THE CHINESE QUESTION
145
Exchange warned Hayes that if he failed
to veto the bill, "the interests of
the trade and commerce of the United
States with the Chinese Empire
will be greatly imperilled."45
In New York the Chamber of Commerce
condemned the bill "as exposing the
merchant in his dealings to the con-
sequences of public dishonor; and
finally, as presenting the hasty action
of our Congressional Body in sorry
contrast with the more cautious and
dignified wisdom of the Heathen
Empire."46 Edwards Pierrepont, former
minister to Great Britain, could
"imagine no greater folly than to shut
ourselves out from the trade and the
reciprocal market of quite the most
populous Empire on earth . . . and how a
statesman can be willing to sac-
rifice our great advantage, which
England will seize, to a temporary clamor
is inconceivable."47
The Pacific Coast made a valiant, last
minute effort to prevent a veto.
'The state of feeling on the Pacific, as
I learn from all sources is intense
and universal," Senator Sargent
wired Hayes on February 25. He enclosed
a telegram from the editor of the San
Francisco Bulletin announcing that
"all prudent men dread Veto as
greatest possible calamity."48 From the
governors of California and Nevada, and
from the mayors of San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Sacramento, Hayes
received telegrams, resolutions, or
memorials hostile to Chinese
immigration.49 Even commercial organiza-
tions such as the Portland Board of
Trade and the Astoria Chamber of
Commerce favored the bill.50 One
exception was provided by some Pres-
byterian, Congregationalist, Methodist,
and Baptist clergymen in San Fran-
cisco and Oakland, who preferred
"to see at present no Congressional ac-
tion on the Chinese question."51
A former employer of Chinese immigrants
praised them as "faithful and
industrious" and "plodding and intelligent,"
but a semi-literate ranch hand from
Nevada wrote that "able backed men
are beging for bred when all would have
employment at good wages if
the Pacific Coasts was not being litery
overrun with Chinamen."52
Republican organizations in California
pleaded with Hayes to sign the
bill for the future interests of the
party on the Pacific Coast.53 A telegram
from the editor of the San Francisco Morning
Call warned Senator Sar-
gent that "there are but few
persons here now who do not believe the
President ought to sign the bill. The
state will go Democratic if the bill
is Vetoed."54 By
supporting anti-Chinese legislation, California Republi-
cans had hurt the Democratic party.
Philip Roach complained to Senator
Bayard that "the Working men have
left us to follow the leadership of
Kearney a Republican," who
"has carried off two-thirds of our party by
his cry 'the Chinese must go.' "55 Republican
success depended upon the
party following Blaine on the Chinese
issue rather than other easterners,
such as Curtis and Beecher. The Portland
Daily Standard praised the
Plumed Knight from Maine: "Let him
lay aside 'the bloody shirt,' don the
armor of the warrior in defense of free
white labor, and cease not or flag
in the fight until the fiat of the
Government shall proclaim that the Chinese
must go."56
With the assistance of the advice he was
receiving, Hayes at last made
some conclusions of his own. Aside from
the damage that a veto might do
146 OHIO HISTORY
in the Far West, he undoubtedly realized
that it would be politically ad-
vantageous. His own sources of
information, editorials, letters, and tele-
grams, enabled him more accurately to
assess public opinion than could
Blaine or other eastern Republicans who
had supported the fifteen pas-
senger bill at the time of its passage.
Blaine seriously miscalculated eastern
opinion. "The sentiment against that
bill is growing very strong," Con-
gressman Garfield of Ohio recorded in
his Diary. "I am satisfied that Sena-
tor Blaine has made a great mistake in
his advocacy of it."57 Blaine's error,
in fact, cost him eastern support for
the Republican nomination in 1880.58
Even though Hayes did not, like Curtis,
think that free immigration was
a basic principle of the Republic, he,
unlike Blaine, wished to avoid dras-
tic solutions. Although he had concluded
that Chinese immigration was
"pernicious" and he was
willing to "consider with favor measures to dis-
courage the Chinese from coming to our
shores," he realized that the pres-
ent bill was "inconsistent"
with treaty obligations. "We have accepted the
advantages which the treaty gives,"
he noted in his Diary. "Our traders,
missionaries, and travellers are
domiciled in C[hina]. Important interests
have grown up under the treaty, and rest
upon faith in its observance."
