Ohio History Journal




Rutherford B

Rutherford B.

Hayes and

JOHN

SHERMAN

by JEANNETTE PADDOCK NICHOLS

At noon on Wednesday, January 18, 1893, the United States Senate con-

vened and, according to custom, heard a brief opening prayer by the Chap-

lain. When Dr. J. G. Butler had finished, the senior Senator from Ohio,

John Sherman, addressed his colleagues:

Mr. President, it becomes my painful duty to announce to the Senate

the death of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, at his residence in Fremont,

Ohio, last evening at 11 o'clock. . . .

It was my good fortune to know President Hayes intimately from

the time we were law students until his death. To me his death is a

deep personal grief. All who had the benefit of personal association

with him were strengthened in their appreciation of his generous qual-

ities of head and heart. His personal kindness and sincere enduring at-

tachment for his friends was greater than he displayed in public inter-

course. He was always modest, always courteous, kind to every one who

approached him, and generous to friend or foe. He had no sympathy

with hatred or malice. He gave every man his due according to his

judgment of his merits.

I therefore, as is usual on such occasions, move that the Senate, out

of respect to the memory of President Hayes, do now adjourn.1

This was no routine eulogy. John Sherman spoke from the heart, much

more feelingly than was his wont. The two politicians, near of age (Hayes

seven months the senior),2 had known each other and had participated in

the vagaries of political life in Ohio through half a century. Their particu-

lar differences in temperament, opportunity, experience and abilities had

been of sorts that enabled them to build and maintain through the decades

NOTES ON PAGE 197



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126                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

mutual feelings of respect and liking. Their relationship flowered into a

lasting affection that came easily in the life of Hayes, more rarely in that

of Sherman.3 The strains so common between presidents and cabinet mem-

bers were minimal between these two. Their mutual regard was due in part

to the fact that their respective ambitions approached fruition at junc-

tures when fulfillment could be complementary rather than antagonistic.

This was in marked contrast to the tides of fate which upon occasion made

rivalry a frequent factor in relations between Ohio's longtime Nestor at the

National Capitol and such ambitious shorter-term politicos as Garfield and

Foraker, for example.4

To understand the foundation on which the President and his Secretary

of the Treasury built their warm relationship it is necessary to note various

episodes and to compare their experiences as fellow-Ohioans. Sherman's

admission to the bar at the age of twenty-one in 1844 had been preceded by

schooling no higher than an academy and by private law instruction from

friends and relatives in Mansfield. At this county seat he engaged actively

in legal practice. There he had emerged as a "self-made" man, a keen stu-

dent of finance and politics known for his competence and dignity. Since

he lacked easy warmth of manner, however, his political advancement was

based more on respect for his ability than on the comraderie easy for per-

sons of less reserve. He had cultivated Whig affiliations until he helped to

found the Republican party and won (1854-1860) four elections to the na-

tional House of Representatives.5

On the other hand, Hayes graduated from Kenyon College and Harvard

Law School before he was admitted to the bar in 1845 in his twenty-third

year, and later enjoyed at Cincinnati more than a decade of law practice.

There he had emerged a person of modest ability, firm in his beliefs, ambi-

tious but chary of antagonisms, and pleasant in his dealings. He had won in

1858 a single term as City Solicitor, but his frequently Democratic area pre-

vented a second term.

Thus, prior to the Civil War, Sherman had acquired six years of ex-

perience in successfully wooing the Ohio voters while becoming a notable

Republican leader on the national scene, but Hayes thus far had not gone

much beyond the confines of a city victory. Then came the accession of Lin-

coln and the Civil War, which altered the political destinies of each man.

The elevation of Senator Salmon P. Chase to Lincoln's cabinet enabled

Sherman (after a hard fought caucus struggle)6 to leave the House for the

Senate, and Lincoln was moved to ask him not to leave that chamber for an

army post. Sherman had become engrossed, before the called summer ses-

sion of 1861, in unpaid service as a colonel of Ohio Volunteers. The Presi-

dent felt he needed senatorial leadership on Capitol Hill no less than mili-

tary leadership on the Virginia slopes. To a man who had amply demon-

strated his legislative skill--by forcing through the presecession House ap-

propriations essential to the federal government--Lincoln's call to battle

for wartime financial legislation on the Senate level could not be without its

personal and patriotic challenge.7 But Sherman acceded to Lincoln's re-



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HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                           127

 

quest before he had ever led a charge in uniform. His return to service in

the toga cheated him of the military identification acquired by Garfield and

many other men, who would find it helpful in later political warfare.

