Ohio History Journal

RICHARD T. FARRELL

Internal-Improvement Projects in

Southwestern Ohio, 1815-1834

During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, merchants, farmers, and

manufacturers successfully established Cincinnati's economic prominence in the

West. Taking advantage of the city's strategic location, pioneer merchants supplied

the increasing number of immigrants from Europe and the eastern states with the

goods they needed before they moved up the valleys of the Great Miami and

Little Miami rivers. As farmers gradually settled this region, agricultural production

increased. Merchants began collecting farm surpluses and providing farmers with the

merchandise they could not produce for themselves. The availability of agricultural

surpluses helped to promote milling, brewing, distilling, and packing industries,

and these in turn created new demands for products from the fields and forests.

The resultant increase in farm production encouraged manufacturers to produce

tools, machines, and other items for households and farms. Together, the growth

of industries and expansion of agriculture stimulated trade.1

The city prospered as a result of the combined efforts of merchants, manufac-

turers, and farmers.² Responding to the demands for locally made goods, manu-

facturing interests played an increasingly important role in the city's economy.

The value of products manufactured in Cincinnati in 1819 was $1,059,459, and

1,238 of the city's total population of over 9,000 were engaged in manufacturing

or related service industries. By 1830 the value of manufactured products had

reached $2,800,000, and more people were involved in manufacturing than in com-

mercial or service occupations.

Commercial transactions followed a similar pattern. In 1819 the city's exported

products, consisting chiefly of flour, pork, bacon, hams, lard, whiskey and tobacco,

were valued at $1,334,080. By 1829 the value and quantity of export items ex-

ceeded three million dollars. Agricultural products still headed the list, but such

items as hats, cabinet furniture, printing materials, clothing, casting machinery,

and tin and copperware appeared with greater frequency. Taking into account

1. For general discussions of the economic development of Cincinnati, see Richard C. Wade, The

Urban Frontier, the Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830 (Cambridge, 1959); William F. Gephart, Trans-

portation and Industrial Development in the Middle West (New York, 1909); Randolph C. Downes,

"Trade in Frontier Ohio," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XVI (March 1930), 467-494.

2. The following evidence of economic growth in Cincinnati is taken from Richard T. Farrell,

"Cincinnati, 1800-1830: Economic Development Through Trade and Industry," Ohio History, LXXVII

(Autumn 1968), 111-129.

Mr. Farrell is assistant professor of history at the University of Maryland.

6                                                                        OHIO HISTORY

East. Recognizing the crucial importance of transportation to long-term economic

development, business and political leaders knew that the city's future depended

upon the completion of an internal-improvements program that would insure routes

to eastern and southern markets and provide access routes to main transportation

arteries.³

Efforts by these leaders to complete such a program provide a model study of

how the business community responded to obstacles to economic development.

Internal-improvements advocates approached the transportation problem with op-

timism, perseverance, and ingenuity, but their plans were often frustrated by a

lack of funds and inadequate governmental assistance. Through determination and

prudent use of the limited funds contributed by the state and national governments,

however, they were able to construct a transportation system which stimulated

immediate economic development and laid the groundwork for future growth.

Between 1815 and 1834 all segments of Cincinnati's economy depended on the

Ohio River.⁴ Most residents, therefore, recognized the importance of removing

obstructions on this essential trade artery so that the city could attain and secure

its position as the commercial and industrial center of the Ohio Valley. Two proj-

ects designed to improve navigation on the Ohio particularly interested the com-

mercial leaders of the city. These were, one, the removal of obstacles along the

entire course of the river that made navigation treacherous, and the other, the

construction of a canal around the Falls at Louisville.

Popular river guides testify to the dangers boatmen encountered in navigating

the Ohio. In addition to the more or less anticipated obstacles--a shifting main

channel, sand bars, and ice--over which man had little control, snags, sawyers,

rapids, and submerged rocks created the greatest hazards.⁵ Men who knew the

river were convinced that many of these obstacles could be removed easily and at

little expense. Encouraged by the national government's interest in internal im-

provements during the first decade of the nineteenth century, they urged Congress

to begin such a program. One editor succinctly suggested that,

Western waters are OUR canals, and from the simplicity of their wanted improvements,

are entitled to the first application of moneys and subscription and appropriation from the

national government. How great would be the folly to undertake other works, the labor

of years, however useful, and neglect those of equal or tenfold more national importance,

which can be completed almost at any moment in which they are undertaken.6

3. Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820-1861

(Athens, Ohio, 1969); Jacob H. Hollander, The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Study in Municipal

Activity (Baltimore, 1894), 10. For general discussions of transportation problems in the Old North-

west, see Charles H. Ambler, A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley (Glendale, Calif., 1932);

R. Carlyle Buley, The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period, 1815-1840 (Indianapolis, 1950), I, Chapter 7;

William T. Utter, The Frontier State, 1803-1825 (Carl Wittke, ed., The History of the State of Ohio,

II, Columbus, 1942), Chapters 4, 7; John G. Clark, The Grain Trade in the Old Northwest (Urbana,

Ill., 1966), 1-7; George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951), Chap-

ters 2, 3, 4.

4. For a general history of transportation in the Ohio Valley, see Ambler, Transportation in the

Ohio Valley.

5. Zadok Cramer, The Navigator, Containing Directions for Navigating the Monongahela, Allegheny,

Ohio, and Mississippi Rivers . . . (Pittsburgh, 1821); Samuel Cumings, The Western Pilot, Containing

Charts of the Ohio River and of the Mississippi . . . (Cincinnati, 1829); "Copy of Captain Chase's

Journal of Observations on the Manner in Which the Contract with Mr. Bruce Has Been Executed

. . . Nov. 21 to Dec. 1825," in Senate Executive Documents, 19 cong., 1 sess., No. 14; Buley, Old

Northwest, I, 432-435.

6. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette (cited hereafter as Liberty Hall), March 18, 1916.

8                                                                      OHIO HISTORY

was said to operate so efficiently that even the largest trees offered "but a trifling

resistance."⁸

The river improvement bill of 1824 was of considerable importance to residents

of the Ohio Valley. It established a precedent by which the national government

could participate in internal-improvement projects of limited scope that were

planned by private or state enterprise. During the next decade Congress received

numerous requests for additional appropriations to clear the river, the majority of

which were approved. Moreover, the national government soon increased its con-

tributions by subscribing to the stock of private companies chartered by state gov-

ernments for specific improvements.⁹ Partly as a result of this change in policy,

residents along the Ohio River were able to proceed more rapidly with internal

improvements.

One project which benefited from the government's new policy was the canal

around the Falls at Louisville. As communities developed along the river, the Falls

became a matter of mounting concern. Except for a few months each spring and

again in the autumn, this obstruction usually created a natural barrier blocking

direct passage to New Orleans and forced the transshipment of goods at Louisville.

Several proposals had been considered between 1800 and 1815, but all proved too

expensive or impractical. Commercial interests in Cincinnati believed that a canal

was the obvious solution, and they attempted to obtain the assistance of other

communities along the river. Much to their chagrin, however, towns below the

Falls (Louisville being the most important) refused to cooperate. Because of its

strategic location, Louisville's economy was largely dependent on the transshipment

business, and its merchants were unwilling to risk the loss of their advantage. Other

communities below Louisville rejected the suggestion at this time because the

Falls did not block their passage to New Orleans.¹⁰

Civic leaders in the Queen City, however, were persistent, dedicated, and pug-

nacious. Infuriated by Louisville's chronic procrastination and especially by a report

that business interests on the Kentucky side of the river favored a canal just wide

enough for keelboats, they accepted the fact that a joint effort was impossible and

resolved to act independently of Kentucky. Cincinnati businessmen then turned to

the Jefferson and Ohio Canal Company which the Indiana legislature incorporated

in 1817 to construct a canal on the Jeffersonville side of the river. Although the

directors of the company encouraged the general assemblies of Ohio and Indiana

to contribute, they considered it inadvisable in 1817 to depend too heavily on state

assistance. Instead they tried to finance the venture through private investments

and a lottery. The Cincinnati directors called frequent public meetings to arouse

interest and appointed two representatives in each ward to solicit support, but all

their fund-raising efforts were of no avail.11

8. Senate Executive Documents, 19 cong., 1 sess., No. 14. A more effective "snag boat" was designed

by Henry M. Shreve, superintendent of western river improvements for the topographical engineers.

It went into operation in 1829 but was used primarily for major projects and on other western rivers.

Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History (Cambridge,

1949), 193-200.

9. Goodrich, American Canals and Railroads, 40; Hunter, Steamboats on Western Rivers, 190-191;

Ambler, Transportation in Ohio Valley, 396.

10. Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory (Cincinnati, 1847),

401-402; Louis C. Hunter, "Studies in the Economic History of the Ohio Valley," Smith College Stu-

dies in History, XIX (October 1933-January 1934), 6-23.

11. Liberty Hall, January 20, May 26, 1817, January 5, February 11, 25, March 15, 18, May 20,

November 3, 1818; Western Spy, May 9, 23, 1817, January 3, May 9, 16, July 25, 1818, November 6,

1819; Cincinnati Inquisitor and Advertiser (cited hereafter as Advertiser), October 13, July 7, 1818.

Internal Improvement Projects                                                  9

Plagued from the beginning by financial problems and construction difficulties,

the Jeffersonville and Ohio Canal Company was soon doomed. Promoters in Cin-

cinnati began to lose interest in the Indiana project by 1819, but not in a canal.

Realizing that private enterprise alone could not succeed, they sought state assis-

tance.¹² They were partially motivated by recent discussions in the Ohio legislature

of plans to construct a canal from Lake Erie to the Ohio River. If it allocated any

funds for internal improvements, they reasoned, then preference ought to be given

to the canal at the Falls. A local editor probably expressed the opinion of many

when he wrote that,

Whatever improvements may be meditated for the benefit of commerce, either in clearing

out the beds of lesser streams, or in connecting the Lakes with the waters of the Ohio, they

are all of much less importance to the vital interests of the country, than a free and un-

interrupted passage to New Orleans.13

Several public-spirited citizens in the Queen City suggested that the legislature

could not be expected to pay the entire cost of constructing the canal. With con-

siderable justification, they pointed out that it should be financed by all states

bordering the river. Since it would benefit the country at large, the national gov-

ernment should also contribute.14 Aroused by appeals from Cincinnati, merchants

and farmers on both sides of the Ohio showed renewed interest in a joint project.

In 1819 the state assemblies of Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio ap-

pointed commissioners to study the proposed sites and to recommend the one

offering the greatest advantages. Indiana, however, did not participate in the pro-

ceedings because it was already committed to the Jeffersonville project. Optimism

was so great in Indiana that the legislature had agreed to subscribe two hundred

shares of the Jeffersonville Company's stock and had set aside $10,000 from the

state's three percent fund for this purpose.15 These actions seemed to mean that

Indiana would not participate in competitive schemes.

Although the joint commissioners completed their survey in 1820 and reported

favorably on the Louisville site, plans to construct the canal did not materialize.

