Ohio History Journal

ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR.

William Medill's War with the Indian

Traders, 1847

William Medill's tenure as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Polk administra-

tion came at the critical time of continental expansion which resulted in forceful

removal of the Indian from lands desired by white settlers. Soon after he took

office Medill attempted to make some basic reforms in policy governing relations

with the Indians. One of the most controversial aspects of his reforming activities

as commissioner revolved around his determination to crack down on the rampant

abuses in the Indian trade. The difficulties he encountered demonstrate the grip

private trading firms held on governmental policy relative to Indian affairs.

Medill's background was typical for a politician of his day. Born in New Castle

County, Delaware, in 1802, he studied law at Newark Academy (Delaware Col-

lege) in 1825 before leaving for Lancaster, Ohio, where he was admitted to the

bar in 1830. From here the handsome, full-bearded, ambitious young man entered

Ohio Democratic politics. Serving first as a state representative between 1835 and

1838, he then won election to two terms in the United States House of Representa-

tives (1839-1843).1 Because of his radical attitudes on money and the bank issue,

Medill became known in the state as a follower of the Van Buren wing of the

Democratic party.²

After James K. Polk's victory in the presidential campaign of 1844, Ohio

political bosses managed to have Medill appointed second assistant postmaster

general, a job that would allow him to funnel a large amount of patronage toward

Ohio. Nevertheless, the Ohio Van Buren faction, like all of Van Buren's followers,

remained perturbed over Polk's inclination to support the conservative, pro-bank,

1. Medill also gained some note for presiding over the Ohio Constitutional Convention in

1850, as governor 1853-1856, and serving as the first comptroller of the federal treasury in

Buchanan's administration, 1857-1861. There is some controversy over the exact date of Medill's

birth. Several dates, ranging from 1801 to 1805, have been used, and it is probable that the exact

date is lost to history. The most commonly used date, however, appears to be 1802. Biographical

Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), 1397; Charles B. Gal-

breath, History of Ohio (Chicago, 1925), II, 59; Dwight L. Smith, "William Medill, 1853-1856,

in Governors of Ohio (Columbus, 1954), 68-71.

2. Edgar Allen Holt, Party Politics in Ohio, 1840-1850 (Ohio Historical Collections, I, Colum-

bus, 1930), 173.

Mr. Trennert is Assistant Professor of History, Temple University. Part of the research for

this article was made possible through a summer research grant from Temple University.

48                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

received the top post in the Indian Bureau.

At the time of the appointment, William L. Marcy, Polk's Secretary of War,

technically headed the Office of Indian Affairs. Although Marcy was a man of

ability, the Mexican War and the political duties of a Cabinet member diverted

his attention to other matters, leaving responsibility for determining Indian policy

to the new commissioner. Medill had absolutely no prior experience in dealing

with Indians, but he soon proposed numerous reforms in Indian policy based on

his experience as an officeholder, such as strengthening the education and civiliza-

tion programs, cutting expenses in the department, and improving the caliber of

men employed by the bureau.⁶ His most ambitious and controversial project was

the struggle to reform trade relations with the Indians.

From the first contact between white and Indian, abuses, frauds, and debauchery

had been characteristic of their relations, with the private trader often contributing

more than his share to the difficulties. With the Jacksonian removal policy of the

1830's, when all eastern tribes were moved west of the Mississippi River, many

persons hoped a permanent solution to the "Indian problem" had been discovered.

The basic premise of this policy revolved around the belief that white contact with

the Indian was degrading to the native and was the cause of the inter-racial con-

flicts. The goal of the Government was to end such problems peacefully. This

seemed best accomplished by civilizing, educating, and assimilating the red popula-

tion. The lands west of the Mississippi seemed ideally suited to this purpose.⁷

When the actual process of removal began in the mid-1830's, Congress tried to

establish permanent trade and intercourse regulations to protect the Indians from

all the evils of the white man's world until the slow process of civilization was

completed. Consequently, in 1834 Congress completely revised the laws regulating

trade and intercourse with them, incorporating the new policies. This legislation

defined the unorganized territory west of the Mississippi as "Indian Country," and

set regulations and penalties to safeguard the Indian in his new home. Most of

the provisions simply reiterated past laws, but taken together, they show the intent

of Congress. Liquor was forbidden; the licensing system for traders was tightened;

no whites were permitted to hunt or trap in the Indian country; no persons could

settle or inhabit any land guaranteed to the Indians, and the Government would

forcibly remove anyone violating these laws.⁸ The intent of these provisions,

clearly, was to benefit the Indian, not the settler.

In the decade following removal, the Government attempted to live up to what

it considered was beneficial for the Indian and renewed attempts to foster civilza-

6. For some of Medill's reform proposals, see Medill to Marcy, December 30, 1846, in

"Changes in the Public Service," House Executive Documents 70, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 500;

Medill to Thomas H. Harvey, Indian Superintendent at St. Louis, January 7, 1847, Records of

the Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 39, Record Group 75, National Archives; "Annual

Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1846," Senate Executive Documents 1, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.,

No. 493, pp. 214-228.

7. Francis P. Prucha, "Indian Removal and the Great American Desert," Indian Magazine

of History, LIX (1963), 309-322.

8. For a complete discussion of the reasons behind the revisions of the 1830's see Francis

P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse

Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). The congressional testimony concerning the 1834

bills is contained in "Regulating the Indian Department," House Report 474, 23 Cong., 1 Sess.,

No. 263.

William Medill                                                                49

tion. During the 1840's a reforming spirit pervaded the Indian Bureau and this

produced some advances toward assimilation, particularly in the form of manual

labor schools.⁹ Yet as the decade wore on evidence shows that many of the Indians

were not being reached by the civilizing effort, or did not care to be. One of the

major reasons for this failure seemed to be that the private traders continued to

operate without much concern for the welfare of the Indian.

