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and, of course, there is a constant demand for new vessels." Further

along, after traversing a portion of the Ohio river, the same author

writes: "The boats which float upon the Ohio river are various--from

the ship of several hundred tons burden, to the mere skiff. Very few, if

any, very large vessels, however, are now built at Pittsburgh and

Marietta; but the difficulties incident to getting them to the ocean have

rendered such undertakings infrequent. An almost innumerable number

of steamboats, barks, keels and arks are yearly set afloat upon the river

and its tributary streams. The barks are generally about one hundred

tons burden, have two masts, and are rigged as schooners or hermaphro-

dite brigs. The keels have, frequently, covered decks, and sometimes

carry one mast. These and also the barks are sometimes moved up the

river by polling, and by drawing them along shore with ropes."

The first steamboat built on western waters, the New Orleans, was

constructed at Pittsburgh, in the year 1811, but four years after Fulton's

Clermont made its first successful trip on the Hudson. There is record

of a steamboat having been built by Capt. John Walker at Elizabeth in

1815, and soon after that there were yards in operation in various towns

on the Monongahela and Ohio, turning out the new type of vessels.

These soon largely took the place of all other kinds of craft in bearing

the commerce of the rivers, and the sea-going vessels made New Orleans

their port of arrival and departure. Indeed, so far as a searching

investigation has revealed, no ships were built in this region after the

construction of the first steamboat. Thus came to an end a notable

movement which in its entire activity does not seem to have covered

more than a score of years, but which must have done much, in its time,

to bring this then obscure region to the notice of the rest of the world.









Professor of History in Northwestern University.


From the opening of the Revolutionary War, American leaders

looked to the conquest of Detroit, the headquarters of the posts and key

to the fur trade and control of the Indian tribes to the northwest of the

Ohio.1 Throughout the war this post, in the possession of the British,

"continued," as Washington wrote, "to be a source of trouble to the whole

western country."2

The garrison at Detroit, at the beginning of the year 1776, consisted

of 120 soldiers under the command of Capt. Richard Lernoult. The

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fort was defended by a "stockade of picquets," about nine feet out of

the earth, without "frize or ditch." Three hundred and fifty French and

English made up the entire number of men in the town and nearby

country, capable of bearing arms.3 The majority of these men were

French militiamen assembled under their own officers. Commanding

the fort were two British armed schooners and three sloops manned by

thirty "seamen and servants." There was not a single gunner among

the crews; they were dissatisfied with the service and incapable of

making much resistance.

Three hundred miles away to the southeast was Fort Pitt, the only

American fortification (1775) guarding the long frontier stretching from

Greenbrier, in Southwestern Virginia, to Kittanning, on the Upper Alle-

gheny.4 This fort was without a garrison. The inhabitants were de-

pendent on the protection of the militia of the neighboring counties, and

large numbers were reported to be in a most defenceless condition.5

From these two centers, in council after council, were to be exer-

cised all of the diplomatic finesse of white men in attempts to gain

control over the Indians of the Northwest. Assembled at some of these

conferences were the chiefs and other representatives of the Delawares

of the Muskingum and the Ohio; the Shawnee and Mingo of the Scioto,

the Wyandot, Ottawa and Pottawattomi of Lake Michigan, the Chippewa

of all the lakes; and, besides these, the Miami, Seneca, Sauk, and

numerous other tribes. All told, the Northwestern tribes numbered

some 8,000 warriors.6

In general, the American policy tended towards securing Indian

neutrality, which was clearly stated by the Continental Congress in a

speech prepared for the Six Nations early in July, 1775. The war was

declared to be a family quarrel between the colonists and Old England,

in which the Indians were in no way concerned. It was urged that they

should remain at home and not join on either side, but "keep the

hatchet buried deep."7 They were apprehensive of the policy to be

pursued by the British. Consequently, three departments of Indian

affairs were created, to be under the control of commissioners, whose

duties were to treat with the Indians in order to preserve their peace and

friendship and prevent them from taking part in the present commotions.

They were to superintend also the distribution of arms, ammunition and

clothing, such as was essential to the existence of the Indians.8

Within a year, however, a resolution was passed that it was ex-

pedient to engage the Indians in the service of the united colonies and

especially to secure their cooperation in bringing about the reduction of


The British early employed the savages to cut off outlying settle-

ments. Under plea that the "rebels" had used Indians in their hostilities

on the frontier of Quebec, after the capture of Ticonderoga, and that

Vol. XXII -5.

