FORT MIAMIS: THE INTERNATIONAL
BACKGROUND
by RICHARD C. KNOPF
Historian, Anthony Wayne Parkway
Board
The Paris peace treaty of 1783 which
officially ended the war
between the kingdom of Great Britain
and her rebellious American
colonies, and which established what
were supposedly internationally
recognized boundary lines between
British Canada and the newly
independent American states, was
considered at the very beginning
by the British as but a tenuous piece
of international diplomacy.
Britain felt confident in 1783 that,
given time, the erring Atlantic
states would return to the fold.
Had not the British government felt
pressures from British
America, it probably would have waited
patiently for the expected
bid of the former colonies to return to
British control and super-
vision. Complaints and angry cries of
merchants, fur traders, and
the royal exchequer came almost as soon
as the treaty provisions
were made known. These parties,
interested in the profits de-
rived from the Canadian fur trade,
immediately castigated the
the treaty-makers, and pointed out
vehemently that this trade would
be greatly lost if British control were
removed from the territory
north and west of the Ohio River. So
strong were these pressures,
and so angry the protests, that on
April 8, 1784, the very day
before George III proclaimed the treaty
of peace ratified, an
order was issued from the office of the
secretary of state for home
affairs to "hold the posts"
within the agreed boundaries of the
new United States of America.1
It is not known whether the United
States was aware of this
order at the time. Until the adoption
of the new American con-
stitution in 1789, it made little
difference to the American Re-
public, riven as it was with interstate
strife and the bungling,
ineffective national government of the
Confederation. Thus the
British maintained their posts within
the borders of the United States,
and kept their administrative control
over these areas and the
1 Samuel
F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty (New York, 1923), 6.
146
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 147
Indians and traders who lived and
worked there. As a matter of
fact, British power was constantly
being strengthened both as a
result of and because of the growing
fur trade. By 1790, seven
years following the agreements made at
Paris, the annual fur trade
of British Canada was officially
reported as worth £40,000 annually,
fully half of which business was
carried on in the "countries to
the southward of the Great Lakes."2
Furthermore, it was reported
that this trade had been barely tapped,
and future operations
would accrue even greater wealth for
fur traders, London en-
trepreneurs, and a tax-conscious
exchequer.
By 1790 the Americans were moving
westward into the new
Northwest Territory. As a result of the
Ordinances of 1785 and
1787, this region was considered open
to legal settlement. By the
same token, the American government had
the obligation to pacify
the hostile Indians and to exert
effective control over the area.
A firmly entrenched British Canadian
administration was
not to be forced out by hot words and
weak armies. Constantly
relying on the argument that loyalist
losses had not been repaid by
the Americans as had (they said) been
specified in the treaty of
peace,3 they maintained and
strengthened their grip. British Indian
agents, operating in the country south
of the Canadian border,
stirred the Indians into active
resistance against the encroachments
of United States settlers and American
armies. By 1793 two armies
had been defeated by the Indians, and
American arms had been
humiliated. Indian aggressiveness,
spurred on by the British,
increased.
Into this seemingly impossible
situation Major General Anthony
Wayne was thrown. Chosen by Washington
after much delibera-
tion and with some qualms, Wayne was
sent to command the
2 Ibid.
3 The treaty specified only that
congress "should recommend" to the states that
loyalists be reimbursed for their
losses. This the congress had done, and thus had
observed the letter, if not the spirit
of the treaty provision. It is true that many states
greeted such "recommendations"
with derision, and refused to act on these claims.
There were cases of individual
molestation for Toryism even to the point of lynching.
The strongest agitation against the
loyal British subjects came from the southern
states, where such colonial leaders as
Patrick Henry denounced the British crown and
decried the idea of reimbursement. Ibid.,
100.
148
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
frontier army, first at Legionville
(near Pittsburgh), and later at
Hobson's Choice (Cincinnati), and to
bring victory to American
arms. Never a wholly popular officer
with troops, his experience
along the southern border fighting
Indian raiders, as well as his
Revolutionary exploits, helped to equip
him to command, train,
and discipline a victorious force.
In spite of the series of American
defeats, the choice of Anthony
Wayne as the commander of the newly
formed Legion of the
United States worried the British
administration in Canada. Re-
ports constantly came to them of the
rigid discipline and methodical
training which Wayne was giving to his
army. Something had to
be done to halt this threat. Even the
Indian bravado and de-
termination did not convince the
Canadian officials that Wayne's
would be but another disastrous
campaign into the wilderness.
There had been successive attempts on
the part of the United
States to make peace with the Indians,
but all to no avail. The
British had been good
"fathers" to the Indians and thus had
ensured their loyalty. Small bands had
made agreements at Forts
McIntosh and Harmar, but never had the
great bulk agreed to
United States encroachment. Even at the
end of April 1793, as
Wayne was drilling his troops at
Legionville, United States Peace
Commissioners set out to the
northwestward to meet with the
Indian chieftains at the rapids of the
Miami of the Lakes to make
another attempt at peaceful settlement
of differences.
As originally scheduled, the meeting
was to take place in the
month of June, but as late as July the
commissioners were cooling
their heels, waiting for the Indians to
ready themselves for the
peace talks. Small missions had met
with the commissioners, but
time and again a complete meeting was
delayed. One of the prin-
cipal excuses for the delay of the
negotiations was the Indian
complaint that General Wayne was moving
northward with seem-
ingly hostile intentions. Already, the
Indians reported to the United
States negotiators that the commander
of the Legion of the United
States had cut a road to a point six
miles north of Fort Jefferson,
right into the heart of the Indian
country. The peace commissioners
wrote in July 1793 asking Secretary of
War Knox to order Wayne
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 149
to withdraw from these forward posts
during the peace nego-
tiations.4
Some of Wayne's men felt that this
peace mission would be a
success, and peace rumors flew about
the post at Fort Washington.
