THE CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861
by
WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE
Professor of History, University of
Wisconsin
and
HAZEL C. WOLF
Instructor in History, Manual
Training High School
Peoria, Illinois
The outbreak of the Civil War found a
nation completely
unprepared for the conflict. The federal
government had neither
plans for conducting the war nor an
organizational structure for
implementing the plans. In the first few
weeks after Fort Sumter,
chaos mingled with confusion while the
state governors raised
militia to meet Lincoln's call and faced
local problems of which
the newly installed national
administration had no understanding.
Within two weeks, however, as the
governors of the states began
planning to take over the direction of
the war, Abraham Lincoln
interposed in their arrangements and
took the reins into his own
hands. The need for his act became
apparent when the gover-
nors of western states assembled at
Cleveland, Ohio, to formulate
instructions for the federal government.
When the war began the governors of the
states west of the
Alleghenies found the task of organizing
an all-out war effort
complicated by problems not so
frequently encountered in the
older seaboard states. In general the
western states had fewer
constitutional provisions for the rapid
assembling of militia forces,
less concentrated populations, and
transportation facilities totally
inadequate for the hasty dispatch of
troops. In addition the West
was unable to assume financial
responsibility for supporting many
regiments for long periods of time. When
Secretary of War
258
CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 259
Simon Cameron's request of April 15,
1861, for one regiment of
37 officers and 743 men from each of the
states of Michigan,
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, six each
from Illinois and In-
diana, thirteen from Ohio, and sixteen from Pennsylvania came,
the West could respond with an
enthusiasm equal to that of the
East but lacked an equal ability for
hasty compliance.1
The West's response to the call
indicated that each had addi-
tional problems peculiar to itself.
Iowa's Governor Samuel Kirk-
wood and Wisconsin's Alexander Randall
raised men in compara-
tively short order, but they had to join
in the general clamor for
the national government to supply arms
and uniforms.2 In In-
diana Governor Oliver Morton was so
badly in need of arms for
the troops which he raised that he went
in person to the War De-
partment.3 Michigan's
Governor Austin Blair faced a treasury
which had been looted by the former
treasurer--a situation which
forced him to raise $100,000 from
Detroit bankers before he could
issue his call for volunteers.4 In
Ohio Governor William Dennison
found himself swamped with regiments,
but he had no state officer
capable of an efficient handling of the
situation.5 Governor Rich-
ard Yates of Illinois wanted permission
to requisition federal arms
and accouterments for his rapidly
assembling volunteers.6
The greatest problem of the westerners,
however, concerned
the potential strength of secessionist
sentiment and arms in the
contiguous border states. Governors
Claiborne Jackson in Mis-
souri and Beriah Magoffin in Kentucky
were avowed secessionists,
1 The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Series 3, I, 68-69.
Here-
after cited as O. R.
2 Ibid., Series
3, 1, 91, 102; S.H.M. Byers, Iowa in War Times (Des Moines,
1888), 45; Wisconsin State Journal, April
15, 23, 1861; Wisconsin Daily Patriot, April
16, 20, 1861; Wisconsin, Report of
the Adjutant-General, 1861, 5, 8, 13.
3 William D. Foulke, Life of Oliver
P. Morton (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1899),
1, 113-114; William B. Weeden, War
Government, Federal and State, in Massachusetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania and Indiana, 1861-1865 (Boston, 1906), 145; Charles M.
Walker, Sketch of the Life,
Character, and Public Services of Oliver P. Morton (In-
dianapolis, 1878), 51-53; W.H.H.
Terrell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion (In-
dianapolis, 1869), 3; O. R., Series 3, 1, 64.
4 Charles Moore, History of Michigan (4
vols., Chicago, 1915), 1, 416; John
Robertson, Michigan in the War (Lansing,
1880), 17-18; O.R., Series 3, 1, 88, 97.
5 Ibid., Series 3, 1, 77, 101-102; Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the
War (2 vols., Cin-
cinnati, 1868), 1, 28ff.
6 O. R., Series 3, 1, 81. In Pennsylvania Governor Curtin
prodded his legisla-
ture for a law which would revamp the
state's militia regulations. See James
G.
Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (2
vols., Norwich, 1884), 1, 306-307; William H.
Egle, ed., Andrew Gregg Curtin: His
Life and Services (Philadelphia, 1895), 41-42,
123, 212; Paul Angle, New Letters and
Papers of Lincoln (Boston, 1930), 267; Apple-
ton's American Annual Cyclopaedia and
Register of Important Events of the Years
1861-5 (5 vols., New York, 1864-70), 1, 564-570; New York
Times, April 10, 1861.
