Ohio History Journal

136                                              OHIO HISTORY

Taft, more than any other of his contemporaries, opposed the encroach-

ment of the federal government into the area of private enterprise be-

cause "he continued to see the world wholly in individual terms and to

believe that the protections the New Deal was offering against economic

insecurity were standing in the way of the free growth of strong, self-

reliant individuals and thriving business enterprise." Cogently summar-

izing the standard view of Taft, Roper observed: "He identified himself

with the belief that the innovations of the Democrats in the national and

international field were causes and not results of the new problems that

beset the country. By the end of the war he had become a strong rally-

ing point for those who believed the national government was headed

in the wrong direction."6

Although this general interpretation is correct in many instances, it

nonetheless needs revision. Taft may have been one of Harry S. Truman's

major political critics, and he may have played an important role in pre-

venting the adoption of the bulk of the Fair Deal, but in the important

area of housing Taft was a leading supporter and defender of the Tru-

man program. During the first four years of the Truman administration,

housing policy figured prominently in national politics. An acute hous-

ing shortage, which reached almost 5,000,000 units by mid-1946, thrust

housing into the center of the political maelstrom. The shortage caused

national attention to be focused upon the enduring problem of slum hous-

ing--an urban problem which had existed since the early nineteenth

century. By 1945, however, housing and land use experts estimated that

one of every five American families, primarily because of low income,

was forced to live in slum housing (by modern standards) and that one-

fourth of all urban areas was "blighted."⁷ Attempts at housing reform

had existed as long as the slums, but not until the 1930's did the federal

government act decisively. Primarily in hopes of reviving the prostrate

housing industry, the New Deal established the Home Owners Loan Corp-

oration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the nation's first public

housing program.⁸ Although these New Deal programs made significant

contributions to housing reform, Franklin D. Roosevelt never became

enthusiastic about them.⁹ Not so his hand-picked successor, because Harry

S. Truman made housing one of his major reform objectives and person-

ally devoted considerable attention to its progress. This unprecedented in-

terest eventually helped achieve the only major legislative victory of his

Fair Deal--the housing act of 1949.

This triumph resulted, however, because a large number of Republicans,

led by Robert A. Taft, supported the legislation in congress. The heart

of this act--810,000 units of federally subsidized public housing--seemed

to its opponents to be socialism, or even worse. Unlike most New Deal

reforms, public housing had never been absorbed into the main stream

of American life. Nonetheless, the supposed "conservative" leader not

only supported public housing but helped develop its specific programs

and even co-sponsored the legislation with two liberal Democrats. "Mr.

ROBERT A. TAFT AND PUBLIC HOUSING                            137

Republican," therefore, played a crucial role in the only significant legis-

lative victory of Truman's entire Fair Deal.

Truman and Taft were normally outspoken political foes, but they

concurred upon the need for comprehensive housing legislation in the post-

war period. Although critical of the overall tendency toward increased

federal regulation of the economy and expanded welfare programs, Taft

endorsed public housing because it filled a need which he believed the

private housing industry could not meet. "Private enterprise," Taft said

bluntly, "has never provided necessary housing for the lowest-income

groups."¹⁰ Basic to his interest in housing reform was a belief that de-

cent housing was a prerequisite for good citizenship. He saw in a happy,

healthy, well-housed family a microcosm of the democracy. Because the

family provided the cornerstone upon which the United States was erected,

good housing was vital. While many Americans rejected public housing

as foreign to American ideals and practices, Taft believed it to be the

only logical alternative to the perpetuation of slum housing.11 As originally

conceived in the Wagner housing act of 1937, however, public housing

meshed neatly with Taft's deep commitments to free enterprise, Christian

humanitarianism, and a locally rooted democracy. No tenant could live in

a public housing project if he could afford private housing, but conversely,

no family need live in a filthy tenement either; "I feel that we have an

interest in seeing that there is provided for every family in this country

at least a minimum shelter, of a decent character, which will enable the

American family to develop."12 Public housing, as a pragmatic compro-

mise between the necessity of adequate housing and a free economy, had

proved its value, Taft lectured the senate in 1949:

I myself have visited many of the public housing projects,

and they have accomplished much good. I have gone through the

city of Cleveland, where such projects have been built in some places

in what formerly were slum areas. The public-housing projects have

not only improved the condition of the people who live in them, but

they have raised the standard of the entire neighborhood. ... I be-

lieve the Congress ought to adopt the program and start the United

States toward the elimination of what I think is the greatest social

evil in the United States today.13

Taft was not, however, a wild-eyed utopian in his conception of public

housing. He viewed it solely as an expedient; ideally, of course, private

housing would provide adequate housing for all income groups. His deep-

seated commitment to the free enterprise system demanded assurances

that public housing would never invade the territory of private housing.

