Ohio History Journal

GERALD W. WOLFF

Mark Hanna's Goal:

American Harmony

'A man who won't meet his men half-way is a G_ d__ fool!' declared Mark Hanna

one day in 1894. He was referring to the Pullman strike and the fact that troops

had been sent to end it. That terse, profane comment tells a great deal about

Hanna. He was, above all else, a pragmatist with a canny ability to successfully

adjust to changing conditions. Twenty years previously, when his coal mines were

struck, troops had been brought in--with disastrous consequences. He had learned

much from this experience. Thereafter he tried diligently to show by example how

relations between labor, capital, and management could be ordered for the bene-

fit of all. The one solid absolute in his life was a profound belief in the living

standard capitalism had brought to America. To preserve that way of life, he fol-

lowed what he considered to be the most effective method of achieving his goal.

Important priorities included conservative labor unions, cooperative capitalists, a

sympathetic public and government, and loyal anti-Communist European immigrant

laborers--all working together to maintain an "essential harmony between the inter-

ests of business and the whole community."1

This general point of view, envisioning American society as an integrated,

mutually beneficial, harmonious whole, was not unique with Hanna. It was shared

also by many large conservative business interests in the late 1880's and through

the progressive era, though in modified forms. Several factors account for this

support by big business. One is that, despite the continued growth in the size of

industries, ruinous competition in the business world was threatening to weaken

the economic base of the country. From about 1897 to 1901, many corporations

attempted to combat such competition voluntarily through the merger movement.

Even though this method did not prove successful in achieving its purposes, many

businessmen and financial interests continued to seek a "stable," "predictable,"

and "rationalized" economy. Another challenge that the large industrialists had

to face came from the demands made by the growing number of labor unions.

Also, radical doctrines such as Socialism seemed to appeal especially to immigrant

workers and could prove to be a threat both to an economy based on capitalism

1. Quoted in Thomas Beer, Hanna (New York, 1929), 133; Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna:

His Life and Work (New York, 1912), 115.

Mr. Wolff is assistant professor of history at The University of South Dakota.

140                                                               OHIO HISTORY

and his conservatism was conditioned by his big business interests.³

Lastly, many conservative businessmen promoted and joined organizations dedi-

cated to fostering their economic and social ideal. Before World War I the National

Civic Federation was the most important of these groups. It dealt with a large num-

ber of political and economic problems and questions related to the promotion of

a rationalized American system. Corporate businessmen dominated the organiza-

tion. However, the NCF also included in its leadership corps representatives from

trade unions, such as Samuel Gompers, and a broadly defined "public" which en-

compassed several important groups. The major goals of the NCF were: the defense

of the free enterprise system, the promotion of general harmony among all classes,

and the conciliation of specific disputes through cooperation and meaningful dis-

cussion among key leaders of major interests.⁴

Not all business interests favored this emphasis upon cooperation. In general,

there was a division between leaders of the larger corporations and those repre-

senting smaller merchants and manufacturers. The latter tended to view American

society and its problems in much narrower terms than did the magnates and formed

their own merchant association, including the National Association of Manufactur-

ers. The NAM for much of the progressive period opposed labor unions, shunned

cooperative capitalism, and continued to espouse the older principles of laissez faire

capitalism.⁵

The NCF, on the other hand, with Hanna as one of its early leaders, opposed

these "anarchist" businessmen, as well as Socialists, radicals, and reformers among

the middle class and laborers.⁶ Mark Hanna was not only an important part of the

NCF but also of the whole moderately conservative outlook and movement just

described. Although he rejected parts of that movement, enlarged upon others, and

added some variations and innovations of his own, he was in many ways typical

of it. The importance of his involvement, moreover, was enhanced greatly because

of his economic and political power and influence and because of his persistence

and dedication to the cause.

Hanna's early championship of organized labor continued throughout his later

career and was directly related to his goal of achieving harmonious management-

labor relations. In a speech to the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin

Workers in Columbus in 1903 he completely rejected the assertion of David Parry,

president of the National Association of Manufacturers, who claimed "organized

labor knows but one law, and that is the law of physical force." Instead, Hanna

lamented the "overt acts" by irresponsible parties but praised "the advancement

that has been made in the settlement of disputes in bringing closer together the

employer and employee." The Senator believed that it was virtually impossible for

an individual laborer to go to his employer with a complaint and command much

respect or attention. He reminded businessmen that organized labor was an older

creation than organized business and that workers' desire to join for protection and

advancement should be no more shocking than the efforts of businessmen to orga-

3. Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism, 3-7, 12-13, 65-66; Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, xiv; Samuel Haber,

Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago, 1964), ix-xii;

Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 18.

4. Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, xv, 4, 5; Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 5, 18-20, 41, 118; Foster

Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: A History (New York, 1949), 186-187.

5. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 4-5; Ralph M. Easley, "The Work of the National Civic Fed-

eration," Harper's Weekly, November 26, 1904, p. 1805.

6. Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 7; Dulles, Labor in America, 186.

Mark Hanna                                                                    141

nize capital. American prosperity depended upon both the laborer and the entre-

preneur, who were ". . . partners in toil who ought to be partners also in the profits

of that toil." This sharing of profits could be achieved best through "organized union

labor Americanized in the best sense and thoroughly educated to an understanding

of its responsibilities, and in this way to make it the ally of the capitalist, rather

than a foe with which to grapple."⁷

Many of the most obnoxious characteristics of labor organizations, such as hos-

tility to capital, Hanna believed had been imported from Europe and would soon

disappear because they were so alien to American life. Unlike those of Europe,

American unions would "prove a boom to our country, when a proper basis of con-

fidence and respect is established." That spirit of respect and confidence was becom-

ing an increasing reality, in part, he said, because of the conservative attitudes that

were developing within most unions as the years passed. Not simply labor leaders,

but the workers themselves were contributing much to the growth of a calm and

cooperative relationship with capital and were not likely to be led away from the

"straight road by hot-headed members."⁸

To help insure the continuation of this trend of mutual cooperation, the mid-

western millionaire attempted to convince his fellow industrialists that there were

benefits for businessmen in labor organizations. When labor's interests were placed

in the hands of a few able leaders, capitalists could communicate more easily with

their workers and so avoid unnecessary and perhaps costly disputes. At the same

time, he admonished unions to choose representatives who understood both sides of

labor-capital problems and ones who would not lead workers into strikes just for

the sake of a fight. While speaking before the iron, steel and tin workers, Hanna

said that in his own industrial affairs he considered the best lawyer the one who

could keep him out of court and the best leaders of labor organizations those who

could keep workers out of all avoidable difficulties. To obtain recognition, unions

should elevate their cause to such a level of dignity that it would be impossible for

any reasonable man not to consider their demands and requests. "Let it be under-

stood," he said, "that there is just as much intelligence and integrity of purpose in

the minds and hearts of laboring men as any other class and you will get recogni-

tion." Consistent with these views, the rugged entrepreneur opposed union partici-

pation in both the boycott and the sympathy strike. As a condition of recognition,

workers organizations should abandon all such hostile actions; but, at the same

time, Hanna opposed those persons who sought the incorporation of labor organiza-

tions as a means of making unions legally more responsible for their actions. He

implied that the bargaining position of unions might be seriously limited by incor-

poration.⁹

Hanna felt that if it was good for laborers to join together to form unions, then

it was just as good for capital to organize to form trusts. To break up trusts and

discourage big businesses would mean that the United States was reverting to prim-

7. Quoted in Marcus A. Hanna, speech of April 21, 1903, Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 22,

1903; Marcus A. Hanna, "Labor and Capital," in Harriet Blackstone, ed., The Best of American Ora-

tions Today (New York, 1926), 288; Marcus Hanna, Mark Hanna: His Book (Boston, 1904), 32, 36;

Marcus Hanna, "Socialism and the Labor Unions," National Magazine, February 1904, p. 555.

8. Ibid.; Hanna, His Book, 35, 44.

9. Oscar S. Straus, "Results Accomplished by the Industrial Department, National Civic Federa-

tion," American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, XX (July 1902), 37-42; Ohio State

Journal, April 22, 1903; Hanna, His Book, 33-34; William H. Kiekhofer, Economic Principles, Problems,

and Policies (New York, 1941), 128.

142                                                               OHIO HISTORY

itive methods of economic organization. In fact, the increasing size of industries

was an integral part of America's material progress and "brought to our industrial

institutions," he said, "greater economic results; . . . an increase and expansion of

trade, and higher wages for the men." Large combinations of capital also made it

easier to establish friendly, uniform relations with labor and to produce better mer-

chandise for the public. Furthermore, he denied that trusts were monopolies since

"there is not a field of industry in this country not open to anyone and everyone

who sees fit to embark capital in that line." All in all, Hanna thought the trusts

had become institutions as permanent as organized labor.10

In Hanna's view the biggest threat to American harmony was the strike, for

which he had a passionate dislike. Again and again, he referred to the tremendous

cost and waste that strikes produced. Strikes resulted in more than material priva-

tion. "You cannot measure . . . from a monetary standpoint the enormous loss that

has resulted from these difficulties. It is the duty, a sacred duty for us all to use all

the efforts and influences in the circles of labor and in the ranks of capital to bring

about a condition of things which will prevent the occurrence and recurrence of

such conditions."11

Conciliation was a much better method of settling labor-capital disagreements.

