Ohio History Journal

130                                              OHIO HISTORY

not to be bound by the result."²³ Under these circumstances talk of a Hayes,

Garfield, or other candidacy persisted. Hayes lightened the tension perhaps

by giving a reception Monday evening for the incoming Republican gov-

ernor, General Edward F. Noyes. It was attended by the warring factions

and described by Hayes as "A very lively, happy thing."²⁴

Late on Tuesday evening two Republicans--a state senator and a repre-

sentative--rang Hayes's doorbell. They assured him that enough new coali-

tion votes would materialize Wednesday to make him United States Senator

and that this would guarantee him the next presidency of the United States.

Luckily for Sherman the ambitions of Hayes and Garfield were less strong

than their fears of the effects which disloyalty to their party's caucus would

have upon the future of their party and themselves. Hayes made it clear

that he would not consent to be a candidate other than through regular

caucus endorsement. His two callers departed, only to be followed by a

final suppliant, who insisted that his group now had the votes to elect Hayes.

But the Governor, answering the doorbell at midnight, standing in his

nightshirt, stood his ground. This with a firm finality which his garb could

not diminish.²⁵

Next day the roll call in the legislature gave Sherman a majority, overall,

of only six votes, and some members hastily undertook to switch. An alert

lieutenant-governor quickly declared Sherman "duly elected." Afterward

Sherman claimed that he had had enough Democratic promises to over-

balance Republican losses in any case.²⁶ The crucial moment had been

Hayes's refusal; the rest was anti-climax. To Hayes, Sherman was now much

in debt.

The Senator was destined to repay it, and at a high rate of interest; but

an unpleasant misunderstanding marred their relationship soon after

Grant's second inauguration. The eager Republicans who on January 9,

1872, had dangled before Hayes the presidency of the United States proved

unable to give him, on October 8 following, even so modest a place as a

seat in the House of Representatives of the Forty-Third Congress. The party

phalanx which swept the state for Grant included Hayes, Sherman and Gar-

field, but they could not stem a strong Democratic tide in Hayes's district.

This rejection inflicted upon the reputed "best vote-getter" his first ex-

perience with defeat for an important office; it may have made him unwont-

edly sensitive.

At any rate, Grant in March of 1873 sent the Senate hasty nomination

of Hayes for a position he did not expect, had not applied for, and did not

much desire--that of Assistant Treasurer at Cincinnati. The nomination

caught Ohio's Republican Senator, under whose purview such matters must

come, off base. The outgoing and incoming Secretary of the Treasury

(George S. Boutwell and William A. Richardson) had both assured Sher-

man that necessary preparations under the law were such that no appoint-

ment need be made until June 1; on this understanding he had assured sev-

eral applicants that no choice would be made until they had had a fair op-

portunity to present their qualifications. He would be charged with mis-

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                         131

leading them if the Hayes appointment went through earlier. Therefore,

when the matter came up in executive session, he asked that it go over. All

this Sherman explained to Hayes, assuring him that he would "heartily and

cheerfuly concur in your appointment.^"27

But by an irony of fate damage had been done. Hayes's pride was

wounded by postponement of a place which he might have declined even if

confirmed. Tempermentally inclined to over-simplification of patronage

problems it was hard for him to "comprehend the crochet of Mr. Sherman."

Although he absolved Sherman of personal hostility, he replied quite can-

didly. "The action taken was calculated, although not so intended, to in-

jure me and to wound my feelings and frankness required that I should

say that I think you were in error in your views of duty under the circum-

stances."28

Fortunately, neither Hayes nor Sherman made the prime political mis-

take of cherishing personal misunderstandings. The campaign of 1874 found

them appearing together amiably, with Hayes according Sherman high

praise for straightforward presentation. The next year, when his party for

the third time nominated Hayes to wrest the governorship, from a Demo-

crat, he especially sought Sherman's company on the stump, in preachment

against the fiat money tenets of the incumbent governor, William Allen.²⁹

They managed to squeak through, by 5544 votes; but Sherman was appre-

hensive lest Republican disunity enable the Democrats to capture the presi-

dency in the 1876 election and undo gains obtained through the Civil War.

Thus he called on Ohio Republicans to give Hayes a united delegation at

the national convention, because he could "combine greater popular

strength and greater assurance of success than other candidates." Though

not "greatly distinguished" as a general or as a member of Congress, he was

"always sensible, industrious and true to his convictions and the principles

and tendencies of his party." As governor, he had "shown good executive

abilities." Moreover he was "fortunately free from the personal enmities

and antagonisms that would weaken some of his competitors."³⁰

Such arguments, pressed by Sherman upon Senator A. M. Burns of the

Ohio legislature in a letter of January 21, 1876, gained force. Ohio was

actually a unit bloc at this national convention, which met, luckily for

Hayes, in Cincinnati.³¹ That body, after wrangling over Blaine and his

chief competitors through six ballots, on the seventh, adopted Sherman's

reasoning and chose Hayes. Fortunately Sherman was spared the foreknowl-

edge that Hayes's most valuable asset--his current lack of enemies--could

not work for himself in 1880.