If the United States abrogated the
treaty, he feared that American citizens
in China "would be left without
treaty protection." Moreover, he believed,
with others, that the Burlingame Treaty
was of our seeking. "If we assum-
ing it to have been a mistaken policy. [sic]
It was our policy. We urged it
on China. Our minister conducted
it."59
Secretary Evarts appears to have had
influence with Hayes also. Congress-
man Garfield's Diary records Evarts'
participation in a meeting held on
February 23: "I advised him [Hayes]
to veto the bill, and point out, fully
the iniquity of its provision --
Secretary Evarts was there and joined in
the discussion. I am sure the bill will
be vetoed."60 Following this meet-
ing, Hayes set down his decision in his
own Diary: "In the maintenance of
the National faith it is in my judgment
a plain duty to withhold my ap-
proval from this bill. We should deal
with China in this matter precisely
as we expect and wish other nations to
deal with us."61
Evarts, even more than Hayes, was aware
of the dangers of the unilateral
abrogation of a sacred treaty. The
Chinese ministers in Washington com-
plained to him that the bill was
offensive to their countrymen. They could
excuse the abusive language of the
common people as that of inferior
characters, but were shocked to hear
"eminent public men" using similar
words. They also requested protection
for the Chinese in San Francisco.
On February 28, Evarts assured them that
the United States would observe
its treaty obligations free from popular
and political considerations.62
Hayes's veto message, which may have
been written by Evarts, was sent
to Congress on March 1. It dealt
primarily with the history and provisions
of the Burlingame Treaty, the
constitutionality of the treaty-making pro-
cess, and the dangers of unilateral tampering
with treaty obligations. Hayes
pointed out that the power to make a new
treaty and to modify an exist-
ing treaty, as the fifteen passenger
bill proposed to do, was not lodged by
THE CHINESE QUESTION 147 the Constitution in Congress, but was the prerogative of the President with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. Moreover, the denuncia- tion of one part of the treaty by the United States liberated China from the whole treaty including the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 of which the Burlingame Treaty was only a supplement or amendment and which con- ferred important privileges on Americans in China. He did not believe that "the instant suppression of further immigration from China" justi- fied "an exposure of our citizens in China, merchants or missionaries, to the consequences of so sudden an abrogation of their treaty protection." At the same time, he promised to consider "renewed negotiations, of the |
difficulties surrounding this political and social problem." He also indi- cated that "the simple provisions of the Burlingame treaty may need to be replaced by more careful methods, securing the Chinese and ourselves against a larger and more rapid infusion of this foreign race than our sys- tem of industry and society can take up and assimilate with ease and safety."63 |
148 OHIO HISTORY
The bill's supporters in the House
immediately put the veto to a test.
A new vote was taken on the bill, but it
did not receive the required two-
thirds majority.64 Samuel
Randall, the Speaker of the House, privately
"denounced the anti-Chinese
business as bosh and clap trap," and stated
that he believed many men in the House
who voted to pass it over the veto
were glad it had failed.65 Even
though Congress sustained him, Hayes feared
that his message had been inadequate.
"You will approve of what is done,"
he wrote Beecher, "but may think a
fuller treatment of the subject ought
to have been given. You must consider
how pressed we are for time -- no
time to investigate and an ocean of
facts poured on us--"66
The veto was generally approved east of
the Rocky Mountains, but was
bitterly denounced in the West, even
though The Nation thought it was
based "on grounds to which the
'Hoodlums' of California can take no ex-
ception."67 On the following day, with
but three exceptions, dispatches
flooded the office of the Associated
Press in San Francisco bitterly denounc-
ing Hayes.68 In one town he
was burned in effigy. Despite the veto, the
people of the Pacific Coast did not
fully realize how much he sympathized
with them. They could not read the
comments in his Diary about what he
considered to be the perniciousness of a
population which could not as-
similate with Americans. "It should
be made certain by proper methods
that such an invasion can not," he
concluded, "permanently override our
people. It cannot safely be admitted
into the bosom of our American So-
ciety."69
The following year, Evarts sent a
three-man commission to China that
negotiated a new immigration treaty allowing
Congress to "regulate, limit,
or suspend" the immigration of
Chinese laborers. It provided the legal
basis under which Congress passed the
Chinese Exclusion Act of May 1882,
suspending the immigration of Chinese
laborers for ten years.70 By adher-
ing to treaty obligations and resorting
to diplomacy, Hayes preserved the
position of American missionaries and
merchants in China. William Dean
Howells, the editor of the Atlantic
Monthly, praised his decision: "The
Chinese veto-message was everything your
friends could have wished in
dignity, humanity and common sense of
justice. In that and the silver veto
and the New York Custom House business
and your good will to the irre-
claimable South, you have made history
of the best kind."71
The President made history, but history
has neglected the President's
achievement. Had he signed the bill, and
had China retaliated against
Americans residing in its Empire, there
might have been a serious crisis.
By making the right decision rather than
the wrong one, he prevented a
possible international conflict. But it
does not follow that Chinese immi-
gration was an insignificant diplomatic
problem, nor that the public failed
to become excited about it. Even so,
Hayes nevertheless listened for three
years to the public debate on the
subject before he felt compelled to break
his silence and provide Executive
leadership for the nation.
THE AUTHOR: Gary Pennanen is As-
sistant Professor in the History Depart-
ment at Wisconsin State University, Eau
Claire.