive capacities of the national and
state governments, both North and South.
As the chaos of 1861 painfully revealed,
recruiting large numbers of men,
supplying them with weapons, uniforms,
and equipment, and transporting
them to the field were tasks initially
beyond the ability of any American gov-
ernment to perform efficiently. To
sustain a long war, therefore, both the
North and the South had to increase the
size and efficiency of their military
administrations. Both sides, though the
Union more than the Confederacy,
would adapt fairly quickly to the
demands of the war, and within a year they
would manage to build and maintain
armies far larger than any in previous
American experience. Yet even by 1865
there were areas in which administra-
tion was still defective.l
The experience of Ohio illustrates well
both the process and the difficulties
of developing administrative systems for
the war. Ohio began the conflict
with a militia system still in the early
stages of reform, a military staff made
up largely of political appointees, and
a nearly empty armory. Its initial mo-
bilization was typically chaotic, and
errors in the first months of the war
plagued not only Governor William
Dennison but also his successor,
Governor David Tod. Haphazard federal
policies, shortages of resources, dis-
agreements with the War Department, and
mere inexperience all created nu-
merous difficulties, as did a resentment
of increases in executive power. But
Ohio's three war governors, Dennison,
Tod, and John Brough, all proved to
be dedicated and innovative
administrators, and by 1863 most areas of Ohio's
mobilization were functioning smoothly.
Part of the state's success, though,
resulted from simply abandoning numerous
responsibilities to the federal
government and focusing on a narrow range
of activities, particularly recruit-
ing.
Noel Fisher received his Ph.D. from The
Ohio State University in 1993.
1. Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men
(Madison, 1971); Richard D. Goff, Confederate
Supply (Durham, 1969); Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster
General of the Union Army: A
Biography of M. C. Meigs (New York, 1959); Fred Albert Shannon, The
Organization and
Administration of the Union Army (Cleveland, 1928); Albert Burton Moore, Conscription
and
Conflict in the Confederacy (New York, 1924).
26 OHIO
HISTORY
The story of Ohio's wartime mobilization
has been told several times and
from several different perspectives, and
it is not the purpose of this article
simply to relate that story again.2
Its focus, rather, is on the development of
administrative systems in the state: the
structure and functions of the staff,
the role of the militia, the methods
developed by Ohio for recruiting and sup-
plying its soldiers, and the
effectiveness with which Ohio carried out these
tasks.
The Military Staff
Ohio's military staff structure
underwent a number of changes in the first
two years of the war. Several positions
were added, the responsibilities of
some offices expanded dramatically while
others were practically eliminated,
and a number of administrators who
proved inept were replaced. Despite nu-
merous changes, however, the number of
men who actually directed Ohio's
mobilization was strikingly small, and
increases in the size of the military
staff did not nearly match the increase
in responsibilities that came with the
war.
The militia laws of 1857 established a
staff of seven officers: an Adjutant
General, who would also act as Inspector
General; a Quartermaster General; a
Paymaster General; an Engineer in Chief;
a Judge Advocate General; and two
Aides-de-Camp. The governor was also
granted authority to organize a com-
missary department and a medical
department, headed by a Commissary
General and a Surgeon General,
respectively, but these departments did not ex-
ist in April 1861. In the prewar period
staff positions were essentially politi-
cal appointments, with limited pay,
status, and responsibilities, and were fre-
quently filled by men of limited
abilities. This situation improved only
slightly in early 1861, when the
Adjutant General and Quartermaster General
were given office space in the
statehouse and an increased budget.3
Due to these and other weaknesses, Ohio's
staff was unable to manage ef-
fectively the initial mobilization.
Adjutant General Henry B. Carrington ac-
cepted far too many companies in the
first two weeks and was subsequently
forced to dismiss many of them. This
action created considerable resentment,
2. Richard H. Abbott, Ohio's Civil
War Governors (Columbus, 1962); Eugene H. Roseboom,
The Civil War Period, 1850-1873, in The History of Ohio, ed. by Carl Wittke, vol.
4 (Columbus,
1944); Emelius O. Randall and Daniel J.
Ryan, History of Ohio: The Rise and Progress of an
American State, vol. 4 (New York, 1912); Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the
War: Her Statesmen,
Her Generals, and Soldiers, 2 vols. (New York, 1868).
3. Militia Law of Ohio, Being an Act
to Organize and Discipline the Militia and Volunteer
Militia, Passed March 28, 1857 (Columbus, 1857); Ohio, Annual Report of the
Adjutant
General, 1861 (Columbus, 1862), 420-21; General Regulations
for the Military Force of Ohio,
with Laws Pertaining Thereto, Compiled
and Prepared by Henry B. Carrington (Columbus,
1861), 7, 76-79, 157, 192-93.
Groping Toward Victory
27
reduced the initial enthusiasm for the
war, and lost the state a number of re-
cruits. Carrington also mislaid muster
rolls and confused the order in which
companies had been accepted, leading to
numerous disputes among units con-
cerning their designation. Mistakes in
supply were equally numerous and
costly. Tents and camp equipment were
shipped to the wrong locations,
many of the items contracted for in April
and May were defective, and Ohio's
first two regiments were sent to
Washington, D.C., without arms. To com-
pensate for the limitation of his staff,
Dennison attempted to shoulder much
of the administrative burden himself. He
not only rallied the state and called
in volunteers, he also personally
negotiated contracts for uniforms and arms,
arranged transportation for soldiers and
supplies, and provided funds for these
activities. But the governor, though
possessed of seemingly unlimited en-
ergy, lacked experience in military
affairs, and many of his actions were faulty
as well.4
Once the pressure of the initial
mobilization had eased, therefore, Dennison
took a number of steps to strengthen his
staff. First, he replaced two key of-
ficers. In July Carrington resigned to
accept a colonel's commission in the
regular army and was succeeded by
Colonel C.P. Buckingham, a dedicated and
efficient administrator. Buckingham
unsnarled the bureaucratic tangle that
Carrington had left, located or
reconstituted missing records, increased the
clerical staff, and instituted new
procedures to speed the formation of compa-
nies and regiments. Buckingham was
called to the War Department in July,
and he was succeeded first by Brigadier
General Charles H. Hill, then by
Brigadier General Benjamin R. Cowen,
both of whom were equally efficient.
The Quartermaster's Department also
changed hands. In October 1861
Quartermaster General D.L. Wood resigned
to raise a regiment and was suc-
ceeded by Colonel George B. Wright, who
remained in this office until the
end of the war. Wright was zealous and
hard working, and he made strenuous
attempts to acquire the best arms and
equipment possible for the state's
troops.5
4. Governor William Dennison to Hon.
Stanley Matthews, 18 April 1861, Dennison to
General L. A. Sheldon, 19 April 1861,
Governor's Correspondence, 1862-1864, Series 142,
vol. 3, Adjutant General, Civil War,
Administration, Ohio Historical Society, hereinafter cited
as Series 142, OHS; Ohio, Annual
Report of the Adjutant General, 1862 (Columbus, 1863), 289-
90; Matthew Oyos, "The Mobilization
of the Ohio Militia in the Civil War," Ohio History, 98
(Summer-Autumn, 1989), 147-74; Harry L.
