Ohio History Journal

WESTERN OPINION AND THE WAR OF 1812*

BY JOHN F. CADY, M A.

I.

The determining factor in any situation is the active,

positive element involved in it. In the realm of physics,

for example, force is measured by the product of mass

and velocity, but the direction of movement is deter-

mined by the positive, active velocity, not by the passive

mass acted upon. So it is in historical and political

movements. The desires and convictions of the posi-

tive, progressive group are of far more significance

than the timid, half-hearted-predilections of a far larger

element. The dead inertia of conservatism may be con-

sidered a more or less constant quantity; the variable

determinants in the equation are the men of energy and

enterprise -- explorers, conquerors, reformers, imperi-

alists, those who have faith in their own powers, and

the courage to dare take their place on the frontiers or

vanguard of a country's enterprise. The movements

of national life are directed and guided by the active,

energetic element of its population.

This principle finds perhaps no better illustration

anywhere than in the determining influence which the

spirit of the back country had upon national policy dur-

ing the period leading up to the War of 1812. The

aggressive people on the frontiers entertained certain

* Last June this paper was awarded the annual prize offered by the

Ohio Society of Colonial Wars, for the best essay on early western his-

tory, by a graduate student of the University of Cincinnati. It was also

offered as a thesis for the degree of M. A. in the University of Cincinnati.

(427)

428      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

strong, well defined desires and convictions, and because

their desires were so positive they were able to dictate,

in no small measure, national policy to the much larger

conservative East who were too timid and undecided to

take any action at all. The young Republican leaders

in Congress, backed by insistent and urgent public

opinion in the West forced the United States into a

war with a powerful nation, a war to which large sec-

tions of the country were utterly hostile, and which was

regarded with enthusiasm in none but the three sparsely

settled States west of the Alleghanies. The difference

in the attitude of the West is traceable in part to its

pride in resenting national insults, and in part to the

fact that the War of 1812, in the West, was coupled

with a popular Indian war for which the West believed

Great Britain responsible. This paper concerns itself

primarily with a consideration of these two elements,

nationalistic pride and patriotism, and the inevitable

Indian struggle, as the factors furnishing the grounds

for differences between Eastern and Western opinion,

a difference the assumption of which the subject of this

paper necessarily involves.

It is my purpose to discuss under II, the factors

which operated to set Western opinion off from Eastern

opinion, namely, the aggressive character of the frontier

people, their loyalty to the national government and the

presence of an inferior and yet brave and warlike race

of savages on its borders. In the third main division

the development and the shifting of Western opinion

in regard to a British war will be treated from the

chronological standpoint; first, the attitude of the West

up to 1809, when the land purchases by Governor Har-

rison precipitated an Indian crisis; and secondly, the

Western Opinion and the War of 1812   429

rapid rise of the war spirit from 1809 to 1812. This

chronological development of Western opinion will be

followed under IV., by a consideration of the actual

influence it had toward the declaration of war, when

translated into action by the Western leaders in Con-

gress. The fifth division concerns itself with the support

of the thesis of this paper based on the activity of the

West in the campaigns of the war period: followed,

under VI. by a summary and some conclusions.

II.

The first factor which operated to develop a peculiar

Western opinion was the aggressive character of the

frontiersmen themselves. "The country whither these

settlers went was not one into which timid men would

willingly venture, and the founders of the West were

perforce men of stern stuff, who from the very begin-

ning formed a most war-like race."¹ They had risked

all in their venture into the wilderness, where their very

existence depended upon self-reliance and personal

courage The land on which they lived they held by

right of conquest from the Indians; and where the law

of superior force is the ultimate recourse, there is no

wonder that they were to prove impatient with con-

ventional forms and artificial restraints which might

block their desires.²

The people of the West were characterized by more

than aggressive individualism, however; perhaps even

more characteristic of this section as contrasted with

the East was its ardent nationalistic patriotism. The

frontier from the first of colonial history has been the

1 Theodore Roosevelt, Life of Thomas H. Benton (Boston 1899)

page 2-4.

2 Ibid. Page 14, 15.

430      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

great Americanizing force of our country. Its poten-

tialities and its problems took Europeans and trans-

formed them into Americans. As succeeding waves of

immigration pushed the frontier back, first to the fall-

line of the rivers, then to the Alleghanies, the Missis-

sippi, and the Rockies, meeting strikingly similar prob-

lems in western New England as in the last phase

of the far Western frontier, they seem to have left be-

hind them, like a moving glacier, characteristic traces

which have since differentiated Americans from Euro-

peans. The story of western expansion is the real his-

tory of the American nation, far more than its diplo-

macy; the most important element in the evolution of

our political institutions, and the deciding factor in

nearly every great national issue. Particularism was

everywhere lost on the road to the West.³

In the back country there was no distinction be-

tween North and South in any way commensurate with

the differences between West and East. "They felt for

the South against the North, but more for the West

against the East, and most strongly of all for the Union

against any section whatever."4 All three of these points,

it may be noted, point significantly to the possibility of a

war with Great Britain. The conquest and exploitation

of the measureless resources of the new country was not

a sectional, but a national problem. Cooperation among

themselves, however well developed, was not sufficient

to realize the dreams which their horizons, widened by

visions of a mighty empire, had produced. The Federal

3 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History

(New York 1920) p. 4-23; see also Evarts Boutell Greene, Foundations

of American Nationality (New York 1922) p. 319.

⁴ Roosevelt, T. A. Benton, p. 11.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812    431

government must aid in the defense of the country, in

the development of roads and canals and in maintaining

the unobstructed outlet down the Mississippi.

Their politics was determined very little by European

issues, very little by the Eastern pro-French or pro-

British attitude.  It seemed far more important to

Westerners that American interests be satisfied, than

that they should take sides in the European struggle.

Nor were they influenced by the petty sectional and

State loyalties which split the East. Henry Clay voiced

his indignation at this servility to Europe in disregard of

American interests in a speech of December 25, 1810,

after a Delaware senator had opposed Madison's an-

nexation of west Florida on the grounds that it might

cause trouble with England. "Sir", he said, "Is the

time never to arrive when we may manage our own

affairs without fear of insulting his Britannic Majesty?

* * * Whether we assert our rights by sea, or at-

tempt their maintenance by land,--whithersoever we

turn, this phantom incessantly pursues us."5  The dis-

regard of our rights as a nation cut deeply into the

pride of the Westerner. They had "little patience with

the half-way measures of defense of national rights

* * * Their ideas of union transcended the policies

of the Eastern statesmen whose eyes saw no further

than the top of the Alleghanies, and whose ears listened

all too eagerly to the admonitions of European chan-

cellors."6

The West had far less reason to fear the conse-

quences of a war for national rights than their country-

5 The works of Henry Clay, Edited by Calvin Colton, (New York

1904) in ten volumes. Vol. 1, p. 182.

6 Allen Johnson, Union and Democracy (Boston 1915) p. 203.

432     Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

men nearer the sea-coast; and willingness to defend it

by war is after all the final test of nationalism. To

the Easterner a declaration of war against England was

not to be undertaken in any careless manner.  Great

Britain ruled the sea, and had a splendid army backed

by military traditions of long standing, against which

the United States army would make but a pitiable show-

ing. Thoughtful men realized that privateers, however

destructive to British commerce, afforded no means of

defense for the coast. With commerce and industry

already crippled by Jefferson's disastrous embargo

policy, and with a national treasury almost empty, the

danger of internal collapse was added to that of mili-

tary defeat. On the other hand, the people of the West

had little to fear from attack by a foreign power, with

the exception of the loss of New Orleans which they

proved themselves fully able to defend. The dangers

which threatened the West in 1811 and 1812 would be,

in their opinion, diminished rather than increased by a

declaration of war, for only then would they be free to

strike directly at the heart of the power behind the

Indian Confederacy which was growing stronger and

stronger with every month of delay. For the British

power in Canada the Westerner had nothing but supreme

contempt; but even had it been a considerable danger, the

vast reaches of the interior of the country would be

adequate protection for him. "The attempts of Eng-

land to penetrate into the great interior would be like

blows of a sledge hammer struck into a bin of wheat;

a few kernels would be bruised or destroyed, but the

iron would soon bury itself harmlessly just under the

surface of the mass."7

7 Kendric Charles Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality,

(New York 1906) p. 80-83.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812    433

Nor did the fear of financial or industrial collapse

have the same horrors for the West. Industrially they

were practically self-sufficient; they had no commerce

to be driven off the sea; and, as a debtor section, they

certainly would have little objection to cheap money and

inflation of currency.  Thus it can easily be seen

that there were the very strongest of reasons for a

much greater display of nationalism in the West than

existed in any other part of the country. One cannot

study the lives of the typical leaders of the West without

realizing the tremendous sincerity of its loyalty to the

Federal government, whether the issue be that of a

Burr's conspiracy, South Carolina nullification, or

Southern secession.

But people are seldom willing to go to war unless

they themselves have some interest at stake. The im-

pressment of seamen affected the West not at all; the

decrees of European powers were none of their particu-

lar concern; nor did they feel even the effects of the

disastrous embargo policy. A few Western leaders

perhaps would have favored war on these grounds

alone, but the masses move more slowly. Sufficiently

significant it is that they resented these insults far more

than did those sections vitally concerned with them.

