Taft, MacArthur, and the
Establishment
Of Civil Government in the
Philippines
By RALPH ELDIN MINGER*
ON APRIL 17, 1900, a brilliant, golden,
sunny day, the
United States Army Transport Hancock
with the Second
Philippine Commission on board pulled
away from the
crowded dock at San Francisco,
California, while whistles
shrieked a shrill farewell and the air
rang with enthusiastic
cheers.1 The boat had barely
passed through San Francisco
Harbor when the commissioners began to
hold their first meet-
ing.2 All of them realized
the stern nature of their task. The
physical character of the Philippine
Islands, the nature of its
people, the uncertain social and
political conditions prevailing,
and a host of other factors made the
work of pacifying the
islands and creating a civil government
complex. For William
* Ralph Eldin Minger is an assistant
professor of history at San Fernando
Valley State College.
1 Herbert S. Duffy, William Howard
Taft (New York, 1930), 86.
2 William Howard Taft was the president
of the commission. The other four
members were Vice Governor Luke E.
Wright of Tennessee, a Democrat and
former attorney general of that state;
Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, a zoologist
on the faculty of the University of
Michigan and the only member of the commis-
sion who had ever been in the
Philippines; Henry Clay Ide of Vermont, formerly
chief justice of the United States Court
in Samoa and therefore a man with some
experience in colonial government; and
Bernard Moses of California, a professor
of history at the University of
California and a writer of note on the history of
the Spanish colonies in America. W.
Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands
(Boston, 1928), I, 124-125; Henry F.
Pringle, The Life and Times of William
Howard Taft (New York, 1939), I, 165. The appointments of all the
members
of the Philippine Commission were dated
March 16, 1900. Dean C. Worcester,
The Philippines Past and Present (New York, 1930), 269.
The First Philippine Commission,
appointed by President McKinley in Janu-
ary 1899 to study political conditions
in the newly acquired islands and make
recommendations for their government,
had a life of only one year.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 309
Howard Taft, president of the
commission, it represented the
beginning of two decades in which much
of his time, energy,
and thought was devoted to the problems
created by an
increased American participation in
world affairs. The star of
Taft was rising. At the time of his
appointment to the com-
mission, the New York Times, after
a brief resume of Judge
Taft's record, described it as one
"of continuous and brilliant
success."3
Actually, Taft's was a placid star, not
a comet against the
judicial and political sky. Born on
September 15, 1857, in
Cincinnati, Ohio,4 he
graduated with distinction from Yale on
June 27, 1878, the faculty of the
university appointing him
salutatorian because he ranked second
in scholarship in a class
of 132.5 It was preordained, of course,
that William Howard
should study law upon his graduation
from Yale, for as his
younger brother Horace observed later,
"all of us Tafts went
into the law as naturally as we went
from junior year to senior
year in college."6 So
turning westward, Taft went back to
Cincinnati, where in 1880 he received
his law degree from the
Cincinnati Law School and was admitted
to the Ohio bar.7
This was followed by a period of years
in which he engaged
in politics, held various minor
political offices, practiced law,
and toured Europe.8 He went
on the bench in March 1887,
when Governor Joseph B. Foraker
appointed him to the
superior court of Cincinnati for the unfinished
term of Judge
Judson Harmon, who had resigned. After
serving the unex-
pired term of fourteen months, Taft was
renominated by the
Republican party and in April 1888 was
elected for a five-year
term.9 In 1889 President
Benjamin Harrison offered him the
3 New York Times, February 7, 1900.
4 Robert Lee Dunn, William
Howard Taft, American (Boston, 1908), 262.
Dunn's book carries a two-page appendix summarizing the
chief events in Taft's
life to 1908.
5 Pringle, Taft, I, 44; Dunn, Taft,
262.
6 Horace Dutton Taft, Memories
and Opinions (New York, 1942), 48.
7 Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 268. Hereafter cited as D.A.B.
8 Ibid., 266.
9 Francis McHale, President and Chief
Justice: The Life and Public Service of
William Howard Taft (Philadelphia, 1931), 45. Taft won by a vote of 21,025
to
14,844 over William Disney, the
Democratic candidate. Ibid. This was the only
310
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
post of solicitor general of the United
States, and Taft
accepted, assuming office on February
4, 1890.10 Then, on
March 21, 1892, he resigned from this
position to become
United States circuit judge for the
sixth judicial circuit and
ex-officio member of the circuit court
of appeals of the sixth
circuit, which included Cincinnati.11
Taft had served eight
years on the federal bench when, on
February 6, 1900,
President William McKinley announced
his appointment as
president of the Second Philippine
Commission, a post he had
not sought.12
Henry F. Pringle, his biographer,
states that Taft knew
"as much--and as little--about the
Philippine Islands as the
average American."13 At
a later date, Taft admitted that this
was indeed the case.14 This did not
mean, however, that Taft
was totally devoid of ideas about the
Philippines. Before leav-
ing the United States, he had formed
some rather general con-
ceptions as to what the commission
needed to accomplish.
When the commission had convinced the
Filipinos of its desire
to give them individual liberty and a
large measure of political
self-government, Taft felt that they
would become more
tractable than they had been up to
then.15 He thought it
especially important that the Filipinos
have the benefits of all
the constitutional guarantees of
individual liberty contained
in the state and federal constitutions
in the United States. He
believed firmly that the restoration of
peaceful conditions and
the establishment of a successful
government were not the
work "of a day, or a week, or a
month, or indeed of a year"
but rather that of several years of
intensive work.16
office, except for the presidency of the
United States, which Taft achieved by
popular vote. D.A.B., XVIII,
266-267.
10 D.A.B., XVIII, 267.
11 Pringle, Taft, I, 122.
12 New York Times, February
7, 1900; Duffy, Taft, 79; Pringle, Taft, I, 159-
160.