Hanna thought it was truly amazing how some of the worst strikes were caused by

the most insignificant of differences. "The time is ripe in this country," said the

Cleveland industrialist in 1901, "for a better and permanent understanding between

the men who control invested capital and the men whose labor makes this capital

profitable." Capital and labor were not foreordained to battle each other. Actually,

Hanna saw a harmony of interest between business and labor; one could not pros-

per without the other sharing in its good fortune. It was perhaps too much to ex-

pect both sides to settle their differences every time, but there was always a neutral

ground where labor and capital could meet. The main goal was to get the two sides

together when trouble occurred so that a full debate of the issues could take place.

Strikes seldom erupted when the disenchanted representatives of labor and busi-

ness came together for a "frank, open, manly talk of differences." Thus, Hanna

asserted that labor-captial differences could be adjusted in most cases through con-

ciliation based upon an attitude of fellowship and "right motives."12

Hanna had promoted collective bargaining even before many of the most benev-

olent employers had accepted it. He made it clear that he believed unions would

abide by agreements once they were made. Hanna cited one instance again and

again as substantial proof that labor unions would "stick to a bargain"; this was

also a reason why employers should have confidence in the function of trade agree-

ments. The instance to which he referred took place in 1902 when the bituminous

coal miners of West Virginia voted to uphold their end of a trade agreement rather

than begin a sympathy strike in support of the famous anthracite strike that had

just begun. Hanna was elated by the decision and sent John Mitchell, president of

the United Mine Workers, a telegram:

I want to congratulate you and through [sic] your associates in the successful outcome of

your convention in upholding the honor and integrity of your organization. This result is

10. Hanna, "Labor and Capital," 287; Marcus A. Hanna, "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration,"

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, XX (July 1902), 21, 25.

11. Ohio State Journal, April 22, 1903.

12. Croly, Hanna, 405; interview with Hanna in New York Tribune, December 21, 1901; Hanna,

"Socialism and the Labor Unions," 557.

Mark Hanna                                                                  143

a demonstration of the highest regard which the miners hold in keeping faith, and it en-

titles them to the respect and confidence of the Public.

To Hanna, this one incident established the reliability of labor unions. It convinced

him that "as conditions exist today there is every reason . . . for the employer to

have confidence in an agreement made by his employes."13

Conciliation and trade agreements, however, depended not only upon labor and

capital but also upon the attitude of the public. Hanna's love of the people was

about as warm and sentimental as that of Vanderbilt who proclaimed, "the public

be damned." But he realized that any plan for permanent peace between worker

and employer would have to take the public into consideration. Any hope of suc-

cess for conciliation of labor disputes hinged upon "the strong impelling influence

of an enlightened public sentiment." Labor and industry could form conciliation

committees by the hundreds, but they would not succeed without public sympathy,

for, he declared, the people are the "final arbiters."¹⁴ Because Hanna realized the

importance of public opinion, he preached to the people about their responsibilities,

just as he had talked to the leaders of labor and industry:

I wish I could impress upon every American the responsibility that rests upon each one of

us. Every year of experience, every dollar of accumulated capital, every talent we possess

should be regarded as a sacred charge for the good of the nation, to help in uniting the

interests of rich and poor, learned and unlearned.15

Fortunately, according to Hanna, the public's growing acceptance of labor unions

was already helping to force more and more employers to recognize organized

labor.16

Government also had a role to play in aiding business and labor to adjust ami-

cably to one another. The state, Hanna believed, existed primarily to aid business-

men and to promote prosperity. Prosperity, of course, benefited everyone, especially

labor. To achieve this, the Republican party was to be the main engine of state,

and party leaders were responsible for seeing that prosperity was insured. Business,

for its part, was to fill party coffers generously during election years in order to

keep the Republicans in power. Hanna personally did his best to implement this

policy of promoting business prosperity through the government and Republican

party. For example, as a United States Senator in 1897, he participated in the crea-

tion and supported the passage of the Dingley tariff bill. That bill substantially

raised the tariff rates on many industrial products, which Hanna, along with others,

believed would aid the business community and the economy in general. Again

in 1900 Hanna acted on his belief that the Republican party, as the most significant

vehicle of government, must assert itself to help maintain a prosperous economy.