By the 1840's the Indian trade was pretty much of an unglamorous shell of

what it had been. The great days of the fur trade had ended with the extermination

of the beaver a decade earlier. About the only remaining way for traders to make

a profit was to supply the wants of the tribesmen in return for their annuity money

(federal payments due for lands relinquished) and for other valuables, such as

buffalo robes. Competition between traders for this patronage was stiff. Often

traders used unscrupulous methods, as getting the Indians drunk in order to obtain

a share of their business.¹⁰ The major firm dealing with the Indians was the Pierre

Chouteau, Jr. & Co.--still commonly called the American Fur Company.

The Chouteau family, by reason of its long history in Missouri, was extremely

prestigious and influential. Chouteau's respectability, however, did not prevent him

from engaging in unsavory practices in order to retain domination of the trade.11

In this regard he often found it necessary to join with other leading traders, par-

ticularly George W. and William G. Ewing of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to change or

evade undesirable regulations. Thus the traders, big and small, only adhered to the

Indian intercourse laws when their convenience was served and profits were gained.

Agent Thomas P. Moore, describing the operation of these men on the Missouri,

presents an excellent picture of the problem:

The agent is charged with the duty of resisting and punishing infractions of the inter-

course law, whether committed by a large and powerful trading company, or a band of

unlicensed traders. The first have the power, from their extensive intercourse with the

Indians, and the number of their employees, to counteract every move adverse to their

schemes, and to render his [the agent's] stay in the country impossible by denying him

shelter or aid of any kind; while the second travel in small armed bands, prepared to resist

the execution of the law.¹²

When Medill took office he rapidly became aware of the difficulties in enforcing

the trade and intercourse laws. At the same time Congress began one of its periodic

investigations of Indian policy, and on August 10, 1846, the House of Representa-

9. Francis P. Prucha, "American Indian Policy in the 1840's: Visions of Reform," John G.

Clark, ed., The Frontier Challenge (Lawrence, Kan., 1971), 81-93.

10. Such methods, of course, were not new to Indian trade. Writing about some of the

unsavory trading tactics during the colonial period, Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the Amer-

ican Indian (New York, 1972), 33, states that "Rum was in fact one of the main reasons for

the traders success with the Indians.. .the trader could easily induce his warriors to have a free

'dram' of rum before the business of barter began...one dram called for another, and before

long the tribesmen were thoroughly drunk. The trader could then literally steal the skins and

furs.... "

11. Hiram M. Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the Far West (New York, 1936), I,

365-368, 381-382. The American Fur Company, John Jacob Astor's economic giant, had

actually passed out of existence in 1834. At that date Chouteau acquired the company's western

operations. Chittenden discusses Chouteau's background and states that "He made no attempt

to introduce a higher standard of business morality in the trade than it was accustomed to....

In short his code of business was sufficiently elastic to fit the situation with which he had to deal."

12. Moore to Harvey, September 21, 1846, in "Annual Report.. .1846," p. 292.

50                                                               OHIO HISTORY

tives called upon the Secretary of War to give them suggestions for reform.¹3 Marcy

turned the responsibility for gathering the information over to Medill. This enabled

the new commissioner to make a thorough investigation of Indian policy.

Two chronic problems drew much of Medill's attention. The first was the illegal

liquor trade. Under the existing laws a fine of $500 and forfeiture of goods were

the only penalties imposed upon anyone convicted of introducing liquor into Indian

country. These restrictions were notoriously weak. So much whiskey made its

way to the frontier that a national scandal had developed. British traders smuggled

liquor down from Canada, Mexicans brought it up from Santa Fe, and, more

significantly, American frontiersmen imported it from the adjoining states. For

nearly ten years almost every official along the frontier had noticed the prevalence

of whiskey sellers and the resultant effect on the Indians. In 1846 things seemed

worse. "Some efficient steps should be taken," pleaded subagent Robert B. Mitchell

at Council Bluffs, "to prevent the frequent use, and the ease of obtaining and

introducing whiskey to this nation. This article is kept in great abundance near the

[Iowa] State line, where squaws and young men exchange horses, guns, blankets

and other articles that they can get on credit from the traders, for whiskey."¹⁴

Such activities angered Medill and he minced no words when it came to the use

of alcohol among the Indians. His main concern was that whiskey was under-

mining the Government's attempt to improve the condition of the Indians. "I

cannot too strongly impress on you," he wrote to one agent, "the importance of

the duty imposed upon you. The prevention of the use of strong drink has almost

been the one thing needful to ensure the prosperity of the Indian race and its

advancement in civilization. The use of it has tended more to the demoralization

of the Indians than all other causes combined."¹⁵ In his annual report for 1846,

Medill stated, "Whiskey is the greatest obstacle to their rapid moral and social

elevation, and no means should be spared to break up the traffic in it, now and

heretofore so extensively and injuriously carried on among the Indians, principally

by the descriptions of persons [unscrupulous white men] above mentioned." One

means of making improvements seemed to be that of changing the law:

Under the present laws, the only penalty for introducing liquor into the Indian country,

and selling or bartering it to the Indians, is, in the former case, a forfeiture of the article

if found, and in the latter a fine if convicted of the offense. The profits of the trade are

so great that the risk of detection and loss of the article is, and will be incurred without

hesitation.16

Similar problems arose in connection with annuity payments. These payments,

often in cash, were compensation for past treaties and agreements. In 1834 Con-

gress decided to stop giving funds to heads of families and began the practice of

supplying annuities to the chiefs for distribution. Supposedly this system would

end the perpetration of fraud and allow the chiefs to apply the funds "to the

13. Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1221; Medill to Marcy, December 30, 1846, in

"Changes in the Public Service." The Senate was also looking to changes in Indian policy, par-

ticularly in relation to the addition of new agents, see Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess.,

1198.

14. Mitchell to Harvey, September 11, 1846, in "Annual Report . .1846," p. 301.

15. Medill to Moore, April 1, 1846. Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 38.

16. "Annual Report.. .1846," p. 228.

William Medill                                                                51

expenses of their Government, to the purpose of education, or to some object of

general concern."¹⁷ But paying annuities to the chiefs and headmen failed to

improve the condition of the Indians. Entrusting a large amount of money to a

few individuals only proved to be a windfall for unscrupulous traders. The chiefs,

finding the temptation to run up huge personal debts too much to resist, charged

their purchases to tribal funds, leaving little or no money for the rest of the tribe.