13 Pringle, Taft, I, 157.
14 Address at Nashua, New
Hampshire, February 19, 1908. William Howard
Taft Papers, Library of Congress.
15 Taft to Harrison Gray Otis, April 14,
1900. Taft Papers. All letters subse-
quently cited are in this collection
unless indicated otherwise.
16 Taft to E. B. McCagg, April 16, 1900.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 311
During the voyage to the Philippines,
the Hancock made
stops at Honolulu, Yokohama, and Hong
Kong.17 The re-
ports received at every port by the
commission from individ-
uals familiar with conditions in the
Philippines stressed two
themes--that public affairs had been
woefully mismanaged by
the American authorities and that any
hope of achieving
pacification in the islands soon was
unfounded.18 Taft was
disturbed in particular by information
that the United States
Army was disgusted with the Filipinos
because they fought a
bush type of warfare and had come to
regard them as and
treat them like "niggers."19
Such social prejudice appeared
to be especially strong among the
"ladies of the Army," and
the commission proposed to end it as
quickly as possible. In
general, Taft feared that the conduct of
the United States
Army toward the natives had not been as
conciliatory as it
should have been.
There was one ray of hope in an
otherwise depressing situa-
tion. On arriving at Hong Kong, Taft
sent a cable to Major
General Arthur MacArthur, the military
governor in the
Philippines.20 In reply, Taft
and his fellow commissioners
received a reassuring response:
"Cordial greeting and warm
welcome await the commission."21
The members of the com-
mission were very glad to receive this
cable because, as Taft
reasoned, "it argues strongly that
MacArthur intends to co-
operate as fully as he can with the
commission, and that he
does not intend to pursue the policy
which Otis22 pursued of
ignoring the old commission, and making
light of its efforts."23
17 Duffy,
Taft, 86.
18 Taft to Helen H. Taft, May 30, 1900.
19 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 2,
1900.
20 Ibid.
21 Taft
to Helen H. Taft, May 31, 1900.
22 The reference is to Major General Elwell S. Otis, who was designated
military governor of the Philippine
Islands on August 29, 1898. On May 5, 1900,
General Otis was relieved at his own
request and returned to the United States.
General MacArthur was selected to
succeed him. Forbes, The Philippine Islands,
I, 74, 102. General Otis was famed for his inefficiency
and indecision. As General
MacArthur once put it, "Otis is a
locomotive bottom side up, with the wheels
revolving at full speed." Clark Lee and Richard
Henschel, Douglas MacArthur
(New York, 1952), 19.
23 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 2,
1900.
312
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
The solicitude and warmth of General
MacArthur seemed
to augur well for a spirit of cooperation and
compromise
between the commission and the military
regime. In personali-
ties Taft and MacArthur could not have
presented a more
striking contrast. And in order to
provide a full background
for subsequent developments, it is
necessary to delineate briefly
the character and background of the
colorful general.
Arthur MacArthur's military career
encompassed the life
of the United States Army from Fort
Sumter through the
Spanish-American War.24 Born
in New England, raised in
Wisconsin, he had enlisted in the Union
army in 1862, when
only seventeen years old.25 Covering
himself with distinction
in some of the key battles of the Civil
War, he had achieved
the rank of colonel of volunteers at
the age of twenty.26 For
valor at Missionary Ridge, the major
commanding the
Twenty-Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers
recommended the
Medal of Honor for Arthur MacArthur,
but it was not
awarded to him until June 30, 1890.27 At war's end
he dedi-
cated himself to regular army service
in what subsequently
was to prove one of the dreariest
periods in all of United
States military history.28 It
was perhaps an unusual choice,
coming as it did at a time when
ambitious men of caliber found
more lucrative and fruitful outlets for
their talents in industry
and finance. At the outbreak of the
Spanish-American War,
Colonel MacArthur was made a brigadier
general, being
advanced shortly thereafter to the rank
of major general.29
MacArthur was an active participant in
the battles with the
Spaniards in the Philippines, led most
of the big campaigns
24 Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the
President and the Future of American
Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), 24.
25 Francis
Trevelyan Miller, General Douglas MacArthur: Fighter for Freedom
(Philadelphia, 1942), 23-25.
26 Lee
and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 15; Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story
of Douglas MacArthur (New York, 1954), 6.
27 Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 15. Apparently the
recommendation
for a Medal of Honor was buried and lost
in the whirl of events. In a review of
Civil War medals almost three decades
later the oversight was corrected. Hunt,
The Untold Story of Douglas
MacArthur, 5.
28 Rovere
and Schlesinger, The General and the President, 24.
29 New York Times, September 6, 1912.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 313
against Aguinaldo's insurrectos, and
emerged a national
hero.30
Never renowned for his economy in the
use of words,
General Arthur MacArthur had a flair
for the flamboyant and
the grandiloquent.31 Long accustomed to authority, he
was
quite naturally impatient with the
seemingly laborious process
of civilian law and order. As a strong
commander he harbored
powerful convictions about personal
government, especially in
the remote regions of American control,
and may well have
rationalized the psychological
importance of an "emperor"
figure upon the Orientals.32
On June 3, 1900, a blistering, hot,
tropical Sunday, the
Hancock anchored in Manila Bay and the commissioners re-
tired to the ship's cabin to await the
arrival of Major General
MacArthur.33 Instead,
however, the general sent his launch to
bring the five commissioners ashore and
an artillery battalion
escorted them to the Ayuntamiento, the
civil building of the
city of Manila, where General MacArthur
had his headquar-
ters. General MacArthur extended a
formal but most cordial
welcome to the members of the
commission and an hour later
he came out to the Hancock to
return their call.34 Taft thought
him "a pleasant looking man, very
self-contained." The next
day Taft and MacArthur had lunch
informally at Malacanan
Palace.35 Although he
suggested that the commission find
offices elsewhere than in the
Ayuntamiento, the general did not
press the point and soon arranged separate
offices for each
commissioner in that building which
were "pleasant and
30 Miller, General Douglas MacArthur,
67-68; Rovere and Schlesinger, The
General and the President, 24-25.
