Ohio History Journal

OHIO   IN  NATIONAL POLITICS, 1865-1896

By CLIFFORD H. MOORE, PH. D.,

Professor of History in Ripon College,

Ripon, Wisconsin.

CHAPTER I

SOME DETERMINING FACTORS

The sectional conflict, which ended in 1865, contrib-

uted a number of conflicting elements to the new era of

national life. Prominent was the suspicion engendered

by four years of struggle; and it persisted throughout

the period of the next generation as a barrier to a true

sense of national unity. Men easily visualized the war's

destruction of life and property. Its cruelty had left an

indelible imprint upon their memories, and the dangers

of the "post war mind," which selfish interests stood

ready to capitalize to their own ends, tended to sweep

aside better standards of judgment in matters of justice.

Through an inability to dissemble the passions of

struggle, national problems became more perplexing,

and they would have been intricate under even more

favorable circumstances.

While the passions of war clouded the future and

reduced unity to terms of military supremacy or at best

to a legal theory, another great sectional rivalry had

been temporarily eclipsed. The issue of "one nation or

(220)

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  221

two" had united the north-east and north-west in com-

mon purpose. A temporary alliance had been formed:

it was the first of importance between these sections

since states west of the Alleghanies had begun entering

the Union. Its genius was the spirit of Republicanism;

and every state in the north-west, from Ohio to the Pa-

cific coast, expressed its allegiance in terms of that par-

ty's ideals. In only five states, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri,

Oregon and California, was the Democratic party a

factor to be immediately reckoned with. These states

consequently assumed primary importance in party ma-

neuvers concerned with the issues of reconstruction and

the new era of national life: at critical times they shared

the balance of power and formed vulnerable points in

the Republican ideal of unity.

Circumstances other than that just mentioned mark

Ohio's claim to significance during the era of national

reconstruction.  Special importance is to be attached

to geographical location, the character and extent of

population and economic interests. A survey of the

period indicates that the state was in one way or another

concerned with practically all those developments which

featured national life as a whole: whether viewed from

the standpoint of interests which were purely local or in

the light of a broader relationship, the history of the

state appears as a cross-section of the new national de-

velopment.

In 1870, the largest population of any state west of

the Alleghanies was located in Ohio. The total reached

somewhat more than two and one-half millions and

was surpassed by only two eastern states, New York

and Pennsylvania; at a rough estimate one-tenth of the

222      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

national voting strength was accounted for in this con-

stituency. The process of adjusting varied social and

political interests incident to the differing antecedents

of a population drawn from older sections of the Union,

as well as a due proportion of the European influx, fa-

vored an aggressive attitude toward national as well

as state affairs. As the first product of the Northwest

Territory a habit of leadership had been assumed. His-

tory and tradition united in attributing a peculiar

genius or merit to Ohio's native stock--a sort of local

patriotism to be capitalized in advancing her sons to

places of national honor. And the first generation of

native born did represent a typical product of the ante-

cedents and influences which characterized national life

as a whole. The National Road was Mason and Dixon's

line in miniature; "People from the Southward" con-

tended with those of New England antecedents for con-

trol of state and national affairs; frontier experiences

had left their imprint and the state had long since be-

come eloquent in advancing the western cause in the

form of national issues.

Geographically, Ohio was the junction point of

the types of civilization developed in the older and in

process in the newer sections of the nation. The Ohio

River, which skirts the entire southern border of the

state, connects with the Mississippi Valley and Gulf of

Mexico. Lake Erie on the north forms the connecting

link with the Atlantic seaboard and the north-west.

These waterways in the days of primitive methods of

travel made possible the early settlement of the state by

a heterogeneous population and provided a national

highway for the exchange of products. The generous

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896      223

contributions of Ohio to the population of north-west-

ern states, the degree to which the state provided the

industrial centers of the seaboard with agricultural

products and the importance of early Ohio river com-

merce, attest the significance of this fact.¹ The census

of 1860 indicated that the state was the center of na-

tional population. Industrial interests centered to the

east and agricultural just to the west of the state's

boundaries. Thus, historically and geographically, the

state boxed the national compass and was a social and

economic pivot of national interests.

Preceding the war, Ohio was primarily identified

with  agricultural interests.    Until 1880, less than

twenty-five per cent dwelt in cities of 4,000 or greater

population. In 1870, only one city registered more than

100,000. Prosperity centered extensively in the great

excess of farm products supplied to the manufacturing

interests to the east and the plantations to the south.

By 1860, however, the agricultural frontier of the state

had passed. Progress in this line related primarily to

the introduction of greater diversity of crops and more

intensive methods of cultivation. The advent of the

industrial frontier with its factory and city life condi-

tioned a social and economic readjustment by all odds

the most significant in the history of the state. Urban

districts, although in a minority in point of population

throughout the remainder of the century, became the

1 A suggestive discussion of the social and commercial relationship of

Ohio to the Southern states is found in David Carl Shilling's Relation of

Southern Ohio to the South during the Decade preceding the Civil War,

in the Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of

Ohio, Vol. XIII, 1913, No. 1. Cf. also Atlantic Monthly, August, 1867,

(Vol. XX), pp. 229 ff.; and Vol. LXXXIV, pp. 679 ff.

224       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

dominant and decisive factor in determining the atti-

tude of the state toward national issues. With a dis-

proportionate command of the state's wealth, the power

of the press, and the intellectual and political talent of

the state, these cities finally left to the rural elements

scarcely more than a choice between essentially indus-

trial programs.

In 1870, Cleveland and Toledo vied with each other

as distributing and collecting agencies for the districts

reached by the Great Lakes. The Civil War had

checked the importance of Mississippi River navigation

and stimulated the railway and lake traffic east and

west. The great opportunity of these cities came with

the increased demand of the northwest for Ohio and

Pennsylvania coal and the bulky articles of manufac-

ture, and the opening of the iron and copper mines of

the upper lake region. Constantly increasing commerce

and ship building brought subordinate industries in

their trail. When railway traffic became sufficiently de-

veloped Cleveland was brought into direct contact with

the coal fields and iron producing centers of the nation

and was assured a well balanced and diversified indus-

try. The city's interests became ultimately identified

with the financial and industrial interests of the east.

Toledo, less fortunate in location in so far as these re-

sources were concerned, was soon outdistanced by

Cleveland, but became conspicuous in the state's politics

as a center of "isms" and third party movements.

The expansion of Cleveland enabled that city to

² Toledo was in 1878 a center of the greenback movement. It early

inclined toward socialistic programs. Sam Jones, better known as "Golden

Rule" Jones, later became mayor of the city and an inspirer of many

liberals.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896   225

share the pre-eminent political leadership held by Cin-

cinnati since the days of early statehood.  Primarily

connected with the agricultural interests of the north-

west and the border states, the latter city had the ad-

vantage of being a sort of political center of gravity--

an "Old Hunkers' Paradise" in the words of an eminent

historian.³ As the center of population and industry

shifted westward, Chicago, Kansas City and St. Louis

drew an increasing share of the type of traffic that con-

ditioned Cincinnati's earlier development. The old sec-

tional ties and a multiplicity of voting interests, how-

ever, enabled the city to continue as a strategical point

in political conflicts.

While political contests centered primarily in the

two major cities in opposite corners of the state, lesser

centers occasionally figured prominently. This fact

was, however, in its final analysis, merely one of various

devices by which party discipline was preserved. The

choice of candidates and the dictation of platforms were

frequently delegated to the lesser cities and towns as

political expediency dictated. In this way solidarity was

promoted and rank and file became conversant with

theories that were ultimately accepted as their own.

The chief medium by which the dominance of indus-

trial influence was maintained in unifying party action

and rendering it consonant with the national program

was the newspaper. Party machinery as developed in

the mid-century era functioned extensively through this

particular channel; the influence of a celebrated group

3 Cf. Shilling, loc. cit., pp. 12-18; Atlantic Monthly, August, 1867, Vol.

XX, pp. 229 ff.

Vol. XXXVII-15.

226      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

of editors was a powerful factor in articulating popular

opinion and translating it into political results. A list

of Ohio editors included men of national reputation and

influence. Foremost, perhaps, may be placed the name

of Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial. He

was not so steadfast in his Republicanism but that he

gained influence in more or less independent projects

even beyond the boundaries of the state. In circulation

and consequent numbers reached, the Cincinnati En-

quirer distanced all rivals. Its name was a household

term in great areas of the mid-west. The weekly edi-

tion probably approached 100,000. In 1873, its editor

boasted that the circulation was greater in Ohio, Indi-

ana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois and West Virginia,

than that of any paper published within those states.⁴

Under the editorship of Washington McLean until the

early seventies and later under his son, John R., the

paper frequently assumed a dictatorship of the Demo-

cratic party. Its ambition was to articulate a great sec-

tional interest, and, in pursuance of it, its editor did not

hesitate to declare Cincinnati the logical site for the

national capitol. No paper surpassed it in capitalizing

popular impulses in furtherance of political designs.

Another Cincinnati paper of extensive influence

(aside from the German press) was the Gazette, under

the bitterly partisan editorship of Richard ("Dick")

Smith. With the Commercial and the Dayton Journal

under W. D. Bickham, the Gazette shared the press

leadership of the Republican party in south-western

Ohio.

