Ohio History Journal

84                                                     OHIO HISTORY

"Soldiers!" he began,

You are ordered to cross the frontier, and enter upon the soil of Virginia.

Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to protect the majesty of the

law, and to rescue our brethren from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to

act in concert with [loyal] Virginia troops, and to support their advance. ...

Preserve the strictest discipline;--remember that each one of you holds in his

keeping, the honor of Ohio and the Union. If you are called upon to overcome

armed opposition, I know that your courage is equal to the task;--but remember,

that your only foes are the armed traitors,--and show mercy even to them when

they are in your power, for many of them are misguided. When, under your

protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia have been enabled to organize

and arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return to your homes,

with the proud satisfaction of having saved a gallant people from destruction.¹

At 5 A.M. on the morning of May 27, 1861, the First (West) Virginia

Regiment accompanied by four companies of the Second (West) Virginia

Volunteers proceeded southeast from Wheeling along the line of the Balti-

more and Ohio Railroad toward a Confederate encampment in the interior.

The Sixteenth Ohio, stationed at Bellaire, across the river south of Wheeling,

was ordered to support the movement. To the south, the Fourteenth and

Eighteenth Ohio regiments occupied Parkersburg.² Colonel Frederick W.

Lander, aide-de-camp to McClellan, directed the invasion at Parkersburg,

while Colonel Benjamin F. Kelley, commander of the First (West) Virginia

Volunteers, led the spearhead south from Wheeling.³

On learning that Kelley had reached Fairmont, some twenty miles from

his position at Grafton, Colonel George A. Porterfield, the Confederate

commander, withdrew his troops to Philippi, fifteen miles further south.⁴

Kelley continued his advance without opposition.⁵ Meanwhile, the Fourteenth

Ohio moved east from Parkersburg. On June 1 Lander joined the Fourteenth

near Clarksburg and ordered Colonel James B. Steedman to prepare his

troops for a night march on June 2 against Porterfield at Philippi. Lander,

accompanied by an advance guard, pushed on to Grafton. There he found

Kelley, who had been joined by Indiana troops under Brigadier General

Thomas A. Morris, planning an attack on Porterfield also. A council of war

followed and the decision was made to march on Philippi in two converging

columns--one wing directed by Kelley, the other by Lander.⁶

At noon on June 2 Kelley's troops were transported by rail to a point

eight miles east of Grafton and marched south. Lander, reinforced by the

Eighteenth Ohio and the Sixth and Ninth Indiana regiments, detrained at

Webster, a few miles west of Grafton. As a result of a forced march on a

rainy, moonless night Kelley and Lander arrived at Philippi almost simul-

taneously before dawn on the morning of June 3.

86                                                        OHIO HISTORY

of Confederate troops in the northwest; but never was Garnett in a position

to launch offensive operations against the superior forces thrown into western

Virginia from Ohio. From his headquarters at Laurel Hill, Garnett apprised

General Robert E. Lee, in command at Richmond, of the difficulties he faced.

Arriving at Huttonsville on June 14, Garnett reported:

I found there twenty-three companies of infantry . . . in a miserable con-

dition as to arms, clothing, equipments, instruction, and discipline. Twenty of

these companies were organized into two regiments, the one under Lieutenant-

Colonel Jackson and the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Heck. Though wholly

incapable, in my judgment, of rendering anything like efficient service, I deemed

it of such importance to possess myself of the two turnpike passes over the Rich

and Laurel Mountains, before they should be seized by the enemy, that I left

Huttonsville on the evening of the 15th with these two regiments and Captain

Rice's battery, and, by marching them a greater portion of the night, reached

the two passes early in the afternoon of the following day. . . .

I regard these two passes as the gates to the northwestern country, and, had

they been occupied by the enemy, my command would have been effectually

paralyzed or shut up in the Cheat River Valley. I think it was a great mistake

on the part of the enemy not to have remained here after driving Colonel

Porterfield's command over it. . . .

