Ohio History Journal

DANIEL NELSON

The Great Goodyear Strike of 1936

It was the "first" CIO strike, a "stepping stone toward the automo-

bile industry," an affirmation of the potentialities of the sit-down

strike, a case study of rank and file militancy, and a "remarkable" ex-

ample of the effects of non-violent agitation.' Its beginnings were ob-

scure, its consequences uncertain. "The circumstances in which the

strike was carried on and the method used" rather than the imme-

diate causes or results made it a turning point in the labor history of

the 1930s.² It was the great Goodyear strike, which paralyzed Akron

for more than a month in February and March, 1936.

Contemporary journalists and writers, all CIO partisans, first called

attention to the importance of the conflict. Edward Levinson and

Mary Heaton Vorse published brief histories of the strike in 1937;

Ruth McKenny followed in 1939, Alfred W. Jones in 1941, Rose Pe-

sotta and Harold S. Roberts in 1944.³ These works, building blocks

for more recent students of the turbulent years, help explain the often

insubstantial foundations of their studies.⁴ The Levinson and Vorse

Daniel Nelson is Professor of History at The University of Akron. He is indebted to

Bernard Sternsher, Warren Van Tine and Lorin Lee Cary for their critical reading of an

earlier draft of this essay.

1. John Brophy, A Miner's Life (Madison, 1964), 264; Edward Levinson, Labor On

the March (New York, 1956), 146; "Lewis Wins Akron Victory," Business Week (March

28, 1936), 20; P. W. Chappell to H. L. Kerwin, March 21, 1936; Federal Mediation and

Conciliation Service Records, National Archives RG 280, File 182/1010.

2. "The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Strike," Monthly Labor Review, 42 (May,

1936), 288. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of the labor history of the

1930s is Bernard Sternsher, "Workers in the 1930's: Middle Range Questions and

Ethnocultures," Paper presented to the 1982 meeting of the Organization of American

Historians, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

3. Levinson, Labor On the March, 143-46; Mary Heaton Vorse, Labor's New Millions

(New York, 1938), 5-6; Ruth McKenny, Industrial Valley (New York, 1939), 277-370;

Alfred W. Jones, Life, Liberty and Property (Philadelphia, 1941), 101-07; Rose Pesotta,

Bread Upon the Waters (New York, 1944), 195-227; Harold S. Roberts, The Rubber

Workers (New York, 1944), 147-51.

4. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL (Cambridge, 1960), Ch. 6; Irving

Bernstein, Turbulent Years (Boston, 1970), 592-97. James R. Green; The World of the

Worker (New York, 1980), 153.

8                                              OHIO HISTORY

A reexamination of the Goodyear strike, based in part on informa-

tion unavailable to the writers of the late 1930s and early 1940s, sug-

gests a different view. The conflict was indeed a precursor of the sit-

down era and a test of the CIO, as the early historians of the strike

observed. But it bore few other similarities to their schemata. Good-

year was hardly a reactionary employer and the URW wore the man-

tle of progress badly. The principal struggle featured hostile groups of

workers, not management and labor. Though the URW was the ma-

jor beneficiary of the strike, few knowledgeable union leaders would

have chosen it as an example for other workers. And far from demon-

strating the strength of the CIO, the Goodyear strike exposed the

limitations of the Lewis group. Not least, the strike was a reminder of

the critical role of groups other than managers and workers in the re-

sults of the struggles of the 1930s.

The major events of the Goodyear conflict are not in dispute. Fol-

lowing many months of hostility between the Rubber Workers locals

and the Akron manufacturers, a series of brief sit-downs closed sev-

eral plants in January and early February, 1936. The overriding issue

was the Goodyear decision to shift from the six-hour day, which it

had adopted in 1930, to the conventional eight-hour day and to dis-

charge redundant fourth-shift workers. The last of the sit-downs, at

Goodyear Plant 2, led to a series of meetings and ultimately to a spon-

taneous move to picket Goodyear on the evening of February 17.

From that point the contest escalated rapidly. The workers soon

picketed the entire Goodyear complex, halted production, and idled

nearly 15,000 employees. URW Local 2 took up the cause of the

fourth-shift workers, transforming the dispute into a full-scale con-

frontation between the URW and the industry's most powerful em-

ployer. CIO leaders rushed aid to the strikers. The company refused

to negotiate and obtained an injunction that severely restricted the

pickets; the sheriff's effort to enforce the injunction produced the

most famous incident of the strike, a dramatic confrontation between

deputies and strikers on February 25. Faced by 5000 club and gun-

wielding strikers, the law officers retreated and the plant remained

shut. After February 25 the strike became an endurance contest,

with federal and local government representatives trying to foster ne-

gotiations. A breakthrough occurred in mid-March when company

representatives prevailed upon union leaders to accept a compromise

plan. At a ratification meeting on March 14, the workers rejected the

proposed settlement. Within hours former mayor C. Nelson Sparks

announced the formation of a Law and Order League to reopen

Goodyear. Unhappy with the prolonged strike, most Akron citizens

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                       9

were even less pleased with the prospect of a violent confrontation.

The League effort quickly aborted. Negotiations resumed and the

company made additional concessions. On March 21 the strikers ap-

proved an agreement that continued the six-hour day and provided

formal grievance procedures for union members. Akron unionists,

their CIO allies, and, it seemed, industrial workers in Detroit, Flint,

and other cities viewed the settlement as a unprecedented victory.

The Sit-Downs

To later observers the most distinctive feature of the strike was its

beginning. In early 1936 the sit-down was a novelty in American in-

dustry, a little-used expression of rank and file protest.⁶ The Good-

year strike irrevocably changed that; henceforth the sit-down would

be a hallmark of the militant behavior associated with the rise of

mass production unionism and the CIO. Like John L. Lewis, it be-

came a symbol of "labor on the march." But it is essential to distin-

guish between the impact of the sit-downs of January 28-February 18

on Goodyear workers and on outsiders. Neither the sit-down as a

weapon nor the tactics of the successful sit-down were new to the

former. The first sit-down in the rubber industry had occurred at

the General Tire Company in June 1934; the sit-down era in American

industry dated from that incident.⁷ In 1934 and 1935 rubber workers

avoided sit-downs because of lingering hopes that negotiations or liti-

gation would result in conventional bargaining procedures and be-

cause of union leaders' desires to avoid strikes. By late 1935, howev-

er, many workers had become disillusioned with the unions, and

sit-downs resumed, this time without union sanction. There were two

in late 1935, both successful.⁸ They were a modest prelude to the up-

heavals of 1936.

Four of the six sit-downs associated with the beginning of the

Goodyear conflict were reminiscent of the General Tire sit-down.⁹ At

Firestone on January 28, at Goodyear Plant 2 on January 31, at Good-

rich on February 7, and at Goodyear Plant 2 again on February 14,

6. For the background of the sit-downs, see Daniel Nelson, ed. "The Beginning of

the Sit-Down Era: The Reminiscences of Rex Murray," Labor History, 15 (Winter, 1974),

89-90.

7. Ibid., 91-96.

8. Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 8, 11, 1935.

9. This paragraph is based on Daniel Nelson, "Origins of the Sit-Down Era: Worker

Militancy and Innovation in the Rubber Industry, 1934-38," Labor History, 22 (Spring,

1982), 208-11.

10                                             OHIO HISTORY

tire builders, the handicraft workers who assembled tire casings be-

fore vulcanization, instigated the protests. Their actions were rela-

tively brief and non-violent. Though unauthorized, they were trade

union protests for improved working conditions; the tire builders

had no larger visions or goals. Employers also reacted much the same

way as they had in 1934. They did not attempt to expel the strikers.

Instead, they kept the plants open and tried to reduce tensions. In-

deed, the Firestone personnel manager inadvertently gave the tech-

nique a powerful boost when he agreed to pay strikers half their

wages for the period they occupied the plant. Executives and super-

visors apparently were more surprised than frightened by the sit-

downs; at least until the Goodyear strike, they did not grasp their

disruptive potential.