Hayes, on the other hand, left the law court that June for what proved

to be extended military service, beginning as a major of Ohio Volunteers.

His tour of duty carried him into the not-too-horrendous8 campaigning in

West Virginia. He had won recognition for bravery and suffered three bat-

tle wounds when Ohio voters elected him to Congress in 1864, at the mo-

ment he was promoted to brigadier general. By the time of the official be-

ginning of his congressional service in December of 1865, he had won a

brevet of major general and numerous military friendships which were cher-

ished by him ever after.9

The importance of military insignia to Ohio's Republican party in the

post-Civil War period scarcely can be overestimated. All but two of its

gubernatorial candidates between 1865 and 1903 possessed war records, as

did all but four of the men actually elected to that office. "Lesser offices

reveal a similar situation."10 On the national level, James G. Blaine was

the only Republican candidate for President between Lincoln and William

Howard Taft that did not possess military experience. Sherman later com-

plained that his lack of war service was responsible, in part, for his failure

to obtain the presidential nomination, which lie sought three times.1l Colo-

nel John Sherman gave his sword, sash and epaulets, which he wore so

briefly in mid-summer of 1861, to the then Colonel Tecumseh Sherman;

and by the irony of fate that brother later enjoyed the refusal of the high

office the Senator desperately craved.

Military insignia was the more precious because of the continual can-

nonading on Ohio's political front, both between parties and within them.

Divisiveness was indigenous to that state, born of the original disparate im-

migration, nurtured by different sectional reactions to political, economic

and social change, and perpetuated by an incessantly revolving political cal-

endar. Politicking could hardly pause. Partisans battled over the choice of

governor and legislature in odd-numbered years, scarcely waiting to whet

their knives before renewing the fray over congressional nominations in

even-numbered years and indulging in the highest pitch of rivalry in their

quadrennial presidential canvasses.

More fertile soil for controversy hardly could be found; in it Hayes and

Sherman cultivated their careers, becoming political veterans of different

sorts. In due time Hayes tended to become more palatable to the so-called

"liberals" and Sherman to the "conservatives." But both established records

of cautious party regularity which tended to protect their eligibility in fac-

tional contests. To both of these ex-Whigs the Republican party was an

article of faith. On the whole, Hayes proved to be the more fortunate, be-

cause his principal opponents until 1876 were mainly candidates of the op-

posite party; Sherman's were candidates within his own party from the mo-

ment he became an aspirant for the Senate.

It can be said that Sherman got, and kept, his grip on the senatorship

through the medium of Ohio's chronic disunity. In 1861 the refusal of



128 OHIO HISTORY

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radical and conservative Republicans in the state legislature to come to cau-

cus agreement among three older, leading contestants gave the nomination

on the seventy-eighth ballot to Sherman as a middle-of-the-road, compromise

candidate. When his term neared an end in 1865, luck was on his side.

Sherman's party--then calling itself "Union"--was split over the issue of

Negro suffrage, which might cost it victory.

This was the parlous situation midsummer of 1865 when Sherman jour-

neyed down to Cincinnati, and found occasion to call at the office of Con-

gressman Hayes. The Senator there learned that the General could not yet

quite take party antagonisms in stride. Hayes, unlike Sherman, had not been

tried in the fires of ten years of bitter prewar and wartime political infight-

ing. Also, he was aggravated by the premature patronage clamor with which

constituents can impatiently pester a member of Congress even before he

takes his seat. Altogether, the job of Representative seemed less likely to

prove satisfying than had leading troops in the field. In this state of mind

Hayes confided to his Diary, after Sherman had departed that July day,

"'Politics a bad trade' runs in my head often. Guess we'll quit."12

But Hayes did not quit. The fledgling Representative had found some-

thing of a mentor in the experienced Senator. They shared the ardors of

that campaign--and others to follow. That summer Hayes could observe

how Ohio's Republican factionalism could be mitigated by an even greater

lack of finesse in Democratic counsels. Vallandigham in 1865 was leading

the Democracy to campaign for conservative reconstruction, which then

helped the Sherman men to shift their emphasis to anti-Copperheadism.