The states concerned then began deliberations on their own improvement programs

and gave them first priority. Likewise, the national government failed to provide

any tangible assistance. Indiana, whose participation was desirable, if not essential,

not only boycotted the commission but also continued to thwart the venture. At

the same time the commissioners' report was made public, the Jeffersonville Com-

pany announced that its survey proved a canal on the northern side of the river

would cost less than one on the southern side. Finally, the Panic of 1819 prostrated

the West and delayed the completion of all internal-improvement projects.16

Residents of Cincinnati were confused by the conflicting reports of construction

costs at the two sites. They were also disgruntled with the charters held by the

Kentucky and Indiana companies. In 1820 they asked the Ohio legislature to allo-

cate funds for a survey of both sides of the river to determine whether a canal was

12. Liberty Hall, January 11, May 17, 1820.

13. Advertiser, February 16, 1819.

14. Cincinnati Directory for 1819 (Cincinnati, 1819), 71; Liberty Hall, April 25, 1819.

15. Ibid., May 27, 1820; Logan Esarey, "Internal Improvements in Early Indiana," Indiana His-

torical Society Publications, V (1912), 67.

16. Liberty Hall, January 11, April 4, July 5, 1820, January 3, 1824; John P. Foote, Memoirs of the

Life of Samuel E. Foote (Cincinnati, 1860), 170-173.

10                                                                OHIO HISTORY

feasible and to resolve the question of costs. Although funds were authorized for

the survey, Governor Jeremiah Morrow did not employ an engineer until 1823. His

delay was apparently justified since competent engineers were. scarce and those

who were qualified were working elsewhere. Wasting no time, the legislature for-

warded the engineer's report to Congress along with a request that the Federal

Government construct the canal. A House committee recommended appropriating

$100,000 to help with construction costs, but Congress refused to allocate the

money.17

Leading merchants in Louisville finally succumbed to the inevitable. In 1825

they applied for a new charter for the Louisville and Portland Canal Company.

Convinced that the company's intentions were genuine, investors in Cincinnati

immediately subscribed nearly $200,000 in stock. But their enthusiasm was not

enough, and, as usual, actual construction was delayed by financial problems. In

1826 and again in 1828 the national government purchased stock. With this assis-

tance the company opened the canal to traffic in December 1830. It was completed

the next year at a total cost of $1,000,000. Of this amount the Federal Government

contributed $230,000.18

During the next decade the venture was a success. The number of boats passing

through the canal rapidly increased, and the company made money. By 1840 stock-

holders had received cash and stock dividends amounting to ninety-nine percent

of their original investments. Moreover, between 1831 and 1840 the canal satisfied

the immediate needs of farmers and merchants above the Falls. Although its de-

fects soon became apparent, few individuals complained. Gradually, however, mer-

chants and farmers who used the canal regularly could no longer restrain their

irritation with the company. In their opinion rates were excessive, and delays

caused by one-way traffic, low water, and landslides and debris that blocked the

passage were inexcusable. In addition, as the size of steamboats increased, the

utility of the canal was reduced. These inconveniences, the result of poor construc-

tion and lack of planning, stimulated demands for improvements. Again, Cincin-

nati residents led the campaign for action, but results were slow in coming. Delayed

by legal, political, and financial difficulties in addition to the Civil War, the enlarged

canal was not opened to traffic until 1872.19

Although the Ohio River was the city's main trade artery, residents of Cincin-

nati did not devote all their efforts to its improvement. Transportation routes to

the back country were also important to the people of southwestern Ohio. Major

navigation projects would have a limited effect on the economic development of

Cincinnati unless farmers could get their products and purchases to and from the

city. Most businessmen, therefore, not only supported such improvements but also

were determined that the projects should terminate at the Queen City. Area resi-

dents investigated three separate projects designed to facilitate the flow of agri-

cultural produce into the city: developing navigation on the two Miami rivers,

building roads into the city, and constructing a canal through the Miami Valley.

A few miles west of the city the Great Miami River empties into the Ohio.

17. Liberty Hall, December 18, 1822, January 14, August 29, November 7, 1823, February 3, 1824;

Cincinnati National Republican and Ohio Political Register (cited hereafter as National Republican),

May 27, 1823; House Reports, 18 cong., 1 sess., No. 98.

18. Liberty Hall, March 15, 1825; Review of the Report of the Board of Engineers on the Improve-

ment of the Falls of the Ohio (Washington, 1834), 4.

19. House Miscellaneous Documents, 40 cong., 2 sess., No. 83; Hunter, Steamboats on Western

Rivers, 184-186.

Internal Improvement Projects                                               13

charter any new companies in southwestern Ohio. In his opinion opposition came

from the back country which depended on Cincinnati for a market. The farmers

in this region were opposed to turnpikes because of tolls.²⁵

But most people agreed that poor roads impeded the development of the city

and should be improved. Since capital was limited, numerous "do-it-yourself"

projects were considered. One of these designed to improve the Mill Creek road

attracted attention. This road was the main artery into the city from the north. All

of the city's newspapers urged the public to attend a meeting called by local busi-

nessmen to discuss the project, and one editor even went so far as to suggest that

individuals without "an accommodating disposition" should stay at home. After a

lengthy debate those attending the gathering decided to rebuild the road to meet

turnpike standards and then macadamize it with rocks and crushed stone. All work

would be done by local residents, and a board of managers would oversee con-

struction and determine the value of work performed by other residents. Again

nothing practical was accomplished. A few individuals opposed raising money for

materials by open subscriptions. They argued that property owners along the route

should contribute more than other citizens. When their suggestion was rejected,

they withdrew their support and the project collapsed.²⁶

There were numerous basic problems which frustrated local efforts to build roads

prior to 1825; and although there is abundant evidence to indicate general, en-

thusiastic support, few actual improvements were made. Road-building advocates

had to depend almost exclusively on local capital, and money was scarce. Further-

more, individuals were reluctant to contribute money when they could not antici-

pate direct benefits. They wanted either a dividend from their investment or a road

through or by their property. Dissension between city and county residents, dis-

agreements over the priority of projects, and lack of experience in construction

were also significant factors in delaying local road building.²⁷

Although financial assistance was limited, the Federal Government tried to en-

courage road construction in Ohio. In addition to appropriating funds for the Na-

tional Road, numerous post roads were built in the state. Over these routes stage

lines ran between major towns, at least during the summer and autumn, carrying

mail and passengers. In some cases mail routes opened up outlying areas to stage

and wagon traffic, but generally mail was still carried by horseback.²⁸

The Federal Government also encouraged road construction in other ways.