Henry Adams, speaking of the first month of 1809, says

that "after four years of outrage * * * not an

American could be found between Canada and Texas

who avowed the wish to fight."8 One could keenly feel

the sting of such treatment at the hands of both France

and England and yet hesitate to advocate war with

either of them. Henry Clay as late as December, 1810,

8 Henry Adams, History of the United States, (New York 1896)

Vol. 4, p. 424.

Vol. XXXIII--28.

434      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

said, "I most sincerely desire peace with England; *

* * I even prefer an adjustment with her before one

with any other nation,"⁹ although shortly after this

speech he left the Senate to lead the House in its dec-

laration of war because he saw that the rapid rise of the

war spirit in the West after the Spring of 1810 must

inevitably bring war.

What was it then that transformed this more or

less quiescent smarting under national insults into a

demand for immediate action in three short years?

We shall presently see. As soon as the frontier states

began to feel a really serious grievance of their own

against Great Britain their patriotism became vocal,

and they called for war in no uncertain tones. Men

fight for interests, not for sentiment alone, and we now

turn to the economic problem which was the really de-

termining factor in Western opinion.

The one paramount need of the frontier was a more

numerous population; for without it their stupendous

task of settlement was impossible of accomplishment.10

But to attract new settlers, necessary for building great

Commonwealths from this wilderness, more land must

be available for settlement and that which was already

under white control must be rendered more safe. And

so, after all, to Western opinion, the War of 1812 was

much more important as a step in the settlement of the

West than as a vindication of our national rights. There

was practically no increase in the population of Illinois

9 The Works of Henry Clay, Vol. 1, p. 183, 184.

10 See Arthur Clinton Boggess, The Settlement of Illinois, (Chicago

1908) p. 75-79. All the petitions for more land were based on the need

of more settlers. In many parts of Indiana Territory the population

was too sparse for the maintenance of a civil county administration, much

less for defense.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812       435

or Indiana Territory until after this war.11 The seri-

ousness of their situation can be appreciated when, be-

fore the Indian power was crushed at the Thames, the

country was threatened with depopulation at the very

time when a strong body of whites was most needed for

its defense. Nor did the Western people themselves

desire anything more strongly than access to the new,

virgin lands destined to be the heritage of themselves

and their children.

The purchase of Louisiana so pleased the Westerners

that they easily forgot their scruples of a few years

previous against undefined executive authority.¹² It

threw before their eyes the idea of a vast and rich

promised land waiting for someone to possess it. All

looked forward with increasing impatience to the day

they were to enter upon their inheritance. But although

this acquisition was a source of much gratification in

that it removed a foreign power from our frontiers,

there yet remained a serious problem in the West in the

presence of the Indians who blocked access to these un-

occupied lands.

"The question of whether the aborigines had any

right to the soil seems to have been utterly foreign to the

pioneer's mind. He wanted the land, and to him it was

a matter of course that the Indian must leave it."13

The "manifest destiny" attitude of the white settlers is

admirably expressed by Governor William Henry Har-

rison as follows: "Is one of the fairest portions of the

11 Ibid., p. 106.

12 Edward Channing, The Jeffersonian System, (New York 1906) p.

73, 74. In the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 they had declared them-

selves "Tamely to submit to undelegated, and consequently unlimited,

powers in no man or body of men on earth."

13 Carl Schurz, Henry Clay, (Boston 1899) in two volumes, Vol. 1,

p. 14.

436      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few

wretched savages, when it seems destined by the Creator

to give support to a large population and to be the seat

of civilization, of science and of true religion?"14

Numerous petitions for extinction of Indian land

titles came from frontier communities from 1800 to

1802. This desire would have become a serious prob-

lem if left unsatisfied, and to avoid trouble the govern-

ment early authorized more land purchases.¹⁵ Accord-

ingly, purchases were negotiated by Harrison; three in

1803, three in 1804, two in 1805, and later, four in 1809.

But even with these acquisitions only a small portion of

Indiana was free to settlers.¹⁶

President Jefferson at this time entertained some

dreams of transforming the Indians into agriculturists,

and making of them permanent settlers. For various

reasons, as we shall see, this was impossible and un-

desirable under the conditions obtaining in the North-

west. Some progress in this respect had been made in

the South where, under the control of a Federal agent,

the Indians lived peaceably in villages and tilled the

soil. But even here the situation was far from satis-

factory. The very peacefulness of the Indians made

them a more perplexing obstacle; such a policy fur-

nished no excuse to the whites for expelling them by

force.¹⁷ Nor were these Southern Indians free from

injustice at the hand of whites, as the following quota-

tion from a current newspaper will indicate: "Not-

withstanding detachments of United States troops have

14 Indiana Historical Society Publications, (Indianapolis 1895) Vol.

4, p. 264, 265.

15 Boggess, The Settlement of Illinois, p. 75-79.

16 Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 4, p. 264, 265.

17 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 7, p. 220.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812      437

frequently been employed in removing trespassers off

the Indian lands, encroachments continue to furnish

just subjects of complaint."18

This was by no means the most serious side of the

Indian problem, however. The tribes nearest the whites

were virtually caught between two millstones, and were

rapidly being ground to dust. On the one side, the

strong tribes farthest from the settlements would not

let them migrate to their own land without war, and

these vigorous tribes kept trespassing on the lands which

the depleted numbers of the nearer tribes left vacant.19

Where force was thus the only law of possession, oc-

cupancy of land, especially among nomadic savages,

meant little or nothing. The sale of the land which a

tribe had once occupied more than likely overlapped

with the claims of these more vigorous tribes.20 But

the greatest menace to neighboring Indians came from

the other millstone against which they were forced.

Close contact with the whites was poisonous. "No acid

ever worked more mechanically on a vegetable fibre

than the white man acted on the Indian. As the line

of American settlements approached, the nearest Indian

tribes withered away."²¹ The situation was clearly

stated by Governor Harrison in 1805 before the Indiana

Territorial Legislature, when he said that in spite of the

desire of the National government to care for the

Indians, "These humane and benevolent intentions *

18 Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, Sept. 11, 1811; from a

Knoxville dispatch dated Aug. 12.

19 Robert B. MacAfee, History of the Late War in the Western

Country, (Lexington 1816) p. 43-47; From Harrison to Armstrong,

March 22, 1814.

20 Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, (Springfield

1916) p. 57.

21 Adams, History of United States, Vol. 6, p. 69-71.

438       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

* * will be, however, forever defeated unless effec-

tual means can be devised to prevent the sale of ardent

spirits to these unfortunate people * * * You have

seen our towns crowded with furious and drunken

savages, our streets flowing with their blood, their arms

and clothing bartered for liquor which destroys them,

their helpless women and children enduring all the ex-

tremes of cold and hunger."²² Neighboring and distant

tribes, he said, could be distinguished by their appear-

ance. "The latter are generally well-clothed and vigor-

ous, the former, half-naked, filthy, and enfeebled by

intoxication."²³

The existence of the Indians depended upon the

presence of abundant game, and the inevitable tres-

passing of white hunters rendered the intervening

ground worthless to them from this standpoint, although

necessary as a barrier from white contamination. They

had to choose between degeneration, starvation, or

evacuation.²⁴

Nor was it possible for an Indian to get justice from

white juries.²⁵ The Governor, who perhaps understood

the Indians better than did any other individual, said

in an address before the Legislature August 17, 1807,

in speaking of their relation to the British: "Although

(that) the agency of a foreign power is producing dis-

content among the Indians cannot be questioned, I am

22 Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, Sept. 10, 1805.

23 Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. IV; from Harrison

to the Secretary of War, July 5, 1801.

24 Channing, Jeffersonian System, p. 258.

25 Benjamin Drake, The Life of Tecumseh and his Brother the

Prophet, (Cincinnati, 1841) p. 134. Harrison says in a letter, "I wish I

could say the Indians were treated with justice and propriety on all occa-

sions by our citizens; but it is far otherwise. They are often abused

and maltreated; and it is very rare that they obtain any satisfaction for

the most unprovoked wrongs."

Western Opinion and the War of 1812     439

persuaded that their utmost efforts to induce them to

take up arms would be unavailing, if one only of the

many persons who have committed murder on their

people would be brought to punishment."²⁶ The red man

had been driven from economic self-sufficiency to de-

pendence on the fur trade, and now this means of sup-

port was fast disappearing.²⁷ If the policy of purchasing

land from the degenerate tribes continued, it was only

a question of time until the Indians would come to bay.

An Indian war was inevitable; hopeless, of course, as

the damming of Niagara, it must be; and still, such is

the operation of economic law whenever an inferior

race is met by one of higher development.²⁷

Certainly this much can be said, the hostility of the

Northwest Indians toward the United States in the War

of 1812 was not caused primarily by their corruption

at the hands of British agents. The Indians would have

allied with any power which might have warred on the

United States, and with the interests of British traders

identical with those of the Indians in restraining the

United States settlements, it is hardly conceivable that

the British government could have remained disinter-

ested when the Indian war should have taken place.