With this safer issue the Unionists won control of the legislature by a two

to one margin.13 But the total situation remained such that the Unionists

did not long indulge any latent propensity for an intra-party knock-down,

dragout fight over which one of the party faithful should get the plum. Al-

though Radical members from the Western Reserve now found Sherman

too conservative for their tastes, and southern Ohio thought it was their

turn, and adherents of Sherman's colleague, Benjamin F. Wade, feared

Sherman's selection would jeopardize Wade's renomination next time, only

two ballots were needed to name Sherman in 1865.14

Actually Ohio was a political battleground so closely fought that no sen-

atorship could be a sinecure. Sherman's experience in garnering six elec-

tions to the Senate demonstrated the fact. Each time the legislature was to

select a colleague for him, from 1867 up to 1897, the Democrats contrived

to be in control with the result that he never had a Republican colleague

after Benjamin F. Wade lost out in 1867.15 On the other hand, when the

expiration of a Sherman term approached, the Republicans managed to be

in a position to name the Senator, but their disunity was such that the va-

rious internal factions did not combine effectively on a nominee to dis-

place him. Of such factors--not too reassuring--was Sherman's luck com-

posed.16

Hayes also found Ohio's mercurial politics an advantage at times. As the

General won a reputation of being the best Republican vote-getter,l7 his

eligibility for party nominations rose. He wrote of his satisfaction in the



HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN 129

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                         129

victorious campaign of 1866 which brought him his second term in the

House; but his doubts about the joys of being a congressman returned.18

Before his new term had fairly begun, he was glad to resign it to accept

nomination to the governorship. As Governor of Ohio for two consecutive

terms, Hayes became well and favorably known far beyond his Cincinnati

congressional district. Since the legislature was Democratic in his first term,

this fact seemed to free him from blame for its sins of omission and com-

mission; but it lessened the influence of Ohio Republicans in Washington

by enabling the Democrats to give Sherman a Democratic colleague.19

At the same time the Republican party was losing power in Ohio. In

1868 three of its congressmen lost their seats, and eight scraped through by

majorities under one thousand votes. In 1869 Hayes's plurality was but 7500

votes, and his own Hamilton County Republicans sent to the legislature a

contingent of reformists possessed of the balance of power in both houses

and not above cooperating with Democrats. The Reserve also sent some men

of liberal leanings; but they, like their favorite Representative Garfield,

thought twice about possible future punishment for party disloyalty.

Exposure of the corruption in the Grant administration forced Hayes

and Sherman, both of them party loyalists, to walk a tightrope. When Gov-

ernor Hayes was invited to attend a conference of liberals held in Wash-

ington April 19-20, 1870, he stayed home at Columbus for he "wanted no

new party and would have nothing to do with organizing a new one."20

Sherman for his part habitually accommodated himself to temporary shifts

in political winds, but he kept within the boundaries of a cherished com-

mitment to a Republican majority, thereby suffering the wrath of conserva-

tives who hated his concessions to liberals, and of liberals who denounced

him as tarred with Grantism.

The positions of both Governor and Senator, concerned for Republican

success, remained uncomfortable. Although their party had won fourteen of

Ohio's nineteen congressional seats in 1870, and both the governorship and

lieutenant-governorship in 1871, Ohio's incoming legislature that fall con-

sisted of an evenly divided upper house and an assembly in which the fifty-

seven Republicans facing the forty-eight Democrats included men of di-

vided loyalties. This body would determine, in January of 1872, whether

Sherman might succeed himself. Hayes, Garfield and others were approached

by Sherman's enemies to help unseat him.21

Here arose the first crisis in the friendship between Hayes and Sherman.

To the delight of Democrats, the faction opposing Sherman denounced him

as "utterly corrupt";22 they sought to oust him, even if he won in the party

caucus, which was generally conceded to be his during late 1871. Rumors

were rife that the dissidents would stay out of the caucus to be free of its

mandate, and with Democratic cooperation would get a majority for a com-

promise candidate on the day when they voted in the legislature itself.

Hayes at first refused to believe the rumors and then declined to be a candi-

date under a Democratic-Republican endorsement. When the caucus finally

convened Thursday, January 4, 1872, Sherman won easily, 71 to 4, with

most of the dissidents voting for him although some claimed "they were



130 OHIO HISTORY

130                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

not to be bound by the result."23 Under these circumstances talk of a Hayes,

Garfield, or other candidacy persisted. Hayes lightened the tension perhaps

by giving a reception Monday evening for the incoming Republican gov-

ernor, General Edward F. Noyes. It was attended by the warring factions

and described by Hayes as "A very lively, happy thing."24

Late on Tuesday evening two Republicans--a state senator and a repre-

sentative--rang Hayes's doorbell. They assured him that enough new coali-

tion votes would materialize Wednesday to make him United States Senator

and that this would guarantee him the next presidency of the United States.

