Ohio History Journal

MATTHEW OYOS

The Mobilization of the Ohio

Militia in the Civil War

Fort Sumter's fall in April 1861 broke like a thunderclap over Ohio.

Overnight, fervent patriotism replaced months of indecision regarding

Southern secession. When President Abraham Lincoln called for

75,000 militia on April 15, thousands of enthusiastic Ohioans rushed

forward. Among this mass, the state's militia played an important role

in the first weeks of mobilization. At the heights of state government,

officials struggled to overcome years of neglect and put Ohio on a war

footing. From a lower level, existing militia companies would supply a

base upon which authorities could build. Although it showed some

strengths, Ohio's mobilization in the Civil War demonstrated the need

for active federal direction of the nation's militia forces.

In mid-nineteenth century America, state militia organizations as-

sumed a crucial place in the national defense. Ideally, the militia would

furnish a ready supplement to the nation's regular army, a force that

totaled 1,108 officers and 15,259 enlisted men in early 1861. This

system originated in the nation's colonial heritage and the first years of

independence. Distrustful of a large standing army and powerful

central government, the Founding Fathers gave the states considerable

responsibility for the country's military establishment.¹ Heavy reliance

upon the militia lessened following its mixed performance during the

War of 1812 and was largely nullified by the regulars' sound showing in

the Mexican War. Nevertheless, militia forces still retained their status

as the nation's first reserve in 1861. Mobilization in the Civil War

would put state military organizations to their severest test ever.

Unlike previous American wars, the enemy stood right at hand and

presented an immediate threat. In this conflict, both sides lost the

luxury of time to prepare, which America's geographic isolation would

have afforded in a major foreign war. This loss of time especially

Matthew Oyos is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The Ohio State University.

1. John Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard (New York, 1983),

2-3, 97.

148                                             OHIO HISTORY

plagued states that had failed to maintain an adequate peacetime

militia. In Ohio, officials had tried to upgrade military forces prior to

1861, but the state militia was sorely lacking in many areas when the

call-up came. Weapons, equipment, supplies, and uniforms all ran

short, and unsure leadership added to an already trying situation. Still,

Ohio's existing militia system, however rudimentary, laid the ground-

work for the eventual raising of 100,000 men by the close of 1861.

The story of Ohio's call-up allows not only a study of a particular

mobilization but also illuminates many of the militia's characteristics as

an institution. Based on volunteer companies by 1860, the militia

served an important local function as well as furnishing a federal

reserve force. In peacetime it participated in patriotic celebrations,

quelled riots, and sponsored community affairs. The local basis for

militia companies created priorities that often differed from those of

federal authorities. Citizen-soldiers entering national service wanted to

preserve units in which they had invested time, labor, and pride during

peacetime. They desired to serve with officers and men with whom

they had formed close associations both as comrades and as neighbors.

In the years before the war and in the first months of conflict, Ohio's

militia companies exhibited many of these same attributes. As a result,

mistrust ensued between militia units and the War Department, and

disorder plagued Ohio's early mobilization effort.

In theory, the militia system should have worked in close conjunc-

tion with the national government. Federal authorities had the consti-

tutional responsibility of organizing, arming, and disciplining militia

forces. Under legislation passed in 1792 and 1808, Congress established

the militia and began distributing arms to the states proportional to

militia enrollments. For their part, the states would have control over

officer appointments and the training of citizen-soldiers.² In Ohio, the

top military staff usually consisted of the governor as commander in

chief with an adjutant general and quartermaster general as his

immediate subordinates. Under this basic staff existed a military

organization arranged hierarchically as divisions, brigades, regiments,

battalions, and companies. When a call-up came, the governor estab-

lished an allotment, and the adjutant general forwarded these orders to

unit commanders. After these instructions reached the company level,

a captain mustered men liable to service and asked for volunteers. If

enough men failed to step forward, compulsory assignment supposedly

took effect. All able-bodied white males between the ages of eighteen

2. For the actual assigning of these responsibilities see the United States Constitu-

tion, Article I, Section 8.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                    149

and forty-five were legally subject to a call-up. However, as the

mid-nineteenth century approached, most states, including Ohio, be-

gan relying on volunteer companies as their first-line forces.³

By the early 1850s, Ohio's militia system had fallen into extreme

disrepair. At the highest level, the posts of adjutant general and

quartermaster general had become sinecures. As a consequence, the

state sometimes failed to file its annual report to the War Department,

although its yearly arms allotment depended upon this communication.⁴

Many of the higher commands went unfilled, and the organization

existed more on paper than in actuality. Those positions with occu-

pants often contained political appointees who knew little about

military matters. Sometimes commanders did not even know who

served as their immediate superiors and subordinates.⁵ All hope of

making the universal obligation meaningful had also passed away by

the early 1850s. The state now used militia liability as a device to

produce revenue. For fifty cents or by working on a public highway, a

man could dispense with each year's militia duty.⁶

The arms situation was equally poor. Through the years, authorities

had distributed weapons to volunteer units with little discrimination

and then failed to provide for maintenance and repair. As a result,

many muskets and other small arms simply disappeared or became

unusable. Artillery pieces deteriorated through display in public squares

or repeated use in firing ceremonial salutes. Owing to this neglect, Ohio

would have been sorely pressed to arm its troops even had the

command structure been in first-rate shape.⁷

Many factors produced this weakness in the state's militia system.

Outside of annual arms shipments, the federal government did not

provide much leadership for the creation of an effective force. As

mentioned, it stressed the regular army rather than the militia after

1815. In any event, the prevailing constitutional doctrine of states'

rights worked against active federal guidance.⁸ Ohio's state govern-

3. Mahon, History of the Militia, 52-53, 60-61; William H. Riker, The Role of the

National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C., 1957), 21-22.

4. H. B. Carrington, Ohio in the Civil War (Columbus, no date), doc. 3, p. 2.

5. John S. Fulton to the Quartermaster General of Ohio, 18 October 1852, Corre-

spondence of the Adjutant General, Governor, Armory Board and Other Correspon-

dence Relating to the Civil War, 1842-1847, 1850-1856, 1861-1918, Series 1629, Box 1,

Folder 4, Ohio State Archives, Office of the Adjutant General, Ohio Historical Society,

Columbus, Ohio. Hereinafter cited as series 1629, OHS.

6. Henry Stanberry, letter, 31 July 1846, Series 1629, Box 1, Folder 2, OHS; Riker,

National Guard, 27-29.

7. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 3, p. 1; Annual Report of the Adjutant General, 1860

(Columbus, 1861), 13.

8. Riker, National Guard, 35-37.

150                                                 OHIO HISTORY

ment also entertained little interest in a vigorous peacetime militia

during the early 1850s. The Indian threat had receded long ago, and the

few volunteer companies could meet most civil disturbances. Building

a substantial militia would have drained state revenues when no need

for such a force seemed apparent. In a national emergency, Ohio

counted on having time to raise and organize its forces. Also, the

potential for political opposition presented an obstacle. Earlier public

hostility indicated that a revival of the militia system might spark

popular antipathy. Before volunteer companies assumed the role of

active forces in the 1840s, militia musters evoked ridicule, disdain, and

deliberate evasion. Unless an obvious need arose, any effort at

reviving the militia promised to attract similar hostility.⁹

After 1855, Governor Salmon P. Chase and opposition to the

Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 furnished the impetus for militia reform.

Chase took office in 1856 as a prominent figure in the emerging

Republican Party and a staunch opponent of slavery. In the late 1830s,

he had been a leader in the abolitionist Liberty Party and had exhibited

rigid anti-slavery views while a United States Senator from 1849 to

1855.10 Soon after Chase assumed the governor's chair, the Republican-

controlled legislature passed a series of personal liberty laws to protect

the rights of free blacks and accused fugitives. The laws did not block

enforcement of the federal fugitive slave statute but did have the effect

of slowing the return of runaway slaves.11 Although the personal

liberty legislation avoided a direct clash, the actions of state courts put

Ohio and federal authorities on a collision course. In one case during

1857, a state judge claimed jurisdiction in fugitive slave actions, issued

a writ of habeas corpus, and then freed the accused. The release raised

cries that Ohio had begun active resistance against the federal law and

led Governor Chase to Washington in hopes of resolving the matter. He

and President James Buchanan each agreed to dismiss the affair, but

Chase later backed away from this position. In the heat of his 1857

reelection campaign, he said that a state had a right to enforce its own

laws and that the national government should not overstep its bound-

aries. He pledged to defend state laws against federal tyranny if

9. Riker, National Guard, 26-27, 29-32; Annual Report of the Adjutant General,

1859 (Columbus, 1860), 3-5.

