Ohio History Journal




DUNCAN McARTHUR: THE MILITARY PHASE*

DUNCAN McARTHUR: THE MILITARY PHASE*

 

By C. H. CRAMER

 

Duncan McArthur had won his military spurs before the

War of 1812 broke out and had been commissioned a general in

the State Militia. In the spring of 1812, with war looming on

the horizon, Congress authorized the President to organize a num-

ber of volunteers who were to be ready to march on short notice.

The Ohio quota was 1200 men.1 McArthur ordered his militia

division to assemble and used his forensic powers in an effort to

get them to join the volunteer army. He employed every argu-

ment to persuade the men to take the field, running the gamut of

patriotic emotions. His remarks are a good example of a tend-

ency to indulge in hyperbole:

FELLOW-CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS. The period has arrived when our

country again calls its heroes to arms. [We will be fighting against] Eng-

land unjust and perfidious--that proud and tyrannical nation, whose injustice,

prior to 1776, aroused the honest indignation of our fathers to manly re-

sistance; their souls could no longer endure slavery . . . the HEAVEN-

protected patriots of Columbia, obliged the mighty armies of the tyrant to

surrender to American valor.

Notwithstanding Great Britain, in 1782, was obliged to sue for peace,

and beg permission to withdraw her conquered and degraded troops, the

haughty spirit of that proud and unprincipled nation, has ever since burnt

with indignation against the author of her disgrace....

Could the shades of the departed heroes of the revolution who purchased

our freedom with their blood, descend from the valiant mansions of peace,

would they not call aloud to arms? And where is that friend to his country

who would not obey the call?2

Few four-minute speakers of 1917-18 surpassed this attempt

to make the eagle scream. The reference to the Elysian fields

with their "HEAVEN-protected patriots of Columbia" is remi-

 

* This is second of a series of articles on Duncan McArthur. The first was

published in the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, (Columbus).

XLV (1936), 27-33.--Editor's note.

1 Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (Bowl-

ing Green, Ohio, 1919), 61.

2 Division Orders, Chillicothe, April 8, 1812, in Circleville (Ohio) Fredonian,

April 25, 1912; Samuel R. Brown, Views of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army

(Philadelphia, 1815), 5. This address had been corrected in style and spelling by

someone, perhaps the editor of the newspaper. This is especially apparent when it

is compared with some of the personal letters of Duncan McArthur which are quoted

later on in the article.

(128)



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 129

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                  129

niscent of Parson Weems' Life of Washington. In the peroration

of this remarkable biography, in which Weems escorts the sancti-

fied Washington to the pearly gates, he mentions some of the

"shades" to be found there--"the beauteous forms of Franklin,

Warren, Mercer, Scammel, and of him who fell at Quebec, with

all the virtuous patriots, on the side of Columbia, who toiled or

bled for liberty and truth."3

The difficulty of procuring necessary supplies, which con-

tinued during the entire war, began with the first assembly of

troops. The men were obliged to get along without tents and

other equipage.4  McArthur laid the blame on the contractors:

The truth is that when the army assembled at Dayton, it consisted of

nothing but men. There was neither Tents, Blankets, axes, arms or am-

munition, neither was there stores of any kind for the use of the army.

However, to make short of the matter, the chief delay of the army . . . has

been the want of ammunition, and waggons to convey the Flower, Salt, and

Baggage.... Provisions of every kind is plenty in settlements, but the con-

tractors who are engaged to furnish us, have made such miserable calcula-

tions with respect to the conveyance of it, that the army has not been able

to march.5

And again:

If I had room I would say a word on the subject of our ketch-penny

contractors who feed our army Carr[i]on Beef and musty shorts whilst fat

beef, and good flower could be had at 1/2 penny more a 1b.6

General William Hull, of Revolutionary fame, was assigned

to command the Ohio contingent. He arrived in Dayton on

May 20. On May 25 Governor Return J. Meigs officially turned

over the command in a ceremony which was marked by a bom-

bastic speech from Hull and several humorous incidents. The

troops had been drawn up for review. The ceremony would have

been imposing enough but for the staff ponies. Fatigued though

they were from the long trip from New England, whence Hull

had journeyed, the drum and fife corps gave them a renewed lease

on life. As the staff passed before the second regiment the roar

of drums frightened the animal belonging to one of Hull's aides,

and the horse promptly ran off at half-speed in the wrong direc-

tion. The contagion spread rapidly. The horse belonging to

 

3 Harold Kellock, Parson Weems of the Cherry-tree (New York, 1928), 96.

4 McAfee, History of the Late War, 62; McArthur to Thomas Worthington, Fruit

Hill, May 19, 1812, Worthington MSS. (in Ohio State Library).

5 Id. to id., June 26, 1812, Worthington MSS.

6 Id. to id., July 7, 1812, Worthington MSS.



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Captain Hull (brother of the general) dashed off in hot pursuit

in the same direction. Let an eye-witness describe the rest of the

fiasco:

The General's pony followed his aids, and he was a hard trotter, throw-

ing his rider up, until you could see daylight between his seat and saddle.

