The OHIO HISTORICAL Quarterly
VOLUME 70 ?? NUMBER 1 ?? J A N U A R Y 1961
The Corwin Amendment
In the Secession Crisis
By R. ALTON LEE*
THE ELECTION of a Republican president
in November
1860, on a platform opposed to further
extension of slavery,
sparked the secession of South Carolina
from the United
States. Between December 20, 1860, and
February 1, 1861,
the other six cotton states followed
South Carolina out of the
Union. "Never since the world
began was there a more
momentous crisis in the affairs of any
people," declared the
report of a congressional committee.1
Although this statement
is too inclusive, secession undoubtedly
was the greatest
exigency the American people had yet
faced.
During the three-months crisis from the
meeting of con-
gress on December 3, 1860, to the
inauguration of Lincoln on
March 4, 1861, both Republicans and
Democrats made various
attempts to compromise and conciliate.
The "lame duck" con-
gress which faced these problems was
dangerously split in
composition. The senate consisted of
thirty-seven Democrats,
twenty-four Republicans, and two
Americans, or Know-
Nothings. The house of representatives
was even more closely
* R. Alton Lee is a graduate assistant
in the department of history at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma.
1 House Reports, 36 cong., 2
sess., I, No. 31, minority report of Miles Taylor,
John S. Phelps, A. Rust, William G.
Wliteley, and Warren Winslow of the special
committee of thirty-three, 1. This
series of documents, officially designated as Re-
port No. 31, will be cited hereafter as Committee
of Thirty-Three.
2 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
divided into one hundred and nine
Republicans, one hundred
and one Democrats, twenty-six
Americans, and one Whig.2
Such division, together with the temper
of the times, spelled
little hope for any successful
cooperation.
In addition to close division in
congress along party lines,
the picture was complicated further by
the radical attitudes
of individual congressmen. One of the
leading Republicans,
William H. Seward, wrote that "the
Republican party today
is as uncompromising as the
Secessionists in South Carolina.
A month hence each may come to think
that moderation is
wiser."3 But over a
month later he was writing home that
"two-thirds of the Republican
Senators are as reckless in
action as the South."4 Henry
Adams, the son of Congress-
man Charles Francis Adams of
Massachusetts, was living in
Washington during this congressional
session. He was in
immediate contact with politicians and
political events, which
gave his opinion added validity. Henry
wrote his brother that
no compromise would bring the South
back. "We are beyond
that stage where a compromise can
prevent the struggle," he
wrote.5 Even the Democrats, whose
political future necessi-
tated a peaceful settlement, were
divided. Stephen A. Douglas,
one of the leading Democrats in the
senate, noted that there
were senators from his party who did
"not want any settle-
ment."6
A Republican congressman said he
refused to compromise
with the South for several reasons, one
of which being that
"slavery is a sin, an outrage
against humanity, and an insult
to God."7 When the Star
of the West, in its attempt to supply
Fort Sumter, was fired on by South
Carolina on January 9,
2 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 1-2. The Globe listed three
vacancies
in the senate, completing the total of
sixty-six.
3 William H. Seward to Thurlow Weed,
December 3, 1860, in Harriet A. Weed
and Thurlow Weed Barnes, eds., The
Life of Thurlow Weed (Boston, 1883-84),
II, 308.
4 Seward to Mrs. Seward, January 13,
1861, in Frederick W. Seward, William
H. Seward, An Autobiography (New York, 1891), II, 496.
5 Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., January 8, 1861, in Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed., Letters of Henry
Adams (New York, 1930), 77-78.
6 Congressional Globe, 36 cong.,
2 sess., 661.
7 Ibid., Appendix,
129.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 3
1861, Senator Louis Wigfall of Texas
informed the North
that its flag had been insulted.
"Redress it if you dare," he
challenged.8 In an atmosphere heated
with insults such as
these, it is not strange that
compromise was difficult.
One of the plans of conciliation came
from Senator John
Crittenden of Kentucky. But all of his
proposals, including
the cardinal point of recognizing
slavery south of the 36?? 30'
line, failed because of Republican
opposition. The Chicago
platform, drawn up in 1860 by the
Republican party, had as
its major plank opposition to any
extension of slavery. Lin-
coln felt that the Crittenden plan
would violate the main
principle on which he was elected and so
opposed it. With
his opposition, the Crittenden plan
could not carry congress
nor, it might be pointed out, were the
prospects bright for any
congressional plan that Lincoln did not
favor. Although
relatively unknown politically, Lincoln
was the victorious
standard-bearer of the party, and many
Republicans looked
to him for guidance.
Another attempt to solve the issues
between the two sec-
tions was the Washington Peace
Convention, with ex-Presi-
dent Tyler as chairman. This
convention, instigated by the
Virginia legislature, met from February
4 to February 27,
1861, but its proposals, too, were
rejected as yielding to
slavery. Both of these movements have
received much atten-
tion and have been thoroughly analyzed.
Between these two
came a third conciliatory effort, which
has received much less
attention. This was the Corwin
amendment, which, through
an addition to the United States
Constitution, would have
guaranteed the right of slave property
in the states where
slavery then existed. It was named
after, but not originated
by, Thomas Corwin, representative from
Ohio. This was the
only important plan during this crisis
to receive the sanction
of congress, yet the research and study
devoted to it is often
confused and sometimes erroneous.
The movement for and support of the
Corwin amendment
seems to have been prompted by the
necessity of holding the
8 Ibid., 1373.
4
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
border states in the Union. This
amendment, which would
have done nothing more than reaffirm
the right of property in
slaves, was a concession that the
average Republican would
be willing to give in order to reassure
the border states that
their valuable property would not be
molested. The states in
this area had no need to "expand
or die," and wanted to stay
in the Union; but not at the price of
abolishing slavery. The
cotton states, led by South Carolina,
were seceding principally
on the grounds that the Republican
party was opposed to
slavery extension.9 This
party was gradually gaining control
of congress and in the preceding
November election had won
the executive branch. With control of
the presidency they
could soon take over the judiciary, and
in the not-too-distant
future would have congress, thus
gaining complete control of
the national government. Since the
Republicans were believed
to be opposed to slavery, the next logical
step they would take
after gaining control of the
legislative branch, according to
the gulf states, would be to abolish
slavery in the slave states.