He personally drafted the "trust" plank in the Republican platform of 1900. "Hon-

est" trusts, he declared, were essential to the expansion of foreign trade. Only com-

binations calculated to restrain trade, limit production, and control prices were

condemned. Likewise, the plank declared that the Republicans favored anti-trust

laws which would correct these abuses and gain the rights of producers, laborers

and businessmen. To Hanna's way of thinking, most trusts were necessary to keep

13. Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labour, An Autobiography (London, 1925), II, 106;

Robert J. Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902 (Washington, D. C., 1957), 106-107.

14. Hanna, "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration," 22, 24.

15. Hanna, "Socialism and the Labor Unions," 558.

16. Hanna, His Book, 35.

144                                                               OHIO HISTORY

America on the high road to economic success and hence social harmony, and it

was the duty of the Republican party to aid in the preservation of the best of these

business combinations.¹⁷

To promote the multi-faceted plan for harmony in America, a program of edu-

cation was to be developed. One of Hanna's main themes stressed the education

and "Americanization" of labor. The principal thrust of this program was to mold

labor into an active ally of industry by eliminating the prejudice that existed be-

tween worker and businessman. At the same time, labor was to be taught its

responsibility to the community at large. Hanna was convinced that this could be

accomplished, for he had been profoundly impressed by the public's ready accep-

tance of the propaganda he had used in the presidential campaign of 1896. More-

over, he could see no reason why the benign and uncomplicated approach he had

used with his own employees could not be made a success nationally. During many

conferences with his workers' representatives, Hanna had explained the cost of

products, the market value of goods, and what he considered to be a fair profit.

Thus, his laborers always had the information necessary for estimating a fair wage.

Hanna argued that this policy was the major reason he had never experienced a

strike of any consequence since 1876. His men had been taught their responsibil-

ities as well as their rights.18

In addition to this approach, Hanna believed it was absolutely essential to

counteract the spread of Socialist and Communist theories among the semi-ignorant

laboring classes. These theories, portraying capitalists as the enemies of labor, gave,

in his opinion, an utterly false picture of the situation in America. It was incumbent

upon those working for the cause of unions "to Americanize labor organizations,

to fit them for their surroundings and conditions in this country."¹⁹ It was especially

important to Americanize the thousands of immigrants who came to America each

year. This foreign element, according to the Ohio politician, usually came from

the lower socio-economic strata of Europe and as a rule was prejudiced against

capitalism and our government. These persons had to be taught that such an atti-

tude was senseless and that they had much to gain by accepting the American eco-

nomic and political traditions. It would take much time and patience for America

to assimilate such a large number of immigrants so alien to its way of life, but the

effort had to be made.²⁰ Foreign labor was essential to American industry because

demand for workers exceeded the supply; therefore labor could neither be ignored

nor allowed to remain hostile to the free enterprise system. Moreover, foreign

workers eventually became voters and were capable of exercising a potent and

dangerous force when voicing their opinions at the polls.²1

Of course, there would always be an element of European-born labor that could

not be reached and educated by any means. These were the ones who had accepted

Communism or Socialism, who refused to work hoping to get "something for noth-

ing," and who had "no stake in the country."²² The very suggestion of Communism

angered Hanna. 'What?' he remarked to Jacob Riis on the subject, 'Give all the

17. Croly, Hanna, 275-276, 305-307.

18. Hanna, His Book, 30, 37; "Senator Hanna and the Labor Capital Question," Harper's Magazine,

February 6, 1904, p. 193.

19. Hanna, "Labor and Capital," 282-283; Hanna, "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration," 25.

20. Hanna, "Socialism and the Labor Unions," 555, 556; Hanna, "Industrial Conciliation and Arbi-

tration," 24.

21. Hanna, "Labor and Capital," 284-285.

22. Interview, New York Times, December 21, 1901; Hanna, His Book, 39; see also, Tom L. Johnson,

My Story, edited by Elizabeth J. Hauser (New York, 1915), 202-203.