The other sit-downs, at Goodyear Plant 1 on February 17-18 and at

the Columbia Chemical Company in nearby Barberton, Ohio, from

February 17 to February 22 are less well-known, because they oc-

curred after the beginning of the Goodyear strike, but no less impor-

tant. They introduced features of the sit-down movement that would

become increasingly prominent in the following months. Both inci-

dents involved workers who had not sat down in the past and who

had no special grievances. They dramatized the infectious character

of the sit-down movement. Like their co-workers and neighbors, the

Goodyear and Columbia Chemical workers sat down without union

authorization. At Goodyear Plant 1 several hundred tire builders sat

down when the Plant 2 workers began to picket. On the evening of

February 18, 200-300 women tube workers joined them. At Columbia

Chemical eight, then forty, then 460 workers, an entire shift, sat by

their machines. Like the rubber workers, they succeeded in

resolving grievances. And they, too, perplexed and antagonized com-

pany and union officials.10 Their actions were irrefutable evidence

that the sit-down was not unique to the rubber industry and that in-

dustrial employees required only the briefest exposure to it to per-

ceive their latent power.

The other notable aspect of the Goodyear Plant 1 and Columbia

Chemical sit-downs was the employers' response. At General Tire

and at Firestone, Goodrich, and Goodyear Plant 2 the plant manag-

ers had carefully avoided any provocations that might lead to van-

dalism in the occupied buildings. For various reasons they behaved

differently in the other two cases. When the Plant 1 workers sat

10. See Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 18, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 18, 20, 22,

1936.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                  11

down, Goodyear managers sealed off the struck departments. They

maintained heat and power, but barred access to the rest of the

plant. Unable to go to the cafeteria, strikers lowered ropes to outside

pickets who attached packets of sandwiches. Yet many of the work-

ers had no way to reach the outside windows and thus went hungry.

For this reason, as well as the union leaders' desire to reinforce the

elongated picket line, the Plant 1 strikers left the plant at midnight on

the 18th.11 The Columbia Chemical managers hastily shut their

plant on February 18. They could not turn off the heat because of

sub-zero tempratures, but otherwise they isolated the strikers. For

the workers this approach presented immediate problems. But after

some deliberations they decided that an unpleasant existence in the

plant was superior to frigid picket duty. To compensate they adopted

techniques that became famous in Flint and elsewhere in 1937. Wives

"formed almost a continuous line . . . carrying food and supplies to

their husbands" which they passed through the windows.¹² The

strikers slept on benches and amused themselves with boxing

matches and other amateur entertainments. This regimen continued

until a union-management agreement ended the occupation five days

later.

The sit-downs of January 28-February 22 also foreshadowed much

of the subsequent history of the Goodyear strike. They were protests

against the status quo, the Goodyear management but also the organ-

izations, including the URW, that vied for the workers' allegiance.

They created opportunities for the Rubber Workers, but underlined

the need for new and more vigorous policies if the union was to be

successful. The sit-downs marked the beginning of a period of reas-

sessment and conflict among the workers that often overshadowed

the better known struggle between management and "labor."

The Non-Strikers

The Goodyear strike marked the beginning of the decisive phase

in the evolution of formal workers' organizations at Goodyear. The

first phase had occurred between 1910 and 1920 with the growth of

Goodyear and the rise of Paul W. Litchfield as production superin-

tendent and later vice president for manufacturing. Under Litchfield,

Goodyear installed an extensive array of employee benefit programs,

11. Akron Times Press, Feb. 19, 1936.

12. Ibid., Feb. 20, 1936.

12                                                   OHIO HISTORY

notably insurance, athletic, and stock and home-ownership plans.¹³

A unique feature of the Goodyear effort was the "flying squadron," a

select group of production workers who were trained to perform any

task in the factory. Their assignment was to prevent delays that

would curtail production in the integrated complex.¹⁴ The capstone

of the Litchfield effort was the Industrial Assembly, an elaborate

congressional-style company union formed in 1919. The Industrial

Assembly was a "flying squadron" of the rank and file, an institution-

al device for maintaining personal contact with the workers, boosting

morale and productivity, and, when necessary, resolving griev-

ances.¹⁵ Though the postwar recession of 1920-21 decimated Good-

year and its labor force, the ensuing reorganization enhanced

Litchfield's standing (he became president in 1926), and preserved

the personnel program. The effects of the depression of 1930-33 were

similar. Production, profits, and employment opportunities declined,

but the personnel program remained intact.

The NRA posed the first serious challenge to the Goodyear pro-

grams. Workers from all the rubber plants rushed to join the AFL

federal locals established in the summer of 1933. The Goodyear lo-

cal's membership may have reached 7000.16 It offered an alternative

to the Industrial Assembly, one seemingly more attuned to the New

Deal era, and many former Assembly leaders joined the new organi-

zation. They soon discovered that the AFL union could do little

more than the company union. By late 1935, when relations between

the Rubber workers and the rubber manufacturers reached crisis

proportions, the Goodyear local had less than 500 members.¹⁷ On

the eve of the Goodyear strike, neither organization represented

more than a small minority of Goodyear workers. The Industrial As-

sembly seemed inadequate and the URW unsuccessful.

The sit-downs inaugurated a period of organizational innovation

second in magnitude and significance only to the 1910s. Though the

13. See Paul W. Litchfield, Industrial Voyage (New York, 1954), 120, 128-31, 183-86;

Allen, House of Goodyear, 166-75.

14. "Outline of the Goodyear Flying Squadron Training Course," H. L. Matti to

Hugh Allen, Dec. 28, 1933, Goodyear Archives, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,

Akron, Ohio.

15. See Daniel Nelson, "The Company Union Movement, A Reexamination," Busi-

ness History Review, LVI (Autumn, 1982), 335-57.

16. Compare John D. House, "Birth of a Union," (microfilm, Ohio Historical Socie-

ty, 1981), 19, and "A History of Goodyear," Unpublished MS, Goodyear Archives, 336.

Also see W. W. Thompson, "History of the Labor Movement in Akron, Ohio," CI0 Pa-

pers, National and International, Catholic University.

17. House, "Birth of a Union," 34-38.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                      13

sit-down technique was associated with the Rubber Workers, most

Goodyear employees who sat down had no formal ties with either

the URW or the Assembly.18 In essence, they repudiated both

groups. Their actions created what in effect were two new organiza-

tions: a militant, streamlined version of the Industrial Assembly that

opposed the strike and a militant CIO union that sustained it. The

ensuing conflict was, above all, a struggle between these groups for

the allegiance of the Goodyear labor force.

Initially the more promising of the new organizations was that of

the non-strikers. By late 1935 the Industrial Assembly was largely in-

operative. Its limited ability to cope with the conditions of the 1930s,

exemplified by its inability to stop the return to the eight-hour day,

had undermined its standing and demoralized its leaders. A former

Assembly representative and 1936 URW strike leader summarized its

plight when he recalled that it had gone "as far as it could go."¹⁹

The Assembly continued to meet during the crisis of February 14-17,

but few workers, and probably even fewer of its leaders, believed

that it could successfuly cope with the situation. P. W. Chappell, a

Labor Department mediator, reported that its attempts to take credit

for minor concessions the company made to the sit-down strikers "in-

flamed workers who felt [the] real grievance . . . had not been ad-

justed."²⁰ To most observers the Assembly was a hopeless anachro-

nism. In fact, it lingered for a year and a half until the Supreme Court

administered the coup de grace in NLRB v Jones and Laughlin

(1937). But it was moribund, a shell without substance.

The last Assembly meeting of the strike period, on February 19,

coincided with the first meeting of the "non-strikers." The initial im-

petus for the group remains a mystery. Local 2 officials argued that

"foremen and supervisors," operating directly or indirectly at the

bidding of the management, were responsible.²1 Several leaders of

the non-strikers were salaried employees, and company executives

clearly favored the new organization, but Lyle Carruthers, its head,

vehemently denied any company tie. A veteran production worker,

Carruthers asserted the non-strikers were "not connected with the

company in any way. Piece workers . . . are running this entirely.^"22

18. Nelson, "Origins of the Sit-Down Era," 211.

19. Interview with C. L. Skinner, April 23, 1976; Also see "Annual Report, Seven-

teenth Goodyear Industrial Assembly, 1935-1936," National Labor Relations Board Pa-

pers, National Archives RG 25, Box 1878, No. 1578, cases 8-R-184, 8-C-378.