10. Salmon P. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, 22 January 1855, "Diary and Correspondence

of Salmon P. Chase," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, vol. 2

(Washington, D.C., 1903), 267; Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, 20 January 1860,

"Chase Diary," 284; Dick Johnson, "The Role of Salmon P. Chase in the Formation of

the Republican Party," The Old Northwest, 3 (March, 1977), 25-26, 35.

11. George Porter, "Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period," Columbia University

Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, 50 (1911), 18-21.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                             151

Washington attempted any interference.12 To give this position some

weight, Chase turned to the Ohio militia.

A vigorous militia would help demonstrate that Chase was serious

about his stand on the state courts.13 At the very least, the governor

wanted a force ready for any contingency as the 1857 confrontation did

not promise to be the last. Whether he would have resorted to force

will remain unknown. During the next federal-state conflict in 1859, the

Ohio Supreme Court unexpectedly struck down a lower court's

issuance of the writ and thus ended Ohio's legal offensive against the

Fugitive Slave Law.¹⁴ From Chase's perspective in 1857, the mere

possibility of state resistance might have forced the Buchanan admin-

istration's hand. A federal retreat on enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act

would have marked a tremendous victory for anti-slavery forces and

raised Chase's reputation both in Ohio and in Republican circles across

the North.

With the fugitive slave controversy supplying political incentive,

Governor Chase launched a concerted campaign to revitalize the Ohio

militia. His first efforts brought a revision of the state's basic militia

law. Passed in March 1857, this measure retained much of the original

organization but also made some important changes. The bill left in

place the overall command structure and kept the state apportioned

into twenty-three divisions with every county, except Hamilton, serv-

ing as the basis for brigade organization. Owing to Cincinnati's large

population base, Hamilton County would provide three brigades.

These larger units were not intended as field commands; rather they

existed for purposes of administration and recruitment. As one of its

major changes, the bill stipulated that divisions or brigades apply

money left over from annual funding allotments to build or acquire

armories. Through this measure, lawmakers hoped to reverse the

deterioration of state arms stocks and provide for the better care of

weapons. Most significantly, the bill tried to bring all volunteer

companies under tight regulation. The state government would no

longer furnish units with arms and equipment unless minimum require-

ments were met regarding uniforms and company size. This clause

aimed at controlling the arms distributed around the state and at

regularizing the available companies.15

12. Albert B. Hart, Salmon Portland Chase (Boston, 1899), 166-69.

13. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 3, p. 5.

14. Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, 20 June 1859, "Chase Diary," 280-81.

15. Acts of a General Nature and Local Laws and Joint Resolutions, 52nd General

Assembly, 2nd Session, vol. 54 (Columbus, 1857), 44-45, 58; Annual Report, 1860, 5;

Annual Report, 1859, 6.

152                                               OHIO HISTORY

A number of other reform measures followed passage of the basic

law. By 1859, the state legislature had given the divisions and brigades

a more logical structure. A plan also passed to reduce the overabun-

dance of general officers burdening the state organization.16 This

measure would have little immediate effect, however, for it allowed all

men to retain their commands if they so desired. To improve care for

public weapons and equipment even further, work began on a state

arsenal building in Columbus, and Adjutant General Henry B.

Carrington requested funds to pay militiamen directly for the mainte-

nance of state weapons. Not content with the simple passage of

legislation, Carrington dispatched the Quartermaster General to travel

to each county and locate all public arms. Those companies not

meeting state standards would have to surrender any public weapons to

the Quartermaster General for return to Columbus or for sale as

obsolete equipment. As a part of the reform program, a fresh interest

arose concerning actual conduct in the field. Officers held sudden

musters to test their unit's preparedness, and discipline became stricter

at summer encampments.This stress upon order brought a marked

reduction in drunkenness at the 1859 encampment and saw more time

devoted to the instruction of troops.¹⁷

As an important component in the Chase reforms and a backbone of

the 1861 mobilization, Ohio's volunteer companies merit a close

examination. Under the legislation of 1857, these units could exist as

artillery, light artillery, cavalry, infantry, light infantry, or rifle compa-

nies. All but the cavalry and light artillery units required a minimum of

forty men before the election of officers and state recognition could

take place. The cavalry and light artillery formations only needed a

minimum of twenty men before undergoing organization. To encourage

participation, the state offered volunteers certain benefits. While a

citizen-soldier, a man was not liable to labor on the highways or to jury

duty. Fulfilling five years of service exempted a volunteer from any

further peacetime militia obligation.¹⁸ The state's efforts to promote

the militia system proved successful because the late 1850s witnessed

the addition of many new companies. For instance, Dayton had three

organized formations in 1856 and one in the process of organization.

16. Acts of a General Nature and Local Laws and Joint Resolutions, 53rd General

Assembly, vol. 55 (Columbus, 1858), 162-63; Annual Report, 1859, 12, 16.

17. Annual Report, 1859, 5-7, 11, 14-16; Annual Report, 1860, 5-6; Salmon P. Chase

to the General Assembly, 2 April 1859, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Ohio Historical Society,

Columbus, Ohio.

18. Acts, 52nd General Assembly, 47, 49-50; H. B. Carrington to D. L. Wood, 16

January 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                       153

These units had such titles as the Montgomery Cavalry, the National

Guards, the Lafayette Jagers, and the Montgomery Guards.¹⁹ By 1860,

the Dayton area had added the Clay Guard, Dayton Light Guard,

Miamisburg Light Guard, and Dayton Light Artillery to its military

formations.²⁰ Other communities also produced a series of new volun-

teer companies.²¹ Looking at the overall situation in 1859, the adjutant

general could point with some pride towards the militia's slow but

steady growth.²²

The location and composition of the volunteer units followed a basic

pattern. Almost all companies originated in the state's largest towns

and cities. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo by

far had the most numerous and active militia organizations.²³ In the

cities, the formation of companies would encounter less difficulty as

there were more men with free time and wealth to take an interest in the

militia. Also, city dwellers had a larger demand for volunteer compa-

nies than rural residents as they were more likely to experience civil

violence. The men who led these units had a vested interest in their

communities. Company officers often represented such middle-class

groups as store owners, small manufacturers, and other proprieters.²⁴

They were inspired not only by a desire to keep order and a sense of

civic duty but also by a social instinct. At this time, volunteer com-

panies served as an important center of social life. Company musters

allowed neighbors to gather, and the guard units periodically sponsored

events such as dances in which the community could participate.²⁵ The

chance to wear a uniform and have a taste of military life also appealed

to some. Often gaudy and patterned after European styles, company

uniforms attracted attention and identified men as community leaders.²⁶

The activities of the Guthrie Grays, a prestigious unit from Cincinnati,

serve as an example of the companies' civic responsibilities. Subject to

call-out at anytime to keep order, the Grays prevented the lynching of

19. Dayton Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror, 1856-57 (Dayton, 1856), 42.

20. Dayton Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror, 1860-61 (Dayton, 1860), 27.

21. Directory of the City of Cleveland, 1859-60 (Cleveland, 1860), 22; Zanesville

Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror, 1860-61 (Zanesville, 1860), 24.

22. Annual Report, 1859, 13.

23. "Annual Report of the Quartermaster General," in Annual Report, 1860, 28-29;

Dayton Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirror, 1858-59 (Dayton, 1858), 27;

Columbus Directory, For Two Years Ending April 1862 (Columbus, 1862), 135-136;

Toledo Directory (Toledo, 1858), 244.