Well balanced as they were for a review, with splendid swords, at their

sides, they were not so well adapted to a race, especially at a trot. The con-

sequence was, that the General's feet lost the stirrups, he lost his balance, his

hat flew off, and to save himself he seized the horse's mane. The frightened

animal going at the rate of a mile in four minutes, at a hard trot. By this

time the yells of the spectators and some of the wild volunteers, rendered

the scene one of the most amusing I ever witnessed at a military review.7

The staff, after a conference, concluded to abandon the at-

tempt to pass the army. They decided to take a position and

require the troops to pass them! This order was executed suc-

cessfully.

McArthur made an excellent impression at Dayton. Allen

Trimble commented on the full uniform and the tall plume of

Colonel Lewis Cass and the well-proportioned physique of Major

Jeremiah Munson, but adds that "it was admitted on all hands

that McArthur looked more like a go-a-head soldier than any of

his brother officers."8

On the first of June, the army left Dayton, arriving at

Urbana on the eighth. On the eleventh McArthur and his regi-

ment were detailed to cut a road for the army as far as the Scioto

River. In this day of rapid and easy communication it is hard

to realize that the American army in Ohio during the War of

1812 had to build roads before it could move at all. The troops

had to cut their way through the woods and swamps, and bridges

had to be constructed over streams. Guides went forward and

blazed the trees on the route with tomahawks; the soldiers fol-

lowed with axes, grubbing hoes, spades and shovels. By June 16

a trail was opened to the Scioto River and the construction of two

block houses had begun. These outposts were called Fort Mc-

Arthur in honor of their builder.9

The rest of the army caught up with McArthur on the nine-

7 "Autobiography and Correspondence of Allen Trimble," Old Northwest Genea-

logical Quarterly (Columbus), X (1907), 38.

8 Ibid.

9 McArthur to Worthington, June 19, 1812, Worthington MSS; Fredonian, June

20, 1812; John McDonald, Biographical Sketches (Cincinnati, 1838), 101. McDonald was

paymaster in McArthur's regiment.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 131

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                  131

teenth. On the twenty-first Colonel James Findlay was ordered

to assume the job of cutting the remainder of the road, and the

rest of the troops followed slowly. Rain began to fall on the next

day and what was euphemistically called a road became impassable

for heavy wagons. The army settled down in the mud. When

the rain subsided the army trudged on and early in July reached

Detroit. In 1812 the present automobile metropolis was a mere

village containing around 200 houses and 1200 people.10

When the American force crossed over to the Canadian side

north of Detroit in the middle of July McArthur commanded the

detachment which successfully decoyed the enemy south of the

town. He marched and countermarched his troops for a day, left

a few men to continue the ruse, and then hurried north with the

remainder to join the main American force. Cass and McArthur

urged an immediate attack on Maiden but Hull refused to advance

without his artillery, which had not been brought up. Since Mc-

Arthur was "most restive and uneasy in a state of inaction" Hull

sent him up the river in pursuit of a body of Indians!11 On this

expedition he captured valuable supplies at McGregor's Mills,

traversed 130 miles in three and a half days without blankets or

provisions, and penetrated sixty miles into enemy territory.12

This exploit brought the ire of the British down upon him.

James Hannay, a British historian writing soon after the war,

notes that it was in this expedition that "McArthur commenced

that career of plunder and rapine which gave him so evil a repu-

tation during the war."13

A little later he commanded an expedition which attacked

Canadians and Indians on the Aux Canards River. Robert Lucas

felt that Hull should not have ordered this expedition and the

ensuing skirmish while dangerous was ineffective and aimless.

"We fired at them . . . for amusement till we was tired," said

 

10 Robert Lucas, Journal of the War of 1812 during the Campaign under General

Hull (Iowa City, 1906), 15ff. Lucas, later governor of Ohio, wrote an invaluable

day-by-day account (in the form of a diary) of his experiences.

11 McAfee, History of the Late War, 72, 73; McDonald, Biographical Sketches,

105ff.; Lucas, Journal, 27, 28.

12 For an account of this expedition, see McAfee, History of the Late War,

76ff. and two letters: Colonel James Denny to Mrs. Denny, July 13-18, 1812, Old

Northwest Genealogical Quarterly, X (1907), 288-9, and McArthur to Major Morris,

July 24, 1812, in Chillicothe (Ohio) Supporter, August 8, 1812.

13 James Hannay, The War of 1812 (Halifax, 1901), 63.



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Lucas; he added that the enemy returned the fire and he "was

diverted to see some of the Boys Dodge at the whistling of the

balls."14 McArthur observed that the "cannon balls play a very

unpleasant tune; they were landed in the midst of us, but no man

was hurt but some a little scared." In this skirmish his horse was

shot in the head and (according to McArthur) "the ball did almost

knock him down, but he recovered without falling to the ground;

his head is yet very sore but I think he will recover."15 Bullets

were not quite as dangerous in 1812, apparently, as they became

later as "civilization" advanced. For a few days, subsequently,

McArthur commanded the American army (then on the Canadian

side) while Hull returned to Detroit. Though he showed more

activity than Hull little was accomplished in the general's

absence.16

During this period the dissatisfaction of the officers with Hull

metamorphosed into mutiny. As early as the spring, when the

army was at Dayton, McArthur and William A. Trimble had

suspicions of his ability. Trimble thought of him as a "short,

corpulent, good natured old gent, who bore the marks of good

eating and drinking, but none of the marks of a chief, according

to my notions of a great general. . ." On another occasion,

Trimble walked with McArthur to his room. He asked him if he

would dare to give his opinion of the general. "Not publicly,"

replied McArthur, "but I say to you, he won't do. He is not the

kind of man we want, and I fear the result of our campaign; 'twill

be disastrous."17 On August 12 a conversation took place be-

tween the colonels, respecting the ability of Hull. They were

of the unanimous opinion that if he continued in command, the

surrender of the army would follow. After toying with the idea

of depriving Hull of his command and bestowing it upon either

Colonels John Miller or McArthur, Cass addressed a letter to

Meigs, governor of Ohio, with the suggestion that he march to

relieve them. On his arrival Hull would be divested of his

authority and Meigs was to assume it. After Cass had written the

letter the others added the following endorsement:

14 Lucas, Journal, 38-9.

15 McArthur to Morris, Supporter, August 8, 1812.

16 Lucas, Journal, 41ff.

17 "Autobiography of Allen Trimble," 37.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 133

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                     133

 

Since the other side of the letter was written, new circumstances have

arisen. The British force is opposite, and our situation has nearly reached

its crisis. Believe all the bearer will tell you. Believe it, however it may

astonish you; as much as if told by one of us. Even a c x x x is talked of

by the x x x! The bearer will supply the vacancy. On you we depend.

Signed by

CASS, FINDLEY, MCARTHUR, TAYLOR,

and E. BRUSH.18

On the evening of the fourteenth a detachment of 300 men

under Cass and McArthur was sent out to relieve E. Brush, who

had been bottled up by the British. After advancing twenty-four

miles they found themselves in a marsh and without provisions.

Without food for two days, excepting a few green pumpkins and

potatoes, the detail under McArthur was hastening back to Detroit

when a French Canadian running across the prairie informed

them that Hull had surrendered the town, fort and army to the

enemy. McArthur was in a difficult position with the enemy in

front and famine in the rear but at first he had no intention of

surrendering his small detachment to the British. He ordered a

retreat and after marching some two miles a large ox was dis-

covered feeding by the roadside. Hunger proved, for the moment,

to be more compelling than fear of the enemy. The ox was

"slaughtered in less time than any professional butcher could have

done the deed." While the meat was roasting two men dressed in

British uniform rode up, waving a white flag. They carried

with them the articles of capitulation. After a conference Mc-

Arthur decided to surrender, since a retreat to Ft. Wayne (the

nearest place where supplies could be found) was beyond the

power of endurance for men already reduced by fatigue and

hunger.   The officers and troops from      Ohio returned home on

parole. McArthur was at Fruit Hill early in September when a

dinner was given in honor of the returning warrior at Chilli-

cothe.19

It is not the purpose here to weight the responsibility of Hull

 

18 McAfee, History of the Late War, 96. A man named Owen Brown was

one of the contractors furnishing beef to William Hull's army. He took his son

John with him to Detroit. Later when this boy had become the half-crazed hero of

Potawatomie he recalled this mutinous conduct by the officers of Hull's army. See

Charles B. Galbreath, "John Brown," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications

(Columbus) XXX (1921), 218.

19 McAfee, History of the Late War, 98ff.; McDonald, Biographical Sketches,

122ff; Hull to McArthur, August 16, 1812, in Supporter, August 29, 1812; Fredonian,

September 9, 1812.



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for the disaster at Detroit. There is no doubt that he was care-

less and dilatory but a fair observer would admit that his position

was a difficult one. Henry Adams was of the opinion that he was

a brave man who was motivated to surrender largely by

the "thought of his daughter and the women and children of the

settlement left to the mercy of the Indians. . . . Doubt-

less his fears were well founded, but a general-in-chief whose

mind was paralyzed by such thoughts could not measure

himself with Isaac Brock."20 The West, however, saw but one

side of the surrender and their antagonism to Hull was bitter. A

poem composed a few months later and contributed by "Anti-

Hullism," is a good example of the feeling:

Revenge whets our steels, Justice guards every life;

Let Saint George lead the trembling Canadians to meet us,

Let the slaves be led on by their Proctors and Brocks;

Not, as on those cursed plains at Detroit shall they greet us,

For instead of Old Hulls they shall find we are Rocks.21

As Hull's popularity decreased that of McArthur grew in

direct proportion. The story went the rounds that on hearing

the news of the surrender McArthur had dashed his sword to the

ground and broken it. The tale is probably not authentic since

similar behavior was ascribed to many of the other officers.22 Such

stories are perfect ones for hero-worshippers to linger over.

Many persons speculated over the outcome at Detroit if Mc-

Arthur had been in command and none doubted that the result

would have been a different and happy one.          The Chillicothe

Fredonian even accused Hull of traitorous action:

It is reported that Hull sent Cols. McArthur and Cass out of the

way . . . fearing lest their well-known abilities, their patriotism, and the

confidence the army placed in them, should have effectually thwarted his

traitorous designs. These brave officers were sent out on a dangerous ex-

pedition, without provision, and without the means of subsistence, in order

to afford the British and Indians an opportunity to oblige them to sur-

render; and during their absence, the fort and the army were basely sur-

rendered, as well as the troops under their command.23

20 Henry Adams, History of the United States (New York, 1921), VI, 327.

21 Supporter, December 19, 1812.

22 See Old Northwest Genealogical Quarterly, X (1907), 41, for the supposed

behavior of Cass, and see Lucas, Journal, 67, for that of Major Witherall. McDonald

does not mention any activity of this sort on McArthur's part, and it is not likely

that he would have passed up such a laudatory story.