Luckily for Sherman the ambitions of Hayes and Garfield were less strong

than their fears of the effects which disloyalty to their party's caucus would

have upon the future of their party and themselves. Hayes made it clear

that he would not consent to be a candidate other than through regular

caucus endorsement. His two callers departed, only to be followed by a

final suppliant, who insisted that his group now had the votes to elect Hayes.

But the Governor, answering the doorbell at midnight, standing in his

nightshirt, stood his ground. This with a firm finality which his garb could

not diminish.25

Next day the roll call in the legislature gave Sherman a majority, overall,

of only six votes, and some members hastily undertook to switch. An alert

lieutenant-governor quickly declared Sherman "duly elected." Afterward

Sherman claimed that he had had enough Democratic promises to over-

balance Republican losses in any case.26 The crucial moment had been

Hayes's refusal; the rest was anti-climax. To Hayes, Sherman was now much

in debt.

The Senator was destined to repay it, and at a high rate of interest; but

an unpleasant misunderstanding marred their relationship soon after

Grant's second inauguration. The eager Republicans who on January 9,

1872, had dangled before Hayes the presidency of the United States proved

unable to give him, on October 8 following, even so modest a place as a

seat in the House of Representatives of the Forty-Third Congress. The party

phalanx which swept the state for Grant included Hayes, Sherman and Gar-

field, but they could not stem a strong Democratic tide in Hayes's district.

This rejection inflicted upon the reputed "best vote-getter" his first ex-

perience with defeat for an important office; it may have made him unwont-

edly sensitive.

At any rate, Grant in March of 1873 sent the Senate hasty nomination

of Hayes for a position he did not expect, had not applied for, and did not

much desire--that of Assistant Treasurer at Cincinnati. The nomination

caught Ohio's Republican Senator, under whose purview such matters must

come, off base. The outgoing and incoming Secretary of the Treasury

(George S. Boutwell and William A. Richardson) had both assured Sher-

man that necessary preparations under the law were such that no appoint-

ment need be made until June 1; on this understanding he had assured sev-

eral applicants that no choice would be made until they had had a fair op-

portunity to present their qualifications. He would be charged with mis-



HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN 131

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                         131

 

leading them if the Hayes appointment went through earlier. Therefore,

when the matter came up in executive session, he asked that it go over. All

this Sherman explained to Hayes, assuring him that he would "heartily and

cheerfuly concur in your appointment."27

But by an irony of fate damage had been done. Hayes's pride was

wounded by postponement of a place which he might have declined even if

confirmed. Tempermentally inclined to over-simplification of patronage

problems it was hard for him to "comprehend the crochet of Mr. Sherman."

Although he absolved Sherman of personal hostility, he replied quite can-

didly. "The action taken was calculated, although not so intended, to in-

jure me and to wound my feelings and frankness required that I should

say that I think you were in error in your views of duty under the circum-

stances."28

Fortunately, neither Hayes nor Sherman made the prime political mis-

take of cherishing personal misunderstandings. The campaign of 1874 found

them appearing together amiably, with Hayes according Sherman high

praise for straightforward presentation. The next year, when his party for

the third time nominated Hayes to wrest the governorship, from a Demo-

crat, he especially sought Sherman's company on the stump, in preachment

against the fiat money tenets of the incumbent governor, William Allen.29

They managed to squeak through, by 5544 votes; but Sherman was appre-

hensive lest Republican disunity enable the Democrats to capture the presi-

dency in the 1876 election and undo gains obtained through the Civil War.