Therefore, the slave states must get
out of the Union while
they could and set up their own
government, dedicated to the
preservation and expansion of slavery.
When the states began to secede, the
North pessimistically
felt it could only watch, hoping the
fever would not spread too
far north. While some were wishing for
an Andrew Jackson
instead of a James Buchanan, many in
the North experienced
the sentiment later expressed by Samuel
S. Cox, congressman
from Ohio, when he wrote that
"there seemed to be a general
acknowledgment that secession at
present was the best course."
He went on to say that this fact seems
"now inexplicable to
many persons, because it is forgotten
that from December,
1860, until March, 1861, there was hope
of reconciliation."10
The North could do nothing rash to the
seceding states as
9 For illustrations of this, see the
secession resolutions of Georgia, Mississippi, and
South Carolina in Henry Steele Commager,
ed., Documents in American History
(New York, 1958), I.
10 Samuel S. Cox, Union--Disunion--Reunion:
Three Decades of Federal Leg-
islation, 1855 to 1885 (Providence, R. I., 1885), 64.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 5
long as there was a chance of bringing
them back peacefully.
Northern hopes and plans were summed up
by Hamilton Fish
when he proposed that substantial
concessions be made to
"secure Virginia and other Border
States, and to strengthen
the hands of Union men, South." He
continued by saying that
if the border states followed the gulf
states he had no hope
of their being brought back. But if
they could be held by
concessions, "they may remain, for
the purpose of bridging
over the space and bringing back the
Southern States."11
Even as late as March 1861 Seward
warned Lincoln of the
danger of losing Virginia and Maryland.
After reading his
inaugural address before its delivery,
Seward warned Lincoln
he would have to modify his stand in
the speech. Otherwise,
"within ninety, perhaps within
sixty days" the North would
be obliged "to fight the South for
this capital. ... In that
case," he continued, "the
dismemberment of the Republic
would date from the inauguration of a
Republican Adminis-
tration."12
To the slave states' charge that the
ultimate aim of the
Republicans was the extinction of
slavery, an idea that gained
credence especially after John Brown
became a martyr in
northern eyes, the Republicans could
answer by saying they
stood behind the Chicago platform.
While the main plank
opposed extension of slavery, the
Republicans said that the
fourth plank described their intentions
in regard to slavery
within the states. This plank stated:
That the maintenance inviolate of the
rights of the states, and
especially the right of each state to
order and control its own domestic
institutions according to its own
judgment exclusively, is essential to
that balance of powers on which the perfection
and endurance of our
political fabric depends; and we
denounce the lawless invasion by
armed force of the soil of any state or
territory, no matter under what
pretext, as among the gravest of
crimes.13
11 Hamilton Fish to W.
S. Thayer, December 15, 1860, in Allan Nevins, Ham-
ilton Fish (New
York, 1936), 80.
12 Seward, William H. Seward, II, 512.
13 Kirk H. Porter, comp.,
National Party Platforms (New York, 1924), 56.
6
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Nevertheless, southern fears on this
score continued. War-
ren Winslow of North Carolina gave
expression to this sus-
picion in congress by calling attention
to antislavery speeches
in the past "in these Halls"
that had built up southern
anxieties. Among others, he pointed out
that John Quincy
Adams had once affirmed congressional
power to abolish slav-
ery and that Joshua Giddings of Ohio
had advocated a plan
for slave insurrection.14 Thomas
Ruffin, also of North Caro-
lina, called attention to the fact that
Lysander Spooner's
book, The Unconstitutionality of
Slavery, had been com-
mended by William H. Seward.15
Despite Republican protestations, the
idea persisted. In a
congressional report Thomas Nelson of
Tennessee pointed
out that "rightfully or
wrongfully--the opinion has obtained
an extensive credence in the
South" that because of the recent
Republican victory on the principle of
non-extension of slav-
ery, "its next step would be to
carry the 'irrepressible con-
flict' into the States and abolish it
there."16 Another southern
minority report of this same committee
expressed an equiva-
lent opinion."17 Even a
northerner, John Logan of Illinois,
pointed out that although Republicans
maintained there was
no justification for such mistrust,
that was not the question.
The main point was, "Does the
apprehension exist? You have
been told that it does," he said.18
So the problem of the Repub-
licans became one of assuring the slave
states that they had
no intention of destroying slavery,
only of preventing its
extension.
As early as December 1860 the New
York Tribune reported
"conservative Congressmen"
expressing the belief that pre-
vention of further secession was
impossible, but they hoped
for compromise which would
"preserve the border slavehold-
ing states in the Union with the
non-slaveholding states."19 In
14 Congressional Globe, 36
cong., 2 sess., 627.
15 Ibid., Appendix, 227.
16 Committee of Thirty-Three, minority report of Thomas A. R. Nelson, 5.
17 Ibid., minority report
of Taylor, Phelps, Rust, Whiteley, and Winslow, 2.
18 Congressional
Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., Appendix,
180.
19 New York
Tribune, December 10, 1860.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 7
January 1861 the Tribune stated
that Republicans were aware
of "the embarrassing
position" of the border states. "They
are loyal at heart," was the
report, "and if they could be cut
off and disengaged from the malicious
revolutionists of the
Cotton States, I do not doubt that the
feelings of the Repub-
licans would prompt them to yield
everything that they might
ask which could be granted
honorably."20 Holding the border
states was so important that even the
extreme plan was pro-
posed of buying the slaves in states
"north of the Potomac
and west of the Mississippi." The
estimated cost of this proj-
ect was set at $100,000,000.21
"Who would refuse to be taxed
for such a purpose? Nobody who is not a
fool or a traitor,"
said the antislavery Tribune.22
The Corwin amendment, one
such proposal to reassure the border
states in the secession
crisis, almost succeeded. The purpose
of this paper is to
show Lincoln's influence on the
amendment and to trace its
progress through congress.