Any federal project would supply housing only for those unable to rent

standard housing from private owners. He viewed public housing cau-

tiously, because he did not want it to shelter one family that could afford

decent private housing. Taft carefully studied cost of living tables to

determine the minimum rent for such housing; he was determined that

ROBERT A. TAFT AND PUBLIC HOUSING                            139

1945. He encouraged detailed testimony and frequently engaged in lengthy

questioning of the long parade of witnesses. His time-consuming methods,

however, irritated Senator Wagner, who already believed, in accordance

with his 1937 housing act, that only a massive public housing program

would solve the problem of low-income housing. At one point, when Taft

announced his intention of holding further hearings, the New York Demo-

crat exclaimed in frustration, "I don't think housing needs any more

investigation; I think it needs action."19 Wagner's impatience proved

premature, however, because from the more than two thousand pages of

testimony Taft concluded that the housing industry was clearly unable

to provide low-income families with adequate housing. And, he decided,

in agreement with Wagner, that only an expansive public housing pro-

gram would provide the solution.

On August 1, 1945, Taft presented his subcommittee's report to the

senate. The subcommittee based the report upon the assumption that "from

the social point of view, a supply of good housing, sufficient to meet the

needs of all families, is essential to a sound and stable democracy." Be-

cause poor housing was a "deterrent to the development of a sound citi-

zenry," the subcommittee recommended a "comprehensive" program, with

emphasis upon public housing and urban redevelopment. The subcom-

mittee emphasized the need for many aids to private housing, but care-

fully pointed out that the continued failure of the industry to provide de-

cent housing for low-income families left the government with no al-

ternative but to expand the New Deal public housing program. "The

justification for public housing must rest on the proposition that the Fed-

eral Government has an interest in seeing that minimum standards of

housing, food, and health services are available for all members of the

community," the subcommittee concluded.20

The post-war housing movement culminated on November 14, 1945,

when Taft, together with Democrats Wagner and Allen J. Ellender of

Louisiana, introduced a detailed and complex bill embodying the major

features of the subcommittee report.21 By this time President Truman

had wholeheartedly endorsed the principles set forth in the report in his

September 6 message on reconversion. In that message Truman told the

congress that decent housing no longer could be considered a reward for

individual effort, but now should be a right inhering in every American,

regardless of income. Truman urged congress to pass appropriate legis-

lation to meet this ambitious goal. "A decent standard of housing for all

is one of the irreducible obligations of modern civilization," Truman told

the congress. "The people of the United States, so far ahead in wealth

and production capacity, deserve to be the best housed in the world. We

must begin to meet that challenge at once."22 Although Truman now

made housing reform part of his Fair Deal, Taft continued his unqualified

support of comprehensive housing legislation.

Such action by the Ohio senator, however, seemed far out of character.

His strong endorsement of public housing and his willingness to co-

140                                               OHIO HISTORY

sponsor such "leftist" legislation with the ultra-liberal New Dealer Wag-

ner, caused many explanations to appear. Most generally, they were built

upon the assumption--apparently false--that Taft was ready to sacri-

fice principle for presidential votes. The New Republic, ignoring Taft's

role as originator of the bill, said, "Taft's first step [toward securing the

nomination] was to jump on the housing bandwagon and join Senators

Wagner and Ellender in sponsoring their long-range housing bill." This

opinion journal warned that "liberals in Congress must be suspicious

of Taft bearing the gift of political support."²³ Another liberal journal,

the Nation, blandly ignored the fact that the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill

was the largest housing bill ever introduced in congress, and accused

Taft of sponsoring "a mild and watered-down housing bill" to prevent

a truly effective one from being passed.24 The National Association of

Real Estate Boards, the major lobby group opposed to the bill, did not

engage in such subtleties. This organization, through its membership

newsletter, charged Taft with fathering a "Republican New Deal," and

lamented that Taft had become converted to "socialism" in order to se-

cure labor's vote in 1948: "If a candidate believes in public housing and

thinks he must have a little of it to pacify the CIO, then he has to ac-

cept the implications. He does not any longer believe in the American

private enterprise system. He is at heart a socialist."²⁵ Earlier, the same

newsletter had observed, "The cynicism of Senator Taft and his associ-

ates who are leading the Senate away from Constitutional principles and

fair play has never been equalled in the history of any party."26  The

young liberal, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., however, saw a common-sense