Coles, Ohio Forms an Army (Columbus, 1962);
Roseboom, Civil War, 380-81;
Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 159-66; Joshua G. Bates,
Ohio's Preparation for the War (Cincinnati, 1884); Reid, Ohio in the War, 25-29,
54-55;
Captain Guthrie to Quartermaster General
D. L. Wood, 14 June 1861, Telegraphic Dispatches
to the Quartermaster General, Series
134, vol 1, Office of the Adjutant General,
Quartermaster General, Ohio Historical
Society, Columbus, Ohio, hereinafter cited as Series
134, OHS.
5. Annual Report, 1861, 151, 168; Annual Report, 1862, 291;
"Annual Report of the Adjutant
General," in Messages and
Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio
for the Year 1863 (Columbus, 1864), frontpiece; "Annual Report of
the Adjutant General," in
28 OHIO
HISTORY
In addition to securing more capable
administrators, Dennison also ex-
panded his staff. In April the state
legislature granted the governor authority
to appoint several assistant
quartermaster generals and aides-de-camp and a
medical board to examine and certify
regimental surgeons. Dennison also es-
tablished a Commissary Department,
headed by George W. Runyan, and ap-
pointed an assistant adjutant general to
ease the load on Carrington. Both the
Adjutant General and the Quartermaster
General in turn hired a large force of
clerks to process the mountains of
paperwork in each office. By 1863, for
example, the office of Quartermaster
General included an Assistant
Quartermaster General, a Chief Clerk of
Ordinance, an Assistant Clerk of
Ordinance, a Bookkeeper/Auditor, an
Assistant Bookkeeper/Auditor, a
Transportation Clerk, a Ticket Clerk, a
Superintendent of the State Arsenal,
and a Superintendent of the State
Laboratory. All these additions gave the
governor a staff of reasonable size, and
one capable of performing effectively
the tasks of mobilization.6
But this pleasant situation was
short-lived. The Ohio legislature was reluc-
tant to fund an establishment of this
size, and the belief in the spring of 1862
that the war was nearly won increased
this reluctance. In April 1862 the leg-
islature eliminated the office of
Assistant Adjutant General, and the next
month it allowed the commissions for
Commissary General and Judge
Advocate General to expire. As explained
below, the loss of the Commissary
General and Judge Advocate General was
not critical, but the elimination of
the Assistant Adjutant General was a
serious blow. In addition to its prewar
duties of writing regulations for the
state forces, issuing yearly reports, and
heading the state militia, the Adjutant
General's office was expected to exam-
ine muster rolls, oversee the formation
of regiments, help devise recruiting
policies, maintain the flow of reports
to Washington, D.C., advise the gover-
nor, manage the reorganization of the
state militia, and compile lists of offi-
cers and men from Ohio serving in the
war. Much of this work the Adjutant
General was required to supervise
personally, and having an assistant had con-
siderably eased this load. The position
of Assistant Adjutant General was not
restored for over a year, and to
compensate the Adjutant General was forced to
Messages and Reports to the General
Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year
1864 (Columbus, 1865), frontpiece; Governor William Dennison
to Quartermaster General D.
L. Wood, 14 October 1861, Governor
Dennison's Military Correspondence, Series 1606, vol.
1, Office of the Adjutant General, Civil
War, Administration, Ohio Historical Society,
Columbus, Ohio, hereinafter cited as
Series 1606, OHS.
6. Annual Report, 1861, 151, 178; General Regulations, 79, 157,
192-93, 226-29, 249;
Annual Report, 1862, 288-89; "Report of the Quartermaster
General," in Messages and
Reports to the General Assembly and
Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1863
(Columbus, 1864), 534, 592; "Annual
Report of the Adjutant General," in Messages and
Reports to the General Assembly and
Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1865
(Columbus, 1866), 5-6.
Groping Toward Victory 29
increase his clerical staff well in
excess of his budget.7
While some offices expanded
dramatically, others almost disappeared, either
because their duties were transferred to
federal officers or because they were
found to be of little use. In late 1861,
for example, the War Department
agreed to take responsibility for
arming, equipping, and feeding all recruits as
soon as they arrived in camp, and the
state Quartermaster General and
Commissary General were left to care for
only the state troops. Thus in early
1862 these offices were combined into
one. Experience also demonstrated
that the Engineer in Chief, Judge
Advocate General, and Aide de Camp had
few duties to perform for the war, and
these offices were likewise merged into
a single position.8
Recruiting
Recruiting was by far the most important
and demanding task that the state
governments performed in the war.
Raising men and organizing them into
units was a complex, laborious task that
became increasingly difficult as pub-
lic enthusiasm for the war declined.
Recruiting was also an inherently politi-
cal process, and the fairness,
efficiency, and diplomacy with which it was car-
ried out would not only influence
support for the war but also affect the polit-
ical fortunes of the governor and his
appointees.
Systems for recruiting in Ohio evolved
almost constantly throughout the
war. The increasing difficulty of
securing men spurred numerous innova-
tions, but the desire of the governor to
secure maximum control over the pro-
cess, and the quest for more efficient
methods, also contributed to change.
Ohio's mechanisms were generally quite
effective, and the state's governors
devised a number of innovations that the
War Department subsequently
adopted. But as was common, Ohio's
success came at a high price in
bonuses, inequities, and corruption.
The state militia was supposed to
provide a ready means for mobilization in
the event of war. But the militia in
Ohio, as in other states, had declined pre-
cipitously in the antebellum period.
Musters had been held less and less fre-
quently, militia laws ignored, and arms
supplied by the federal government
neglected and lost. Thus, when Salmon P.
Chase assumed the governorship
in 1856, he made militia reform a
priority. The result was a new set of mili-
tia laws, passed in 1857, and increased
public attention to the topic of state
defense. The 1857 laws required the
enrollment of all white males ages eigh-
teen to forty-five, their attendance at
three musters per year, and an annual
7. General Regulations, 76-78; Annual
Report, 1861, 151; Annual Report, 1862, 288-90;
"Annual Report," 1863, 359.
8. "Annual Report," 1863, 527.
30 OHIO HISTORY
brigade encampment of two to six days.