It was felt that England would gain
much more by having the
friendship of the United States, and
would lose a great deal by
provoking a war. British involvement in
Europe, at the moment,
and trade relationships between her and
the United States would
make peace almost mandatory.5
However, as the summer drew to a close,
the peace commissioners,
unlike observers at Fort Washington,
gave up hope of a successful
conclusion to their mission and finally
returned home. It seemed
as though the last ray of hope for peace
had faded.
Meanwhile, the British, as well as the
Indians, were becoming
increasingly apprehensive of the
movements of Wayne's force. They
were particularly disturbed by the
information brought by a de-
serter from the Legion of the United
States who reported to
Colonel McKee, the British Indian agent
at the rapids of the
Miami of the Lakes, that Wayne was
encamped at Fort Greene
Ville with a force of 2,500 men, but
would stay the winter there
because of a shortage of supplies. The
deserter further told McKee
that Wayne had originally planned to
winter near Detroit, and
that in addition to the regular run of
firearms, was equipped with
twenty-two howitzers.6
From this report it seemed even more
evident to the British
that Wayne's army was not only designed
to combat the Indians
and to pacify them, but also ready to
break the British hold in
Detroit, and perhaps even in Upper
Canada. This was certainly
disturbing news to Lieutenant Governor
John Graves Simcoe, and
at this point he began to formulate
plans for the defense of the
territory under his control (which
included Detroit, Michilimackinac,
and the Maumee Valley).
4 Peace Commissioners to Secretary Knox,
July 10, 1793, in American State Papers,
Indian Affairs (2 vols., Washington, 1832), I, 342 et seq.
5 William Eaton to Stephen Jacob, Fort
Washington, June 24, 1793, in Ayer
Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois.
6 E. A. Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John
Graves
Simcoe (5
vols., Toronto, 1923-31), II, 108-109.
150
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
By the end of 1793 Wayne had sent a
detachment northward
from Fort Greene Ville to build and
garrison Fort Recovery on
the site of General Arthur St. Clair's
disastrous defeat. It is in-
teresting to note that even at the
beginning of February 1794,
Lieutenant Colonel England, commandant
at Detroit, while he
knew of the building of Fort Recovery,
was not yet aware of the
exact location of Fort Greene Ville.7
Meanwhile, Thomas Jefferson, as
secretary of state, was at-
tempting to settle the fine points of
the Treaty of Paris of 1783.
Among other things, he reminded George
Hammond, the British
minister to the United States, that the
British garrisons "had not
been withdrawn with all convenient
speed," as had been stipulated
in the treaty, but that the officers of
those forts had actually under-
taken to exercise jurisdiction over
those areas and peoples within
the vicinity of the forts.8 To
these complaints Hammond was deaf.
He could hold his ground fairly well,
as the Americans, too, had
not completely fulfilled the spirit of
their obligations assumed
under this treaty.
By the beginning of the year 1794 the
reports concerning Wayne's
legion were even less encouraging to
the anxious British. The fort
at Greene Ville was reported to be the
garrison of four thousand
men, two miles in circumference, with a
daily guard of three
hundred men. Furthermore, Fort Recovery
was said to have a
garrison of three hundred. The
information continued that it was
said that "Wayne will drink of our
waters early in the Spring."
One might well imagine the
consternation of the British officials
over such a report as this.9
Lord Dorchester, governor of Canada,
inadvertently also, was
making his officials in Upper Canada
uneasy. One speech in par-
ticular had been upsetting to them as
well as to the Americans.
In it he had informed the Indians that,
in reality, there was no
border between the United States and
Canada, and that they should
7 Ibid., 139.
There was poor intelligence on both sides during this period. In
spite of the relatively large forces
involved and the active movements of many in-
dividuals and parties, exact knowledge
was difficult to obtain.
8 Jefferson to Hammond, December 15,
1793, in Writings of Thomas Jefferson
(9 vols., New York, 1853-55), IV, 94-97.
9 Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, February
3, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 141.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 151
not sell their lands to the American
settlers in the border zone.
As a war between the two nations was
inevitable, Dorchester
continued, the British would win these
territories outright, and
any sales made by the Indians would not
be recognized.10
There is no doubt but that this speech
of Dorchester's was an
inflammatory one.11 However, when one
realizes the extent to
which the commanders of some of the
British forts had been
humiliated by the Americans, one can
understand Dorchester's
attitude. In upper New York, in the
Lake Champlain region,
Americans had informed the commander of
the British garrison
there that British jurisdiction
extended no farther than the range
of his guns. Dorchester feared that
eventually the British would
be driven out of that region. Likewise,
he felt that Wayne's tactics
in the regions around Detroit would be
of a similar nature, and
therefore he directed Simcoe to fortify
the Detroit-Miami region
as soon as possible.12
With Dorchester's sanction and
encouragement, Simcoe redoubled
his efforts on the plans for Canadian
defense against possible
invasion by the Americans. At least,
officially, he called his plans
ones for defense. Of course, they were
defensive, but the area to
10 Lord Dorchester (Sir Guy Carleton,
1st Baron Dorchester) had a keen, though
perhaps partial, interest in Canadian
affairs. He had been with the military forces
in America from 1758 to 1762 (Seven
Years' War, or French and Indian War);
acting governor and governor of Quebec
from 1766 to 1770; commander of the
British forces in Canada from 1775 to
1777; commander-in-chief in America from
1782 to 1783; governor of Quebec from
1786 to 1791; and finally governor-general
of Canada in 1793. This wide
acquaintance with American, and, more especially,
Canadian affairs put Dorchester in a
strong position both in North America and in
Britain. Because of the lax handling of
American colonial policy in London during
most of this period, the
governor-general of Canada was virtual ruler and policy-
maker in his own territory. Though his
policies were perhaps examined from time
to time by the home government, there is
reason to believe that the London ministry
of home affairs (which nominally
controlled colonial policy) either lent tacit
support or actually gave some direction
to Dorchester's actions and statements.