20. Chappell to Kerwin, Feb. 18, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

21. United Rubber Worker, I (April, 1936), 2.

22. Akron Times Press, Feb. 22, 1936

14                                                    OHIO HISTORY

John House, Local 2 president, probably came closest to the truth

when he charged that a combination of plant supervisors and Indus-

trial Assembly leaders had created the non-strikers.²³ Whatever the

exact circumstances of its birth, the group had a substantial follow-

ing. Chappell asserted that 12,000 Goodyear employees, 80 percent of

the total, backed the non-strikers, but his estimate lumped all neutral

and uncommitted workers in the anti-strike camp.²⁴ Non-striker

meetings typically attracted 3500 or more enthusiasts and there were

many other sympathizers. No one doubted that non-strikers sub-

stantially outnumbered strikers in the early stages of the dispute.²⁵ A

vote at any time during February 1936 probably would have given

the non-strikers an overwhelming victory.

Contemporary accounts suggest that non-strikers were typically

middle-aged, veteran employees who had little to gain and much to

lose from the strike. Candidates in the previous Industrial Assembly

election, who played leading roles in the organization, were men in

their late 30s and early 40s. Ninety-five percent had five or more

years of service; their ties to Goodyear antedated the Depression.²⁶

Non-strikers often boasted of their superior experience, dedication

and loyalty. They were the heart of Goodyear.²⁷

Age and experience were not the only characteristics that distin-

guished the non-strikers. Regardless of their backgrounds, non-

strikers were men and women of utilitarian views and middle-class

pretensions. Their overriding concern was steady work at a high

wage. Their goals were largely external-home ownership, material

comforts, and standing in the community.²⁸ For years Goodyear had

satisfied these desires. When it failed to do so in the early 1930s,

many of these individuals turned to the union, but only briefly. By

late 1935 they had become disillusioned with the URW. For long-

service workers the company's decision to move from four six-hour

shifts, the work-sharing expedient of the Depression years, to three

eight-hour shifts signified a return to normality. Through the long

Depression period their earnings had been severely reduced, in part

23. Akron Beacon Journal,Feb. 22, 1936.

24. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

25. Powers Hapgood reported to John L. Lewis that the strikers had only a "hand

full [sic] of adherents." Quoted in Melvyn Dubofsky, "Not so Turbulent Years: Another

Look at the American 1930's," Amerikastudien, Vol. 24, (1979), 16.

26. Wingfoot Clan, 24 (Oct. 2, 1935), 3-7; 24 (March 27, 1935), 1, 3. Goodyear employ-

ees were overwhelmingly native-born. Ethnic and racial distinctions were unimportant.

27. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 24, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 28, 1936.

28. This description is based on Daniel Nelson, "The Leadership of the United

Rubber Workers, 1933-42," Detroit in Perspective, 5 (Spring, 1981), 25.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                      15

because of the six-hour day. By eliminating fourth-shift men hired

during the expansion of 1935, the company proposed to increase their

incomes by one-third or more. To protest that change seemed irra-

tional, to strike against it inconceivable. Non-strikers were captive to

their expectations. For the first two weeks of the strike they, not the

union militants, posed the greatest threat of violence.

The non-strikers made their presence known quickly. On February

19 several hundred men jammed city hall, demanding police protec-

tion for workers entering the plant. When Mayor Lee D. Shroy and

Police Chief Frank Boss urged patience and calm, they responded

with jeers and catcalls. If there was no agreement in twenty-four

hours, their spokesman warned, they would ask the Governor to call

out the National Guard. Many non-strikers volunteered to serve as

special deputies.²⁹ The group then moved to a nearby high school

auditorium to elect representatives and make plans. By that time

there were 1400 in the crowd. On February 20 they returned to the

high school, angrier than ever. "Throughout the meeting," a jour-

nalist reported, "leaders attempted to quiet the rising resentment of

the crowd, insisting that violence was unnecessary."³⁰ As the crowd

grew, Carruthers and other non-striker leaders decided to move the

meeting to the Akron Armory, a larger facility. When National Guard

officials refused to open the Armory, Carruthers lost control.

'Let's take it,' the workers shouted, and a general rush began for the

doors. A cheering section of nearly 200 shouted derision at Mayor ...

Schroy and Sheriff Jim Flower.

Leaders brandished placards bearing such sentiments as 'it's up to you to

protect us, Mr. Mayor.' 'We have the right to work.' 'Down with mob rule'

and 'We work, you strike.'

A petition directed to both officials and demanding protection for the

company and the non-strikers was circlated in the crowd as it swept down

Mill Street.³¹

After breaking into the Armory, the throng filled the 3,000-seat

building to overflowing and non-striker leaders began an unruly se-

quel to the earlier meeting. Summoning public officials for interroga-

tion, the non-strikers pressed for immediate action. "'We demand

that you do your duty and see to it that we are returned to our jobs,'

one man shouted. His assertion that 'if you don't we will' was wildly

29. Akron Times Press, Feb. 20, 1936.

30. Ibid., Feb. 21, 1936

31. Ibid.

16                                              OHIO HISTORY

applauded."³² The mayor and the sheriff demurred, however,

when the militants demanded to be deputized.

For the next four days the non-strikers reassembled daily at the

Armory to devise strategy and to intimidate public officials. On Feb-

ruary 21 they perfected their organization; Carruthers selected fifty

men, including ten captains, who "will be ready to go help Sheriff

Flower or city police . . . and will round up non-strikers when any un-

expected meeting is called.³³ Later he appointed three committees

that "separated the non-strikers into mobile units."³⁴ The non-

strikers also discussed credit arrangements with local merchants. At

the end of the session they joined in loud choruses of "Let Me Call

You Sweetheart," "I Want a Girl," and other songs.³⁵ On February

22 Carruthers counseled patience and cautioned against any act that

might discredit the non-strikers. To his relief, news of the injunction

against mass picketing arrived during the meeting. The men ad-

journed in high spirits, believing that local officials would now have

to aid them. Another overflow meeting on February 23 disavowed

any intention of attacking the picket line.³⁶ Entertainment and group

singing replaced the fiery speeches of a few days before. On Febru-

ary 24, the day before the sheriff was to enforce the injunction,

Carruthers announced that no more mass meetings were planned.

The men left the Armory with every expectation of returning to their

jobs the next day.³⁷

In the meantime, a second group of non-strikers was organizing in a

somewhat different fashion. When pickets closed the Goodyear

complex on February 18, between 600 and 1000 employees remained

in the factories. They included President Litchfield and other top

officials, who stayed to dramatize their contempt for the strikers, and

a large contingent of loyal production workers. Soon they were

trapped. The pickets did not prevent them from leaving, but they

could not abandon their posts without appearing to surrender to the

strikers. After a week, Litchfield and the executives left to direct the

strike resistance from a downtown hotel, but most of the "captives"

remained for the duration of the dispute. The company provided

cots, meals, mail and telephone service, and paid them their regular

wages, but there were hardships. The absence of barbers, beauti-

32. Ibid.

33. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 22, 1936.

34. Akron Times Press, Feb. 23, 1936.

35. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 22, 1936.

36. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1936

37. Chappell to Kerwin, Feb. 24, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                         17

cians and liquor bothered some workers. (Women workers were re-

ported to be near tears as they wondered what to do about facials,

manicures, and hair waves.)³⁸ Inactivity was a universal affliction.

Since there was little or no work for most of the inmates, athletic ac-

tivity, cards, and reading became their preoccupations. On Sundays

they held impromptu religious services under the direction of A. C.