31 For
one who had distinguished himself in a judicial career, Taft may well have
appeared as plain and pedestrian--while
a strange irony of history was to place him
in juxtaposition to his complete
antithesis. However, the antagonism that arose
between the two men, as the narrative
will conclusively demonstrate, developed
only gradually over an extended period
of time.
32 Although this comment may appear
unfair to the general, it would seem that
he was not averse to supplying his own
person to fulfill the image. However, it is
doubtful that the Filipinos thought in
terms of an "emperor" figure.
33 Pringle, Taft, I, 167-169.
34 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 3, 1900.
35 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 5, 1900.
314
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
cool."36 He even helped
Taft to find a suitable residence.
After having been in Manila slightly
more than a week, Taft
indicated in a family letter that
General MacArthur had been
"exceedingly cordial, and I find
him a very satisfactory man
to do business with."37 And
in a letter to President McKinley,
Taft noted that General MacArthur had
been "most courteous
and anxious in every way to cooperate
with us to bring about
the end we both have in view."38
Taft's initial estimate of
conditions in the Philippines was
sober, optimistic, and firm:
The situation in Manila is perplexing.
You meet men who are com-
pletely discouraged at it; you meet men
who are conservative but very
hopeful of good results; and you meet
men who have roseate views of
the situation. My own impression is that
the back of the rebellion is
broken, and that the state of robbery
and anarchy which exists in the
islands where the soldiers are not in
control has induced a number of
leading generals, quite a number of whom
have been captured, to take
the view that surrender is the best
course. This is perhaps an optimistic
view . . . and I believe there is more reason to
believe in it this time
than any time before. I am very anxious
that civil government shall be
established. The Army is a necessary
evil, but it is not an agent to
encourage the establishment of a
well-ordered civil government, and the
Filipinos are anxious to be rid of
policing by shoulder straps. . . . We
shall be here two months at least before
we assume the powers that are
given us, and in that time we shall have
occasion to make many inves-
tigations.39
The Philippine commission came to
Manila armed with a
lengthy set of instructions, drafted
principally by Elihu Root
as the secretary of war,40 and issued
by the president only ten
days before they sailed from San
Francisco. Basically, these
instructions established the principle
that the Filipinos were to
have the widest possible control over
their own affairs.41
36 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 13, 1900.
37 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 12,
1900.
38 Taft to William McKinley, June 15, 1900. William McKinley Papers,
Library
of Congress.
39 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 12,
1900.
40 Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938), I, 354.
41 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the
Annual Message of the President, House
Documents, 56 cong., 1 sess., No. 1,
pp. xxxiv-xxxix.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 315
They authorized the transfer, on
September 1, 1900, of all
legislative power in the Philippines
from the military governor
to the commission, which for its part
was to establish provin-
cial and municipal governments and
prepare the central gov-
ernment for complete transfer to
civilian authority. The com-
mission was instructed to remember that
the government they
were to create was designed for the
happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the Filipinos, and the
measures they adopted
should conform to the fullest extent
possible, consonant with
just and effective government, to the
customs, habits, and
even prejudices of the people of the
Philippine Islands. At the
same time, the instructions continued,
the Filipinos were to be
reminded that their experience in
government was meager,
and that the United States adhered to
certain basic principles
of government considered essential to
the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual liberty. If these
principles of gov-
ernment should conflict with local laws
of procedure and
customs, then the latter must give way.
The instructions care-
fully set forth a bill of rights
similar to the amendments to the
United States Constitution. but
generally the main body of
Philippine laws was to be maintained
with as little interference
as possible. In short, they were much
more than instructions
to a commission--"they were the
outline and the framework
within which the civil government of
the Philippines was to
be formed and to
develop."42
The instructions were also, in the apt
phrase of one author-
ity, "thick with
paternalism," but considering the general out-
look of the McKinley administration and
the expansionist
sentiment in the United States, they
were surprisingly
liberal.43 With the
perspective provided by the passage of more
than half a century and an increased
and clearer knowledge of
the issues, conflicts, and passions
involved, they stand quite
well the test of critical examination
and evaluation. As was to
be expected, many Filipinos were not
satisfied. The heart of
their argument was stated succinctly by
one of their greatest
42 Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 354.
43 David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York, 1947), 85.
316
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
statesmen, Ramon Magsaysay, when he
wrote, "There is no
substitute for complete
self-government."44
The independence issue overshadowed all
others that Taft
was to face in the Philippines. Before
the end of his first
month in the islands, he had formulated
some tentative con-
clusions on the subject. The idea that
the Filipinos could
govern themselves, was, Taft felt,
ill-founded.45 They were
in many respects, he found,
"nothing but grown up children,"
who would need the training of
"fifty or a hundred years"
before they would realize what
Anglo-Saxon liberty was.
Of the educated ones among them, most
were "profound
Constitutional lawyers," who could
discuss "with eloquence
and volume" American
constitutional questions and were
"most glib in running off the
Phrases." Unfortunately, how-
ever, they had not the slightest
conception of practical ques-
tions and how to solve them.
By the middle of July 1900 Taft was
sufficiently sure of his
conclusions to write directly to the
secretary of war, Elihu
Root, about his wards:
The population of the Islands is made up
of a vast mass of ignorant,
superstitious people, well intentioned,
light-hearted, temperate, some-
what cruel, domestic and fond of their
families, and deeply wedded to
the Catholic Church. They are easily
influenced by speeches from a
small class of educated meztizos, who
have acquired a good deal of
superficial knowledge of the general
principles of free government, who
are able to mouth sentences supposed to
embody constitutional law, and
who like to give the appearance of
profound analytical knowledge of
the science of government. They are
generally lacking in moral charac-
ter; are with some notable exceptions
prone to yield to any pecuniary
consideration, and are difficult persons
out of whom to make an honest
government. We shall have to do the best
we can with them. They are
born politicians; are as ambitious as
Satan, and as jealous as possible
of each other's preferment. I think that
we can make a popular assembly
out of them for the Islands provided we
restrain their action by a legis-
lative council to be appointed by the
Governor, and a qualified veto for
the Governor, if we can take 18 months
or 2 years as a preliminary
44 Ramon Magsaysay, "Roots of
Philippine Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXV
(1956), 31.