11 By early spring, 1794, relations had
reached such a critical point that Lord
Dorchester was probably justified in
making his statement concerning an imminent
war between Great Britain and the United
States. As a matter of fact, at the same
time that news was received of
Dorchester's incendiary speech, a report also reached
Philadelphia concerning the capture of
almost 300 American vessels engaged in
shipping materials from the French West
Indies to France. While the temperature of
the war fever rose to white heat in some
quarters of the United States, Hamilton and
his more serious-minded Federalists
defeated the aggressive agitators and Francophiles
by sending the able John Jay to Britain
to negotiate differences between the two
countries.
12 Dorchester
to Simcoe, February 17, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 154.
152
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
be defended was not Canada alone (or,
perhaps, even primarily
defense for Canada), but rather that
area beyond the Canadian
borders in the Maumee Valley and
Detroit which was still under
British control, in spite of its paper
surrender in the Treaty of
Paris. So great was his urgency that he
warned Henry Dundas, the
superintendent of Indian affairs, not
to move troops out of Canada.13
Meanwhile, Dorchester's speech was
beginning to have re-
percussions both within and without
Canada. Canadian officials,
in private correspondence, deplored
Dorchester's remarks concern-
ing a coming war with the United
States. Simcoe, himself, wondered
how long the British would be able to
retain the loyalty of the
Indians when they realized that the
United States was intent upon
wresting the northwest posts from
British hands.14
Fears continued to spread in Upper
Canada. The regular soldiery
was not deemed sufficient to meet the
onslaught of Wayne's force,
and Simcoe, finally in a moment of near
desperation, recommended
the formation of an armed militia to be
equipped and paid from
public funds.15
Fears, however, were concerned not only
with the approach of
Wayne's forces, but also with the
Indians' loyalty, which would be
necessary in order to retain the status
quo. Constantly the United
States was sending out peace feelers to
the Indians. Washington
had gone even so far as to advocate a
system of non-profit trade
between the United States and the
Indians, non-profit in the sense
that such trade would mean a fair
exchange of goods. This definitely
was stealing the British thunder. The
Delawares, in particular,
seemed interested in the peaceful
settlement of their differences
with the United States.16
Fear seemed to be the keynote of the
whole policy of Simcoe in
Upper Canada. His outlook was almost
completely pessimistic. In
the middle of March 1794 he wrote to
Lord Dorchester that, while
13 Simcoe to Dundas, February 23, 1794, ibid.,
157-163.
14 Simcoe to Dundas, no date, ibid., 164-165.
15 Ibid. Some of the fur trading companies had offered their
services as militiamen
earlier.
16 Simcoe to Dundas, March 2, 1794, ibid., 169-170. This might
possibly have
been due to the influence of Heckewelder
and the Moravians, who had exerted a great
deal of peaceful, pro-American influence over the
Delawares.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 153
he would do everything possible to keep
Wayne out of the Maumee
Valley and away from Detroit, he felt
that there were insufficient
forces in Upper Canada and the
bordering regions to defeat him
if he really was intent upon an
invasion of that region. The question
of the loyalty of the subjects of the
king in Detroit itself was
doubtful, and a concentration of troops
in that area would only
mean the weakening of the border
defenses elsewhere.17
The threat of American boldness during
this period not only
was being felt in Canada, but was also
having its effect along the
Mississippi south of the mouth of the
Ohio. Day by day, as settlers
in western Kentucky, western Tennessee,
and the lands bordering
the Ohio cried for free access to the
open sea, the Spanish feared
for their position of control over the
Mississippi Valley. Sensing
that their position was similar to,
and, in a way, dependent upon
the British control of the northwest,
the Spanish asked Simcoe for
help and an alliance of the British and
Spanish forces in the New
World.18 The lieutenant
governor replied that he could not help
them materially, as he was
concentrating all his forces against a
possible attack by Wayne. However,
Baron de Carondelet's letter
was sent forward to Lord Dorchester for
further study.19
The great hope of the British to stave
off the impending American
attack was the support of the Indians.
Always the British had tried
to hold their loyalty, and for the most
part, had been kind and
generous to them. Nevertheless, it
became more and more necessary
to insure Indian support. Indian agents
told the Indians that war
was inevitable between Great Britain
and the United States and
that the only motivating factor in the
American imperialism was
their greed for land. No doubt, to the
Indians, this was an effective
argument. Again and again at peace
conferences, the talks had
always reached an impasse when the
Americans, after proffering all
17 Simcoe to Dorchester, March 14, 1794, ibid., 179-180.
18 In Europe there was in effect an
Anglo-Spanish alliance against the French.