approach to Taft's seemingly out-of-character support of a New Deal-

Fair Deal program. Taft's "saving grace," Schlesinger said, was a "clear-

cut logical intelligence and a basic respect for fact." After his subcom-

mittee had collected its detailed testimony, Schlesinger correctly observed,

Taft saw the need for public housing and acted accordingly.²⁷

Because of the pressing national housing shortage, the Wagner-Ellen-

der-Taft bill received overwhelming public support. The sense of urgency

was reflected in a speedy senate passage on April 15, 1946.28 The bill,

however, died in the house banking and currency committee, which was

dominated by a coalition of conservative Republicans and rural southern

Democrats. Under the skillful leadership of Republican Jesse Wolcott

of Michigan, the conservatives refused to allow the bill to go to the house

floor. At one point, the committee even refused Taft the privilege of

testifying for his own bill. Despite great pressure from the White House

and public opinion, the bill died in committee.29

In 1947, because of the election of the first Republican congress since

the Hoover administration, Taft now became the accepted leader of the

senate.30 The Ohioan continued to support the housing bill, now renamed

the Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill in deference to his majority leadership. He

found, however, that the rank and file of his party opposed the bill. Taft,

nonetheless, labored hard for the bill in 1947, but finally realized that

ROBERT A. TAFT AND PUBLIC HOUSING                            141

passage was impossible. Confronted by the virtual assurance of a repe-

tition of the previous year's action in the house banking committee, and

a general Republican discomfort over public housing, Taft decided to

abandon his bill for the year. When challenged on his failure to place

his own bill on the senate agenda, Taft with his usual candor, told the

senate that he had removed the bill from his "must" list because the pub-

lic housing feature would prevent its passage; the senate, he said, would

only waste valuable time on the bill because its consideration by the

house was unlikely.31

In the presidential election year of 1948, Taft doggedly continued his

support of housing reform, even though Truman had turned housing into

a major political issue.³2 The senate passed T-E-W on April 22 by ac-

clamation and again the bill went to the house banking committee;33

the bill's supporters hoped that the pressure of an election year would

force the committee to approve the bill. Surprisingly, this is exactly

what happened, but the rules committee promptly killed the bill.³⁴ For

three consecutive years, therefore, an important bill, which had extensive

public support and was virtually assured of easy passage, died without

the house of representatives ever having the opportunity of voting on

the measure.

The solidly entrenched anti-reform conservatism of the house bank-

ing and rules committees, which openly flouted the basic principles of

democracy and representative government, embarrassed the Republican

leaders, who had serious intentions of ending sixteen years of Democratic

occupancy of the White House. Even Taft, himself a leading presidential

aspirant, could not persuade his fellow Republicans in the lower house

to pass the bill. Wolcott, assisted by Leo Allen's rules committee, Speaker

Joe Martin, and whip Charles Halleck, presented a united front against

the bill. Republican Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont recalls the situa-

tion in his memoirs: "House sentiment was strongly against public hous-

ing. There is in my memory a clear picture of Taft backing Joe Martin

up against the wall of the Senate chamber and demanding in no uncertain

terms that the House accept the bill."35 This, as well as all other per-

suasion techniques, proved futile.