They also authorized the formation
of volunteer companies, who were
required to serve for five years and who
would be the first units called in an
emergency. Finally, the new legislation
created a military staff and an
elaborate structure of brigades, regiments, and
divisions.9
These laws were typical of those found
in other states, but they were im-
possible to implement. The organization
of regiments, brigades, and divi-
sions was a paper structure that served
mostly to create a large number of
high-ranking offices. Furthermore, the
state legislature refused to appropriate
sufficient funds to supply and train even
a small portion of the available
manpower. Thus, in subsequent years
Adjutant General Carrington advocated
a number of changes in the laws,
particularly a shift from universal service to
the recruitment of a limited number of
well-trained companies, who would be
paid for their service. This suggestion
was ignored, but in 1861 the state leg-
islature reduced the number of divisions
and created a more realistic structure.
For the most part, however, the reform
years were frustrating. The legislature
was tightfisted, the public showed
little interest in reform, and Carrington
was forced to spend much of his time
tracking down arms previously received
from the federal government.l0
Ohio thus entered the war with a small
and still developing militia. In
1860 Carrington could report only twelve
hundred enrolled infantry, two ar-
tillery batteries, and a handful of
cavalry. Ohio's first two regiments had to
be patched together from volunteer
companies, while the next eleven were
completed through an equally haphazard
process. The governor simply issued
recruiting commissions to applicants who
seemed capable of raising compa-
nies or regiments, and these men in turn
located recruits. The system, such
as it was, relied on individual
influence and initiative and the public's
widespread enthusiasm for the war.
Recruiters were required by law to report
regularly to the adjutant general on
their activities or lose their commissions,
but enforcement of this regulation was
lax.11
After the initial mobilization, therefore,
Dennison and Adjutant General
Buckingham initiated a number of changes
to make recruiting more efficient.
Their first step was to improve the
process by which troops were organized
and mustered into federal service. Under
existing regulations, companies had
9. Militia Law; Reid, Ohio in
the War, 18-19.
10. Ohio, Annual Report of the
Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the
Year 1859 (Columbus, 1860), 1-9; Ohio, Annual Report of the
Adjutant General to the Governor
of the State of Ohio for the Year
1860 (Columbus, 1861), 5-8, 10-12, 17;
General Regulations,
401-02, 425-26; Annual Report, 1861, 169-77.
11. Annual Report, 1861; Ohio,
Adjutant General's Department, Directions for Enlisting and
Organizing Volunteer Forces in Ohio (Columbus, 1861); Oyos, "Mobilization;"
Coles, Ohio
Forms an Army; Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 159-66;
Bates, Preparation for the War;
Reid, Ohio, 25-29.
Groping Toward Victory 31 |
|
to be recruited to full strength before the men could be enrolled. Regiments, likewise, had to be completed before regimental officers could be appointed and begin drawing supplies. Early recruits, thus, had to endure an indefinite period of uncertainty, lasting from a few days to a few weeks, until their units were fully organized. During this time they could receive no supplies, equipment, or subsistence from federal stores, and they were under the author- ity of no officers. This situation created considerable hardship and discontent, and a number of troops responded either by deserting or by transferring to other units, in Ohio or other states. Others who remained created discipline problems or complained to relatives, politicians, or the press. Thus, in August 1861, under pressure from Ohio and other states, the War Department established new mustering procedures for both companies and reg- iments. These new regulations allowed recruits to be mustered in as half companies and authorized the appointment of a regimental quartermaster, sur- geon, and assistant surgeon at the beginning of a regiment's organization. Shortly thereafter the War Department modified these orders further and autho- rized the mustering of a lieutenant at the beginning of a company's organiza- tion. Company and regimental officers could then requisition and distribute |
32 OHIO
HISTORY
supplies to recruits as the men arrived.
These changes not only accelerated
mustering, they also ensured that a
recruit would be provided for as soon as he
arrived in camp. This system was
retained until March 1864.12
Dennison's second important step was to
secure complete control over the
recruiting process. This move involved
the governor in conflicts with both
the War Department and influential
figures in Ohio, but Dennison's insis-
tence on control, though politically
motivated, was necessary to the estab-
lishment of a rational system for
recruiting. The issue of control emerged in
the summer of 1861, when Secretary of
War Simon Cameron issued recruit-
ing commissions for two cavalry
regiments and a battery of artillery. Shortly
thereafter, Cameron authorized Major
General John C. Fremont to raise two
cavalry regiments in Ohio for service in
Missouri, while two other men re-
ceived commissions for two additional
regiments of cavalry. Cameron failed
to inform Dennison of most of these
actions, and the governor had to discover
them on his own. Dennison, angry that
his own authority had been com-
promised, complained that Cameron's
appointees were hampering recruiting
for infantry regiments, and in August he
demanded that the War Department
give him undiluted control over
recruiting in his own state. Cameron agreed
and promised to issue no more
commissions. Shortly thereafter the War
Department formally established
Dennison's control over recruiting. In
September the federal adjutant general,
Lorenzo Thomas, ordered all persons
in Ohio raising troops to report
immediately to Dennison and gave the gover-
nor supervision over their work. Then in
December Thomas issued orders
that further clarified the governor's
authority: "During the organization of new
regiments in the state of Ohio, and
until the muster rolls are completed, the
Governor of the state will have
exclusive control there, and he is authorized to
transfer companies, detachments-whether
mustered into the service or not-
from one regiment to another, as he may
find necessary to complete their or-
ganization."13
12. Annual Report, 1861, 165-69;
Colonel C.P. Buckingham to A. E. Merritt, 14 August 1861,
Military Correspondence of the Adjutant
General, 1861-1876, Series 146, vol. 3, Adjutant
General, Administration, Ohio Historical
Society, hereinafter cited as Series 146, OHS;
Governor William Dennison to Secretary
of War Simon P. Cameron, 15 August 1861, Cameron
to Dennison, 15 August 1861, The War
of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880-1900), hereinafter cited as
O.R., Series III, vol.
1,416; Buckingham to Major W. J. Cramm,
29 August 1861, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 7, OHS;
Department of the Adjutant General,
General Orders No. 75, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 8,
OHS; Assistant Adjutant General Thomas
A. Vincent to Colonel James A. Wilcox, 31 March
1864, Correspondence of the Adjutant
General, Governor, Armory Board, and other
Correspondence Relating to the Civil
War, 1842-47, 1850-56, 1861-1918, Series 1629, Box 3,
folder 13, Ohio Historical Society,
hereinafter cited as Series 1629, OHS.