When congress met on December 3, 1860,
they received
President Buchanan's message. In this
message Buchanan
asked, among other items, that an
"explanatory amendment"
be proposed by congress. This amendment
should deal with
the three specific points of
controversy between the two sec-
tions: (1) express recognition of the
right of property in
slaves, (2) protection of this right in
the common territories,
and (3) recognition of the right of
masters to obtain their
runaway slaves.23 The next
day Alexander Boteler of Vir-
ginia proposed in the house that
"so much of the President's
message as relates to the present
perilous condition of the
country be referred to a special committee
of one from each
State." The motion carried by a
vote of one hundred and
forty-five to thirty-eight and the
committee of thirty-three
was set up.24 It might be
noted that of the thirty-eight vot-
ing against the committee, all were
Republicans except one
20 Ibid., January
1, 1861.
21 Ibid., January
16, 1861.
22 Ibid., January
29, 1861.
23 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 4.
24 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 6.
8
THE 0HIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
who was an Anti-Lecompton Democrat.
Some of the south-
ern congressmen refused to vote on the
proposition, because
they said their states were in the
process of calling conven-
tions in order to secede from the
Union, so it would be useless
for them to vote.
Two days later Speaker William
Pennington announced the
committee membership saving he had
chosen them "accord-
ing to his best judgment."25
Almost all agreed that his choice
of Thomas Corwin as chairman was a wise
one, since he was
a strong Unionist, who had no sympathy
for radical aboli-
tionists.26 However, some of
the representatives questioned
his good judgment on the other members.
John McClernand
of Illinois pointed out that there were
sixteen Republicans
on the committee. Yet in the November
elections that party
received less than 1,900,000 votes,
while all opposition votes
totaled over 2,800,000 and these were
represented by only
seventeen members.27 Clement
Vallandigham of Ohio com-
plained that there was not one Democrat
named "from the
sixteen free States . . . east of the
Rocky Mountains."28
Professor Dwight L. Dumond has pointed
out that "wherever
possible, Southern representation was
accorded to Douglas
supporters who were out of harmony with
the vast majority
of the people of that [southern]
section."29 But even though
inauspicious, a start had been made in
the house toward com-
promise.
In the senate a resolution for a
comparable committee was
sponsored by Lazarus Powell of Kentucky
on December 6,
but was not passed until December 18.30
The members of the
senate committee, the committee of
thirteen, were named
December 20, the day South Carolina
seceded. Membership on
this committee had a better
distribution than that in the
25 Ibid., 22.
26 Josiah Morrow, ed., Life
and Speeches of Thomas Corwin (Cincinnati,
1896), 60.
27 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 39.
28 Ibid., 38.
29 Dwight Lowell Dumond, The
Secession Movement (New York, 1931), 156.
30 Congressional
Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 19,
117.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 9
house. The Republicans had only five
members, while the
gulf states had two and the border
states three. The other
three were northern Democrats.31 It
was to these committees
that all plans of compromise in
congress were referred. Some,
like Crittenden's plan, were defeated
in committee. Others had
approval of the committee of
thirty-three but were defeated
in either the house or the senate. The
committee of thirteen
finally had to report that it could
agree on nothing.32
The idea that was to become the Corwin
amendment orig-
inated in the senate committee of
thirteen, with William H.
Seward first sponsoring it. This
movement of conciliation
seems out of character with the antislavery
ideas that Seward
had previously advocated, and it is to
be questioned from
whence this idea came. Seward was known
at this time as
the arch-enemy of the slavery forces.
He was famous, or
infamous if one were in a cotton state,
for his 1858 speech
in Rochester, New York, in which he
coined the phrase
"irrepressible conflict" in
describing the opposing forces that
were splitting the nation North and
South. But even as early
as 1848 he had spoken in a similar vein
and reiterated it in
the senate during the debates on the
compromise of 1850 and
the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854. Then,
too, in debate on the
compromise of 1850 he had answered the
claim that the con-
stitution protected slavery in the
territories by stating that
there was "a higher law than the
Constitution."33 After the
elections of 1858 Seward had written
the abolitionist Theo-
dore Parker that he was happy over the
election of Charles
Francis Adams to congress. "I see,
at last, Massachusetts
coming about," he wrote.34 Corwin
later referred to Adams
as the "Archbishop of
anti-slavery."35 All this would seem
to make Seward a radical antislavery
man. But, on the other
31 Ibid., 158.
32 Senate Reports, 36
cong., 2 sess., No. 288, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Committee
of Thirteen.
33 Seward,
William H. Seward, II, 352, 126.
34 Seward to Theodore Parker, n.d., ibid.,
353.
35 Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., December 26, 1860, in Ford,
Letters of Henry Adams, 72.
10
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
hand, Seward's impatience with the
"Radicals" and their un-
willingness to compromise has also been
shown. His actions
in congress during this crisis seem to
indicate that although
he was a staunch Republican in the
sense of being antislavery,
he was also willing to arbitrate after
the gulf states revealed
that they were no longer bluffing in
their secession threats.
Lincoln, the president-elect, was slow
to make known his
views on the compromises proposed in
congress. But as Pro-
fessor David M. Potter has shown, he
gradually indicated
how he stood on the issues and soon
took over direction of
the compromises through the Republican
leaders in congress,
especially Seward.36 At the
same time he brought his influence
to bear on members of the house.
Corwin, the chairman of
the committee of thirty-three,
corresponded with Lincoln.
In January he wrote Lincoln describing
political conditions in
the capital, indicating in the letter
that he had been requested
to do so by Leonard Swett, Lincoln's
close political friend.
Corwin told Lincoln he had been serving
on the committee
for a month and if the states were no
more harmonious than
the members of the committee, then
"we must dissolve & a
long & bloody civil war must follow.
Southern men are
theoretically crazy," he
continued. "Extreme Northern men
are practical fools . . . quite as mad
as the former, Treason
is in the air around us everywhere.
It goes by the name of
patriotism."37 More
specifically, Henry Adams wrote that
Lincoln had "exercised a strong
influence on this committee
[of thirty-three] and always
right."38 Two days later he
wrote that "the President elect
has signified too in more ways
than one, what the committee had better
do and what leave
undone."39
One of the first written indications of
Lincoln's attitude
toward compromise in congress came in a
letter to Lyman
36 David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New
Haven,
Conn., 1942), 176.