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they had brought Indians for the attack on Boston, General Gage urged

that General Carleton might be privileged to use Canadians and Indians

for a counter stroke.10

There was necessity for prompt action on the part of the Americans,

in order that they might gain the friendship of the tribes beyond the

Ohio. In the provisional treaty at Camp Charlotte, Governor Dunmore

promised the Indians that he would return in the spring and bring it to

completion. By that time, the revolutionary movement had assumed

such proportions that he deemed it inadvisable to risk a journey to the

frontier. Again, he found a ready agent in Dr. John Connolly,11 a bold,

enterprising, restless character, who had been left in command of the

garrison of seventy-five men at Fort Dunmore. In a conference at

Williamsburg, in February, Major Connolly was instructed by Lord

Dunmore to use his efforts to induce the Indians to espouse the cause of

Great Britain. In this he succeeded, in so far as he brought together at

Pittsburgh the chiefs of the Delawares and a few Mingo, whom he

assured that a general treaty, with presents, was soon to be held with

all the Ohio Indians.12 Disbanding the garrison in July, he returned to

find Dunmore a fugitive on board a man-of-war off York. Together they

concocted a plan fraught with grave consequences for the back country

and for the American cause in general. In a personal interview, Connolly

won the assent of General Gage to the plan, and received instructions

for its development.13 It was designed that Connolly should proceed to

Detroit, where he was to have placed under his command the garrison

from Fort Gage, led by Capt. Hugh Lord. This nucleus of an army,

together with the French and Indians of Detroit, was to proceed to Fort

Pitt. It was hoped that their force would be enhanced by the Ohio

Indians, for whom liberal presents were provided, and by numbers of

the militia from Augusta County, who for their loyalty, were to have

300 acres of land confirmed to each of them. Forts Pitt and Fincastle

were to be destroyed, should they offer resistance, and the expedition

was then to take and fortify Fort Cumberland and capture Alexandria,

assisted by troops led by Dunmore and landed under protection of the

ships of war.14 Thus were the Southern colonies to be cut off from the


Conditions promised well for the success of the enterprise. Con-

nolly had won the favor of the Indians; Fort Pitt, as already noted, was

in a condition to offer but little defense; and the backwoodsmen were

without the necessary equipment in arms and ammunition to obstruct such

an expedition. They were disunited, also, because of the Pennsylvania

and Virginia boundary dispute. A letter from Connolly to a supposed

friend at Pittsburgh led to his betrayal.  Virginia authorities were in-

formed of the intrigue. Runners were sent out from all the Southern

provinces into the Indian nations through which he proposed to pass,

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with orders for his arrest.15 With three associates, he was captured near

Hagerstown, while on his way to Fort Pitt.16

For upwards of two years thereafter the frontiers were free from

any general participation in the war. Meantime, immigration to the

West continued,17 and the contest went on between British and American

agents for ascendency over the Indians of that region.

Major Connolly had conducted his treaty with the Indians at

Pittsburgh in the presence of the committee of correspondence of West

Augusta County.18 The provisions and goods furnished by the com-

mittee on that occasion assisted materially in gaining the good-will of

the Indians for later negotiations. A petition to Congress from the

committee followed at an early date, setting forth their fears of a rupture

with the Indians on account of the late conduct of Governor Dunmore,

and asking that commissioners from Pennsylvania and Virginia should

be appointed to confer with the Indians at Pittsburgh.19

On June 24, therefore, six commissioners were appointed by Vir-

ginia for the purpose of making a treaty with the Ohio Indians, and a

sum of 2,000 pounds was appropriated for that purpose. Capt. James

Wood, one of the commissioners, a man well versed in frontier affairs,

was delegated to visit the tribes and extend to them an invitation to

attend the conference at Pittsburgh. He was likewise to explain the

dispute to the Indians, make them sensible of the great unanimity of the

colonies, and "assure them of our peaceable intentions towards them

and that we did not stand in need of or desire any assistance from


The day following, Captain Wood set out from Williamsburg on

his hazardous journey of two months, accompanied by Simon Girty, his

sole companion, who acted as interpreter. The report made on his return

was not wholly promising for the cause he represented. His reception

by the Delawares, Shawnee, and other tribes was friendly, for the fear

excited by the battle of Point Pleasant was still upon them.21   He

learned, however, that two British emissaries had already presented belts

and strings of wampum to seventeen nations, inviting them to unite with

the French and English against the Virginians.22 They were warned

that an attack by the "Big Knives" was imminent from two directions,

by the Ohio and by the Great Lakes. The Virginians were a distinct

people, they were assured, and an attack upon them would in no case be

resented by the other colonies. Besides, the invitation to a treaty, which

would be extended to them, should under no conditions be accepted; for

the representatives who were to meet at Pittsburgh could not be depended

upon. Similar advice was given the tribes of the Upper Allegheny

river, brought together at Niagara. Many of these Indians, at the insti-

gation of Governor Carleton and Guy Johnson, were induced to go to

Albany, and many more to Montreal, to join the British armies.