13. Governor William Dennison to
Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron, 1 August 1861, 23
August 1861, O.R., Series III, vol. 1,
377, 447; Dennison to Cameron, 16 August 1861, Series
1606, vol. 1, OHS; Annual Report,
1861, 162-63, 167; Department of Adjutant General, Special
Orders No. 243, 10 September 1861,
Special Orders No. 319, 3 December 1861, Series 1629,
Groping Toward Victory 33
Dennison's final reform, and perhaps his
most important, was the creation
in the fall of 1861 of a network of
county military committees. By this
point the governor had recognized that
the labor of mobilization was far
greater than he and his staff could
accomplish on their own. The committees
thus were established to provide a
reliable means of conducting the work of
mobilization at the local level and to
link local communities to the state gov-
ernment. The county committees consisted
of from four to ten men, and
eventually they were called on to
perform a multitude of tasks. They
screened and recommended candidates for
commissions, organized recruiting
rallies, helped administer the draft,
pressured deserters to return to the ranks,
raised and distributed funds for
soldiers' families, and helped reorganize the
state militia. They also granted local
figures input into decisions, provided
the governor with information, and
mediated federal and state authority.14
Governor David Tod, who succeeded
Dennison in January 1862, continued
his predecessor's quest to improve
Ohio's methods of recruiting. Tod's most
important innovation was the shift to
recruiting by districts, a change that
was prompted by a dangerous lag in
volunteering. In May 1862 Tod had is-
sued commissions for three new infantry
regiments, but after six weeks of ef-
fort none was near completion. Thus,
when President Abraham Lincoln
called for 300,000 men in July 1862 and
Ohio faced the daunting task of rais-
ing 37,000 recruits, Tod and Adjutant
General Charles H. Hill realized the ne-
cessity for creating a new system. Their
solution was to divide the state into
eleven recruiting districts, ranging in
size from three to nine counties, and,
with the aid of the military committees,
to assign each district a portion of
Ohio's quota. Some districts were in
turn divided into subdistricts with their
own quotas. Tod reasoned, correctly,
that this system would improve recruit-
ing in at least three ways. First, it
would give regiments a local identity,
strengthen ties between soldiers and
communities, and generate increased sup-
port for the war. Second, the new system
would spur recruiting by placing
the responsibility for meeting the
state's quota on individual communities.
Any district that failed to meet its
assignment would be marked as deficient
and face embarrassment accordingly.
Finally, recruiting by districts was a
major step toward the creation of an
organized system for raising men. It
abandoned the haphazard reliance on
individual initiative and placed the re-
sponsibility on townships and counties;
it also attempted to balance the mili-
tary demands on all areas of the state.15
Box 3, folder 7, OHS; John A. Gurley to
President Abraham Lincoln, 16 September 1861, O.R.,
Series III, vol. 1, 519-20.
14. Annual Report, 1862, 300-01;
"Annual Report," 1863, 449-53; "Annual Report," 1864,
13-14, 257-61, 273-74; Abbott, Civil
War Governors, 16; Reid, Ohio in the War, 70-71, 217-19.
15. Governor David Tod to Secretary of
War Edwin M. Stanton, 20 August 1862, O.R.,
Series III, vol. 1, 421; Tod to Provost
Marshal James B. Fry, 28 October 1863, O.R., Series III,
vol. 3, 943; Annual Report, 1862,
298-301, 303-08; "Annual Report," 1864, 273-74.
34 OHIO HISTORY |
|
Tod also attempted to tap new sources of manpower, but here his success was more mixed. Tod's first target was the state's immigrant population. In July 1862 he issued recruiting commissions for three German and one Irish regiments and granted the recruiters considerable aid and latitude. The results, though, were somewhat disappointing. One German regiment was com- pleted, but recruiting for the other two lagged, and by some error they were sent to Kentucky before they could be filled. The Irish regiment fared even worse. After two months of work its original recruiters had failed to com- plete even a single company and had somehow lost all the enlistment papers. Another officer then took up the work, but he managed to recruit only one company and fragments of others. In December these were inserted into an- other regiment then forming, and no more such units were authorized. Other states had successfully organized ethnic units, but Ohio may have waited too long to make the experiment.16 Ohio was only somewhat more successful in recruiting African-American troops. Both Dennison and Tod rejected numerous offers of service from
16. Annual Report, 1862, 302-03. |
Groping Toward Victory
35
African-Americans in the first two years
of the war, and Tod had not objected
when recruiters from the 54th
Massachusetts, the famous black regiment orig-
inated by Governor John Andrew,
officered by the Massachusetts elite, and
filled out with prominent free blacks,
operated in Ohio. But by the summer
of 1863 official attitudes had changed.
Manpower quotas were bearing heavily
on the state, the draft was looming, and
the administration was determined to
obtain every recruit possible. Thus,
when in May 1863 the War Department
authorized Ohio to raise one regiment of
African-American troops, Tod
pushed this project with great energy.
He quickly issued recruiting commis-
sions, established a special camp of
rendezvous near Delaware, created a vol-
unteer fund for the support of families
of recruits, and issued a proclamation
asking for assistance and support from
the population. By November eight
companies had been completed, but the
War Department then stopped recruit-
ing and ordered them sent to the Fifth
United States Colored Troops near
Nashville. State authorities were thus
denied the opportunity to field a full
regiment with an Ohio designation. In
January 1864 Ohio received a second
chance, when Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton authorized a second unit.
Recruiting for this regiment,
subsequently designated the 27th United States
Colored Troops, preceded more rapidly,
and it was completed within a few
months. Nonetheless, Tod's hopes of
relieving the burden on the white pop-
ulation by recruiting blacks were
disappointed. Ohio received credit for
slightly over five thousand
African-American recruits, but due to the state's
early resistance to their service, lack
of incentives for recruits, and lack of
support for their families, hundreds
more served in federal units or those of
other states.17
Least successful of all were Ohio's
efforts to recruit in the South. In July
1864 the War Department authorized Northern
governors to employ a limited
number of recruiting agents in occupied
territory. Governor Brough saw this
as yet another means of filling the
state's quotas, and soon Ohio had numer-
ous agents scouring Tennessee, Alabama,
Mississippi, and other states for
men. But these manpower brokers, who had
expected quick results and easy
profits, soon became discouraged. They
faced stiff competition from the
agents of other states, while Union
officers, particularly Major General
William T. Sherman, were hostile and
uncooperative. And the existence of
17. Office of the Adjutant General,
General Orders No. 143, 22 May 1863, Governor David
Tod to Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton, 27 May 1863, Stanton to Tod, 27 May 1863,
Assistant Adjutant General C. W. Foster
to Tod, 18 June 1863, Tod, "To the People of Ohio,"
22 June 1863, Tod to Stanton, 26 June
1863, Stanton to Tod, 27 June 1863, O.R., Series III, vol.
3, 215-16, 229, 380-81, 402, 419; Foster
to Tod, 11 January 1864, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 10,
OHS; Provost Marshal General James B.
Fry to Governor John Brough, 20 July 1864, Series
142, Vol. 3, OHS; Foster to Brough, 20
September 1864, Series 1629, Box 3, folder 12, OHS;
"Annual Report," 1863,
299-300; Charles H. Wesley, Ohio Negroes in the Civil War
(Columbus, 1962); Reid, Ohio in the
War, 176-77.