Indicative of the affinity in 1876 between these two politicians was the

interchange which ensued. Hayes wrote Sherman June 19:

I trust you will never regret the important action you took in the in-

auguration and carrying out the movement which resulted in my nom-

ination. I write these few words to assure you that I appreciate and am

grateful for what you did.³²

132                                              OHIO HISTORY

Sherman replied by hand on Senate Chamber notepaper next day:

Your kind note is rec'd for which accept my thanks. The importance

of your nomination was with me a mathematical deduction and if any

outside fact gave color to my reasoning it was your honorable & proper

course when during my last canvass for Senator you refused to accept

the benefit of a small defection of a few political friends. I am more

than happy when following reason and duty to recognize also a per-

sonal kindness. We opened the campaign here gloriously last night &

the acquiescence in your nomination is general and hearty.³³

Acquiescence in Hayes's election was destined, in many areas, to be

neither general nor hearty, a fact which put Hayes in debt to Sherman and

took toll of Sherman's political future. The incoming President would not

infrequently find useful to him his personal and political ties to his Secre-

tary of the Treasury, but the bond would not always operate to the per-

sonal and political advantage of his exceptionally faithful servitor.

Election evening, November 7, brought dismay to both men; they went

to bed thinking Tilden had won. But before dawn an unwary Democratic

official asked the editors of the New York Times (a Republican group) for

an estimate of Tilden's votes, thus suggesting that the Democrats were un-

sure. Before sunrise the editors were communicating with "Zack" Chand-

ler, chairman of the Republican national committee; they persuaded him

to telegraph the Republican leadership in each of the three key states:

"Hayes is elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana.

Can you hold your state? Answer at once." Whatever their answers, Chand-

ler a few hours later boldly told the press: "Hayes has 185 votes and is

elected." This would leave Tilden with only 184. Next the Republicans had

to make good Chandler's brashness.³⁴

Both sides sent "visitors" to watch the count of votes in each of the three

states. Louisiana was the most doubtful and Grant asked Sherman (and

others) to hurry to New Orleans. After stopping at Columbus to see Hayes

and at Cincinnati to meet other of Ohio's emissaries, Sherman entered upon

"a long, anxious and laborious time in New Orleans."³⁵ Soon he was re-

porting to his wife Cecilia his unhappiness over his assignment and a sharp

prescience of consequences to himself.

I have been assigned a much more conspicuous position here than I

wished and am almost sorry that I came. We are acting only as witnesses

but public opinion will hold us as partisans. . . . This whole business is

a thankless, ungracious task not free from danger entirely unofficial

and at our individual expense. . . . I frequently regret that I ever came.

Grant in 8 years did not remember my existence until he had this most

uncomfortable task to perform and then by his selections forced me to

come. I am carefully studying the case as it is developed and will say

what I think is true without fear or favor. . . . We have done nothing

of which we need to be ashamed.³⁶

The Republicans had been shamed before the nation by the exposure of

corruption in Grant's entourage and Sherman was one of the party's leader-

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                        133

ship who feared such vulnerability. As Hayes phrased their mutual appre-

hension: "You feel, I am sure, as I do about this whole business. A fair

election would have given [it to] us but . . . there must be nothing crooked

on our part."³⁷ Down in Louisiana the intimidation on both sides which

had marred the casting of ballots made itself felt in the counting of them.

Two government employees, testifying before the Returning Board about

coercion by the Democrats, demanded of the worried chairman of the Re-

publican "visitors" a written guarantee of future employment outside the

state.

The age-old obligation for each party to take care of its faithful had been

sanctified by immemorial custom; but these employees required a pledge

in writing, which is not so customary. To this the badgered chairman, over-

estimating their party loyalty, acceded. Within a twelve-month he and Hayes

would rue this documentary testimonial to pressure, which confirmed Sher-

man's prediction that "no good" could come of the visitation.³⁸

Numerous messages passed back and forth between New Orleans, Colum-

bus and other centers, often in code; and at long last Sherman, Garfield

and four companions stopped in Columbus on December 4, enroute to

Washington. In the governor's office that afternoon the cautious Hayes

polled each man individually. As he reported in his Diary, "All concurred

in saying in the strongest terms that the evidence and law entitled the Re-

publican ticket to the certificate of election, and that the result would in

their opinion be accordingly." At the gubernatorial mansion that Monday

evening the Governor and his Lady entertained the emissaries with "a jo-

vial little gathering."³⁹

Not so jovial was the atmosphere Sherman found in Washington on Tues-

day, the second day of the final session of the Forty-Fourth Congress. That

body was scheduled to meet in February in joint session to attend the open-

ing of the electoral certificates by the president of the Senate and the count-

ing of them. But who should count them? The House was Democratic 168

to 107, and the Senate Republican 43 to 29 with two Liberal Republicans.