Two newspapers in Cleveland, as in Cincinnati, as-

⁴ Cincinnati Enquirer, January 1, 1873.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896           227

serted political influence in comparatively equal degree.

The Plain Dealer and Leader, Democratic and Repub-

lican organs respectively, contested their relative impor-

tance and respectability as well as the issues of the day.

Edwin Cowles made the Leader the vehicle of his recog-

nition as the "Horace Greeley of the West."                 The

Plain Dealer, at one time boasting Charles F. Browne

(Artemus Ward) as a member of its staff, was, after

1865, under the control of William D. Armstrong, the

undisputed organ of its party in Northern Ohio.

In Toledo the Blade was important primarily be-

cause of its retention of one of the best known news-

paper wits of the day--"Petroleum V. Nasby."⁵ His

letters from "Confedrit X Roads," purporting to be

those of an illiterate observer on the issues of the day,

were considered sufficiently effective thrusts at Demo-

cratic stupidity to be copied extensively by the Repub-

lican press.⁶     The Blade's nearest competitor was the

Commercial, organized by Clark and Ralph Waggoner,

formerly editors of the Blade, in 1866, as a Johnson

organ.

5 David R. Locke.

6 The following is a typical extract from the writings of a satirist

whom one must know in order to sense a significant current in national life.

It appeared during the height of the financial agitation: "G. W." orders a

barrel of whiskey and pays in the "follerin dokeyment: Confedrit X Roads,

Sept. 1, 1875. I promise to pay G. W. Bascom sixteen hundred and eighty

dollars, Jehial Perkins. 'Wats this?' askt the astonished Bascom with an

expreshun uv intense disgust usurpin the place of the smile. 'Pay for that

likker,' replied Perkins calm es a Joon mornin'. 'But this aint pay--its

your promise to pay, and you aint got time nor place fixed for payment--

you aint got no interest exprest, nor nothin. Wen do you perpose to pay

it? 'Never, G. W., never. Under the noo dispensashen, promises to pay is

money. All you want is faith. So long as you beleeve that that paper is

money, what do you want of money? With faith enuff that paper is money

. . . . . .'" Cleveland Leader, September 18, 1875.

228      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

The location of the official party organs was natu-

rally Columbus. The Ohio State Journal edited by Gen-

eral Comly met the needs of the Republicans, while at

different times the Statesman, the Democrat and the

Times gave aspiring Democrats good services.

Several news sheets other than those mentioned de-

serve recognition as educative agencies. The Crisis of

Columbus, commonly regarded as the "Copperhead"

organ during and immediately after the war, the Co-

lumbus Dispatch, "a skim milk independent," the

Springfield Republican, the Cleveland Herald and the

Dayton Democrat, appear among the better known

prints.

With slight exceptions, no change in the physical

make-up of Ohio newspapers was apparent between

1860 and 1880. They usually consisted of four pages

of news, essays on freaks and freakish events, editorials

and catechisms on political issues. In October, 1880, the

Cleveland Leader first advanced the campaign issues by

a page of crude cartoons. From that period, owing to

the development of advertising, dated also the tendency

to multiply pages and to feature a wider range of infor-

mation.

As magazines advanced in significance and news-

paper editing became a complex function, the impor-

tance of a dominating personality vanished. Through

the period of transition, however, a great readjustment

in American life was taking place. With it came the

necessity for the realignment of parties in keeping with

the new era. From the issues of the war to those of a

new age, an intensive educational campaign was neces-

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  229

sary. In this capacity newspapers and their editors

wielded an extensive influence.

Important as newspapers were as political agencies,

they may be regarded as first only in a series of factors

incident to elaborate political machinery made possible

by industrial agencies. Closely connected with the daily

press and tending to overshadow it during the later

years of the century, was the development of party ma-

chinery designed to reinforce regularity wherever weak-

ness manifested itself or critical interests demanded.

Owing to close contests between the two dominant par-

ties, the modern political machine became a conspicuous

factor in the state's politics at a comparatively early

period. In fact, various modern practices and devices

may be said to have developed extensively within Ohio

as the result of a series of critical contests.

One must not gather, however, that parties were

without their ideals. In fact, a great measure of solidar-

ity rested upon the assumption that certain broad princi-

ples and ideals continuously permeated the party struc-

ture. Certain antecedent practices and creeds formed

party ties as binding as those of national patriotism. At

all times political leaders used the appeal of loyalty as the

surest device for promoting solidarity. The persistence

with which men commonly followed the party of their

choice is reflected in the similarity of election returns

from one canvass to another. A brief survey of the sit-

uation as it stood in 1865 will illustrate the extent to

which party alignment had been crystallized and the

degree to which sectional influences persisted.

The Connecticut Reserve, consisting of the counties

in the north-eastern part of the state and settled almost

230      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

entirely by New Englanders, was Unionist and Repub-

lican by an overwhelming majority. The Ohio Com-

pany's purchase, consisting approximately of Washing-

ton, Athens, Meigs and Gallia Counties, was also settled

primarily by New Englanders and next to the Reserve

was noted as a Unionist and Republican stronghold. In

the south-western part of the state, from Delaware

County on the north to Montgomery and Warren

Counties on the south, extended another tier of consist-

ently Republican counties--a monument to the Whig

dictatorship of Thomas Corwin. With few exceptions,

the rest of the state, owing to an admixture of Scotch-

Irish, Germans and those of Southern antecedents, was

debatable territory. The counties of Monroe, Fairfield,

Holmes, Auglaize and Mercer were inclined to be as

staunchly Democratic as the Reserve was Republican.⁷

The issues of the war had fixed this alignment quite

definitely. It persisted with comparative regularity sev-

eral years after the original issues had lost their signifi-

cance. In no other northern state had party strife been

more bitter during the Civil War period. The contest

for governor in 1863 had made party ties practically the

acid test between loyalty and treason. The Democratic

party had become, in the judgment of many, synonymous

with "rebel" and "Copperhead." Others viewed the Re-

publican party as a revival of French Jacobinism seek-

ing to eradicate the last vestiges of respectable society

as established by the Constitution. This comparative

7 For the sources of Ohio's population see Chaddock, Ohio before 1850;

Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol.

XXXI; also Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period, in the

same series of Studies, Vol. XL.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  231

rigidity of party lines was a basic factor in determining

processes by which political ends were achieved.

The same factors conditioning the alignment of vot-

ers produced political leaders of a similar type. Fully

conscious of the prestige implied by commanding this

aggressive constituency, men of varying types maneuv-

ered for success in politics. Within their ranks were

those who had in youth experienced the hardships of the

crude agricultural life of the frontier.  Shirt-sleeves

and "galluses" had been the common badge of self-

reliance and democracy. A vision of success in business

or law led them to broader fields of enterprise. An age

characterized by its legalistic faith looked primarily to

the law to develop men well qualified to draw up rules

for the safe-keeping of society. Political eminence was

therefore the best tested criterion of a successful career

and offered its appeal accordingly.

The importance of the various factors enumerated

varied from one period to another. In general, how-

ever, each of those indicated suggests the basis of Ohio's

conspicuous position in national life and politics for a

number of years following the war. The period was

one in which politics and business were of primary con-

cern. The State, through a close identity with the chief

current of national life, gained political distinction as

an offensive outpost of an expanding industrialism and

a defensive stronghold of a capitulating agrarianism.

232      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

CHAPTER II

POLITICS AND THE WAR ISSUES

The three years following immediately upon the

close of the war were characterized politically by issues

directly connected with Reconstruction  Events so

shaped themselves that negro suffrage was ultimately

faced as a direct issue and practically eliminated from

the political realm. Problems connected with the status

of seceded states projected beyond this period and ap-

peared under various guises in connection with issues

only remotely connected with the war and primarily re-

lated to the newer era. Each party, therefore, passed

through a critical stage of readaptation to the new situ-

ation.

The campaign for governor in 1865 and the congres-

sional campaign of the year following may be character-

ized as preliminary sparring matches with each party

maneuvering for advantage. The issue upon which the

Union party had rested was eliminated by the collapse

of the Confederate cause. Since the opening of hostili-

ties between North and South in 1861, the preservation

of the Union was the single bond that held together for-

mer Whigs, Abolitionists, Know-nothings, Free Soilers,

and Anti-Slavery Democrats. When that issue was

closed, former prejudices threatened to assert them-

selves with disruption of the party as an imminent con-

sequence; and many politicians were thoroughly aware

that the end of the war carried threats of ending like-

wise their political careers.

The fortunes of the Peace Democracy, on the other

hand, were conditioned by factors scarcely less promis-

ing. In time of war the peace idea is popular and that

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  233

alone gave the Democratic party an advantage. Its

factions ranged from avowed nullifiers and secessionists

to those who, though professing loyalty to Union prin-

ciples, held that the war was not a necessary program

for perpetuating the Union. Its dilemma was similar

to that of the Unionists. From a practical standpoint

it faced the problem of keeping its factions as nearly

intact as possible while constructing a program which

should win over factions, especially those of Democratic

antecedents, attached to the opposite camp. Owing to

the embarrassment of the Unionists on the immediate

issues of reconstruction, Democratic attempts met with

partial success. The moral and social tone of the nation

was such, however, that a general demoralization of the

party long persisted as a heritage of its war record . its

success at best could be only partial or as a result of a

temporary protest against certain phases of the Unionist

policy.