260 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
and each refused to send his militia to
Washington's aid. The
latter's refusal brought frightening
visions to the citizens of Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois.7
On the day on which Lincoln called for
troops, an alarmed
Cincinnatian wrote Dennison that
Magoffin and Breckinridge
would drive Kentucky out of the Union
and that loyal men in
Kentucky would need help. Therefore, he
continued, Ohio would
need 10,000 men to keep Kentucky from
placing batteries on the
hills back of Newport and Covington. Men
must not be sent
away from Cincinnati for there were many
traitors there; Penn-
sylvania and New York would have to
assume responsibility for
protecting the national capital. Another
suggested that General
George B. McClellan, whom Dennison had
appointed to com-
mand Ohio troops, take charge at
Cincinnati. Still another wrote
Dennison that he had knowledge that
arrangements had been
made to tear up the rails through Ohio
and Indiana the moment
Kentucky declared for secession.8 Citizens
of southern Indiana
formed companies of home guards to
protect their property.9
Hardly had the guns of Sumter ceased
when alarmed Republicans
in southern Illinois demanded that Yates
send troops and cannon
to protect Cairo and Shawneetown from
seizure.10 The governors
took heed.
Governor Dennison was thoroughly
alarmed. In desperation
he asked Cameron to send heavy guns from
Pittsburgh, ordered
railroad presidents to hold back all
shipments of contraband, in-
structed telegraph lines to let no
communications regarding troop
movements pass through, and told
Cincinnati's mayor to prevent
munitions, provisions, or contraband
from passing through the
city.11
Dennison, however, had even greater
interest and anxiety
concerning the western part of Virginia.
On May 10, 1861, he
7 O.R., Series 3, I, 70, 82-83; Appleton's
Cyclopaedia, I, 444.
8 Letters of Timothy C. Day, April 15; James Todd, April 16; J. W. Clark,
April 16; Richard Smith, April 25; and J. K. Harnfeld, May 1,
1861, to Dennison, in
Ohio Executive Records-Correspondence, Boxes 196-198,
Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Society Library, Columbus.
9 O.R., Series 3, I, 102-103.
10 Letters of John Olney, April 15; C. M. Hawley, April 25, 1861, to
Yates, in
Yates MSS., Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield.
11 O.R., Series 3, I, 101, 104;
Letters from G. C. Davies, April 22; Rufus King,
April 29; M. B. Wright, April 29,
1861, to Dennison, and Dennison to Mayor George
Hatch, April 29, 1861, in Ohio Executive
Records--Correspondence, Box 198.
CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 261
sent to McClellan a number of reasons
why his troops should
cross the Ohio River and occupy
Parkersburg and other towns
along the border. Although Dennison had
already placed a bat-
tery opposite Parkersburg and wanted
West Virginia included in
the Department of Ohio, McClellan,
declaring that he saw nothing
to fear from that section of Virginia,
advised delay of any
invasion.12
Five days later the New York Times reported
that Dennison
and Pennsylvania's Governor Andrew
Curtin had pledged their
entire support to protect the Union men
of Virginia from that
state's eastern secessionists.13 On
May 20 Virginia's John S.
Carlile, soon to enter the Senate from
"loyal" Virginia, wired
Dennison that Virginia secession troops
were moving to Grafton,
Charleston, and Wheeling. Dennison
relayed the word to Mc-
Clellan, but the general still adhered
to his original view concern-
ing western Virginia and did not move.
Four days later, when
Cameron ordered him to do so, he made a
point of getting specific
permission from Dennison to use Ohio
troops before he entered
West Virginia to rescue the new state.14
To the west of Ohio, while Dennison
intervened in Virginia,
Indiana's Governor Morton worried about
Kentucky. Although
he had no important river city to guard,
Morton reported to the
War Department that his people in
southern Indiana who had
formed military companies in
anticipation of marauders were
helpless without arms.l5 Morton
begged the federal government
for artillery to place on the banks of
the Ohio. Meantime he sent
agents into Kentucky who assured him
that Kentucky's Unionists
badly needed support.16
In Illinois Governor Yates had double
worries. His state
faced slaveholding states on two sides,
and the proximity of Ken-
tucky and Missouri made the strategic
importance of Cairo pain-
fully obvious. Moreover, rumors from the
democratic counties
12 Reid, Ohio, 1, 46-48.
13 New York Times, May 15, 1861.
The paper also said that Yates and Morton
had made the same pledge to Union men of
Kentucky and Missouri. On May 13 Den-
nison, in asking the state legislature for $30,000 for the relief of
Unionists in Missouri,
said, "It is well known that the state
authorities of Missouri are arrayed against the fed-
eral government." See also Columbus
Crisis, May 13, 1861.