This force I consider more than sufficient to hold these two passes, but not

sufficient to hold the railroad, if I should get an opportunity of seizing it at

any particular point; for I must have an adequate force in each of the passes

to secure them for our use.10

Lee had urged Garnett to destroy the Cheat River bridge on the Baltimore

and Ohio. Even though Garnett recognized the importance of this objective,

he advised Lee, "My moving force (say three thousand) . . . will not be

sufficient, I fear, for this operation."¹¹ At no time did Garnett's army exceed

4,500 (including a Georgia regiment which did not arrive until June 24),

while McClellan was to have nearly 20,000 men at his disposal in the

northwest alone. Garnett himself had a rendezvous with death at Carrick's

Ford on July 13. In retrospect, the feeble efforts made by the authorities at

Richmond to hold the northwest were doomed from the beginning.

Porterfield had been ordered to Grafton on May 4 by Lee to "select a

position for the troops called into the service of the State, for the protection

and defense of that part of the country." Using Grafton as a base of oper-

ations, Porterfield was directed to occupy Parkersburg and Wheeling and

prevent the Baltimore and Ohio "from being used to the injury of the

State."¹² Obviously, Lee expected an invasion from Ohio. Yet, his orders

to Porterfield were totally unrealistic and therefore impossible to implement.

By far the largest number of troops to be used in these operations were to

WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861                               87

be raised in the northwest itself. On May 3 Governor John Letcher had

ordered the militia of nineteen northwestern counties to rendezvous at Park-

ersburg and Grafton.¹³ The major difficulty in this plan was the fact that

twelve of those nineteen counties were Union strongholds. Few militiamen

answered a Confederate "call to the colors" from these areas; and the seven

secessionist counties listed in Letcher's proclamation did not contain the

manpower necessary for carrying out Lee's instructions.

Furthermore, adequate provision was not made for supplying Porterfield

with arms, ammunition, and equipment. On May 4 Lee informed Porterfield

that two hundred muskets had been sent to Colonel Thomas J. "Stonewall"

Jackson at Harpers Ferry and would be forwarded to Grafton.14 Ten days

later Lee shipped Porterfield another six hundred muskets.15 If these sup-

plies arrived, they were not nearly enough. On May 29 Porterfield reported

that during his retreat from Grafton to Philippi, he was met by an unarmed

company of volunteers from Upshur County which he was compelled "to

send home, for want of arms to supply them with." Earlier he had been

forced to dismiss two cavalry companies--one each from Barbour and

Pocahontas counties for the same reason.16 As a result, Porterfield, with

only a thousand poorly equipped and untrained militiamen under his com-

mand, was in no position to occupy Parkersburg and Wheeling; nor could

he systematically destroy the railroad bridges along the line of the Baltimore

and Ohio Railroad after the invasion began. Unable to oppose Kelley at

Grafton, he withdrew to Philippi. "As soon as I can organize my com-

mand," he wrote, "which I hope to do soon, I will return to some more

eligible point in the neighborhood of Grafton, which will enable me to

command both railroads."¹⁷ Porterfield was "whistling in the dark." The

major flaw in his strategy under the conditions he had to face was the fact

that he did not retreat far enough fast enough.

Although George B. McClellan won glory and the command of the army

of the Potomac for his military exploits in northwestern Virginia, Governor

William Dennison of Ohio must be given a full measure of recognition for

making the invasion of northwestern Virginia possible. His efforts have not

been fully appreciated.

As early as January 1861 Dennison warned Governor Letcher that the

"entire power and resources of the State of Ohio" were to be offered to the

president of the United States to coerce and subjugate seceding states.

Naturally enough, Letcher considered this letter an implied threat against

Virginia.18 And indeed it was! When the Virginia Convention of 1861

passed an ordinance of secession on April 17, Dennison launched a vigorous

program to defend Ohio against invasion.