23 Fredonian, September 1, 1812.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 135

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                  135

The popularity of McArthur elected him to Congress in the

fall. He refused the candidacy for governor which was pressed

upon him, but consented to run for the lower house of the national

legislature. The Fredonian rejoiced to find that even his enemies

were now constrained to acknowledge his merit and worth. Even

the Scioto Gazette "whose columns for some years past teemed

with scurrility and abuse against him, has now to acknowledge

his qualifications, fidelity, merit and patriotism ...."24 He was

elected by a vote that was almost unanimous. During the winter

he was exchanged and freed from his parole. Congress author-

ized him to raise a regiment. Like Cass he felt that he would

"much rather hold a commission in the Armies than a seat in the

Counsel of my Country."25 For this reason he resigned his seat

in Congress before he had a chance to serve in the legislative

chamber.

During the spring of 1813 McArthur and Cass were engaged

in a strenuous campaign to recruit the members of their forces.

Again their appeals for soldiers rival some of the high-powered

pleas of 1917-18, but they were not quite so successful. On

April 7 this call to arms, issued by the newly appointed brigadier-

generals appeared in the Supporter:

To THE YOUNG MEN OF OHIO

FELLOW CITIZENS.--You have all seen the unexampled outrages which Eng-

land has committed upon our interest and honor, and you have seen the

solicitude which our govt. had manifested to preserve the relations of peace

and amity. ... The same power which drove your fathers to arms to acquire

your independence, now drives their sons to arms to defend it.... That man

is unworthy of the name of an American, who can tamely hear the call of

his country and look idly upon her battles. Our govt. is engaged in no

schemes of aggrandizement [sic], no places [plans] of ambition. . . . Are

you prepared to have your midnight slumbers awakened by the Indian yell,

and the conflagration of your own dwellings gleam upon the last act of

savage barbarity? . . . The inducements held out by your government are

greater than any country ever offered to the patriotism of its citizens. A

gratuity of sixteen dollars, the monthly pay of eight dollars and clothing

are the offers for the service of a year. Your officers will be men who are

your friends, your neighbors . . .years of honorable peace and security will

be cheaply purchased by a few months of activity and enterprise.

Little is found in this appeal which rubs shoulders with

reality: the selfish if at times unconscious desire of the West for

 

24 September 29, 1812.

25 Supporter, October 24, 1812.



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fertile lands in Canada; the fact that Indian troubles were largely

due to the westerner's own philosophy that the only good Indian

was a dead one; that soldiers were scarcely well paid on eight

dollars a month for risking their necks when contractors were

filthy with cash; that peace and security can never be purchased

at the price of a "war to end wars." The Ohio Federalist com-

mented disparagingly on this chauvinistic ranting by saying that it

was a repetition of the "stale and oft repeated slang which has

filled the mouths of the war orators."26 Healthy criticism was

apparently possible in the War of 1812--a striking contrast to the

situation a little over a century later in the same region. A

thorough militarist like McArthur chafed under such abuse. He

had some very definite ideas about carrying on an efficient war:

conscription should be adopted in order to overcome the lassitude

of patriots; the war to be financed by issuing paper money as

in the Revolution; and some effective means to be adopted to

"stop the mouths of those who without cause, vilify, slander and

traduce the administration and every officer of Government."27

Without "voluntary conscription" McArthur found the re-

cruiting job a difficult one. He described it as "laborious and un-

pleasant," and rode down several horses visiting almost every

town and village in the lower end of the State.28 The chief rea-

son for the indifference of the Ohioans to military service was that

the pay offered the soldiers was not nearly so good as McArthur

had intimated in his stirring summons to arms. He summed up

the situation to Thomas Worthington as follows: "In short,

money is plenty and labour high, common laborers ask, and some

receive from 14 to 16$ per month, and altho the monthly pay and

bounty of a soldier, is considered high in many parts of the union,

yet it is no object, in the lower end of the State of Ohio."29

A great many persons were suspicious whether they would re-

ceive even the meager pay allowed. A good example of this

uncertainty appears in a letter written in the next year. The

author has a weird though charming idea of spelling and gram-

mar, but no one could question his sound business sense:

26 May  11, 1813.

27 McArthur to Worthington, October 21, 1814, Worthington MSS.

28 Id. to id., June 9, 1813, Worthington MSS.

29 Ibid.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 137

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                    137

 

To GENERAL MCARTHUR

There is a number of people here desirous of entering the Service in

defence of there countries rites as Volunteers, but hesitate at presant on

these grounds. first wishing to know wheather they receive the pay and

Amoliments for 6 Months 3rd Wheather they receive Mone in part (pre-

vious to there Marchin) for there Horces if so if you would be so good as

to inform me you will oblige your verry humble Servant.

FREDERICK FANNING.