Mark Hanna                                                                145

damn fools in the world equal rights with good men? . . . By God no!' To Hanna,

life was competitive, and competition was the only way to achieve material ad-

vancement. America, in his view, provided for such progress by extending equality

of opportunity to all men and allowing the best to rise to the top. He told the work-

ingmen of America that any one of them could become wealthy if he showed initia-

tive. In Hanna's opinion, there was complete social and economic mobility in the

United States, and an almost inexhaustible supply of natural resources made suc-

cess possible for any man. Labor's only real hope for advancement was within a

system where the basic tenet was individualism. Communism, on the other hand,

promoted incompetence by destroying the desire to better oneself.²³

At the same time, Hanna was convinced that once the mystery of European

Socialism and Communism was exposed to the blinding light of truth and reality

the great majority of all workers, regardless of origin, would reject such ideas as

repellent to all the ideals of American life. "Its objects will be seen," he said,

to be the very opposite of those desired both by labor and capital, since it gives no aid

toward the building up and development of the country, nor does it guarantee each man a

chance to make a home for himself . . . No "ism" is wanted by the American people that

will take from any citizen the just and equitable reward of his labor.²⁴

Who should provide the truth and reality about Communism and Socialism? The

churches and school systems would help greatly, but Hanna also urged the many

workers already Americanized to do a good share of the instructing. In a speech

to the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, Hanna said that

their thirty years of union experience gave them a golden opportunity to set a

proper example for younger, more radical unions. On that occasion, he discussed

their teaching duties with an almost evangelical zeal:

You are the only men that can do it [Americanize unions], and when you are meeting in

your councils or when you are meeting with your fellows in every day life, preach it as your

Gospel . . . obedience to the law . . . good citizenship, and that makes a good government.

And that is the spirit of our institution [the National Civic Federation].

In making this appeal I wish I could impress upon every man before me how much

individual effort can accomplish if only that effort is put forward. Those of you who have

seen the benefits in the long years of your experience as members of this association [the

Civic Federation] are the best missionaries possible in the case of labor to preach it from

every street corner and to every man you meet. In unions there is strength, in unions of

interests there is greater strength and a common cause will make it in the end a great

success.²⁵

Hanna realized that if he could convince Americanized labor to help indoctrinate

those who had rejected the ideals of capitalism, then businessmen would have a

powerful ally.

At the same time, however, capitalists were to be taught their responsibilities

toward labor. The business community would have to accept labor unions if it

expected labor-capital disputes to be settled peacefully and permanently. Why con-

demn unions and their leaders because they made occasional mistakes? It would be

23. Quoted in Beer, Hanna, 168, 216; Ohio State Journal, April 22, 1903; "Senator Hanna and the

Labor Question," 193.

24. Hanna, His Book, 40-41.

25. Ohio State Journal, April 22, 1903; Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 118.

146                                                                OHIO HISTORY

a better policy, a more "Christian-like" policy, to help them correct the errors they

made rather than to ignore their organizations. After all, the members of labor

unions were only trying to improve themselves and the condition of their families.

This desire to improve one's situation was what made progress in America possible.

'If you are the stronger or abler,' he once told a meeting of employers' associations,

'much less excuse you have to show resentment because the other side is simply

asking that they have their share.' It was up to the captains of industry to "go more

than halfway" to insure a lasting peaceful coexistence between labor and capital.

Capital had been able to dictate terms to labor for many years, but this was no

longer the case, and the sooner it was realized, the better off everyone would be.²⁶

Unions were on the rise, and their leaders made formidable opponents. Hanna

believed after 1900 that economic prosperity provided two jobs for every laborer.

Such a condition would give workingmen a powerful lever. Labor was becoming

too powerful to be brushed aside with haughty disdain, and it would be expecting

too much of human nature to suppose that labor would not use its newly organized

power to obtain a greater share of industrial profits. Hanna told his fellow entre-

preneurs that they "must, sooner of later, grapple with the question--the serious

problem--of adjustment of these matters, instead of trying to turn back to conditions

that have passed."²⁷

The situation would also improve, declared Hanna, if each industrialist would

not only accept unions but also take an active interest in the problems of individ-

ual employees. As a beginning, the employer could choose any one of his workers,

acquaint himself with his condition, and ask, "Is there anything I can do to help

the situation?" The businessman might find, said Hanna,

that sickness or other misfortune has come to him. He is too proud to ask alms. If you

find that he and his family are suffering under these conditions, do not wait until he gets

to the poorhouse, or a committee organized by law shall ascertain these facts, but make

yourself responsible.28

Ending capital's imperious ways would not weaken its position, for there was no

better investment for a corporation than a happy, cooperative group of employees.²⁹

Hanna did more than simply plan and talk about social and economic harmony

in America. Beginning early in his career, he made a sustained effort to implement

many of his ideas, and, among the workers in the many businesses he had acquired,

Hanna earned a reputation for fairness and paternalistic benevolence. During the

1897 campaign, when the Ohioan's political opponents were slashing at that repu-

tation by calling him a "labor crusher," he let fly a ringing challenge from a

podium in Zanesville, Ohio:

Go to any one of the five thousand men in my employ . . . Ask them whether I ever pay

less than the highest going wages, ask them whether I ever asked them whether they be-

longed to a union or not ... Ask them whether, when any men or any committee of men,

26. Ibid.; quoted in Ralph M. Easley, "Senator Hanna and the Labor Problem," Independent, March

3, 1904, p. 487; Ohio State Journal, April 22, 1903; Hanna, "Socialism and the Labor Unions," 556.