The Virginia commissioners, together with those appointed by

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Congress, assembled at Pittsburgh, September 10. Thus, notwithstanding

English opposition,23 which in a measure had been overcome by traders,

chiefs and delegates from the Seneca, Delawares, Wyandot, Mingo, and

Shawnee gathered slowly for the conference. Each tribe on arrival was

received with "drum and colours and a salute of small arms from the


During a period of three weeks, the commissioners strove by speech,

and through presents of clothing and strings of wampum, to convince the

Indians that they should keep the hatchet buried, and use all endeavor

to induce the Six Nations and other tribes to remain absolutely neutral.

They were assured that the cause of Virginia was the cause of all

America. The commissioners say:25

In this dispute your Interest is Involved with ours so far as

this, that in Case those People with whom we are Contending

should Subdue us, your Lands, your Trade, your Liberty and all

that is dear to you must fall with us, for if they would Distroy

our flesh and Spill our Blood which is the same with theirs; what

can you who are no way related to or Connected with them to

expect? * * * we are not Affraid these People will Conquer us,

they Can't fight in our Country, and you Know we Can; we fear

not them, nor any Power on Earth.

In the event of American success, they declare, with true Ameri-

can assurance, they would be so incensed against those Indians who

fought against them, "that they would march an army into their country,

destroy them and take their lands from them."26 To still further con-

vince the Indians of their invincibility, they assert that the Indian tribes

at the North were ready to become their allies, and that the people of

Canada, with the exception of a few of Governor Carleton's fools, were

friendly to the American cause.27 The natives were invited to send their

children to be educated among the white people, without expense to them-

selves.28 No little trouble was experienced in leading the Indians to

agree to surrender all prisoners and negroes, and deliver up stolen horses.

This done, peace "to endure forever" was established.

While the treaty at Pittsburgh has been made, in the language of

its text, to last "until the sun shall shine no more, or the waters fail to

run in the Ohio," both of these reverses of nature seem to have taken

place in the Indian imagination by the following spring. In the mean-

time, they had been visited by British agents to secure their adherence.29

The traces to Detroit were well worn by the tribes which assembled there

to meet Hamilton, who strove in every way to excite the Indians to

take up the hatchet.30 To this end, British officers were generous with

their presents and lavish in their hospitality, partaking with the Indians

in the feast of roast ox, and recovering their dead anew with rum.

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Congress, early in April, appointed Col. George Morgan Indian

agent for the Middle Department. The choice was a wise one. For

a number of years he had been a trader in the Illinois country, where

he had become noted among the Indians for his generosity and strict

honesty. No man of the time better understood the methods necessary

in winning the friendship of the Western tribes. He was instructed to

forward at once the great belt presented to the Indians at Pittsburgh.31

The commissioners for the Middle Department were directed to conclude

a treaty with the Western tribes at the earliest convenient time. Mor-

gan was, so far as possible, to adjust all differences through arbitra-

tion32--in the language of the instructions :33

Inspire them with justice and humanity, and dispose them to

introduce the arts of civil and social life and to encourage the

residence of husbandmen and handicraftsmen among them.

Arriving at Pittsburgh, May 16, 1776, Morgan, in his endeavor to

prevent the attendance of the Indians at a council called by Hamilton

at Detroit, proceeded at once to the Shawnee towns.34 William Wilson,

a trader who accompanied Morgan, extended the invitation to other

tribes to assemble at Pittsburgh, September 10, for the purpose of mak-

ing a treaty.

At the time, the frontier defense was entrusted to 100 men at Fort

Pitt, 100 at Big Kanawha, and 25 at Wheeling, all in the pay of Vir-

ginia. These numbers were far too meagre for the purpose, much less

were they capable of any offensive warfare.35  Messengers were dis-

patched to Congress and to Williamsburg, imploring an augmentation of

the numbers in the garrisons and the formation of new posts having

proper supplies of ammunition and provisions.36 The militia of West-

moreland and West Augusta counties were called out.37 The county-

lieutenants of Hampshire, Dunmore, Frederick, and Berkeley were di-.

rected to collect provisions and hold their militia in readiness to march

to Fort Pitt for immediate service.38 A company of militia was ordered

out as "rangers" for Fincastle County. But notwithstanding the defense-

less condition of the frontier, apprehension was so widespread lest the

savages should destroy their homes during their absence, that the militia

was gotten together only after great delay,39 many absolutely refusing

the draft.40

Not until the 644 warriors and chiefs representing the Six Nations,

Delawares, Munsee, and Shawnee assembled at Pittsburgh, was it known

for what purpose they came. The conference served to dissipate the

widespread gloom, for these Indian envoys promised "inviolable peace

with the United States and neutrality during the war with Great

Britain."41 Twelve chiefs were induced to visit Philadelphia, where they

were introduced to Congress. For a few months after the treaty, all

the other Western tribes, with the exception of a few of the Mingo

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known as Pluggy's Band, seemed desirous of preserving peaceful rela-