Developments of the summer of 1865 appeared alto-

gether favorable to the plans of the party which had

been more than four years in opposition and without

office. The threatening break between President John-

son and the Radicals regarding the program of recon-

struction threatened to shatter completely the fragile

bond by which the party had maintained its unity. In

many communities, especially those regarded as debat-

able political territory, party differences were slight; a

radical attitude toward restoration of the South or in

the direction of negro suffrage carried the possibilities

of a disastrous defection. In the Reserve an equally

disastrous defection awaited any program that suggested

other than a radical or vindictive attitude.

234        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

The dilemma of the Unionists is illustrated by the

difficulties encountered by two of the party's exponents

--Senator Wade and General J. D. Cox. The former

had risen on the high tide of the anti-slavery issue, and

as a leader of the Radical group became apprehensive

of the development in Washington which threatened to

consign "the great Union or Republican party bound

hand and foot to the tender mercies of the rebels * * *

and their Copperhead allies of the North." The course

which he later pursued in hurling campaign invective

upon the Democracy as not only "dead but damned

through the sin of treason" contributed to the destruc-

tion of whatever availability he had formerly possessed.²

His political martyrdom came through an erroneous

faith in Ohio's love for the negro.³

General Cox, on the other hand, narrowly escaped

sacrificing his political future on the opposite horn of

the dilemma. Unlike Wade, he was not temperamentally

vindictive in attitude and was consequently strongly in-

clined to debate the possible tyranny of majorities as

1 Porter, op. cit., p. 209.

2 Referring to a speech delivered by Wade at Marietta, Thomas

Ewing, Sr., wrote: "He spoke it in eight or ten of the southern counties.

In Gallia, he brought down the Republican majority 1017 -- in Washington

about 700 and it had a like effect in Scioto, Lawrence, Meigs and Athens.

If he had stumped the state, the Democratic ticket would have prevailed

by 30,000." Ewing MSS., October 16, 1867.

3 The Cincinnati Commercial, November 6, 1867, reported the follow-

ing interview: "I had no idea that there were so many Republicans in

Ohio who were willing to see negro suffrage in the South, but wouldn't let

the few niggers of Ohio vote. That's what got me. They all seemed to

be in favor of it as a measure of reconstruction just as much as I was.

I didn't dream they'd be mean enough to vote against it here."

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896       235

against the rights of minorities.⁴ The Unionists in an-

ticipation of the Election of 1865 had nominated him as

their candidate for governor. His availability centered

in his war record and Oberlin training--a tacit guaran-

tee to the Reserve that their ideals were respected.⁵ The

party platform endorsed the policy of the President as

looking to the "restoration of peace and civil order in

the so-called seceded states". An endorsement of the

Declaration of Independence (often a device for meet-

ing a political impasse) was procured as a compromise

on the problem of the negro. The Unionists as a whole

for the sake of solidarity evaded the endorsement of

more tangible principles.

On July 24th, however, General Cox threw his party

into confusion. In response to an inquiry from a com-

mittee of colored students at Oberlin, he was compelled

to declare his program regarding negro suffrage. He

explained at some length his conviction that a com-

munity of blacks and whites in the South was an absolute

impossibility. He further elaborated a scheme for or-

ganizing the freedmen into communities in the South

under the territories. The response to this incident was

immediate. "Politics run wild in Ohio," wrote a corre-

spondent to Chase. "Cox, your old friend, seems to have

fallen into the arms of the Conservatives and to have

ignored the former teachings of Oberlin."⁶ The Dem-

4 Cox, subsequently, in his inaugural, warned against a "hard peace":

"A victorious majority, flushed with its triumph, finds it easy to forget the

rights of minorities, and it remains for us to prove whether in our day the

old cry of 'Woe to the conquered' may be silenced by a truly republican

determination to administer the government for the real advantage of all--

of the defeated rebels as well as of the loyal victors."

5 Cox's wife was a daughter of President Finney, of Oberlin.

6 Porter, op. cit., p. 218, footnote.

236      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

ocratic and Radical press united in declaring the letter

an apostasy of Unionist principles. "It is a painful con-

fession," declared the Crisis, "drawn from a devotee

that the faith which he preferred, the ideas he imbibed,

and the principles he has cherished from his youth have

proved when put to the final test chimeras, falsehoods,

failures, frauds, and humbugs."⁷ The Democrats thus

had cause for optimism when their convention met at

Columbus on August 24.

In the hope of a radical defection and with the pur-

pose of making effective overtures to the Conservatives,

the Democratic Convention declared for the doctrine of

States' Rights as announced in the Virginia and Ken-

tucky Resolutions.⁸ The so-called seceded states were

declared to be still in the Union and therefore entitled

to all the reserved rights of the states. The program

for negro suffrage was held as "an insidious attempt to

overthrow popular institutions by bringing the right

to vote into disgrace." The Convention further resolved

to stand by President Johnson in all Constitutional ef-

forts to restore immediately to the states the exercise

of their rights and powers under the Constitution. The

military record of General George W. Morgan com-

mended him as the candidate for governor.

Despite a defection of 65,000 Unionist votes, Gen-

eral Cox carried the election by a majority of 30,000.

The Unionist candidate's program was side-stepped in

Radical areas during the campaign as merely the pecu-

liar ideas of an individual--an opportunity which Gen-

7 Crisis, August 9, 1865.

8 Cf. Porter, op. cit., p. 214.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896   237

eral Cox had safeguarded in his Oberlin letter.⁹ The

Unionists maintained control of the state and an ex-

tension of time in which to square public opinion and a

program.

For another year Unionist leaders were forced to

maneuver in an atmosphere of indefinite popular opin-

ion. Successive attempts were made to endorse the pro-

gram of the President or Congress. While certain Con-

servatives turned to the Democrats, others hesitated in

doubt as to the direction in which the path of political

wisdom lay. In the Congressional campaign and that

for state officers in 1866, party unity was in large

measure preserved by pleading that no real difference

existed between Congressional and Presidential pro-

grams. The only real difference, it was maintained,

was in the manner of imposing terms.

Meanwhile, the Democrats capitalized the Unionist

dilemma by encouraging the cooperation of the Johnson

sympathizers. Their convention of 1866 was primarily

designed for this purpose. In the National Union Club

Convention, held at Philadelphia in August of the same

year, the party shared its representation with Johnson

sympathizers, although it first assured itself that it had

not for its object "the disbanding of the Democratic

party and merging it into a new organization." The

fiasco of the campaign during the following October,

coupled with a fear on the part of regular party leaders

that the policy of cooperation implied a certain danger

9 He had declared: "If other views than mine prevail, I shall hold it

my duty to act cheerfully and promptly with the body of loyal men, believ-

ing that the best solution which they can give will be the best obtainable

and that to divide from them will be to deliver the government into the

hands of its enemies." Crisis, August 9, 1867.

238      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

to their individual interests, brought a change of tactics.

The election impending for the following year loomed

as especially significant to the interest of both parties

and their leaders. Besides the governorship, a legisla-

ture which should choose Senator Wade's successor was

at stake. The campaign would naturally bear a signifi-

cant relation to the Presidential campaign impending a

year later. With a view to reaping the full benefit of

the apparently hopeless situation between the Presi-

dent and Congress, three leaders consistently identified

with the Democratic party proceeded to take the situa-

tion in hand.

Prominent above all others was Clement L. Vallan-

digham. His name had become synonymous with "Cop-

perhead" Democracy as a result of his banishment from

the state and subsequent candidacy for the governorship

in 1863. Gifted with a commanding personality and the

power to appeal to the masses, he had intrenched him-

self as an undoubted hero in the estimate of thousands

of his constituents. His convictions led him into an

aggressive attitude dictated in great measure by an hon-

est and fearless nature. He was thus an asset and a

liability to the Democracy as it attempted to extricate

itself from the dilemma of the Civil War period. The

Unionists made him the victim of their propaganda; he

was himself an issue--"a millstone on the necks of the

Democracy"; many of his party associates stood ready

to read him from the party councils. Owing to his

tenacity he remained a factor to be reckoned with until

his untimely death in 1871.10

10 For highly favorable estimates of Vallandigham see Ohio Archaeo-

logical and Historical Publications, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 266 ff., and Cox

Three Decades of Federal Legislation, pp. 80-85.

240       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

Bandanna," as he was popularly called, the third of the

group, was of Virginia birth, a thorough party man

with convictions as to the political justice of his party's

ideals. He was a constitutional lawyer of recognized

ability. His peculiar manner enlisted confidence though

it seldom aroused enthusiasm. He was, nevertheless, a

striking figure, and later was to voice a powerful protest

against measures of questionable constitutionality that

were forced rough-shod through the national legisla-

ture. "Ernest, outspoken, and free in his criticisms of

men and manners, he would wave his red bandanna

handkerchief like a guidon, give his nose a trumpet

blast, take a fresh pinch of snuff, and dash into a debate,

dealing rough blows and scattering the carefully pre-

pared arguments of his adversaries like chaff."¹¹ On

the stump he was effective, though, like Senator

Sherman, he failed to attract men by personal magnet-

ism. Much of the popular strength of both men cen-

tered in that type of venerability which tends to crystal-

lize about those long in public life.