However, by 1794 it looked as if the
Spanish were about to make a separate peace
(which they did later). Also, by the
Treaty of Peace of 1783 free use of the
Mississippi had been approved by both
the United States and Great Britain. It is
doubtful if the British would have made
any great gains by an alliance of forces
with Spain in the New World.
19 Simcoe to de Carondelet, April
11, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 200-201. Baron
de Carondelet was the governor of
Louisiana, successor to Miro.
154
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
sorts of kindness and giving all kinds
of promises of Indian in-
dependence, began speaking of moving
their boundaries farther
to the west.20
Yet, the urging of the Indian agents to
the Indians to maintain
their allegiance to their
"Father," the king of England, was not
considered enough. There had to be
visible evidence of Canadian
intent to keep the Americans away from
the Maumee Valley and
Detroit. The Indians had to see that
their British "brothers" were
supporting them, were in alliance with
them against the Americans.
Thus, by the end of April 1794,
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe had
already gone up the Maumee River, had
selected a site for a fort
to ward off Wayne's blows from Detroit,
and had set men to
work on its construction. Together with
his plan to fortify certain
islands in Lake Erie, this venture had
been reported to Dorchester.21
In spite of Canadian fears, there is no
evidence that the British
were ready to ally themselves with the
Spanish in the New World
as Baron de Carondelet had suggested.
Undaunted by the British
lack of interest in his proposition,
the Spanish governor of Louisiana
did send Indian envoys to the Indian
councils in the Maumee Valley.
These envoys promised their Indian
brothers of the northwest that
they would aid in any action against
the Long Knives.22 A failure
of American arms in the Northwest
Territory would materially
aid the Spanish in the retention of
their control of the Mississippi
Valley.
By the middle of May 1794 the news of
Lord Dorchester's war-
mongering speech to the Indians had
reached Philadelphia, and
Edmund Randolph, Jefferson's successor
as secretary of state, wrote
a caustic note to the British minister,
George Hammond, asking
for an explanation. Randolph warned
that the United States, in
its drive against the hostile Indians,
could not be expected to
make a fine distinction between the
Indians and the British, who
were encroaching upon American soil.23
Hammond answered
20 John Butler to Joseph Chew, April 27, 1794, ibid., 218.
21 Simcoe to Dorchester, April 29, 1794, ibid., 220-221. Simcoe was
also intent
upon the fortifying of Presque Isle.
22 Record of a Council, May 7,
1794, ibid., 231-232.
23 Randolph to Hammond, May 20,
1794, ibid., 238-240.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 155
Randolph's charges with countercharges.
He did not deny the
speech of Lord Dorchester, but reminded
Randolph that he could
have nothing to do with the affair, as
he represented the king of
England, not the royal Canadian
governor. As to the charge that
Dorchester had already sent men to
build a fort on the Miami of
the Lakes, Hammond said that he had no
knowledge that such a
post was being erected, but "even
admitting your information
to be accurate, much will depend on the
place on which you assert
that the fort is intended to be
erected, and whether it be for the
purpose of protecting subjects of his
Majesty's residing in the
districts dependent on the Fort of
Detroit, or preventing that
fortress from being strained by the
approach of the American
army."24
This letter pointed up two factors
which were to be salient features
of British policy in Canada down
through the Jay Treaty of 1794.
In the first place, it would seem to
indicate that British policy
toward Canada was not made or directed
with any vigor from
London, but rather was left to the
discretion of the colonial
governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester.
Secondly, and of primary
importance to the Wayne campaign and
the building of Fort Miamis,
it was felt necessary by the British
Canadian administration and the
British minister in Philadelphia that
the British build a fortress
within the limits of the United States
as established by the Treaty
of Paris of 1783 if that
fortification was designed as a protection
for Upper Canada.25 As one
peruses many of the letters which
were exchanged by the administrators of
Canada, one finds that the
motivating factor behind all of this
military preparation was a
defensive and protective one for the status
quo, that is, British re-
tention of Detroit, Michilimackinac,
and the Maumee Valley, and
thus protection of the lucrative
British trade in this legally and
essentially non-Canadian area. In other
words, one can feel very
sure that allusions to "Upper
Canada" refer not only to that area
within the Canadian boundaries, but
also, and of more importance,
24 Hammond
to Randolph, May 22, 1794, ibid., 240-241.
25 Actually one may feel sure that the term "Upper Canada"
referred to that
area administered by the governor of
Upper Canada, not to a geographical location.
156
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
to those areas which were beyond the
legal control but which were
under the actual administration of
Upper Canada.
Randolph's rebuttal to Hammond's
assertion of the right to
build a British fort at the rapids of
the Maumee was a powerful
one. He pointed out clearly that the
entire Maumee River, in-
cluding the rapids, was within the
American boundaries. He
informed Hammond that the status quo
was to apply strictly until
difficulties between the two countries
were worked out.26 Hammond
had insisted on the idea of status
quo earlier, though it would appear
that his idea differed from Randolph's
in that it meant the main-
tenance of British control over this
territory. Thus if the building of a
fort was justified to keep this
control, Hammond did not feel the
erection of such a post would in any
way damage the basic premise.
According to American intelligence, the
British themselves
seemed ready to fight Wayne's force if
it moved northward into
the Maumee Valley-Detroit area.