With difficulty, Colonel Morgan persuaded the Virginia authorities

that an expedition43 against these banditti would tend to bring on gen-

eral hostilities with the tribes already jealous of the slightest encroach-

ment by Americans.44 He thought it more essential to restrain the front-

iersmen and promote good order among them; to pacify leading men

among the tribes by liberal donations; and in all respects treat the

Indians with "Justice, humanity and hospitality."45

Meantime much time was consumed at Pittsburgh in the discussion

on the character of aggressive operations to be undertaken. It was

counseled that an expedition to Detroit was the only remedy against the

incursions of Indians. Others held this plan to be impracticable and

unnecessary. No more telling reasons for the probability of a success-

ful attack on Detroit, were formulated during the entire war, than those

submitted by Colonel Morgan. He urged:46 first, that the road was

practicable; second, that the Delawares and Shawnees were disposed to

remain quiet; third, that there were no powerful tribes near or on the

road to Detroit, to oppose such an expedition; fourth, that Detroit was

at the time in a defenseless state; fifth, that it was from that post that

the offending Western Indians were supplied "in all their wants and

paid for all their murders"; and sixth, that its possession would induce

all the tribes, through fear and interest, to enter into an American alli-

ance.47 For the purpose, he advised from 1,200 to 1,500 regular troops

and such volunteers as might be secured. He opposed continuously the

plan of General Mcintosh, who looked toward retaliatory expeditions.

Not only were these expeditions failures, but they prevented the possi-

bility of the capture of Detroit. Finding that his advise was unheeded.

and confident that the policy then adhered to would produce a general

Indian war, Colonel Morgan resigned his office as Indian agent.

At this critical time, when the control of the Western Department

was about to pass into the hands of incompetent men; when conditions

seemed to warrant the recommendation by the Board of War for the

immediate assembling of the Indians for another treaty;48 and when it

seemed probable that the British and their Indian confederates were

prepared to overrun the entire frontier, the authorities at Detroit were

forced to turn their attention to the advance of George Rogers Clark.49

With his coming, a new phase of the war in the West was inaugurated.

The brilliant work of this leader in capturing the Illinois posts is

a well-known story and the present is not the occasion on which to

discuss his plans for holding the conquered territory.  His thought

turned to the capture of Detroit, and his disappointment was a great

one when he learned late in December, 1778, that the expedition which

was to have been lead by General McIntosh against that post had been


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At the close of the campaign against the Shawnee, 1780, Clark was

free once more to develop plans for the capture of Detroit. He pro-

ceeded to Richmond, and by December 25, full instructions were drawn

up under which Clark was to advance with two thousand men into the

hostile territory at the earliest practicable moment after the opening of

navigation. The ultimate object of the expedition was to be the reduc-

tion of Detroit and the acquisition of Lake Erie. Such a movement

was intended to place the British on the defensive. If no check were

given their advance, militia would ultimately have to be withdrawn, it

was feared, from the South to be sent against them. Governor Jeffer-

son had appealed to Washington to furnish powder for the expedition,

the burden of which was otherwise to be borne by Virginia. Washing-

ton ordered Colonel Brodhead, at Fort Pitt, to give the enterprise every

possible assistance by furnishing, upon Clark's order, the supplies asked

for and a detachment of Continental troops, including a company of

artillery as large as could be spared. But the militia could not be induced

to enlist for the expedition, and the artillery company ordered to accom-

pany Clark from Fort Pitt was lacking in the quota of officers and men

necessary for that service and the equipment in cannon, shells, shot, and

other stores were inadequate.

The accumulation of supplies for the expedition was so much de-

layed that the time of setting out from Fort Pitt was extended to June.

During this period of waiting, Clark learned of the abuses incident to

the conduct of public affairs in the West. Instances were cited in which

goods belonging to the State were used in carrying on private trade with

the Indians. Reports of the subordination of public interests to private

gain were not, however, confined to any one section. A proclamation

was issued by the Council of Pennsylvania against forestalling by which

individuals gained control of flour and other necessities on the market

and thus enhanced the prices. These lapses in public morals are not

wholly surprising when the commanding officer at Fort Pitt makes the

following proposal to the Governor of Pennsylvania: "Should our State

determine to extend its settlements over the Allegheny river I should be

happy to have an early hint of it because it will be in my power to

serve several of my friends."50 But the reply of President Reed came

as a well calculated rebuke to all such suggestions of graft. "At pres-

ent," he wrote, "my Station will prevent my engaging in pursuits of that

nature lest it might give offense and give Reason to a censorious world

to suppose I had made an improper use of my publick character." On

account of numerous accusations against him, the leading one being

speculation with public funds, Colonel Brodhead was, within a year,

forced to resign his command.