37 Thomas Corwin to Lincoln,
January 18, 1861, in David C. Mearns, The Lin-
coln Papers (New York, 1948), II, 406.
38 Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 20, 1860, in Ford,
Letters of Henry Adams, 68-69.
39 Henry Adams to Charles Francis
Adams, Jr., December 22, 1860, ibid., 69.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 11
Trumbull. Trumbull had written Lincoln
that Seward was
denouncing compromise in regard to the
North paying for
runaway slaves. He then indicated
surprise that the house
"voted to raise a committee on the
State of the Union,"
because to conciliate would be to
repudiate Republican prin-
ciples on slavery.40 Lincoln's
reply to Senator Trumbull was
that there should be "no
compromise on the question of ex-
tending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere
long,
must be done again."41
The next day he answered a letter
from
William Kellogg of Illinois, a member of the committee
of thirty-three, who asked advice
concerning Lincoln's views.
Lincoln told Kellogg to "entertain
no proposition for a com-
promise in regard to the extension of
slavery."42 He also
answered E. B. Washburne, congressman
from Illinois, after
a request for counsel along the same
line, telling him not to
compromise on extension of slavery.43
Even as late as Feb-
ruary 1861 he wrote Seward that on the
question of extending
slavery he was "inflexible."44
It will be noted that in all these
letters referring to his
policies, Lincoln was most vitally
concerned with preventing
extension of slavery.45 In
regard to the domestic institutions
of a state, Lincoln was not so
inflexible. In the above-quoted
letter to Seward he also said, "As
to fugitive slaves, District
of Columbia, slave-trade among the
slave States, and what-
ever springs of necessity from the fact
that the institution
40 Lyman Trumbull to Lincoln, December
4, 1860, in Mearns, The Lincoln
Papers, I, 326.
41 Lincoln to Trumbull, December
10, 1860, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N. J., 1953), IV, 149.
42 Lincoln to William Kellogg,
December 11, 1860, in John G. Nicolay and John
Hay, eds., Abraham Lincoln; Complete
Works (New York, 1902), I, 657.
43 Lincoln to E. B. Washburne, December
13, 1860, ibid., 658.
44 Lincoln to Seward, February 1, 1861, ibid.,
668-669.
45 Professor Richard Hofstadter has
developed the theme that Lincoln felt that
slavery was becoming nation-wide and
that he consequently stressed the principle
of opposition to extension of slavery. This
doctrine was to arrest the trend and
at the same time unite as nearly as
possible the two opposing views in the North of
antislavery and "Negrophobia."
Hofstadter points out that his "house divided"
speech supports this idea, because of
the rhetorical question, "Have we no ten-
dency to the latter condition?" in
reference to the point that the nation would soon
be all free or all slave. Richard
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition
(New York, 1957), 110-120.
12
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
is amongst us, I care but little, so
that what is done be comely,
and not altogether outrageous."
Prior to this he had written
General Duff Green that he desired no
constitutional amend-
ment, though he would not withhold the
opportunity of the
people expressing their will in regard
to one. He then went
on in this letter to reiterate plank
four of the Chicago plat-
form, reaffirming the right of a state
to exclusive control of
its domestic institutions.46
The background and introduction of
Seward's proposals
to the committee of thirteen is rather
involved. It will be
worth while to chronicle these events
in some detail. Thurlow
Weed and William H. Seward were the two
outstanding Re-
publicans in New York at this time. New
York had worked
hard for Lincoln in the previous
November election even
though the Republicans in that state
were disappointed that
Seward had not received the nomination.
For this, and other
reasons, Lincoln decided to name Seward
as his secretary of
state. Soon after this decision Weed
was invited to Spring-
field to confer with Lincoln. The
invitation was extended by
Leonard Swett and David Davis, the two
men, according to
Weed, who had contributed most to the
fact that Lincoln
was nominated.47 Their
letter stated that Lincoln wanted him
to "come immediately."48
Seward wrote Lincoln that Weed
was on his way west and he, Seward,
would await Weed's
return to New York.49
The Tribune reported that Weed
made his visit December
20 and was "closeted with Lincoln
from 9 o'clock until 3."50
During the conference Lincoln read the
latest issue of Weed's
paper, the Albany
Evening Journal, which contained an
edi-
torial "which had for its object
the holding of the border
46 Lincoln to Duff Green, December
28, 1860, in Nicolay and Hay, Complete
Works, I, 661-662.
47 Weed and Barnes, Life of Thurlow
Weed, I, 602.
48 Leonard
Swett and David Davis to Weed, December 10, 1860, ibid., II, 302.
49 Seward to Lincoln, December 16, 1860,
in Seward, William H. Seward, II,
482.
50 New York
Tribune, December 21, 1860. Weed
and Barnes, in Life of Thur-
low Weed, I, 611, say he spent two days in Springfield, but
Lincoln in his letter
to Trumbull says Weed was there
one day. See below, note 53.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 13
slave states in the Union," and
which decried the "radical
abolitionist" activities.51
Lincoln observed that the ideas
"opened up a new channel for his
thoughts," and "after this
subject had been talked up, and over,
and out," they discussed
a cabinet.52 When Weed left
Springfield he carried instruc-
tions for Seward in regard to
congressional compromise.
Lincoln told Trumbull of the visit in a
letter the next day,
saying he gave Weed "three short
resolutions" that he had
drawn up, "which, or the substance
of which," he thought
"would do much good, if
introduced, and unanamously [sic]
supported by our friends."53 This
memorandum was sup-
posedly lost until Frederic Bancroft
discovered a sheet among
Seward's manuscripts with three
resolutions in Lincoln's
handwriting. The sheet contained only
the following:
Resolved:
That the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution ought to be
enforced by a law of Congress, with
efficient provisions for that object,
not obligating private persons to assist
in its execution, but punishing
all who resist it, and with the usual
safeguards to liberty, securing free
men against being surrendered as slaves
....
That all state laws, if there be such,
really, or apparently, in conflict
with such law of Congress, ought to be
repealed; and no opposition to
the execution of such law of Congress
ought to be made ....