These debts thus became the nation's debts, and the United States Government

soon found itself making annuity payments directly to the traders to satisfy the

personal accounts of a few tribesmen. Then, too, once the chiefs and principal

men became indebted to the traders, they were forced to act as the traders desired

or lose their credit.¹⁸ The trading companies consequently held enormous power

over the tribes--a power that could be used against the Indian Office if

necessary.¹⁹

Numerous reports reached the commissioner's office enumerating the abuses

perpetrated under the annuity system.²⁰ By early 1847, Medill decided on the

necessity of several changes. First, annuities must be kept under tight control to

prevent the degradation that accompanied the accumulation of too much money

in the hands of a few tribesmen. From the commissioner's viewpoint, the Indian,

"who is naturally improvident and has little regard for money when it comes into

his possession, after supplying his temporary wants, has the means of living for a

time, independent of industry or exertion, in idleness and profligacy, until the

indisposition to labor or the habit of intemperance becomes so strong, that he

degenerates into a wretched outcast." Two other proposals were made at the same

time. One suggestion would have made a cut in the size of the annuity should the

tribe decrease in number, and the other proposed that "goods and provisions"

should be furnished in lieu of cash if the tribes would agree.²¹ These changes were

all intended to reduce the amount of money available to the tribes and thus elimi-

nate the temptation for whiskey sellers and traders to cheat and debauch the Indian.

Medill discovered also that some trading companies were actively working

against the efforts of Indian agents to help the tribes. He found that if agents were

overly zealous in trying to protect the Indians from fraud, the traders used their

political power in Congress to have the objectionable men replaced. One corre-

spondent wrote Medill to warn him that "the most active representatives of the

Indian traders" were presently using such threats to force Thomas H. Harvey,

Indian Superintendent at St. Louis, to tone down his attempts to prosecute several

17. "Regulating the Indian Department," 9-10, 27-28.

18. An excellent account of the activities of the traders is contained in a report by Capt.

J. R. B. Gardiner, who witnessed the annuity payment of the Sac and Fox in 1843, printed in the

Washington Daily Union, October 20, 1847.

19. Ordinarily the traders used their power to get the chiefs to oppose changes in depart-

mental practices that might hurt profits. Also it was not beyond the realm of possibility for the

traders to actually excite hostilities. "These people," wrote one observer, "would not hesitate

to get up a.. .war even at the sacrifice of a few lives provided it offered any inducement in the

way of profit." See D. D. T. Grant to General P. Whitmore, October 27, 1847, Office of Indian

Affairs, Letters Received, Miscellaneous, 1847.

20. See, for example, an office memo by Medill dated July 27, 1846, Medill Papers. Other

indications of the situation appear later in Harvey to Medill, June 5, 1847, Office of Indian

Affairs, Letters Received, St. Louis Superintendency, and Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847,

Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 40.

21. "Annual Report...1846," p. 217; Medill to Robert B. Mitchell, January 22, 1847, Office

of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 39.

52                                                                OHIO HISTORY

companies for fraud and liquor smuggling. The traders, continued the letter, "are

men of great means, activity, and determination in procuring the removal of agents

of the Government connected with Indian affairs; and although not seen often in

such efforts are generally prime movers in asking a change when the government

agents unite energy and high character for integrity."²² Such information un-

doubtedly upset Medill. He soon determined to correct the situation, and this

resolve developed into a crusade against the traders.

Until Congress could be urged into taking legislative action, Medill's ability to

change the system was severely limited. He, however, did all in his power to

reduce the abuses. Agents were directed to be especially active in halting the

liquor trade. "There are but few whites residing in the district of the country

referred to," noted one of his instructions, "except at distant and widely separate

trading points: and over these traders and their employees it will be your duty to

keep a watchful eye."²³

Although traders were occasionally caught and prosecuted as a result of this

surveillance, the illegal activities continued much as before--the vastness of the

Indian country and the paucity of agents assured the traders relative immunity.

Quite a few cases of fraud were also uncovered, but the larger trading outfits

usually managed to evade punishment. Even though companies such as Chouteau's

and the Ewing's were often found to be cheating the tribesmen out of annuities,

charging unfair prices, and smuggling liquor, their effective lobby in Washington,

especially among the Missouri congressmen, was usually successful in clouding the

issue sufficiently for them to escape conviction.²⁴ Such methods as appealing to the

President, the Secretary of War, and Congress, and if necessary bribing witnesses

were used. Clearly, then, new laws and impartial enforcement were necessary if

the tribes were to be protected.

Upon the urging of the Indian Office, Congress began consideration of the revi-

sion of Indian policy early in 1847. On February 9 the House committee on Indian

affairs reported a bill making major amendments in the laws of 1834.25 The com-

mittee proposed changes in the trade and intercourse regulations generally in line

with Medill's recommendations, and on March 3, 1847 they became law. By far

the most significant features of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1847 came

in the modification of the annuity provisions and a tightening up of the liquor trade.

Sections II and III of the act provided that

Any person who shall sell, exchange or barter, give, or dispose of, any spirituous liquor

or wine to an Indian, in the Indian country, or who shall introduce, or attempt to intro-

22. T. P. Andrews to Medill, December 24, 1846, Medill Papers. There are indications that

Medill was aware of the pressure of traders as soon as he came into office in 1845. See George

W. Ewing to Medill, November 19, 1845, in the George W. Ewing Papers, Indiana Division,

Indiana State Library.

23. Medill to Moore, April 1, 1846. Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 38.

24. Medill to Harvey, October 31, 1846, March 27, 1847, and Medill to G. W. Ewing, July 17,

1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vols. 38 and 39. One outstanding example of the

trader's power to evade prosecution comes to light in Medill's attempt in 1846 to prosecute

Pierre Chouteau, Jr. & Co. for smuggling liquor up the Missouri. Despite practically an ironclad

case, Chouteau managed to delay the trial long enough (two years) to buy off the witnesses and

persuade the Government not to revoke his license. The final result was a small fine and no

inconvenience to Chouteau's operations. Much of the correspondence relating to this case is

found in Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received, St. Louis Superintendency, 1846-1849.

25. Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 366.

William Medill                                                              53

duce, any spirituous liquor or wine in the Indian country,. . shall in the former case be

subject to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, and in the latter case not

exceeding one year.

*     *    *

All annuities or other moneys, and all goods, stipulated by treaty to be paid to or furnished

to any Indian tribe, shall, at the discretion of the President or Secretary of War, instead

of being paid over to the chiefs, or to such persons as they shall designate, be divided and

paid over to the heads of families and other individuals entitled to participate therein, or,

with the consent of the tribe, be applied to such purposes as will best promote the happi-

ness and prosperity of the members thereof, under such regulations as shall be prescribed

by the Secretary of War.

Annuities, where sufficiently large, might be paid semi-annually. In an attempt

to dampen the Indian's thirst, annuity money could also be withheld from those

natives under the influence of alcohol or those refusing to cooperate with the

Government in preventing the use of ardent spirits.²⁶

Medill was pleased with the text of the reforms. "It is probably one of the most

salutary laws affecting our Indian relations that has ever been passed," he wrote

to Thomas Harvey. The new annuity provisions seemed to promise great improve-

ments for the Indians. In the past "it was too often the case that the upright and

well disposed reaped little or no benefit . . . whatever; the idle and profligate

recklessly incurring large debts on the faith of them, which through improper

influences [of traders] the chiefs would be induced to recognize and sanction as

national or binding on the whole tribe, and order to be paid out of their annuities,

thus robbing the better class to make good the improvidence of the worse."²⁷

The trading companies reacted violently to the provisions of the 1847 act; and

Medill, as the author of the legislation, received most of their fury. Aiding the

companies' own powerful lobbyists were a number of influential politicians, includ-

ing his own party colleague, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton, and Daniel

Webster, a new England Whig.²⁸ Because the traders knew they lacked moral

grounds for attacking the liquor restrictions and there was little chance for repeal,²⁹

they concentrated on blocking the annuity provisions. In spite of the opposition

being mobilized against him, Medill showed no inclination to be swayed from his

determination to break the hold of the traders over the Indians. Whenever lobbyists

approached him asking that some provision of the law not be enforced lest the

companies lose money, he turned them down with ill-disguised hostility.³⁰ The

traders, consequently, attempted to go over the commissioner's head. Chouteau,

26. U. S. Statutes At Large, IX, 203-204.

27. Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 40. See

also, "Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1847," Senate Executive Documents 1,

30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 503, p. 476.

28. Both Benton and Webster were very close to the Chouteau firm; Benton from his Missouri

background and interest in the fur trade, and Webster from holding financial interests in the

company. See Bernard DeVoto, Across the Wide Missouri (Boston, 1947), 24; and Elbert B.

Smith, Magnificent Missourian, The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia, 1958), 66-67,

80-82.

29. Traders generally gave lip service to the desirability of keeping alcohol from the Indians.

However, a few times they had tried to convince the Government to ease restrictions. Their

argument was always the same, they wanted liquor only to meet British competition. They were

always flatly refused. See Chittenden, American Fur Trade, I, 356.

30. Charles Findlay to P. Chouteau, Jr. & Co., August 22, 1847, Chouteau Papers, Missouri

Historical Society.

54                                                                OHIO HISTORY

Ewing, and others fired off strong letters to Secretary of War Marcy defending the

old system of annuities on economic and humanitarian grounds. The traders

claimed the law would ruin business. A number of tribes had run up substantial

debts and the companies feared they would not be collectable according to the new

annuity provision: "If the payment of annuities are to be made, not as usual to

the Chiefs, but to 'heads of families,' it follows that the Chiefs, head men and

braves, whose obligations we hold, can never meet them, and the traders must

bear consequences enormously injurious to them."³¹

Unable immediately to postpone the implementation of this new provision, the

traders turned their attention to making sure that existing debts were not declared

null and void. Several of the companies held large claims dating prior to the

enactment of the 1847 law; the Potawatomies, for example, were said to owe

$74,000.32 Should the notes be held invalid, the traders said, the Government would

be in a position of imposing ex post facto laws. At least one firm contended that

the trading companies were doing more than the Government to insure the survival

of many tribes. George W. Ewing wrote to Secretary Marcy that while "trade with

the border tribes has been adverse and even disastrous," his company had gen-

erously continued to serve the natives because "during the long interval between the

payment of annuities these destitute people fall back on their traders and demand

credit and have always got it. Without it they would perish & suffer."³³ Using such

reasoning, the traders asked the Government to suspend the act of 1847 until such

a time as injustice would not be worked against them. In essence they wanted

payment of all claims on the books prior to March 3, 1847. Benton hinted to

Medill that such would be prudent policy.³⁴

Still the commissioner refused to be influenced by the trading companies or his

colleagues. The feud, of course, soon became public knowledge. Medill hastened

to assure all interested parties that no injustice would result and that the law did

not operate retroactively. But he also made it abundantly clear that the Indian

Office had no intention of paying any fraudulent claims, no matter when they were

incurred. On August 30, 1847, the companies were instructed to submit all claims

to the bureau before April 1848 for a decision as to whether the debts were of a

truly tribal character or had been incurred by individual Indians. Only those claims

found to be valid would be paid out of tribal funds.³⁵ The companies readily sub-

31. P. Chouteau, W. G. and G. W. Ewing, and S. S. Phelps to Marcy, [1847?], Office of

Indian Affairs, Letters Received, Miscellaneous, 1847. Medill wrote to Harvey on August 30,

1847, reporting, "Since the passage of the law, letters have been received by the President and

this Department from some of the traders & alleged creditors of the Indians against per capita

payments, which they represent as an innovation upon past usage, & a consequent invasion of

their vested rights."

32. Report of subagent Alfred J. Vaughan, September 29, 1847, Chouteau Papers. In 1848

the traders finally claimed $64,000 due from the Potawatomies. See Petition to the President,

November 20, 1848, George W. Ewing Papers.

33. George W. Ewing to Marcy, May 8, 1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received,

Miscellaneous, 1847.