Nevertheless, even at the end
of May 1794, such action was not at all
certain on the British
side, and the Indians who asked for
armed help and support against
the Legion of the United States got
only evasive replies.27 In spite
of the American impression, the
Canadian administration was well
aware that an active conflict between
Canadian garrisons and the
United States Legion might well set off
a general British-American
war. To initiate such a struggle was
beyond the responsibility or
authorized power of the Canadian
government. Only official sanction
from London could overcome this
impasse, and while the British
officials in Canada prepared as if it
were assured, it never came.
With or without active, armed British
support, the Indians began
collecting and by the middle of June it
was reported that 2,000
Indians were around Wayne. Simcoe
himself was favorable to a
plan to aid and support the Indians,
though he realized that to do
so was to exceed his authority, and he
did not wish to take the
responsibility for an open breach
between the United States and
26 Randolph
to Hammond, June 2, 1794, in American State Papers, Foreign Affairs,
I, 464-466.
27 Speech from the Western Indians to the British, May 24, 1794, in Simcoe
Papers,
II, 247.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 157
Great Britain. Open support of the
Indians promised to aid in
creating such a breach. Thus he shifted
the responsibility to
Dorchester and asked that the
governor-general authorize supplies
to the Indians. The most he could do
directly was to express his
hope to McKee that the Indians would
collect in sufficient number
to defeat Wayne. The lieutenant
governor carefully avoided a dis-
cussion of Indian supply and support.28
He did, however, instruct
McKee to keep all but the regular
traders from going farther into
the Indian country than Fort Miamis.
Simcoe was well aware that
among some of the traders, particularly
those of French extraction,
there was questionable loyalty to His
Majesty. If these were allowed
to penetrate beyond the limits of
effective British control, they
might possibly arouse the Indians
against the British.29
The Indians were also attempting to get
British and French-
Canadian support against Wayne. At the
Indian council of war
held in the middle of June 1794 it was
resolved by that council
that the British and French-Canadian
traders who depended upon
the Indians for their livelihood should
join with the Indians in
the defense of their country and common
interests. While this did
not have the official sanction of the
British government in Canada,
it certainly was in accord with their
desires and wishes.30
At the same time, in England, John Jay,
the American special
representative to the British
government, was going forward with
his negotiations to settle
international differences between the
United States and Great Britain. For
the most part, these delibera-
ions revolved around points of conflict
arising from the Treaty of
28 This is not to say that the British
gave no support to the Indians. For a long
time, British officials had been in the
habit of dispersing "presents" to their red
brethren. See Treaty of Fort Harmar
Discussions, in Draper Manuscripts, State
Historical Society of Wisconsin,
Madison, Wisconsin, vol. 23U (microfilm in Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical
Society, Columbus). In Vol. XXIX, Part 2,
No. 46, of the Wayne Papers belonging to
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania,
is a sworn statement made by William
Wells, who attended the Indian council at
the Miami rapids in the summer of 1793,
in which it is noted that McKee, at least,
promised all necessary aid in the way of
arms, ammunition, provisions, and clothing.
Even at these meetings great quantities
of supplies were given to the Indians.
29 Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15,
1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 266-267; Simcoe
to McKee, ibid., 268.
30 Ernest Cruickshank, "Diary of an
Officer in the Indian Country in 1794,"
American Historical Magazine, III (1908), 639-643.
158
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
Peace, 1783, and from varying
interpretations of the rights of
neutral traders. Jay seemed immediately
cognizant of the fact that
the British did not want to add any
more enemies to the growing
list of nations hostile to her. The
weakening of the British alliance
with Spain in 1794 had meant the loss
of a powerful and valuable
ally against France. Still, Britain was
not yet willing to make com-
plete concessions to the Americans.
After receiving information
from the Anglophile American secretary
of the treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, to the effect that the United
States would not go to war
under any circumstances, Britain was
not prone to take a humble
position before the American
representative. Though Jay was not
at first aware of Hamilton's
representations to the British, he did
feel that the relations between the two
countries should be of as
even temper as possible during the
negotiations. He therefore
wrote to Washington asking that no
hostile actions be taken in
the western country. He also expressed
the thought that the British
would probably surrender the posts
along the border in the treaty
which was forthcoming. In another
letter to Edmund Randolph he
expressed the same sentiments. Acts of
an "irritating nature," he
was confident, would not aid in his
discussions with the British.31
Meanwhile, the Canadian government
continued and progressed
with their plans to secure "Upper
Canada." At Fort Miamis progress
was slow, and after nearly three months
the fort was still not
complete enough to receive the
six-pounders designated for its
protection. Discontent among the
workers and the fevers of the
wilderness had taken their toll.32
Simcoe, perhaps rationalizing his
actions in this area of the
Maumee Valley, finally claimed the area
for the British by stating
that it had not been included in the
cession of the treaty of 1783.
How much of this was rationalization,
how much honest belief,
and how much of it was designed to
influence the loyalty of the
Indians is a matter for conjecture.
Under any circumstances his
claims could have any of a wide variety
of effects. Certainly such
31 Jay to Washington, June 23, 1794, in Simcoe
Papers, II, 290-291; Jay to
Randolph, June 23, 1794, ibid., 291.