Thus he called on Ohio Republicans to give Hayes a united delegation at

the national convention, because he could "combine greater popular

strength and greater assurance of success than other candidates." Though

not "greatly distinguished" as a general or as a member of Congress, he was

"always sensible, industrious and true to his convictions and the principles

and tendencies of his party." As governor, he had "shown good executive

abilities." Moreover he was "fortunately free from the personal enmities

and antagonisms that would weaken some of his competitors."30

Such arguments, pressed by Sherman upon Senator A. M. Burns of the

Ohio legislature in a letter of January 21, 1876, gained force. Ohio was

actually a unit bloc at this national convention, which met, luckily for

Hayes, in Cincinnati.31 That body, after wrangling over Blaine and his

chief competitors through six ballots, on the seventh, adopted Sherman's

reasoning and chose Hayes. Fortunately Sherman was spared the foreknowl-

edge that Hayes's most valuable asset--his current lack of enemies--could

not work for himself in 1880.

Indicative of the affinity in 1876 between these two politicians was the

interchange which ensued. Hayes wrote Sherman June 19:

I trust you will never regret the important action you took in the in-

auguration and carrying out the movement which resulted in my nom-

ination. I write these few words to assure you that I appreciate and am

grateful for what you did.32



132 OHIO HISTORY

132                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

Sherman replied by hand on Senate Chamber notepaper next day:

Your kind note is rec'd for which accept my thanks. The importance

of your nomination was with me a mathematical deduction and if any

outside fact gave color to my reasoning it was your honorable & proper

course when during my last canvass for Senator you refused to accept

the benefit of a small defection of a few political friends. I am more

than happy when following reason and duty to recognize also a per-

sonal kindness. We opened the campaign here gloriously last night &

the acquiescence in your nomination is general and hearty.33

Acquiescence in Hayes's election was destined, in many areas, to be

neither general nor hearty, a fact which put Hayes in debt to Sherman and

took toll of Sherman's political future. The incoming President would not

infrequently find useful to him his personal and political ties to his Secre-

tary of the Treasury, but the bond would not always operate to the per-

sonal and political advantage of his exceptionally faithful servitor.

Election evening, November 7, brought dismay to both men; they went

to bed thinking Tilden had won. But before dawn an unwary Democratic

official asked the editors of the New York Times (a Republican group) for

an estimate of Tilden's votes, thus suggesting that the Democrats were un-

sure. Before sunrise the editors were communicating with "Zack" Chand-

ler, chairman of the Republican national committee; they persuaded him

to telegraph the Republican leadership in each of the three key states:

"Hayes is elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana.

Can you hold your state? Answer at once." Whatever their answers, Chand-

ler a few hours later boldly told the press: "Hayes has 185 votes and is

elected." This would leave Tilden with only 184. Next the Republicans had

to make good Chandler's brashness.34

Both sides sent "visitors" to watch the count of votes in each of the three

states. Louisiana was the most doubtful and Grant asked Sherman (and

others) to hurry to New Orleans. After stopping at Columbus to see Hayes

and at Cincinnati to meet other of Ohio's emissaries, Sherman entered upon

"a long, anxious and laborious time in New Orleans."35 Soon he was re-

porting to his wife Cecilia his unhappiness over his assignment and a sharp

prescience of consequences to himself.

I have been assigned a much more conspicuous position here than I

wished and am almost sorry that I came. We are acting only as witnesses

but public opinion will hold us as partisans. . . . This whole business is

a thankless, ungracious task not free from danger entirely unofficial

and at our individual expense. . . . I frequently regret that I ever came.

Grant in 8 years did not remember my existence until he had this most

uncomfortable task to perform and then by his selections forced me to

come. I am carefully studying the case as it is developed and will say

what I think is true without fear or favor. . . . We have done nothing

of which we need to be ashamed.36

The Republicans had been shamed before the nation by the exposure of

corruption in Grant's entourage and Sherman was one of the party's leader-



HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN 133

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                        133

 

ship who feared such vulnerability. As Hayes phrased their mutual appre-

hension: "You feel, I am sure, as I do about this whole business. A fair

election would have given [it to] us but . . . there must be nothing crooked

on our part."37 Down in Louisiana the intimidation on both sides which

had marred the casting of ballots made itself felt in the counting of them.

Two government employees, testifying before the Returning Board about

coercion by the Democrats, demanded of the worried chairman of the Re-

publican "visitors" a written guarantee of future employment outside the

state.