27. Ibid.; Hanna, His Book, 31.

28. Hanna, "Labor and Capital," 286.

29. Hanna, "Socialism and the Labor Unions," 556; for a review of Hanna's business ventures and

background, see Croly, Hanna, 40-45, 57, 61, 63, 68-69, 85, 88.

Mark Hanna                                                                 147

came to me with a complaint if I ever refused to see them . . . Ask them if I ever in my

life intentionally wronged any workingman. I never did.³⁰

Three weeks after Hanna issued the challenge a number of testimonials ap-

peared in the Cleveland Leader. A report of an investigation conducted by T. L.

Lewis, president of the Ohio State Trades Assembly and secretary of the Ohio

Miners' Union, showed that Hanna "paid the highest standard wages for labor

performed in industries in which he was interested." A. W. Wright, a former mem-

ber of the executive board of the Knights of Labor, claimed the miners who worked

for the affluent industrialist in Michigan were the only miners in the state who

owned their own homes. Not only labor union leaders, but also entire groups of

Hanna's laborers took the time to prepare and sign resolutions, apparently of their

own free will, testifying to his munificence. The dock workers at Ashtabula Harbor,

for example, produced a signed document stating that Hanna paid them good

wages, that he always paid them on time, and that he treated them well. Hanna's

street railway workers and the boilermakers in the Globe Iron Works Company

also wrote similar statements regarding his fairness and cordiality in reviewing

their complaints and grievances. William Warner, secretary of the United Mine

Workers of the Pittsburgh district wrote that:

The true story of Mr. Hanna's attitude to his workmen and toward union labor, as far as

the mining interests in Western Pennsylvania are concerned, is that he is the best man in the

whole district to work for.

While I cannot conscientiously support Mr. Hanna in his political views, yet ... [it can-

not be said] that Senator Mark Hanna is tyrannical, mean, or pays his workmen less than

his competitors. If there were a greater number of Mark Hannas there would be less des-

titution and complaint among the coal miners.³¹

The Ohio industrialist, moreover, never opposed the formation of unions in

industries with which he was doing business or in his own, for that matter. In the

early 1870's at the time of general economic depression he promoted the develop-

ment of a national association of coal miners whose purpose was to secure decent

wages for the workers. As soon as the headquarters of the new union was opened

in Cleveland, its president, John Siney, visited various coal companies in the area

in an attempt to establish friendly relations. All of the company presidents he

visited rejected these overtures except Hanna, who was then of Rhodes and Com-

pany and had recently organized an operator's union whose purpose was to facili-

tate the arbitration of conflicts. Hanna read the miners' constitution and questioned

the officers carefully. He found that the new union advocated settling disputes

through arbitration and striking only as a last resort. When asked if they would

accept decisions of arbitration contrary to their demands, the representatives in-

dicated they would. Then Hanna wanted to know whether the union's leaders had

enough influence to get the miners to comply with an unpopular decision by ar-

bitrators. Again, they replied that under such circumstances they would do every-

thing possible to insure that the membership continued to work and not strike.

These answers seemed to satisfy Hanna. "Then," he said, "I am heartily with you,

and will do all I can to have the operators submit all questions that may arise

30. Cleveland Leader, September 25, October 2, 1897.

31. Ibid., October 15, 1897.

148                                                                   OHIO HISTORY

in the future, to the decision of a board of arbitration."³² So, as early as 1873,

Hanna had embraced collective bargaining as a means of maintaining harmony

between business and labor.

Hanna soon had an opportunity to make use of the arbitration process with

the bituminous coal miners in the Tuscarawas Valley, but with the "disastrous

consequences" referred to earlier. Toward the end of 1874 the miners were notified

that their wages would be reduced from ninety to seventy cents per ton, and they

protested vigorously. The officers of the Miners' National Association and the opera-

tors agreed to submit the question to a board of arbitration consisting of three

representatives from the miners, three from the operators union, of which Hanna

was a member, and an umpire. The decision of the umpire fixed the wages at

seventy-one cents per ton, thereby seemingly favoring the operators.³³ Many of the

miners believed that more could have been gained by striking, but at the urging

of their officers, they returned to work. The settlement, however, did not last long.