January 8, 1867, St. Jackson's or St. Hickory's Day

in the calendar of loyal Democrats, was a logical time

to restore the party to its original principles. The Dem-

ocratic triumvirate made an advanced division of the

party spoils. Thurman was to be the candidate for gov-

ernor; Vallandigham, in case of a Democratic legisla-

ture, was to succeed Wade in the Senate; Pendleton

should receive the party endorsement for the Presiden-

11 Poor's characterization continues: "When he sat down, he would

signal to a Republican friend and they would leave the Senate chamber by

different doors and meet in a committee room, where there was a supply

of old Bourbon whiskey." Poor, Reminiscences, Vol. II.

242      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

Hayes. The Oberlin letter and the fact that General

Cox had eulogized President Johnson in 1866, combined

to make him unavailable. As a Representative in Con-

gress, General Hayes had followed the Radicals but had

evinced no great enthusiasm for the cause. The plat-

form endorsed the proposed amendment ot the Constitu-

tion enfranchising the negro, and the reconstruction

measures of Congress.

The campaign centered primarily in the issue of

negro enfranchisement. The Unionists had successfully

side-stepped that issue in 1865 and although the "Visible

Admixture" law, and the last of the Ohio "Black Code"

had been repealed, the Radicals had succeeded in bring-

ing the issue before the voters in a proposed amendment

which provided that "white" be stricken from that

clause in the Constitution which described the qualifica-

tions for suffrage.

The contest was second in intensity and national in-

terest only to that of 1865. The State Legislature had

in a blundering manner given an added issue. In fram-

ing the negro suffrage amendment the preceding Febru-

ary, Conservatives in the House had sought to gain for

it an added popularity by disfranchising as many Peace

Democrats as possible. An amendment to the Senate

bill disfranchised those who had "borne arms in support

of any insurrection or rebellion against the Government

of the United States, or have fled from their places of

residence to avoid being drafted into the military serv-

ices thereof, or have deserted the military service of

said government in time of war and have not subse-

quently been honorably discharged from the same."

When it was discovered that about one-fourth of the

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  243

total deserters credited to Ohio had left the army after

Lee's surrender in order to escape services on the Mex-

ican border or on the Indian frontier, attempts were

made to secure from the Federal Government honorable

discharges for all who had left after April 15, 1865.

Not until July, through the services of J. M. Ashley, a

representative from the Toledo district, did a bill pass

Congress which removed the ban of desertion.

The campaign threw the Unionists on the defensive,

although they countered by resurrecting the war records

of their opponents. General Hayes pleaded the cause

of the negro and attempted to convince his audiences that

slavery and rebellion were convertible and union and

liberty inseparable terms. Thurman pleaded the consti-

tutional case of the Democracy and declared that for

six years the Unionists had unnecessarily prolonged the

war by shamelessly and needlessly trampling the Con-

stitution under foot. Intellect and passion were ap-

pealed to in opposition to the proposed enfranchisement

of the negro-the proposition to confer the vote upon

"7,000 or 8,000 negroes while taking it away from two

or three times as many white soldiers." Wagons filled

with girls dressed in white and bearing banners in-

scribed "Fathers, save us from negro equality" featured

Democratic processions. Inscriptions of Republican

banners read: "Honest Black men are preferable to

white traitors"; "Democrats murdered our President";

"If any man pull down the American flag, give him a

Post Office--A. Johnson."¹³

The campaign result was a virtual victory for the

Democracy. The total vote indicated an increase of

13 Toledo Blade, September 23, 1867.

244      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

67,000 over the election of 1865 with a bare majority

of less than 3,000 for General Hayes. Twelve thousand

fewer votes were cast on the Amendment than for the

governor, with a direct majority of 38,000 against it.¹⁴

The Democrats procured control of both houses of the

Legislature and the assurance of naming the successor

to Wade in the United States Senate.

The result of the war issues apparently placed the

Democracy on a competitive basis with the Unionists.

Their voting strength had been steadily recruited since

the disastrous election of 1863 when they had been de-

feated by a majority of 100,000. The impending Presi-

dential campaign extended a reasonable hope of success

to the minority party providing its program was di-

rected with reasonable tact and foresight. A new turn

in popular interests extended an apparent opportunity

for Democratic leaders to identify their party with a

program that would at least partially relieve it from the

popular prejudice revealed by the recent campaigns.

The issue born of this new popular interest became sig-

nificant in the Presidential campaign of 1868.

*  *  *  *   *

A natural consequence of the issues of the Civil War

was a distraction of popular attention from economic

and social interests which were not directly con-

nected with that event.  The North-west in general

passed through a stage of expansion and prosperity

while serving as an important agency in procuring the

subjection of the South. The demands of the war for

food and men eliminated all possibilities of "hard

14 The term "white" remained in the Ohio Constitution until the adop-

tion of a new instrument in 1912.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  245

times" connected with over-production and unemploy-

ment. Ohio had profited greatly from this favorable

situation.  During the war and for a period of two

years following, prosperity was the common topic of

newspapers and official reports. The state debt de-

creased rapidly and reports visioned its entire efface-

ment within a very short period. In 1865, the per capita

indebtedness was somewhat less than one-half that of

1844.15 Thanks in part to cheap money, the mortgage

debt was estimated to have been reduced by somewhat

less than $17,000,000, or about one-third the total, be-

tween 1859 and 1863; state bank deposits more than

doubled between 1860 and 1863.16 But great as the

general satisfaction was with this situation, many

pointed to the even greater possibilities of the future.

The report of the State Auditor in 1865 was typical of

the prevailing optimism: "With a rigid adherence to

economy, the proper amendments of the tax laws, and

the steady and intelligent enforcement of a just and

equal taxation, the public debt will disappear in seven

years, and the state levy sink down to one mill on the

dollar. Then, with the rate of interest properly ad-

justed, capital will flow into the State, manufactories

will spring up and population and wealth augment in a

ratio hitherto scarcely dreamed of."¹⁷

Definite programs by which industrial interests

should be advanced took various forms. The general

idea was that greater freedom was to be advanced to

those interests directly concerned, especially in so far as

15 Annual Cyc., 1865, pp. 683 ff.

16 Annual Cyc., 1863, pp. 731-732.

17 Annual Cyc., 1865, p. 684.

246      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

it related to finances. That industrial interests were

awakening to the new issues, was indicated in the gen-

eral demand for the removal of barriers that had been

erected primarily for agricultural interests. Business

interests of Toledo and Cincinnati petitioned the Legis-

lature either for the removal of the six per cent interest

maximum or its increase to from seven to ten per

cent "to keep money from New York and the far

West."18 The Toledo Blade early in 1867 declared that

"traffic in money should be as free as that in corn."¹⁹ In

December of the same year the National Convention of

Manufacturers met in Cleveland to declare a construct-

ive program for the advancement of their own interest

and to identify it with the large realm of national in-

terest. It placed itself upon record as opposed to any

scheme for the rapid reduction of the National debt as

"fraught with danger." A memorial addressed to the

Senate and House of Representatives read in part as

follows:

"Labor increased our wealth from $7,135,780.228

in 1850 to $16,159,616,068 in 1860. The same ratio,

making an allowance of $4,520,732,313 for the wastes

of war, will increase the national wealth to $32,000,-

000,000 in 1870. In comparison with this, our national

debt which by the Secretary's last report was $2,511,-

800,013.33, will be neither an embarrassment nor a

terror.

"Wise legislation that will protect well our industrial

interests and give permanency and stability to all gov-

ernmental affairs, will greatly increase the power of

18 Toledo Blade, November 20, 1867.

19 Ibid., February 26, 1867.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  247

labor in our midst, which, when relieved of excessive

taxation, will soon make us the most prosperous and in-

dependent nation on earth."²⁰ Ohio newspapers echoed

the advantages of industrial interests over agricultural

as a medium of advancing national welfare. The Blade

called attention to the returns of English industrial cap-

ital at 120 per cent as compared with a return of only 13

per cent on capital invested in agriculture.²¹ It was in-

deed a radical program from the standpoint of Jeffer-

sonian or Jacksonian economy toward which the indus-

trialists were driving and being driven.

Before the election of 1867 had closed, popular at-

tention was being centered more and more in the direc-

tion of the national debt and financial measures in re-

lation to the advancement of material interests. Bond

issues and the National Bank had been designed pri-

marily as devices by which financial support had been

procured for prosecuting the war. These instruments

of finance had in turn largely relieved property interests

from direct taxation and provided the basis of inflation

which had too frequently augmented private credit in

spite of a wealth-consuming war. Finances, then,

formed the chief issue about which the problems of the

new industrial age revolved.  A brief survey of the

factors concerned will make clear the character of the

struggle as it unfolded itself.

The function of money and credit ever tended to be-

come more complicated and important as the industrial

age advanced. In the various forms of its relationship

to economic life it was open to numerous and puzzling

²⁰ Ohio State Journal, January 3, 1868.

²¹ Toledo Blade, January 3, 1867.

248      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

intellectual slants. In this and subsequent crises

through which the struggle passed, many phases and

combinations of phases of the subject were emphasized.