N. B. A Letter from you if you please direct to me (as several have pro-

posed joining provided they are satisfyed in this respect) will be rec'd with

chearfullness.                                             H.F.F.30

During the summer and fall McArthur marched and coun-

termarched in an attempt to be of assistance to William       Henry

Harrison. None of this activity was of any great significance,

however, and to recount it in detail would be wearisome to the

reader who has reached this point of the narrative. He was not

with Harrison when Henry A. Proctor was overcome on the

Thames River on October 5. This was a great disappointment

since he had wanted to "wipe out the stain which had been

acquired in Hull's campaign."31

In December McArthur was ordered to attend the military

trial of Hull to be held at Albany.32 Reaching the capital of New

York late in January, 1814, the Scotchman developed an intense

dislike for the town because of the high prices prevailing there.

"This is a poor place," he wrote his wife. "I was asked $126 by

a merchant Taylor for a Coat, Vest and Pantaloons [and] rather

than submit to the imposition I have concluded to wear my old

clothes until I can return to New York or Philadelphia. . . ."33

Early in February Cass and he were examined. Both testified

against Hull. The grandson of the latter, writing in defense

of the general some years later, asserted that the testimony of

McArthur was strongly marked by an "evident predetermination

to say as many things as he can to injure General Hull, and as

few as possible in his favor."34 Although his testimony was

30 Letter dated September, 1814, McArthur MSS. (in Library of Congress),

XVII, 3184.

31 McArthur to Nancy McArthur, September 12, 1813, McArthur MSS., III,

575-6.

32 Supporter, December 8, 1813.

33 McArthur to Nancy McArthur, January 26, 1814, McArthur MSS., IV, 721.

This parsimonious streak drew the following comment from McDonald: "Notwith-

standing that he was liberal in feeding the hungry, and clothing the naked, he was

admitted to be a close and severe dealer." See his Biographical Sketches, 182.

34 James F. Clarke, History of the Campaign of 1812 and Surrender of the Post of

Detroit (New York, 1848), 403-4.



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damning, McArthur really felt some sympathy for his former

commanding officer, now in the nadir of his disgrace. "The poor

old man with all his falts and infirmities," he wrote, "is to be

pitied, his high tone is much altered, he appears to have no hope

of justifying his conduct, and is deserted by all."35 The wit-

nesses were all dismissed in early March and McArthur set out

by horseback for Philadelphia. Stopping off at Newark, he pur-

chased a magnificent carriage costing $700. He reported to his

wife that it was a "Hansome" affair but that he had no idea how

he would get it all the way to Chillicothe.36

He had scarcely arrived in Philadelphia when he began to

worry about being appointed to attend the trial of that mercurial

officer General James Wilkinson. He feared that such a misfor-

tune would keep him in the East several months longer.37 His

suspicions were soon confirmed. He was ordered to repair to the

south end of Lake George by April 15 to sit as a member of a

court of inquiry. He arrived at Ft. Edward before anyone else,

and was thoroughly miserable. The lake was covered with ice,

the air was disagreeably cold, and the entire aspect of the country

was mountainous, rocky and barren.38   Shortly afterward the

court was disbanded because of a technical objection made by

Wilkinson.39 McArthur was back in Chillicothe by the middle of

May.

Before turning to his activities as commander of the North-

western Army it will be convenient to summarize McArthur's ex-

ertions in the first two years of the war. It must be concluded

that they were marked by considerable zeal and vigor but that the

results were scarcely commensurate with the energy displayed.

His campaign with Hull, through no fault of his own, had been

catastrophic. The better part of the ensuing year had been spent

in getting exchanged. Although he served in Harrison's expedi-

tion to Canada, he did not play a vital part in it because he was

left behind to command the base at Detroit. His services at the

trial of Hull and his attendance at the abortive inquiry into the

35 McArthur to Worthington, February 4, 1814, Worthington MSS.

36 Id. to Nancy McArthur, March 19, 1814, McArthur MSS., IV, 1031.

37 Id. to Worthington, March 19, 1814, Worthington MSS.

38 Id. to Nancy McArthur, April 15, 1814, McArthur MSS., VII, 1274.

39 Supporter, May 21, 1814. James Wilkinson was finally acquitted by another

court.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 139

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE             139

conduct of Wilkinson certainly contributed nothing that was par-

ticularly beneficial to his country's cause. His personal losses

had been heavy. In addition to the fatigue of the campaigns and

the loss of income because of continual absence from home, his

family suffered an additional misfortune when their beautiful

dwelling, (Fruit Hill,) was consumed by fire in the spring of 1814.

Only the general's papers and a part of the furniture were

saved.40 McArthur had worked willingly and energetically dur-

ing these two years but the smiles of the martial gods were not

for him.

The winter and spring of 1814 witnessed great dissatisfaction

with Harrison in the West. In January the commander of the

Northwestern Army set up his headquarters in Cincinnati and

did not budge from that spot until his resignation four months

later. With the exception of scattered attacking parties sent out

from Detroit, no movement was executed. "The proud boasts of

the first months of the war and confident huzzas for Canada were

no longer heard," reported one commentator. "Indeed, Harrison

showed little inclination to raise an army for this purpose; and

for the commander of an important district he displayed rather

languid interest in the prosecution of the war."41 In defense of

the general it may be said that there was a decided lessening of the

war fever in the West, that he was having the usual trouble with

army contractors, and that a strained relationship with John

Armstrong (the secretary of war) made planning almost impos-

sible. McArthur, however, blamed the inactivity on Harrison and

before long was carrying on a first-class cabal with Worthington

(then a representative in Congress), working toward the sub-

stitution of the "hero of Chillicothe" for the "hero of Tippe-

canoe."