Western opinion as a rule, however, saw only its side

of the argument and interpreted this very natural close

relation of Canadian traders to the Indians in the most

unfavorable light, considering the Indian problem as

exclusively of British manufacture.²⁸

26 Logan Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison,

(Indianapolis 1922) p. 233; from The Western Sun (Vincennes) Aug. 22,

1807.

27 Clarence Walworth Alford, Centennial History of Illinois, in

twelve volumes. Vol. 1, (Springfield 1920) p. 434.

28 Rufus King, Ohio, (Boston 1888) p. 317.

440      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

At this time the Indian cause found two leaders in

the persons of the prophet and his brother, Tecumseh,

great patriots of their race, who came forward with

proposals, first, to reform the Indian himself, and then

to forcibly arrest the advance of the whites. The capac-

ity and influence of these leaders precipitated the crisis

which led Western opinion to the brink of a British war.

When these two great determining factors in Western

opinion became joined, namely, pride demanding the

assertion of our sovereign rights, and second, the be-

lief that the British were complicated in the critical

Indian-land problem of the West, the stage would be

set for the demand for a British war.

III.

Had the settlers of the West been able to clear the

Indians from the lands they wanted by peaceful means,

it is extremely doubtful that they would have been so

decided in their demand for a war with Great Britain.

Of course, they were traditionally hostile to British in-

fluence, and attributed any discontent among the Indians

to its door, but this issue was latent and inactive until

revived by actual Indian hostilities. The land purchases

negotiated by Harrison in 1804 and 1805 satisfied the

settlers for a time,²⁹ for these purchases included over

two million acres of the finest land in Indiana. His

acquisitions were hailed with great rejoicing, although

Harrison explained to Washington that the exorbitant

price of about one cent an acre, which he had been forced

to pay, was entirely too high, and that he hoped to re-

duce the average cost by later purchases.30 Nor was

29 See the Liberty Hall for December 24, 1804.

30 Indiana Historical Society  Publications, Vol. IV, p. 260.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812    441

there any great amount of discontent among the Indians

at this time, because of them; for the near-by tribes

were dependent on the annuities which they secured in

payment for their land, and the disgruntled tribes were

placated by the distribution, through Harrison, of some

three hundred dollars in bribes among their chiefs.31

From this time until the next land purchase in 1809,

therefore, the Indian menace in the Northwest was not

threatening. Other issues occupied the center of at-

tention, such as Burr's conspiracy, and the bitter political

fight in Indiana Territory over the introduction of

slavery. During these years one searches in vain for

any substantial evidence of hostility toward either Great

Britain or the Canadian Government. It is true that

the Prophet and his brother were active, and that they

were suspected of connections with Canada;32 but these

suspicions were by no means assured facts and were

the cause of no alarm to speak of.

The excitement over Burr's intrigue occupied the

center of attention for a time. The bitter feeling kindled

against him when he became suspected of treason indi-

cates that Burr had sadly underestimated, among other

things, the nationalistic loyalty of the western people. A

contemporary correspondent of the Liberty Hall news-

paper, Cincinnati, suspected that the agents of Burr, and

not those of the British, were themselves responsible for

what discontent there was among the Indians, in order

to increase the dissatisfaction of the Westerners over

the inadequate protection the Federal government was

affording them. He pointed out in support of his con-

31 Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 4, p. 258.

32 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 6 (New York 1896)

p. 77-80.

442      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

tention that many of the recent massacres had taken

place in central Kentucky (far from the frontiers),

which state Burr was particularly desirous of winning

over to his plan, and a district which the Indians by

themselves would have little reason to harass.³³

The issue which soon after occupied the center of the

stage in Indiana Territory was that of the fight against

Harrison's opposition to the separation of the Territory

into two divisions, Illinois and Indiana, simultaneous

with his attempt to legalize slavery. By February 1809,

both of these issues had been decided, public sentiment

becoming definitely anti-slavery and Illinois becoming

a separate territory. Because the Harrison pro-slavery

party met defeat in both of these issues,³⁴ some have

suspected that the aggressive land policy which the Gov-

ernor resumed in September of 1809 was a definite bid

to win back his popularity. Professor MacMaster goes

so far as to state this positively.³⁵ But, in view of the

fact that his position as Governor was appointive.

not elective, and that his office as Indian agent was quite

separate from his position as Governor of Indiana Ter-

ritory, it is perhaps a little unfair to attribute such an

action to so upright a man, in absence of positive proof.

One or two results of these contests are, however, very

significant. Randolph, the pro-slavery faction candi-

date for Congress in 1809, refused to discuss the slavery

issue in his campaign, and, in order to divert attention,

he tried to make the election turn on the policy of the

Government toward Europe and, incidentally, toward

33 Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, Nov. 25, 1806.

34 Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., Indiana (Boston 1888) p. 325-380.

35 John Bach MacMaster, History of the People of the United States,

(New York 1885-1900) Vol. 3, p. 528.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812  443

Canada. Thus the old issues of Burr's intrigue, separa-

tion of Indiana Territory, and the introduction of

slavery were dead by 1809, and political maneuvers in

the Territory came to play no small part in turning at-

tention to the new issue of a possible war with a Euro-

pean nation.³⁶

But the key to the change of attitude of the West

toward a British war was the increasing danger which it

began to feel from the Indians after 1809. One is sur-

prised in studying the previous period to note how little

hostility was manifested against the Canadian govern-

ment. On this point, however, the attitude differed

considerably according to the remoteness of the settle-

ment. The more distant settlements of Saint Louis,

Western Illinois and Indiana, that had contact with the

more vigorous and war-like of the Indians, were always

much more hostile to the British than were the bulk

of the Western people in Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio.

One most not identify a statement made by one of the

agents farthest removed in the wild Indian country with

the attitude of the West in general.

In these earlier years many of the Westerners at-

tributed the dangerous attitude of the Indians to the

result, not of official British propaganda, but of the

sinister influence of traders. The dominance which the

British traders acquired with the Indians was so im-

portant to their friendship that the United States gov-

ernment tried to break the monopoly by establishing its

own distributing centers.³⁷  But these posts had no

chance to compete with uncontrolled private enterprises,

36 Dunn, Indiana, p. 386.

37 Alvord, Centennial History of Illinois, Vol. I, p. 412, 413. In the

year 1808 there were twelve of these posts in operation.

444      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

especially when the government forbade them to sell

liquor or to grant credit to the natives.³⁸ One of these

trading companies, the Northwest Company of Canada,

had a great many United States citizens as stock holders.

In one bitter tirade against this company, a Western

newspaper said, "The members have been much more

inimical to the interests of Western America than even

the government of Great Britain * * * Many are

the hundreds of Kentucky scouts which have been pur-

chased out of the coffers of Boston and New York *

* * It matters nothing to what nation the company

belongs or by whom protected, * * * an organized

company of fur hunters will always be a banditti of the

most ferocious savages. * * * Could the North-

west Company of Canada be annihilated it would be a

blessing both to Great Britain and to the United States.

Until that event takes place, the most barbarous cruel-

ties may be expected to be committed upon the frontier

settlers."39

Frequently, it is true, false alarms of Indian up-

risings were sounded, but these were invariably officially

discounted a few weeks later. Such an alarm, for in-

stance, occurred in February, 1806,40 being officially

denied by the Governor of Ohio on March 3rd, follow-

ing.41 The peaceful condition of the frontier was the

same year commented upon by Harrison in his speech

38 Ibid., p. 439.

39 Liberty Hall for November 25, 1806. An editorial copied from

the Western World.

40 Liberty Hall for February 10, 1806.

41 Ibid., March 3, 1806. Governor Hull of Detroit sent the follow-

ing statement to Cincinnati soon after, "If accounts of Indian hostilities

have been circulated, as I think possible, I wish they may be contradicted

as they are a great injury to the country."--Ibid., Aug. 11, 1806.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812        445

before the Territorial legislature.⁴² In 1808 an Indian

town appeared at Tippecanoe Creek on the Wabash,

under the direction of the Prophet and Tecumseh. The

former had long enjoyed great influence even among the

most remote tribes, by means of his mystical propaganda,

which had little or no reference to an Indian war. The

Prophet's influence was distinctly on the decline when

Tippecanoe was founded, however.⁴³ Tecumseh was

a much abler man than his brother, and saw deeper into

the Indian problem. But he was not widely known until

after 1809, nor had his dream of a Confederacy emerged

out of the infant stage before this time. There were,

of course, certain suspicions of the hostility of the Tip-

pecanoe Indians, but as late as September 1, 1808, Har-

rison wrote to the Secretary of War after a two weeks'

visit from the Prophet, as follows: "I was not able to

ascertain whether he is, as I first supposed, a tool of

the British or not. * * * Upon the whole, Sir, I

am inclined to think that the influence the Prophet has

acquired will prove rather advantageous than otherwise

to the United States."44 A little later a dispatch from

the Indian agent at Fort Wayne expressed the opinion

that no "harm is intended or will be attempted by the

Prophet on any of the white people."⁴⁵ The same letter

suggested that the time was favorable to negotiate fur-

ther land purchases along the Wabash.