A popular conception, for example, held it to be a lubri-

cant for industrial machinery--an accelerator which by

expansion could speed up a period of economic depres-

sion. On one point only was practical unanimity evi-

dent. This was in the general acceptance of the idea

that financial expansion or credit must keep pace with

the increase of wealth and population. It was in the

program by which this fact was to be accomplished that

differences existed.  Industrial and banking interests

characterized their program as the "sound money doc-

trine" and realized profit and security in the concessions

of the National Bank Act--security especially from

Congress, which in determining the needs of industry

might "mistake its own pulse for that of the nation."

"Sound money doctrine" advocated sound money in so

far as it discountenanced the issuance of credit certifi-

cates in any form on the part of the government. By

the quantity theory of value, banking credits stood in

the way of being depreciated by any such action.

The "greenback movement," actuated as it was by

debtor classes who viewed any increase in the denom-

inator of values as a source of relief from their obliga-

tions, nevertheless carried within itself an opposing

theory of justice. By its opponents the program was

caricatured as a "soft money craze"--any scheme of

government credit circulation other than that of

coin worth its intrinsic value was open to the criti-

cism  "soft money."²²  Programs for securing such

22 Government indebtedness in the form of bonds which secured bank-

ing circulation was on the other hand consistent with the banking program.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  249

credits varied among proponents of the general

scheme. Some held that the mere fiat of the govern-

ment was sufficient security, especially since the gov-

ernment had sovereign authority through its taxing

power over all national wealth.²³ "Print" was held to

be etymologically the same as coin--hence the scheme

was constitutional. Others advocated securing govern-

ment credit by making issues of certificates interchange-

able with bonds, the value regulated by an interest rate

payable in coin--a system "free from the manipulations

of both banks and Congress and in the hands of the

people where it belongs." Another commonly advanced

view held that a coin reserve was necessary to stabilize

such government credit. All these schemes, however,

possessed a common unity in their declared warfare

against the perpetuation of the national debt, and bank-

ing associations which "drew interest on their indebted-

ness and practiced extortion upon the people": "The

right to coin and issue money is a function of the gov-

ernment and can no more with safety be delegated to

private individuals than we could afford to delegate to

private individuals the power to make penal statutes or

levy taxes." In its broader aspects the "needs of indus-

try and commerce" were to be the standard of finance

rather than metallic value or the criterion of banking

interests, and whether "sound" or not the program was

a phase of that popular struggle which had as its object

the control of economic agencies which were soon to

demonstrate a power and magnitude that completely

overshadowed that of the government itself.

23 The number embracing this scheme was comparatively small.

250       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

Various interests of the past designated Ohio as an

area in which the issue possessed paramount interest.

With Kentucky, the state had attacked the Second bank

of the United States when it forced their banks to pay

their debts. A latent suspicion of Eastern methods of

finance was an abiding legacy from the days when An-

drew Jackson counted Ohio a dependable supporter in

his war upon the "monster."²⁴ Success appeared cer-

tain, therefore, when the Cincinnati Enquirer and Pen-

dleton advanced a scheme of finance which possessed an

apparently double virtue--first, relief from embarrass-

ing taxes occasioned by the war debt and, second, the

necessary expansion of credit to meet agricultural needs

and industrial development.

The program was to be realized by demanding the

payment of bonds in certificates issued upon the credit

of the United States in all cases in which gold was not

specified. The issuance of non-interest-bearing certifi-

cates in payment of bonds made possible, according to

the advocates of the scheme, a short cut to the payment

of the debt and a consequent lowering of taxation. By

making the certificates legal tender in the payment of

taxes and debts, it was claimed that a quick return to

specie payments was automatically assured and an ex-

pansion of credit created to meet the advancement of

economic interests. On the theory that "there should be

24 Ohio Democratic leaders persisted in identifying their party with

their sectional interests. A "toast" at a Jackson Day banquet in 1867 is

illustrative: "The North-west--not hewers of wood or drawers of water

for New England monopolists ought the North-west to be. Woe to her

representatives who aid the cormorants to devour her substance and im-

poverish her people by high tariff, unequal taxation and the creation of

unnecessary debt." Cincinnati Enquirer, January 9, 1867.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  251

no divided sovereignty in providing the people with

their currency," the scheme looked to the elimination of

the national banking system as well as the payment of

the national debt. "Eliminate the National Bank notes

and there will be no undue inflation of the currency"

was the answer to the indictment of opponents.

After the issue had been drawn and had become a

more or less Democratic dogma, the "sound money" ad-

vocates ridiculed that party for having turned a com-

plete somersault since 1863 when they had so radically

opposed the issue of fiat money. For example, no one

had been more radical in opposition to fiat money during

the war than Pendleton. He was likewise represented

as an apostate from the Jacksonian Democratic tradi-

tion of specie as against credit money. Accepting the

program of credit circulation, however, as an estab-

lished fact, Pendleton could claim consistency in advo-

cating a national currency as against the national bank

currency. Good legal opinion declared that no contract

was violated since bondholders should receive as good

currency as they had given in exchange for the bonds.²⁵

The general program for a national currency as out-

lined gained wide circulation during the latter months

of 1867 and became familiar as the "Ohio Idea." The

immediate popularity of the scheme in the face of a

slackening "war prosperity" was evident.  The En-

quirer congratulated itself repeatedly as the pioneer of

the movement. Party lines threatened to dissolve in

behalf of the new issue.  Newspaper editors of both

25 A manuscript in the Thomas Ewing papers written by Ewing shortly

before his death is one of the ablest defenses of the Pendleton program

available.

252      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

parties attached no political importance to the program

and only quibbled as to differences. The Blade, for ex-

ample, in its remonstrance against McCulloch's contrac-

tion of the greenbacks, declared that its own program of

inflation demanded only a sprinkle whereas the Enquirer

was demanding a flood.

Congress immediately reflected the effect of the new

popular pressure and political expediency demanded im-

mediate action. Sherman was especially active in evol-

ving a program which would square his party with the

rising tide. The editor of the Cleveland Leader ad-

vised him repeatedly of the necessity for immediate ac-

tion. Under date of February 20, 1868, he wrote:

"The reason why I advocate an early resumption is to

prevent the Copperheads from carrying the next Presi-

dential election. I will say confidentially that in the cry

now being raised by the Copperhead Demagogues of

'Gold for the Bondholders and Greenbacks for the la-

borers' I see the defeat of the Union party next fall

which even the military prestige of Grant cannot pre-

vent." "No doubt you should do something with the

National Banks," urged another prominent adviser.

"They are simply grand swindling shops under the Na-

tional Flag.^"26

Sherman launched his program and frankly de-

fended it out of deference to popular demands. Febru-

ary 4, 1868, an act passed the President's veto which

forbade any further reduction of the currency and au-

thorized the replacement of "mutilated notes." By this

act the minimum limit of legal-tender notes was fixed

at $356,000,000--the volume then afloat after McCul-

26 T. J. McLain to Sherman, December 18, 1867. Sherman MSS.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  253

loch's policy had done its work. Senator Sherman, in

advocating the measure, declared that it was entirely

preliminary to other legislation "which must include

the banking system, the time and manner of resuming

specie payment, the payment of the debt and the kind

of money in which it can be paid, and the reduction of

expenditures and taxation."²⁷

His program was professed in the interests of public

justice and with due deference to the government's obli-

gations to national interests. His conclusions in regard

to the subject had been reached against the earnest ar-

guments of personal and political friends, and against

his own "personal and pecuniary interests."²⁸  This

speech, in view of the fundamental change in attitude

which party allegiance was to encompass on the part

of Sherman and many of his associates, is particularly

significant. Few men of opposing political attachments

formulated the social and economic issue in broader

terms. The political exigency first received emphasis:

"I might show you by the resolutions of political parties,

both Republican and Democratic, that we cannot avoid

or evade this issue. We must meet it. I have here the

resolutions of both political parties in the state of In-

diana, both declaring that these bonds ought to be paid

in greenbacks and differing only as to the limit of green-

backs. I have also resolutions adopted in different parts

of the country. The tendency of the Democratic party is

to drift into a political declaration that these bonds shall

be paid in greenbacks; and great masses of patriotic

men all over the country of the political faith to which

27 Congressional Globe, January 9, 1868, p. 408.

28 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., part V, Appendix, p. 188.

254      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

the majority of the Senate belong have come to the same

conclusion. We are, therefore, compelled to consider

the question. It will be made the basis of every election

next fall in nearly all the north-western States. No

man can be elected to Congress unless he commits him-

self for or against this proposition."29 By all means

the government was bound to express its good faith by

backing the notes with as good credit as that which

stood behind the bonds: "I say that equity and justice

are amply satisfied if we redeem these bonds at the end

of five years in the same kind of money, of the same in-

trinsic value it bore at the time they were issued. Gen-

tlemen may reason about this matter over and over

again, and they cannot come to any other conclusion; at

least, that has been my conclusion after the most careful

consideration. Senators are sometimes in the habit, in

order to defeat the argument of an antagonist, of say-

ing that this is repudiation. Why, sir, every citizen of

the United States has conformed his business to the

legal-tender clause. He has collected and paid his debts

accordingly. Every state in the Union, without excep-

tion, has made its contracts since the legal-tender clause

in currency and paid them in currency."30 * * *

"There is a wide discrimination made between the bond-

holder and the noteholder, which gives rise to popular

clamor and is the cause of a great deal of just complaint.