McArthur's loyalty to Harrison in 1813 was unquestionably

sincere, but his attitude was now changed. Worthington, too,

had altered his position and proceeded to devote his considerable

influence in McArthur's behalf. In January, 1814, McArthur

wrote Worthington "in confidence" that Harrison was "better

 

40 Ibid., April 23, 1814.

41 Dorothy Burne Goebel, William Henry Harrison; A Political Biography

(Indianapolis, 1926), 188.



140 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

140    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

calculated to swallow draughts of flatters, than to conduct a vigor-

ous campaign," and that "unless some change for the better does

shortly take place I shall leave the service as I think the sooner

the less disgrace."42 In February he grew bolder. He sent a

letter to the secretary of war in which he made no attempt to hold

his light under a bushel. "I must confess," he averred, "that I

calculate on as little credit in serving under Genl. H--n as any

other, his want of arrangements is intolerable. I flatter myself

that if the Ohio Militia are called out they would as soon serve

with, or under me, as any other who may be placed on our fron-

tier."43 Worthington wrote back from Washington that Arm-

strong was impressed with the wisdom of McArthur's views and

that the chances for the dismissal of Harrison were good. He

begged too, that these matters be kept secret.44

The bureaucratic wheels move so slowly, however, that Mc-

Arthur grew disheartened and determined to resign. In April he

had written his wife that he was "heartily tired of a war which

promises neither credit, nor advantage, from the manner in which

it has been conducted."45 On June 4, he sent in his resignation,

claiming that he would have liked to remain in the army until

there was some "honorable adjustment" of our national difficulties

but that the state of his and Mrs. McArthur's health, along with

the recent conflagration at Fruit Hill induced him to quit the

service.46  As it turned out, he had acted hastily. Unknown to

McArthur, Harrison had resigned on May II, although he re-

mained in command until June I, and the Chillicothe patriot had

been appointed to the vacancy as commander of the Northwest

Army.47 The secretary of war refused to accept the resignation

which arrived in Washington after he had received his promotion

and McArthur, ostensibly with reluctance, but actually with

pleasure accepted the position which he had coveted.

He entered upon the duties of his new position with his

accustomed vigor. Two major obstacles, however, deterred him

 

42 January 14, 1814, Worthington MSS.

43 Undated letter from Albany, Worthington MSS.

44 McArthur MSS., V, 810.

45 Ibid., VII, 1274.

46 McArthur to John Armstrong, June 4, 1814, McArthur MSS., IX, 1715.

47 Armstrong to McArthur, May 28, 1814, McArthur MSS., IX, 1607.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 141

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE              141

 

from accomplishing decisive results as a reward for his labor.

The first was the indecision of the War Department as to its

plans; as a consequence McArthur found himself on many a wild-

goose chase. The second was the frightful system of provisioning

the army which rendered movement impossible at times. Mc-

Arthur had once coveted his position of command but he was to

repent more than once of his desire. These difficulties, reinforced

with wounded vanity, played prominent roles in his too frequent

resignations.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate the bungling manage-

ment of the war from Washington. During the summer months

McArthur marched five hundred men to Buffalo, but he arrived

several days after the battle of Lundy's Lane.48  Meanwhile he

was engaged in a furious altercation with Armstrong over an

expedition sent under Colonel George Croghan to Mackinaw.

Armstrong had sent the order directly to Croghan without con-

sulting McArthur, the commander of the district. The latter hit

the ceiling. "Unless my instructions can be more explicit," he

wrote the secretary of war, and "I be acquainted with every mili-

tary movement in the district I must beg to be excused from act-

ing any longer in service."49  Armstrong slipped out of the

difficulty by saying that the Government had no intention to treat

the general with disrespect, and that the whole affair had been

caused by an error on the part of a clerk!50 After this dispute

had been settled a projected mounted expedition failed (in spite

of untiring efforts on the part of the commandant) for various

reasons: the Militia of Ohio and Kentucky were reluctant to

serve because of uncertainty about being paid; the Indian allies

were not enthusiastic about the possibilities of booty from an at-

tack on their brethren (whites were much better "pickings") ; and

the War Department failed to cooperate with the fleet on Lake

Erie.

It is apparent that if McArthur had any military ability he

was unable to use it because his superiors at Washington could

 

48 McArthur to Captain Kennedy, General Brown's Headquarters, August 8,

1814, McArthur MSS., XIV, 2573.

49 Id. to Armstrong, Chillicothe, July 6, 1814, McArthur MSS., XII, 2198.

50 Armstrong to McArthur, July 12, 1814, McArthur MSS., XII, 2281.



142 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

142     OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

not see beyond the ends of their noses. He was further handi-

capped by the inefficient system of supplying the army. The sys-

tem in use was that of letting contracts to diverse individuals for

the necessary supplies. The door was left wide open for cor-

ruption and chicanery. McArthur wrote to James Monroe in

October summarizing some of his difficulties as follows:

No important military operations can be carried on in this district for

the want of an efficient staff.... There are only three men in the quarter-

master's department who in my opinion ought to be continued in the service.