42 Ibid. for December 2, 1806. The speech was delivered Nov. 4,

1806. "The Indians," he said, "so realize their inability to oppose the

whites by arms," that he considered their recourse to arms very unlikely

"unless driven to it by . . . injustice and oppression: of this they

already begin to complain, and I am sorry to say that their complaints

are far from being groundless."

43 enjamin Drake, Tecumseh, p. 100-109.

44 Esarey, Harrison's Letters, p. 302.

45 Ibid., Wells to Harrison, April 8, 1809, p. 337-339.

446      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

By the first months of 1809, evidence of hostile de-

signs began to reach Harrison, but these signs did not

seem particularly alarming at the time, because the

northern tribes were reported leaving the Prophet after

hearing of them. Friendly Indians reported the pres-

ence of no hostile bands in their territories, and by the

last of May, 1809, the alarm had subsided. Harrison

was still doubtful as to hostile intentions in July 1809,

when he said, in a letter, that although several powerful

tribes were under the influence of the Prophet, "I am

persuaded that they were never made acquainted with

his intentions, if they were really hostile to the United

States."46  Occasionally articles were copied from East-

ern newspapers having a distinctly anti-British tone,⁴⁷

but of this one finds surprisingly little until a year or

so later. Governor Huntington of Ohio in his message

before the State legislature, December, 1809, reviewed

the foreign relations of the country, showing no par-

ticular preference for either France or England; nor

did he admit the serious possibility of a European war.⁴⁸

Although Governor Harrison was sympathetic to the

wretched plight of the Indians, he shared the ambitions

of all Westerners in longing to see their lands in pos-

session of the whites.⁴⁹ His purchases of land in 1809

threw the gauntlet directly into Tecumseh's face. This

year marks the turning point in the attitude of the

Indians toward the United States, and also, significantly,

in the demand for a British war which soon became

46 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 110-112.

47 Liberty Hall, for December 20, 1809; from the Baltimore Whig.

48 This address can be found in the Liberty Hall for December 13,

1809.

49 Alvord, History of Illinois, p. 437.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812          447

so urgent in the West. This was not the first time that

the Governor's desire to dispossess the Indians had ex-

cited official alarm.⁵⁰ In April, 1809, Harrison got in

touch with Eustis, the Secretary of War under the new

Administration, relative to the land policy he was to

pursue during the next four years. He indicated that

there was no great immediate danger from the Indians.51

He received authority to negotiate the purchases he

had proposed, July 1809; but this express statement ac-

companied it: "To prevent any further dissatisfaction,

chiefs of all nations who have, or pretend rights to these

land should be present at the treaty."⁵² The chiefs of

some of the nearest degenerate tribe were assembled,

and treaties of cession to some three million acres of

land were secured, the Governor knowing full well that

such a policy could not but result in an Indian war.⁵³

Robert McAfee says in an almost contemporary ac-

count, that the Prophet's party at Tippecanoe had no

part in this cession because they could not possibly plead

occupancy to the land.⁵⁴ These purchases were followed

by similar acts in other sections of the West.⁵⁵

Tecumseh appeared at Vincennes and openly threat-

ened war; he warned Harrison not to attempt the oc-

cupation of the new purchase. The chief maintained

50 Ibid., p. 417. From the St. Clair Papers, Vol. II, p. 400. "Har-

rison's activities were watched with anxiety by President Jefferson, who

more than once reprimanded and . . . reproved the ardent Indian

superintendent for his aggressive policy."

51 Esarey, Harrison's Letters, p. 354-356.

52 Eustis to Harrison, July 15, 1809, in American State Papers, In-

dian Affairs, Vol. 1, p. 761.

53 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 82-85.

54 McAfee, History of the Late War, p. 11.

55 Lewis Collins, History of Kentucky, (Covington, Ky., 1878) in

two volumes, Vol. I, p. 27. On January 15, 1810, an act in the Kentucky

Legislature provided, "for extinguishing the Indian claims below the Ten-

nessee River."

448       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

that the land was not the property of any particular

tribe, much less of its chiefs, and refused to recognize as

legal any alienation of territory not expressly agreed

to by all the warriors. From Harrison's standpoint this

view was unreasonable and impossible. He attributed

it, perhaps not without justice, to British influence, and

maintained, as had Jefferson, that the claims of the

government were paramount to the "lands of all ex-

tinguished or decayed tribes to the exclusion of all re-

cent settlers."⁵⁶ And yet the Indian cause was hope-

less unless these purchases could be prevented. The

economic interests of the two peoples conflicted so

markedly that it became clearer and clearer that their

positions were irreconcilable. Tecumseh and Harrison

separated, each to prepare for the coming war.

Matters did not immediately become critical because

Harrison, under orders from Washington, made no

attempt to occupy the disputed territory. By the first

of April 1810, however, persistent rumors and occasional

acts of hostility began to point directly toward an Indian

war.⁵⁷   Harrison wrote on April 25, 1810, that the

Prophet was undoubtedly planning hostility to the

United States, the immediate cause of which was

British interference; he concluded, however, with this

statement: "I think it probable that the British agents

in Canada have anticipated the orders of their govern-

ment in their endeavors to set the Indians upon us,"

56 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 120, 121. He said to the brothers, "You say

that they purchased lands from them who had no right to sell them;

show that this is true, and the land will be instantly restored."--Ibid.,

p. 123. He considered his actions fully justified when he wrote to the

Secretary of War that Tecumseh's claims rested "upon no other basis

than that of their being the common property of all the Indians."--

Ibid., p. 163.

57 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 113 ff.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812   449

and that a report of better international relations would

cause them to cease.⁵⁸ When Tecumseh appeared at

Vincennes the following August with some four hun-

dred painted warriors all the West began to take alarm.

His purpose seems, however, to have been only intimida-

tion, for he strongly denied at this time any hostile in-

tentions, insisting only upon his stand that the land was

common property of the warriors. Harrison refused

to discuss this issue further at this time, referring the

chief to the President.⁵⁹ Tippecanoe soon became rec-

ognized as the rendezvous for the disciples of Tecum-

seh's Confederacy, which by the almost superhuman

efforts of this chief, was growing with great rapidity.

Several great problems, however, even his ability was

not able to solve. One of them was that of feeding his

followers without help from the United States; serious

defections from Tippecanoe because of sheer starvation

being no uncommon occurrence. The nearer, more de-

pendent tribes he was never able to influence against the

United States except in a small way.

The most significant thing in all this period is that

there was very little evidence of a desire in the West

for a war against Great Britain until the Indian menace

began to loom up as increasingly dangerous. In the

spring of 1811 Tecumseh appeared before Vincennes

again and announced his purpose to visit the Southern

Indians. This act marks another definite turning-point

in the attitude of the West toward the British. Previous

to this time, central Kentucky and Tennessee seem to

have been comparatively indifferent to the troubles in

58 Esarey, Letters of Harrison, p. 417-419. Harrison to the Secre-

tary of War.

59 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 124-141.

Vol. XXXIII--29.

450       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

the North, although Grundy had already been elected

from Tennessee for the express purpose of demanding

a war.⁶⁰ When they saw the probability of the dread

Indian war spreading to their Creek Neighbors, they be-

came intensely interested. They began to appreciate

the magnitude of Tecumseh's plan and viewed with the

greatest alarm a juncture of the British with a com-

bined Indian Confederacy. In numerous public meet-

ings the Westerners assembled and memorialized the

President for more adequate protection, insisting especi-

ally upon the removal of the Indians from Tippecanoe.

By this time they were "fully convinced that the forma-

tion of this combination was a British scheme."61 On

May 22, 1811, a newspaper article appeared voicing the

first express statement demanding a British war that

can be found among early Cincinnati papers. It copied

articles from Republican papers in the East, emphasizing

our debt from the Revolution to France. The writer

admitted that France had injured us, but maintained

that he "would sacrifice more to France than to Great

Britain," the latter's policy since 1792 having been

prompted by nothing but resentment and revenge against

the United States.⁶²

Although Western opinion was convinced of hostile

designs, the burden of Tecumseh's message as he visited

the tribes was to suppress all signs of immediate

hostilities.⁶³ He must have time to complete his Con-

60 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 137.

61  Drake, Tecumseh, p. 146.

62 Liberty Hall, May 22, 1811; copied from Newark Sentinel.

63 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 7, p. 221, Hawkins,

the United States agent among the Creeks, reported that Tecumseh spoke

for peace, and especially in behalf of the British; this probably being the

only condition which would assure him British assistance, without which

his cause was hopeless.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812        451

federacy before the whites would have an excuse to

strike; and all the tribes must await the signal from

Canada, if they were to attain united action. A sort of

religious fanaticism, especially among the younger men

of the Creeks, resulted from his Southern visit.⁶⁴ Drake

reports that he secured the unanimous approval of his

plan at a secret midnight session of the younger war-

riors, and that he even visited the Seminoles in Florida,

but with little success.⁶⁵ This visit convinced the West

that British intrigue was active in the South and in

Florida, as well as in the Northwest.⁶⁶ All frontiers-

men realized that defensive warfare was worthless

against the Indians, for they never attack in large bands.