In 1863, we were compelled for wise purposes to take

away the right of the holder of the greenback to fund

it, because we wished then to force our loans upon the

market; and while that right was outstanding we could

29 Ibid., p. 181 ff.

30 Ibid., p. 184.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  255

not do it. Now that the war is over, that the whole

process of funding is intended to be voluntary at the

discretion of the noteholder, we ought promptly to re-

store this right to allow the note to be converted at any

time into some kind of bond; and we propose also to

allow the bond to be converted into notes keeping within

the limit of notes fixed by law. Then there is no dis-

crimination; the bondholder and the noteholder are

both public creditors; both depend upon public faith.

The noteholder may go to the Treasury of the United

States and demand his bond; the bondholder may go

also and demand his note. They are put on a basis of

equality. This destroys all speculation in government

securities. Both will then stand on the same footing,

and both will be of equal value. The noteholder may at

his option draw interest in gold by converting it into

bonds, and the popular cry of demagogues that we have

provided gold for the bondholder and notes for the peo-

ple will be silent."31  * * * The peroration identified

the policy with an ideal of social justice that has ever

animated men of altruistic mold since property holding

became a recognized privilege.

"Senators often tell us that we must not be influ-

enced by public discontent or clamor. I agree with this

when the discontent is not founded upon substantial

equity, but when it is founded upon equity it will make

itself felt through you or over you. And Senators must

remember that this is a government of the people, for

the people and by the people. It is not like the Govern-

ment of Great Britain, a despotic oligarchy, where the

rights of property override the rights of persons; where

31 Ibid., pp. 187-188.

256       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

the laws are made to add to the accumulations of the

rich, though hundreds of thousands may thereby be

pinched with poverty. That is the land of entails, where

the offices of the church are bought and sold as property,

and where all that is good in life--office, honor, prop-

erty--is confined to less than one-tenth of the popula-

tion--where the laws are studiously formed to exclude

the poor from all political rights. We borrow from

these people of kindred blood many of the best guards

of liberty, but we must take care not to engraft on our

republican system the leading feature of their present

government, the supremacy of property over labor.

* * * To encourage, maintain, and reward labor

must be the principal object of our legislation. Capital

can take care of itself. It has many advantages in com-

petition with labor. It may be idle--labor cannot be.

* * * No privilege should be granted to the bond-

holder that is not granted to the noteholder. Both are

public securities, and both, and equally, can appeal to

the public faith. No privilege should be granted to the

bondholder unless it is compensated for by some advan-

tage reserved by the Government, and the whole public

debt should be made to assume such form that it may

be a part of the circulating capital of the country bear-

ing as low a rate of interest as practicable, and with

only such exemptions as will maintain it at par with

gold."32

Here indeed, was an issue, irrespective of the rela-

32 Ibid., pp. 188-189. Under date of March 9, 1868, Joseph Medill of

the Chicago Tribune wrote to Sherman as follows: ". . . You have demon-

strated unanswerably to my mind that while we must not water the c'y,

yet the bondholders cannot require any better money than greenbacks for

the principal of their debt. .  . ." Sherman MSS.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896           257

tive merits of the conflicting financial ideas, worthy of

the best mettle of statesmanship.³³ The national fiscal

policy thenceforth became the important pivot of the

new era. It carried important social as well as eco-

nomic implications and threatened the unity of the new

nation much as it had that of the British Empire in

1776. Was the West ready to join the bankrupt South

in overthrowing the program of industrial finance, as it

had joined the East in overthrowing the agricultural

system of the South? Apparently Ohio was all but a

unit in influence to that end. During the time that the

issue was under debate, H. D. Cooke declared Garfield

"the only member of the entire Ohio delegation who

would vote aye on a square proposition that the bonds

should be paid in gold and he says that it will defeat him

for reelection."³⁴ At all events the popularity of the

"Ohio Idea" possessed an immediate political signifi-

cance; while threatening the unity of the Republican

party, it promised to advance George H. Pendleton to

the Presidency.³⁵

Before the Democratic National Convention met in

33 Sherman shortly afterward attempted to cast this record into ob-

livion. Cf. Recollections, II, p. 624 ff.

34 Oberholzer, Jay Cooke, II, pp. 40-41.

35 The State Journal became especially apprehensive. In a long edi-

torial of February 27, 1868, it made the following plea: "Whatever may

have been done elsewhere, whatever weakness and fear may have given up,

whatever short-sighted and timid policy may have yielded in other quarters,

here in Ohio, where so many Statesmen and Generals and Soldiers have

made us a name and a praise in the whole earth, whose sons have fallen

on so many fields for the government and Union, whose own faith has been

kept with its creditors in spotless purity, here, in the stronghold of patriotic

devotion and scrupulous integrity, let there be no symptoms of weakness or

wavering."

Vol. XXXVII--17.

258      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

New York, however, various political developments mili-

tated against the success of the Pendleton program.

The New York and Indiana delegations were headed by

factions openly and determinedly hostile to the Ohio

group. A strong sentiment was yet evident that the

campaign should center in the issue of the Fourteenth

Amendment. In Ohio the State Legislature, encour-

aged by the 50,000 majority against amending the state

constitution in behalf of negro suffrage, passed a reso-

lution retracting the act of ratification by the previous

Legislature. The so-called "Visible Admixture" law,

designed to disfranchise at least 2,000 voters, was

passed. By it any person challenged at the polls must

swear and procure the oath of two witnesses that his

freedom from an admixture of African blood was prac-

tically absolute. Although this law was soon declared

unconstitutional, it served to keep the issue of negro suf-

frage before the public. Another phase of the legisla-

tive program prompted Republican leaders to arouse

suspicion as to the sincerity of Democratic proposals.

Legislation designed to disfranchise college students

and the inmates of the Soldiers' Home enabled the Re-

publicans to act on the offensive when the National Con-

vention met in New York on July fourth.

A source of friction overshadowing all others had

resulted in the redivision of party spoils made necessary

by the partial success in the election of 1867. A legis-

lature had been secured upon terms which represented

a revolutionary reaction to the vindictive attitude threat-

ened by such men as Wade. A popular reaction to the

crusading spirit had been uncovered, and astute party

managers were not slow to see that it stood in the way

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896              259

of crystallizing about the person of their most radical

party leader--the man who had been most uncompro-

mising at the moment when it was apparently political

suicide to do so; Pendleton's personality and financial

program did not stand in distinct relief to Vallandig-

ham's enthusiastic and idolizing audiences.³⁶ More pli-

ant politicians whose control rested upon influences

which must frequently defeat popular tendencies, could

not therefore look with equanimity upon so complete a

vindication as that connected with Vallandigham's elec-

tion. Without regard to the agreement of the year

before, Pendleton and the Enquirer turned to squaring

the Legislature to the election of Thurman--a choice

that squared better with promoting Pendleton's presi-

dential chances. Vallandigham was bitterly disappointed

by his defeat. His vindication had been near at hand. It

36 A leading correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial at various

times insisted that in case the election were left in the hands of the masses,

Vallandigham would undoubtedly be elected. Under date of October 25,

1867, he wrote: "I shall not attempt to account for Mr. Vallandigham's

popularity among the Democratic masses; least of all shall I attribute it

to the same cause to which I attribute his unpopularity among the Demo-

cratic politicians.  I have attended two 'jollification' meetings recently,

and have seen at each such demonstrations in the direction of hero-worship

as are seldom exhibited in this country. . . . .

The speech occupied a little over an hour in its delivery, and I thought

that at its conclusion the assembled Democrats would quietly disperse to

their respective homes. But not so. The ovation, instead of having ended,

had just commenced, and for about an hour there was such a scene of wild

confusion, produced by attempts to congratulate the speaker, as is seldom

witnessed by any one, and I hope will never again be witnessed by me

except from  a respectful distance.  They crowded around his carriage,

they choked every avenue of travel around him, and conducted them-

selves in a general way like so many lunatics." Cited in Vallandigham,

Life of Vallandigham, p. 421. Accounts in the same tenor are given in

the Commercial, November 24 and 25, 1867.

260      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

was beyond the nature of things to expect him to be-

come aggressive in behalf of the man who had failed to

stand by him. He was shortly to reveal his hand in

another enterprise.

The day before the Convention, Pendleton with his

"body-guard" of three hundred men clad in linen dust-

ers and caps, paraded the streets bearing a banner in-

scribed, "The people demand payment of the bonds in

greenbacks and equal taxation. One currency for all.