Horrocks, head of Goodyear's eductional programs. Altogether it

was a "hectic existence . . . but not a difficult one to take."³⁹ Like

their compatriots on the outside, they were aggressive, unyielding,

and not a little self-righteous. Horrocks captured their outlook in his

February 28 sermon:

We have built an industrial leadership that is second to none, and.... it

stands out as a city built upon a hill. We are going on to still greater things

because we have a well founded belief in ourselves, in the people with

whom we work, in that coming of the soul, often referred to as our Goodyear

spirit..  .  40

Despite their numbers, leadership and commitment, the non-

strikers faced serious, ultimately insurmountable obstacles. First and

most obvious was the problem of allegiance. The non-strikers had

abandoned their fellow employees at a critical juncture. In an era of

heightened class sensitivity, this was no small matter. To many non-

strikers, the memory of the company's pre-Depression record and

the union's erratic 1933-36 performance was more than sufficient to al-

leviate any qualms about their actions. To them, the strike was a des-

perate, irresponsible, and largely leaderless gamble, not the heroic

struggle of the Levinson, McKenny, and Pesotta accounts.⁴¹ But for

other non-strikers the problem of allegiance was increasingly trouble-

some. Rubber Workers' officials, unionists in other industries, news-

paper reporters and even, on occasion, company spokesmen treated

the dispute as a labor-management conflict. Obviously the non-

strikers were not managers. By the latter stages of the dispute they

were less certain about their loyalties. Probably few of them became

union supporters during the strike; many, nevertheless, were weaned

38. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 22, 1936.

39. Ibid.

40. Akron Times Press, Feb. 24, 1936.

41. The more active non-strikers continued to oppose the URW after the strike.

Operating though several small but vigorous organizations, they were a constant irritant.

In an August 1937 NLRB election, 3193 Goodyear employees voted against the URW.

Akron Beacon Journal, August 25, 1937.

18                                              OHIO HISTORY

from their instinctive, pragmatic identification with the Goodyear

management.

Second was the problem of leadership, a more serious matter.

Who was in charge of the anti-strike forces, non-strikers or company

executives? Initially the non-strikers played the leading role. Thanks

to the Industrial Assembly, they counted in their ranks most of the

Goodyear workers with leadership experience. They organized with-

out difficulty and demonstrated their political sophistication in deal-

ing with public officials. From February 19 to February 24 they were

the most important force in the strike; thereafter their influence

waned. Like the Industrial Assembly representatives, the non-

strikers were never wholly independent. They had substantial re-

sources but nothing like those of the executives. Gradually, perhaps

inevitably, they fell under the company's sway. Litchfield's emer-

gence from the plant on February 25 symbolized this shift. Goodyear

executives tried to preserve the non-strikers role, but without great

conviction or success. In the days after the injunction fiasco, Car-

ruthers and his associates devoted most of their energies to fruitless

appeals for state intervention. By early March they were reduced to a

peripheral role in the conflict.

Finally, there was the problem of morale. Having deferred to com-

pany officials, most non-strikers lost interest in the day to day prog-

ress of the dispute, though not in the outcome. Carruthers cautioned

against this possibility but was powerless to avert it. When negotia-

tions broke down in mid-March, the non-strikers tried to regain the

initiative, but were again thwarted. As P. W. Chappell had surmised,

the strike was in essence a contest between union members and non-

strikers. By mid-March the former had triumphed; only the details

remained to be settled.

URW Militancy

The transformation of Local 2, and to a lesser degree the URW,

was the critical development of the strike period. The Local entered

the conflict with little support and little prospect of success. It

emerged a larger and stronger organization; more importantly, it ac-

quired the shared experiences and leadership skills that sustained it

in the difficult years ahead. Before the strike the union was only one

of several groups contending for the employees' favor; afterward it

occupied an established niche, whatever its actual strength or influ-

ence. By most measures the strike was a modest union victory. By

this gauge it was an unquestioned triumph. The conflict gave the lo-

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                           19

cal (and the international, which was almost exclusively an Akron or-

ganization in 1936) a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Goodyear and

Akron workers that it had not enjoyed before and had no immediate

prospect of acquiring.

By early 1936 Local 2 had declined to a hard core of 500-600 dues-

paying members, men and women who in many respects were indis-

tinguishable from the non-strikers. The men were nearly all veteran

employees.⁴² John House, the president, had worked at Goodyear

since 1925. Ralph Turner, the vice-president, had started in 1919,

and Everett G. White, the secretary-treasurer, in 1920. Other union

officials had similar backgrounds. They also had had leadership op-

portunities: House had served in the "flying squadron" and the In-

dustrial Assembly; Turner and Charles Skinner, a prominent commit-

teeman, had been "speakers" of the Assembly; Tracy Douglas,

another prominent committeeman, had been the key figure in the

"senate" during and after World War I. A few of these men also had

had trade union experience, as members of the United Mine Workers

in particular.⁴³ A profile of rank and file union members would proba-

bly reveal considerably less seniority. On the whole, however, Local

2, like the non-strikers, was an organization of middle-aged individu-

als who had substantial experience and responsibilities.

The distinguishing characteristic of union activists, and probably

Local 2 members generally, was their sensitivity to managerial au-

thoritarianism.⁴⁴ In mass production facilities like the Goodyear

complex, the quest for efficiency was unrelenting and changes in work

techniques and assignments were continuous. In return for their coop-

eration, workers received the highest wages in American industry.⁴⁵

Union activists shared the values, ambitions, and aspirations of oth-

er workers, but were more alert to issues of personal freedom. Their

recollections repeatedly emphasize this point.⁴⁶ In the 1920s, when

42. A committeeman's notebook listing 560 union members in a major department

indicates that 64 percent of the male union members had ten years service and 88 per-

cent preceded the Depression. Only 13 percent of the female members had ten years

service; 40 percent had been employed before 1930. NLRB Records, Box 347, case

8-C-378.

43. Nelson, "Leadership of the United Rubber Workers," 24.

44. Ibid., 25. See also Dubofsky, "'Not so Turbulent Years,'" 16-17; Robert H.

Zieger, "Memory Speaks: Observations on Personal History and Working Class Cul-

ture," Maryland Historian, 8 (Fall, 1977), 2-9.

45. Federal Housing Administration, "Akron, Ohio Housing Market Analysis,"

Nov. 1938, 109-10; Akron Beacon Journal, July 13, 1937; U.S. Department of Labor,

"Wages in the Rubber Manufacturing Industry, August, 1942," Bureau of Labor Statis-

tics Bulletin, No. 737 (Washington, D.C., 1943).

46. Nelson, "Leadership of the United Rubber Workers," 25.

20                                               OHIO HISTORY

changes in production methods were most rapid, they were quies-

cent, if unhappy. Many turned to the Industrial Assembly, but the

Assembly, successful in many areas, was powerless to deal with the

fundamental issue. By the 1930s these individuals had become de-

termined opponents of the status quo in the plant.

These attitudes were reflected in the operation of Local 2. Union

activists did not risk their careers to create a new dictatorship.

Leaders, they believed, should be spokesmen rather than decision

makers. The men they selected were articulate and personable; they

"spoke well." Many had high school diplomas.⁴⁷ They were also in-

different to personal gain. Only House served the local through the

1930s, and none of the Local 2 executives sought or served in other

union offices. Their colleagues and successors were men of similar

outlook. Local 2 became a rank and file enterprise, committed to the

well-being and independence of the individual.

The six-hour dispute added a new group to the union ranks, the

low-seniority workers. These men were younger and less experi-

enced; they had not worked at Goodyear in the 1920s and were less

alert to the issue of managerial power, except in the special way it af-

fected them. The joining of old and young, veteran and novice,

proved a potent combination. It created a strike organization, main-

tained the picket line, and rallied a growing number of uncommitted

employees to the union cause. In the course of the dispute the local's

ranks grew tenfold. By mid-March the union had become a power in

Goodyear and in the industry.⁴⁸

The creative tension that infused the local union in early 1936 was

evident in many ways. It was unmistakable at the tumultuous meeting

of February 17, when Local 2 leaders condemned the management's

arbitrary behavior and sit-down participants emphasized their eco-

nomic plight.⁴⁹ It was apparent a week later, when union sympathiz-

ers of all descriptions rallied to thwart the sheriff's effort to disperse

the pickets.⁵⁰ It reappeared on numerous other occasions. On Febru-

ary 24 House, confronting a sheriff's deputy, asserted in mock inno-

cence that he had "no responsibility at all" for the presence of the

men or their actions. An unsuspecting and literal-minded striker

47. House, "Birth of a Union"; Interview with John D. House, April 4, 1972; Inter-

view with Ralph Turner, May 10, 1976; Interview with Charles L. Skinner, April 23, 1976.