Early in May, Clark suffered his greatest disappointment upon

learning that Col. Brodhead had refused to allow the regiment under

Colonel John Gibson to accompany him. The surprise and disappoint-

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ment were the greater for Brodhead had already given assurance of his

complete co-operation.51 By the middle of March, Brodhead regarded

his own condition as desperate  He feared an attack from Detroit and

Niagara and in that event he believed that large numbers of the in-

habitants would aid the enemy.52 Besides he was confident that the

revolt of the Delawares that were not under Moravian influence was

about to lead to a general Indian war53 and three hundred men were

sent against them.

That volunteers joined this expedition in order to avoid accompany-

ing Clark cannot be definitely asserted, but it is certain his enlistments

were materially affected thereby. Col. Brodhead now sought some argu-

ment which would excuse his policy of opposition to Clark. He was

desirous of winning laurels for himself and a number of times had

appealed to Washington for permission to organize an expedition against

Detroit and Natchez and assistance in carrying it forward.54 Brodhead

was convinced that he was well within his instructions in refusing to

grant Clark's request for a regiment.

Clark's position was likewise tenable for he had interpreted Jef-

ferson's dispatch to mean that by the consent of Baron Steuben and

Washington, he was to be accompanied by Col. Gibson's regiment and

Heath's Company.55

Both men appealed to Washington. "From your Excellencies let-

ters to Col. Brodhead," Clark wrote, "I conceived him to be at liberty

to furnish what men he pleased, * * * If you should approve of

the troops in this department joining our forces tho they are few the

acquisition may be attended with great & good consequences as two

hundred only might turn the scale in our favour." The next day he

appealed again for assistance, saying, "For in part it has been the in-

fluence of our posts in the Illinoise and Ouabash that have saved the

frontiers and in great measure baffled the designs of the Enemy at

Detroit. If they get possession of them they then Command three times

the number of Valuable warriors they do at present and be fully

Enabled to carry any point they aim at Except we should have a

formidable force to oppose them."56

Clark assumed that his request would be granted. Regular officers

and soldiers were desirous of going on the expedition which was sup-

posed to be aimed against the Indians.57 While awaiting Washington's

reply, boats were completed and provisions collected. Notwithstanding

the desire of President Reed of Pennsylvania to render all the assist-

ance within his power58 volunteers were secured only after the use of

extreme measures due chiefly to the dispute over the boundary.59 A

general draft was finally resorted to.60  Enforcement of the order in

Monongalia County brought on a riot.61

Among other problems demanding Clark's attention besides the sup-

pression of this mob,62 was the difficulty of securing supplies with a

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currency which steadily depreciated in value.63 Findings of the general

court martial were reviewed by him in which such questions were con-

sidered as the legality of drafting, punishment of horse-thieves, and

embezzlement of public property.64

Clark's problems were still more complicated because of a dispatch

from Washington by which he was informed that Colonel John Con-

nolly was about to join forces with Sir John Johnson and come by the

way of Lake Ontario against Ft. Pitt and other western posts.65

In the midst of these preparations, social life at Ft. Pitt was not

lacking. "We have heard," Wrote Col. Gibson, "that the Gentlemen and

Ladies of Stewart's Crossings intend paying us a visit to-morrow, in

consequence of which a grand Bower is erected in the Orchard, a Bar-

becue is preparing for tomorrow and a Ball in the Evening at Col. Gib-

son's Room."66  The celebration of the "Anniversary of our Glorious

Independence" also received due attention.67

While the necessary supplies had been collected by the first of June

at a cost approaching two million dollars the weeks wore on with Clark

still hoping to secure the requisite number of volunteers.68 His appeals

to Washington, that Col. Gibson's regiment might be permitted to accom-

pany him, failed.69 Drafts were of slight avail, and finally, early in

August, despairing of accomplishing his designs in the face of deep

seated opposition on the part of the officials of the western counties

of Pennsylvania, he set out for Louisville, with four hundred men.70

This number was little more than adequate to guard the boats which

contained supplies for fully two thousand men. Clark hoped his force

would be be reenforced in Kentucky and that he might still accomplish

his object or at least make some demonstration against the disaffected

Indians.71 Before setting out, he was forced to draw on his supplies

in order to relieve the distressed condition of the garrison at Ft. Pitt.72

Plans were outlined whereby Colonel Gibson was to lead an attack

against the Wyandotte, September 4, and Clark was to march from

the Mouth of the Miami upon the Shawnee villages.

Clark's preparations had served as a defense for the frontiers.

Efforts were redoubled to put Detroit in condition to withstand an

attack.73 Demands for presents made by the Indians in council at that

post increased "amazingly."74 By the end of May, the fears of the

British and their allies were increased by the report that Clark was

descending the Ohio with one thousand men and that this number

would be increased by a like number from Kentucky.75 Their confidence

was restored through a dispatch from General Haldimand contradicting

this rumor and assuring them that Detroit and the Indian country were

in no danger. They were ordered to act at once in order to prevent

the farther strengthening of the frontier settlements.76  Such an order

meant war on combatant and non-combatant alike and the garrison of

militia of Pittsburgh were called upon to assume a full share of the

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defense but the events of which could not now be even enumerated for

the time allotted to me has already expired.