Knox County (Vincennes) citizens, losing patience with

Madison's unwillingness for action, said in a petition of

July 31, 1811, that the lives and the property of the

settlers could be made secure only by scattering the

Tippecanoe Indians, and that this must be done im-

mediately.⁶⁷ Harrison, even if he had not wished to

attack, could not but yield to the storm of hostility

gathering around him. He had always been far too

lenient in his treatment of the Indians to suit the West-

erners, and had only recently been made very unpopular

over the slavery issue.  Illinois and Indiana  were

threatened with depopulation unless something was

done.⁶⁸

64 Ibid., p. 222-223.

65 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 143-144.

66 McAfee, History of the Late War, p. 454-458. McAfee states

that the occupation of the Floridas would not only have been good

policy, but fully justifiable, vast British stores in Pensacola being used

to excite the savage hostility at this time.

⁶⁷ Indiana, Historical Society Publications, V. 4, p. 272-277; Ameri-

can State Papers, Indian Affairs, V. 1, p. 802.

68 Alvord, History of Illinois, p. 438.

452        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

The Governor had been collecting troops for some

time, and finally, on September 18, 1811, he received

instructions from Eustis to take up a position in the new

purchase, providing the security of it demanded.⁶⁹ Prep-

arations began which culminated in Tippecanoe. But

this expedition to disperse the Indian town was not con-

strued at the time as the necessary prelude to a British

war. Harrison believed that a show of force was nec-

essary to intimidate the followers of the Prophet; and

although he was determined to make it impressive, he

expected no fighting.⁷⁰ He knew that many of the

Indians had no desire, even now, to venture on a war

with the settlers, and that most of the others would

have been inaccessible to British influence had not their

grievances been so real.⁷¹ With the news of his advance

into the Indian country, however, alarm increased many

fold, and it only remained for the slaughter at Tippe-

canoe to bring the war fever to a white heat.⁷² The

depredations on United States maritime interests, en-

dured in comparative silence for five or six years, now

began to be talked of on all sides as a cause for war.

Even now, however, some of the trouble at least with

69 Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 4, p. 277.

70 Esarey, Harrison's Letters, p. 565. Parke to Harrison, Sept. 13,

1811. A dispatch from Frankfort, Kentucky, ran in part as follows:

"We presume that the President of the United States has determined to

remove the Prophet. . . . The Governor does not anticipate any

fighting." See Liberty Hall, Sept. 11, 1811.

71 See the Liberty Hall for Sept. 11, 1811.

72 Liberty Hall for Nov. 13, 1811; quoted from the Ohio Sentinel.

A British agent was reported as saying, "My son, keep your eyes fixed

on me--my tomahawk is up--be ready--but do not strike until I

give you the signal." And another, before the news of Tippecanoe:

"The interference of the English with the Indians, ceases to wear a ques-

tionable shape. Evidence continues to appear that the English anticipate

a war with us, and are getting ready to strike a heavy blow on our

frontiers. . . . If plunder on the ocean be united with the cruelty

of the tomahawk, then let freemen do their duty."

Western Opinion and the War of 1812  453

the Indians was attributed to corrupt traders and un-

scrupulous frontiersmen.

There is reliable evidence that the attack of the

Indians at Tippecanoe would probably never have oc-

curred had Tecumseh been present. The battle cost

tremendously in the prestige of the two brothers, and

made practically impossible the realization of their Con-

federacy. Tecumseh arrived on the Wabash but a single

day after the battle, and viewed, to his great mortifica-

tion, his plans, all but completed, shattered as a result

of the open disregard of his positive orders. His pro-

posed visit to the President fell through, and he ceased

connections with Harrison after January 1812, reproach-

ing the Governor bitterly for his advance into the Indian

country. After futile attempts to revive his town at

Tippecanoe, the great chief had no choice but to flee to

the arms of the British, although even as late as June

1812, he appeared at Fort Wayne to see if the Ameri-

cans would grant his old demands.⁷³

The reaction from the battle of Tippecanoe in the

West was tremendous. On November 21st, an extra

appeared in Cincinnati, announcing the carnage on the

Wabash. Its comment was as follows, "So much for

British Influence.  From the hostile conduct of the

Indians we may make pretty correct calculations of the

friendly disposition of the English government." The

paper attributed the loss directly to the fact that the

Administration had refused to give the orders permit-

ting Harrison to attack the Indians. It concluded as

follows: "Will our government act; or will they always

73 Drake, Tecumseh, p. 153-158.

454        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

sleep? Surely this is enough to rouse them from leth-

argy."⁷⁴ The guns captured at Tippecanoe were of

British make, and so was the powder; in fact, even the

list coverings in which the guns had been imported had

not been removed from some of them.⁷⁵

From now on, as far as the West was concerned,

neutral rights and impressment were of significance, not

as a cause for war, but as an argument to justify a

declaration of war to the East.⁷⁶ To their minds a state

of war was already an actual fact, and the indecision of

the other sections to recognize this fact was rendering

the West impotent to defend itself. The battle of

Tippecanoe had changed the center of Indian hostilities

to Canada. There was no longer an Indian town to at-

tack; it was no longer possible to strike at the hostile

Indians except in connection with their British allies in

Canada. Governor Meigs of Ohio, in his message before

the legislature this year, advised preparation for a Brit-

ish war.⁷⁷ Everywhere was heard the cry for the con-

quest of Canada. Great Britain, in one of her choicest

possessions, was open to attack; and the West suddenly

74 Liberty Hall, Nov. 21, 1811.

75 Niles Weekly Register (Baltimore, 1811 ff.) Vol. 1, p. 311-312.

The Western Spy of Cincinnati for December 7, 1811, contained a report

by an Army officer present that "Brass and copper kettles, steel traps,

muskets, all [of] British manufacture, to the amount of at least five

thousand dollars," were found in the Prophet's town.

76 The series of indictments of the British in the West, laid before

Congress June 11, 1812, indicate pretty accurately the attitude of the

West. I quote two of them from Harrison. "If the intentions of the

British government are pacific, the Indian department of Upper Canada

have not been made acquainted with them, for they have very lately

said everything to the Indians who have visited them to excite them

against us." "It is impossible to ascribe this profusion [of distribution

of fire-arms] to any other motive than that of instigating the Indians to

take up the tomahawk. It cannot be to secure their trade; for all the

peltry collected on the waters of the Wabash in one year, if sold in the

London market, would not pay the freight of the goods which have

been given to the Indians."--See Niles Weekly Register, Vol. 2, p. 343.

77 Liberty Hail, Dec. 18, 1811.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812             455

became extremely interested in it as a future field for

expansion.⁷⁸ A statement in Niles Register throws some

light on the extent to which the attitude of the War

Republicans of the East was determined by this Western

issue. It ran, in part, as follows: "France is invulner-

able to us; we might as well declare war against the

people of the moon as against her; but Great Britain

is tangled in her tenderest part" [i. e. Canada.]⁷⁹

The enthusiasm of the West was further increased

by the fact that they anticipated no particular difficulty

in the enterprise. The Indian chiefs with whom the

agents came in contact were all for peace; in fact,

Tecumseh himself seemed to strain every effort to avoid

war.⁸⁰ It seemed that nothing could prevent the con-

quest of Canada, thus enabling them to administer upon

Great Britain a punishment which, in their eyes, she

so richly deserved.⁸¹ Even had the efforts of Tecumseh

and the peacefully-inclined chiefs been able to restrain

the young braves, which they were not, the West could

no longer be held back. The die was cast; it was merely

a question of time until the West should march on

Canada.

78 The Western Spy, for Dec. 7, 1811. At the bottom of a recruit-

ing advertisement was appended the following statement: "It is sup-

posed we shall be marched to Canada next summer, which is a very

healthy and agreeable country."

79 Niles Register, Vol. 2, p. 284.

80 The Western Spy, Dec. 28, 1811. During the temporary lull in

the Indian outrages following the destruction of Tippecanoe, the Fort

Wayne agent reported that, "The public may rest assured that the late

attack on our troops is as much disapproved by the bulk of the Indians

as by the whites, and that there is not any danger to be apprehended at

present on any of our frontiers."

81 The conquest of Canada was, of course, the immediate objective

of the West, proof of which is abundant; but this fact by no means

proves that it was the fundamental reason back of their war spirit. This

viewpoint, however, is the thesis of an article in a recent issue of The

Mississippi Valley Historical Review (March 1924) by Lewis Morton

Hacker. He minimizes the Indians as a factor in the situation, and is

456        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

When murders began to appear along the fron-

tiers in March and April, numbering twenty scalps in

Indiana alone by June, the people of the Northwest de-

manded immediate action.⁸² A similar condition was

excited in the South when, in October 1811, rumors

of troubles with the Southern Creeks became current.⁸³

A dispatch from Nashville, the following April, told of

a false report of a Creek rising which brought an im-

mediate response from six thousand volunteers in Ten-

nessee. It continued, "Never, on any occasion, could

there have been more promptitude and patriotism dis-

played."84

Indian massacres became more common; volunteer

regiments demanded permission to place themselves be-

tween the Indian's tomahawk and their wives and chil-

dren.⁸⁵ Governor Harrison even went so far as to col-

lect a company of mounted volunteers at Vincennes in

greatly exercised in explaining why the West desired Canada so much

more than the prairie land of Illinois and across the Mississippi. He

seems to ignore the fact that something over three million acres, recently

purchased, of the best land in the Wabash Valley alone had as yet been

unoccupied by the whites besides much river bottom land in other sec-

tions. It is a little hard to understand why Westerners should be attracted

more strongly to a country with a colder climate, already partly occupied

by whites, and entirely cut off from the river navigation which was the

heart of the transportation system of the West.