45 Taft to John M. Harlan, June 30,
1900. The quotations in the remainder of
this paragraph are drawn from this revealing letter.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 317
period during which the Commission, with
some representative Fili-
pinos, shall legislate for the Islands.46
Even before the arrival of the
commission in the Philip-
pines, Taft had hoped that the United
States Senate would
pass the Spooner bill, which in essence
provided for the
establishment of civilian control in
the Philippines, and that
the house of representatives would
concur.47 He felt that the
passage of this measure would give the
commission the addi-
tional sanction of congressional
action, which would prove to
be important in its work. Subsequent
events were to vindicate
Taft in the importance that he attached
to this measure.48
Two days after the arrival of the
Philippine commission in
Manila, MacArthur suggested to the war
department that an
offer of "complete immunity for
past and liberty for future"
be made to all those Filipinos who had
not violated the laws
of war and who would renounce
insurrection and accept the
sovereignty of the United States.49
President McKinley agreed
46 Taft to Elihu Root, July 14, 1900.
47 Taft
to Charles P. Taft, April 23, 1900. In January 1900 Senator John C.
Spooner of Wisconsin had introduced a
bill which provided that, after the Philip-
pine insurrection had been suppressed,
the president, until the congress provided
otherwise, should have "all
military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern
the said islands," with the powers being
"vested in such persons and . . . exercised
in such manner as the President . . .
shall direct for maintaining and protecting
the inhabitants of said islands in the
free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and
religion." Garel A. Grunder and
William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the
United States (Norman, Okla., 1951), 73. This bill met stiff
resistance in the
senate. Many senators, led by George F.
Hoar of Massachusetts, opposed any bill
which by implication indicated our
intention of remaining in the Philippines. Ibid.
In addition, many congressmen were
perfectly content to let the president admini-
ster the islands under his powers as
commander-in-chief of the army. Finally, the
bill was redrafted as an amendment to an
army appropriation bill by Secretary
Root and Senators Lodge and Spooner and
became law on March 2, 1901. John A.
Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A
Biography (New York, 1953), 207. This amend-
ment transferred the government from a
military to a civilian basis. Thereafter,
the president was to govern the
Philippines by authority of congress, and not in
his capacity as commander-in-chief of
the military forces. Maximo M. Kalaw,
Philippine Government (Manila, 1948), 68-69. The Spooner amendment thus
"ended the military regime in the
Philippines." Arturo M. Tolentino, The Govern-
ment of the Philippines (Manila, 1950), 156.
48 It is interesting to note that the
projected frame of government for the Philip-
pines, including an elected assembly, a
legislative council, and a qualified veto for
the governor, recapitulates our own
colonial experience, except that the Filipinos
were now placed in the role of the
colonials.
49 Grunder and Livezey, The
Philippines and the United States, 65.
318
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
with this suggestion after expanding the
proposal by pro-
viding a ninety-day period for
acceptance of these terms and
authorizing the payment of thirty pesos
to each Filipino who
presented to the military authorities a
rifle in good condition.
General MacArthur issued this amnesty
proclamation on
June 21, 1900.50 Taft was not sure how
much good it would
do but remained hopeful. However, as he
watched MacArthur
negotiate with the various Filipino
factions, he began to have
misgivings. Although he made allowances
for the fact that
the general had been ill, yet Taft did
not believe him "as keen
witted" and
"clear-headed" as was mandatory in dealing with
such political matters.51 As
for MacArthur's censoring of a
reporter's dispatch which was critical
of his role in these nego-
tiations, Taft found such action
"revolting" and "utterly un-
American."52 And when it
appeared that MacArthur resented
the commission's efforts to investigate
other matters, Taft
predicted trouble for the future.53
He was certain of it upon
learning that the military governor was
asking the war depart-
ment to diminish the commission's power
of appointment, for
such action contained "the seed of
a controversy" between the
civil and military authorities.54
Taft's critical view of General
MacArthur's abilities and
actions soon received ample confirmation
in the latter's han-
dling of an important insurgent leader,
Pedro A. Paterno.55
After being released on parole in early
July 1900 on the
strict understanding that he was not to
engage in any activi-
ties hostile to the United States,
Paterno had written an
article in the Philippine newspaper El
Progreso advocating
50 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 21, 1900.
51 Taft to Helen H. Taft, June 27, 1900.
52 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 5, 1900.
53 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 8, 1900.
54 Taft
to Helen H. Taft, July 18, 1900.