1. American Archives, 5th ser., iii, p. 1368; Mich. Pion. and Hist.

Coils., xxvii, pp. 612 et seq.

From this post, a trace led westward by way of the Maumee and

across the upper Wabash to Post St. Vincent. In like manner an Indian

path extended to Kaskaskia and other posts on the upper Mississippi

Not only was it a great centre for the fur-trade, but in years of good

harvests flour and grain were furnished to other posts from Detroit.-

Draper MSS., 46J9.   The post was of great importance during the

French regime. Indians from the Northwest took part, in common with

Canadians, in the battle on the Plains of Abraham. June 29, 1759, a

courier announced that there were about to arrive 100 French and 150

Indians from Detroit; 600 to 700 Indians with M. Linctot, 100 Indians

with M. Rayeul, and the convoy of M. Aubry from Illinois with 600 to

700 Indians. Twelve hundred other Indians from the same region were

also reported to be on the way.-Wis. Hist. Coils., xviii, pp. 212, 213.

2. Letter to Daniel Brodhead, Dec. 29, 1780.

3. Thwaites and Kellogg, Revolution on the Upper Ohio (Madison,

Wis., 1908), pp. 147-151.

Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton arrived Nov. 9, 1775, but Captain

Lernoult commanded the troops until the summer of 1776.

The total population in 1773 was about 1,400; 298 of them men.-

Mich. Pion. and Hist. Colls., ix, p. 649. The population in 1778 was

2,144; 564 being men.-ibid., p. 469.

4. Fort Blair, near the mouth of the Kanawha, had been evacu-

ated by order of Governor Dunmore, and was burned by some of the

Ohio Indians.-Amer. Archives, 4th ser., iv, p. 201.

5. George Morgan, Indian agent at Fort Pitt, in a letter of May

16, 1776, reported that there was "scarcely powder west of the Mountains

sufficient for every man to prime his gun and only 200 lb. wt. in the

Fort here."-Letter to Lewis Morris, Papers of Continental Congress,

vol. 163, entitled "Generals Clinton, Nicola, et al., pp. 237-239.

6. Delawares and Munsee 600, Shawnee 600, Wyandot 300, Ottawa

600, Chippewa 5,000, Pottawattomi 400, Kickapoo, Vermillion, and other

small tribes of the Wabash 800, Miami or Picts 300, Mingo of Pluggy's

Town (Scioto River) 60.-Morgan, Letter Book, iii, March 27, 1778.

Wyandot 180, Tawa 450, Pottawattomi 450, Chippewa 5,000, Shaw-

nee 300, Delawares or Munsee 600, Miami 300.-Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes,

iii, pp. 560, 561.

The Sauk, Foxes, and Iowa numbered some 1,400 warriors.

7. July 13, 1775.-Amer. Archives, 4th ser., ii, p. 665.

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8. July 12, 1775, in Ibid., p. 1879. The three departments were

Northern, Middle, and Southern. The Northern Department included

the Six Nations and all other Indians north of these tribes.     The

Southern included the Cherokee and other Southern tribes. The Middle,

all Indians between the territory of the two others. There were to be

five commissioners for the Southern and three each for the two other


9. Journals of Continental Congress, iv., p. 395.

The commissioners were instructed, May 25, 1776, to offer as an

inducement 50 of Pennsylvania currency for every prisoner (soldier

of the garrison) brought to them. The Indians were to be given the

free plunder of the garrison.

Washington was authorized to employ Indians, on June 17, 1776.-

Id. (new ed.), v, p. 452.

10. June 12, 1775, General Gage to Lord Dartmouth.-Amer. Ar-

chives, 4th ser., ii, p. 968.

11. Penna. Colon. Records, 1760-1776, pp. 477, 484, 485, 637, 682.

12. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 35.

13. The entire plan is given in Ibid., pp. 140-142.

14. Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War (Madison, Wis., 1905)

p. 86; Amer. Archives, 4th ser., iv, p. 616.

15. Id., iii, p. 1543.

16. A copy of the plan was in their possession. Capture of Con-

nolly, in Id., iv, p. 616.

17. More "cabin improvements" were made in 1776 than in any

other year.-Draper MSS., 4C485.

18. Rev. on Upper Ohio, pp. 37, 38.

19. Jour. of Continental Congress (new ed.), ii, p. 76.

20. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 35. *

21. These two tribes had invited others to unite with them against

the English in 1764.-Wis. Hist. Colls., xviii, p. 262.

22. Amer. Archives, 4th ser., iii, pp. 76-78.

23. Ibid., pp. 1542, 1543.

24. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 74.