Why the author should consider the rabidly partisan Randolph as

giving the "only contemporary accounts that reveal the affair in its true

light," while ignoring most of the evidence from Western sources prior

to 1811, is also rather puzzling. The grievance of the West against

Great Britain was not that she held lands which the West desired, but

that Westerners believed her involved in the attempt of the red men to

block their access to land already controlled and purchased by the United

States. They wished to punish Great Britain, not to rob her; self-protec-

tion alone would have justified the attack; and the Kentucky troops made

no attempt to push on after their victory at the Thames. The flood of

settlers after 1814 from the Eastern seaboard came because the Indian

menace was gone. Land-hunger was undoubtedly the determining factor

in Western opinion, but it was not land-hunger for Canada.

82 Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 4, p. 283f.

83 Liberty Hall, October 9, 1811.

84 The Western Spy, April 25, 1812.

85 Ibid., June 6, 1812; copied from the Kentucky Gazette of May

16, 1812.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812        457

May, 1812, but the necessary orders were not forth-

coming and the Indian outrages continued unresisted.

McAfee's opinion, no doubt characteristic of the West,

was that this mistaken policy of forbearance only in-

creased the Indian's opinion of the weakness and im-

potency of the United States; whereas "by vigorous

measures we might easily have beaten them into peace-

able deportment and respect."86 Regardless of the

action of Congress, the West would not have waited

much longer. But this section was almost alone in its

enthusiasm. Under such a state of affairs, with much

of the Union openly hostile to a British war and a

greater part indifferent, a war was an extremely pre-

carious undertaking. It is at least doubtful that there

would have been any war at all had it not been that the

juncture of the British with Tecumseh's followers

fanned to a white heat the war spirit of the West. In-

juries to neutral rights and impressment of seamen

could possibly alone have been sufficient cause for the

fiery language of a few of the war-hawks in the 12th

Congress, but the West as a section came to demand

war only when defense of national sovereignty coincided

with the attainment of their personal interests.⁸⁷ But

the West by itself could not declare war for the country;

this was to be done only in Congress. And so it is

now necessary to examine how this war sentiment was

translated into the declaration of war by the leaders

of the 12th Congress.

86 McAfee, History of the Late War, page 39-42.

87 Ibid., page 2. "Although this interference with the Indians was

not an obvious and ostensible cause of the war, yet it may fairly be

considered as a very sufficient cause. Much of that resentment against

the British which prevailed so strongly in the Western States, the prin-

cipal advocates for the war, may be fairly attributed to this source.

This is McAfee's comment.

458       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

IV.

At the time the Twelfth Congress convened in extra

session November 5, 1811, it is true that the pacifism

so evident in earlier years throughout the country had

disappeared to some extent. It could hardly be said of

this Congress, even when the war-hawks were not con-

sidered, what John Quincy Adams had said of Congress

in 1807.88 And yet if it was true that discontent had

increased steadily throughout the country with Jeffer-

son's policy, it had resulted, not so much in nationalistic

sentiment for a British war, as in disunion and sec-

tionalism. A few states besides the three in the West

sent resolutions to the President pledging their sup-

port in the coming war, after Madison's warlike message

the opening day of the session. These states were

Pennsylvania, Virginia and Georgia,⁸⁹ but even these

Eastern states shared in no small measure the desires

and dangers peculiar to the West. New England was

bitterly hostile to the administration, as were many of

the Republicans, and nowhere was there any popular

enthusiasm for the war, in the East.

The Twelfth Congress represented an overwhelming

victory for the Republicans. The new members, some

seventy in number, were for the most part younger men,

"the first ripened product of the generation which had

grown up since the Revolutionary War."90 As zealous

patriots they had tremendous faith in the future of their

country, and felt keenly the many national insults which

88 Adams, History of the United States. Vol. 4, page 145, 146. "I

observe among the members great embarrassment, alarm, anxiety, and

confusion of mind, but no preparation of any measure of vigor, and an

obvious strong disposition to yield all that Great Britain may require, to

preserve peace again a then external show of dignity and bravery."

89 Niles Register, Vol. 1, p. 297, 299.

90 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, page 50-52.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812      459

the former pacific policy had tried to ignore. Foremost

among these younger men was Henry Clay, the new

Speaker of the House and the embodiment of the spirit

of the West. He came from a seat in the Senate where

he had recently startled the older politicians by his

strenuous advocacy of war, which he did with a cool-

ness and composure contrasting strongly with the fear

of Easterners.⁹¹ He had left the Senate because he

had seen war approaching, and as Speaker, Clay was

certainly to be far more than the presiding officer. He

proposed to use his powerful influence in realizing the

desire so near the heart of the West, and to choose his

committees with the idea of war in mind.⁹² Clay's in-

fluence in securing the declaration of war cannot be over-

emphasized. Time after time he left his seat as Speaker

to become the most brilliant supporter of his own

measures.⁹³

Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes, the brilliant trio

from South Carolina, and all products of the back

country, were not only willing, but thoroughly compe-

tent to back their leader; and this they did, with cogent

reasoning and stirring oratory. Grundy of Tennessee

openly advocated the annexation of Florida and Canada.

These war-hawks, about forty in number, were "willing

to face debt and probable bankruptcy on the chance of

creating a nation, of conquering Canada, and carrying

the American flag to Mobile and Key West."⁹⁴ Madi-

son's pugnacious message really left very little to choose

91 Annals of Congress, First Session, 11th Congress, p. 579-582. "I

trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous," he had declared, "When I

state I verily believe that the militia of the State of Kentucky are alone

competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet."

92 Johnson, Union and Democracy, p. 207.

93 See the "Works of Henry Clay," Vol. 1, p. 184-190.

94 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 4, p. 122.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812    461

between France and England, for he condemned both

quite roundly. Naturally a rather timid man, the Presi-

dent was willing to accept the lead which Clay was only

too glad to give. "For a time the West was in com-

mand, rushing headlong into difficulties with little cal-

culation for needs, and little concern for the conse-

quences."95

The start toward war was very bold and decided.

The hostile spirit flamed up so violently at the news of

British intrigue at Tippecanoe that it seemed war would

soon be an actuality.⁹⁶ But before long the debates of

Congress began to degenerate from the realm of reason-

ing and wise planning to mere mouthings, the Repub-

licans hoping thereby to lash themselves into the opinion

that war was desirable. Designed solely to drum up

courage as they were, these speeches certainly convinced

no one of anything.⁹⁷ It was only by the help of Federal-

ists, who joined the war leaders especially to embarrass

the administration, that they were able to pass their

extensive army bills. The Republican majority def-

initely balked when the tax bills came up, and these lay

untouched by Congress for months. Even Clay and

his followers were impatient with Secretary Gallatin,

when he could devise no means of financing the war

apart from the prosaic loans and taxes so unpopular in

the country. A great part of the war party wished to

confine war operations entirely to the land, and the

forty-odd war-hawks were left stranded when they

proposed their bill for naval appropriations.⁹⁸ Congress

95 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, p. 70.

96 Schurz, Henry Clay, p. 77.

97 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 6, page 142-144.

98 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, page 56-57.

462       Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

was evidently unwilling to pay the cost of defending

maritime rights. One authority said, "Hardly more

than one-third of Congress believed war to be their best

policy. By force of will and intellect alone, the group

of war members held their own and dragged Congress

forward in spite of itself."99

Some historians have suspected that Madison lined

up with this war party for political reasons, in view of

the coming election. But there is no evidence suffi-

cient to discredit Clay's denial of having threatened

Madison with defeat if he did not cooperate, and it was

probably as Carl Schurz has said, "Madison was simply

swept into the current by the impetuosity of Young

America."¹⁰⁰ There is some evidence that he too shared

somewhat the misgivings of many of his followers over

the approaching conflict, and, moreover, because of the

political consequences involved.¹⁰¹

The real grievances which the United States govern-

ment had for declaring war were, of course, Britain's

Orders in Council and her impressment of seamen; but

the new factors, which at this time were responsible for

turning the country toward war, were the reports of the

Henry Mission to New England, the intrigues among the

Indians which sent Western opinion pell-mell toward

war, and the fact that an energetic war-like minority

led by Western men was able to capture the leadership

99 Johnson, Union and Democracy.

100 Schurz, Henry Clay, p. 84-85.

101 Writings of James Madison, Vol. 8, p. 191 (New York 1908).

He wrote to Jefferson relative to this matter on May 25, 1812: "The

business is becoming more than ever puzzling. To go to war with

England and not with France, arms the Federalists with new matter, and

divides the Republicans. . . . To go to war against both, presents a

thousand difficulties; . . . It is pretty certain also that it would not

gain over the Federalists."