88                                                  OHIO HISTORY

One of the first important decisions made by Dennison was his choice of

McClellan to command the Ohio volunteers. The appointment, on April 23,

was received with general approbation throughout the North.19 In addition to

McClellan, the appointment of Jacob Dolson Cox and William S. Rosecrans

as brigadier generals proved to be salutary. If not brilliant commanders,

these two were competent officers. In a day when politics often determined

the appointment of officers to high command their selection was no mean

achievement in itself.

On April 26 the Ohio legislature passed an act conferring war powers on

Dennison. The Ohio governor acted swiftly. On May 1 he advised R. W.

Taylor, auditor of the state of Ohio, that he planned "to call into active

service nine regiments of Infantry and a proper proportion of artillery and

cavalry." He requested that funds be made available immediately for

expenses incurred.²⁰ Dennison then dispatched purchasing agents to Illinois

and New York City to acquire arms and made arrangements to buy addi-

tional quantities in Europe. He also took steps to give the military top

priority in the use of rail and telegraph lines. As the national government

had to rely on state governments almost exclusively in the early stages of

the war for troops, arms, ammunition, and supplies, governors such as

Morton of Indiana and Dennison exercised great influence on Lincoln and

the war department.

On April 27 the Ohio governor wrote to Lincoln recommending that

McClellan be placed in charge of all military forces west of the Alleghenies.²¹

A week later McClellan was chosen to command the newly created depart-

ment of the Ohio, composed of the states of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana.²²

But Dennison was not satisfied. On May 7 he again contacted Washington,

urging that western Virginia be placed under McClellan's jurisdiction also.

The next day this request was granted.23 Dennison's purpose was quite clear.

He immediately wrote McClellan at Cincinnati, urging him to occupy Park-

ersburg.²⁴ McClellan hesitated. The information he received from the

"frontier" indicated "that the moral effect of troops directly on the border

would not be very good--at least until Western Virginia has decided for

herself what she will do."²⁵ Dennison, however, was not disposed to await

the outcome of the vote on the secession ordinance on May 23. While he

did not attempt to interfere with McClellan's conduct of military operations,

he continued to make strong suggestions.

On May 20 Dennison received word from Wheeling informing him of

Confederate troop movements in the vicinity of Grafton.26 Immediately the

Ohio governor wired Winfield Scott, the federal general in chief, and Mc-

Clellan of these developments. Scott's reply apparently was vague and

90                                                       OHIO HISTORY

indecisive. Later that same day Dennison sent a second dispatch to Mc-

Clellan and urged the immediate invasion of western Virginia without

specific instructions from Washington. It can never be said of Dennison

that he was not a man of action. In his dispatch to McClellan he said:

Enclosed I send you [a] copy of my telegram to Genl Scott and his reply

from which you will see he is not disposed to share any of the responsibility

in taking care of Western Virginia. This being so will it not be better for you

to take this part of your military district under your immediate supervision

and provide whatever you may deem necessary for its protection! Will not the

responsibility justify your asking for an increase of the Ohio Contingent and

for all the arms and accompaniaments [sic] that will be needed for its vigorous

discharge: It seems to me to so open the way as to enable you to command all

the area and means necessary for the prompt assured occupation of Western

Virginia and for carrying out your plan of campaign in respect to that part

of the Union. Whatever aid I can render is at your command.²⁷

Scott's reasons for declining to issue specific orders to McClellan re-

garding western Virginia are not clear. Possibly he felt that direct action

before the ratification of the secession ordinance by the Virginia electorate

would be premature. On April 27 Scott had commented in a note to Lincoln

that "a march upon Richmond from the Ohio would probably insure the

revolt of Western Virginia, which if left alone will soon be five out of seven

for the Union."²⁸ On the other hand, Scott sent a strongly worded communi-

cation to McClellan on May 21 expressing displeasure at McClellan's com-

plaint to the secretary of war that he was without "instructions or authority."