55 Pedro A. Paterno had served in the
cabinet of Emilio Aguinaldo during the
short-lived Philippine Republic of 1897,
was second in authority to Aguinaldo, and
had acted as the representative of the insurrectos in
negotiating the pact of Biac-
na-bato of December 14, 1897, which
ended the insurrection of 1896. Taft to
Charles P. Taft, July 7, 1900; Taft to
Charles P. Taft, July 25, 1900; Kalaw,
Philippine Government, 43-44.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 319
independence under an American
protectorate.56 Clapped in
jail again for this indiscretion,
Paterno quickly repented and
was once again put at liberty.57 Resourceful
and infinitely
imaginative, he now proposed a
three-day grand fiesta, which,
in the Philippine tradition, would be
replete with music,
speeches, fireworks, marching, and
dancing.58 This fiesta,
intended as a celebration of the
amnesty granted by General
MacArthur and designed to eclipse any
previous festival in
Philippine history, was suggested as an
event of pure enter-
tainment and good will.59 Since
the proclaimed purpose of the
festival was the promotion of the cause
of peace and because
"if there is one thing more than
another that a Filipino likes,
it is a fiesta," Taft gave his
approval.60 As he wrote to Secre-
tary Root:
The fiesta which is coming off,
if it does not result in a fiasco, as I
hope it may not, will be quite an
important event, in that it brings home
to the people the fact that peace is
near at hand, and is a recognition by
them that they would like to have peace.61
The fiesta was scheduled to begin on
July 28, 1900. That
morning Taft learned that Paterno and
others among the
Philippine leaders had written speeches
advocating the cause
of independence and at the very least a
protectorate relation-
ship between the United States and the
Philippines.62 Accord-
ingly, he declined to attend a banquet
prepared for the first
evening and by way of a rebuke wrote
the following to
Paterno:
We are advised that a number of the
speeches which have been sub-
mitted to you for delivery this evening
in express terms support the
view that an independent government
should be established in these
56 Taft to Charles P. Taft, June 30, 1900; Taft to Root, July 26, 1900;
Taft to
Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.
57 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.
58 Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 25, 1900; Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.
59 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900;
Duffy, Taft, 97-98.
60 Taft to Root, July 26, 1900.
61 Ibid.
62 Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.
320
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Islands under the protectorate of the
United States. . . . In other words,
that the United States should assume responsibility to
the world for a
government in which it could exercise no
direct influence.
No one having any authority to speak for
the United States has ever
said one word justifying the belief that
such a protectorate will be estab-
lished. It is impossible. We of the
Commission who are sent here with
instructions to establish a civil
government have no authority whatever
to consider or discuss such a proposal.
By destroying the power of Spain in
these Islands, and accepting the
sovereignty thereof, the United States
assumed a responsibility to the
world to establish here a civilized
government of law and order, which
should duly respect the rights of all,
whether foreigners or natives. It
proposes to meet this responsibility by making a
government in which
the citizens of the Islands shall
exercise as large a measure of self-
government as is consistent with the establishment of
law and order.
. . . Further than this the government
of the United States will not go.63
Taft finally went to the banquet after
Paterno appeared at
his house and entreated him to come, but
it was held under
such restricted conditions, no speeches
being allowed, that the
affair turned out to be a fiasco.64
Although Taft's position in
this matter appears to have been, and was, in fact,
arbitrary,
it was a reflection of a basic
conviction--that the Filipinos
would have to go through a period of
tutelage before they
could assume fully the responsibilities
entailed in complete
self-government. The outcome of the
banquet measurably
lessened his respect for MacArthur.
Taft felt that Mac-
Arthur, who bore the official
responsibility, had bungled in not
keeping firm control over the affair,
especially in regard to the
political content of projected
speeches.65 He came to hold a
diminished regard for the general's
political astuteness and
his grip on the situation.
To Mrs. Taft he poured out his
discouragement with
MacArthur and particularly the problems
their relationship
would pose for the success of his
mission.66 The more he had
to do with the general, "the
smaller man of affairs" he thought
63 Taft to
Pedro A. Paterno, July 28, 1900.
64 Taft
to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.
65 Taft
to Root, July 30, 1900; Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.
66 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 321
him. "I have no doubt that he is a
good soldier but his experi-
ence and his ability as a statesman or
politician are nothing,"
he wrote. In a caustic comment he noted
that MacArthur had
"all the angularity of military
etiquette and discipline and he
takes himself with the greatest
seriousness." In this instance
Taft appeared to have been less liberal
than the general, but
MacArthur, once roused to the political
implications of the
fiesta, proposed measures which
appeared to Taft to be "al-
most brutal in their severity."
MacArthur felt that the ban-
quet should be suppressed unless Taft
were willing to attend,
and proposed to arrest any Filipino who
made speeches offen-
sive to American officials.67 In
the end when Taft attended the
banquet, it was in order to "let
the matter down easy."68 This
was perhaps indicative of his deeply
entrenched conservatism,
his avoidance of extremes--on the one
hand, he would not hold
out false hopes of immediate
independence and democracy, nor
would he, on the other hand, impose a
policy of brutal re-
pression.
But the central disagreement between
the two men came
over the fundamental question of how
soon civil rule should
be established. While Taft and the
other members of the com-
mission hoped that many towns and
provinces might soon be
given civil governments, American
soldiers, engaged in a grim
and thankless jungle war, were deeply
skeptical.69 Taft had
characterized the Filipinos as
our "little brown brothers," but
Robert F. Morrison, writing in the
Manila Sunday Sun,
countered with a piece of doggerel that
mirrored the senti-
ments of many American soldiers:
I'm only a common soldier-man in the
blasted Philippines;
They say I've got Brown Brothers here,
but I dunno what it means.
I like the word Fraternity, but still I
draw the line;
67 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900;
Taft to Charles P. Taft, July 30, 1900.
68 Taft to Helen H. Taft, July 29, 1900.
69 Taft to Root, July 26, July 30, 1900; Forbes, The Philippine Islands,
I, 125;
Worcester, The Philippines Past and
Present, 273; Ernest L. Klein, Our Appoint-
ment with Destiny: America's Role on
the World Stage (New York, 1952), 119;
John Holladay Latane, America as a
World Power, 1897-1907 (New York, 1907),
82-99; Lee and Henschel, Douglas MacArthur, 18-23.
322
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
He may be a brother of William H.
Taft, but he ain't no friend
of mine.70
Alarmed by what he viewed as widespread
Filipino disaffec-
tion, MacArthur took a dim view of the
commission's optimis-
tic proposal that a native constabulary
would inspire popular
support for the military campaign
against the insurrectos.71
The general, Taft informed Secretary
Root, "regards all the
people as opposed to the American forces
and looks at his task
as one of conquering eight millions of
recalcitrant, treacherous
and sullen people."72 Despite verbal
allegiance to the theory of
civil control, MacArthur appeared to
trust only "the strong
hand of the military." Taft
believed that the proper exercise
of police powers was an integral part of
the preparation
needed by the Filipinos toward the
ultimate goal of stable self-
government.73 And in this respect he did
not seem to fear the
possibilities of sabotage in the actual
operations of the force.