36 OHIO HISTORY |
|
only a single camp of rendezvous, at Bridgeport, Alabama, made the expenses of transporting and feeding recruits unusually high. Within a few weeks most of Ohio's agents had returned, bringing back only a handful of men.18 Recruiting by districts created a more structured, ordered system of raising men and created an incentive for communities to fill their quotas. The strongest motivation for individual recruits, however, was provided by boun- ties. Some communities began offering bounties in the first months of the war, and after 1862 the practice became almost universal. The amount paid to recruits varied considerably, but by 1864 the average bounty was around four hundred dollars, and some areas offered as high as eight hundred dollars. In all, Ohio paid twenty-three million dollars in local bounties during the war. These were in addition to the bounties offered by the federal government. 19
18. Governor John Brough to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 14 July 1864, 18 July 1864, Provost Marshal General James B. Fry to Brough, 18 July 1864, Stanton to Brough, 4 August 1864, O.R., Series III, vol. 4, 494, 514-515, 575-76; Hugh Carey to Brigadier General Benjamin R. Cowen, 2 August 1864, 16 August 1864, Series 1629, Box 1, folder 7, OHS; "Annual Report," 1864, 271-72. 19. Eugene C. Murdock, Ohio's Bounty System in the Civil War (Columbus, 1963); Randall and Ryan, History of Ohio, 184. |
Groping Toward Victory 37
Under the recruiting system created by
the federal and state governments,
bounties were an inevitable development.
But they did not constitute in any
way an organized system, nor were they
under the control of the state gov-
ernment. Bounties were raised by local
communities, and to a great extent
the system was operated by private
brokers who brought in recruits and then
took part, or all, of the bounty as
their fee. Governor Brough began to inves-
tigate the bounty system in 1864, and
soon he became one of its fiercest crit-
ics. In February 1865 Brough sent
Stanton a long indictment that charged
that bounties were creating a vast
system of inequity and corruption. Urban
districts, which could pay higher
bounties, drew off manpower from poorer
rural areas. Many recruits lost their
bounties to brokers, while others secured
their payments and then deserted.
Finally, Brough charged that the bounty
system had corrupted at least half the
deputy provost marshals in Ohio.
According to his investigation, numbers
of these officials were in league with
bounty brokers and were paid large sums
for their cooperation. Brough thus
recommended that the entire system be reformed,
but his charges came too
late to have much effect.20
Until 1864 Ohio's organized militia
system played a relatively minor role
in the recruiting process. The initial
mobilization took most of the available
companies, and the subsequent demands of
the war left the Adjutant General's
office little time to rebuild the force.
It was not until 1863 that the state leg-
islature passed "An Act to Organize
and Discipline the Militia," a set of laws
that provided for the formation of new
militia companies on the same plan as
the 1861 laws. Major General John Hunt
Morgan's raid across the Ohio
River and the state's panicked response
disrupted the reorganization process,
but militia encampments were held in
August and September, and by
December over 167,000 men had enrolled.
But the resulting force was as un-
wieldy as the prewar militia, and in
March 1864 the Ohio legislature made a
second, more fundamental attempt at
reorganization. The new laws abandoned
the ideal of universal service,
dissolved the enrolled militia, and retained only
the volunteer militia. The resulting
force, now known as the Ohio National
Guard, was more centralized than the old
and more under the authority of the
governor and the Adjutant General. Men
wishing to form companies had to
apply to the county military committees
for recommendation; they were then
given recruiting commissions by the
governor. Companies would have to
give bond before they could receive arms,
and the governor was granted au-
thority to disband units that failed to
pass inspection or who refused to report
for service when ordered out.21
20. Governor John Brough to Secretary of
War Edwin M. Stanton, 6 February 1865, O.R.,
Series III, vol. 4, 1149-51;
"Annual Report," 1864, 6-8.
21. Governor William Dennison to
Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron, 19 August 1861,
O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 430;
"Annual Report," 1863, 362-428; "Annual Report," 1864,
8-14,
38 OHIO HISTORY
The 1864 laws marked the beginning of
the modern National Guard in
Ohio. Of more immediate importance, the
new militia created an opportunity
for Brough to make a dramatic
contribution to the war. In April 1864 the
governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Iowa, and Wisconsin drafted a plan to
raise 100,000 three-months troops. The
primary purpose of this force was to
free up more men for Lieutenant General
Ulysses S. Grant's impending cam-
paign in Virginia by replacing veterans
now serving in garrisons and on rail-
road lines. This scheme was popular in
Ohio, for it would allow volunteers
to make a short-term, relatively safe
contribution to the war. This prospect
fueled enthusiasm for the militia, and
all over the state new companies were
quickly enrolled. By the end of May Ohio
had sent 35,000 militia to the
East, where they served not only as
garrison troops but also with the Army of
the Potomac.22
Although not all its methods were
successful, Ohio exceeded its total man-
power quota for the war and outdid most
other states in recruiting. But Ohio
failed in its attempts to devise an
effective system for replacing losses in ex-
isting regiments. This was a vexing
problem shared by all states and one that
no government ever solved. In 1861 the
War Department had authorized reg-
imental officers to detach men from
their units and send them home to recruit
replacements, and this system was
supposed to keep existing regiments at full
strength. But regimental recruiters
brought in few troops, and many regi-
ments shrank to less than half their
original numbers. Tod believed that the
problem was that the men sent to recruit
had no incentive to carry out their
duties, and he proposed to remedy that
defect. In May 1862 he suggested
combining all recruits not yet mustered
into full companies. Officers dis-
placed by this process would be given
forty days to complete a new company;
if they failed they would lose their
commissions. The War Department ig-
nored this suggestion, but two months
later the governor proposed a similar
scheme. Noting that "recruiting
officers for new regiments have their com-
missions to earn; those of the old have
theirs in their pockets," Tod again
suggested giving these men an equally
powerful incentive. Regimental
commanders, or the governor, would
appoint noncommissioned officers to re-
cruit, with the promise of a commission
when they met their quotas. But the
War Department misunderstood Tod's
scheme. Stanton replied that, under
General Orders No. 88, noncommissioned
officers already could be sent home
to recruit for existing companies and
they needed no commissions to do so.
266; Roseboom, Civil War Period, 405;
Reid, Ohio in the War, 130-33.
22. Governors John Brough, Oliver P.
Morton, Richard Yates, W. M. Stone, and James T.
Lewis to President Abraham Lincoln, 21
April 1864, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to
Brough, 16 May 1864, 26 May 1864,
Lincoln, "Special Executive Order Returning Thanks for
the Ohio Volunteers for 100 Days,"
O.R., Series III, vol. 4, 237-38, 384, 411, 707-08; "Annual
Report," 1864, 18-37, 267; G. W.