Probably the most significant was the three percent fund. In Ohio's Enabling Act

Congress included a provision to return to the state three percent of the net pro-

ceeds from the sale of public lands in the state. The money was to be used ex-

clusively for surveying and constructing roads. Although the fund undoubtedly

provided some valuable assistance, it had several drawbacks. In the first place, the

amount received was not large. Including supplementary contributions from the

state, total expenditures between 1804 and 1830 from the fund were only $342,-

814.15. Moreover, distribution of the money was left to the discretion of the legis-

25. Andrew Mack to Isaac Bates, January 8, 1819, Box 1, Bates Papers, 1789-1873, Cincinnati His-

torical Society.

26. Advertiser, February 26, March 19, 22, 29, April 5, 9, 19, May 17, 1823; National Republican,

March 18, 1823; Liberty Hall, March 14, April 4, July 22, 1823, January 23, 1824.

27. For examples of some of these problems, see Liberty Hall, August 5, September 2, 12, Novem-

ber 28, December 5, 1823.

28. See Archer B. Hulbert, The Cumberland Road (Cleveland, 1904), 77-78; Buley, Old Northwest,

I, 464-471.

14                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

lature. This proved to be an unfortunate arrangement. It fostered political logrolling

and meant that much of the fund was wasted on salaries for special commissioners

who were appointed each time a new road was proposed. In addition, the arrange-

ment meant that small sums of money were widely distributed over settled areas

of the state rather than concentrated on a few major projects.²⁹

Nevertheless, the three percent fund provided some needed capital, and Cin-

cinnati was one of the first towns to benefit. In 1804 the legislature appropriated

part of the Federal money for the construction of two roads into the settlement.

Other appropriations were made from time to time for road surveys, bridge con-

struction, and improvements on existing roads. Through this fund the state's road

system advanced much more rapidly than it would have if left to its own resources.³⁰

The state government was not as generous in appropriating its own money for

road improvements as it was with the three percent fund. In general, it encouraged

projects between 1815 and 1834 but left the financing to local enterprise. In 1817

Governor Thomas Worthington tried to persuade the legislature to assume the

responsibility for building north-south and east-west through roads, but he was un-

successful. Some money was added to the three percent fund, but by this time it

was also used for bridge construction and improvements on existing roads. The

legislature, however, facilitated actual construction of new roads by granting liberal

charters to turnpike companies, establishing construction standards, requiring able-

bodied males to work on the roads, and levying a special state tax that was re-

turned to the counties for construction purposes.³¹

The charters granted to turnpike companies illustrate in part the willingness of

the legislature to encourage road construction. In 1828 civic leaders from south-

western Ohio obtained charters for the Cincinnati, Lebanon, and Springfield Turn-

pike Company with an authorized capital of $150,000, and the Cincinnati,

Columbus, and Wooster Turnpike Company with an authorized capital of $200,000.

Following a standard practice, both charters established routes, set construction

specifications and toll rates, divided managerial responsibilities among stockholders

in towns concerned, and included provisions by which the legislature could pur-

chase the company. Although later charters granted more liberal terms, these com-

panies also received some concessions from the legislature. They were given the

right of eminent domain, exclusive rights to construct roads over described routes,

and permission to sell stock to the county commissioners. Companies such as these

were only a beginning. Within ten years the legislature had chartered eight turn-

pike companies, some of which were to build roads in southwestern Ohio.³²

Appeals urging support for road companies were eloquent and optimistic. In a

speech pointing out advantages of improved roads, the engineer for the Cincinnati,

Columbus, and Wooster Company exhorted:

Are you a philanthropist, and delight in the improvement of your race? Improve, then,

your roads. Are you humane and take pleasure in seeing the condition of your faithful

animals ameliorated? Improve your roads. Are you religious, and aim to attend the house

29. Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development, 131-134.

30. Acts Passed at the Second Session of the First General Assembly of the State of Ohio . . . (Chil-

licothe, 1803), I, 136-145; Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development, 134.

31. For a discussion of turnpike charters and road building, see ibid., Chapter 8.

32. Cincinnati, Lebanon, and Springfield Turnpike Company Charter; Cincinnati, Columbus, and

Wooster Turnpike Company Charter, Ohio Turnpikes and Canals [n. d.]; miscellaneous pamphlets and

documents on internal improvements collected by the Cincinnati Historical Society Library; William D.

Gallagher, "Ohio in 1838," The Hesperian, I (May 1838), 8.

Internal Improvement Projects                                                  15

of God in time, and with your passions unruffled? Improve your roads. Do you belong to

a civilized community in any capacity, and wish to increase and extend the blessing of

civilization? The same answer applies with equal force.³³

Similarly, but with less verbosity, newspaper editors encouraged their readers to

support the companies. Their appeals brought results and construction began, but

the roads were not completed for several decades.³⁴

Lending impetus to the demands for new roads after 1825 was the state's deter-

mination to construct a canal system. The two main branches of the system, the

Ohio Canal and the Miami Canal, were not completed until 1834, but sections of

both were opened to traffic beginning in 1827. As new sections were completed,

local residents rushed to build access routes to the artificial waterways. Rarely

could these be classified as improved roads, but they were essential and improve-

ments came with time.³5

The construction of the canal system connecting Lake Erie with the Ohio River

was by far the most ambitious and significant internal-improvement project under-

taken by the state between 1815 and 1834. Such a canal had been suggested early

in the state's history, but in the absence of traffic and capital the project was not

seriously considered until after the War of 1812. During the next decade business

and political leaders repeatedly urged the General Assembly to appropriate funds.