24. Toledo Directory, City Guide, and Business Mirrorfor 1860 (Toledo, 1860), 23, 67,

119, 123; Dayton Directory, 1860-61, 27, 175, 117, 120; Zanesville Directory, 1860-61,

24, 57, 67, 92.

25. Daily Ohio State Journal (Columbus, Ohio) 3 January 1861, 2-3; 1 April 1861, 2.

26. Annual Report, 1860, 6-7.

154                                               OHIO HISTORY

a suspect in the murder of two policemen during January 1861. More

often, the organization received the call to take part in public celebra-

tions. In late January 1860, it participated in ceremonies honoring the

Kentucky and Tennessee legislatures as they visited Ohio. In February

of the following year, the Grays escorted President-elect Lincoln

through Cincinnati as he traveled to Washington for his inaugural.²⁷

Beyond ceremonial functions, the Guthrie Grays also demonstrated

the political clout possessed by volunteer units. In 1859, members

sponsored a bill to guarantee the continued existence of independent

organizations and won approval from the General Assembly. Their

action responded to the state's efforts to bring all militia formations

under its direct control. The law allowed the Grays access to state arms

and granted the same exemptions from public service that the regular

militia enjoyed. Under this measure, the unit also protected the right to

dress as it wished. For the state militia system, the bill had a limited

impact as it applied only to counties containing cities with more than

80,000 residents, in essence just Hamilton County. The measure still

demonstrated the influence that volunteer organizations could attain.²⁸

Despite the restricted nature of the Guthrie Grays' actions, their

success in the General Assembly still indicated the limited reach of

Governor Chase's reforms. When Chase left office in 1860, the state

militia had a long road to travel before it would become an effective

military system. According to Adjutant General Carrington, the militia

yet suffered in the higher levels of organization. He wrote in 1859 that

the state could not claim one complete regiment, nor did it even

possess the capability to call forth "one compact, well combined and

well disciplined battalion...."29 The arms situation also remained

poor, a circumstance that plagued Ohio right up to April 1861. At the

end of Chase's governorship, the state had 1,360 muskets, 241 rifles,

and 11 artillery pieces under its control. This stock of arms would

hardly fulfill requirements in a major mobilization. Still scattered

around the state were arms with an estimated value equivalent to 7,505

muskets.³⁰ State budgeting for the militia system also remained sparse.

Carrington claimed that Ohio's funding for its Military Department was

low when compared to the militia expenditures of other states. His

27. E. Hannaford, The Story of a Regiment: A History of the Campaigns and

Associations in the Field of the Sixth Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Cincinnati,

1868), 25-26.

28. Ibid., 24.

29. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 2, 1.

30. "Annual Report of the Quartermaster General" in Annual Report, 1859, 18, 25;

Annual Report, 1859, 4-5.

156                                                   OHIO HISTORY

affiliated with the Whigs, and when that party dissolved he helped

organize the Republicans in Ohio. In addition to opposing slavery, he

had made his reputation through a successful law practice and the

railroad business, not to mention his work in the party machinery.³³

During Dennison's first year in office, the state government just

followed the same reforms begun in 1857. Collection of arms continued

so that the quartermaster general could report at the end of 1860 that he

had accounted for 3,229 muskets, 485 rifles, and 30 artillery pieces.³⁴

The number of organized companies did not rise greatly because the

state still counted less than 2,000 active militia at the close of 1860.

With no new reforms initiated during the year, the drive for improving

the militia seemed to be gradually losing momentum.³⁵

Even the secession crisis following Lincoln's election failed to spark

energetic preparations for war. From newspapers and other sources,

the public received an awareness of danger as Southern states began

withdrawing from the Union. The potential for armed conflict loomed

especially large after federal authorities refused to abandon Fort

Sumter in Charleston Harbor.³⁶ Yet despite the possibility of trouble,

the Ohio militia system remained quiescent. In the months preceding

the war, the state did not attempt to increase the militia's readiness.

The General Assembly considered resolutions to prepare the militia

system but produced nothing substantive. Ironically, the only act

approved that affected the militia passed on the day Southern guns

opened fire on Fort Sumter.³⁷ Some of the volunteer companies started

preparing on their own, but their efforts amounted to very little. The

Guthrie Grays, for instance, entertained a resolution to provide arms

and officers towards the creation of new companies, but the proposal

suffered defeat. They settled only upon firing a salute to the command-

er of Fort Sumter and the Union.³⁸ Rather than making preparations,

the volunteer companies went about their business as usual in the

33. Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Generals, and Soldiers, vol. 1

(Cincinnati, 1895), 20; James A. Schaefer, "Governor William Dennison and Military

Preparations in Ohio, 1861," Lincoln Herald, 78 (Summer, 1976), 52; Carl Wittke, ed.

The History of the State of Ohio, 6 vols. (Columbus, 1944), vol. 4: The Civil War Era, by

Eugene Roseboom, 350.

34. "Annual Report of the Quartermaster General" (1860), 28.

35. Annual Report, 1860, 11; Ohio State Journal, 18 January 1861, 1.

36. Ohio State Journal, 10 November 1860, 3; 12 November 1860, 3; 12 April 1861,

2-3.

37. Ibid., 9 January 1861, 2; Acts of a General Nature and Local Laws and Joint

Resolutions, 54th General Assembly, vol. 58 (Columbus, 1861), 81-83.

38. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 28-29.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                       157

winter of 1861. They remained content to participate in various

ceremonies and the usual social events.³⁹

The militia's inaction originated in an anti-war mood that gripped the

state. Although talk of war flourished, most people wanted peace.

Fighting their fellow citizens appalled many, and some question

remained about resisting secession.⁴⁰ In the legislature, the Republican

majority was badly split on how to handle the issue of disunion and the

continuing question of the Fugitive Slave Law. On secession, a spirit of

reconciliation prevailed. The Republicans appeared willing to endorse

a constitutional amendment that protected slavery where it already

existed, but hostilities commenced before both chambers fully consid-

ered the measure.⁴¹ The general sentiment to avoid war accounted in

large measure for the militia system's failure to launch preparations.

From the highest reaches of the state government down to company

commanders, people hesitated to take provocative actions.

The attack on Fort Sumter drastically reversed feeling in Ohio.

Hopes for peace evaporated. Instead, unbridled patriotism and a desire

for the fight seized the people. After hearing of the fort's surrender on

April 14, mobs of enthusiastic citizens poured on to the streets of

Ohio's communities.⁴² Viewing such displays of popular emotion, one

observer proclaimed that "the people have gone stark raving mad!"⁴³

The next day, President Lincoln issued his call for 75,000 militiamen,

a proclamation greeted with applause in Ohio. Instructions from the

War Department soon followed assigning the state its quota of men

under the call-up. Ohio would raise thirteen regiments of infantry and

could place one major general and three brigadier generals at federal

disposal. The men enlisted under this requisition would serve for only

three months, as most authorities believed that one campaign would

end the war.⁴⁴

39. Ohio State Journal, 3 January 1861, 2-3; 9 January 1861, 2; 1 April 1861, 2.

40. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 27-28; Wittke, History, 273-74.

41. On April 17, the state senate gave its approval to the amendment, two days after

the call-up. Wittke, History, 375-76; Reid, Ohio in the War, 20-21.

42. Harry L. Coles, Ohio Forms an Army, Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission,

no. 5 (Columbus, 1962), 3; William Kepler, History of the Three Months' and Three

Years' Service from April 16, 1861, to June 22, 1864, of the Fourth Regiment Ohio

Volunteer Infantry in the War for the Union (Cleveland, 1886), 14-15.

43. Jacob D. Cox, Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, vol. 1 (New York,

1900), 3.

44. Altogether the state would contribute 10,153 men, much more, of course, than it

could count as active militia; William Dennison to Abraham Lincoln, 15 April 1861, The

War of the Rebellion: A Compiliation of the Official Records of the Union and

Confederate Armies, Series III, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1899), 73; Simon Cameron to

William Dennison, 15 April 1861, Official Records, Series III, vol. 1, 68-69. Hereinafter

the Official Records, Series III, vol. 1, will be cited as O.R.