That the Federal Union must be
preserved.54
Because of the content and Lincoln's
letter to Trumbull, Ban-
croft decided this was the lost
memorandum.
The Republican leaders in the senate,
aware of Weed's
visit and knowing that when Seward
spoke he would speak
for Lincoln, carried on in the
committee of thirteen until
Seward arrived. On Saturday, December
22, the committee
had turned down Crittenden's
compromise. On Monday, De-
cember 24, Seward arrived in Washington
and attended his
51 Weed
and Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed, I, 603.
52 Ibid., 605.
53 Lincoln to Trumbull, December 21,
1860, in Basler, Collected Works, IV, 158.
54 Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (New York,
1900),
II, 10.
14
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
first meeting in the committee. He
asked, and permission was
granted, to record his vote on the
previous Saturday's action.
He cast his vote, as all the
Republicans had, against the Crit-
tenden plan.55 He then
introduced three resolutions to the
committee. They were:
1st. No amendment shall be made to the
Constitution which will
authorize or give to Congress the power
to abolish, or interfere within
any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of
persons held to labor or service by the
laws of said State.
2d. The fugitive slave act shall be so
amended as to give the alleged
fugitive a jury trial.
3d. The legislatures of the several
States shall be respectfully re-
quested to review all their legislation
affecting the rights of persons
recently resident in other States, and
to repeal or modify all such acts
as may contravene the provisions of the
Constitution of the United
States, or any laws made in the
pursuance thereof.56
There is enough difference between
these resolutions and
Bancroft's memorandum to indicate that
Seward did not fol-
low Lincoln's written proposals.
Seward then wrote Lincoln explaining
what he had done.
He said he had only had time to confer
briefly with Weed and
get to Washington on Monday (December
24). This confer-
ence took place on a train trip from
Syracuse to Albany.
Seward wrote:
He gave me, verbally, the substance of
the suggestion you prepared
for the consideration of the Republican
members; but not the written
proposition. This morning [December 26]
I received the latter from
him; and also information for the first
time, of your expectation that
I would write you concerning the temper
of parties and the public here.
I met on Monday, my Republican
associates of the Committee of
Thirteen, and afterward, the whole
committee. With the unanimous
consent of our section, I offered three
propositions which seemed to me
to cover the ground of the suggestion made
by you, through Mr. Weed,
as I understand it....
This evening, the Republican members of
the committee, with Judge
Trumbull and Mr. Fessenden, met at my
house, to consider your written
55 Committee of Thirteen, 8.
56 Ibid., 11.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 15
suggestion and determine whether it
shall be offered. While we think
that the ground has already been
covered, we find that, in the form you
give it, it would divide our friends,
not only in the committee, but in
Congress, a portion being unwilling to
give up their old opinion, that
the duty of executing constitutional
provisions, concerning fugitives
from service, belongs to the States, and
not at all to Congress. But we
shall confer, and act as wisely as we
can.57
This letter would indicate that the
resolutions presented to
the committee of thirteen were from the
verbal instructions
Lincoln gave Weed in their talk and that
they were of similar
intent but different in composition from
his written instruc-
tions.
The only provisions of Lincoln's
contained in Seward's
proposals were the repeal of personal
liberty laws and a jury
trial for fugitive slaves. The first
proposal, which was to
become the Corwin amendment, was not
even mentioned in
Lincoln's memorandum. The two sets of
resolutions have led
to conflict in interpretation of the
event. Professor Potter,
in his work on this period, suggests two
alternatives. He con-
cludes that either Seward was ready to
"deviate from Lin-
coln's program" or that Weed did
not inform Seward cor-
rectly of Lincoln's wishes.58 A
third solution is offered by
George Fort Milton in his book The
Eve of Conflict. Milton
states that Lincoln proposed an
amendment guaranteeing
slavery in the states. He says that the
suggestion came from
Lincoln and cites Seward's letter but
with no further explana-
tion or analysis, a supposition that
Potter rejects.59
Although the evidence is circumstantial,
there is a strong
possibility that Milton's assumption is
correct. Seward indi-
cates in his letter to Lincoln that he
introduced his proposals
on the basis of Weed's oral instructions
and did so solely on
these grounds, believing they covered
Lincoln's idea. Then
two days later he received the written
instructions and, after
57 Seward to Lincoln, December 26, 1860, in
Seward, William H. Seward, II,
484-485.
58 Potter, Lincoln and His Party, 175.
59 Ibid. For Milton's statement, see George Fort Milton,
The Eve of Conflict
(New York, 1934), 527.
16
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
consultation with other Republicans,
decided that Lincoln's
written suggestion would alienate some
states-rights Republi-
cans. It is not known what Weed told
Seward, but it is
known, as indicated above, that Weed
and Lincoln discussed
methods of holding the border states in
the Union--which
this amendment would help do. Seward
said he introduced
his resolutions in accordance with
Lincoln's idea; in his
words, "as I understand it."
Since Lincoln's memorandum
and Seward's resolutions are so
different, it is obvious that
either Seward deliberately
misunderstood Lincoln or that
Weed passed on to Seward, orally, a
different proposition.
The latter seems more likely, as Seward
uses the present
tense "understand" while he
has the memorandum with him,
suggesting there were two and they were
different.
Another factor in favor of the latter
is, as Seward says in
his letter, that on the same evening he
was writing, he had
met with other Republicans and they had
discussed and re-
jected Lincoln's written proposal. All
of the Republicans on
the committee had voted for the
amendment guaranteeing
slavery, knowing that Seward was
speaking for Lincoln.60
When they saw the memorandum two days
later, they could
easily have seen the difference in the
two, and Seward could
have explained this only by informing
them of the exact na-
ture of the oral instructions. Since
the two conflict, the party
leaders would not have decided to disregard
Lincoln's memo-
randum unless they were convinced
Lincoln favored the
amendment as well.
Also, the nature of the amendment
itself was a guarantee
that Lincoln would be willing to give.
While Seward, becom-
ing more conservative and willing to
compromise, easily could
have originated this amendment, it is
more in line with Lin-
coln's theories. Seward was antislavery
in his "irrepressible
conflict" and "higher
law" theories, while Lincoln had repu-
diated this "higher law"
doctrine.61 It was largely because
60 Committee
of Thirteen, 11.