In 1901 the commission organized the
Philippine constabulary
and in due course the constabulary was
to justify the confi-
dence placed in it by the commission.74
As the first of September 1900 drew
near, the date on which
the commission was to take up its legislative
functions, the
members of the commission formally
expressed their desire
for harmony with the military
government.75 MacArthur
was receptive to an invitation to attend
commission meetings
and even proposed a conference to
resolve points of friction in
their relationship.76 At this juncture Secretary Root stepped
into the picture to clarify the
boundaries of authority between
the military and the commission. His
explanation that the
commission's power of appointment
included the power of re-
70 Mark Sullivan, Our Times (New York, 1926-35), I, 7.
71 Taft to Root, July 30, November 30, 1900; Taft to J. B. Bishop,
November 30,
1900.
72 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.
73 Taft to Root, July 30, 1900.
74 Forbes, The Philippine
Islands, 203-207; Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philip-
pines: A Study in National
Development (New York, 1942), 733-734.
75 Taft to Arthur MacArthur, August 23, 1900. Elihu Root Papers, Library of
Congress.
76 MacArthur to Taft, August 24, 1900. Root Papers.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 323
moval, while helpful, was
counterbalanced by his confirmation
of the military governor's full control
over civil officials.77
Actually Root did not clarify the
important question of where
ultimate authority lay. Thus mutually
reassured, Taft and
MacArthur conferred on August 30, 1900,
and as Taft re-
ported to Root,
the General expressed himself as
disliking much the cutting down of the
power of the military Governor and
transferring it to the Commission,
but he said that he was very anxious to
assist in every way the Admini-
stration and to carry out its purposes,
but that the Commission was an
anomalous body and that the plan was
likely to result in discord unless
there was hearty co-operation, which he
proposed to give and that he
was willing to abide any construction
put upon the instructions.78
Nevertheless, on a basic issue of
policy like the constabulary
question, MacArthur was still
"very, very, sensitive." For his
part, Taft was scornful of MacArthur
for being "weak
enough to express great personal
humiliation in having his
power as Military Governor cut down in
this wise and to give
us the opportunity to know how anxious
he has been to avoid
the transfer."
It was apparent to Taft that MacArthur
was exceedingly
jealous of his prerogatives as military
governor. In fact as
Taft reported to Elihu Root, MacArthur
now felt that the
office of military governor had been
"mediatized."79 By way
of explanation, Taft said that MacArthur
felt he had suffered
a deep and painful personal humiliation
in the loss of power
and authority he had been accustomed to
exercising and which
he had felt to be his due. In a letter
to his brother Charles,
William Howard related the growing
estrangement between
the two men, which he attributed to the
"formality and mili-
tary etiquette" which MacArthur
insisted upon observing
with the commission, coupled with
"certain sensitive points"
by the general on matters of policy.80 Taft felt convinced that
77 Root
to Taft, August 28, 1900. Root Papers.
78 Taft
to Root, August 31, 1900. The two quotations in the following paragraph
are taken from this important letter.
79 Taft to Root, September 18,
1900.
80 Taft to Charles P. Taft, August 31, 1900.
324
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
the vast majority of Filipinos were
desirous of ending military
control because of its "abrupt and
unconciliatory character,"
and confessed that he himself felt
"impatient at it."81 Nor
were relations helped by the fact that
General MacArthur
gave "no social recognition of the
presence of the Commission
here."82
In the uncertain stalemate that existed
between general and
judge, the latter enjoyed one supreme
advantage, which a more
authoritarian personality might have
employed with deadly
effect. After all, it was Taft who
could write at all times to
Secretary Root explaining his side of the
case.83 Such com-
munication was apparently foreclosed to
MacArthur, whose
channel was limited to his military
superiors in Washington.
And it should be noted that Taft was a
voluminous corres-
pondent, who left no phase of the
Philippine situation un-
touched in his letters to the secretary
of war. Had he been
bent upon the destruction of General
MacArthur, he certainly
had every opportunity for accomplishing
this purpose. Yet, as
he stated to Secretary Root, he wished
to do MacArthur "full
justice," and within the
limitations of human frailty he ap-
pears actually to have attempted to do
exactly that.84
Why did Taft not urge upon the
secretary of war the im-
mediate transfer of all powers in the
Philippines to civilian
hands-thus, in effect, abolishing
MacArthur's governmental
powers? The probable answer lies in
Taft's innate caution,
for he felt that "the change to a
civil government should be
made with care and deliberation."85 At this time, it must be
81 Ibid.
82 Taft to Charles P. Taft, September
12, 1900.
83 One writer described the enormous
powers exercised by Secretary Root in the
following manner: "The power of the
Secretary of War in the new possessions
was unlimited. His brief cable was law;
his verbal utterance to an Army officer
about to take charge of a province or an
island was as binding as a sealed and signed
decree. Through the governors-general or
the military commanders the Secretary
was the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary for the millions of people in
the Philippines and in Cuba."
Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding:
A Personal Narrative, Covering a Third of a Century,
1888-1921 (New York
1922), I, 256.
84 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.
85 Taft to Gustavus H. Wald, September 7, 1900.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 325
remembered, he was in the process of
formulating his con-
ceptions of administrative policy and wanted to avoid
a pre-
mature transfer of authority. He was feeling his way
in an
area in which there were no precedents
as guideposts--and as
was characteristic of the conservative
jurist, he was not going
to take precipitate action.