158                                                   OHIO HISTORY

Although federal requirements far exceeded Ohio's active militia

force, state volunteer companies still supplied the foundation for the

mobilization. In the very first regiments organized, the active militia

played a dominant role. Such units as the Cleveland Grays, Dayton

Light Guards, Columbus Videttes, and Rover Guards of Cincinnati

tendered their services at first word of the requisition. All told, twenty

of these organizations filled the complement of the first two regiments.⁴⁵

In the atmosphere prevailing after Sumter's fall, state officials eagerly

accepted companies without any objection as to composition. They

valued any assistance offered and prized the experience that the

prewar units represented.

The companies making up the First and Second Regiments, howev-

er, did not enter service without some change in their organization.

Most had to recruit new members because companies required be-

tween seventy and 100 men to qualify for the call-up. Judging from

prewar arms distribution figures, the large majority of units had only

forty to fifty active members prior to hostilities.⁴⁶ Obtaining enough

men did not prove difficult owing to the reigning climate of war fever.

In Columbus, the State Fencibles posted notices around the city

announcing the unit's desire for recruits. Early on April 16, one day

after the President's proclamation, the company had filled its rolls.⁴⁷

The Fencibles' sister units had an equally good response, for they had

all reached Columbus by April 18 and started forming into regiments.⁴⁸

In this first muster of troops, the state militia system had not yet

received a true test. The mobilization seemed due more to the initiative

of local companies than to the direction of state officials. Eager to

participate in the coming action, the volunteer units flooded the state's

Military Department with offers once word arrived of the call-up. In

reality, the state's capability to mobilize men appeared rather limited.

Lacking an adequate military staff, the governor and adjutant general

45. The full roster of these regiments was as follows: First Regiment, Three-Month

Service, Company A-Lancaster Guards; Company B-Lafayette Guards (Dayton); Com-

pany C-Dayton Light Guards; Company D-Montgomery Guards; Company E-Cleveland

Grays; Company F-Hibernian Guards (Cleveland); Company G-Portsmouth Guards;

Company H-Zanesville Guards; Company I-Mansfield Guards; Company K-Jackson

Guards (Hamilton); Second Regiment, Three-Month Service, Company A-Rover Guards

(Cincinnati); Company B-Columbus Videttes; Company C-Columbus Fencibles; Com-

pany D-Zouave Guards (Cincinnati); Company E-Lafayette Guards (Cincinnati); Com-

pany F-Springfield Zouaves; Company G-Pickaway Company; Company H-Steubenville

Company; Company I-Covington Blues (Miami); Company K-Pickaway Company. For

this listing see The Military History of Ohio, 1669-1865 (New York, 1887), 148.

46. "Annual Report of the Quartermaster General" (1859), 28-29.

47. Ohio State Journal, 17 April 1861, 2.

48. Wittke, History, 383-84.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                               159

personally alerted the Columbus companies about the requisition. The

night of April 15 both men visited the homes of company officers and

told them to report their units in the morning. They contacted

companies in other cities by telegraph and left the same instructions.⁴⁹

In retrospect, calling out troops whether by foot or wire probably

amounted to the easiest task faced by state officials. Taking care of

units once assembled and putting the state on a war footing represented

much larger tasks.

The First and Second Regiments did not stay in Ohio long enough to

tax the state's militia system. Concern for the safety of Washington led

to the dispatch of the two regiments on April 19, the day after assembly

in Columbus. Governor Dennison informed the Secretary of War that

Ohio could send the regiments but without much preparation. Despite

this warning, Secretary Simon Cameron told him to send the troops.⁵⁰

The War Department planned to supply the regiments with full

complements of arms, equipment, and uniforms once they reached the

capital.⁵¹ Unfortunately, the governor of Maryland closed his state to

troop movements and thus blocked the way to Washington. Without

the arms required to meet possible resistance in Maryland, the Ohio

regiments remained in Pennsylvania. Governor Andrew Curtin prom-

ised to provide for the men while they were in his state. He boarded

them temporarily in the capital building at Harrisburg but was unable

to furnish adequate supplies. Finally at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on

April 30, the First and Second Regiments entered the federal service.

They reached Washington in early May and later participated in the

First Battle of Bull Run before their three-month term expired.⁵²

To the regiments' satisfaction, mustering in as federal volunteers did

not upset their original company organization. State militia units

traditionally harbored the concern that federal authorities would try to

break up prewar formations before accepting volunteers into national

service. The citizen-soldiers wanted to serve in their peacetime units

and resisted being viewed just as fillers for federal forces. These fears

did not materialize for the First and Second Regiments because the

national government accepted the units as offered. Few men suffered

rejection, at least among the officers. Many of those captains, first

lieutenants, and second lieutenants who had led their companies before

49. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 11-12.

50. William Dennison to Simon Cameron, 16 April 1861, O.R., 77.

51. Reid, Ohio in the War, 28.

52. Annual Report of the Adjutant General, 1861 (Columbus, 1862), 6; Coles, Ohio

Army, 5; Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of the Rebellion,

1861-1866, and in the War with Mexico, 1846-1848, vol. 1 (Akron, Ohio, 1893), 19.

160                                                      OHIO HISTORY

April 1861 retained positions of command. The companies also man-

aged to keep the regimental officers that they had elected. Thus the

troops would face the three-month's service led by commanders with

whom most were long familiar.⁵³ Close ties between officers and their

units, however, did not necessarily bring battlefield effectiveness.

Company leaders often held their positions because of their promi-

nence in the community and not their military prowess. Some who

proved competent at raising and drilling men would fail under the test

of fire.

While the First and Second Regiments had undergone assembly and

then dispatch from Columbus, state officials had begun to put Ohio on

a war footing. They worked with remarkable speed and accomplished

much in a short space of time. In the General Assembly, Republicans

and Democrats acted together to support the mobilization. Responding

to the governor's appeal for funds, the Senate passed a $1 million

appropriations bill on April 16. Two days later, the measure cleared the

House by a unanimous vote. It provided $500,000 to carry out the

President's requisition, $450,000 to arm and equip the Ohio militia, and

$50,000 for a special contingency fund. Before the legislature ad-

journed on May 13, it passed a number of other mobilization bills.

Lawmakers protected the property of volunteers from debt execution

and acted to prevent arms shipments to Southern states.⁵⁴ They also

defined treason against the state of Ohio, authorized more general

officers, and stipulated that contracts for provisions go to low bidders.⁵⁵

Accomplished in large part by cooperation between the General

Assembly and governor, this war legislation did much to counter the

state's inaction during the secession crisis. Problems that arose during

the mobilization would suggest that these measures had come too late.

53. Prewar records on existing volunteer companies are sketchy at best. State records

such as the Annual Reports of the Adjutant General lack detail in regard to these units.

A determination concerning the retention of command personnel can be made by

comparison of company lists found in the Roster of Ohio Soldiers with pre-1861 city

directories. Within the directories can usually be found a section on military units that

contains a list of officers for local companies; Cox, Military Reminiscences, 18-19;

William Dennison to General John E. Wool, 20 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1,

OHS.

54. For the Governor's efforts to enforce the latter measure see the following, William

Dennison to H. J. Jeivett, 20 April 1861, Adjutant General's Letterbook (April 20, 1861

- July 16, 1861), 65, Correspondence from the Adjutant General, 1861-1876, 1880-1898,

Series 146, Box 1, Ohio State Archives, Office of the Adjutant General, Ohio Historical

Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Series 146, AG's Letterbook, OHS. William

Dennison to Alfred Gaither, et al., April 29, 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's Letterbook,

190, OHS; William Dennison to T. W. King and Company, 24 April 1861, Series 146,

Box 1, AG's Letterbook, 130, OHS.

55. Reid, Ohio in the War, 20-24; Roseboom, History of Ohio, 380.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                              161

One other bill passed by the General Assembly provided the

governor with a larger military staff.⁵⁶ This law was necessary because

the state maintained just a skeletal Military Department in peacetime.