Western Opinion and the War of 1812     463

in Congress. Had it not been that Foster, the British

Minister, acquainted only with New England Federalist

and the Eastern Republican sentiment, failed utterly

to appreciate the intensity of the war spirit in the West,

the declaration of war, at least at this particular time,

might have still been avoided. Great Britain undoubt-

edly did not want war and would have granted con-

cessions had she thought them necessary in order to

avoid a break. Even with the cooperation of Madison

and the blind incompetency of Foster to aid them, the

war-hawks secured their measure only with the greatest

difficulty.

Clay and his friends in the final session refused to

make the debate public, by this means excluding any

influence from public opinion and giving the Speaker

almost absolute power. Even then, about one-fifth of

the majority party refused to support the war, the vote

for war being not nearly as large as it should have

been.¹⁰² South and west of Pennsylvania there were

sixty-two who voted for the war and thirty-two against;

while the votes in the North and East were evenly

divided at seventeen all. Six Republicans of the Senate

voted with the Federalists, making the vote in this body

only nineteen to thirteen for war.¹⁰³ Nearly all of the

support for the war policy north of Pennsylvania,

came from the back counties whose interests were al-

most identical with those of the West. After the decla-

ration of war, when the concessions of Great Britain in

regard to her Orders in Council became known, it was

102 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 227-228.

103 Schurz, Henry Clay, p. 80-85. "It is a remarkable circumstance

that the war spirit was strongest where the people were least touched by

the British Orders in Council and the impressment of seamen."

464      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

again Clay's stirring oratory which sustained the east-

ern supporters of war, in defense of seamen's rights.104

Although the ostensible causes for the war, as far

as Britain's officially acknowledged acts were concerned,

were the failure of that country to withdraw her Orders

in Council and to cease her impressment of seamen, we

have seen that even the West had borne these insults

to national honor for years without any great excite-

ment, until an Indian confederacy backed up by the

British came to menace them. The section most in-

jured by these Orders in Council opposed the war, and

all the naval appropriations to protect these rights failed

to pass. There was considerable point to the questions

asked by thirty-four anti-war congressmen in a pamph-

let and circulated throughout the country.  "How,"

they asked, "Will war upon land protect commerce upon

the ocean? What balm has Canada for wounded honor?

How are our marines benefited by war which exposes

those who are free without promising release to those

who are impressed?"105 As Professor Alvord has said,

"The true issues of the War of 1812  *  *  *  must

be sought in the West."106

A few other facts it seems are inescapable, in view

of the evidence submitted above. One is that only the

utmost exertion of a relatively small group of young men

in Congress, determined leaders coming largely from the

West and back counties of the Middle and Southern

states, was able to push a declaration of war upon their

reluctant colleagues. Another significant fact is that

the vigorous, war-like spirit injected into Congress by

104 Works of Henry Clay, Vol. 1, p. 198-201.

105 Niles Register, Vol. 2, page 315.

106 Alvord, History of Illinois, page 440.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812  465

these young Republicans was so decisively novel and

foreign to the general attitude of the East with which

he (Foster) was familiar, that the British Ambassador

failed utterly to appreciate it until war had become in-

evitable.

We now turn briefly to consider what light is thrown

on our problem by the actual activity of the West dur-

ing the war itself.

V.

One incident, not connected with actual operations

against Great Britain, is worthy of mention because it

throws considerable light upon the Western desires and

ambitions which determined Western opinion. One of

the most questionable acts of aggression that the United

States has ever been guilty of, was Madison's annexa-

tion of Spanish West Florida by Executive Proclama-

tion in 1810. The legality of such procedure was not

questioned at the time; "the Southern states needed the

Floridas and cared little what law might be cited to

warrant seizing them."107

Having been deterred at this time in his plan for

securing the whole of Florida,¹⁰⁸ the President again

took up the matter in November 1812. When, upon

Madison's order, the militia of Tennessee under Jack-

son, over two thousand in number, were called out os-

tensibly for the "defense of the lower country," it be-

came an easy matter for the Southwest to believe that

British intrigue was active in Florida as well as in

Canada. But this peculiar style of defense, which in-

volved the occupation of the land of a friendly power,

found many opponents even in the administration, and

107 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 5, p. 318-320.

108 Ibid., page 326

Vol. XXXIII -- 30.

466        Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

Jackson's ardent volunteers were forced to return home,

to their great disgust.¹⁰⁹

It could easily be shown also, from the enthusiasm

displayed in the Southern war with the Creek Indians,

a sequel to the Indian war of the North, how insatiable

and unfair was the hunger for Indian lands in Tennes-

see and Georgia; but this is far less illuminating for

our purpose than the campaigns in the North. The

frontiersmen of Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana even sur-

passed their Southern neighbors in their enthusiasm for

the war. When the first call for volunteers sounded,

more than the desired number offered themselves, many

of them from the most prominent families of these

states.¹¹⁰ Never thinking a moment of defeat, the mili-

tia was everywhere put on the war basis, and "eagerly

awaited marching orders into Canada."¹¹¹ By way

of contrast, New York City and Boston opposed with

much feeling the "madmen of Kentucky and Tennessee,"

and the New England militia flatly refused the Presi-

dent's summons.

But the task of conducting a campaign in the track-

less wilderness, far from the base of supplies, with a

disorderly and undisciplined militia enlisted for only

109 Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 206-207. How great the desire for the Floridas

was in the Southwest can be judged from the following excerpt from a

letter of Jackson's to the Secretary of War before his recall. "I have

the pleasure to inform you that I am at the head of 2,700 volunteers

. . . who go at the call of their country to execute the will of the

Government, who have no constitutional scruples; and if the Govern-

ment orders, will rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American

eagle on the ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine,

effectually banishing from the Southern coast all British influence." See

S. G. Heiskell, Andrew Jackson and Early Tennessee History (Nash-

ville 1918) p. 331.

110 McAfee, History of the Late War, p. 49.

111 Babcock, Rise of American Nationality, p. 67.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812      467

six months, was to prove no easy undertaking.112 The

very geographic conditions which had freed the West

from the fear of a British invasion rendered their own

offense many times more difficult. The news of the

defeat and surrender of Hull's militia at Detroit struck

the West like a thunderbolt. These backwoodsmen knew

well the effect of such a defeat in strengthening the

Indian's support of the victors. "Every citizen seemed

animated with a desire to wipe off the disgrace, * *

* and to avert the desolation which menaced the fron-

tiers."¹¹³ "The whole state of Kentucky was for several

weeks a constant scene of military parade," these troops

being joined by back county volunteers from Pennsyl-

vania and Virginia.¹¹⁴ Vincennes was considered in

great danger; if the West was to escape the horrors of

terrible Indian massacres, the Indians must be crushed,

and that quickly.115 Danger of defeat was very real,

and hatred for the Indians and the British passed all

bounds; volunteers insisted on being immediately led

into the northern country.116

The West took matters into its own hands, chose

Harrison as leader under a commission of Major-Gen-

eral in the Kentucky militia, and set out to conquer

Canada by a campaign, "not directed from Washing-

ton."117 Madison wisely did not interfere. Each man

furnished his own rifle and ammunition, the whole

affair resembling far more a raiding expedition against

112 McMaster, History of the People of United States, Vol. 3, p.

341.

113 McAfee, p. 106.

114 Ibid., p. 109.

115 McAfee, History of the Late War, p. 113. Gov. Shelby to Eustis.

116 Alvord, History of Illinois, p. 442. For the purpose of destroying

Indian menace, not to conquer Canada.

117 Adams, Vol. 6, p. 414.

468      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

the Indians than a campaign against a strong European

power.118 As a matter of fact, Great Britain's part

throughout the Western war was chiefly as an ally to

the savages.119

Harrison saw that he could not hope to retain his

popularity except by immediate action, and, undoubtedly,

pressure of public opinion pushed him farther than his

prudence would have dictated.¹²⁰ He soon encountered

well-nigh insurmountable difficulties in the matter of

securing supplies, and only Winchester's blunder at

the River Raisin, together with the British commander

Proctor's incapacity saved his reputation in the West.121

This display of patriotic zeal, which maintained itself

pretty constantly in the West until the close of the

campaigns around Detroit, was totally lacking in other

sections remote from the Indian menace. Nowhere else

was the war taken seriously. The indifference along the

coast, and the half-heartedness of the Eastern attempts

on Canada were paralyzing to the efforts of the National

Government. The war was to prove in the end a most

bold and successful experiment, but in the process it un-

doubtedly was a reckless one.122 Kentucky troops

throughout the campaign around Detroit furnished the

most valuable portion of Harrison's army. Governor

Shelby himself commanded a detachment of some three

thousand men, and Richard M. Johnson's troop of

cavalry won almost single-handed the battle of the

Thames.123 After Perry's victory on Lake Erie, the

118 Ibid., p. 392-393.

119 Roosevelt, Thomas H. Benton, p. 7.

120 "Adams, Vol. 7, p. 72-74.

121 Ibid., p. 99-107.

122 Adams, History of the United States, Vol. 7, p. 415-418.

123 Ibid., p. 12-29.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812          469

downfall of the enemy followed as a matter of course,

the actual details of the battle having but little to do with

the theme of this paper.