32 England to Simcoe, June 25, 1794, ibid.,
294.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 159
a statement justified his action even
if it was not justified by the
treaty.33
One thing was evident to both the
government and the British
traders in the area: if the Americans
did get actual possession
and control of Detroit,
Michilimackinac, and the Maumee Valley,
most of the British fur trade would
suffer, as it was centered in
that area. No matter what the
settlement might be, there was a
general opinion that the Indians should
not be apprised of any
decisions of the British to yield up
their posts to the Americans
until such time as that was an
accomplished fact. By doing this, the
British traders could be assured of a
continuing trade until such
transfer was actually made, and the
Canadian administration would
continue to have Indian support in the
case that hostilities should
break out between the United States and
Britain. Thus while the
British were building up their forces,
while there was a genuine
fear of an invasion by the United
States of this territory administered
by Upper Canada, there was still an
undercurrent of concilation,
and a hope for peaceful settlement of
disputes. As a matter of
fact, it seemed more than a hope; it seemed
as if the British had
already read the handwriting on the
wall.34
Simcoe was not alone in his fear of a
defeat of British arms in
case of a struggle with the Americans.
McKee, at the rapids, con-
stantly urged that supplies be sent for
the use of the Indians,
and that arms and ammunition be
furnished to them. Without
these, McKee was confident, the Indians
would be severely beaten.35
In July 1794, with Wayne's legion
poised at Greene Ville and
33 Simcoe to Dundas, July 5, 1794, ibid.,
303-305. Probably Simcoe did not know
or chose not to recognize the treaty of
1783. Certainly, if he considered a treaty
to be a contract between the two
nations, the Americans had not lived completely
up to their part of the bargain. In such
a case, he could, with some justification,
rationalize that the treaty was null and
void. Thus, the building of Fort Miamis,
and the general arming of that area
under the administration of Upper Canada,
would not be an infringement upon United
States sovereignty.
34 Observations of Isaac Todd and Simon
McTavish, Representatives of Trading
Houses Interested in Canada-British
Trade, July 1794, ibid., 310-311. The Jay
negotiations going on in Britain at the
time probably added hope for peaceful settle-
ment of difficulties, and, as will be
seen later, directives actually were issued from
London to the Canadian administration to
cease new incursions into American
territory and hold only to the status quo.
35 McKee to England, July 10,
1794, ibid., 315. See footnote 28.
160
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
ready to strike northward into the
heart of the Indian Confederacy,
Lord Dorchester tried to halt the
American threat. In a formal
protest to Wayne he said:
I am commanded to declare that during
the inexecution of the Treaty of
Peace Between Great Britain and the
United States and until the existing
differences respecting it shall be
mutually and finally adjusted, the taking
possession of any part of the Indian
Territory, either for the purpose of
War or Sovereignty, is held to be a
direct violation of His Britannic Majesty's
Rights, as they unquestionably existed
before the Treaty, and has an
immediate tendency to interrupt and in
its progress to destroy that good
understanding which has hitherto
subsisted between His Britannic Majesty
and the United States of America. I
therefore desire you to desist from
any such Aggressions.36
There is little doubt that
historically, and perhaps even legally,
Dorchester had a valid point. Certainly
the treaty of 1783 had
not been fully executed. It is
doubtful, however, whether he was
standing on firm ground when he
actually forbade the American
forces to enter the territory in
question. Under any circumstances,
a show of British arms would be
necessary if there was to be any
warlike action, and the governor of
Canada would have to back
up his protest with more than the mere
force of words if it were
to have any effect.
In Europe John Jay continued his
efforts to negotiate a settle-
ment of British-American differences.
As a result of some of these
talks, Lord Grenville37 wrote
to George Hammond, saying that
Jay had assured him that the United
States would not attack any
British posts within American lands as
granted in 1783 which had
been held by His Majesty since that
time. He further said that the
status quo should prevail and that in case any measures of en-
croachment had been taken by either
side, they should immediately
cease.38
36 Lord Dorchester's Protest, ibid.,
318-319.
37 Lord William Grenville was
foreign secretary during this period of the negotia-
tions with the Americans. The second son
of Lord George Grenville, William Wyndam
Grenville was created a peer in 1791.
William Grenville held his post in the Pitt
ministry from 1792 until its fall over
the Catholic controversy in 1801.
38 Grenville to Hammond, July 17, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II,
321-322.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 161
This statement meant, as was later
explained, two things: (1)
that Fort Miamis was subject to attack,
as it was not extant in
1783; and (2) that Wayne's legion, as
long as it moved only against
the Indians, was not considered to be
an encroachment. On this
latter statement there may be some
dispute. However, Jay's letter
to Washington reveals that the American
envoy had informed
Grenville of Wayne's plans, and had
warned that Fort Miamis might
be attacked. Grenville must have been
aware of this when he sent
orders to Dorchester through the Duke
of Portland39 to retain
the status quo, meaning that
there should be no shifting of boundaries
or erecting of posts not already
existing.40
Simcoe himself, in answer to charges
that the British were
supplying the Indians, denied such
charges, and said that the
British were not associated with the
Indians against Wayne. He
did express a fear that Wayne's designs
were not wholly directed
against the Indians. He pointed out
that the legion was advancing,
not toward the Miami villages, but
toward Detroit. Simcoe ad-
mitted, though still denying that he
supplied or associated with
them, that the British encouraged the
Indians to unite in their own
defense with contingent advantages both
to the Indians and to
the British.41
From other letters exchanged during the
course of Wayne's
campaign and from Simcoe's attitude,
one has to feel that he was
probably telling the truth, as none of
the administrators of Upper
Canada every actually promised military
aid to the Indians, even
in spite of McKee's urging. Colonel
England, the commander at
Detroit, certainly was apprenhensive of
stirring up trouble when
ne wrote to Simcoe on July 22, 1794:
I ever apprehended the Americans would
be extremely jealous of our
establishing a post on the Miamis, and
that it would expedite the rupture;
39 The Duke of Portland (William Henry Cavendish Bentinck) was home
secretary
from 1794 to 1801. At that time the administration
of colonial affairs was carried
on by the home office.