Carey to Brough, 7 May 1864, Series 1629, Box 4, folder 3,
OHS; Randall and Ryan, History of
Ohio, 254-55.
Groping Toward Victory
39
Only if an entire company were required
could the governor issue recruiting
commissions. Tod subsequently proposed
other schemes for bringing old reg-
iments up to strength, but none was
implemented.23
Even so, the shrinkage of existing
regiments remained a critical problem.
On 18 August 1862 the War Department
notified Tod that 37,500 men would
be required to bring the state's units
to full strength, and in March 1863
Sherman estimated Ohio's deficit at
50,000. Thus, in September 1863 Tod
again urged that officers and men
"ready for promotion" be sent home to re-
cruit with the reward of commissions if
they succeeded. This time the War
Department responded favorably and
authorized the governor to issue recruit-
ing commissions, set quotas, and
establish time limits for meeting them.
Tod was pleased with this success, but
he proposed to expand his scheme fur-
ther. Arguing that the deputy provost
marshals in Ohio were "comparatively
idle and will make good recruiting
officers," the governor suggested setting
quotas for them as well, again with the
promise of a commission for meeting
them. Provost Marshal General James B.
Fry replied that he had been con-
templating a similar scheme, though his
employed bounties as an incentive
rather than commissions, and agreed to
allow Tod to try his own plan. Even
with these innovations, however, Ohio
failed to attain many recruits to beef
up its existing regiments. The state's
deficit continued to grow, and in March
1864 the War Department revoked the
authority of the governor to issue re-
cruiting commissions for old regiments.
Shortly thereafter Stanton invited
Brough to devise his own scheme for
filling existing regiments, but the war
ended before any effective solution
could be found.24
Supply
In April 1861 Ohio was largely
unprepared for the manpower demands of
the war, having only the militia and the
volunteer companies as a foundation
for recruiting. But Ohio's preparations
in the area of supply were even more
inadequate. The state possessed only a
small amount of arms and equipment,
and its capacity to acquire more was
severely limited. Dennison was a great
23. Office of the Adjutant General,
General Orders No. 69, 28 August 1861, Series 1629,
Box 3, folder 7, OHS; Governor David Tod
to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 23 May
1862, Tod to President Abraham Lincoln,
28 July 1862, Tod to Brigadier General C. P.
Buckingham, 1 August 1862, Buckingham to
Tod, 4 August 1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 66-67,
269, 289, 293.
24. Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham to
Governor David Tod, 18 August 1862, O.R.,
Series III, vol. 2, 407; Major General
William T. Sherman to Tod, 12 March 1863, O.R., Series
III, vol. 3, 65-66; Tod to Secretary of
War Edwin M. Stanton, 18 September 1863, Tod to
Provost Marshal General James B. Fry, 25
September 1863, Fry to Tod, 29 September 1863,
O.R., Series III, vol. 3, 822, 839,
849-50; Fry to Tod, 23 September 1863, Series 1629, Box 4,
folder 2, OHS.
40 OHIO
HISTORY
improvisor, but even so the first months
of the war were characterized by
shortages and defective supplies. By the
end of 1861 the state had simply re-
linquished most of the tasks of supply
to the federal government.
The condition of the state arsenal at
the beginning of the war was pitiful.
Despite the efforts of the Adjutant
General to collect arms scattered around the
state, in April 1861 Ohio possessed only
about 2700 muskets, a few hundred
swords, some old artillery pieces, and a
small quantity of camp equipment.
Quartermaster General Wood could furnish
only parts of three regiments with
infantry accoutrements, and he could
find not a single tent. Even worse, fear
of invasion in southern Ohio forced the
governor to retain some arms for state
defense, and Ohio's first two regiments
were sent off without weapons.25
But Governor Dennison was resourceful,
and immediately he began scour-
ing the country for supplies. He sent
Wood and Judge Advocate General C.P.
Wolcott to Washington, D.C., and New
York City to purchase arms, and
eventually the two men brought back
almost 12,000 muskets and rifles.
Dennison also persuaded Miles Greenwood,
a large machine works in
Cincinnati, to repair and alter old
muskets. In late April the War Department
sent 10,000 muskets and 400,000
cartridges, with the promise of more to
come, while Governor Richard Yates of
Illinois donated an additional 5,000
muskets. The governor also contracted
with a number of firms in Ohio and
surrounding states for blankets, tents,
canteens, powder, and ammunition, and
he established a state laboratory in
Columbus to manufacture powder and
ammunition.26
Through these means Ohio managed to arm
and equip its first regiments.
But the state's resources, financial and
industrial, were simply unequal to the
demands of the war, and the
Quartermaster General simply could not fully
supply all the thousands of recruits
pouring into camp. Throughout the
summer and fall of 1861 Dennison
received a steady stream of complaints that
troops were serving without uniforms,
cookware, infantry accoutrements, and
reliable arms. Dennison had hoped that
Major General George C. McClellan
25. Captain John H. Dickerson to
Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 1 May 1861, Wood to
Dickerson, n.d., Wood to Major General
George C. McClellan, 27 May 1861, 19 June 1861,
Series 134, vol. 1, OHS; Colonel C.P.
Buckingham to Colonel E.P. Scammon, 24 July 1861,
Series 146, vol. 3, OHS; "Annual
Report of the Quartermaster General," in Annual Report,
1861, 581-82.
26. Governor William Dennison to
Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 17 April 1861, 18
April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, folder
1, OHS; Dennison to Wood, 18 April 1861, Series 1629,
Box 4, folder 26, OHS; Dennison to
Colonel C.P. Wolcott, 17 April 1861, 18 April 1861,
Dennison to E.B. Dennison, 18 April
1861, Dennison to John English, 18 April 1861, Dennison
to Scott & Brown, 18 April 1861,
Series 142, vol. 3, OHS; Major General John E. Wool to
Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott,
23 April 1861, 25 April 1861, Wool to Secretary of
War Simon P. Cameron, Governor Richard
Yates to Wool, O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 106-07, 114-
15, 127, 147-48; Major John Symington to
Wood, 17 June 1861, Series 134, vol. 1, OHS;
Dennison to J.W. King, 29 April 1861,
Series 146, vol. 4, OHS; Coles, Ohio Forms an Army,
19-22; Reid, Ohio in the War, 57-60.
Groping Toward Victory
41
would take over the administration of
supply and solve these problems, but
the general soon left the state, and
Dennison was again left to his own
means.27
Dennison recognized the state's
limitations, and increasingly his solution
was simply to abandon efforts at
supplying troops on his own and turn to the
federal government for aid. The War
Department, which recognized the prob-
lems created by numerous state and
federal officials competing for supplies,
proved receptive to Dennison's
appeals. In August United
States
Quartermaster General Montgomery C.