34. On May 8, 1847, Benton wrote to Medill, enclosing a letter from Chouteau, urging that

"the law of the last session, declaring void contracts made by the Indians for money or goods,

not be made to operate retroactively." See Medill to Benton, May 18, 1848, Office of Indian

Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 39.

35. W. G. and G. W. Ewing to Medill, October 26, 1846, George W. Ewing Papers; Medill to

W. G. and G. W. Ewing, November 20, 1847, and Medill to Harvey, August 30, 1847, Office of

Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 40.

William Medill                                                            55

mitted their claims. At the same time realizing that Medill held the key to their

success, they also launched an attack on the commissioner, denouncing him in the

press, working to convince members of Congress that he was prejudiced against the

traders, and attempting to have him removed from office.³⁶

William G. Ewing, senior partner of W. G. & G. W. Ewing Company, even made

an unsuccessful bid for election to Congress which was at least partly based on his

desire to give the company more political influence.³⁷ Medill retaliated by allowing

the Washington Daily Union, the administration paper, to print from his files "a

few specimens of the dealing of traders with the Indians." These letters were par-

ticularly critical of the Chouteau and Ewing operations, stating among other things

that the old annuity system had "left the way open, if it did not offer, inducements

to their [chiefs] being bribed to allow unjust and unfounded claims against the

tribe."³⁸ As a result, by the end of 1847 the Indian Commissioner and the private

trading companies were at loggerheads.

By April 1848 pressure on the commissioner had become intense for him to act

favorably on the debts allegedly owed the companies. According to previous

instructions, the firms had submitted to the Indian Office for adjudication claims of

$163,000, which they classified as "national debts."³⁹ The Ewing brothers as well

as lobbyists for Chouteau and several other companies flocked to Washington to

see that the claims were paid in full. This they intended to accomplish by pressur-

ing the President and Secretary of War for a favorable decision. They also used

any other means at their disposal to coerce the administration. In one instance, for

example, they convinced Governor James Whitcomb of Indiana and that state's

entire legislature (where the Ewings had considerable sway) to petition the Presi-

dent to act favorably on their claims.⁴⁰

Trader criticism of the commissioner made its way into congressional debate during

the 1848 session. At that time Congress was discussing a general reorganization of

the Indian Bureau. Although the reorganization plan had nothing to do with

Medill's enforcement of the trade and intercourse laws, several western congress-

men used the opportunity to castigate the commissioner's activities. Whig Con-

gressman Richard F. Thompson from Indiana, who was speaking for the com-

panies, repeated everything the traders were saying. He charged Medill with im-

properly enforcing regulations, using the new law to drive legitimate traders out

of the Indian country, and attempting to put the companies that opposed him out

of business. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, observed the Indiana politician,

"exercised a power which should be confined to no man under our free govern-

ment." Robert W. Johnson from Arkansas attacked the annuity system by charging

that the new mode of payment tended to destroy tribal government and the power

36. An indication of the activities of the traders can be seen in Findlay to Chouteau, October

1, 1847, and Willard P. Hall to R. W. Cummins, November 4, 1848, Chouteau Papers.

37. Joseph Sinclair to Medill, August 7, 1847, Medill Papers.

38. Washington Daily Union, October 20, November 2, 1847. That Medill intended to give

the companies no aid in satisfying the department is clearly indicated in a letter to George W.

Ewing, November 20, 1847, George W. Ewing Papers.

39. "Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1848," House Executive Decuments 1,

30 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 537, p. 400.

40. Joseph Sinclair to Medill, April 5, 8, and May 11, 1848, Medill Papers. In the April 8th

letter, Sinclair wrote that "Both the Ewings I suppose are now in Washington[;] they hope to

tire you out with their importunities, so that to get rid of them, you will grant them what they

ask for."

56                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

of the chiefs, obliterated their national existence, worked against the Federal

Government by weakening the influence of agents over tribal leaders, and actually

did nothing for the individual Indian whose portion of the annuity might be as

low as a dollar and a half. Medill was defended in these debates by William

Rockhill of Indiana (the man who defeated William Ewing for Congress). Rock-

hill reviewed some of the documents involved in the case against the Ewings and

then asked if perhaps Thompson had "some personal and pecuniary interest" in

the matter.⁴¹

Even though criticism against him continued, Medill was determined to persist

in the matter, and he was not without support from reform-minded friends.⁴²

When he began examining the claims submitted by the traders, he listened to the

advise of men like Joseph Sinclair, an ex-agent from Ft. Wayne who had long

favored a per capita annuity system.⁴³ As a result Medill was tough on the traders,

placing upon them the absolute burden of proving that the debts were legitimate.

In most instances the traders came up short. For example, in the case of the claims

of the Ewings and James Clymer against the Potawatomies for $4,773, Medill

rejected nearly the entire sum. His justification was "There is no data upon which

to judge whether the charges are reasonable, as in many cases quantities and dates

are not stated, and there is nothing to indicate the particular kinds of quantities

of articles. . . . Thus, of the whole amount charged, there is only some $830 of

which there is any specification or explanation whatever." Nearly all of the other

thirty-two cases were rejected for the same basic reasons; the companies either

failed to prove the debts were legitimate or were of a national character. In

announcing these decisions Medill also noted that over the last few years "the

enormous sum" of $721,066 had been paid to traders from annuity funds. It

seemed incredible to him how, "in any just and proper system of trade," the

traders could still be asking for more money.⁴⁴

Although most of the commissioner's decisions were undoubtedly just and

earned him a great deal of respect in some quarters, they provoked the trading

companies into more opposition. William G. Ewing, who had just lost his license

to trade with the Sac and Fox as well as his claims against the Potawatomi, Sac

41. Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 904-905; Appendix, 773-774. Upon Rockhill's

election to Congress, Joseph Sinclair described him as a good Democrat, a strong supporter to

Medill, and a man who would not engage in any business with Ewing and gang. See Sinclair to

Medill, August 7, 1847, Medill Papers.