14 Reid, Ohio, 1, 48.
15 O.R., Series 3, 1, 102-103.
16 Terrell, Indiana, 212; Foulke,
Morton, 1, 134-135; O.R., Series 3, 1, 125-126.
262
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
of the entire southern part of the
state, commonly called "Egypt,"
filled the Illinois governor with
dread.17
Illinois officials went into action.
Governor Yates and United
States Senator Lyman Trumbull, together
with the state treasurer,
the auditor, and the secretary of state,
sent a joint letter to Lincoln
on the alarming situation in Missouri.
They made two proposals:
arms in the St. Louis arsenal should be
removed immediately to
Illinois, and a separate army of 20,000
men should be assembled
at Cairo. This, they said, would
"save Missouri certainly, would
embarrass the Confederacy, and would
protect Illinois."18
The Illinois communication, together
with the saucy replies
which the War Department was getting
from the southern gov-
ernors, drove Secretary Cameron to
direct Yates to send a briga-
dier general and four extra regiments to
Cairo, and two or three
more regiments to aid the garrison in
the St. Louis arsenal. Yates
complied immediately.19 In
addition Cameron instructed General
Nathaniel Lyon, new commandant of the
St. Louis arsenal, to
issue to Illinois troops 21,000 stands of
arms, 110,000 cartridges,
and two field pieces. On April 25,
therefore, Lyon permitted
Yates's men to carry secretly almost all
of the contents of the St.
Louis arsenal to Alton and thence to
Springfield.20
The activities of the governors in
raising troops, dispatching
them to Washington, and arousing the
martial spirit of their
people contrasted sharply with the
slowness, confusion, and in-
efficiency of the federal government.
The governors raised men,
but the national government had no arms
for them. The gov-
ernors organized their troops into
regiments, but the army sent
no officers to muster them into service.
The governors housed,
fed, and clothed the volunteers, and
raised money on their per-
sonal security, but the national
government was dilatory in taking
over the burden of their support. When burned bridges and
snipped wires through Baltimore cut
Washington off from com-
munication, the governors on their own
initiative handled the
17 Letters of C. H. Ray, April 16; T. S.
Rodery, April 19; and others, May 2-9,
1861, to Yates, in Yates MSS.
18 O.R., Series 3, I, 80-81.
19 Ibid., Series 3, I, 93, 113; Chicago Times, April 20,
1861; Thomas M. Eddy,
The Patriotism of Illinois (2 vols., Chicago, 1865), I, 97-102; John A. McClernand
MSS.,
Illinois State Historical Library.
20 O.R., Series 3, I, 116-117; John G.
Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln,
A History (10 vols., New York, 1890), IV, 193-195.
CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861
263
problem of sending troops and assumed
the task of dealing with
the border states.21
In a short time the governors became
disgusted with the
administration's lack of coordination
and its timidity. The state
executives, closer to the people than
the federal officials, believed
that popular enthusiasm should be
harnessed immediately for
victory. Hence Governor Dennison touched
a responsive chord
when he invited all the governors west
of New England to confer
in Cleveland on May 3.
To the conference came Dennison, Morton,
Curtin, Randall,
and Blair to meet with the agents of
Yates and New York's
Governor E. D. Morgan, both of whom were
too busy to come
personally. The governors found
themselves in thorough agree-
ment both in their criticisms of the
government and in their plans
for action. They met General McClellan
and were delighted with
him and with his talk of drastic
measures against the rebels. The
governors agreed that they should
vigorously instruct the Presi-
dent on the need for more men, more
efficiency, more enthusiasm,
and a concrete plan of campaigns. They
delegated Randall to
present their demands to Lincoln.
The spirit of the meeting was manifested
in the evening
when Cleveland's citizens assembled
before the governor's hotel
for an impromptu serenade. Cleveland's
mayor introduced Gov-
ernor Dennison who--quite out of
character--remarked that the
time for speaking had passed and the
time for action had come.
Ohio, he announced, would march sternly
off to put down treason.
Then Dennison introduced in succession,
Curtin, Randall, and
Blair.
Each of the governors rose to the
occasion. Governor Curtin
assured the crowd that a just God was
above them who abhorred
wrong and upheld right, and that every
man in Pennsylvania was
ready to take up arms for the national
honor. "To arms!" he
cried, "The country of Washington
shall defend the flag of Wash-
ington, and it shall wave on every fort,
state, and capitol in the
land!"