Tecumseh, who was given a commission in the Brit-

ish Army, lost all patience with the weak policy of the

British commander, whom he likened to a fat dog who

tucks his tail and runs when frightened.¹²⁴ The brave

chief fought to the last, and his death marks the close

of an era in the Indian-land problem of the West. With

the victory at the Thames and the Death of Tecumseh,

the Indian menace vanished, and the succeeding years

found thousands of Americans in ever increasing num-

bers advancing like a mighty flood over the land vacated

by the natives. But Tecumseh had forced the country

to pay an approximation of the real value of these lands.

Only seven or eight hundred British troops ever crossed

the river at Detroit, but twenty thousand men and five

million dollars were used by the United States in ex-

pelling them.125 "The campaign at Tippecanoe, the

surrenders at Detroit and the Mackinac, the massacres

at Fort Dearborn, the River Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the

murders along the frontier, and the campaign of 1813

were the price paid for the Indian lands in the Wabash

Valley. * * * No part of the war more injured

British credit than the result of the Indian alliance." 126

124 McAfee, Late War, p. 372, 373. In a speech delivered by Tecum-

seh, September 18th, 1813, he is reported to have said to Proctor when

the latter was retreating without a struggle, "You have got the arms and

ammunition which our great father sent for his red children. If you

have an idea of going away, give them to us, and you may go . . . .

We are determined to defend our lands, and if it be his will, we wish

to leave our bones upon them."

125 "The precise cost of the Indian war could not be estimated, being

combined in many ways with that of the war with England, but the

British counted for little within the Northern territory except as Tecum-

seh used them for his purposes." See Adams. History of the United

States, Vol. 7, p. 140.

126 Ibid., p. 140-141.

470      Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

The victory at the Thames did not conquer Canada, nor

did it lead to the cession of a foot of British territory;

it did not cause the repeal of the Orders in Council, nor

the abandonment of impressment, and yet the North-

west was perfectly satisfied by it and the Kentucky

troops were home in less than a month after the battle.¹²⁷

The Thames is perhaps more memorable for the death

of Tecumseh than for the defeat of the British regulars,

as Mr. Roosevelt has said.128

VI.

It has often been remarked that the Treaty of Ghent,

which closed the War of 1812, made no mention of the

grievances which were its more ostensible causes. I

wish to hazard, if I may, the opinion that, in view of the

fundamental issue which brought the West to blows

with the Indians and therefore with the British, the

negotations at Ghent did decide at least one important

issue. I refer to the policy of interposing a permanent

Indian barrier-state between Canada and the line of the

Greenville Treaty of 1795, which policy the British Sec-

retary for the Colonies had espoused in that year. Con-

cerning this matter, there must have been at least a

tacit understanding between Governor Craig of Canada

and the British Ministry.129 Great Britain made her

last attempt to realize this buffer state at Ghent. A

statement of Henry Clay relative to this matter illus-

trates the point. "From the moment that Great Britain

came forward with her extravagant demands [at

127 Ibid., p. 142, 143.

128 Roosevelt, T. H. Benton, p. 7.

129 F. J. Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 131. Craig

certainly, whether officially or not, was in touch with Tecumseh, and

gave aid to the Indians.

Western Opinion and the War of 1812   471

Ghent], the war totally changed its character. It *

*  *  became a British war, prosecuted for objects of

British ambition, to be accompanied by American sacri-

fices. * * * The demands, boldly asserted, and one

of them [the recognition of the Indians as a nation

declared to be a sine qua non of peace, were finally

relinquished. Taking this view of the subject, if there

be loss of reputation by either party in the terms of

peace, who sustained it ?"130

It must be remembered that this recognition of the

Indians as a single nation was at the heart of Tecumseh's

demands to Harrison from 1809 to 1812, and it is not

unlikely that the chief was influenced from Canada in

formulating his demand. This issue of an Indian buffer

state was primarily responsible for leading the West

into the war, and was perhaps the only one decided in

the peace parley at Ghent, as far as it reveals any

decision at all. It is not to be wondered at that New

England and the seaboard States were happy over the

return of peace, for they had never supported the war

enthusiastically. New England had, from the first, been

bitterly hostile, and the Middle and Southern States

were in the grip of terrible financial distress at the time.

But it is more remarkable when one remembers that

the West, which had clamored so loudly for war, also

was satisfied by a peace which mentioned none of the

issues on the basis of which their spokesmen in Congress

had demanded a war. What can account for this fact

better than that this movement for an Indian state,

backed by British sympathy, had been definitely de-

feated? Canada had not been conquered, nor had mari-

130 The Works of Henry Clay, Colton's Edition, Vol. 1, p. 206.

472     Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

time rights been vindicated; but the Indians had been

definitely and finally crushed, and the West was free

to begin more fully to appropriate its boundless wealth

of land. The campaigns around Detroit had been the

West's own enterprise, and the enthusiasm and vigor

with which they carried it through were foreign to

any other land engagement except its other attempt at

New Orleans. With Canada almost within their grasp,

the victors at the Thames were far more anxious to

return home than to continue toward the accomplishment

of that for which some have thought they demanded war.

A comparative study of the volume of immigration to

Indiana and Illinois before and after 1812 will con-

vince anyone of the importance of the solution of the

Indian-land problem to this region.

It is not difficult for one to exaggerate a single

phase of any problem upon which attention has been

concentrated for a considerable time, and it may be that

such a treatment as this paper represents should best

be considered as an emphasis. It is not pretended that

the interference of the Canadian government in the

affairs of the Northwest would have caused war be-

tween the United States and England, had not ample

justification for war already existed. The encourage-

ment of the Indians was never officially acknowledged

by the British government in England, nor has thorough

research revealed any such responsibility. Had not

other differences existed between the two nations, of a

far more serious nature than the unofficial intrigue

among the Indians, this latter question might easily have

been settled without war. The tremendous influence

of the disregard of maritime rights upon American at-

Western Opinion and the War of 1812  473

titude toward a British war must not be lost sight of

just because the final precipitation into war came from

a Western opinion tremendously aroused over the Indian

problem.

In addition to what has been said above, about the

significance of the negotiations at Ghent, several other

conclusions can probably be asserted with some con-

fidence in view of our studies. The first of these is that

an active minority of aggressive Westerners, intensely

loyal to the National government and to the future great-

ness of the Nation, actually gave direction to the policy

of the United States when the twelfth Congress de-

clared war. Secondly, this sentiment for war became

urgent in the West simultaneously with the appearance

of an Indian Confederacy led by an able chieftain, which

threatened the safety of the settlers and their access to

new land. In the third place, before Governor Har-

rison's land purchases of 1809, which precipitated a

crisis in a situation already pregnant with possibilities of

war, Western opinion did not consider the British gov-

ernment by any means as exclusively responsible for the

degree of discontent existing among the Indians. They

rather blamed private trading interests, and even

thought that the machinations of Burr and Wilkinson

might be responsible for it. Fourth, that our thesis is

upheld by the campaigns which the West undertook, by

the result of peace negotiations, and by the subsequent

movement of population into these new lands. Fifth,

that the War of 1812 represents perhaps the first im-

portant bearing of the Nationalistic spirit of the West,

and the problem of westward expansion upon national

policy, which issues were to become the determining

474     Ohio Arch. and Hist. Society Publications

factors in American History throughout practically the

remainder of the century.

For the first time since 1789 the Nation was free

to work out its own problems. Attention ceased to be

centered on European affairs, and was turned inward

and westward toward the new country, to the realiza-

tion of its potential development, the appreciation of

which, in the minds of a small group of able young men,

had been so influential in precipitating the struggle.

"The breezy exuberance and the high optimism of the

first products of this Western life,"¹³¹ was to become the

characteristic spirit of the entire nation as it turned

to its new tasks.

The Nationalistic democracy of the West had come

into contact with Jeffersonian states-rights democracy,

and had scored a signal victory. But in this meeting

can be seen the seeds of the conflict which expressed

itself in the heated political controversies in the decade

soon to follow, culminating in the Civil War, when

Western nationalism was to prove the deciding factor

in the preservation of the Union. The Nation now

faced its tasks with the vigor of one who has laid aside

the weights of outworn European issues and quarrels,

and who is ready to run his own race with patience.

131 Babcock, History of American Nationality, p. 187.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Sources.

1. The Writings of James Madison, Vol. VIII, New York,

1908.

2. American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Vol. I.

3. Annals of Congress, 10th Congress, 2nd Session; 11th

Congress, 1st Session; 12th Congress, 1st Session.

4. Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the

Western Country. Lexington, 1816.

5. Logan Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry

Harrison. Indianapolis, 1922.

6. The Works of Henry Clay. Edited by Calvin Colton,

New York, 1904, in ten volumes, Vol. I.

II. Newspapers and Pamphlets.

1. Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, for December

24, 1804; September 10, 1804; February 10, March 3,

August 11, November 25, December 2, 1806; December

13, December 20, 1809; May 22, September 11, Octo-

ber 9, November 13, November 21, December 18, 1811.

2. Niles Weekly Register, Baltimore, 1811 ff. Vols. I, II,

VII.

3. The Western Spy, for December 7, 1811, December 28,

1811, April 10, 1812, April 25, 1812. The newspapers

are found in the Young Men's Mercantile Library, Cin-

cinnati, Ohio.

III. Secondary Authorities.