42. Besides the support of Marcy and Polk, Medill's actions received approval from several

newspapers. The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote on June 3, 1849, that "A more faithful, capable

and honest man... has never filled that post [Commissioner of Indian Affairs].... Under-

standing the acts made use of by agents representing Indian claims to swindle the government,

or the Indians out of their treaty funds, he saved both to some extent from robbery; though in

doing so he had to sustain attacks that a man of ordinary nerve could not have resisted." A

letter in the Pennsylvanian (Philadelphia), February 25, 1848, praised Medill for his reforms

and warmly suggested that he should be the next Democratic vice presidential candidate. See

also the Ft. Wayne Sentinel, April 8, 1848, and the St. Louis Daily Union, July 22, 1847.

43. Sinclair had been subagent at Ft. Wayne (1845-46) and had overseen the removal of the

Miami Indians to the Osage River in 1847. He had long favored paying annuities to heads of

families and in this connection had come into conflict with the Ewings. There was no love lost be-

tween Sinclair and the traders. See, for example, George W. Ewing to Medill, November 19,

1845, George W. Ewing Papers, wherein Ewing called Sinclair a "blaggar and rascal," unfit for

office. Sinclair had warned Medill that the traders would submit fake bills of purchase, Sinclair

to Medill, April 8, 1848, Medill Papers.

44. The decisions of all thirty-three cases are listed in "Annual Report ... 1848," pp. 418-429,

401.

William Medill                                                             57

and Fox, and Miami, launched a further attack on Medill, charging prejudice

against the companies and proposing that all claims should be removed from his

jurisdiction and be given to an impartial committee.⁴⁵ Ewing also agreed to act for

several other trading houses in encouraging the Secretary of War or the President

to override the Indian Commissioner's decisions. If Ewing's tactics proved suc-

cessful, as Medill well knew, the "Scoundrels" had things so shaped that a reversal

could be claimed as a confirmation of the commissioner's unfitness, and that he

might be removed from office.⁴⁶ In the field the traders worked to make the whole

annuity system inoperative by persuading the tribes to reject individual payments

and, in some cases, by bribing agents to continue paying tribal funds directly to

the traders.⁴⁷ Despite these tactics Medill remained firm, and he was upheld by

his superiors. All the traders could then do was await the upcoming election of

1848 and hope the present administration was replaced by one more responsive to

their monetary interests.

In regard to the halting of the liquor trade, the Indian Office experienced mixed

success. Medill had anticipated that the addition of imprisonment to the fines

already in existence would produce the desired result, and in some cases this

appears true. Yet reports continued to stream in from the field that the law was

ineffective and the prevalence of alcohol was as great as ever. The trading com-

panies, of course, had continued to smuggle alcohol; but part of the problem, as

Thomas Harvey explained to Medill in his report for October 1848, was not only

with whites taking liquor into the Indian country but also with the close proximity

of white settlers to Indian lands. Indians were able to slip into the adjoining states

of Missouri and Iowa where numerous stills operated right on the border and

purchase all the whiskey they could carry home. Such procedures meant that

whites were not guilty of taking liquor into the Indian country. And, said Harvey,

"the existing laws of the State of Missouri [and Iowa] on this subject of selling to

Indians are so ineffective that it is difficult to convict the seller, or to punish him

effectually if convicted."⁴⁸

Any attempt by the Federal Government to prevent the production and sale of

liquor in the border states immediately incited the sensitive question of state

sovereignty. The Indian Bureau did attempt to use its influence to persuade the

border states to reform their laws. Secretary Marcy in July 1847 wrote a pointed

letter to three frontier governors intimating that greater vigilance was required.⁴⁹

Medill, in his 1848 report, again brought the matter to attention. Liquor, he

wrote, "can never be checked until the States adjoining the Indian country come

foreward and cooperate in the general effort against this unholy and iniquitous

traffic, by passing stringent laws, restraining the evil disposed among their citizens

on the frontier from engaging in it with the Indians."⁵⁰

45. Petition to the President, November 20, 1848, George W. Ewing Papers.

46. Sinclair to Medill, May 11, 1848, Medill Papers.

47. John Miller to Harvey, September 15, 1848, in "Annual Report . . . 1848," p. 465;

Willard D. Hall to Richard W. Cummins, November 4, 1848, Chouteau Papers.  Hall, a Missouri

congressman, actually urged the Potawatomi agent Cummins to disobey the commissioner and

aid the traders in collecting their debts.

48. Prucha, "Indian Policy in the 1840's," 101; Harvey to Medill, October 4, 1848, in "Annual

Report . . . 1848," p. 441.

49. Marcy to the Governors of Missouri, Iowa, and Arkansas, July 14, 1847, in "Annual

Report . . . 1847," pp. 767-769.

50. "Annual Report . . . 1848," p. 402.

58                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

As long as frontier citizens saw no pressing need to limit the activities of whiskey

sellers, the Indian Office had no cooperation in enforcing the law, only apathy.

Faced with the obvious state inaction, Superintendent Harvey recommended

attacking the problem where the bureau possessed some authority with the Indians.

He, therefore, suggested arresting all intoxicated Indians and putting them to hard

labor. Those who did not learn their lesson the first time and continued to pur-

chase liquor should then be prosecuted under the law of 1847 and sent to prison.

Medill saw some definite merit in this procedure and recommended it to Marcy.⁵1

A few weeks later, however, Zachary Taylor and the Whigs swept the national

elections and the plan died.

On March 4, 1849, the mantle of Indian responsibility was handed over to the

Whig party. The most important question as far as Indian policy was concerned

was whether the new administration would retain Medill and allow him to continue

his strict enforcement of the trade laws. The answer came soon.

One of the changes that occurred with the inauguration of Taylor was the

creation of the Department of the Interior and the transfer of the Indian Office to

that department.⁵² The selection of Thomas Ewing, also from Lancaster, Ohio, as

the first Secretary of the Interior placed a forceful personality in charge of Indian

affairs. Ewing, a long time Whig Senator, was one of the President's most trusted

advisors. Obese and somewhat fearful looking, he fully believed in the spoils

system. "In his eyes," noted one authority, "the substitution of deserving Whigs

for Democrats was no casual order of business, but a transcendent preoccupation."⁵³

Not only would he personally direct Indian policy, but he would do it with his own

men.