Shortly after the agreement had been reached, another coal company in the

district, which did not have members in either the miners' or operators' unions,

raised its wages nine cents above that awarded the unionized companies. As a

result, the Miners' National Association demanded further talks with Hanna's

association of operators. This time the executives of Hanna's Rhodes and Com-

pany agreed to the miners' demands and raised wages in April 1875, but reduced

them again in March 1876. Furious, the miners called a strike and occupied the

Warmington mine just south of Massillon, Ohio, of which Hanna owned an in-

terest. In a rapidly moving and unfortunate series of events, strike-breakers were

hired; a riot ensued; a top executive of the company was badly beaten; and Gov-

ernor Rutherford B. Hayes was asked to send a company of militia to protect the

strike breakers. The night the militia arrived, the embittered strikers seized the

Rhodes Company's four mines and set them on fire. Finally, after one miner was

shot and many more were arrested, the strike ended, and the employees sullenly

returned to work.³⁴ At the end of this arduous struggle, Hanna announced:

Now that we have . . . brought these law-breakers to the bar, I am willing to meet the

miners and settle this matter in a fair spirit and law-abiding manner.

Men have a right to go on strike in these coal regions if they choose to. But they have

no right to commit arson and murder.³⁵

Even though Hanna was not able to settle this labor dispute amicably, the Mas-

sillon uprising served to intensify his determination to avoid strikes. After this

experience he, more than ever, considered strikes to be dangerous, wasteful, un-

necessary, and on the whole he successfully averted them in his own businesses.³⁶

32. Andrew Roy, The History of the Coal Miners of the United States . . . (New York, 1907), 152-

159; Hanna, "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration," 23; Croly, Hanna, 91; see also a speech made

by Hanna in Cambridge, Ohio, printed in Cleveland Leader, October 2, 1897. Moreover, in 1897, John

McBride, a labor leader, Democrat, and former worker in the Hanna-owned mines, wrote that "After

the disastrous strike of 1873-74, when organization among mine workers had been practically obliter-

ated, John Seny [sic] and other officers of the Miners' National Association were not only recognized

by, but secured the cooperation of Mr. Hanna and his company in efforts to establish and maintain

the union in Ohio." Cleveland Leader, October 15, 1897.

33. Roy, Coal Miners, 163-164. Roy claims that the award was a fair one, since Rhodes and Com-

pany was the only enterprise in the valley that had not cut its wages following the panic of 1873.

34. Ibid., 164-168; Croly, Hanna, 92-95; Hanna to Hayes, June 16, 1876, in Rutherford B. Hayes

papers, Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio.

35. Quoted in Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 17, 1904.

36. See Croly, Hanna, 403-405.

Mark Hanna                                                               149

Because he felt that labor peace was vital in maintaining a climate for the growth

of American harmony, Hanna used his powers of persuasion and wide range of

influential friends to settle and prevent strikes outside his own businesses. He was

an expert "wire-puller," and could virtually cut through tons of red tape to reach

the heart of a controversy. The only requirement was that he be told the nature

of the problem before he arranged a meeting between a company and its employees

or union.³⁷ In October 1900, for example, when he was United States Senator as

well as chairman of the National Republican Committee and campaign manager

for William McKinley, Hanna helped end a strike called by the United Mine

Workers against companies in three Pennsylvania anthracite coal districts. The

strike, precipitated by demands for higher wages and for the abolition of company

stores, involved approximately 140,000 employees. Hanna, with some difficulty,

met with the presidents of the companies, defended the miners' demands, and

warned that Bryan could defeat McKinley in the upcoming election if the dispute

were not settled. The executives gradually gave in under Hanna's pressure but re-

fused to recognize the recently organized United Mine Workers, and only a two-year

truce ensued--not a settlement. Similarly, he helped avert a strike in 1900 against

the New York, New Haven, and Hartford railroad by arranging a meeting between

the owners and E. E. Clark, head of the Order of Railway Conductors. Again, in

the summer of 1901, largely through the Senator's efforts working through the

National Civic Federation, a strike was settled in the newly formed United States