Pendleton the people's nominee." Despite the selection

of New York over St. Louis as the place for holding the

Convention, commonly regarded as a blow at Pendle-

ton's chances, the delegation was determined upon a

conspicuous part in the Convention proceedings. A few

days previously, five members of the delegation were in-

duced to withdraw in favor of Vallandigham, Pugh,

Jewett, Thurman, and Morgan--the five most influen-

tial Democrats of the state, with the exception of the

candidate for the Presidential nomination. The contest

as developed in the Convention resolved itself into a

duel between New York and Ohio. The platform as

adopted on the third day embraced the Pendleton pro-

gram and went on record against the Reconstruction

Acts as "usurpations, unconstitutional, revolutionary,

and void." The "Ohio Idea" was safely launched, but as

the result of maneuvers designed to break the deadlock

between candidates, the Ohio delegation became the

victim of one of the most peculiar ironies in political

history. As a result of Vallandingham's cooperation in

an attempt to secure the nomination of Chase, an Ohio

delegate led a stampede of the Convention to the New

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  261

York nominee, Horatio Seymour, a recognized oppo-

nent of the Pendleton program.³⁷

During the impeachment trial of President John-

son, it became evident that the Republicans must nomi-

nate General Grant. The program was backed by the

Ohio press from the beginning--as soon as it became

known that Grant would not be the Democratic candi-

date. His election was represented as a patriotic duty,

and the campaign resolved itself into an incrimination

of Seymour, the "Mephistopheles of the riots," and the

"guiltiest of the murderers of that bloody mob."³⁸ The

Pendleton program was represented as merely a step in

the direction of a general program of repudiation--if

not actually in itself repudiation. The Democratic cam-

paign in the state, owing to the fiasco in New York,

never assumed significance. The Enquirer expressed

its determination to stand back of its candidate in 1872.

The success of the Republican party in electing Gen-

eral Grant by an overwhelming electoral vote and by a

popular majority of 300,000 left the Democratic party

in practically the same position it had occupied in 1865,

with the exception that it had involved itself with an

additional discredited program. The Republican party,

which had emerged from its previous Unionist factions,

stood practically unchallenged as the embodiment of na-

tional patriotism. While there was no real unity among

Republicans on the financial issue, the success of 1868

contributed toward incorporating the ideal of bank

37 The plan was that Seymour should refuse the nomination and trans-

fer his support to Chase.  Cf. Ann. Rep't. of the Am. Hist. Assoc., 1902,

Vol. II, pp. 520-521.

38 In reference to the draft riots in New York in 1863.

262      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

credit and "sound money" as a party tradition. Grant's

majority in Ohio reached 40,000--20,000 less than that

of Lincoln in 1864.

By clever maneuvering, the Democrats were in po-

sition to cause the Republicans considerable anxiety. By

combining with a "Reform" movement in Hamilton

County in 1869, they succeeded in maintaining a nomi-

nal majority in the state Legislature. On party issues,

however, that combination acted with the Republicans.

As candidate for governor the same year, the Demo-

crats, under Pendleton's direction, had nominated Gen-

eral Rosecrans. The latter, much to the satisfaction of

many Democrats, declined the nomination in a letter

in which he scored the party for its erratic course. Pen-

dleton, to save the situation, was forced to accept the

state committee's nomination and suffer defeat by a

margin of 7,500 votes.

Before the next Presidential election a series of

events and factors in state and nation combined to

awaken new hope on the part of disappointed Democrats

and stranded Conservatives. In the light of these de-

velopments it will be seen how remote from certain pop-

ular interests was the canvass of 1868 with its election

of a national hero and ambiguous appeal to national

honor on an "honest money" platform.³⁹

39 The Committee on Resolutions of the Republican Convention is re-

ported to have struggled four hours before securing a resolution that was

sufficiently ambiguous regarding "honest money."

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  263

CHAPTER III

THE NEW DEPARTURE

The election of General Grant in 1868 was secured

without reference to the fundamental problems of the

newer era; the keynote, "Let us have peace," the plat-

form and the candidates merely asked the voter's ap-

proval of what had been achieved in reconstruction.

This program proved expedient in carrying the election,

but involved serious difficulties the moment the adminis-

tration assumed responsibility for concrete action. The

execution of the enforcement acts committed the ad-

ministration to a radical policy against which a very

powerful element of the Republican party was in a posi-

tion of vehement protest. The disregard of the Presi-

dent for the conventions of his office, connected with his

inability to judge men for their political capacity, had

led to evils which gave rise to severe criticism and pro-

test throughout the nation. The many sources of op-

position, both social and economic, attested a national in-

terest in the practical problems of the future, while in-

dicating a flagging interest in the issues of the war.

An immediate effect of the Grant regime was to

create a situation altogether favorable to the establish-

ment of political alliances on issues more real than those

of the shadow conflict of 1868.1 As early as 1867, Ham-

ilton County had furnished a conspicuous example of

the possible success of such movements. Samuel F.

Cary, who had been passed over by his party convention

1 The break between Sumner and Grant had early in 1871 aroused

apprehensions of a serious break in the Republican party. Cf. Ohio State

Journal, March 22, 1871.

264        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

for the Second Congressional District nomination,

opened an independent campaign against the regular

nominee as a "Working-man's Candidate" and with the

aid of his "Tin Bucket Brigade," gained recognition of

the Democrats by his aggressive campaign.² His suc-

cess was not lost sight of in the years immediately fol-

lowing. The partial Democratic success of 1867 had

convinced many that the future of the party rested in

acting "with such moderation and sound discretion that

it may permanently convert them (the Conservatives)

to the Democratic organization."3 It was in pursuance

of this policy that party leaders had elected Thurman

to the Senate over Vallandigham in January, 1868.

Vallandigham's retort was in the form of one of the

most far-reaching political alliances consummated be-

fore 1871--that between himself and Chase before the

National Convention which had nominated Seymour.

It demonstrated at all events the degree to which politi-

cal lines might be crossed during that era. The Pen-

dleton men had saved themselves from Vallandigham's

promotion of the Chase movement in the New York

delegation only by uniting in advance upon Seymour.

2 October 4, 1867, when Cary's election became a practical certainty,

the Enquirer openly supported him. October 8, his name was inserted in

the Democratic ballot.

3 The Cincinnati Enquirer (October 14, 1867) asserted: "We could

have given the Conservative Republicans one-half of the County offices,

and made a clean sweep of the negro-worshiping, bank aristocracy and

tax exempting bondholders of Hamilton County. Let us in the future fight

the Devil with fire on a larger scale than we did in this County at the

late election." The same paper, October 15, clipped the following from

William D. Morgan's Newark Advocate: "Let it be the care of the Demo-

cratic party not to drive these men away from their new association; but

let it act with such wisdom, moderation and sound discretion. that it may

Permanently convert them to the Democratic organization."

266       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

ernor.⁴ Representatives James M. Ashley and Robert

Schenck, of the Toledo and Dayton districts respect-

ively, lost their seats in the elections of 1868 and 1870

by effective party and factional combinations.    Such

proofs of political instability were disconcerting to the

established party leadership, but a source of encourage-

ment to those who had ambitions or had experienced

recent disappointments.

State and national elections from 1871 to 1873 were

conditioned by the same attitude which had character-

ized the elections immediately preceding them. From

the camps of both parties issued factional expeditions

which held forth the hope of being offered favorable

terms of leadership in the opposing camp, or of being

met half way in the formation of an entirely new or-

ganization. Also an actual step was to be taken in the

direction of shifting political issues from their former

channels.

Cincinnati was fertile soil from which new political

ventures were in the habit of springing. The instability

of its voting elements was ever the hope and despair of

aspiring politicians. The city's immediate touch with

sectional interests, on the other hand, commended its at-

mosphere as peculiarly favorable for maturing political

schemes which were in the grafting process. It was

the vantage point from which Salmon P. Chase had

aided in articulating the Republican party when he had

first hoped to become President of the United States.

4 In remonstrating against the "miscellaneous" tickets in the election

of 1869, the Ohio State Journal scored the "Republican Soreheads" in the

following terms: "They are simply playing into the hands of our political

enemies and damning themselves politically forever." Ohio State Journal,

September 14, 1869.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896   267

March 10, 1871, the city was again the scene of an

event which promised at least future influence for the

men who promoted it. Quickened by the success of the

Liberal movement in Missouri and the cause of "re-

union and reform" which Carl Schurz was at the time

promoting among the border states, a dozen disaffected

Republicans took council with each other.⁵ Prominent

among them was J. D. Cox, who had recently broken

with Grant and resigned from the Cabinet. With him

were associated George Hoadly and Stanley Matthews,

prominent attorneys, Fred Hassaurek, editor of the

city's most important German paper, and J. W. Hart-

well, Vice-President of the Dayton and Hamilton Rail-

way.^5a They declared as their program the common pur-

pose of cleansing the Republican party, or starting a

new one. The report of principles, embracing amnesty,

civil service reform, specie payments and a revenue re-

form was signed by one hundred prominent citizens.

The "Reunion and Reform Association," which grew

out of the movement, although originally intended as a

Republican affair, enlisted the interest of Democrats--

especially those who felt their political discouragement

most bitterly.⁶ The Enquirer was sympathetic. Some

Republicans were hopeful and others were cynical.⁷

Sherman's sympathizers knew that the immediate ob-

jective was to secure their leader's seat in the United

5 Cox was at that time in intimate correspondence with Schurz. See

especially Schurz's letter of April 4 in Schurz's Speeches, Correspondence

and Political Papers, II, pp. 254-255.

5a Cincinnati Enquirer, March 28, 1871.

6 Cf. Schurz's op. cit., II, p. 255.

7 See especially Cincinnati Enquirer, March 23, 1871.

268        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

States Senate.⁸ The New York Tribune, whose editor

was to figure prominently in the movement a year later,

expressed the suspicion of regular party men when it

scored the promoters "for oiling their favorites pre-

paratory to getting them comfortably swallowed by the

Sham Democracy as candidates for the Presidency.^"9

As the campaign of 1871 approached, the Democrats

laid their plans with the growing Republican defection

clearly in mind. With the exception of Pendleton, all

proposed candidates for gubernatorial honors were at

one time or another of Unionist or Republican ante-

cedents. Naturally "the thoroughgoing Copperheads"

must be kept in abeyance while the gap between the lib-

eral elements of the two parties was closed.