The adjutant general and quartermaster general held the only two

full-time positions. Such offices as the commissary general, engineer-

in-chief, judge advocate general, and paymaster general remained filled

but became active only when a demand arose. The need now was

obvious, and the governor took action to expand the military staff. By

April 19, he had started organizing the Commissary Department and,

two days later, indicated that he would ask the legislature to authorize

assistant adjutant generals. These men would help take the increasing

burden of work off their department heads.⁵⁷ Moving somewhat slower

in other areas, the state did not find a surgeon general until early May.

At that time, Dr. G. G. Shumard received the rank of colonel and began

to establish the Medical Department at General Headquarters.⁵⁸

While he expanded his military staff, Governor Dennison also

appointed the four general officers allotted under the federal quota. His

most important task was selecting a major general. Dennison recog-

nized that he had no familiarity with military matters and wanted the

new major general to function as his principal military adviser. For his

first choice, he desired the services of Major Irvin McDowell, an Ohio

native. McDowell, however, was attached to the War Department and

unavailable for the assignment. Dennison then turned to George B.

McClellan, a man promoted by some prominent citizens of Cincinnati.

At the time, McClellan headed the eastern division of the Ohio and

Mississippi Railroad, but he had graduated from West Point and served

with distinction in the Mexican War. On April 19, the governor ordered

McClellan to Columbus and made him major general on April 23.⁵⁹ In

his choices for brigadier general, Dennison showed more regard for

politics. Only one of the three, Joshua H. Bates of Cincinnati, had a

West Point background. The other two held important positions in the

state senate. Jacob B. Cox of Warren, Ohio, had obtained influence as

Republican Party leader, while Newton Schleich of Lancaster, Ohio,

worked for the Democrats in the same capacity. Though these last two

selections may have seemed poor on the surface, they did have some

56. Reid, Ohio in the War, 23-24.

57. William Dennison to G. W. Runyan, 19 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1,

OHS; William Dennison to William Lawrence, 21 April 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's

Letterbook, OHS, 25.

58. Special Order no. 156, 8 May 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's Letterbook, 309,

OHS.

59. Coles, Ohio Army, 7; William Dennison to G. B. McClellan, 19 April 1861, Series

1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; Cox, Military Reminiscences, 8-9.

162                                               OHIO HISTORY

redeeming military qualities. Both men had participated in the state

militia, and Cox showed an independent aptitude for military matters.⁶⁰

Having designated his major commanders, Governor Dennison also

organized a system of camps for troop rendezvous. In this undertaking,

state officials again had to recoup from the lack of prewar preparations.

Ohio did not possess a single camp in April 1861 for assembling and

training its volunteer units. As a consequence, the first days of the

call-up were marked by inefficiency and discomfort for the troops.

Rather than hold companies back until the state had constructed

camps, the governor allowed units to pour into Columbus. Without any

means to house or feed the men, authorities placed them in the city's

hotels at reduced rates and hired contractors to furnish food. This

arrangement proved expensive but provided an important stopgap

while the state established camps. By April 22, the establishment of

camps was almost completed. Officials had organized Camp Taylor in

Cleveland and occupied Camp Jackson in Columbus. The Columbus

site stood at Goodale Park, a location just north of downtown. Both

facilities helped alleviate mobilization problems, but the state still had

to rely for a time on the services of hotels and contractors.⁶¹

After assuming command in late April, General McClellan further

improved the troop assembly process. Adept at administration and

organization, he perceived the need for a third major camp outside

Cincinnati. McClellan envisioned a system where the state would

organize its regiments at other locales and then ship them to the new

facility after mustering into federal service. Also concerned about

defending the state's southern boundary, McClellan selected a location

about thirteen miles outside of Cincinnati along the Little Miami River

and a railroad line. On April 30, work began on the site, which received

the name of Camp Dennison in honor of the governor.⁶²

On the whole, the efforts to mobilize Ohio for war reflected well on

William Dennison. He should receive credit for his leadership in the

legislature and his fairly rapid expansion of the military staff. Dennison

also did well by appointing an experienced military adviser and by

working hard to surmount the problems of organizing troops. Howev-

er, he brought upon himself many of the difficulties associated with the

60. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 7-8, 27-28; W. Cooper, Sketches of the Senators

and Representatives in the Fifty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Ohio

(Columbus, 1861), 7, 25; Annual Report, 1861, 7.

61. Reid, Ohio in the War, 28-29; Coles, Ohio Army, 6; Cox, Military Reminiscences,

18-19; J. A. Peem to H. B. Carrington, 24 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS.

62. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 12, 21; George L. Wood, The Seventh Regiment: A

Record (New York, 1867), 20, 23-24.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                   163

call-up. The gathering of units without any prior preparations led only

to confusion and great expense for the state.

Dennison acted expeditiously because Ohio needed to organize at

least eleven more regiments and faced the possibility of federal

requisitions in the future. To assist the raising of new units, Adjutant

General Carrington tried to use the existing framework of divisions and

brigades. Officers of these commands communicated with him, either

asking for instructions or reporting the progress of recruitment in their

areas.⁶³ The effectiveness of the divisions and brigades seemed ques-

tionable, at best. When the eleven regiments underwent organization,

the state did not observe the mobilization structure established under

the divisions and brigades. Rather, units originating in general geo-

graphic areas formed the new regiments. The Fourth Ohio Volunteer

Infantry, for instance, came from companies raised in Wayne, Stark,

Knox, Delaware, Marion, and Hardin counties, a grouping that did not

fit any prewar divisional arrangement. At year's end, the adjutant

general confirmed the system's uselessness in his annual report. He

recommended abolishing the divisions and brigades and advocated sole

reliance on regiments and companies as the basis of organization.⁶⁴

In the Third through the Thirteenth Regiments, the existing militia

companies assumed an important role. Like their counterparts in the

First and Second Regiments, they joined their respective units with

their prewar organizations essentially unchanged. The new regiments

differed, however, in that none contained a majority of prewar com-

panies, a fact showing that the supply of trained units had been quickly

depleted. Using this limited resource wisely, the state distributed the

companies throughout the regiments, seemingly to serve as a leaven of

experience. Thus in the Third Regiment, the Governor's Guards of

Columbus provided companies A and B, while the Steuben Guards and

Montgomery Guards of Columbus received slots as Company I and

Company K respectively.⁶⁵ The other regiments followed a similar

pattern in their composition.⁶⁶ It should be added that the recruitment

63. Major General J. S. Norton to H. B. Carrington, 18 April 1861, Series 1629, Box

4, Folder 1, OHS; G. McFall to H. B. Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 3,

Folder 7, OHS.

64. Annual Report, 1861, 171.

65. Ohio State Journal, 25 April 1861, 2. The Ohio State Journal lists the Montgomery

Guards as Company J in the Third Ohio Volunteer Regiment. Presumably, this is an error

on the newspaper's part because the military did not use the letter "J" to designate

companies. Instead, letter assignments ran from "A" through "K" with the letter "J"

excepted.

66. Ibid., 26 April 1861, 2; Kepler, Fourth Regiment, 22; Cox, Military Reminiscenc-

es, 34.

164                                              OHIO HISTORY

of volunteers into the existing companies broadened even further the

base of experience. With many citizens clamoring to serve, some units

grew to such an extent that they reformed into two or three new

companies. All these expanded units remained together in the same

regiments. Though willing to modify their old organizations, the

militiamen did not show any inclination to serve in different outfits.⁶⁷

One prewar unit increased so much in number that it claimed

regimental status. Cincinnati's Guthrie Grays accomplished this feat

and took their place as the Sixth Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Coming from

the state's most populous city, the Grays had built a robust organiza-

tion in the prewar years. Formed in 1854 by a breakaway group from

the Rover Guards, the unit had attracted so many members by 1858

that it organized into two companies and called itself a battalion. Very

proud of their outfit, the prewar volunteers did not dissolve it during

the 1861 mobilization. Rather, they preserved the two original compa-

nies and just raised the rest under their sponsorship. Though the

Guthrie Grays now called themselves a regiment, the unit's composi-

tion actually resembled that of the others forming under the call-up.