. . Labour and every article which is purchased for the use of the govern-

ment costs nearly double what it would . . . were the public debts punctually

paid.... The pay department is equally defective ... Many of the troops

in this quarter have not been paid for twelve months. . . . The ordinance

department is also deficient. The arms out of use, at almost every post

are suffering damage from rust and the ammunition . . . has generally been

badly contracted.51

While at Albany he wrote to Worthington of the frightful

conditions existing among the soldiers:

Unfortunately for our army they are not provided with Clothing to

enable them to appear respectable in summer much less to shield them from

the inclemency of winter. From the want of this Clothing of the proper

kind and quantity...many hundreds of valuable lives have been lost and are

daily losing for want of Clothes to keep the Soldiers Clean and warm. The

Clothes issued in many cases scarcely deserve that name, especially the socks

and shoes, they are generally too small and of the worst quality, entirely

unfit for wind, or winter. The socks are course thin and worthless, and the

shoes badly made of the worst of leather. . . . The Blankets issued to our

troops are so small and worthless, that they neither cover nor keep them

warm, and consequently many lives are lost. This is not all, both the Ration

and the means of Cooking it, is very deficient, there ought to be added to

the ration some Vegetable . . . the want of it produces Bowell complaints

which carry off many .... The police of Camps are often neglected, with

impunity, and the helth and even the lives of many brave fellows distroyed

in this way.52

One of McArthur's men wrote that the wagons furnished the

army were bad, the horses weak and the oxen too fat:

The conduct of our Quartermaster is infamous. There is not a single

waggon furnished me but what was out of order .... And I may say not

one but what was rotten--And I have had one or more waggons to brake down

every day, and ox teams to give out.53

During November conditions became so bad that the troops

at Detroit received no flour. McArthur suggested the immediate

appointment of a special commissary as the only solution.        He

51 McArthur to James Monroe, October 16, 1814, McArthur MSS., XVIII, 3417.

52 Id. to Worthington, Albany, February 13, 1814, Worthington MSS.

53 John Miller to McArthur, January 30, 1814, McArthur MSS., IV, 740, 741.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 143

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE                      143

wrote Worthington asking for a loan of $30,000 for the purchase

of flour and pork. In addition to the lack of provisions the troops

were not being paid, some of them having as much as twelve to

sixteen months back pay due them. McArthur suggested that

since the district paymaster was incompetent that he should be

removed. The suggestion was not heeded.54

The officers were becoming desperate. On the last day of

the year Miller wrote to McArthur from Erie, Pennsylvania, as

follows:

I trust in God, our Government will correct this department of the

Army. A contractor department in time of war is wretched--It is the curse

of every Army to which it is attached.... As long as our Army is fed by

contractors, I have no hesitation in saying that it is impossible for it to

operate with energy or effect. The contractor has it in his power to stop

an army in its most important moves and operations whenever he thinks

proper . . . and wherever I have been, I have found it to be the case that,

when the Army was ready or about to move the contractor runs short of

provisions.55

McArthur felt the same way and wrote Monroe about it:

I trust the Government will adopt some more efficient mode of supply-

ing our armies in time of war, than through a contractor. It is putting it in

the power of one man, either through neglect or design, to stop the most

important movements of an army.56

This state of affairs so disgusted McArthur that after

threatening to resign several times he finally did so in February,

1815. Constant practice was developing him into an expert in

framing letters of resignation. The scorching letter which he

sent to Monroe on this occasion was concluded as follows:

Permit me to assure you Sir, and through you the President, that it is

with reluctance, that I retire from the service of my country at a time when

it would seem to require the united exertion of its friends.57

Needless to add, this resignation like its predecessors, was not

accepted. The secretary of war assured him that there was no

reason to feel personally insulted because

the embarassments of which you complain have not been partial or confined

to your District. They have been universal, and are a consequence of the

embarassments which have attended the finances of the Government. But

measures are now in train to relieve all, and directions have been given par-

54 McArthur to Monroe, December 14, 1814, and January 14, 1815, McArthur

MSS., XX, 3904; XXII, 4171.

55 Miller to McArthur, December 81, 1814, McArthur MSS., XXI, 8998-4000.

56 Chillicothe, January 11, 1815, McArthur MSS., XXI, 4144. This reminds one

of the role of the Du Ponts in the last war. The Government went begging for

ammunition in 1917-18 until the munitions family got its price.

57 Chillicothe, February 5, 1815, McArthur MSS., XXIII, 4408.



144 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

144    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

 

ticularly relative to your district, the Quartermaster of which was a few

days since supplied with 40,000 dollars.58

McArthur thought the contents of the letter "truly flattering"

and as usual, continued in the service.

Handicapped as he was by a moribund War Department and

an inadequate system of supply, McArthur made a successful

foray into Upper Canada in the fall of 1814 for which he de-

serves great credit. By this time Jacob Brown was in a critical

position at Ft. Erie. It was McArthur's intention to march

toward Burlington Heights at the head of Lake Ontario, destroy-

ing the valuable mills on the Grand River as he went and falling

back to the Niagara River to join Brown. He left Detroit on

October 23 with 650 mounted volunteers and seventy Indians.