61 William H. Herndon and Jesse William
Weik, Herndon's Lincoln: The Story
of a Great Life (Springfield, III., 1921), III, 462.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 17
Lincoln was considered more
conservative than Seward on
the slavery question that he received
the Republican nomina-
tion in 1860.62 Lincoln was
anti-expansion, and, in regard
to slave property, his position would
be to enforce the consti-
tution as indicated by his letter to
General Green of December
28. That he had this very point of
slave property on his mind
is shown by a letter to Alexander
Stephens. Just two days
after Weed's visit to Springfield,
Lincoln assured Stephens
that the South had no cause to fear
that a Republican adminis-
tration would "directly or indirectly
interfere with their
slaves, or with them about their
slaves."63
Finally, Lincoln consistently approved the
Corwin amend-
ment throughout its course in congress.
Whether or not he
originated the idea, his endorsement
carried much weight in
getting Republican approval in
congress.
Seward's proposal was approved by the
committee of
thirteen, and it was the only one
endorsed in committee meet-
ings. But when Chairman Powell made the
final report to
the senate, he had to acknowledge that
the committee could
not "agree upon any general plan
of adjustment," and the
amendment was not recommended.64 The
scene must now
shift to the house of representatives,
where the amendment
was introduced and carried to fruition.
Charles Francis Adams first introduced
the amendment in
the committee of thirty-three. Adams'
action in congress dur-
ing this session was characterized by
Fabian tactics. He had
been appointed to the
committee as the representative from
Massachusetts. His conduct on the
committee was diagnosed
by his son Henry as "doing his
best to do nothing."65 This is
true only in a figurative sense. Adams
was antislavery but,
like other moderate Republicans,
willing to compromise for a
62
Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 114n. See also
Reinhard H. Luthin,
The First Lincoln Campaign (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), Chap. IX.
63 Lincoln to Alexander Stephens,
December 22, 1860, in Basler, Collected
Works, IV, 160.
64 Committee
of Thirteen, 1.
65 Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., December 18, 1860, in Ford,
Letters of Henry Adams, 67.
18
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
purpose. The motive behind his actions,
if Charles Francis
Adams, Jr., analyzed them correctly,
was to hold the border
states in the Union without
compromising basic Republican
principles. Charles Francis, Jr., said
his father "hoped to the
last to hold the border states,"
and if war could be avoided,
the gulf states would then "find
their position untenable, and
so be forced ignominiously back into
the Union."66 After con-
gress adjourned a member of his family
tried to console
Adams over the failure of his various
measures, but was
cheerfully informed that they had
served their purpose of
having "occupied time which might
otherwise have been dan-
gerously employed."67
The committee of thirty-three began
meeting December 11,
1860. The first several days were taken
up with considering
various proposals made on the floor of
the house. On Decem-
ber 28, four days after Seward
introduced his proposals to
the committee of thirteen, Adams
submitted to the committee
of thirty-three the following:
Resolved, That it is expedient to
propose an amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States providing
that no amendment having for
its object any interference within the
States with the relation between
their citizens and those described in
the second section of the first
article of the Constitution as "all
other persons" shall originate with any
state that does not recognize that
relation within its own limits, or shall
be valid without the assent of every one
of the States composing the
Union.
The committee approved it by the vote
of twenty-one to
three.68 The Tribune reported
the committee that day as
"trying very hard to report a
series of propositions that will
suit the claims of the border slave
states" and said "it appears
as if they may do it."69 This
amendment should have satisfied
the deepest fears of the South. It
would have meant that
slavery could never have been destroyed
unless every one of
66 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Charles
Francis Adams (New York, 1900), 131.
67 Ibid., 132-133.
68 Committee of Thirty-Three, journal, 19.
69 New York
Tribune, December 29, 1860.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 19
the slave states wished it, and for all
practical purposes would
have made slavery a perpetually binding
part of the constitu-
tion, similar to the clause on
representation in the senate.
Henry Adams mentioned in his letters
that Seward was a
frequent visitor at the Adams house
during this winter. This,
plus the fact that the idea, if not the
wording, was very similar
to Seward's proposal, leaves no doubt
that Adams' amend-
ment came from Seward. Also, on the
final committee vote,
Adams voted against his own measure,
indicating that he did
not promote the amendment through
personal conviction.
A special committee had been set up
within the committee
to prepare bills to carry out all
adopted resolutions. This
subcommittee drew up Adams' amendment
as a joint resolu-
tion of congress recommending a
constitutional amendment to
read as Adams originally proposed it.
The committee vote of
approval, January 11, 1861, was twenty
to five, with Adams
joining the opposition.70 Adams defended
this reversal by
saying he had come to the conclusion
that no adjustment short
of a constitutional obligation "to
protect and extend slavery"
would satisfy the "recusant" states.71
The committee of thirty-three, unlike
the committee of
thirteen, was able to return a majority
report to the house,
though the committee was so badly split
it also sent several
minority reports. The Corwin amendment
was one of the
proposals recommended in the majority
report. The southern
minority report approved the amendment
but complained that
it was not enough "standing
alone."72 A radical northern
minority refused to support it, because
it would be rejected
anyway, they said, as a
"humiliating requirement" for the
North to "enter into bonds for
their good behavior."73 Cor-
win, in submitting the majority report,
alluded to the "secret"
design that the South charged against
Republicans, that of
desiring to abolish slavery, giving
this as the reason for pro-
posing the amendment. "Notwithstanding the
preposterous
70 Committee of Thirty-Three, journal,
35.
71 Ibid., minority
report of Charles Francis Adams, 3.
72 Ibid., minority report of
Taylor, Phelps, Rust, Whiteley, and Winslow, 16.
73 Ibid., minority report of C. C. Washburne and Mason W. Tappan,
6.
20
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
character of this idea," he said,
"the committee have deemed
the belief in it, in some portions of
the South, sufficiently
important to demand a notice at this
time."74 Since Adams
had abandoned the proposal, and Corwin
assumed sponsorship
as chairman of the committee, it became
known as the Corwin
amendment.