25. Ibid., p. 95.

26. Amer. Archives, 5th ser., ii, p. 518.

27. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 95.

28. Amer. Archives, 4th ser., iii, p. 1542.

29. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 144.

30. Morgan Letter Book, ii, Aug. 31, 1776.

31. Jour. of Continental Congress, iv, p. 268.

32. One of the arbitrators was to be selected by the commissioners

-or, in their absence, by the Indian agent-and one each by the parties

in the dispute.-Ibid. p. 268.

33. Ibid., pp. 294, 301.

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34. Amer. Archives, 5th ser., ii, p. 514.

35. Morgan Letter Book, i, Aug. 18, 1776; to committee on Indian


36. Congress directed that a ton of gunpowder should immediately

be sent.-Jour. Continental Congress, iv, p. 396.

37. Rev. on Upper Ohio, p. 200.

38. Morgan Letter Book, ii, Aug. 31, 1776; commissioners to


39. Amer. Archives, 5th ser., ii, p. 513.

40. Rev. on Upper Ohio, pp. 174, 240.

41. Morgan Letter Book, i, Nov. 8, 1776: Morgan to John Han-

cock. Amer. Archives, 5th ser., iii, pp. 599, 600.

42. Morgan Letter Book, i, Jan. 4, 1777.

43. Ibid., March 12, 1777.

"You are to take command," wrote Patrick Henry to Col. David

Shepherd, "of 300 men drawn from the militia of Monongalia, Yoho-

gania and Ohio Counties or either of them and to march with utmost

secrecy and expedition to punish the Indians of Pluggy's Town for

their late cruelties committed upon the people of this state."

44. They were at the time exercised because of the settlement of

lands on the Ohio, below the Kanawha and in Kentucky.

45. Morgan Letter Book, i, April 1, 1777.

46. Morgan Letter Book, iii, July 17, 1778: submitted to Col.

Daniel Brodhead.

47. It was his belief that there were only some 300 hostile In-

dians in the Western Department. Schoolcraft estimated that of the

7,280 Indians capable of bearing arms, only 390 were in the employ

of the British. In this estimate, however, he did not include the num-

bers enlisted from the Sauk, Fox, and Iowa tribes. These alone were

able to summon 1,400 warriors.-Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii, pp.

560, 561.

48. June 28, 1778. Jour. of Continental Congress, xi, p. 568.

49. Hamilton learned of the capture of Kaskaskia on Aug. 6,

1778.-Mich. Pion. and Hist. Colls., ix, p. 490.

50. Penna. Archives, 1779-1781, p. 121.

51. Feb. 24, 1781, Brodhead to Clark, See post, p. -   . "You

may rely on every supply I am authorized to afford to facilitate your


52. Col. Brodhead to the President of Congress, May 30, 1781

Draper Coll., Trip 1860, vi, p. 120.

March 19, 1781, Brodhead to Clark, see post p.

"An Indian man has just brought in a letter which was sent by

some of the inhabitants to the Enemy at Detroit with information

that about one hundred of them were ready to join them so soon as

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they could be informed they should be received by the Commanding

officer there."

53. March, 1781. Brodhead to Clark. See post, p.

"I have wrote the County Lieutenants to meet at my quarters on

the 15th instant to consult on means to protect our Settlements and

annoy the Enemy."

54. Draper MSS., Brodhead Papers, 1, H 122.

Washington to Brodhead, Jan. 4, 1780. Washington stated that

from the estimate he makes of the garrison at Detroit, the men in

Garrison at Ft. Pitt together with the militia would not be adequate

to make the attempt and that the same was true of Natchez.

55. May 20, 1781, Clark to Washington, See post, p.

Gibson agreed with Clark in this interpretation.

56. See post, p.

57. Draper MSS., 51J57.

58. See post, p. -     . President Reed wrote Clark, May 15,

1781: "But from common report we learn, that an expedition under

your command is destined against Detroit. We are very sensible of

its importance to this State as well as Virginia and there is no Gentle-

man in whose abilities and good conduct we have more Confidence on such

an occasion. After this it seems unnecessary to add, that it will give

us great Satisfaction if the inhabitants of this State cheerfully concur

in it. * * *"

59. Draper MSS., 51J49, 56.

60. Draper MSS., 30J51. June 12, 1781.

61. Draper MSS., 51J58, 59.

62. See post, p.

"We the subscribers being Accessary to a Riot in Suppressing a

draught in this County on the 12th Inst. Being Sensible of our Error

and as assurity of our future good conduct do hereby Engage to serve

Ten months in the Continental Service in Case we Should be guilty

of the like misdeminor."

63. See post, p.       Colonel Gibson to Clark.

"I am sorry to have to inform you that a set of Rascals have

begun to depreciate the Virginia money now in Circulation and some

of them have even gone so far as to refuse taking it, in particular

Smith the Brewer has refused to take it in payment for Beer, I am

much afraid it will reach the Country and of Course retard your pro-


64. Draper MSS., 51J73.

James Thompson convicted of horse theft and desertion was forced

to run the gauntlet through the Brigade.