48. Membership did not drop below 5000 again until the 1960s. Local 2 Member-

ship Records, Local 2 Papers, Akron, Ohio.

49. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 18, 1936.

50. This statement is literally true. House recalls the many characters who mobi-

lized on Market Street in "Birth of a Union," 34-35.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                         21

nodded his assent. We have no leader, he told the officer. "We're

here as individuals."⁵1 Chappell summarized the workers' position

when he reported that the "union officials lacked control over their

men .... These workers, not all organization-minded, had joined

the union merely as an aid in the fight for their jobs [but] now that

they had the plant down and the authorities on the run they had no

intention of surrendering any ground gained."⁵² By late February

the alliance of committed veterans and newcomers had bested the

non-strikers' organizations and won the grudging respect of the man-

agement. The question that remained was whether it could translate

the union's new power into an enhanced role in the plant.

Two critical incidents illustrated the union's situation. The first, on

February 28, was an outgrowth of a strike settlement plan proposed

by Edward F. McGrady, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of Labor. Af-

ter the sheriffs rebuff on February 25, city officials, with the help of

the local Congressman, prevailed upon Labor Secretary Frances Per-

kins to dispatch McGrady.⁵³ McGrady found Litchfield utterly un-

cooperative and prepared to leave.⁵⁴ As a final gesture, however, he

proposed a compromise plan: an immediate end to the strike, the

reinstatement of all strikers, and the arbitration of differences be-

tween the company and the union.⁵⁵ After a day of consultation, the

union negotiators, including International President S. H. Dalrymple

and Vice-President Thomas F. Burns, accepted the plan. They be-

lieved that Litchfield would reject it and had no expectation of an

immediate end to the strike. Their action was a public relations ges-

ture.

At an impromptu meeting at the Local 2 hall that evening, Dalrym-

ple announced the committee's action and called for a membership

ballot on the plan. As he explained the arbitration proposal, there

were shouts of "No! No! No!" He continued, only to be interrupted

again.⁵⁶ A reporter described the next moments:

51. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 25, 1936.

52. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

53. Akron Times Press, Feb. 26, 1936.

54. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 27, 28, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 27, 28, 1936;

"Transcript of Telephone Conversation with Mr. Chappell," Feb. 28, 1936, FMCS File

182/1010. McGrady was perceived as a pro-union demagogue. W. R. Murphy to J. W.

Thomas, Feb. 27, 1936, Firestone Archives Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,

Akron, Ohio.

55. Akron Times Press, Feb. 28, 1936.

56. "There was an instant outburst of indignation, everybody talking at once."

Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 201.

22                                                   OHIO HISTORY

A storm of dissension rose powerfully from every corner of the hall.... A

big man shoved forward and the crowd surged after him.

'I'd like to know what the hell we walked out that night to freeze for?' he

demanded. A great shout shook the hall.

Another rose: 'I don't see why it should be necessary to go back to work

before the arbitration is ended.' he said.

William Carney, a Plant 1 tire worker who had emerged as a spokes-

man for the most militant of the union newcomers, stepped forward to

shouts of "take the microphone, Bill!"⁵⁷ Carney opposed the Mc-

Grady plan and called for a postponement of the vote. Burns sought

to defend the committee's action, only to be shouted down.

'If that's all we are going to get, why did we got out in the first place?' a

heated member shouted.

'We want a special meeting to discuss the question. We don't want to vote

now,' voices from the floor cried out.

John House . . . said a few words for the proposals. "Although I favor the

plan, remember it is your decision that is final,' he said.

Then he took an informal vote on the question of beginning balloting imme-

diately. It appeared to be defeated.

Another union official announced that Powers Hapgood, one of the

corps of CIO advisors who were aiding the URW leaders, would

speak for the committee's action.

The announcement did not pacify the crowd.

A demand that William Carney . . . be given the floor soon grew so loud

that instead of allowing Hapgood the floor, a vote was taken to see which

would speak. When Carney won, Dalrymple stepped from the inner office

and declared the meeting over.⁵⁸

Realizing the problems their gesture had caused, URW officials

immediately dropped the McGrady Plan. The strike continued, its

leaders chastened and wary.

The second incident occurred a week later and nearly eliminated

the gains of the previous two weeks. After the sheriff's failure to

break the picket line, the non-strikers had devoted their energies to

political intimidation. In frequent communications with the governor,

sheriff, mayor, and city council, they warned of reprisals if "law and

order" were not restored. Schroy and the council members were

most vulnerable to this pressure.⁵⁹ The non-strikers' minimal de-

57. Akron Times Press, Feb. 29, 1936.

58. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 29, 1936.

59. Akron Beacon Journal, March 3, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 4, 1936;

Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                       23

mand was that the rude shelters the pickets had erected at the plant

gates be removed. The mayor could hardly deny this request; the

huts violated city ordinances and were highly visible reminders of

the strikers' defiance of authority. Schroy conferred with House and

C. M. O'Harrah, the Local 2 picket captain, several times during the

week of March 2-6. They promised to remove the shelters "as soon

as possible." In fact they did nothing. O'Harrah probably did not

even inform the pickets of his promise to remove the huts.60 By

March 6, Schroy's impatience was exhausted. Believing his credibil-

ity and political future were at stake, he ordered sanitation workers to

remove the huts. At 7 a.m. on Saturday, March 7, five trucks and 56

workers accompanied by 75 police arrived to dispose of the huts.

They destroyed four of the shanties before the surprised and sleepy

pickets sounded the alarm.

Ed Heinke, a reporter for the Akron Times Press and an eyewitness,

described the response:

Pickets poured out of the nearby union headquarters. Hurry calls were sent

out for reinforcements...

A moment later, at the General [Tire] plant . . . the word went down the

production line that trouble had developed at Goodyear.

The men dropped their tools, shut the presses and rushed from the

building  ....

Union men in the Goodrich plant were told to stand by. Men in the union

headquarters at Firestone rushed to the scene....

Down over Newton Street hill machine loads of strike sympathizers, with

hatless, coatless men hanging to the running boards, raced toward the strike

scene. Picket reinforcements filled the streets.... 61

Within minutes two or three thousand men jammed the street, forc-

ing the police and sanitation men away from the huts. In the scuffles

that ensued, two policemen were injured. Outraged, Mayor Schroy

first ordered a renewed assault, then hesitated when the police

warned that they would have to go back shooting.⁶² Several hours

later he met House and O'Harah. Schroy agreed to postpone any ac-

tion if the union acted immediately to remove all huts from major

thoroughfares. The union leaders acceded to his ultimatum and the

shanties disappeared. Henceforth, pickets sat in cars near the gates

60. Adolph Germer Diary, March 6, 1936, Adolph Germer Papers, State Historical

Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

61. Akron Times Press, March 7, 1936.

62. Brophy recalled a striker showing him a gun and confiding, "We've passed the

word to the police that we'll give them as good as they send." Brophy, A Miner's Life,

264.

24                                                   OHIO HISTORY

and city officials made no effort to interfere.⁶³ By Sunday the crisis

had passed.

To many observers these incidents were serious indictments of the

strike leaders. The union hall debacle and the near riot of March 7

underlined the unionists' "inexperience" and the precarious hold of

the union officers on their charges. Chappell believed that only out-

side direction of the strike, perhaps the participation of John L. Lew-

is himself, would avert disaster.⁶⁴ Fortunately, he might have

added, experienced advisors were available to provide the element

of professionalism that the URW officers lacked. By late February

they had made the Goodyear contest the "first CIO strike."