Corwin made a lengthy speech on January
21, 1861, in
introducing the amendment on the floor
of the house of rep-
resentatives. He gave some of the
reasons for the necessity
of the amendment, and, in doing so, hit
upon one of the key
fears behind southern secession. Corwin
pointed out the
southern dread that the Republican
party would soon be con-
trolled by abolitionists. Their ultimate
aim, said the South,
was to gain control of the national
government and "overleap
all constitutional impediments" to
destroy slavery in the states
by amendment. Corwin logically called
attention to the fact
that there were only eighteen free
states and fifteen slave
states and this Republican
"scheme" would necessitate thirty
free states to propose such an
amendment and forty-five to
ratify. He said this would probably
never happen and if it
did it would be in the distant future.
But he felt it was neces-
sary to allay this southern
trepidation, which his proposed
amendment would accomplish.75
When Corwin submitted the report to the
house, he made
the motion, which carried, that it be
made the special order
one week from that day "and from
day to day until disposed
of."76 The amendment
was debated for five weeks, during
which many of the representatives took
advantage of their
opportunity to express an opinion on
it. All of the southern
men who spoke favored it. Robert Hatton
of Tennessee was
glad "this source of apprehension
and irritation" would be
"put forever at rest."77
John Gilmer of North Carolina
echoed this sentiment, saying that if
it were passed he would
74 Ibid., majority report, 4.
75 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 74.
76 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 378.
77 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 171.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 21
tell his people "that they should
stay in the Union."78 A
northerner, Albert Porter of Indiana,
approved of it because,
like the ninth and eleventh amendments,
it would not alter the
constitution but would prevent
"misconstruction of existing
provisions."79
Most of the opposition came from the
antislavery men.
This antagonism ranged from the mild,
who opposed it be-
cause the constitution already
contained the guarantee, to the
more radical, like Charles Sedgwick of
New York, who said
he would rather lose his right arm than
approve it.80 Others,
like John Bingham of Ohio, disapproved
of it because it would
make any future amendment on the
subject practically im-
possible.81 This seemed to
be the strongest charge against it.
Samuel Blair of Pennsylvania opposed it
because he felt it
would fail to receive approval of
three-fourths of the states
and this would "provoke an
agitation on the subject" that
would "cast into the shade all
that has gone before it."82 But
in general the moderates, who were in
the majority in the
Republican party, pressed for its
passage because it would
help satisfy the South and
"counteract" disunionist activi-
ties.83
Corwin tried to close debate several
times and bring the
measure to a vote. Time was an
important factor, as the
congressional session would soon end.
On February 4, 1861,
the gulf states had met at Montgomery,
Alabama, to form the
Confederate government. This carried
secession to its final
stage, and yet congress had approved no
compromise meas-
ures. The Crittenden plan had been
rejected in the senate
committee, but its supporters were
still trying hard on both
floors of congress to secure its
passage. The Washington
Peace Convention, from which so much
had been expected,
78 Congressional Globe, 36 cong.,
2 sess., 581.
79 Ibid., 1041-1042.
80 Ibid., 796.
81 Congressional Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 82.
82 Ibid., 254.
83 Henry Adams, "The Great
Secession Winter of 1860-61," Proceedings of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, XLIII (1909-10), 681.
22 THE OHIO HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
was bogging down in debate. The
Republicans refused to
compromise on extension of slavery, so
the Corwin amend-
ment was practically the only
conciliatory measure which held
a promise of success. But Corwin had to
postpone closing
debate several times because "many
gentlemen" desired "to
speak on the subject."84
In the last week of February, Corwin again sought to close
debate, and the opposition continued
its delaying tactics. On
February 26 Galusha Grow of
Pennsylvania moved to post-
pone closure for one day, and Bingham
of Ohio amended his
motion to read four days. The session
would end March 4,
and if it passed the house, the
amendment would still have to
be considered in the senate before
adjournment. Supporters
of the amendment pointed out that the
opposition was trying
in this way to defeat it. A turning
point was reached on Feb-
ruary 26, when Corwin proposed a
substitute for the original
amendment. Corwin said he had consulted
with the "majority
of the committee who are friendly to
this joint resolution"
and, as chairman of the committee,
asked that the following
measure be substituted:
No amendment shall ever be made to the
Constitution which will
authorize or give to Congress power to
abolish or interfere, within any
State, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons
held to labor or service by the laws of
said State.85
Evidently the moderates decided that
the wording in the orig-
inal was too definitive and permanent
to secure the necessary
votes for passage and this milder
measure would have a better
chance. The substitute was exactly that
proposed by Seward
in the senate, with the addition of the
word "ever," and is the
form that was finally approved.
On February 27 the previous question
was called for, and
a roll call vote on the amendment was
taken. One hundred
and twenty-nine votes were required for
the necessary two-
thirds majority, and the amendment
failed on this first try
84 Congressional Globe, 36 cong.,
2 sess., 794.
85 Ibid., 1236.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 23
by a vote of one hundred and
twenty-three to seventy-one.
Seventy of the opposing votes came from
Republicans, the
other one being Hickman of
Pennsylvania, an Anti-Lecomp-
ton Democrat.86
The next day David Kilgore of Indiana,
who had voted
against the amendment, moved to
reconsider the vote. Kilgore
said that Republican policy was
non-interference with slavery
in the states and on the previous day's
voting they seemed to
have forgotten this, being
"carried away by wild fanaticism,
and forgetting the condition of the
country."87 Benjamin
Stanton of Ohio repeated this plea,
pointing out that the seven
cotton states had seceded. "Now,
in this state of things," he
continued, "if the remaining seven
slaveholding states remain
in this Confederacy, they are entitled
to additional guaran-
tees." "Renewed"
demonstrations of applause followed this
speech.88 The motion to
reconsider passed, one hundred and
twenty-eight to sixty-five. A new vote
on the passage of the
joint resolution was taken, and this
time the necessary two-
thirds majority was obtained by the
vote of one hundred and
thirty-three to sixty-five. The house
reporter recorded that
this announcement "was received
with loud and prolonged
applause, both on the floor and in the
galleries."89
The resolution was sent to the senate
with three days left,
the session ending at noon March 4.