Since 1868, Vallandigham had nursed his resent-

ment in comparative silence.10 Pendleton was appar-

ently in complete control of his party as he surveyed

the possibilities of succeeding Sherman in the Senate.

On May 19, however, Vallandigham's silence was

broken by newspaper accounts of a Democratic county

convention held in Dayton the preceding day. Under

his leadership an elaborate program, characterized as a

"New Departure" of the Democratic party, had been

8 L. H. Bond wrote to Sherman October 16, 1874: "Three years ago I

ran for the legislature and lacked only 150 votes of an election in a poll

of thirty-nine thousand votes, and I carried the weight of Hassaurek's op-

position and the enmity of all your rivals in Hamilton County, such as Cox,

Hassaurek, Matthews and several others. These men have since assured

me that personally they would have rejoiced in my success, but they knew

I would support you, and therefore were not enthusiastic." Sherman MSS.

9 Cited in the Cincinnati Enquirer, April 13, 1871.

The Cincinnati Enquirer, May 20, 1871, contains a collection of news-

paper editorial reactions.

10 Cf. Vallandigham, op. cit., pp. 422-423.

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896   269

adopted and submitted as a model for the State Conven-

tion called for June 1. The event was a clear challenge

to the McLean-Pendleton dictatorship, as well as an

overture to schismatic Republicans. The essential fea-

tures of the program attacked the Radical party of 1871

as one different from the Republican organization pre-

ceding the war and as an "Administration or Grant

party" dating from March 4, 1869. The term "New

Departure" was drawn from the set of resolutions which

dismissed the issues of the war, the Constitutional

amendments, slavery, inequality, and "all that is of the

dead past." "The Resolutions of '68, States' Rights,

Negro suffrage, greenbacks for public debts, our South-

ern brethren, justice to the South and everything else

which Democracy had held destructive as opposed to

Black Republicanism, was turned into the hopper to be

seen no more in the original," commented the Dayton

Journal.11 On its positive side the platform declared for

universal amnesty, a strictly revenue tariff, elimination

of extravagance, woman suffrage, and "reform of the

extortionate system   of banking"--a more compre-

hensive program than that offered by the Cincinnati

movement.¹²

The essential features of the program were adopted

by the State Convention, although the resolution con-

cerning the Constitutional Amendments was strongly

opposed by a minority group led by Frank Hurd of To-

11 Dayton Journal, May 19, 1871.

12 George Houk explained the philosophy of the movement by the fol-

lowing simile: "A great earthquake occurs. A mountain sinks and a lake

appears in its stead. We must accept the lake for we cannot restore the

mountain." Dayton Journal, May 19, 1871. Vallandigham declared it "not

a New Departure but a return." Cleveland Leader, May 19, 1871.

270         Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

ledo.13 A resolution to the effect that greenbacks be

made convertible into 3 per cent bonds redeemable in

greenbacks on demand, was conceded to the Pendleton

group. The nomination of George W. McCook of the

famous family of fighting McCooks was an additional

bid for conservative support.

The Vallandigham coup attracted favorable and un-

favorable comment throughout the nation. A congrat-

ulation from Chase for the great "service to your coun-

try and the party," was immediately forthcoming.¹⁴ The

New York Sun, the New York Herald, the Philadelphia

Evening    Herald     and   the  Louisville    Courier-Journal

were among the more conspicuous newspapers endors-

ing the program--the first named declaring that it

placed "Mr. Vallandigham among the most conspicuous

political leaders of the day."¹⁵ The Enquirer was at

first non-committal, inviting "criticism and improve-

ment if not opposition to the main idea."¹⁶ The Repub-

lican press naturally spared no effort in attempting to

13 Hurd's minority resolution that "the 14th and 15th Amendments,

having been made parts of the Constitution by violence and fraud, are

revolutionary and void," was voted down 169-296. Cleveland Leader, June

2, 1871.

14 Vallandigham, op. cit., p. 446.

15 Ibid., pp. 446 ff.

Cincinnati Enquirer, May 19, 1871.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer (quoted in Vallandigham, op. cit., p. 448)

offered the following explanation: "While it makes no apology for the

position the Democratic party has held in the past, it recognizes the situa-

tion, accepts facts that are accomplished, refuses to play heads and tails

on the grave of issues that were live ones only in '62, '63, '64, and '65;

it refuses to allow the Republican party to put a ring-fence around us and

keep us dancing to the same old tunes and rattling the same old bones."

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896              271

discredit Vallandigham as a perpetrator of fraud and

promoter of treasonable hypocrisy.l7

The program was accordingly not without its em-

barrassments. An advance movement of the sort natu-

rally stood in danger of rear-guard defection. Thur-

man had just advanced to leadership of the Democratic

minority in the Senate through his aggressive opposi-

tion to the Amendments, the Civil Rights and the Force

Bills. The success of the movement inferred a loss of

his leadership.¹⁸

The slight hold of the "Departure" upon the party

was    soon    demonstrated.        Shortly    after    the   tragic

death of Vallandigham, which occurred before the con-

test had fairly begun, the campaign languished in inter-

est.¹⁹ Party leaders were soon convinced of the imprac-

ticability of shifting the issues too radically. Further-

more, the Republicans nominated General E. F. Noyes,

17 An observation of the Ohio State Journal is typical: "The whole

game is plainly a ruse to catch the votes of colored men and those conser-

vative Democrats who were driven into the Republican party by the treason

of the Democracy during the war. . . . The New        Departure, Bah !"

Cleveland Leader, May 22, 1871. The Ohio State Journal under the same

date declared: "It would be out of the course of nature for the Republican

party not to feel some gratification that the great archtraitor of the peace

Democracy has been brought by any means to get down on his belly and

humbly eat the many dirty words which have defiled his mouth in the utter-

ance during the past ten years. If his repentance were sincere, and his

desire to atone for his miserable past by some good in the future could be

accepted as reliable, the very angels in Heaven would rejoice over the

salvation of this meanest of sinners." June 12, 1871, Hayes made the

following entry in his diary: "I say with the Albany Journal, 'The voice

is the voice of Jacob but the hand is the hand of Esau'."

18 "I regard this new move as one to foist you -- your friend Thurman

--Pendleton and others and place you as impracticable fogies . . ." James

Fergerson of Center Point, Indiana, to Allen June 19, 1871. Alien MSS.

19 Vallandigham was accidentally shot while demonstrating the use of

a pistol before a jury.

272       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

who had suffered the loss of a limb in the recent war,

and who, as a young Republican was capable of show-

ing how "thoroughly alive and vigorous are the prin-

ciples that slew slavery and made the Union the guar-

antee of liberty."²⁰ The Republicans carried the elec-

tion by 20,000 majority--three times that of 1869.

The Republican majority in the Legislature elected

at the same time was not proof, however, that the first

objective of the program--that of defeating Sherman

for the Senate--was not to be realized.     Shortly after

the election, rumors gained currency that the Senator

was to be sacrificed to the new political order. James

Ashley attempted the part of chief ritualist. He had

been a Representative from the Toledo district during

and at the close of the war, and had been among the

first to advocate impeachment proceedings against Pres-

ident Johnson. During the party tangle he had lost his

seat in Congress.²¹ His scheme during the latter part

of 1871 was to secure a defeat of a caucus nomination

by the Republicans preceding the actual election by the

legislature.²² By throwing the election directly into the

latter body and securing the nomination of three or four

Republicans, he contemplated the ultimate support of

the Democrats for some candidate who had been deter-

mined upon as agreeable to both groups. Governor

Hayes, Robert Schenck and J. D. Cox were prominent

20 Harper's Weekly, July 8, 1871.

21 An account of Ashley is found in Winter's History of North-western

Ohio, pp. 294 ff. Grant had later given him a "lame duck" appointment as

Governor of the Territory of Montana, and shortly afterward dismissed

him from that position.

22 J. R. Wing to Sherman, December 31, 1871. Under date December 4,

1871, Rush R. Sloane wrote: "Ashley will do his best against you and yet I

think him only dangerous on account of his dishonesty." Sherman MSS.. ..

Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896  273

among those considered for the position. The plan failed

primarily because of the prompt action of Lieutenant-

Governor Jacob Mueller. At the close of the first ballot,

and before the result was announced, a Democrat

changed his vote from General Morgan (the recipient

of the complimentary vote of the Democrats) to Cox.

The presiding officer refused to recognize others who

attempted similar changes and declared Sherman duly

elected.²³

The reelection of Sherman marked the failure of

the first phase of the "New Departure," but did not

check the plan to name Grant's successor as President.

The call for the Liberal Convention at Cincinnati in

1872 marked Ohio as the storm center of what was now

regarded as a national movement. The fiasco connected

with the attempt is familiar history. The original pro-

moters lost control of the convention proceedings amid

political manipulations which paralleled, if they did not

surpass, those of the older parties. Only the advance-

ment of Greeley to the nomination was needed to dem-

onstrate the lack of a serious or consistent purpose on

the part of the delegates. As a result Ohio Democrats

and Liberals faced a common impasse. George Hoadly