The CIO Role

The CIO role in the Goodyear strike was one of the conflict's most

celebrated features. Supposedly it inaugurated the labor alliance as a

militant organization, a successful alternative to the AFL and an all

but irresistible force in American industrial affairs.⁶⁵ This was what

Lewis, John Brophy, his lieutenant, and their representatives in Ak-

ron intended.⁶⁶ In retrospect, however, a somewhat different picture

emerges. Brophy hinted at this view when he noted that "our people

found that one of their most demanding jobs was to restrain the local

talent.. . ."⁶⁷ Rather than inciting the strikers to greater militancy,

as Levinson and other contemporary analysts suggested (and as CIO

critics charged), or guiding the Rubber Workers, as Chappell antic-

ipated, CIO representatives played little direct role in the conduct of

the strike or the negotiations. Their contributions fulfilled neither

the hopes nor the fears of the other participants.

The Goodyear strike was an opportunity for the CIO to outflank the

AFL and to establish the credibility of the Lewis committee with in-

dustrial employees in other industries. In the first of these endeavors

the CIO had an immense advantage; the Rubber Workers had al-

ready opted for industrial unionism and had aligned itself with Lew-

is. Following visits by Adolph Germer on February 22-23 and by

63. Akron Times Press, March 7, 8, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 9, 1936.

64. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936; "Long Distance Telephone Conversation

Between H. L. Kerwin and P. W. Chappell, March 17, 1936," FMCS File 182/1010.

65. See Levinson, Labor On the March, 146-47.

66. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263; Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 25, 26, 1936; CI0 Exec-

utive Committee Minutes, Dec. 9, 1935, "Report by Director for Meeting of Feb. 21, 1936,

April 14, 1936," Katherine P. Ellickson Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

67. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263; Lorin Lee Cary, "Institutionalized Conservatism in

the Early C.I.O.: Adolph Germer, A Case Study." Labor History, 13 (Fall, 1972), 488-91.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                    25

Brophy on February 23, the CIO threw all its resources into the

Goodyear cause.⁶⁸ Germer, who returned on February 24, worked

behind the scenes with the strike leaders; Powers Hapgood, who

arrived on February 26, served as the principal CIO liaison with the

public; and Rose Pesotta of ILGWU, who also arrived on February

26, maintained contacts with the pickets. Brophy made three short

visits, Leo Krzycki of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and Ben

Schafer of the Oil Workers remained for longer periods, and envoys

from the Clothing Workers, Mine Workers, and Auto Workers spoke

at rallies and meetings. The CIO also contributed $3000 to the strike

fund. By contrast, the AFL role was meager. Green contributed

$1000 and had agreed to a speaking appearance when the strike

ended.⁶⁹ Apart from Akron-area functionaries who provided assis-

tance through the Central Labor Union, the only AFL organizer to

appear was Coleman Claherty, Green's former Akron representative.

Claherty toured the picket line one Sunday afternoon. No strike

leader greeted him.

Although generally successful in working with strike leaders, Ger-

mer and his colleagues had some difficulty impressing the strikers

themselves. For all their ability and good intentions, the CIO offi-

cials were outsiders, unfamiliar with the industry and community.

They and their resources were welcome, but on the strikers' terms.

The gulf between them and the strikers was epitomized by their

physical isolation; they lived at the Portage Hotel in downtown

Akron and spent their free moments in each other's company. Their

late-night gatherings at the Portage bar attracted reporters, curious

citizens, and company informants.⁷⁰ It is not surprising that they

found Vice-President Burns, a Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts-

resident also housed at the Portage, the most accessible and cooper-

ative of the URW officials.

From the time of their arrival, the CIO advisors handled the strik-

ers' press and public relations. In the hectic early days of the strike,

Germer undertook this job with minimal assistance. He wrote press

releases, met with reporters, and coordinated the publicity work of

the other CIO representatives. Presumably it was he who decided

that the strikers should rely on the radio to communicate with sym-

pathizers and potential allies. Dalrymple, Burns, Frank Grillo, the In-

68. Brophy, A Miner's Life, 263

69. United Rubber Worker, I (April, 1936), 16.

70. Germer reports many such gatherings in his diary. Also see Akron Beacon Jour-

nal, Feb. 28, 1936.

26                                                   OHIO HISTORY

ternational secretary-treasurer, and Local 2 officials made frequent

broadcasts; their statements, with only two exceptions between Feb-

ruary 26 and March 10, were products of Germer's facile pen.71

Thereafter, McAllister Coleman, a labor journalist Germer brought

from New York to relieve the burden, composed both press releases

and broadcast scripts. The climactic episode in the union radio blitz

was a nine-and-a-half hour all-night broadcast on March 16-17,

when union leaders feared a vigilante attack on the picket line. Grillo

and Coleman coordinated the program, which featured amateur

entertainment, recorded music, news from the picket line, and pro-

strike editorials.⁷² Unionists agreed that it was a remarkable

achievement.

The less imaginative Goodyear public relations staff was hopelessly

outclassed. Masters of newspaper advertising, they stumbled badly

when they sought to employ the new technology of industrial con-

flict. Litchfield's broadcasts confused rather than edified his listen-

ers, and those of other executives and non-strikers lacked the profes-

sional quality of the union appeals. Even union critics agreed that the

strikers won the battle of the air waves.⁷³ The only unpleasant note

for the CIO was personal rather than professional. After his all-night

stint, Coleman began a five-day alcoholic binge that ended his use-

fulness and ultimately led to his dismissal.⁷⁴

CIO representatives were equally effective in public appearances.

Germer, Hapgood, Pesotta and others made daily inspection tours of

the picket lines, often pausing for impromptu rallies.⁷⁵ They also par-

ticipated in countless meetings at the union hall and in a series of

mass rallies at the Armory. Beginning on March 3 the union spon-

sored daily programs in a theater near the strike area. Pesotta re-

cruited amateur musical and theatrical groups for these sessions and

led the strikers in labor songs and parodies of popular tunes. Hap-

good specialized in inspirational talks to the strikers, their families,

and allies. His dapper appearance, measured tone, and educated air

confounded popular notions of the labor agitator. Local journalists

devoted far more attention to him than his role in the strike organiza-

71. Germer Diary, Feb. 26-March 10, 1936.

72. Akron Beacon Journal, March, 17, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 17, 1936.

73. Akron Beacon Journal, March 23, 1936; Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 221-22;

United Rubber Worker, I (April, 1936), 2.

74. Germer Diary, March 17-21, 1936.

75. Pesotta recalled that "we all took turns speaking from the union sound truck. Au-

diences would gather quickly whenever the truck stopped. The loud speaker never lost

its novelty for them." Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 206-07.

28                                                OHIO HISTORY

Germer began to take a more active role in early March. Secret talks

between March 4-7 produced the first Goodyear concessions: an of-

fer to reinstate the strikers, retain the six-hour day, and consult union

representatives before making policy changes. The company also

agreed to reduce the number of "flying squadron" members.⁷⁸

However, in a March 9 radio broadcast President Litchfield seemed

to suggest a different and less generous settlement. Believing they

had been "double-crossed," the union negotiators decided to make

their aims public.⁷⁹ In a broadcast on March 10 House asked for

clarification of the Goodyear proposals and for action on the URW

demand for termination of financial assistance to the Industrial As-

sembly.80 But when the negotiators met on March 12, the Goodyear

representatives refused to consider House's demands. They insisted

on a ratification vote.⁸¹ After considerable discussion and pressure

from Germer, the union negotiators grudgingly agreed to present the

company's proposals to the strikers at an Armory meeting on Satur-

day, March 14. As Germer reported to Brophy, he "hoped [the] men

would accept [the] company's proposition and then build up their

union."82

As Saturday approached there were ominous signs of rank and file

discontent. To many strikers the proposal seemed more like a back to

work order than a union victory. The union negotiators, led by

House, made no attempt to hide their feelings. On Thursday night

Germer, Krzycki, Schafer, and Burns discussed the possibility of re-

jection, though Germer remained hopeful. On Friday evening the

strike rally at the theater turned into an anti-settlement protest led by

Carney.⁸³ After that, even Germer saw that there was little hope for

ratification.⁸⁴

On Saturday morning the strike leaders and Germer met to com-

plete their plans for the afternoon. They decided that House would

open the meeting and call on George Hull, a member of the negotiat-

ing committee, to read the Goodyear proposal. When Hull finished,

House would ask Dalrymple to explain the procedure for amending

the company plan and open the meeting to discussion. They agreed

78. Chappell to Kerwin, March 12, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010; Germer Diary, March

4-9, 1936; Akron Times Press, March 8, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 9, 1936.

79. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936; FMCS File 182/1010.

80. Akron Times Press, March 11, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 11, 1936.

81. Akron Times Press, March 12, 1936; Akron Beacon Journal, March 12, 1936.

82. Germer Diary, March 13, 1936.

83. Akron Beacon Journal, March 14, 1936

84. Germer Diary, March 13, 1936.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                         29

that there would be a secret ballot on the amended Goodyear offer.

At that point W. H. Ricketts, a Local 2 activist, appeared. Ricketts

claimed to represent a group of pickets and announced that he would

introduce a series of detailed amendments. They were the work of

James Keller, the local Communist Party leader, who had been meet-

ing with a handful of strikers.85 The amendments included the de-

mands that the union negotiators had raised on March 12 and that

the Goodyear representatives had refused to consider. House and

other union executives expressed sympathy toward the proposal.

Germer, however, was dismayed: "I had already prepared a substi-

tute resolution without definite instructions to [the] negotiating com-

mittee but this fellow [Ricketts] also House preferred to tie the com-

mittee down to specific points. I told them I thought it was poor

strategy but I couldn't get them to see it.^"86

By 2:00 the Armory overflowed with 4000 or more strikers. Few at-

tempted to disguise their dissatisfaction with the settlement. A news-

paperman who eluded the union guards reported that it was "pretty

plain from the start that the crowd wasn't going to accept the compa-

ny's peace plan.^"87 When a malfunction of the public address sys-

tem delayed the start of the meeting, House led the group in singing.

The refrain of a popular labor song, "No, No, a Thousand Times

No," provided dissidents with a theme.⁸⁸ When House finally

stepped to the microphone to begin the meeting, he was greeted by

chants of "No! No! No!"⁸⁹ After a brief introductory statement,

House turned to Hull. The events of the next few minutes eliminated

the last small hope of an immediate settlement. Germer recalled:

[Hull] gave [a] brief but very unsatisfactory explanation of what hap-

pened.... [He] did not read [the] company proposition.... Then House

'explained' some more. Dalrymple got no chance to read his statement.

After Ricket [sic] read his resolution House took it upon himself to change

the program. He called Burns and Dalrymple into a huddle at the table and

had Burns say 'the negotiating committee accepts the resolution as part of its

report  . . .'

I walked upon the stage and told Burns he blundered. He resented the

suggestion, so I went to the hotel in disgust. I considered leaving.⁹⁰

85. McKenny, Industrial Valley, 353-55; Daily Worker, March 13, 14, 23, 1936. For a

candid assessment of the Communists' limited role, see John Williamson, "Akron, A

New Chapter in American Labor History," Communist, XV (May, 1936), 424-25.

86. Germer Diary, March 14, 1936.

87. Akron Times Press, March 15, 1936.

88. Akron Times Press, March 15, 1936; Interview with John D. House, April 1973;

Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 219.

89. Akron Times Press, March 14, 1936.

90. Germer Diary, March 14, 1936; Akron Time Press, March 15, 1936.

30                                              OHIO HISTORY

House explained that the Ricketts amendments meant a return to the

picket line, but no one spoke up for the Goodyear plan. By a show of

hands Local 2 members adopted the amended report. C. M. O'Har-

rah had the last word: "I'm telling you right now," he exclaimed,

"this strike has just started. We're going out to hold that picket

line.' "91

P. W. Chappell summarized the views of Germer and the other

outsiders when he wrote that House "allowed the meeting to get

away from him."⁹² House would likely have replied that the meeting

was never his to control. What to Chappell and Germer was poor

management was to URW leaders the rough and tumble of a demo-

cratic union. Roberts Rules might be observed in the breech, but

the principle of consensus was maintained. On March 14 that meant

the strikers would continue to press their demands. As Germer had

anticipated, their decision was costly. Within hours former Akron

Mayor C. Nelson Sparks announced the formation of the Law and

Order League. The strike was once more in jeopardy.

Community Response

From the beginning of the Goodyear strike the elements of an anti-

strike coalition were present in Akron. Two of them, the Goodyear

management and the non-strikers, require little additional comment.

Goodyear officials had consistently opposed the URW since 1933;

they would continue to do so until 1941. The non-strikers, their zeal

and possibly their numbers somewhat diminished, were also deter-

mined opponents.⁹³ A third element was a substantial minority of lo-

cal citizens not directly involved in the conflict. Farmers, profession-

als, and upper-income residents of all backgrounds were deeply

suspicious of the URW and the strikers.⁹⁴ In most cases their anxiety

did not arise from hostility to unions or collective bargaining per se

but from fear of their possible consequences. Anything that threat-

ened the prospect of economic recovery became the object of their

enmity. For several years they viewed the URW with misgivings. Aft-

er February 18 most of them probably saw Local 2 as a threat.

Finally, there were local government figures, pragmatic in outlook

91. Akron Times Press, March 15 1936.

92. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

93. See Roberts, Rubber Workers, for post-strike activities.

94. Jones, Life, Liberty and Property, 143-236. For a recent effort to cast such an align-

ment in broader, theoretical terms, see Edward Greer, Big Steel (New York, 1979).

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                    31

sensitive to interest group pressures and wary of any move that would

expose themselves to electoral retaliation. The mayor, sheriff, prose-

cutor, and most of the thirteen councilmen needed Rubber Workers'

votes to be elected and dared not appear indifferent to the strikers'

interests. In addition, the mayor was supposedly miffed at Goodyear

executives for not supporting his election campaign in 1935.⁹⁵ The

URW was by no means devoid of political influence. Yet the strikers

were vulnerable on the critical economic growth issue. The one point

on which company and union, pro-strike and anti-strike forces,

agreed was the desirability of expansion. Any threat to the city's fu-

ture prosperity would provoke a reaction that cut across other lines.

Though the strikers subscribed to the growth ideal like everyone

else, their actions invited criticism. By closing the plant they reduced

spending and profits and increased unemployment and uncertainty.

In the minds of many people this was tantamount to opposing growth.

No politician could-or would-tolerate an anti-growth movement.

As long as the strike lasted there was danger that these groups

would coalesce into an anti-strike movement. The sheriff's attempt to

implement the injunction had been a close call for the strikers. Only

the prospect of violence had deterred the mayor and governor.⁹⁶

The police confrontation of March 7 also might have served as an

anti-strike catalyst. The March 14 vote created a new crisis, the most

serious of all. By that time it was widely acknowledged that the inter-

ests of the community demanded an end to the dispute, and to many

people rejection of the company's offer was a rejection of the city as

well. Political neutrality became more difficult.

In the meantime, anti-union activists and Goodyear representatives

had formulated a plan to break the strike. Non-strikers supposedly

originated it, while Litchfield and the heads of other rubber compa-

nies provided financial support.⁹⁷ Sheriff Flower may have been in-

volved in the discussions, though he was determined not to appear

as the leader of the effort. Schroy, whose relations with Goodyear,

the non-strikers, and Flower had been less than happy since the in-

junction confrontation, stoutly refused any tie. The non-strikers then

turned to local businessmen.98 They found a willing leader in former

Mayor Sparks, an outspoken community booster who had headed a

"Citizens Committee" of prominent businessmen during the first two

95.  Ibid., 107.

96. Akron Beacon Journal, Feb. 25, 1936; Akron Times Press, Feb. 25, 1936.

97. U.S. Senate Hearings, 29, 51-52.

98. Germer Diary, March 12, 1936.

32                                                OHIO HISTORY

weeks of the strike.99 From their discussions emerged the Law and

Order League. By March 14 Sparks was ready to act. When word

came of the strikers' decision, Sparks and his allies implemented

their plan. Goodyear issued a statement withdrawing its concessions

and Sparks announced the formation of the League. His objective,

he said, was to aid law enforcement officials when the plant reo-

pened. If they refused to cooperate, the League would act alone.¹⁰⁰

Statements by Litchfield and Sparks on Sunday, March 15, em-

phasized the economic growth issue. In refusing Chappell's last min-

ute request for an interim agreement, Litchfield maintained that he

could no longer reinstate the strikers "because Goodyear has lost

business."