Douglas assumed leader-
ship in trying to rush it through in
time. On March 1 he
asked that it be made special order
along with the Crittenden
plan, and it was given the first and
second reading the same
day.90 The next day Senator
Charles Sumner attempted delay
by asking that the previous day's
journal be corrected. Sum-
ner maintained that he had objected to
the second reading the
same day, a violation of rule 26, and
he had thought the chair
heard his objection. Three other
senators said they had heard
him, so a vote was taken to correct the
journal and it carried,
86 Ibid., 1264.
87 Ibid., 1283.
88 Ibid., 1284.
89 Ibid., 1285.
90 Ibid., 1305.
24
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
twenty-four to seventeen.91 This
meant a delay of one day
for the second reading. Senator William
Bigler made a mo-
tion to suspend rule 26 for this
resolution, and the motion
carried, twenty to sixteen, thus
removing Sumner's block.
The resolution was debated so heatedly
that a vote was
impossible that day. Even though March
3 fell on a Sunday,
the senate reassembled that evening at
seven o'clock. A large
crowd filled the galleries and many
even stood in the aisles
and doorways. They became so noisy and
disorderly that little
could be heard on the senate floor.
Douglas tried to get the
galleries cleared, saying that many in
the mob were political
friends of those senators attempting to
block the Corwin
amendment.92 After repeated
efforts the galleries were cleared
and debate resumed. Late that night the
senate voted, and
by the exact two-thirds necessary, the
amendment was ap-
proved twenty-four to twelve, all of
the opposing senators
being Republican.93
Even in the final stages in congress
Lincoln exerted pres-
sure for its passage. When the
amendment passed in the
house and was sent to the senate, the New
York Tribune re-
ported that Lincoln had "advised
the Republicans of his state"
to support it.94 After it
barely passed the senate, the Tribune
noted the opposition of the Republican
senators, commenting
that it was known that "Mr.
Lincoln favored its passage,
though the Republicans were about
equally divided."95 Henry
Adams admitted it took "some
careful manipulation, as well
as the direct influence of the new
President" before it could
get congressional approval.96 Lincoln
gave the amendment a
final stamp of approval the day after
its passage in his
inaugural address when he said:
I understand a proposed amendment to the
Constitution-which
amendment, however, I have not seen-has
passed Congress, to the
91 Ibid., 1338-1340.
92 Ibid., 1375.
93 Ibid., 1403.
94 New York Tribune, March 2, 1861.
95 Ibid., March 5, 1861.
96 Henry Adams, "The Great Secession Winter," 683.
THE CORWIN AMENDMENT 25
effect that the Federal Government shall
never interfere with the
domestic institutions of the States,
including that of persons held
to service. To avoid misconstruction of
what I have said, I depart from
my purpose not to speak of any
particular amendments so far as to say
that, holding such a provision to now be
implied constitutional law, I
have no objection to its being made
express and irrevocable.97
The opening of hostilities interrupted
state proceedings on
the amendment, although three states
took affirmative action.
The Ohio legislature ratified it May
13, 1861, and the Mary-
land legislature approved it as late as
January 10, 1862. On
February 14, 1862, Illinois endorsed the Corwin
amendment
by state convention, but since the
joint resolution specified
state legislatures, this ratification
was not valid. Only one
other proposed amendment between the
twelfth and thirteenth
amendments came as close to becoming a
part of the constitu-
tion.98
An evaluation of the Corwin amendment
is difficult in light
of the fact that civil war broke out
regardless of compromise
attempts, thus rendering its purpose
void. Disregarding the
war, it is difficult to see what the
outcome would have been
had the amendment become a part of the
constitution, since
our thinking is so attuned to the
thirteenth amendment,
which brought about the opposite effect
of the Corwin amend-
ment. But an evaluation can be made in
terms of the seces-
sion crisis.
Even after the gulf states took
definite action to secede, the
general attitude of the North was to
let them go peacefully
or to wait for further developments.
The South had been
threatening and bluffing in this regard
for so many years
that it took time for many northerners
to realize they were
actually out of the Union and not
merely using this as a
weapon to achieve their ends.
Fortunately, some of the poli-
tical leaders in this crisis realized
the immediate, if not the
97 Abraham Lincoln, "Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861," in Commager, Docu-
ments in American History, I, 388.
98
Herman V. Ames, "The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States During the First Century
of Its History," Annual Report of the
American Historical Association (Washington, 1896), II, 22-23.
26
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
long-range, results and tried to take
steps to quarantine the
fever. If the South set up an
independent nation, and espe-
cially if war broke out, the North
would want, and need,
as many of the border states as
possible. They would have
to have the slave area surrounding the
national capital, unless
they wished to see the Confederacy
establish itself in the
capitol.
The border states, in general, had a
loyal majority, as
shown by the elections and meetings
held in those states before
April 1861 to decide on secession. But
disunion activity was
strong in all the slave states, and the
North had to counteract
this by offering more than the seceders
could. One of the
desired things they could offer was a
guarantee not to inter-
fere with slave property. This was the
principal contribution
of the Corwin amendment. As Henry Adams
contended, this
was but "one weak link in the
chain by which the border
states were to be held";99 but the
secessionists offered little
more, and they were passing laws
prohibiting the importation
of slaves from the upper South.
Lincoln and the more tolerant
Republicans were clever
enough to realize that their alleged
ultimate objective, the
complete destruction of slavery, made a
strong propaganda
weapon for disunionism. Since their
party had been founded,
and Lincoln elected, on the basic
principle of non-extension
of slavery, they could easily extend to
the slave states a guar-
antee of their property without
violating Republican prin-
ciples. It was the more radical who,
ignoring the stated
principles of the party, refused to
acknowledge what the
constitution already contained. In a
sense, it is surprising
that there were enough moderate Republicans
in this congress
to help the Democrats pass the Corwin
amendment, Demo-
cratic ranks being thinned as they were
by the secession of
the lower South. Luckily, the moderates
persevered, and in
doing so, gained precious time for the
Union. This time-
saving element was another major
contribution of Corwin's
amendment.
99 Henry Adams, "The Great
Secession Winter," 683.