The only difference was that the Grays, rather than the state, had

controlled the regiment's recruitment.⁶⁸

As suggested, the majority of companies in the Third through the

Thirteenth Regiments did not exist before the war. An inspired

citizenry raised these units after the President's proclamation of April

15. Recruitment often followed a process whereby certain community

leaders would announce their intent to establish a company. They then

held a public meeting at which speakers delivered emotional speeches

to whip their listeners' patriotism to new heights. Following the

orations, the sponsors of the new units would take the names of

volunteers. In this charged atmosphere, the rolls were not long in

filling. Organization proceeded after a company achieved the requisite

seventy to 100 men. Normally, the men who had raised the unit became

its officers. Often, they had some claim to military knowledge through

a prior militia experience or service in the Mexican War. With their

officers in place, the companies then offered their services to the

adjutant general and hoped for acceptance into one of the regiments.⁶⁹

67. Ohio State Journal, 26 April 1861, 2.

68. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 18-22, 30-37; William Dennison to W. K. Bosley, 19

April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; Charles F. Goss, Cincinnati: The Queen

City 1788-1912, vol. 1 (Cincinnati, 1912), 316-17.

69. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 14; Coles, Ohio Army, 7; Theodore Wilder, The

History of Company C. Seventh Regiment, O.V.I. (Oberlin, OH, 1866), 2-3; H. B.

Carrington, order, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; John F. Schutte

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                               165

Having both old and new companies in the regiments created certain

imbalances. Upon assembly, the new units had to elect regimental

officers to field and staff commands. Most men were unfamiliar with

the military qualities of those standing for election and consistently

selected officers on the basis of their prominence in prewar militia

companies. Leaders of the existing volunteer units thus gained a

dominant role in the new regiments.⁷⁰ Having commanders with at

least some claim to military experience proved beneficial, but inequal-

ities in equipment, arms, and uniforms contained the potential for

resentment. The original members of the prewar militia companies

normally possessed weapons and other supplies, while men in the new

units went without as a result of shortages in state stocks. For example,

some men would have tents for shelter, while others had to fend for

themselves, especially when hotels and other lodgings were not

available.⁷¹ The regiments adopted a standard form of clothing as one

way to ease the inequalities. As with its other war supplies, Ohio

suffered from a severe shortage of regulation uniforms. To get men out

of civilian clothing or impractical militia costumes until the state

produced enough uniforms, units imitated the clothing worn in the

Italian unification movement. The "Garibaldi uniform" consisted of a

red flannel shirt, blue trousers, and soft felt hat.⁷² With a clothing

standard established, the regiments could begin developing some

degree of cohesion.

Although the state could not supply the regiments with uniforms,

arms, or equipment, the muster into federal service proceeded without

delay. When the muster took place in late April and early May, it

occurred at Camps Jackson, Taylor, Dennison, and a new state facility

near Cincinnati named Camp Harrison. The induction process seemed

to go smoothly for the Ohio volunteers. They had to undergo physical

examinations before acceptance, but few suffered rejection. Federal

regulations stipulated a thorough medical check, but examiners did not

apply these rules rigidly. One officer from the Sixth Ohio arose from a

sickbed to avoid missing the enrollment. He gained acceptance by

painting his cheeks to hide the flush and by managing to stand

to William Dennison, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 1, OHS; W. Wilson to

H. B. Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 3, Folder 7, OHS; W. C. Ferguson to

H. B. Carrington, 17 April 1861, Series 1629, OHS; Kepler, Fourth Regiment, 15-16, 22.

70. For the regiments that followed the first thirteen, Governor Dennison sought out

men with educations from West Point. He found fourteen and appointed them to

regimental commands. See Coles, Ohio Army, 7.

71. Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 33-34.

72. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 13-14.

166                                                OHIO HISTORY

throughout the procedure.⁷³ In all, entry into the three-month service

caused few problems for the Ohio units. Federal authorities accepted

the regiments as offered and did not break up formations or remove

officers. Therefore the regimental commands, prewar militia compa-

nies, and newly raised companies passed into national service almost

untouched .74

As these units were preparing for the federal muster, the Ohio

military establishment had become strained to the breaking point.

Although the state could not hope to arm, clothe, and equip all the men

in the federal quota, Adjutant General Carrington had accepted com-

panies far above the required number. He seemed to have lost his head

in the first rush of war and accepted offers without keeping count. As

a result, Ohio had a total of 30,000 volunteers two weeks after the

President's call-up. Ten thousand went towards filling the federal

quota, but that still left a large body of men on hand.⁷⁵

Not wanting to dampen the passion for war, Carrington and Gover-

nor Dennison hesitated to disband the excess units. Dennison first tried

to relieve Ohio of responsibility by requesting an expansion of the War

Department quota. He wrote to Secretary Cameron explaining that he

had accepted too many men in the confusion of the call-up. Saying that

Ohio would have at least twenty regiments, the governor asked

Cameron to take them all into federal service. He reasoned that the

national government would eventually require the troops, acceptance

would boost morale in Ohio, and a large federal army could intimidate

the South.⁷⁶ Despite Dennison's arguments, Cameron was unmoved

and turned down the request.⁷⁷ Determined not to disperse the men,

Dennison and Carrington turned to the state legislature for help. Here

they received a sympathetic hearing. On April 26, a law passed

allowing the retention of nine extra regiments as a state militia reserve.

This force would protect the state from Confederate invasion and also

stand ready to fill any future federal requisitions. The state also kept

4,000 additional men to serve as a second reserve. Any units that still

remained would be dissolved.⁷⁸

73. William Dennison to J. D. Phillips, 1 May 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's

Letterbook, 226, OHS; Directions for Enlisting and Organizing Volunteer Forces in

Ohio, 1861, (Columbus, Ohio); Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 36; Military History of Ohio,

148-49; Wood, Seventh Regiment, 21.

74. Kepler, Fourth Regiment, 23-25; Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 34-36.

75. Coles, Ohio Army, 6; Annual Report, 1861, 6; Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 3, 9.

76. William Dennison to Simon Cameron, 22 April 1861, O.R., 101-02.

77. Simon Cameron to H. B. Carrington, 27 April 1861, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 9,

OHS; Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 9.

78. Annual Report, 1861, 6-7.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                167

Ohio's retention of the excess companies proved extremely fortu-

nate. When Confederate forces cut the strategically important Balti-

more and Ohio Railroad in western Virginia, the state reserve force

furnished the first Union response. Not mustered into federal service,

these troops crossed the Ohio River in late May and reopened the

railway by occupying Grafton, Virginia. On June 3, they routed a small

Confederate force at Philippi. McClellan had chosen the reserve troops

for this task because he wanted to save the federalized Ohio regiments

for a larger campaign in Virginia's Kanawha Valley. The federal

regiments were also in the process of reorganization and thus unavail-

able for immediate service in western Virginia. Serving for three

months, Ohio's reserve forces performed well and brought credit upon

Dennison, Carrington, and the General Assembly for retaining the

excess troops.⁷⁹

Weapons for the reserve force had to come mainly from outside

Ohio. In the first weeks of war, the state could not arm men called

under the federal quota, much less those in reserve units.⁸⁰ On April

27, Carrington reported that he had 8,000 unarmed men at Camp

Jackson and 5,000 men lacking weapons at Camp Taylor. To deal with

this situation, the governor sent Quartermaster General David L.

Wood and, later, Colonel C. P. Wolcott to the East Coast to purchase

needed armaments. These men, however, met only limited success

because of competition with buyers from other states.81 Though Ohio

had shown much initiative, the federal government would serve as the

state's chief supplier, and it acted with relative dispatch to provide

relief. The army sent 10,000 muskets from the Springfield Armory on

April 25 and, four days later, added 3,000 more to that total. Also,

Major General John E. Wool directed Illinois to furnish Ohio with

5,000 muskets from state stocks. In its efforts to arm, however, the

state did not neglect local businesses. It hired such firms as Hall,

Aryres, and Company of Columbus to provide caissons, battery

wagons, and traveling forges for artillery outfits. The state also

contracted with Miles Greenwood of Cincinnati to rifle smoothbore

muskets and set up a laboratory for manufacturing ammunition.82 By

79. James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York,

1982), 159; Annual Report, 1861, 7; Cox, Military Reminiscences, 42-44; Carrington,

Ohio, doc. 1, 6-7.

80. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 10.

81. H. B. Carrington to S. W. Cochrane, 27 April 1861, Series 146, Box 1, AG's

Letterbook, 175, OHS; William Dennison to General D. L. Wood, 18 April 1861, Series

1629, Box 4, Folder 26, OHS; Coles, Ohio Army, 6-7, 19.

82. Major General John E. Wool to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, 25 April 1861,

O.R., 114; Major General John E. Wool to Simon Cameron, 29 April 1861, O.R., 127;

168                                              OHIO HISTORY

the beginning of May, Ohio could count on significant supplies of

weapons to arm not only the troops under federal requisition but a

substantial portion of the reserve forces.

In early May, a new federal call for troops supplanted the arms

situation in importance. President Lincoln issued a proclamation on

May 3 asking for 42,034 volunteers to enlist for three years or the

duration. Under the requisition, Ohio's obligation was nine regiments.

This number had little relevance because the new call eventually aimed

at converting the existing three-months regiments into more permanent

units. The Secretary of War soon instructed governors to muster their

three-months regiments into the three-year service. Applying only to

units not yet sent forward, this order did not compel three-month

volunteers to convert their enlistments.⁸³ To Ohio, the three-year call

meant that the entire force of eleven regiments would undergo reorga-

nization. The First and Second Regiments were not subject, having

long since departed for Washington. This fresh set of orders hampered

Ohio's ability to put its federalized regiments in the field and caused

much discontent in the ranks. The changeover also caused a break-

down in communications between Columbus and Washington.

To carry out the reorganization, all eleven regiments gathered at

Camp Dennison. Trouble broke out at once over the appointment of

officers. The regiments had originally assembled under state law,

which required the election of commanders. Under federal jurisdiction

that rule no longer applied, and the governor possessed full powers of

appointment. When this regulation became known, discontent spread

throughout the ranks. Men worried that they would have new officers

imposed upon them without any consideration of their sentiments.

They saw in the federal rule a danger to the companies and regimental

staffs with which they had first entered the service. Removing the old

officers would go far towards destroying the militia character of the

various units. Whether attached to organizations with prewar origins or

those raised after April 15, troops wanted to serve under officers whom

they had chosen.⁸⁴

The fears about officer appointments proved unfounded. Among the

eleven regiments, past commissions were reaffirmed if officers wanted

Richard Yates to Major General John E. Wool, 30 April 1861, O.R., 147; "Annual Report

of the Quartermaster General," in Messages and Reports to the General Assembly and

Governor of the State of Ohio, 1861 (Columbus, 1861), part 1, 587-88; Coles, Ohio Army,

22.

83. Fred S. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army,

1861-1865. vol. 1 (Cleveland, 1928), 35-36.

84. Annual Report, 1861, 6; Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 45-46.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                    169

to join the three-year service.⁸⁵ In retrospect, the volunteers need not

have worried much about losing their commanders. Because Governor

Dennison controlled the appointment process and not federal officials,

a wholesale overthrow of officers was not likely. Removing command-

ers would have risked a political uproar, especially when communities

found out what the governor had done to local units.

After concerns dissipated over officer appointments, the conversion

to three-year regiments moved rapidly. A large majority in all grades

enlisted in the long-term service. Among regimental staffs, almost

every officer committed himself, and most company officers followed

suit. In the enlisted ranks, about 75 percent made the conversion, while

approximately 25 percent declined reenlistment.⁸⁶ As these figures

indicate, the prewar militia and newly raised companies passed suc-

cessfully into the three-year service. Those men who did not sign up

would remain with the regiments until their three-month term had

ended. Although they stayed, recruiting commenced to fill their places

in the three-year service. Of the volunteers who chose not to reenlist,

their reasons usually concerned the length of service or disappointment

with military life. Some felt that their homes and businesses could not

withstand three years in the army. Others who had enlisted in the first

rush of patriotism now found their spirits flagging due to the drudgery

and hardship of camp life.⁸⁷

The retention of the three-month men soon caused difficulties in

Camp Dennison and with Washington. With new recruits filling vacan-

cies in the three-year enlistment, quarters at the camp soon bulged

from overcrowding. Insubordination arose as three-month and three-

year soldiers clashed over prerogatives. To regain control, state

authorities wanted to separate the three-month men from the rest.

They deemed that the best solution lay in an immediate mustering out

with pay. The governor and his military staff made repeated appeals to

Washington for permission to discharge the three-month men. Suffer-

ing from its own unpreparedness, the War Department failed to

answer. Frustrated by Washington's silence, Ohio took matters into its

own hands. The colonels of each regiment ordered all three-month men

85. Annual Report, 1861, 6; William Dennison to Simon Cameron, 29 May 1861,

O.R., 242-43.

86. The Roster of Ohio Soldiers provided the data necessary for these determinations.

Making calculations based upon every regiment and company would have been a

daunting task. A sampling was taken, therefore, of regimental officers in the Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Ohio Volunteers. To examine retention of company officers

and enlisted men, samplings of at least three companies were each taken from the Fifth,

Sixth, and Tenth Ohio Regiments. See pages 85-104, 107-24, 133-47, 179-200, 209-33.

87. Wilder, Company C, 8-9; Hannaford, Sixth Regiment, 45-46.

170                                             OHIO HISTORY

recruitment because it scattered two to three thousand unpaid and

thoroughly disillusioned soldiers across the state. Convinced that the

government did not keep its promises, these men discouraged others

from volunteering.⁸⁹

President Lincoln himself issued orders dealing with the short-term

enlistees. Aware of the situation at Camp Dennison, Lincoln did not

want the three-month men released. He felt that such an action would

be a breach of faith and directed that Ohio reincorporate these troops

into their regiments. Unfortunately, the damage to future recruitment

had already occurred before these orders arrived.⁹⁰ Responsibility for

this problem rested primarily at the door of Governor Dennison and his

military staff. They acted irresponsibly in allowing the dispersal of the

three-month men without federal approval. However, the War Depart-

ment's failure to respond in a timely fashion brought some of the blame

upon it as well.

In Camp Dennison, the training and outfitting of the regiments

continued despite the controversy over the three-month men. These

units finally took to the field in late June fully armed, equipped, and

uniformed. Under George McClellan, now a major general in the U.S.

Volunteers, the Third through the Thirteenth Regiments would see

their first action in western Virginia.⁹¹ The battles fought there would

make McClellan's reputation and bring him command of the Army of

the Potomac.

As noted, the First and Second Regiments were not included in the

three-year reorganization. Since the prewar militia dominated in those

two regiments, their fate is worth pursuing. Soon after the Battle of

Bull Run in late July 1861, the regiments' three-month term expired,

and they were detached in early August. Reorganization commenced

almost at once, and by October mustering into the three-year service

had taken place.⁹² Having had a different experience than their sister

units, the prewar companies did not survive in the First and Second

Ohio. Many men who had served their three months and experienced

battle felt they had done their duty and owed no further obligation.

Others reenlisted, but their presence did not preserve the units' original

militia character. Too few stayed, and many now served in different

commands. The experience of Company A in the First Regiment seems

88. Annual Report, 1861, 6-7.

89. Annual Report, 1861, 7.

90. Coles, Ohio Army, 13-14; Annual Report, 1861, 7.

91. Annual Report, 1861, 7.

92. Roster, vol. 2 (Cincinnati, 1886), 1, 31.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                                171

typical. Originally the Lancaster Guards, the company retained only its

old captain in the three-year service, and he soon received a promotion

out of the unit. No other officers reenlisted nor did many of the men in

the ranks.⁹³ Some of the three-month men did offer their services again

later in the war.⁹⁴ They would join as individual volunteers, however,

because the militia's role had ceased after the first call-up.