Meigs instructed the U.S. quartermas-
ter in Columbus, Captain John Dickerson,
to supply all Ohio regiments with
cookware and utensils. Shortly
thereafter, Meigs expanded the order to in-
clude tents and complete sets of
infantry accoutrements. Finally, in early
1862 the War Department issued orders
that made purchasing supplies solely
a federal responsibility. Under this
arrangement the state quartermaster gen-
eral simply submitted requisitions to
the federal quartermaster.28
These arrangements were altered slightly
in 1862 and 1863. Shortly after
Tod assumed the governorship he became
dissatisfied with the performance of
the federal quartermasters and made some
efforts to resume state contracting.
In July the War Department had to remind
him, and other governors, that it
alone provided all arms, equipment, and
supplies for federal recruits. But Tod
continued to press for some adjustments
in the existing system, and in
August Stanton agreed that the state
quartermaster could take over the distri-
bution, though not the acquisition, of
weapons and accoutrements. But the
trend toward complete federal responsibility
was irreversible. Tod's supply ar-
rangements also proved unsatisfactory,
and in October 1863 federal quarter-
masters resumed the distribution of
arms.29
Ohio's experience with providing food
and shelter to its troops followed a
similar pattern. Ohio had no commissary
department in April 1861, and thus
27. "Resolution, General Assembly,
State of Ohio," 24 April 1861, Hunter to Governor
William Dennison, 3 June 1861, William
Dennison Papers, 1860-62, MSS 305, Ohio Historical
Society, hereinafter cited as MSS 305,
OHS; E. Kingman to Quartermaster General D.L.
Wood, 27 June 1861, Series 134, vol. 2,
OHS; Dennison to "Chairman, Committee on
Resolutions of 7th August 'Democratic
Convention,' Cleveland, Ohio," 14 August 1861, Series
1606, vol. 1, OHS; Dennison to Captain
J.H. Dickerson, 30 November 1861, Series 1606, vol. 2,
OHS; Major General George C. McClellan
to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood, 13 May
1861, 14 May 1861, Series 134, vol. 1,
OHS; Reid, Ohio in the War, 29.
28. W.F. Caggen to General J.W. Bates,
19 August 1861, Governor William Dennison to
Captain J.H. Dickerson, 7 September
1861, 8 September 1861, 25 September 1861, 26
September 1861, Series 1606, vol. 1,
OHS; "Annual Report, Quartermaster General," 1861,
596-97.
29. Assistant Adjutant General C.P.
Buckingham to Governor David Tod, 11 July 1862,
Series 1629, Box 3, folder 8, OHS;
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to Tod, 9 August 1862,
Tod to Stanton, 11 August 1862, O.R.,
Series III, vol. 2, 342, 355-56; "Annual Report of the
Quartermaster General" in Messages
and Reports to the General Assembly and Governor of
the State of Ohio for the Year 1863 (Columbus, 1864), 536-37.
42 OHIO HISTORY
in the first weeks of the war Dennison
was forced to improvise in this area
also. He hastily established a
commissary department, appointed agents to
set up camps throughout the state, and
contracted with local hotels and other
suppliers for meals. Given the crush of
mobilization, these arrangements
were the best that could be contrived,
but they created discontent nonetheless.
Troops suffered from exposure and poor
hygiene, and meals were often late
and inadequate. These improvised
arrangements were also quite expensive,
and frequently contractors overcharged
for their services. Soon the complaints
of soldiers reached the public and the
press, and the state legislature officially
requested that it be allowed to examine
all contracts that Dennison had
made.30
Dennison recognized the defects of these
arrangements as well as anyone,
and in May 1861 he turned to the War
Department for aid. But the federal
government refused to support troops
that were not yet mustered into federal
service. In July, therefore, Dennison
appointed a new Commissary General,
Columbus Delano, expanded the Commissary
Department, and fixed the max-
imum rate for rations at thirty cents
per day per recruit. Delano in turn ap-
pointed one or two assistant
commissaries for each camp and renegotiated a
number of contracts with suppliers. The
new Commissary Department
brought some regularity to the area of
subsistence, but the results were still
unsatisfactory, and the costs were
bearing heavily on the state. Dennison
thus continued to press the War
Department to take over the task of feeding
and sheltering Ohio's recruits. Finally,
on October 1 Washington sent a fed-
eral commissary to Columbus and ordered
him to assume all existing con-
tracts, reimburse the state for its
expenses thus far, and provide subsistence
for all recruits as soon as they reached
camp.31
Abandoning all subsistence and supply
responsibilities to the federal gov-
ernment was a logical step that freed
Ohio from a heavy, perhaps unmanage-
able, burden. It also left Ohio recruits
at the mercy of federal officers, how-
ever, and created conflicts between
state and federal authorities. On several
occasions state officials charged the
War Department with neglecting Ohio's
troops, and in turn federal
administrators complained that state authorities
were ungrateful and unreasonable. Most
of these conflicts were smoothed
over, but a few created considerable
tension.
30. Governor William Dennison to G.W.
Runyan, 19 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, folder
1, OHS; Dennison to General W.H Lytle,
19 April 1861, Series 142, vol. 3, OHS; Hon. N. Bill
to Adjutant General H.B. Carrington, 23
April 1861, Lieutenant Colonel George B. Senter to
Dennison, 25 April 1861, MSS 305, OHS;
John Q. Lane to Quartermaster General D.L. Wood,
5 May 1861, 24 May 1861, A.H. van
Voorhees to Wood, 20 May 1861, 21 May 1861, 25 May
1861, S.E. Brown to Wood, 21 May 1861,
22 May 1861, 24 May 1861, Series 134, vol. 1, OHS;
"Annual Report of the Commissary
General," in Annual Report, 1861, 539; Coles, Ohio Forms
an Army, 6-7, 16-19.
31. "Annual Report, Commissary
General," 1861, 541-43; Adjutant General, Directions.
Groping Toward Victory 43 |
The first such exchange occurred in May 1861. Dennison had been in- formed that the War Department was hoarding 55,600 smoothbore muskets, 1200 rifled muskets, and 1300 "Harpers Ferry rifles," and immediately he sent a request for 25,000 muskets and all the rifles to arm the state militia. Secretary of War Cameron replied curtly that the War Department could sup- ply only troops actually in federal service and pointed out that Ohio had al- ready received more than its quota of 10,000 muskets. Cameron's refusal was valid, but it was also insensitive and insulting, and Dennison resented it ac- cordingly. A similar, more serious conflict occurred six months later. In October 1861 Dennison again received information, again of doubtful origin, that Cameron had sent New York 13,000 Enfield rifles and several hundred Springfield rifles. The governor immediately reminded the War Department that seven Ohio regiments were waiting for arms and asked, "Has not Ohio reason to complain?" Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott assured Dennison that his information was completely inaccurate and that Ohio had not been deprived, but the governor remained dissatisfied.32 The dispute over arms surfaced once more in mid-1862. Tod had continued Dennison's campaign to acquire better weapons, and finally in July Assistant Secretary of War P. H. Watson promised to ship 10,000 Austrian muskets.