Steel Corporation.³⁸

In addition to his efforts in settling labor disputes, Hanna in his later years fre-

quently promoted his view of the economic order by delivering speeches to groups

of workers and especially to capitalists. He always had many invitations to speak,

and as long as his health and strength continued, he accepted as many of these

opportunities as possible "for the purpose of talking to the business men and em-

ployers of this country just as they ought to be talked to." At the same time, he

also promoted written propaganda. On one occasion, he wrote to his friend, Ralph

Easley, secretary of the National Civic Federation, asking him to persuade a cer-

tain Mr. Adams to write an article against sympathy strikes. Easley was then to

convince Samuel Gompers to publish the article in his labor magazine. Hanna also

mentioned that he was interested in buying copies of such a treatise to distribute

among laborers.³⁹

Yet another example of Hanna's involvement in promoting better relations be-

tween business and labor was his role in the development of the Department of

Commerce. In a letter to Jacob Bennett on October 1, 1900, Hanna suggested that

'there should be a department capable of handling such situations as this [the

threatened coal strike of 1900] and this matter is being put before the President in

a very strong way.'40 By January 1902, Hanna was advocating formation of a De-

partment of Commerce and Labor which would have the power to investigate cor-

poration books and protect the rights of the workingman.41 According to Hanna,

37. Easley, "Hanna and Labor Problem," 485.

38. Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles (New York, 1936), 144-145; Cornell, Anthracite Coal

Strike, 55.

39. Ohio State Journal, April 22, 1903; William Cosgrove, "Mark Hanna as a Labor Conciliator,"

(unpublished M.A. thesis, John Carroll University, Cleveland, 1959), 32-33.

40. Quoted in Beer, Hanna, 275 fn. 5.

41. Ibid.; Croly, Hanna, 374.

Mark Hanna                                                                    151

and under his leadership the organization concentrated upon the establishment of

long range stability and compatibility between labor and capital, as well as the

mediation and conciliation of specific labor-capital disputes.⁴³ With respect to the

long range plans of the NCF, the Senator tried to make it an educational body

which would gradually teach both labor and capital how far each could go without

destroying opportunities for conciliation. Only through such education, he declared,

could the NCF eliminate the underlying hostility which existed between employer

and employee.⁴⁴ "Thus, the so-called gulf between capital and labor . . . will be

narrowed and bridged, and the danger of strikes . . . will be minimized."⁴⁵ Labor

was to learn to act through responsible trade unions and adhere to its contracts

and other agreements at all costs. In return, the NCF leaders would attempt to

gain widespread recognition of unions as permanent American institutions and

establish respect for labor leaders who presented and implemented their demands

in a reasonable and cooperative manner. In order to help achieve these ends, the

NCF, by the time of Hanna's death in 1904, had broadened its scope so that it

included annual national conferences, a monthly industrial magazine, worker wel-

fare, trade agreements, and a department of industrial economics to promote ed-

ucation. Hanna hoped that such endeavors would "lay the foundation stone of a

structure [of mutual trust between labor and capital] that will endure for all time."⁴⁶

As for the more immediate problems between labor and capital, as has been

mentioned, Hanna used the NCF as a vehicle to help allay and settle various

strikes as they arose. By November 1903, the conciliation committee of the NCF's

industrial department had sponsored about one hundred labor-capital agreements,

only eighteen of which ultimately failed. The Senator played a major part in many

of these negotiations, including the famous anthracite coal strike of 1902. Even

though these agreements were limited to the few industries where organized labor

was fairly strong, they must have been encouraging to those who favored a policy

promoting social and economic harmony in America.⁴⁷

When Hanna felt that American economic success was being jeopardized by a

number of conflict situations, he did his best, along with many other big business-

men, to maximize adjustment and minimize strife within and between the interests

of labor, managment, and the community. It was important to him that relations

between these major elements of society be based upon such principles as reason-

ableness, cooperation, efficiency, and mutual benefits. Any one group could not be

allowed, through excessive self-interest, ignorance, or perversity, to damage or per-

haps even destroy American prosperity. Mark Hanna, by using his national reputa-

tion in corporate business and politics and by using a variety of methods and de-

vices, was able to play a major part in fostering the American harmony movement.

43. Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 37; Dulles, Labor in America, 186-187.

44. Croly, Hanna, 391-392; "Senator Hanna and the Labor Capital Question," 193.

45. Interview, New York Times, December 21, 1901.

46. Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 9, 37, 38, 118; Straus, "Results, N.C.F.," 39; Easley, "Work of the

N.C.F.," 1819.

47. Ibid., 1808, 1819; Straus, "Results, N.C.F.," 39-41; Easley, "The National Civic Federation,"

Independent, LIV (August 28, 1902), 2066-2067; Croly, Hanna, 388-400; Yellen, American Labor, 149-

153; interview with several coal operators, New York Times, May 24, 1902; Marguerite Green, The

National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925 (Washington, D.C., 1956);

Robert H. Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902: A Record of Confusion," Mississippi Valley His-

torical Review, XLVIII (September 1916), 229-251; Weinstein, Corporate Ideal, 38.