In their opinion a canal would not only provide an outlet for the interior regions

of the state but also would facilitate the flow of trade between the East and West.³⁶

Opposition to the plan in different sections of the state was difficult to overcome.

Some individuals opposed it because their area of the state would not benefit, and

others favored the more traditional road and river improvements. Some feared the

state would incur too large a public debt, and still others opposed an increase in

taxes. Governor Ethan A. Brown observed in 1821 that,

The magnitude and novelty of the enterprise and the dread of incurring a debt of so con-

siderable [an] amount as might be required to complete the work, was sufficient to deter

many; but some local opposition, and particularly no surplus of money . . . induced the

friends of the measure not to press the step of authorizing a survey and estimates this year.³⁷

Agitation for a canal system brought results in February 1825. At that time the

legislature authorized the construction of the two main lines of the system. The

most ambitious of these was the Ohio and Erie Canal. It was to run from Ports-

mouth on the Ohio River to Cleveland on Lake Erie using stretches of the Scioto,

Licking, Muskingum, and Cuyahoga rivers. The second part of the system was

the Miami Canal from Cincinnati to Dayton through the Great Miami River Val-

ley. These routes were selected to gain the support of the most heavily populated

area of the state and were not, because of terrain features and an inadequate water

supply, the most desirable. In 1822 the canal commissioners had authorized surveys

33. John S. Williams, Address to an Enterprising Public upon the Improvement of Roads, and the

Introduction of Track Roads (Cincinnati, 1833), 4-5.

34. Charles Cist, Cincinnati in 1841: Its Early Annals and Future Prospects (Cincinnati, 1841), 80-82.

35. Buley, Old Northwest, I, 450.

36. Chester E. Finn, "The Ohio Canals: Public Enterprise on the Frontier," Ohio State Archaeo-

logical and Historical Quarterly, LI (January 1942), 38-39.

37. Ethan A. Brown to Jonathan Dayton, February 4, 1821, Brown Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

See also P. Beecher to [?], January 15, 1825, Beecher-Trimble Collection, 1817-1892, Cincinnati His-

torical Society Library; [C. C. Huntington and C. P. McClelland], History of the Ohio Canals: Their

Construction, Cost, Use, and Partial Abandonment (Columbus, 1905), 7-14.

16                                                                   OHIO HISTORY

for five different river systems: the Mahoning and Grand route; the Cuyahoga,

Tuscarawas, and Muskingum route; the Black, Killbuck, and Muskingum route;

the Scioto and Sandusky route; and the Maumee and Great Miami route. Engi-

neers considered each of these alternatives practical, but as frequently happened,

practical considerations were ignored for political expediency.³⁸

Canal advocates not only sacrificed the most desirable routes but also agreed

to other sectional demands to win votes. The same act allocated funds for road

improvements in the northwestern part of the state and included a promise from

the legislature to consider at a later date the question of extending the Miami

Canal to Lake Erie. To placate other areas of the state, the assemblymen agreed

to support legislation requiring all counties to levy a tax for public education and

to revise the state's system of taxation.³⁹

Letters and editorials in Cincinnati newspapers suggest that at first some

internal-improvement advocates in the Queen City only reluctantly supported the

state's canal project. With some justification they feared it would divert capital

needed to construct the canal at the Falls on the Ohio River. In their opinion the

state should ask the national government for assistance in building the canal from

Lake Erie to the Ohio River. If Congress agreed, local and state funds could be

used for other projects.⁴⁰

In 1820 the legislature approved a resolution requesting the state's congressional

representatives to obtain a Federal land grant for this trans-state canal. Congress,

however, was not inclined to make such a concession at this time. The next year

the Ohio delegation asked Congress to authorize a survey for an Ohio-Erie canal,

but again met refusal. Further attempts to obtain Federal assistance were tempo-

rarily abandoned, and advocates of the project accepted the fact that the state

would have to assume the initiative.⁴¹

Some local opponents of the proposed canal argued that it would reduce the

commercial importance of Cincinnati if the canal terminated west of the city. A

few business leaders believed that once completed, farmers would use the canal

to by-pass the city and continue down the river. Or, worse yet, merchants and

wholesalers could go to the farmer, purchase produce, and ship it directly to New

Orleans. At the same time, farmers living near Cincinnati contended it would bring

more produce to the city and lower prices. To the editor of the Liberty Hall, these

fears were not justified:

Nay, we assume it as a position not to be disputed, that the canal will increase the com-

merce of the city; that the produce of the country will increase, that a wider and more

extensive scope of country will be made tributary to the city; and that, so far from being

a detriment, the canal will make Cincinnati more flourishing than it was ever known to be

before.⁴2

When it became apparent that the state government was actually going ahead

38. Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 15-19.

39. Caleb Atwater, A History of the State of Ohio, Natural and Civil (Cincinnati. 1838), 262; Hunt-

ington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 16-18; Buley, Old Northwest, I, 493-494; Francis P. Wisenburger,

The Passing of the Frontier, 1825-1850 (Carl Wittke, ed., The History of the State of Ohio, III, Columbus,

1941), 92-94.

40. Advertiser, February 16, September 28, 1819; Liberty Hall, March 16, 1819, February 22, 1820.

41. John Kilbourn, comp., Public Documents Concerning the Ohio Canals . . . from Their Com-

mencement down to the Close of the Legislature of 1831-1832 (Columbus, 1832), 12, 15; Liberty Hall,

January 24, 1821.