Said Scott: "It is not conceived . . . what instructions could have been needed

by you. Placed in command of a wide Department . . . it surely was unnec-

essary to say that you were expected to defend it against all enemies of the

U. States."²⁹

If Scott's dispatch can be accepted at face value, it might well be argued

that he expected McClellan to use his own best judgment as to what action

was necessary within the boundaries of his own department. Finally, on

May 24, four days after Dennison had telegraphed Scott urging immediate

action, and only one day after the vote on secession, Scott wired McClellan

in Cincinnati:

We have certain intelligence that at least two companies of Virginia troops

have reached Grafton, evidently with the purpose of overawing the friends of

the Union in Western Virginia. Can you counteract the influence of that

detachment? Act promptly, and Major Oakes, at Wheeling, may give you

valuable assistance.30

Certainly this telegram was not a specific order instructing McClellan to

WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861                                   91

launch offensive operations in western Virginia. But it is clear that Mc-

Clellan believed that Scott now expected action. Following Philippi he wrote

Scott, "I trust, General, that my action in the Grafton matter will show you

that I am not given to procrastination."³1

In the final analysis, it is plain that McClellan's contention in later years

that he had acted entirely upon his own authority and of his own volition,

"and without any advice, orders, or instructions from Washington or else-

where," cannot be accepted at face value.³² Such a view overlooked the

unqualified support McClellan received from the influential Dennison.

Moreover, while Scott's telegram on May 24 may not have issued instructions

per se, it seems clear that McClellan was expected to take such action as he

deemed necessary "to counteract the influence of that detachment," located

one hundred miles from the Ohio River, the exact size of which had not been

clearly determined. Conversely, Scott appeared to be hedging throughout

as if he were attempting to avoid direct responsibility if McClellan met

defeat or if an invasion proved to be premature politically. Scott's fears

of possible political repercussions from military intervention were as un-

founded as McClellan's later estimates of Confederate military strength

were exaggerated.

McClellan arrived in Grafton on June 21 to take personal command of

operations against Garnett. He met with unbridled enthusiasm all along his

route. Describing his reception, he wrote to his wife:

At every station where we stopped crowds had assembled to see the "young

general": gray-headed men and women, mothers holding up their children to

take my hand, girls, boys, all sorts, cheering and crying, God bless you! I

never went through such a scene in my life.³³

To his troops McClellan announced his arrival in more dramatic style.

"Soldiers!" he wrote, "I have heard that there was danger here. I have

come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. I fear now but

one thing--that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel."³⁴ But Mc-

Clellan revealed a different attitude when he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel

E. D. Townsend, the assistant adjutant general, in Washington:

Assure the General [Winfield Scott] that no prospect of a brilliant victory

shall induce me to depart from my intention of gaining success by maneuvering

rather than by fighting. I will not throw these raw men of mine into the teeth

of artillery and intrenchments if it is possible to avoid it. Say to the General,

too, that I am trying to follow a lesson long ago learned from him; i.e., not to

move until I know that everything is ready, and then to move with the utmost

rapidity and energy.³⁵

92                                                  OHIO HISTORY

McClellan wrote this letter from Buckhannon, "the important strategical

position in this region," from which he would launch his attack against the

Confederate forces under Lieutenant Colonel John Pegram at Rich Moun-

tain. Pegram had about 1,300 men, while Garnett and the main body of

troops, composed of about 3,000 men, was entrenched about twelve miles

north at Laurel Mountain. "I shall, if possible," McClellan said to Town-

send, "turn the position to the south, and thus occupy the Beverly road in

his [the enemy's] rear."³⁶

McClellan planned his strategy with precision. While concentrating about

8,000 men at Buckhannon for the main attack on Pegram, he left 4,000 men

at Philippi under Brigadier General Morris, whose major function lay in

"amusing the enemy" on Laurel.³⁷ Moreover, McClellan had a large number

of troops concentrated at several other points--including Weston, Clarks-

burg, Bulltown, and Grafton--which could be called upon as exigencies

demanded. In addition, he ordered Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox to the