For all of his reservations about the
general, Taft did indi-
cate in his correspondence some of the
positive features of the
military governor. Thus he pointed out
that MacArthur was
strongly in favor of cultivating the
good will of the Filipinos,
and the failure of other military
officers to take such a course
met with strong opposition from the
general.86 In addition,
Taft credited MacArthur with being
hostile to the tendency
of many military officers and their
wives "to draw the color
line" in dealings with the
Filipinos. As for MacArthur's gen-
eral military abilities, his bearing,
his devotion to duty, and
his personal qualities, Taft had only
the highest of praise.87
But the basic difference between the
two men was continu-
ing and profound. Taft summed up his
attitude in one highly
concentrated sentence:
General MacArthur is a very courtly,
kindly man; lacking somewhat
in a sense of humor; rather fond of
profound generalizations on the
psychological conditions of the people;
politely incredulous, and politely
lacking in any great consideration for
the views of any one as to the
real situation who is a civilian and who
has been here only a compara-
tively short time, and firmly convinced
of the necessity for maintaining
military etiquette in civil matters and
civil government.88
An uncertain stalemate was the
significant aspect of the
status of the military governor and the
Philippine commission
at the end of 1900. The basic
problem--one of jurisdiction,
the age-old problem of where the
ultimate power lay--was
finally clarified by the enactment of
the Spooner amendment on
86 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900.
87 Taft to Root, August 18, November 14,
1900.
88 Taft to Root, August 18, 1900. On
another occasion, Taft remarked about one
of General MacArthur's pronouncements:
"The obscurity of the language is its
safety." Taft to Root, September
26, 1901.
326
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
March 2, 1901.89 Up to this time
the legal basis for the gov-
ernment of the Philippines had found
its sanction in the presi-
dent's constitutional power as
commander-in-chief. Now the
president's actions were confirmed by
congress, and the presi-
dent was given full authority to
proceed with the establishment
of civil government. Actually the
president had already been
exercising this authority, but congress
wanted to put the
matter on a longer range basis and
remove any areas of doubt.
The significance of this change was not
lost upon General
MacArthur, who now informed Taft that
the new status re-
duced their dispute of the previous
months to "an academic
question."90 This was so because
now there was definitely to
be a civil government and the role of
the military would per-
force be subordinate. More astonishing
to Taft was the
revelation that MacArthur had never
really accepted the
underlying basis for their past
relationship, for MacArthur
indicated frankly that he had viewed
the president's instruc-
tions to the commission as "an
unconstitutional interference
with his prerogative as Military
Commander in these islands."
In short, MacArthur felt that these
instructions were "ultra
vires under the constitutional limitations upon the powers
of
the President as a
commander-in-chief."
This extraordinary language, with its
even more astounding
conclusion, was mystifying to Taft, a
man who had spent
most of his life in the pursuits of
law. He tried hard to com-
prehend what it was that MacArthur was
saying. In effect,
if MacArthur's ipse dixit meant
anything, it meant that the
president of the United States had
acted unconstitutionally in
issuing instructions which impaired the
military powers of a
commander in the field. Taft wondered
how anyone could
stray so far afield--was it not obvious
that the powers of a
commander in the field could derive
only from the war powers
or the powers as commander-in-chief of
the man who was his
superior? As Taft put it:
89 Grunder and Livezey, The
Philippines and the United States, 73-74.
90 Taft to Root, March 17, 1901. The quotations in the remainder of
this para-
graph are taken from this letter.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 327
It has always been a curious phase of
political human nature to me
to observe that men who have not had the
slightest knowledge of legal
principles and who do not claim to have
had any legal education feel
entirely at home in the construction of
the constitution and in using its
limitations to support their views and
to nullify action, the wisdom of
which they dispute. The constitution has
not often been used to main-
tain undiminished the absolute legislative,
executive, and judical power
of a subordinate military commander as
against the express orders of
his constitutional commander in chief.91
The constitutional question was not the
key issue, as Mac-
Arthur himself clearly indicated. What
was at stake was the
very real and apparently very painful
diminution of his au-
thority which was implicit in the
Spooner amendment. Mac-
Arthur frankly told Taft that the
"strain" to which he had
been subjected by the cutting down of
some of his powers and
the transferring of others was "so
great that he could not
endure it much longer." Normally,
an increase in responsi-
bility produces strain, but in this
case the opposite seemed to
prevail. Perhaps the answer lay in what
MacArthur termed
his "extreme humiliation,"
for, according to Taft, as Mac-
Arthur saw it, "it was the cutting
down of his power and the
interference with his efficiency by the
cutting down of his
power that had the element of
humiliation in it." Although he
did not desire to leave the Philippines
until a civil governor
was appointed, MacArthur felt the
transfer should now be
made as quickly as possible. The
statement of humiliation was
astounding to Taft, who felt that
MacArthur, far from oc-
cupying an insignificant position, in
fact held the most im-
portant position that the United States
could assign to a
soldier--he was in command of
sixty-five thousand men and
exercised, in addition, a large civil
authority. MacArthur's
position was comprehensible to Taft only
on the basis that the
general no longer regarded himself as a
soldier, but looked
upon himself as a kind of proconsul,
the first American to
occupy that position in United States
history.
91 Taft to Root, March 17, 1901. The two
quotations in the next paragraph are
drawn from this informative letter.
328
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Within a few months a civil governor
would assume the
commanding general's civil functions,
for Secretary Root had
already decided to make a surgical
separation of the military
and civilian authority. Up to this time
Secretary Root had not
clarified in explicit terms what the
boundaries of authority
were in the Philippines. But the
situation had now changed;
in the opinion of the secretary of war
the establishment of
civil government would hasten the
pacification of the Philip-
pines, would end the evils inherent in
an unduly-long con-
tinuance of military government, and
would "get the army out
of the governing business and get its
officers back to the per-
formance of their proper function as
soldiers."92 However,
Root delayed changing the command until
Taft became gov-
ernor.93 The foregoing principles he
enunciated in clear and
explicit language in his instructions
to Major General Adna R.