The age-old obligation for each party to take care of its faithful had been

sanctified by immemorial custom; but these employees required a pledge

in writing, which is not so customary. To this the badgered chairman, over-

estimating their party loyalty, acceded. Within a twelve-month he and Hayes

would rue this documentary testimonial to pressure, which confirmed Sher-

man's prediction that "no good" could come of the visitation.38

Numerous messages passed back and forth between New Orleans, Colum-

bus and other centers, often in code; and at long last Sherman, Garfield

and four companions stopped in Columbus on December 4, enroute to

Washington. In the governor's office that afternoon the cautious Hayes

polled each man individually. As he reported in his Diary, "All concurred

in saying in the strongest terms that the evidence and law entitled the Re-

publican ticket to the certificate of election, and that the result would in

their opinion be accordingly." At the gubernatorial mansion that Monday

evening the Governor and his Lady entertained the emissaries with "a jo-

vial little gathering."39

Not so jovial was the atmosphere Sherman found in Washington on Tues-

day, the second day of the final session of the Forty-Fourth Congress. That

body was scheduled to meet in February in joint session to attend the open-

ing of the electoral certificates by the president of the Senate and the count-

ing of them. But who should count them? The House was Democratic 168

to 107, and the Senate Republican 43 to 29 with two Liberal Republicans.

On a joint ballot Hayes would lose.40

He might win, however, if the Senate's presiding officer could determine

which of the four sets of conflicting returns-from Oregon, Florida, South

Carolina, and Louisiana--should be counted. This was the solution favored

by Sherman and Hayes. The Senator, as a quasi-agent of Hayes, participated

to some extent in weeks of discussion aimed at securing Democratic consent

to this method of counting. Sherman was one of the negotiators who con-

ferred with important southerners, many of them Old Whigs, arguing that

Hayes--like Sherman an Old Whig--would do more for them than Tilden

who opposed appropriations for the internal improvements badly needed

by the devastated South. A Hayes administration, it was proposed, would

remove federal troops from the South and give it a place in the Cabinet,

besides granting more patronage, funds for railroads and other improve-

ments, engineered with the help of Garfield, as the proposed Speaker of the

House.41 This planning proved to be an exercise in futility. It suggests an

unwarranted hopefulness on the part of Sherman and Hayes. Much of the



134 OHIO HISTORY

134                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

proposed program could not be implemented, although Hayes would prove

able to fulfill part of it.

In the meantime, a committee from each house had been working to-

gether. The members intended to take matters out of the hands of the

group affiliated with Hayes and Sherman. As a result of their efforts, a bill

emerged to create an extra-constitutional electoral commission to which

Congress, acting in joint session, would refer conflicting sets of returns. Its

decisions need be accepted by only one house to become final. This com-

plicated measure, which Sherman and Hayes disapproved as risky for him,

invited filibustering which delayed its enactment until January 29. There-

upon the Electoral Commission was set up with five Senators, five Repre-

sentatives and five Supreme Court Justices, so selected as to give the decid-

ing vote to Justice David Davis, an "Independent." Here the legislature of

Illinois intervened, electing Davis to the Senate--with the result that a Re-

publican Justice, Joseph P. Bradley, took his place. Thereafter the houses

and the commission went through the roll of states, slowed by sporadic fili-

bustering.42

While the counting was in progress, Sherman conferred with Hayes in

Columbus. He returned with the reputed authorization to promise with-

drawal of the troops by Hayes--a promise which Grant (to the surprise of

Sherman) already had given. After a final intensive burst of filibustering

the announcement came of Hayes's election at 4:00 A.M. on March 2.43

That same morning Hayes and his family reached Washington where

Senator Sherman and his brother General William Tecumseh Sherman

awaited them at the station, to welcome them as house guests of the Senator

until after the formal inauguration. Before noon Hayes called on Grant

and went with him to the Capitol where (it is reported) they found the

Democrats cheerful and cordial as they waited their pound of flesh. Satur-

day evening Grant gave Hayes the customary state dinner, with the extra

precaution of a private swearing in, to insure the nation a president during

the Sabbath intervening before the formal inauguration on Monday, March

5.44

Sherman had had a hectic four months since November 7, largely occu-

pied with labor on behalf of Hayes and the party. What would be his recom-

pense? Hayes formulated a tentative cabinet slate and after some hesitation

offered Sherman the Treasury.45 To a Senator with keen interest in na-

tional financial problems and long experience in working upon them, the

opportunity to achieve further distinction in the field was most attractive.

He might, on the other hand, have considered potential hazards threaten-

ing the peace of mind and political future of any member of a Republican

administration installed in 1877. There were five hazards of major im-

portance: a Congress with a Democratic majority in both houses in most of

the four years; the dubious title to the throne; possible opposition to a con-

ciliatory southern approach; an entrenched patronage system to resist civil

service reform; and, perhaps the greatest obstacle, powerful resistance to a

"sound" dollar.



HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN 135

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                         135

 

Any or all of these forces could obstruct the path of a politician stumb-

ling along the boulder-strewn trail toward the presidential eminence. They

could not wreck the future career of a President such as Hayes, who ab-

jured a second term and therefore could face with more composure the

slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. What here follows is a summary of

the reactions of the President and his Secretary of the Treasury to these five

basic problems.46

First, as to the primary handicap, the Democrats held a majority in the

House all four years, and in the Senate for the last two years. Hayes and

Sherman therefore could never plan legislation in easy confidence of a co-

operative push into enactment; compromise skills were prerequisite. This

disadvantage was compounded by the fact that Republicans themselves

were not a unit in response to executive leadership. Some of them openly

fought the Hayes administration in the three fields it sought most to stress

--conciliation of the South, reform of the Civil Service, and strengthening

of the nation's credit. Some of them were ex-Republicans of whom Hayes

sadly observed to Sherman,"New converts are proverbally bitter and unfair

to those they have recently left."47 Under such party handicaps executive

achievements could not be numerous or easy of accomplishment.

The lack of Republican cohesiveness was due also, in part, to the second

handicap listed above, the clouded title to the throne. Subsequent advanced

scholarship would conclude that Hayes lost Florida (although he probably

was entitled to a favorable decision in South Carolina and Louisiana) and

that therefore, instead of besting Tilden by 185 to 184, he lost on the over-

all count by 181 to 188. The Democrats during Hayes's administration loud-

ly proclaimed that they had been cheated; they were only too happy to in-

stitute an investigation complete with witnesses, documentation, and a ma-

jority report attesting the election of Tilden. A report by the Republicans

held the contrary. Eager Republicans subpoened Western Union "cipher

dispatches," using and preserving those which revealed Democratic corrup-

tive practices.48 In the course of these exposures Sherman's unwary pledge

to the two Louisiana office-holders was revealed, to the disgust of the Presi-

dent and his Secretary.49

Before Democratic efforts to unseat the administration lost momentum,

embarrassments for Hayes and Sherman were further increased by their

own party's attacks upon the third handicap--their conciliatory southern

policy which had included choice of an ex-Confederate, David M. Key, as

Postmaster General. The removal of fulltime troops from the South also

aroused Radical Republicans to blistering denunciation for (supposedly)

undermining the structure of Reconstruction erected by the sacrifice of the

Civil War. Hayes stood his ground, with Sherman's endorsement, and occu-

pation of southern centers by federal troops gradually ended.50

By an irony of fate the Hayes administration and the South came to swords

points on a different aspect of federal supervision not confined to the South.

Postwar laws had authorized supervision of presidential and congressional

elections throughout the nation by federal supervisors and marshals. The



136 OHIO HISTORY

136                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

Democratic majority, seeking local control of elections, attached "riders"

to army and other appropriation bills, prohibiting polling place use of any

part of the army. Hayes and Sherman interpreted the riders as efforts to

reduce their party's influence at the polls. A sharp four years' contest en-

sued marked by eight stout presidential vetoes, none of them overridden.51

Administration confrontation with the other two major handicaps--the

entrenched patronage system and the resistance to strengthening the na-

tion's credit--gave Hayes and Sherman repeated challenges and saddled

Sherman with enmities encumbering his ultimate ambition.