Kanawha Valley with four full regiments to dislodge Brigadier General

Henry A. Wise, who arrived in Charleston on July 6. Wise's "Legion,"

composed of 2,700 raw militia troops, was ordered to hold the Kanawha

region.³⁸ Yet, McClellan believed, and rightly so, that Garnett would

attempt to use Wise's command as a diversionary force. If Wise could

threaten McClellan's rear, Garnett reasoned, "the enemy would have to draw

from his force in my front to meet him."³⁹ Wise was eliminated as a poten-

tial threat, however, by Cox's appearance on July 10 and by the swiftness

of McClellan's movements against Pegram. Lee was not able to send

Garnett's urgent request on to Wise until July 11, the same day that

Confederate hopes of holding the northwest were destroyed by Pegram's

crushing defeat at Rich Mountain.⁴⁰

Clearly perceiving that he would suffer heavy losses if he stormed the

heavily entrenched western slope of Rich, McClellan dispatched Rosecrans'

brigade of four regiments on a flanking maneuver.⁴¹ Rosecrans was in luck.

A young Virginian by the name of David Hart led Rosecrans to the summit

of Rich on Pegram's left flank by way of an unguarded mountain trail. A

small force of three hundred Confederates delayed the verdict for three

hours; but Pegram's doom was sealed. Gathering the remnants of his com-

mand, a group of bewildered and terror-stricken men, Pegram tried to make

his way "over the mountains, where there was not the sign of a path, toward

General Garnett's camp."⁴² Convinced of the futility of flight on learning

the next day that Garnett had abandoned Laurel Mountain, there was

nothing left for Pegram "but the sad determination of surrendering ourselves

prisoners of war to the enemy at Beverly."⁴³

94                                                  OHIO HISTORY

the main body of his army escaped. Even though it was twenty-five miles

from Carrick's Ford to the nearest pass through the Alleghenies at Red

House, Garnett's command arrived at this place two hours ahead of Union

troops and made good its escape. Two major factors were responsible: a

delay in the transmission of McClellan's telegram to Hill, and Hill's lack

of knowledge of the mountainous terrain, which led him to conclude that

Garnett's line of retreat would be north instead of east.⁴⁷ Even so, Mc-

Clellan's victory was total.

The scene of action in western Virginia then shifted to the Kanawha

Valley. Cox arrived at Point Pleasant on July 10 and immediately began an

advance on Charleston.⁴⁸ On the afternoon of July 17 his advance guard of

1,200 men encountered 800 Confederates from Wise's Legion at Scary

Creek, fifteen miles west of Charleston. Although Cox was repulsed, the

battle at Scary was little more than a delaying action.⁴⁹ In light of Garnett's

crushing defeat in the northwest, Lee ordered Wise to abandon the Kanawha

and withdraw towards Covington to protect the Virginia Central Railroad.⁵⁰

On learning that Cox had been checked at Scary, McClellan planned to

take personal command of military operations in the Kanawha Valley.⁵¹

But on July 22, the day after the federal disaster at First Manassas, the

"Young Napoleon" was ordered to Washington. In western Virginia he

was succeeded by the hero of Rich Mountain, William S. Rosecrans. Cox,

however, continued his advance. On July 25 he entered Charleston; and

on July 29 he occupied Gauley Bridge, the gateway to the Kanawha Valley

from the east.⁵² For all practical purposes, the campaign in western

Virginia, if not over, had been won beyond recall. Yet the northwest was

too great a prize to surrender without an attempt being made to recover it.

In mid-August General Robert E. Lee, accompanied by a force of 15,000

troops, arrived in the valley of Virginia. Lee's first objective was to regain

the passes through the Alleghenies at Laurel, Cheat, and Rich mountains.