21 O.R., Series
3, I, 106-107, 124; Henry G. Pearson, The Life of John Andrew,
Governor
of Massachusetts 1861-1865 (2
vols., Boston, 1904), I, 200-208, 214-218;
George S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in
Public Affairs (2 vols., New York,
1902), I, 284ff.; Fred A.
Shannon, The Organzation and Administration of the Union
Army, 1861-1865 (2
vols., Cleveland, 1928), I, 53ff.
264
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Wisconsin's governor, with oratorical
pyrotechnics, trans-
ported an army down the Mississippi and
blazed a broad track
through the whole South from Montgomery
to Charleston. Michi-
gan's Blair, not to be outdone in verbal
fireworks, sent Michigan's
troops along and burned Charleston to
the ground.
Thrilled to new heights of enthusiasm,
the crowd called for
McClellan. But the young general knew
better than to compete
with veteran orators. He adopted the
becoming caution of a
military man, skillfully implied that he
was a man of deeds, and
modestly left the impression that the
time would soon come when
his acts would speak for him.22
Away from the stimulus of an audience,
the governors pri-
vately faced their problems. They
dispatched peremptory mes-
sengers to Washington, and they
authorized Randall to urge
"some more definite course of
policy" upon Lincoln. "We are
prepared . . . ," Randall told the
President, "to sustain you and
your administration in every measure,
however extreme, for the
suppression of this untoward rebellion
and for the punishment of
treason." The governors understood
the government's difficulties,
"but now we wish to urge upon you
the absolute necessity, since
Washington is safe, of giving more
attention to the country im-
mediately contiguous to the line between
the free and slave states."
Cairo and the Mississippi River were
essential, Randall told
Lincoln, to the safety and the commerce
of the northwest. This
meant that men and munitions would be
needed. The north-
western states could raise 60,000 men in
four weeks--"among
the swarming millions . . . there is but
one pulse beating today"--
but they needed a better military
organization, and a "military
head to which it can communicate its
necessities without tedious
and mischievous delays." Unless the government took control--
the threat was pointed--there "will
be war between border states,
which will lose sight, for the time, of
the government." There
was widespread dissatisfaction with the
federal government's
timidity, said Randall. The President
must call more men, furnish
them arms, and give the nation a policy.23
22 New York Times, May 16, 1861; E. B. Quiner, The Military History of
Wis-
consin (Chicago, 1866), 64.
23 O.R., Series 3, I, 167-170;
Egle, Curtin, 373-374; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln,
IV, 304ff.; New York Times, May
5, 10; Wisconsin State Journal, May 4, 6; Wiscon-
sin Daily Patriot, May 7, 14; Detroit Free Press, May 7, 1861.
CLEVELAND CONFERENCE OF 1861 265
At the same moment that the governors
met in Cleveland,
the Union Defense Committee of New York
City reported to
Cameron on the number of volunteers who
had answered Lincoln's
call to arms. The committee, which had
more information than
the War Department, had figures from
thirteen of the seventeen
northern governors. The governors had
raised and had under
arms or in near prospect 63 regiments
and a few batteries of
artillery. In addition these governors,
who were belaboring the
Department with demands that it accept
more troops, reported
that they had accepted or had available
38 more regiments.24
Even the harassed and befuddled
administration in Wash-
ington understood the implications of
these events. A situation
in which an unofficial committee raised
troops and reported to the
War Department, and in which the
governors assumed authority,
negotiated with neighboring states, and
instructed the commander-
in-chief on his policy was intolerable.
Faced with the situation,
Lincoln assumed responsibility. On May 4
the War Department
issued a proclamation--dated the
third--of the President calling
for forty regiments of volunteers,
increasing the regular army by
eight regiments, and calling for 18,000
new sailors for the navy.
But there was a difference. These were
no longer state
militia called for ninety days to
protect the public property. These
were volunteers called to serve three
years or for the duration of
the war and "subject to the laws
and regulations governing the
army of the United States."
Officers might be commissioned by
the governors, but the control and
direction would be in the hands
of the President.25
The call for three-year volunteers and
the increase in the
regular army was Lincoln's subtle answer
to the governors who
wanted more vigor in the conduct of the
war. The call had two
effects: It kept the governors so busy
raising troops that they
had no time for further consultations
and planning, and it served
as assurance that Abraham Lincoln was
capable of directing
the war.
24 O.R., Series 3, I, 148-149. The committee, a group of private
citizens who
had been exerting extraordinary efforts
toward getting the war effort organized, had
no answer from Illinois, Indiana,
Delaware, or New Jersey.
25 O.R., Series 3, I, 145-146.