Grantism had made the nation corruption-conscious, and rumors grew

rife and ripe about its pervasive presence. Prominent among proposed tar-

gets for reform were the New York, Boston, and Philadelphia customs

houses, under control of the state machines of Roscoe Conkling, Benjamin

F. Butler, and Simon Cameron. Conkling had been uncooperative on

Hayes's nomination and election and his bailiwick was selected by Hayes

as the first target, against Sherman's wishes.52 Apparently it was not as badly

mismanaged as some other centers but a special Jay Commission exposed

the facts with the result that the collector Chester A. Arthur and naval of-

ficer Alonzo B. Cornell were removed. But Hayes was not able to obtain

Senate confirmation of their successors until February of 1879 and then

only through a thorough expose by Sherman of the custom house scandals.53

The intervening period had been characterized by wavering and equivoca-

tion among the principal actors with Secretary of State William M. Evarts

involved in the political scheming. The situation illustrated the great need

for civil service reform, the divisive effect of the issue upon the party, and

the hard alternatives among which Hayes and Sherman sought to make

selections.54

While all these hot political chestnuts had to be handled, the fifth prob-

lem--that of the nation's credit--was the hottest of all, particularly as the

nation was just emerging from a serious depression. On this subject Sher-

man possessed a thorough knowledge and broad experience acquired in

sixteen years of congressional handling of it. Intimately involved in the

wartime establishment of the greenback currency and the national banking

system,55 he now was determined to protect the nation's credit by making

the greenbacks redeemable in gold (known as resumption of specie pay-

ments) and by avoiding unlimited coinage of cheap silver dollars.

Hayes stood firmly for resumption but was so completely opposed to sil-

ver dollars that he vetoed the compromise Bland-Allison bill that permitted

a limited issue of them. Not at all to Sherman's surprise, Congress passed

the bill over the veto. This concession to inflationary sentiment contributed

some quota to lessening the opposition to resumption of specie payments

which Sherman achieved on schedule, January 1, 1879, partly by virtue of

improving business trends and partly by his own careful management of

Treasury bond issues and other government resources.56

In his expert handling of this fifth and greatest of the administration's

problems Sherman took great pride. He felt that it in no small manner



HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN 137

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                         137

justified his hope for the nation's highest award. Unfortunately, in securing

a presidential nomination, merit and ability are less influential than a warm

personality, united backing by one's state delegation, and a middle stance

not too sharply identified with divisive issues. Of the first two assets, Sher-

man had much.57 In regard to the last three far more important qualifica-

tions, he was sadly lacking. Of hail-fellow-well-met cronies (military or leg-

islative), this naturally-reserved gentleman had few. Of unity, the state's

delegation was bereft by the refusal of nine Blaine men to unite in Sher-



138 OHIO HISTORY

138                                               OHIO HISTORY

 

man's support as the state convention had suggested; Sherman unfortunate-

ly selected Garfield (who gained attention this way) as the one to nom-

inate him. Of a middle stance, Sherman had deprived himself by contribu-

tions to the Hayes administration, by his recent opposition to free coinage,

and by insistence upon resumption; all this made the Secretary less "avail-

able" than men not as competent.58

Hayes did not publicly endorse Sherman, feeling that interference by the

President would be "unseemly." Perhaps he, better than Sherman, realized

that the Secretary was not "available." Commenting in his Diary on nom-

ination developments, he casually wrote, after mentioning Grant and Blaine,

"It may be Sherman or a fourth--either Edmunds or Wilson."59 Garfield in

nominating Sherman said that he did not present him "as a better man or a

better Republican than thousands of others," and called for Republican

unity. A majority of the convention proceeded (on the thirty-fourth bal-

lot) to unite on Garfield.60

To Hayes the Garfield nomination was "altogether good," being a defeat

for Conkling and others who were pressing a third term for Grant. But this

did not mean that the President was indifferent to Sherman's future wel-

fare. Perhaps he felt that it now was his turn to pay a debt. At any rate,

the final decision of the Ohio legislature to give Sherman the Senate chair

which Garfield was relinquishing (as Senator-elect) seems not to have been

unrelated to Hayes's desire that Garfield should cooperate to that end.61

Sherman was deeply appreciative of his endorsement by the Ohio legisla-

ture, unanimous this time. He went to Columbus to tell them so, and in

so doing the Secretary of the Treasury could be said to be thanking also

the President of the United States:

I can only say then, in conclusion, fellow-citizens, that I am glad that

the opportunity of the office you have given me will enable me to come

back here home to Ohio to cultivate again the relations I had of old.

It is one of the happiest thoughts that comes to me in consequence of

your election that I will be able to live again among you and to be one

of you, and I trust in time to overcome the notion that has sprung up

within two or three years that I am a human iceberg, dead to all human

sympathies. I hope you will enable me to overcome that difficulty. That

you will receive me kindly, and I think I will show you, if you doubt

it, that I have a heart to acknowledge gratitude--a heart that feels for

others, and willing to alleviate where I can all the evils to which men

and women are subject. I again thank you from the bottom of my

heart.62

 

THE AUTHOR: Jeannette Paddock

Nichols formerly was chairman of the

Graduate Group in Economic History at

the University of Pennsylvania.