40 Portland to Dorchester, July
15, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II, 322-323; Jay to
Washington, July 21, 1794, ibid., 332-333.
41 Simcoe to Hammond July 18, 1794, ibid.,
323-325; Simcoe to Hammond, July
1794, ibid., 328-331.
162 Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
I should not be surprised if the
Ministry mentioned their disapprobations
of it to Lord Dorchester, as I don't
believe they wish to provoke a war
with the United States, and God knows,
this Country is by no means in a
situation to commence hostilities.42
Colonel England's approach to the
Indians, when they came
to beg for support, though, was
somewhat different. In a speech
to the Indian chieftains on August 6,
1794, he said that the British
would hold to their promises, that Fort
Miamis was there for their
protection. He further emphasized that
British soldiers could not
march against the Americans without
orders from higher authority.
(He might have added that he did not
think that such orders would
be forthcoming.)43
One might ask, just what were the
British "promises"? Whatever
they were, it is evident from England's
speech that they did not
include armed support by British
troops, and, one would judge
from the urgent requests of McKee, that
they also did not include
all-out aid and provisions of one type
or another. For the most part,
one must conclude that the
"promises" fell into that general, and
at that time nebulous, category of
protection. There was not even
a full guarantee of this.44
Meanwhile, Wayne sent out further
offers of peace;45 the Indians
met to debate war and peace, and
decided, finally, for war.46 As
far as Wayne's terms were concerned,
the Indians made no definite
reply. They only hoped that he would
stop to give them time "to
think over his proposition."
However, Miller, Wayne's envoy to
the Indians, did return with the news
that the British would "hold
their ground" and that they had
asked how many cannon Wayne
had with his forces. Wayne, of course,
was interested in the in-
formation concerning the British post,
but he would not halt his
force. Naturally he did not divulge the
fact that he had not suffi-
cient artillery to dislodge the British
from their post.47
42 England to Simcoe, July 22,
1794, ibid., 333-334.
43 England's Speech to the Indians, August 6, 1794, ibid., 360.
44 McKee to England, August 10, 1794, ibid.,
365.
45 "Wayne's Terms of Friendship," in Western Annals (Pittsburgh,
1857), 404-405.
46 "Speech of Turkey Foot at
Grand Rapids," Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XX
(1948), 42.
47 Unidentified manuscript diary,
Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana,
entries of August 16 and 22, 1794.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 163
On the British side, the word still
seemed to be one of "watchful
waiting." Simcoe spoke of a
possible "attack" upon the Miamis
post, and felt that the Indians should
know that if such attack was
made, it would be to Wayne's own
detriment. In other words, it
would seem that the British would enter
the fracas only if Wayne
attacked one of their garrisons.48
Unfortunately, in many respects,
Wayne's scouts, who had ap-
proached within two miles of Fort
Miamis, felt, from what they
had seen and heard, that both the
Indians and the British were
fleeing.49 Somewhat moved,
no doubt, by this information, Wayne
continued his march forward, unaware of
the attack which was
to occur the following morning. The British
had not fled, in spite
of the fact that the fort was still
incomplete.50
The story of the battle at the fallen
timber is too often told
to be repeated here. Wayne's report of
the battle to Secretary of
War Knox, though, is worth noting, as
he reported that the enemy
consisted of the "Indians, and
Canadian militia, and volunteers."51
Subsequent facts seem to indicate that
such non-Indian elements
as were present were there without the
official sanction of the
Canadian government. The Indians fled
to Fort Miamis only to
find the gates closed to them.52
The following day, Wayne, having
surveyed the British post,
reported that it was too strong to be
forced, and thus his army
must move back to Grand Glaize.53 The
move was not made before
a series of notes passed between Wayne,
who was afraid to storm
the fort, and Campbell, the British
commander, who was afraid
that he would. These notes, together
with the letters of Campbell
concerning the battle, show vividly the
bravado with which the two
commanders, both fearing each other,
acted. Wayne's decision
48 Simcoe to England, August 17, 1794,
in Simcoe Papers, II, 386.
49 Unidentified manuscript diary,
Indiana Historical Society, entry of August 19,
1794.
50 Simcoe to England, August 19, 1794, in Simcoe Papers, II,
392-393.
51 Wayne to Knox, August 28,
1794, in Wayne Papers, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (microfilm in
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical
Society, Columbus).
52 "Narrative of the Battle
of Fallen Timbers As Told by Chief Kin-jo-i-no,"
Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XX (1948), 46-48.
53 Unindentified
manuscript diary, Indiana Historical Society, entry for August 21,
1794.
164 Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
not to besiege the post also might have
been due, in some part at
least, to the report of a deserter that
the post was equipped with
4 nine-pounders, 6 howitzers, and 4
six-pounders, as well as four
companies of the 24th Regiment, and
thirty-five of the Queen's
Rangers.54 This was no small
force for such a fortification, and
under such circumstances and with such
fire power, it could cer-
tainly hold out longer than Wayne's
scanty provisions.