42. Ibid., March 1, 8, September 20, 1825.

Internal Improvement Projects                                                17

with its plans, another group of Cincinnati residents voiced its disapproval. These

persons did not object to the canals but believed the role of the state was only to

"foster and encourage public improvements"; private citizens should be allowed

"to enjoy the profits arising from those improvements." In 1822 several political

leaders in Cincinnati had called a public meeting to discuss the possiblity of or-

ganizing a private company to build a canal to Dayton, but they went no further

than appointing a committee to raise money for a survey. No further evidence was

found to indicate that local residents seriously considered building the canals by

chartered companies.⁴³

The lack of interest in any private undertaking can be explained, perhaps, by

the opposition of the state's canal commissioners. They argued that chartered com-

panies were monopolies which had been granted "intangible and irrevocable" privi-

leges, and experience had demonstrated that they frequently disregarded the

public's interest for the sake of profits. Therefore, the commissioners concluded,

"It would be extremely hazardous and unwise, to entrust private companies with

making those canals, which can be made by the state."⁴⁴

At the state level Governor Ethan A. Brown, frequently called the "Father of

Ohio Canals," and Micajah Williams, a state representative from Hamilton County

and later a canal commissioner, were dynamic and tireless leaders in the campaign

for a canal system. In Cincinnati such men as Jacob Burnet, Peyton S. Symmes,

Nathan Guilford, Daniel Drake, Ethan Stone, and Samuel W. Davies endorsed the

plan and worked diligently persuading others that a canal system would bring

numerous advantages to the city and state. Moreover, public antagonism dimin-

ished after the legislature agreed to finance the surveys for a canal at the Falls.

With the assurance of state aid for the city's project, residents of the Queen City

began to take active interest in the state canal system.⁴⁵

Between 1820 and 1825 Cincinnati editors printed numerous articles and edi-

torials pointing out the economic and political importance of canals. At first some

of them attempted to use the Ohio-Erie project to coerce Louisville and other river

towns into building a canal at the Falls. The editor of the Liberty Hall hinted that

the Ohio River was not the city's only route to the East, and that if Louisville con-

tinued to procrastinate, an alternative would be built. Besides, he continued, with

two outlets,

The farmer's hopes would be doubled, and a large part of the western population, instead

of looking only to the forlorn hope of a damp, sickly town [New Orleans], remote from

the ocean and from Europe, with little solid capital, where produce is often spoiled before

it arrives, or devoured by charges before it is sold, would have access to the surest and

best supplied market in America.⁴⁶

Other writers pointed out that the canals would provide employment, put money

into circulation, and help the state's economy recover from the Panic of 1819. Using

as examples similar projects in other states, notably New York, they demonstrated

how canals increased land values and created water supplies that could be used

43. Advertiser, June 11, 1822, December 22, 1824, February 5, 1825; Western Spy, June 8, 15, 1822.

44. Third Annual Canal Commissioners' Report, January 8, 1825, in Kilbourn, Public Documents,

138-139.

45. Liberty Hall, February 18, December 6, 1820, June 12, 1822; Advertiser, January 11, February

15, 1820.

46. Liberty Hall, November 18, 1820.

Internal Improvement Projects                                                  19

In addition to the usual financial difficulties and problems created by lack of

experience in construction techniques, irresponsible contractors caused further de-

lays. The state commissioners let contracts for specified jobs to the lowest bidder.

Unfortunately, too many individuals suddenly considered themselves canal engi-

neers, and they submitted bids without accurately estimating costs. Then, when

they realized they could not make a profit, they abandoned the job.⁴⁹ Even though

other problems continued to delay construction, on November 28, 1827,

three fine boats, crowded with citizens, delighted with the novelty and interest of the occa-

sion, left the basin six miles north of Cincinnati, and proceeded to Middletown with the

most perfect success. The progress of the boats was equal to about three miles an hour,

through the course of the whole line, including the detention at the locks and all other

causes of delay, which are numerous in a first attempt to navigate a new canal, when masters,

hands and horses are inexperienced, and often the canal itself in imperfect order. The boats

returned to the basin with equal success, and it is understood they have made several trips

since, carrying passengers and freight.50

With the exception of the connecting locks, the entire length of the Miami Canal

(sixty-seven miles) from Dayton to Cincinnati was completed by January 1829 at

a reported cost of $746,852.70. The question of a southern terminus had long cre-

ated dissension. Area farmers preferred the cheaper route, following the course of

the Miami River. But this meant the city would be by-passed, and local merchants

had no intention of letting this happen. The merchants won their point, and the

canal was temporarily terminated less than a mile from the river. Once the deci-

sion was made some business leaders petitioned the legislature to make this the

permanent terminal point. Although they were unsuccessful, they blocked further

construction until 1832, and the connecting locks were not completed until 1834.51

The legislature discussed the possibility of extending the Miami Canal to Lake

Erie at the same time it passed the original act. It did not, however, authorize the

extension until 1831. At first Ohio residents were reluctant to support the northern

extension. Canal advocates in Indiana were as anxious as their counterparts in

Ohio to complete a transportation link between the Ohio Valley and Lake Erie.

Early in the 1820's they formulated plans to construct the Wabash Erie Canal via

the Wabash and Maumee rivers to Lake Erie. To help cover construction costs,

Congress in 1827 gave the state of Indiana a land grant amounting to all lands

along the entire route of the canal, on an alternate section pattern ten miles wide.

This meant, in effect, that Indiana was given jurisdiction over some of Ohio terri-

tory since the Maumee cut through the northwestern section of the state. Ohioans

were not pleased with this development. The conflict, however, was resolved through

legislative negotiations. Ohio agreed to construct that part of the Wabash-Erie

Canal which lay within its borders and Indiana gave up its claim to the land in

49. Micajah Williams to Alfred Kelly, April 12, 1826, in "Letters to Ohio Canal Commissioners,"

Cincinnati Historical Society Library. See also Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 22-29;

Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 94-97.