Akron's . . . abject surrender to the defiant demands of a very small part of

its population is becoming so generally known that it will be increasingly diffi-

cult for us to convince our customers that they may depend upon us for an

uninterrupted supply of rubber products so long as they are manufactured in

Akron. 101

Sparks was more specific in two radio broadcasts. Germer, Hapgood,

and the other CIO advisors "have come into our community with

the sole intent to either make Akron's rubber industry 100 per cent

unionized, or wreck the industry. And wreck the city in the ef-

fort!" 1⁰²

By Sunday night the "town's excitement was bordering on pan-

ic."¹⁰³ Sparks claimed to have enrolled thousands of strike oppo-

nents, and the non-strikers promised 5200 vigilantes for anti-strike

duty. Union leaders, on the other hand, promised to resist any at-

tack on the picket line. They assigned Army veterans to serve as pick-

et captains and dispatched bodyguards to protect URW and CIO

leaders. "The headquarters of both sides were armed camps."¹⁰⁴

Rumors were rife, but two critical questions remained unanswered.

What would Schroy do and when would Goodyear reopen the

plant?

The mayor's actions Sunday night and Monday probably per-

suaded Goodyear officials not to open the plant Monday or Tuesday.

99. Akron Times Press, Feb. 25, 1936.

100. Akron Beacon Journal, March 14, 1936.

101. Akron Beacon Journal, March 16, 1936. For confirmation of these charges, see

Garnet L. Patterson to Charles S. Fahy, July 21, 1936, NLRB Records, case 8-C-33.

102. Akron Beacon Journal, March 16, 1936.

103. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

104. Pesotta, Bread Upon the Waters, 220.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                      33

After consulting the police, Schroy opted for continued neutrality.

Convinced that any attempt to reopen the plant would precipitate vio-

lence, the mayor concluded that the best interests of the city de-

manded an end to the confrontation and a negotiated settlement. In a

meeting with the sheriff and police officers Monday morning he was

"firm" in rejecting assistance to the anti-strike forces. " 'The officers

will be [at Goodyear] only to preserve peace,' he declared. 'They will

not take sides with either group.' "105 To Sheriff Flowers's pleas that

more officers were necessary (he had sworn in Sparks as a special

deputy a few minutes earlier), Schroy turned a deaf ear. Later that

day, when Flower proposed that they join the League in asking Gov-

ernor Davey or, if necessary, President Roosevelt, for troops, Schroy

again demurred. While promising to consider any suggestion, he re-

fused to cooperate with Sparks.10⁶ Without the mayor's support

Flower and Sparks were at least temporarily stifled.

By Monday afternoon the anti-strike leaders had lost the initia-

tive.107 Both Akron newspapers attacked Sparks and the League in

outspoken editorials. "A pitched battle," wrote the Beacon Journal,

"will give a black name to the community, without a single benefit

accruing."¹⁰⁸ In response Sparks wavered, denying that his intention

was to do more than "crystalize" public opinion.¹⁰⁹ So shocked

were his recruits at this statement that the League operations came to

a halt.110 Later that afternoon Davey refused to intercede and Labor

Secretary Frances Perkins sent telegrams to House and Litchfield

calling for renewed negotiations.¹¹¹ By Monday evening the anti-

strike movement had floundered.

On Tuesday Goodyear officials indicated a renewed interest in ne-

gotiations. Union-management conferences began on Wednesday,

March 18. Federal mediators reported that the union representatives

"have qui[e]ted down very much in their attitude" and that the

company officials were in a "conciliatory mood."11² Progress was

rapid. By March 20 Goodyear had agreed to maintain the six-hour

day and to recognize the union's committees in handling grievances.

105. Akron Beacon Journal, March 16, 1936.

106. Ibid., March 17, 1936.

107. Chappell to Kerwin, March 26, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

108. Akron Beacon Journal, March 16, 1936.

109. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1936.

110.  Ibid.

111. Frances Perkins to Paul W. Litchfield, March 16, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010.

112. "Telephone Conversation," Chappell and Kerwin, March 19, 1936, FMCS File

182/1010.

Goodyear Strike of 1936                                      35

glance," Chappell wrote, it appeared that the union gained relatively

little. However, on reconsideration "it will be seen that not only were

the main objectives of the strike obtained but that the workers se-

cured additional benefits as well."115

There was an ironic footnote to the settlement. In the eighteen

months following the Goodyear strike, Mayor Schroy and Governor

Davey, the men most responsible for an outcome that could be con-

sidered favorable to the union, became leaders of the anti-CIO back-

lash in Ohio and the nation. An uninspiring administrator-cum-

politician, Schroy rebelled against the sit-down in mid-1936,

mounted a determined anti-union campaign, and won reelection in

1937 in one of the nation's first referenda on labor militancy.¹¹⁶

Davey, a shrewder, more cynical, and more ambitious officeholder,

tried to use anti-CIO sentiment as a stepping-stone to national office.

By breaking the 1937 Little Steel strike and waging a vociferous cam-

paign against labor radicals, he was able to project himself, however

briefly, into the national spotlight and into contention for the 1940

Democratic presidential nomination.117

In later years it became customary to emphasize the role of militant

workers and to downplay the contributions of public officials, espe-

cially the unappealing Mayor Schroy, in the outcome. Davey's refusal

to intervene undoubtedly reflected his desire to win union support in

the upcoming election; Schroy's actions are more difficult to explain.

Personal and political antipathy to Sparks and Flower, leaders of oth-

er Republican factions, may have played a part in his behavior on

March 15-16. The apparent success of his neutrality policy during the

injunction dispute may also have been a factor. But the overriding

consideration was undoubtedly his realization that the plant could

not be opened peacefully, and that violence would be detrimental to

the city's reputation and future prosperity. In the end, the economic

growth issue was decisive. It explains why a businessman heading a

self-proclaimed "business" administration saved the "first CIO

strike" from likely defeat. The fact that the same consideration led

Schroy to adopt a position not unlike Sparks (and Davey) in 1937 is

less important than the fact that he enabled the Goodyear strike to

be recorded in union annals as a triumph. Without a "successful"

115. Chappell to Kerwin, March 21, 1936, FMCS File 182/1010; Pesotta, Bread Upon

the Waters, 224.

116. See Daniel Nelson, "The CIO At Bay: Labor Militancy and Politics in Akron,

1936-38," Unpublished MS.

117. Ibid.; James L. Baughman, "Classes and Company Towns: Legends of the 1937

Little Steel Strike," Ohio History, 87 (Spring, 1978), 175-92.

36                                             OHIO HISTORY

conclusion it is unlikely the strike would have received the attention

of Levinson, McKenny and other CIO partisans. Presumably its "les-

sons" would have been forgotten and the CIO thrust of 1936-37

would have taken a different course. Germer obliquely acknowl-

edged the mayor's contribution when he confided that the union

had been "skating on thin ice."¹¹⁸ He was more explicit at the Ar-

mory meeting on March 21. After the ratification vote his first step

was to offer thanks to the chief of police. 119

The end of the Goodyear strike marked the beginning of a period

of dramatic expansion and development for unions in the manufactur-

ing sector, a period that the CIO partisans of the late 1930s and 1940s

associated directly or indirectly with the Goodyear conflict. The sit-

down technique, the spread of industrial unionism, the growth of

CIO power and, above all, the image of a union movement that was

"on the march," powerful, undaunted, inexorable-all dated from

the Goodyear strike. But there was more. The Goodyear strike pro-

vided not only a preview of "labor on the march," but of workers,

union and non-union, reevaluating their allegiances, of the technology

of mass movements, and of the possibilities for cultivating and manip-

ulating public opinion. It was not the Levinsons, McKennys, Vorses,

and Pesottas, but the stolid Monthly Labor Review which best

grasped the significance of the Goodyear strike. Neither the causes

nor results but "the circumstances in which the strike was carried on

and the method used" gave the conflict its claim to public attention.

118. Germer Diary, March 22, 1936.

119.  Ibid., March 21, 1936.