In a conflict of the Civil War's magnitude, units simply could not

maintain their militia character. Over the course of time, the conduct of

war took a natural toll. Company rolls underwent a large changeover

due to the massive casualties inflicted by this bloodiest of American

wars. As seen in the Lancaster Guards, some men performed well and

received promotions that took them out of their units. Others likely

transferred to different companies or exhibited incompetence and were

discharged. The natural attrition of warfare simply dictated against the

prewar militia maintaining its integrity throughout the struggle. In

terms of the whole war, gigantic manpower requirements swamped the

antebellum militia. Ohio had less than 2,000 active militiamen before

April 1861 but would provide over 340,000 men by the fighting's end.

In terms of regiments, the state's total contribution amounted to 221

infantry, 13 cavalry, and 3 artillery units.⁹⁵

By the closing months of 1861, the state possessed a military system

that could meet large manpower requirements. Ohio's troop-raising

effort improved in part because Washington had begun supplying

consistent leadership, although inefficiency remained until Edwin M.

Stanton became Secretary of War in 1862.96 In July 1861, the federal

government had made permanent the states' role in raising volunteers.

As in the past, the government issued calls and assigned quotas, but the

states produced the men and organized regiments.⁹⁷ National author-

ities, however, began to keep a close watch on state recruiting. Three

times each month the governor had to submit a report about recruiting

conditions and follow the army adjutant general's requests regarding

troop movements.⁹⁸ In addition, the governor now had a fully experi-

enced Military Department in Columbus to handle federal assignments.

93. Ibid., vol. 1, 3-4; ibid., vol. 2, 3-7.

94. Ibid., vol. 1, 8; ibid., vol. 7 (Cincinnati, 1888), 189.

95. Eugene Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio (Columbus,

1969), 200; "Annual Report of the Adjutant General, 1865" in Messages and Reports to

the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1865 (Columbus,

1866), 77-83.

96. McPherson, Ordeal, 162.

97. Shannon, Organization, 46.

98. Simon Cameron to William Dennison, 18 November 1861, Series 1629, Box 4,

Folder 9, OHS.

172                                               OHIO HISTORY

His staff had seen many changes in top personnel since the war's

outbreak. Excitable Henry B. Carrington resigned as adjutant general

to take a colonel's commission in the army. He remained in Columbus

as commander of the U.S. Eighteenth Infantry.⁹⁹ His replacement was

C. P. Buckingham, an able administrator and West Point graduate.

After being condemned for incompetence by the legislature, Quarter-

master General Wood and the commissary general had exited, and the

governor had found more resourceful replacements. With a seasoned

military staff now in place, the mistakes made during the first call-up

would not be repeated.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the extreme shortages of arms,

equipment, and uniforms lessened after the summer of 1861, although

manpower requirements had risen. The Northern war economy had

started gearing up, but quality and periodic deficiencies still remained

problems. 101

Before a proper military system evolved, Governor Dennison had

sustained a severe political battering. Newspapers picked up on the

gaps in the first call-up and made an issue of Dennison's performance.

Critics especially seized upon Ohio's lack of war materials and

complained about the suffering endured by volunteers. Also, the high

cost of contracting for provisions raised charges of profiteering.

Producing a growing uproar, these criticisms had generated the legis-

lature's demand for the replacement of the quartermaster and commis-

sary generals.¹⁰² The outcry would begin to abate after the supply

shortages eased, the state's military staff became more proficient, and

troops commenced moving into the field. Facing reelection that fall,

Dennison received a crippling political wound from the complaints of

the spring. Never an inspiring leader, he failed even to receive his

party's nomination. 103

In their treatment, critics did not give the Dennison administration

its fair due. Although unprepared and guilty of blunders, Ohio's state

officials did many things well in the first months of war. Governor

Dennison recognized immediately the state's unpreparedness and his

own lack of military knowledge. He devoted considerable energy to

mobilizing Ohio for war and finding competent military advisers. Faced

with a critical shortage in war materials, Dennison acted with dispatch

99. Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 15.

100. Coles, Ohio Army, 8; Carrington, Ohio, doc. 1, 13, 15; Annual Report, 1861, 30;

Reid, Ohio in the War, 29-30.

101. Coles, Ohio Army, 20-22; U.S. Quartermaster General to David Tod, 12 August

1862, Series 1629, Box 4, Folder 10, OHS.

102. Cox, Military Reminiscences, 31-32; Wittke, History, 384.

103. Wittke, History, 381; Reid, Ohio in the War, 61.

Ohio Militia in the Civil War                             173

in locating outside resources and in lobbying the War Department for

aid. The governor and his military advisers also showed a good degree

of foresight when they pushed the creation of a militia reserve.This

force became a valuable asset when Confederate forces threatened in

western Virginia.

Despite such displays of good judgment, the Dennison administra-

tion still deserved much criticism. At times, officials acted in haste and

with bad results. Although the militia reserve turned out to be

fortuitous, it originated out of Adjutant General Carrington's unre-

strained enthusiasm and failure to keep track of companies. On top of

this mistake came the decision to remove the three-month enlistees

from Camp Dennison. Undertaken without War Department orders,

this action spread discontented men around the state and appeared to

hurt later recruiting. The most serious charges about shortages of

material, however, must cut with a two-edged sword. As the state's

chief executive, Dennison had to bear ultimate responsibility for any

shortfalls in the mobilization. On the other hand, the prewar climate in

which he operated had not encouraged preparations, and some news-

papers, the vehicles of later censure, had advised peaceable secession

before April 1861. In such an environment, the governor had done well

to continue his predecessor's militia reform program.

Although upgraded before 1861, Ohio's prewar militia system gave a

mixed performance after the outbreak of war. The elaborate structure

of divisions and brigades proved almost worthless in the mobilization.

Often, command positions existed only on paper, or the occupants

possessed little competence in military matters. The state's existing

volunteer companies were the most beneficial to the mobilization.

Although sent off without proper arms, uniforms, or equipment, the

companies composing the First and Second Regiments provided a

quick response to Washington's appeal for defenders. The companies

that remained in Ohio also were useful in the mobilization effort.

Sometimes expanding into two or three new units, these organizations

supplied a core of experience upon which the state could build the next

eleven regiments. Owing to the existing militia's small size, its impact

in the war effort was limited to the first call for men. As demands came

for more troops, the direct recruitment or drafting of volunteers took

precedence, and the militia receded to the role of a home guard. 104

As part of Ohio's first contribution of troops, the prewar volunteer

companies exhibited certain qualities that have since characterized the

104. "Annual Report of the Adjutant General," in Messages and Reports to the

General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1863 (Columbus, 1864),

367-68.

174                                            OHIO HISTORY

militia or National Guard. The men in these units had great pride in

their organizations and wanted to serve in them when called to the

nation's defense. Since the states handled the first call-up almost

entirely, the prewar militia passed without problem into the three-

month federal service. A traditional distrust of national authorities was

evidenced, however, during the restructuring into three-year regi-

ments. Apprehensive that they might lose their officers, the soldiers

complained until reassured that their preferences would be respected.

These protests slowed the mobilization process somewhat, but a

favorable resolution brought a large majority into the three-year

service.

Ohio's performance in the first months of war raised serious

questions about the militia's future value in the national defense. In

mistakes and deficiencies of resources, the state did not stand alone.

The 1861 mobilization demonstrated that the nation could not rely on

the states alone to maintain a sufficient peacetime militia establish-

ment. Even if they chose to develop their militia, the states would show

an understandable tendency to build forces that best fit local demands.

Ohio's few prewar militia units functioned well in patriotic demonstra-

tions and in suppressing civil disturbances but did not come close to

being an adequate national reserve force. If the country wanted state

troops molded into an effective reserve, the federal government had to

provide the necessary leadership. Only it could enforce the general

standards and provide the resources required to make the militia a

potent force. Though Ohio's militia showed some bright spots in the

spring of 1861, the state took many months to overcome its weak-

nesses. Luckily, the enemy was not close at hand as first believed, and

Ohio had time to mobilize. In future conflicts, such good fortune might

not shine on the state and nation.