50. Sixth Annual Canal Commissioners' Report, January 17, 1828, in Kilbourn, Public Documents,

284.

51. See Kilbourn. Public Documents: Seventh Annual Canal Commissioners' Report, January 6,

1829, 333-334; Fourth Annual Canal Commissioners' Report, December 10, 1825, 187-188; Special

Report of Canal Commissioners, February 16, 1830, 389-390; Tenth Annual Canal Commissioners'

Report, January 11, 1832, 2-5; Cincinnati Saturday Evening Chronicle (cited hereafter as Chronicle),

January 31, 1829; Liberty Hall, July 29, August 5, 1829.

20                                                                 OHIO HISTORY

Ohio that Congress had included in the 1827 grant. Thereupon, Ohio residents

showed renewed interest in completing the Miami extension.52

Actual construction on the northern extension of the Miami Canal did not begin

until 1837. By 1845 the 114 mile canal from Dayton to Toledo was completed.

Indiana began work on the Wabash and Erie Canal several years earlier (1832).

By 1842 the junction with the Miami Extension was completed, and a year later

the Wabash Canal was opened from Lake Erie to Lafayette, Indiana. Although

the Miami Extension had almost no effect on Cincinnati during the period of this

study, it was significant because it was financed in part by a land grant from the

national government. This marked a precedent whereby Congress could increase

its involvement in internal improvements.⁵³

As soon as the Miami Canal was opened to traffic, newspaper editors assured

the public that the project was a success. They pointed out that it had reduced

freight rates and increased the volume of produce brought to the city not only

from the immediate vicinity but also from the whole Miami Valley. As an example

one editor pointed out that in one week in March 1829, more than 575 tons of

produce had been brought to the city. The cost of transporting the whole amount

for a distance not exceeding twenty-five miles was $2,800, and it only took ten

boats, sixty horses, sixty men, and thirty boys three days to do the job. By com-

parison, to bring a similar amount by wagon the same distance, it would take 575

wagons, 2,340 horses, and 575 men. And then the cost would have been $7,200.

Moreover, toll receipts indicated the canal would pay for itself in a short time.⁵⁴

Such optimism was only partially justified. Transportation costs declined, and

the volume of produce brought to Cincinnati increased. Toll receipts, however, re-

mained disappointingly low. In 1828 the state's entire canal system collected only

$8,570.69 in tolls. By 1832 the amount had increased to $50,974.73, but this was

not enough to pay the interest on the debt the state had incurred in constructing

canals. Although toll receipts continued to increase between 1832 and 1840, they

did not reach the totals that advocates of the program had promised. This can be

explained in part by the fact that traffic remained primarily local.⁵⁵

By 1835 neither the Miami nor the other Ohio canals had made any significant

impact on the flow of exports from the area served by Cincinnati. The city still

depended almost exclusively on the Ohio River for sending flour, pork, whiskey,

corn, and tobacco--the main exports of the region--to the New Orleans market.

Likewise, imports received in the city continued to follow established trade routes.

Salt and sugar were brought up the river from New Orleans. Iron came down the

river from Pittsburgh. Manufactured items, depending on their weight, came from

both the eastern and southern routes. One authority concluded that:

In short, the northern part of the Old Northwest and the southern part each had its own

commercial outlet or gateway. In fact, the southern part had two, the eastern and southern.

While the two parts of the Old Northwest were now connected by a canal that ran from

52. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era, 99.

53. For a discussion of the extension of the Miami Canal and the means by which it was financed,

see Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 34-38; Burnet, Notes, 455-460. Burnet was largely re-

sponsible for getting the bill authorizing the grant through Congress. Documentary evidence of at-

tempts to obtain Federal assistance can be found in Kilbourn, Public Documents.

54. Chronicle, March 21, 1829. See also National Republican, April 4, May 6, 1827; Chronicle,

March 22, 1829.

55. Cist. Cincinnati in 1841, 84; Eleventh Annual Canal Commissioners Report, January 22, 1833,

in Kilbourn, Public Documents, 37; Huntington and McClelland, Ohio Canals, 43, 78.

Internal Improvement Projects                                                    21

the Ohio river to Lake Erie, neither part was making any considerable use of the outlet

of the other part.56

Although railroads belong to a later era, some internal improvements advocates

claimed that they were superior to other forms of transportation even before the

state's canal system was developed enough to meet the expectations of its support-

ers. No one went so far as to suggest that railroads should replace the canals al-

ready under construction. Rather, they wanted them to supplement the system and

provide new routes to the coastal cities, bypassing the river route through New

Orleans. Speaking for some railroad promoters who were in the city, one writer

maintained that,

We are heartily tired of a Louisiana Monopoly; it cannot be possible that the immense

productions of the almost boundless regions of the West, are to be doomed always to be

filtered through the commission houses of Orleans, or subject to the precarious market of

that city.57

One of the first proposals for a railroad connecting Cincinnati with the East

Coast was made in the fall of 1827. At this time a few prominent citizens discussed

the possibility of building a line from Cincinnati to Charleston, South Carolina,

but they took no action.⁵⁸ Eight years later, in 1835, railroad advocates revived

the plan and formed a committee to promote the project. Although it was to be a

cooperative venture among several states, Daniel Drake, William Henry Harrison,

James Hall, and Edward D. Mansfield from Cincinnati played important roles in

the proceedings. In its entirety the project was quite comprehensive:

The proposed main trunk, from Cincinnati to Charleston, would resemble an immense

horizontal tree extending its roots through, or into, ten states, and a vast expanse of unin-

habited territory, in the northern interior of the Union, while its branches would wind

through half as many populous states of the southern sea-board.⁵⁹

The Kentucky legislature chartered a company in 1837 to build this railroad,

but the Panic of 1837 forced plans to be temporarily abandoned.⁶⁰

The Ohio legislature chartered the first railroad company in the state, the Ohio

Canal and Steubenville Railway Company, in February 1830. This company, with

a capital stock of $500,000 was to construct a single or double lane track from

Steubenville to the Ohio Canal. Other companies soon followed. The next year

the legislature chartered the Richmond, Eaton, and Miami Railroad Company to

build a line from Richmond, Indiana, to the Miami Canal. In 1832 it chartered

the Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company to build an alternative route to

the Miami Canal Extension. Two other companies, the Franklin, Springborough,

56. A. L. Kohlmeier, The Old Northwest as the Keystone of the Arch of American Federal Union:

A Study in Commerce and Politics (Bloomington, Ind., 1938), 19-21; see also Gephart, Transportation

and Industrial Development, 118-119. In a more recent study, Clark suggests that "this division of Ohio

into two more or less separate market structures is of little importance before 1835, . . ." He points

out that most traffic from the state moved south before 1835 and that railroads significantly altered

trade patterns during the 1850's. Clark, Grain Trade in the Old Northwest, 19.

57. Chronicle, March 17, 1827. See also ibid., February 20, 1830, January 1, 22, February 12, 1831,

February 18, 1832; Cincinnati American, May 27, 1831.

58. Ebenezer S. Thomas, Reminiscences of the Last Sixty-Five Years ... (Hartford, 1840), I, 104-111.

59. Rail-Road from the Banks of the Ohio River to the Tide Waters of the Carolinas and Georgia

(Cincinnati, 1835), 7.

60. Hollander, Cincinnati Southern Railway, 10-11.

22                                                               OHIO HISTORY

and Wilmington Railroad Company and the Chillicothe and Lebanon Railroad

Company, were chartered the same year to build feeder lines to the Miami Canal.

The Cincinnati, Harrison, and Indianapolis Railroad Company and the Cincinnati

and St. Louis Railroad Company, also chartered in 1832, planned to build lines

that would open new territories to trade with Cincinnati.61 This was only a beginning,

for during the next decade the legislature chartered many additional companies.

All of these charters contained similar provisions. Capital stock varied from

$500,000 to $1,000,000 depending upon the size of the project. Likewise, the num-

ber of directors varied, nine or twelve being the most common. The directors had

the right to select the "best route" between the specified cities, and most charters

provided for the right of eminent domain. A few included a provision authorizing

the use of construction materials along the route. In all cases the state retained

the right to purchase the company. Although several leading citizens tried to stim-

ulate interest in railroad construction, none were actually built in the Cincinnati

region before 1834.

By expanding the city's trade area, most of these developments contributed

significantly to the economic growth of Cincinnati. But other factors were also in-

volved. Perhaps the most significant was the rapid decline in transportation costs.

Statistical information on transportation rates for the years covered in this study

is meager, and economic conditions and seasonal variations caused rates to fluctuate

considerably. Nevertheless, rates apparently dropped substantially between 1816

and 1834. They were "fairly high" before the Panic of 1819, then "declined dras-

tically" during the subsequent depression. After the economy began to recover,

they continued the downward trend, but the decline was less severe.62

Between 1815 and 1834 Cincinnati became a major trade entrep??t within the

Old Northwest. To achieve this distinction local merchants supported improved

transportation facilities with markets in the East and New Orleans. Equally as

important was the development of access routes to the back country which brought

farmers to the city's markets. Business and political leaders realized that the po-

tential expansion of the city's economy was limited unless the market area was

expanded. Consequently, they favored extending and improving existing trade

routes and quickly endorsed those projects which furthered the expansion of trade.

Residents of the.city, however, frequently disagreed with farmers in the back

country over proposed routes. Both were motivated by their own interests. City

residents, merchants in particular, wanted all projects to terminate at Cincinnati,

and many citizens refused to support those that did not. Most farmers, on the

other hand, tended to favor cheaper, more direct routes to the river. With the ex-

ception of roads, they were indifferent to the fact that a proposed improvement

might by-pass the Cincinnati markets. In most cases the city won out. It had a

greater supply of capital and more influence in the state legislature than the rural

areas of the county.

City rivalries, inexperience in proper construction methods and political logroll-

ing delayed the completion of most internal-improvement projects. Equally serious

61. Acts of Local Nature Passed at the First Session of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly of the

State of Ohio . . . (Columbus, 1830), XXVIII, 184; Acts of a Local Nature Passed at the First Session

of the Thirtieth General Assembly of the State of Ohio . . . (Columbus, 1832), XXX, 11-14, 15-22,

41-45, 103-109, 117-120, 161-167.

62. Thomas S. Berry, "Western Prices Before 1861: A Study of the Cincinnati Market," Harvard

Economic Studies, LXXIV (1943), 44.

Internal Improvement Projects                                           23

obstacles were a lack of capital and an unwillingness to increase taxes. To solve

these problems, internal-improvements advocates turned to the state and national

governments. Committed, as were most Americans to the principles of laissez faire,

they nevertheless were willing to seek governmental assistance to solve problems

which blocked economic progress. Both levels of government responded favorably

to local demands for help even though the amount of assistance was often limited.

Money was received from both the state and national governments for canal con-

struction, river improvements, and road building and improvements. Private citi-

zens also invested money and labor in these projects, and they assumed the major

responsibility for local construction.

The perseverance and ingenuity of local internal-improvements advocates com-

bined with the financial assistance provided by the state and national governments

helped to remove a major obstacle to the city's economic development. Improved

transportation facilities made possible the establishment of a firm economic base

for the city and stimulated long-term economic growth.