When Truman called congress back into special session after the

nominating conventions, supposedly to take emergency action on inflation

and housing, Taft bitterly criticized the move as blatantly political.36

But Truman had cleverly exposed the sharp division of counsel in the

Republican ranks--the GOP platform endorsed a comprehensive housing

program, including public housing, but its leadership in the house adam-

antly opposed such legislation. Trapped between the liberalism of their

platform and the conservatism of their congressional leadership, the Re-

publicans were simultaneously embarrassed and angered when they re-

assembled in steamy-hot Washington on July 26, or "Turnip Day," as Tru-

man said his fellow Missourians called it. Truman, the Republicans said,

had resorted to cheap Missouri politics of the Pendergast variety; several

142            OHIO HISTORY

leaders even suggested adjourning within minutes after the special ses-

sion opened.37 In a formal statement the Republican leadership denied

that housing or prices required immediate attention and condemned Tru-

man's action as the last desperate gamble of a doomed politician. The

Republicans said, however, that they would study Truman's proposals and

privately agreed to pass a housing bill, but one bereft of the controversial

public housing section. To prevent any open public split within the party

that had adopted the theme of "unity" for its presidential campaign, the

leaders decided to prevent the perennial T-E-W bill from escaping the

senate banking committee. For the sake of his party's "unity," Taft

agreed to this, but simultaneously affirmed his intention of re-introducing

the bill in 1949.38

This politically motivated compromise failed to work, however, because

two liberal Republicans, Senators Flanders and Charles Tobey of New

Hampshire, voted in committee with five Democrats to send the bill to

the senate floor. Both were deeply disturbed by what they believed to be

a denial of the democratic process, and so undermined their party's care-

fully developed plans.39 This unforeseen development placed Taft in an

unusually uncomfortable position. Because he had agreed to prevent the

bill from reaching the floor of the upper house until after the election,

the two New England insurgents forced him to oppose his own bill. Caught

squarely in the middle of his party's liberal-conservative feud, Taft stood

by his agreement. Public housing, he said, would prevent passage of the

other important provisions of the bill; a limited bill, containing many

"aids" to private housing, would be better than no bill at all. He assured

the senate that he had previously done everything possible to persuade

the house leadership to allow a vote on T-E-W. He was still for public

housing, but it was not possible then.40 Democratic vice-presidential

nominee, Senator Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, did not allow this golden

moment to pass; seldom did Taft allow himself to be trapped in such an

embarrassing position. Barkley's sarcasm filled the senate chamber. "The

Senator from Ohio," he observed, "apparently has surrendered his position.

. . . I do not myself propose to surrender my convictions."⁴¹ The Flan-

ders-Tobey revolt failed, however, but Republican "unity" had been shat-

tered on the senate floor, with an amused Harry Truman looking on. The

congress eventually passed the "Housing Act of 1948," but it contained

only minor provisions for federal loans to apartment builders. Truman's

strategy to expose the sharp cleavage in his opposition's ranks had proved

extremely successful. All he had done, he said, was to give the Republican

eightieth congress an opportunity to show the voters if it really sup-

ported its party's platform. Its refusal, he said, raised serious questions

about the sincerity of the Republican leadership.42

Taft's action on housing during the bizzare special session provided

Truman with a good example of what he considered to be Republican du-

plicity. During the ensuing campaign Truman often told his audiences

along the railroad tracks how "Taft ran out on his own bill."⁴³ "He tried

ROBERT A. TAFT AND PUBLIC HOUSING                               143

to pose as a man who wanted decent housing legislation," he told an

audience in Taft's own Cincinnati, "but after his defeat at the Republi-

can convention in Philadelphia, Taft didn't have to carry on his pretense

of caring about the needs of the people. He could act in his real character

--as a cold-hearted, cruel aristocrat."44

The Ohio senator, however, did not support housing reform purely for

political considerations, because he continued his support and sponsorship

of an expanded version of the old T-E-W bill in 1949. The bill, sponsored

this time by ten members of each party, eventually passed congress after

bitter debate; Truman signed it into law on July 15, 1949.45 This action,

the high point of Fair Deal legislation, was also the zenith for housing

reform in the United States.46 The political wars of 1948 forgotten, Taft

wrote Truman that he believed the passage of the bill to be "an historical

occasion." "I am hopeful," he wrote, "that the present Act will initiate a

program of public and private housing which will lead to a solution of

our housing difficulties, and bring about ultimately a condition in which

decent housing is available to all."47

Taft's contribution to Fair Deal housing legislation was threefold. He

gave the legislation the necessary bipartisan support to enable it to pass

the senate; about twenty Republicans followed his leadership on hous-

ing. Without these votes the bill would never have become law. Taft also

gave the bill the endorsement of responsible conservatism; frequently,

liberals cited Taft as an example of an enlightened conservative who saw

public housing in its correct perspective.48 Finally, Taft served as a

brake upon more avid public housing enthusiasts, who preferred a far

more expansive program, which probably would have alienated many

moderates who supported the bill. Many conservatives, however, did not

follow Taft's leadership, and as they watched his actions in near-disbelief,

could only mutter, "Taft is becoming a damn Socialist."49

THE AUTHOR: Richard O. Davies is

an assistant professor of history at Ari-

zona State College, Flagstaff. He is the

author also of "Whistle-Stopping Through

Ohio," an account of President Truman's

campaign tour of Ohio in 1948, which ap-

peared in the July 1962 issue of Ohio His-

tory.