65. Connolly, recently exchanged, had proceeded from New York

to Quebec. Sparks, Washington's Writings, vii, 25.

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"I doubt Sir," Clark wrote Jefferson relative to Connolly's expedi-

tion, "we shall as usual be obliged to play a desperate game this cam-

paign. If we had the 2,000 men just proposed such intelligence would

give me pleasure."  See post, p.

66. Gibson to Clark, June 26, 1781. See post, p.

67. Draper MSS., 51J65.

68. Va. State Papers, ii, 140, June 2, 1781. See post, p.

Clark in a letter to Jefferson (August 2, 1781), says he had given

Col. Harrison 126,581 to enable him to collect stores. 300,000 had

already been forwarded to Col. Harrison. Jefferson to Clark, April 20,

1781. Jefferson's Letter Book, 1781.

69. Papers of the Continental Congress, Reports of the Board of

War, 147. Vol. v, pp. 323-325. Washington to the Board of War, June

8, 1781. "As it seemed the public wish, that the expedition of Col.

Clarke against Detroit should be supported, I gave orders to Col. Clarke

against Detroit should be supported, I gave orders to Col. Brodhead

to deliver him a certain quantity of artillery and Stores and to detach

Captain Craig with his Company of Artillery, as there were neither

officers nor men of the Virginia Militia acquainted with that kind of


"I recommended also a small detachment of Continental Troops

from the 8th Pennsylvania and 9th Virginia Regiments, but it was

at the discretion of the Commandant and in case they could be safely

spared. I mentioned that I did not imagine the command could not

exceed that of a Major and perhaps not of a Captain. If therefore

Col. Brodhead saw that the post could not be defended if such a de-

tachment of Infantry was made, he was justifyable not sending it."

70. Va. State Papers, ii, 345. In a letter to Col. Davis, W. Crog-

han declared that the reason Clark was unable to get so few men at

Ft. Pitt was "owing to the dispute that Subsists here between the Vir-

ginians & Pennsylvanians respecting the true bounds of the Latter, and

the general being a Virginian was opposed by the most noted men

here in the Pennsylvania party. The people here bleam Virginia Very

much for making them & their lands (which beyond a shadow of

doubt is far out of the true bounds of Pennsylvania) over to Pennsyl-


Draper MSS., 16S4-59.

The force accompanying Clark was composed of Col. Crockett's

regiment of Virginia State Troops and Capt. Craig's company of Artil-

lery, together with volunteers and militia.

Clark was represented by some of the leading men opposed to

him as a flour merchant, and again as a trader and land jobber for

the State of Virginia. Draper MSS., 51J18.

James Marshall, County Lieutenant of Washington County and

County Lieutenants Cook and Davis, were named by Clark as his

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main opponents. Clark to President Reed, August 4, 1781, post, p.

Marshall advised the people to pay no attention to the drafts ordered

for Clark and offered protection to those who refused. He had told

Clark that while he could do nothing for the expedition as an official

that as a private person he would give every assistance within his

power. Penna Archives, 1781-1783, p. 318.

71. See post, p.

72. See post, p.

73. See post, p.

74. Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Coll's., x, p. 465.

75. Simon Girty to Major De Peyster, Mich. Pioneer and Hist.

Coll's., pp. 478, 479. This rumor was started on account of the expedi-

tion against the Delawares by Col. Brodhead.










Stretching out between the Allegheny and Rocky Mountain ranges

for a distance of 2,000 miles lies the Mississippi Valley, containing three-

fifths of the area of the U. S. and more than half our population. The

Mississippi River, rising in the northern part of Minnesota and flowing

straight on to the Gulf of Mexico, bisects this great valley, and in its

course forms the boundary line between ten great states. From    the

foothills of the Rockies in the northwestern corner of the Valley, after

passing through the wheatfields of the Dakotas and Nebraska, and

receiving many tributaries great and small, comes the Missouri River,

entering the Mississippi a few miles above St. Louis. Further down

this great central stream is met by the Red, Arkansas, White and

Quachita Rivers, draining the Southwestern portion of the Valley.

From the Northeast, running diagonally through the State of Illinois,

the Illinois River meets the Mississippi a short distance above St.

Louis-and great efforts, now in progress, are soon to convert this

river into an effective connection with the Great Lakes System at


The valley of the Mississippi is politically and commercially more

important than any other valley on the face of the globe. Here, more

than anywhere else will be determined the future of the United States,

and, indeed, of the whole western world; and the type of civilization

reached in this mighty valley, in this vast stretch of country lying be-

tween the Alleghenies and the Rockies, the Great Lakes and the Gulf,