Secretary Ewing's attitude toward the Indians is somewhat difficult to ascertain

with any degree of certainty. As a Senator in the 1830's he had on at least one

occasion opposed some of the removal treaties engineered by the Jackson adminis-

tration.⁵⁴ This case, however, involved a small group of Ohio tribes, and on the

more significant congressional debates over the morality of Indian removal, Ewing

largely remained silent. He expressed general sympathy for the lot of the Indian

51. Harvey to Medill, October 4, 1848, in ibid., 441. In approving Harvey's plan, Medill

optimistically stated that if "authority were given to the Department to punish the Indians

themselves, in the manner recommended in the report of the superintendent at St. Louis, . . . this

moral pestilence would soon be driven from the confines of the Indian country, which would be

followed by the dawn of a brighter day upon the condition and destiny of our colonized Indians."

Ibid., 402.

52. Act of March 3, 1849, U. S. Statutes at Large, IX, 395. Section 5 of the act provided that

the Secretary of the Interior would assume all duties in relation to Indian affairs formerly held

by the Secretary of War. See also Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 680; and Ruth A.

Gallagher, "The Indian Agent in the United States before 1850," Iowa Journal of History and

Politics, XIV (1916), 54-55.

53. Ewing, born in 1789, had practiced law in Lancaster; Ohio, before entering politics. He

was twice United States Senator (1831-37 and 1850-51). In 1841 he served as Secretary

of the Treasury during the brief administration of William Henry Harrison. For a general study

of Ewing see Paul I. Miller, "Thomas Ewing, Last of the Whigs" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Ohio State University, 1933); and for Ewing as Secretary of the Treasury, see Abby L. Gilbert,

"Thomas Ewing: Ohio's Advocate for a National Bank," this number, Ohio History. Ewing's

closeness to Zachary Taylor is discussed in Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Soldier in the

White House (Hamden, Conn., 1966), 153, 163-164. In connection with the patronage issue,

see Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 473-474, and Albert D. Kirwin, John J. Crittenden:

The Struggle for the Union (Lexington, 1962), 248, who states that "the party faithful had

developed a ravenous appetite during their long exclusion from federal patronage."

54. Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 36-37.

60                                                                   OHIO HISTORY

see that men favorable to their interests were employed.⁵⁶ Most of the concern

centered around Medill's replacement, but men such as Superintendent Harvey at

St. Louis were also on the Whig's black list. In fact, Ewing immediately appointed

David Dawson Mitchell, an old trader and a momentary favorite of the companies,

to Harvey's position.⁵⁷ But Ewing did not act on Medill's case at once. "The

Scamp Medill is not yet removed," wrote George Ewing from Washington in dis-

gust.⁵⁸ With the Whigs in control Medill's continuation in office was a matter of

little significance since Interior Secretary Ewing (he was distantly related to the

Ewing brothers) intended to set policy for the Indian Office and not allow the

commissioner the full responsibility he had enjoyed under the Secretary of War.

Therefore, Medill, whose job President Taylor wanted to keep open for political

reasons,⁵⁹ had the experience of remaining in office while Ewing began overturning

his reforms.

The first item on Ewing's agenda was the reopening of all the claim cases that

Medill had declared null or fraudulent. On April 7, 1849, Ewing ordered Medill to

deliver for additional investigation all papers and evidence concerning the claims of

Pierre Chouteau, G. W. & W. G. Ewing, James Clymer, and the rest.⁶⁰ The

Secretary of the Interior himself reviewed these cases.⁶¹ His decision in nearly

every case was to overturn Medill's ruling and pay off the traders.⁶² Within a year

all of the claims were settled. The exact amount of the settlement is difficult to

determine. In April 1850, when Democratic Congressman William A. Richardson

of Illinois initiated an investigation of Secretary Ewing on charges of corruption in

office, some of the figures came out.⁶³ One of the complaints was that "Thomas

56. G. W. Ewing to John B. Sarpy, March 14, April 10, 1849, Chouteau Papers; J. N.

Reynolds to Thomas Ewing, March 31, 1849, Thomas Ewing Papers, Library of Congress.

There can be little doubt of the traders' influence with the administration. Agents even wrote

to the traders for favors. One subagent wrote of George Ewing asking for a better job, stating

that "I am well aware of your Great influence in Indian Affairs and those controlling at head-

quarters." Thomas Mosely to G. W. Ewing, December 6, 1849, Folder 36, Orlando Brown

Papers, The Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.

57. Medill to Mitchell, March 30, 1849, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 41.

Mitchell was well qualified, having served both as Indian agent and superintendent at St. Louis

(1841-43). However, he also had long been in the employ of the American Fur Company.

George Ewing strongly supported Mitchell; "I am ready to help him all I can," Ewing wrote to

Sarpy, March 14, 1849, Chouteau Papers. See also Roy H. Mattison, "David Dawson Mitchell,"

in LeRoy Hafen, ed., The Mountain Men and the Fur Trade of the Far West (Glendale, Calif.,

1965), II, 241-246.

58. G. W. Ewing to Sarpy, April 10, 1849, Chouteau Papers.

59. Taylor wanted to use the position to reward one of his political backers. Eventually he

nominated Orlando Brown, a favorite of John J. Crittenden. See Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, 64;

and Kirwin, Crittenden, 253.

60. T. Ewing to Medill (copy), April 7, 1849, George W. Ewing Papers. Orlando Brown,

the new commissioner, remarked in this regard "that the change of political sentiments in the

present administration has brought back nearly all the old rejected claims of the past twenty

years." See Brown to Thomas Ewing, February 28, 1850, Orlando Brown Papers, Kentucky

Historical Society.

61. See the Frankfort (Ky.) Commonwealth, October 9, 1849; and C. Glenn Clift, ed., "The

Governors of Kentucky, 1792-1824, The Old Master, Colonel Orlando Brown, 1801-1867,"

Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, XLIX (1951), 17.