Offensive operations in the northwest would then be possible. On September

12 Lee launched an attack against the federal troops at Cheat Mountain

near Huttonsville. But a combination of factors, including mud, rain, sick-

ness, and bungling on the part of his subordinates, conspired to make Lee's

debut as a field general a failure.⁵³

The Confederates also made an unsuccessful attempt to reconquer the

Kanawha Valley. Brigadier General John Floyd, secretary of war under

Buchanan and an ex-governor of Virginia, had raised a force of about 1,200

men in the southwest to protect the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Soon after Wise evacuated the Kanawha region, Floyd was elevated to the

command of the army of the Kanawha. Wise and his legion were ordered

WESTERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1861                                95

to support Floyd. If any degree of success were to be achieved, close coop-

eration between these two political generals was imperative. Their personal

relations, however, were marked by extreme bitterness. Henry Mason

Mathews, a representative in the legislature from the region, wrote to Jeffer-

son Davis urging him to intervene. "They are as inimical to each other as

men can be," he said, "and from their course and actions I am fully satis-

fied that each of them would be highly gratified to see the other annihi-

lated."⁵⁴ Finally, on September 21, a dispatch was sent to Wise relieving

him of command and ordering him back to Richmond.⁵⁵

Floyd did manage to win a skirmish at Cross Lanes on August 26.⁵⁶ And

he repulsed Rosecrans at the battle of Carnifex Ferry on September 10. Yet,

in all probability, Floyd's army would have been destroyed if Rosecrans

had pressed the issue.⁵⁷ In any event, neither Lee nor Floyd was in a

position to challenge federal supremacy in northwestern Virginia. With the

exception of the brief reoccupation of the Kanawha region by Major

General William W. Loring in September of 1862, Union supremacy was

not challenged.⁵⁸ Even Loring's brief success came by default. Most federal

troops were withdrawn from western Virginia when Lee moved north.

Union soldiers returned in force, however, after the battles of South Moun-

tain and Antietam.59

The most obvious result of McClellan's conquest of northwestern Virginia

was that it propelled the "Young Napoleon" into the national limelight and

the command of the army of the Potomac. Moreover, his mountain campaign

provided a psychological cushion for a nation and an army that were shaken

by defeat at the first encounter at Manassas. The strategic importance

of northwestern Virginia to the Union cause, however, has not been appreci-

ated by most students of the Civil War.⁶⁰

Northwestern Virginia served first of all as a buffer zone for the states

of Ohio and Pennsylvania, a protective covering for Pittsburgh and the

Ohio Valley. It also covered the western flank of any Union army operating

in the Shenandoah Valley. In addition, the line of the Baltimore and Ohio

ran through northwestern Virginia--a railroad of great strategic importance

which provided the only connecting link by rail between Washington and

the Middle West. The seizure of the Baltimore and Ohio virtually intact

largely accounts for the rapidity with which the northwest was conquered in

the first place. Finally, whether or not Union occupation of northwestern

Virginia was a prime factor in preserving Kentucky for the Union, the im-

portance of federal supremacy in both areas in paving the way for the

occupation of eastern Tennessee can hardly be exaggerated.⁶¹

It should be stressed also that McClellan's invasion of northwestern Vir-

96                                                         OHIO HISTORY

ginia established the authority of the Reorganized Government of Virginia

under Francis H. Pierpont, Union war governor of the Old Dominion; and

it made a separate-state movement in (West) Virginia possible. After

Garnett's defeat at Rich Mountain and Wise's withdrawal from the Kanawha

Valley, northwestern Virginia no longer was in danger of falling under the

control of a Confederate army of occupation. But in view of the divided

loyalties of the inhabitants of western Virginia and the persistence of

guerilla warfare in this region until 1865, it is clear that a liberal dose of

force was one of the prime ingredients used by northwestern Unionists in

their magic formula for state-making. In truth, West Virginia was a war-

born state.

THE AUTHOR: Richard O. Curry is a

visiting assistant professor of history at the

University of Pittsburgh. His doctoral dis-

sertation was a study of statehood politics in

West Virginia.