Chaffee, the successor to General
MacArthur.94 He reaf-
firmed a basic historical principle
when he stated:
We intend to discontinue the military
government of the Philippine
Islands and to establish a civil
government which will be supreme there,
subject only to review by the executive
and legislative branches of the
United States Government here, and to
which the Army will bear sub-
stantially the same relation that the
Army bears to the civil government
here.95
On the fourth of July, 1901, William
Howard Taft at last
became civil governor of the
Philippines with unchallenged au-
thority.96 Symbolically, General MacArthur
departed on the
same day that Taft assumed his new
position. The departure
was on a friendly basis.97 Taft held a
reception in Mac-
Arthur's honor and accompanied the
general to the dock.
Upon his arrival in San Francisco,
General MacArthur de-
clared that the new civil
administration was welcome both to
the Filipinos and to the military,
"to whom the civil task was
92
Root to Adna R. Chaffee, February 26, 1901. Root Papers.
93 Taft to Charles P. Taft, May 17,
1901.
94 Root to Adna R. Chaffee, February 26, 1901. Root
Papers.
95 Ibid.
96 New York Times, July 5, 1901.
97 Helen
H. Taft, Recollections of Full Years (New York, 1915), 210.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 329
hard and tedious," and expressed
the view that "the two de-
partments are well set apart."98
Taft was clearly the victor, and in his
inaugural address as
civil governor of the Philippines he
made it clear where the
ultimate authority lay, although he did
not exult in his tri-
umph.99 His speech is especially
meaningful to one familiar
with the developments which had
preceded it. Taft reviewed
the events of the past as significant
stages in the eventual road
to permanent civil government on a more
or less popular basis.
This speech also provides a basic
insight into Taft's subse-
quent success as a great colonial
administrator, for, as he put
it,
government is a practical, not a
theoretical, problem and the successful
application of a new system to a people
like this must be brought about
by observing closely the operation of
simple laws and making changes
or additions as experience shows their
necessity.100
Inferentially he alluded to the
controversy with General
MacArthur, although, of course, he did
not do so directly. He
contented himself with the truism that
there would be "the
same cooperation in the future"
that there had been in the past
and that "the possible friction
which may arise" between the
civil and the military in the future
would have no encourage-
ment from "those in whom is the
ultimate responsibility."101
There was work enough and more for all
who were truly con-
cerned with the regeneration of these
islands.
In his peroration Taft invoked divine
blessings upon the
cause of the United States, a cause
which he conceived in pro-
foundly paternalistic terms. The goals
to strive for were the
attainment of liberty, order, and
prosperity for the Filipinos,
but always within the context of
American guidance and tutel-
age. No instinct was more basic in the
man than a kind of
98 New York Times, August 19, 1901.
99 William Howard Taft, Present Day
Problems: A Collection of Addresses
Delivered on Various Occasions (New York, 1908), 1, 4-5.
100 Taft, Present Day Problems, 3-4.
Lord Curzon provided another basic insight
when he said: "Taft was the first
Saxon to love the Malay--and the Malay
returned it." Edward H. Cotton, William Howard
Taft: A Character Study
(Boston, 1932), 53-54.
101 Taft, Present Day Problems, 9.
330
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
inherent paternalism so characteristic
of an American aristo-
crat who conceived of duty and
responsibility in terms that
might be expressed in the words,
government for the people,
but by no means by them.
One final but basic dispute between
MacArthur and Taft
should be noted. Perhaps fundamental to
the entire struggle
for power was the ideological couching
of the difference. For
MacArthur the main burden of his
thinking was tactical and
strategic. To a senate committee on the
Philippines in the
spring of 1902 he elaborated his
philosophy when he stated:
The archipelago, I think, perhaps is the
finest group of islands in
the world. Its strategic position is
unexcelled by that of any other posi-
tion on the globe. The China Sea, which
separates it by something like
750 miles from the continent, is nothing
more or less than a safety moat.
It lies on the flank of what might be
called a position of several thousand
miles of coast line; it is in the center
of that position. It is therefore
relatively better placed strategically
than Japan, which is on a flank,
and therefore remote from the other
extremity; likewise, India, on
another flank. The Philippines are in
the center of that position. It
affords a means of protecting American
interests which, with the very
least output of physical power, has the
effect of a commanding position
in itself to retard hostile action.102
It is significant that such
considerations played no part in
the thinking of William Howard Taft.103 Rather Taft was
concerned with the political
relationship between the islands
and the United States. His thoughts on
this subject found
their fullest expression in a letter
written early in 1904, when
the question of Philippine independence
arose again. It was
not true, he wrote, "that any
independent self-government of a
people is better than the best
government by any other people."
And he summed up his thoughts in this
concluding paragraph:
We have a definite, practical problem in
the Philippines, and it serves
no useful purpose to hinder its solution
by discussing what we are going
102 Affairs
in the Philippine Islands, Senate Documents, 57 cong., 1 sess., No.
331, Pt. II, p. 867.
103 In my study of Taft's
correspondence, I found no allusions to the tactical or
strategic importance of the Philippines
for the United States.
TAFT AND THE PHILIPPINES 331
to do fifty or a hundred or one hundred
and fifty years hence, or by
binding ourselves to a fixed course so
far in advance....When we shall
have made a successful government; when
we shall have developed and
educated the people; when we shall have
created an independent public
opinion--then the question what shall be
done may well be left to both
countries; for if America follows her
duty, as I am sure she will ulti-
mately, I do not think that the Filipino
people will desire to sever the
bond between us and them.104
When the immediate and urgent problems
were solved, as
Taft saw it, the way would be paved for
the assumption of
larger responsibilities. But in the
meantime it was idle and
mischievous to hold out false hopes as
a delusive torment to
those who were not likely to realize
them. In a growing mutual
trust and confidence, the future would
bring its own solutions.
104
Taft to William Lawrence, February 16, 1904.