To mask the real destination of the expedition the troops started

northward as if they intended to strike an Indian village on the

Saginaw River, 120 miles above Detroit. After progressing north

for some distance the men were transported across the St. Clair

River and moved rapidly into Upper Canada. On November 4 they

arrived at Oxford, 140 miles east of Detroit, before any of its

inhabitants knew that a hostile contingent was approaching. The

next day Burford was reached, a local militia force retreating to

Malcolm's Mills (10 miles distant) as the Americans entered the

town.59

It was McArthur's intention to disregard the local militia,

cross the river, and proceed to Burlington. A freshet made the

river impassable, however, and it was also learned that Brown had

recrossed the Niagara to the American side, releasing a large

British force for action somewhere else. Consequently original

intentions were cast aside and it was decided to attack the militia

at Malcolm's Mills. This was done with dispatch and efficiency.

The Americans captured 132 prisoners, lost only one man killed,

and six wounded, and destroyed five valuable mills.60

By this time a large force of British regulars was approach-

ing to meet the invaders. Confronted with this menace, as well

as the uncertainty with regard to Brown's ability to support him,

 

58 January 17, 1815, McArthur MSS., XXII, 4193.

59 McAfee, History of the Late War, 482ff.; Supporter, December 31, 1814.

60 Ibid.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 145

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE              145

McArthur abandoned the idea of a junction at Ft. Erie and

started back to the Thames. By the middle of the month he was

again in Sandwich. The expedition had covered more than 400

miles, 180 of which were in a wilderness. In addition to the

mills 200 stand of arms were destroyed and the entire expedi-

tion had lived off the country for the greater part of the time. Mc-

Arthur claimed that no more private property was destroyed or

consumed than was necessary for the support of the troops, and

that most of it was paid for. He admitted there were some par-

tial abuses by the Indians under his command "whose customs in

war impel them to plunder after victory."61

To the enemy the expedition did not merit such a roseate and

heroic description. One of them, writing a few years later,

denied that it should even be classified as a military exploit but

thought it more closely resembled an excursion of "banditti." The

prisoners taken by McArthur were reported to have been "peace-

able inhabitants, both old and young, and drunken Indians and

their squaws." When a British force put in its appearance this

Canadian avers that McArthur and his band dispersed with such

rapidity that the British regulars could not get within eight miles

of them.62 Hannay, writing at the end of the century, described

the affair as the last effort of "American ruffianism" and insists

that it was undertaken "simply for the sake of plunder and the

cheap glory it might yield." The raid itself was reported to have

been given over to "indiscriminate plunder," the houses of the

settlers being reduced to ashes and the wretched inhabitants left

to perish of cold and hunger. Hannay concluded by saying that

the net result was the infliction of great loss on private individuals

with nothing accomplished for the United States "except to make

its name despised in Western Canada."63

A third British historian probably comes nearer to the truth.

He indulges in hyperbole when he says that the raid was "con-

ceived in the spirit in which the great American Civil War, Sheri-

dan and his horsemen laid waste the She1nandoah valley." He is

 

61 Ibid.; General Orders, Detroit, November 18, 1814, McArthur MSS., XIX,

3692-3.

62 William James, A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of

the Late War between Great Britain and the United States, (London, 1818), 241-3.

63 Hannay, War of 1812, 337-8.



146 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

146    OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

sound, however, in his discussion of the pillage and plunder. He re-

marks that the raid left "a sore memory in Canada" and adds

that it is impossible to determine how far it exceeded the rules

of legitimate warfare because of the conflicting accounts.64 One

wonders just what constitutes legitimate warfare.

Had Brown and George Izard been able to cooperate with

McArthur the expedition might have been turned into a great

offensive against the enemy. There is no question that the march

of over 200 miles into enemy territory with a force of 700 men

required rare courage and unusual energy--qualities certainly

lacking among most of the other American army leaders. Mc-

Afee, who should have known, went so far as to say that the plan

was "not surpassed during the war in the boldness of its design,

and the address with which it was conducted."65

During the rest of the war McArthur marked time. A strong

defense was erected at Malden which made it one of the strongest

positions on the northwestern frontier. In February, 1815, he

made suggestions to Monroe regarding a summer campaign.

Since the British had been burning on the seacoast and appeared

disposed to continue their depredations he proposed that a force

be sent into Canada to lay it waste, thus "interposing between us

and the enemy, a desert which he could not easily pass."66 One

is reminded again of the reference to Sheridan! News of the

peace arrived, however, and the proposals were never executed.

McArthur was not continued in the army when the peace estab-

lishment was settled by Congress early in March.67 He did serve

in a semi-military position during the next few years as he was

involved in making Indian treaties.

Under the circumstances the Chillicothe general had done as

well as could have been expected. The handicaps of a bungling

War Department and an inefficient system of supply would have

discouraged the ablest of generals. Furthermore, his force never

exceeded a thousand men and his most important expedition was

 

64 Sir Charles Prestwood Lucas, The Canadian War of 1812 (New York, 1906),

195-6.

65 McAfee, History of the Late War, 488.

66 McArthur to Monroe, Chillicothe, February 6, 1815, McArthur MSS., XXIII,

4409.

67 Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, General Orders, May 17, 1815, Mc-

Arthur MSS., XXVI, 5043-4.



DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE 147

DUNCAN MCARTHUR: MILITARY PHASE            147

executed with considerably less than that number. The War De-

partment always appeared to be far more interested in the middle

than in the western frontier. His campaign into Canada was

marked by its intrepidity, but its accomplishments were meager.

Had the middle army cooperated sufficiently the stroke might have

been a telling one. One must conclude that since McArthur never

led a large army in a vital campaign, the story of what he might

have done remains within the realm of conjecture.