32. John K. Mansfield to Governor William Dennison, 1 May 1861, MSS 305, OHS; Dennison, "Requisition," 4 May 1861, Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron to Dennison, 9 May 1861, Dennison to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott, 30 October 1861, Scott to Dennison, 30 October 1861, Dennison to Scott, 21 December 1861, Scott to Dennison, 21 December 1861, O.R., Series III, vol. 1, 159, 183, 610-11, 756. |
44 OHIO HISTORY
He then reminded Tod that the War
Department had sent Ohio 10,000 Enfield
rifles in May 1862 and inquired of their
whereabouts. Quartermaster General
George Wright replied that he had
distributed 3400 to four regiments, had sent
5500 to Cincinnati, and had retained the
rest in the state arsenal for the mili-
tia. But Watson ignored Wright's
explanation, accused him of misplacing the
Enfields, and again asserted that Ohio
had already received its quota of first-
class weapons. The correspondence then
became vindictive. Wright defen-
sively repeated his account of the
Enfields, pointed out that Ohio would soon
have 15,000 men mustered and in need of
arms, and argued that Watson's
shipment would be insufficient. He then
charged the War Department with
hoarding 80,000 Springfields, denied
that Enfields were equivalent to
Springfields, and asked why Ohio could
not receive its share of the better
weapon.33
Both sides eventually bent, though not
gracefully. In August the War
Department sent 6300 Springfields, with
a promise to ship more as soon as
possible, and allowed Wright to recall
the 5000 Springfields from Cincinnati.
But Watson could not resist a final
insult. He again asserted that Ohio had
lost the Enfields shipped in May; he
also claimed that the War Department
had only 27,000 Springfields, rather
than 80,000, and expressed his wish that
Wright would "count the Springfields
sent to Ohio by the same multiplying
rule." Wright, in turn, assured
Watson that "state authorities entertain no
suspicion of injustice from the General
Government," but then insisted, one
final time, that only Springfields were
acceptable arms. This unpleasant
correspondence finally ended in October.34
Conclusion
The administrative systems that Ohio
employed in the Civil War were a
patchwork of the traditional and the
modern. Established institutions such as
the militia and established mechanisms
such as bounties continued to play an
important role; at the same time, the
demands of this war far exceeded any in
previous experience, and traditional
practices had to be bolstered by a number
of new mechanisms. In the realm of
manpower, for example, traditional re-
cruiting by prominent individuals
remained important, but increasingly the
use of recruiting districts, the
centralization of mobilization, and the draft lim-
33. Assistant Secretary of War P.H.
Watson to Governor David Tod, 19 July 1862,
Quartermaster General George B. Wright
to Watson, 21 July 1862, Watson to Tod, 8 August
1862, Wright to Watson, 8 August 1862,
O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 234, 241, 329-30.
34. Assistant Secretary of War P.H.
Watson to Quartermaster General George B. Wright, 12
August 1862, Wright to Watson, 13 August
1862, Watson to Wright, 15 August 1862, Wright to
Watson, 15 August 1862, Watson to
Wright, 19 October 1862, Wright to Watson, 20 October
1862, O.R., Series III, vol. 2, 365,
379, 393, 394, 673, 674-75.
Groping Toward Victory 45
ited, and transformed, this method.
With few precedents, and with
surprisingly little guidance from the War
Department, state officials had to
develop these new systems largely on their
own. Their success depended on their
creativity, administrative experience,
and political instincts, and the results
varied widely from state to state. Some
policies were disastrous failures, while
others became models for other states
and the War Department.
Ohio's administrative record in the
Civil War was quite mixed. Ohio
proved less capable of securing supplies
on its own than other states such as
New York or Connecticut, and it had to
seek federal aid quite early in the
war.35 In part this failure
reflected the state's more limited finances and man-
ufacturing base, but in part it also
resulted from poor direction by Governor
Dennison. In the area of recruiting,
conversely, Ohio was conspicuously suc-
cessful. Ohio exceeded its total
manpower quota for the war, and the state
avoided all but two drafts. Furthermore,
Dennison, Tod, and Brough all de-
veloped recruiting procedures that were
subsequently adopted by the War
Department, and they transformed
recruiting from an ad hoc, chaotic process
into a relatively orderly, logical
system. Ohio had its share of failures, but
overall the state's leaders proved to be
resourceful, and they kept pace with the
war.
35. John Niven, Connecticut for the
Union (New Haven, 1965).
NOEL FISHER
Groping Toward Victory: Ohio's
Administration
of the Civil War
The American Civil War posed a vast
challenge to the limited administra-
tive capacities of the national and
state governments, both North and South.
As the chaos of 1861 painfully revealed,
recruiting large numbers of men,
supplying them with weapons, uniforms,
and equipment, and transporting
them to the field were tasks initially
beyond the ability of any American gov-
ernment to perform efficiently. To
sustain a long war, therefore, both the
North and the South had to increase the
size and efficiency of their military
administrations. Both sides, though the
Union more than the Confederacy,
would adapt fairly quickly to the
demands of the war, and within a year they
would manage to build and maintain
armies far larger than any in previous
American experience. Yet even by 1865
there were areas in which administra-
tion was still defective.l
The experience of Ohio illustrates well
both the process and the difficulties
of developing administrative systems for
the war. Ohio began the conflict
with a militia system still in the early
stages of reform, a military staff made
up largely of political appointees, and
a nearly empty armory. Its initial mo-
bilization was typically chaotic, and
errors in the first months of the war
plagued not only Governor William
Dennison but also his successor,
Governor David Tod. Haphazard federal
policies, shortages of resources, dis-
agreements with the War Department, and
mere inexperience all created nu-
merous difficulties, as did a resentment
of increases in executive power. But
Ohio's three war governors, Dennison,
Tod, and John Brough, all proved to
be dedicated and innovative
administrators, and by 1863 most areas of Ohio's
mobilization were functioning smoothly.
Part of the state's success, though,
resulted from simply abandoning numerous
responsibilities to the federal
government and focusing on a narrow range
of activities, particularly recruit-
ing.
Noel Fisher received his Ph.D. from The
Ohio State University in 1993.
1. Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men
(Madison, 1971); Richard D. Goff, Confederate
Supply (Durham, 1969); Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster
General of the Union Army: A
Biography of M. C. Meigs (New York, 1959); Fred Albert Shannon, The
Organization and
Administration of the Union Army (Cleveland, 1928); Albert Burton Moore, Conscription
and
Conflict in the Confederacy (New York, 1924).