On the other hand, Major Campbell, the
commander of the
post, worried and fearful, wrote to
Colonel England at Detroit,
saying, "I sincerely hope the
Governor himself may soon arrive
and take all the responsibility upon
him."55 Certainly Campbell
must have been glad to see Wayne's army
finally move out from
under his ramparts without a shot fired
and without an attempt
made to assail his garrison. The
reports to Simcoe of Wayne's
preparing to take Fort Miamis proved to
be false alarms, and thus
the Indians were allowed to retreat
without pursuit to a point six
miles beyond the post, which had not
really protected them at all.56
Wayne was content with a moral victory
over the British and
pointed out in his congratulatory
general order of August 23, 1794:
The Indians to all appearances have
totally Abandoned their settlements
quite to the Mouth of the River, and
their Villages and corn Fields being
consumed and destroyed in every direction,
even under the influence of the
Guns of Fort Miami. Facts which must
produce a conviction to the Minds
of the Savages that the British had
neither the Power nor inclination to
afford them that Protection they had
been Taught to expect; That on the
Contrary a Numberous Garrison well
supplied with Artillery have been
54 Ibid., entry for August 21, 1794. This report was generally
correct. Earlier
letters and orders recorded the numbers
and types of armament to be sent to Fort
Miamis. Generally, they coincide with
those herein reported.
Whether or not Wayne was willing to risk
the diplomatic consequences, one
cannot definitely tell. That he was
cognizant of the effect such a seizure might have,
cannot be denied, for he certainly was
aware of the tense situation between Britain
and the United States and of the Jay
negotiations. However, Wayne's comment re-
ported by his officers was that the fort
was too strong to take.
55 Campbell to England, August 21, 1794,
in Simcoe Papers, II, 398.
56 Duggan to Chew, August 22 and 23, 1794, in Michigan Pioneer and
Historical
Society Collections, XII (1888), 122-123. Some units of Wayne's force did
follow
the retreating Indians down the river,
but there is no evidence that any conflict
continued beyond Fort Miamis.
Fort Miamis: The International
Background 165
compelled to remain tacit spectators of
the General Conflagration round
them, and their flag displayed to the
Disgrace of the British, and to the
Honour of the American Arms.57
Following Wayne's encounter with the
Indians, the British began
to feel their losses. These had nothing
to do with posts or an attack
by the United States Legion upon the
fort at Detroit, but were
primarily losses of trade, which was
the lifeblood of the area ad-
ministered by Upper Canada, and of
Indian loyalty. McKee was
trying to keep the Indians in the area,
but he was to be sent to
Lower Canada, and it was reported that
the Indians were planning
to move to the southern and western
parts of the country. The result
of such action, of course, would mean
the end of British domination
of the fur trade, with consequent
losses of revenue by the imperial
treasury, and severe curtailment of the
activities of merchant and
trading companies with home offices in
England. Though these latter
groups had exerted pressure earlier and
had succeeded in British
retention, de facto, of the
Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Maumee
Valley areas, nothing they could do at
this point through political
pressure at home or abroad could
convince the Indians that they
should return to a position of
allegiance to the British.58
Some efforts were made in October to
regain Indian favor and
to hold the area. A detachment was sent
to Swan Creek on the
tenth of that month to build a
blockhouse under McKee's direction,
but this action was too late to save
British influence in the area.59
The Indians finally left the British
camp, disappointed and dis-
gusted over their treatment, and made a
treaty, the Treaty of
Greene Ville, with Wayne. The Jay
Treaty, accomplished in London
and ratified by the Americans only
after a fiery debate in the senate,
meant the end of Fort Miamis as a
British garrison. It was sur-
rendered to Wayne on August 7, 1796,60
though Colonel Hamtramck
had established an American garrison
there as early as July 11,
57 "Wayne's Orderly Books,"
ibid., XXXIV (1905), 547.
58 Chew to Thomas Coppis, September 22, 1794, ibid., XII, 145.
59 Simcoe to England, October 10, 1794, ibid.,
148.
60 F. Clever Bald, "Fort Miamis,
Outpost of Empire," Northwest Ohio Quarterly,
XVI (1944), 102.
166 Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
1796. By 1800 it had been dropped from
the official post list of
the War Department.61
The story of Fort Miamis points up two
salient features of British
colonial policy in the decade from 1784
to 1794. In the first place
indications seem to confirm the fact
that where domestic matters
were concerned, the colonial officials
had almost complete authority.
The conduct of colonial affairs in
Canada was thus centered in
Dorchester and his administration. His
pronouncements effectively
made the policy of the colony. In this
particular case he considered
the lands north and west of the Ohio
River as part of his colonial
domain. The illegality of the British
position in this region not-
withstanding, the fact remained that
Canadian officials administered
the territory and British agents dealt
skillfully with the problems
of Indian relations and trade which was
the principal concern there.
In the second place, the change in the
London government's
attitude toward the United States
cannot escape notice. From a
policy of downright deception and
actual non-cooperation in April
1784, the home government found itself
compromising this position
in 1794. In spite of the attitude of
the Dorchester administration,
the territory in question was an
international, not a domestic,
problem. Pressures of world affairs far
outweighed the pressure
of London entrepreneurs and colonial
traders. The European
ferment following the French Revolution
placed American colonial
problems in a place of second rate
significance. Also, a new and
strong central government in the United
States promised to be less
submissive to British humiliations than
had its predecessor.
Thus Fort Miamis is not only the symbol
of the last stand of
British antagonism to the expansion of
her former colonies into
the northwest, but, for the new west at
least, was a pawn moved
in response to considerations of world
politics. The international
chess game reached even onto the
American frontier!
61 Ibid., 106.