62. Many of the claims were paid very rapidly. See Medill to George Ewing, April 18, 1849,

George W. Ewing Papers, paying a claim of $4,541.18 against the Council Bluffs Potawatomi;

and George Ewing to J. B. Sarpy, April 19, 1849, Chouteau Papers, noting that Sarpy's claim

of $750 would be paid.

63. Washington Daily Union, February 21, April 26, 1849. The initial resolution for the

investigation is discussed in Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 1, pp. 783-791.

William Medill                                                              61

Ewing, Secretary of the Interior, reopened and paid to G. W. & W. G. Ewing a

claim against the United States of $77,000, after the same had been adjudicated

and rejected by proper officers of Government before said Ewing was inducted into

said office of the interior."⁶⁴ Although these charges were fundamentally correct,

the figure quoted by the Democrats may have been exaggerated. The Secretary

defended his actions before the Senate in 1851, having since resigned his office to

assume a Senate seat. At that time he produced some previously unpublished

correspondence with Congressman Richardson. In these letters he denied the

specific charges of paying the Ewings $77,000, but did admit to paying claims of

$28,883.67 on other occasions. It is also known that the department paid nearly

$16,000, the entire Sac and Fox claim, to Chouteau and Ewing in March 1850.65

In regard to the mode of paying annuities, Ewing appears to have made little

attempt to enforce the provisions for payment to heads of families. In May 1849

he issued orders that tribes could have their annuities paid directly to the traders

upon request. Although the Indian Office did occasionally state that its policy was

to continue paying annuities to individuals, in actual practice the old system in

many cases was put back into operation. In several instances Indian agents imme-

diately started paying the traders out of annuity funds.⁶⁶ That these activities were

leading back to the same situation that existed before the passage of the law of

1847 was clearly stated in a report by David Dawson Mitchell in 1850:

It too frequently happens that the first information the Indians receive of the existence of

certain claims against them, is from the agents and sub-agents when their annuities are

about to be paid. They are then told that so many thousand dollars of their money have

been retained, and paid over to individuals who presented claims of a national character

against them at Washington City.

When Ewing was questioned by Congress on this matter in 1851, he defended his

actions on grounds that the law of 1847 gave the President or Secretary of War

(now the Secretary of the Interior) discretion in such matters and he simply used

that option in the method of paying annuities.⁶⁷ Although such an interpretation

was not in the spirit of the law of 1847, it was technically correct.

The Whigs did not publicly abandon the crusade against the liquor trade.

64. A general review of what occurred in the House is given in Congressional Globe, 31 Cong.,

2 Sess., 653-658.

65. T. Ewing to Richardson, May 6 and May 15, 1850, quoted in ibid., 654. The outcome

of the House investigation was somewhat anticlimatic. The House passed an amended resolution

stating that any violation was a legal question and not a crime or misdemeanor, Congressional

Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 2, p. 1811; G. Ewing to Chouteau, March 28, 1850, Chouteau

Papers.

66. Medill to Mitchell, May 16, 1849, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, Vol. 42; Luke

Lea to A. H. H. Stuart, [1851?], quoted in Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 653; P.

Sappington and H. H. Jamison to Orlando Brown, November 4, 1849, Office of Indian Affairs,

Letters Received, Council Bluffs Agency. Sappington and Jamison made quite specific charges

against agent John E. Barrow: "We charge him (Barrow) with a wilful and intentional violation

of his duty and the law, in the manner in which the late Otoe payt was made, for the law and

regulations require that the payment of annuities Shall be made to the head of families & not

to Chiefs or Indian traders[;] we are also able to Show the department that Maj. Barrow at the

late payt assumed and paid to traders at least one third of the money due Said Indians to the

traders."

67. Mitchell to Luke Lea, September 14, 1850, in "Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian

Affairs, 1850," Senate Executive Documents 1, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., I, No. 587, p. 48; Congressional

Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 653-654.

62                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

From time to time they continued to denounce whiskey sellers and the unfortunate

effects of alcohol on the Indians. Yet for the next several years the Indian Office

largely ignored any means to effectively enforce the liquor laws. Seemingly other

things were more important, and the tribes continued to receive as much alcohol

as they could pay for.⁶⁸

The final culmination of the reversal of the reforms came with the removal of

Medill from office. In June 1849, President Taylor named Orlando Brown of

Kentucky as the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Medill probably departed

with a combination of relief and sorrow. Upon his retirement he received words

of praise from some Democrats. The Cincinnati Enquirer, in particular, lauded

Medill and expressed hope that Brown would be able to withstand "the brow-

beatings of members of Congress, who are shameless enough to act as agents for

claims against the Bureau." The feelings of the traders are summed up in a letter

from George Ewing to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., stating, "the villain Medill is kicked out,

good--He & the hypocrite Harvey can now console each other in their retirement."⁶⁹

In retrospect, Medill deserves recognition for his attempt to reform some

aspects of the Indian trade while at the same time keeping his bureau free from the

corrupting influences of the traders. It is also quite clear that he was concerned

with helping the Indians; whereas the actions of the traders, regardless of their

public statements, indicated their desire to retain a system which allowed them

freedom to exploit the Indians. Unfortunately, the private trading companies were

too powerful for the Indian Commissioner. While Medill was in office, the traders

frustrated or evaded many of his reforms, and as soon as the Whigs came to power

persuasion was used to undo the reforms. As a result, by 1850 the Trade and

Intercourse Act of 1847 had become a dead letter. Medill's political contribution,

however, was not lost in his home state where he continued in public service,

serving with distinction until shortly before his death in 1865.

68. "Annual Report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1849," Senate Executive Documents 1,

31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 551, p. 939. Reports continued to come in from the field about the con-

tinued use of alcohol, and the files of the Indian Office are full of such material. Yet the reports

of the commissioner for 1850 and 1851 do not even mention the liquor trade. By this time the

department was again considering removing the tribes and all their attention was devoted to

that matter. See "Annual Report... 1850," pp. 35-45; and "Annual Report, Commissioner of

Indian Affairs, 1851," House Executive Documents 2, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 636, pp. 265-274.

69. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 13, 1849. See also Washington Daily Union, June 3, 1849; G.

Ewing to Chouteau, June 13, 1849, Chouteau Papers.