On a joint ballot Hayes would lose.⁴⁰

He might win, however, if the Senate's presiding officer could determine

which of the four sets of conflicting returns-from Oregon, Florida, South

Carolina, and Louisiana--should be counted. This was the solution favored

by Sherman and Hayes. The Senator, as a quasi-agent of Hayes, participated

to some extent in weeks of discussion aimed at securing Democratic consent

to this method of counting. Sherman was one of the negotiators who con-

ferred with important southerners, many of them Old Whigs, arguing that

Hayes--like Sherman an Old Whig--would do more for them than Tilden

who opposed appropriations for the internal improvements badly needed

by the devastated South. A Hayes administration, it was proposed, would

remove federal troops from the South and give it a place in the Cabinet,

besides granting more patronage, funds for railroads and other improve-

ments, engineered with the help of Garfield, as the proposed Speaker of the

House.⁴¹ This planning proved to be an exercise in futility. It suggests an

unwarranted hopefulness on the part of Sherman and Hayes. Much of the

134                                               OHIO HISTORY

proposed program could not be implemented, although Hayes would prove

able to fulfill part of it.

In the meantime, a committee from each house had been working to-

gether. The members intended to take matters out of the hands of the

group affiliated with Hayes and Sherman. As a result of their efforts, a bill

emerged to create an extra-constitutional electoral commission to which

Congress, acting in joint session, would refer conflicting sets of returns. Its

decisions need be accepted by only one house to become final. This com-

plicated measure, which Sherman and Hayes disapproved as risky for him,

invited filibustering which delayed its enactment until January 29. There-

upon the Electoral Commission was set up with five Senators, five Repre-

sentatives and five Supreme Court Justices, so selected as to give the decid-

ing vote to Justice David Davis, an "Independent." Here the legislature of

Illinois intervened, electing Davis to the Senate--with the result that a Re-

publican Justice, Joseph P. Bradley, took his place. Thereafter the houses

and the commission went through the roll of states, slowed by sporadic fili-

bustering.⁴²

While the counting was in progress, Sherman conferred with Hayes in

Columbus. He returned with the reputed authorization to promise with-

drawal of the troops by Hayes--a promise which Grant (to the surprise of

Sherman) already had given. After a final intensive burst of filibustering

the announcement came of Hayes's election at 4:00 A.M. on March 2.43

That same morning Hayes and his family reached Washington where

Senator Sherman and his brother General William Tecumseh Sherman

awaited them at the station, to welcome them as house guests of the Senator

until after the formal inauguration. Before noon Hayes called on Grant

and went with him to the Capitol where (it is reported) they found the

Democrats cheerful and cordial as they waited their pound of flesh. Satur-

day evening Grant gave Hayes the customary state dinner, with the extra

precaution of a private swearing in, to insure the nation a president during

the Sabbath intervening before the formal inauguration on Monday, March

5.44

Sherman had had a hectic four months since November 7, largely occu-

pied with labor on behalf of Hayes and the party. What would be his recom-

pense? Hayes formulated a tentative cabinet slate and after some hesitation

offered Sherman the Treasury.⁴5 To a Senator with keen interest in na-

tional financial problems and long experience in working upon them, the

opportunity to achieve further distinction in the field was most attractive.

He might, on the other hand, have considered potential hazards threaten-

ing the peace of mind and political future of any member of a Republican

administration installed in 1877. There were five hazards of major im-

portance: a Congress with a Democratic majority in both houses in most of

the four years; the dubious title to the throne; possible opposition to a con-

ciliatory southern approach; an entrenched patronage system to resist civil

service reform; and, perhaps the greatest obstacle, powerful resistance to a

"sound" dollar.

HAYES and JOHN SHERMAN                                         135

Any or all of these forces could obstruct the path of a politician stumb-

ling along the boulder-strewn trail toward the presidential eminence. They

could not wreck the future career of a President such as Hayes, who ab-

jured a second term and therefore could face with more composure the

slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. What here follows is a summary of

the reactions of the President and his Secretary of the Treasury to these five

basic problems.46

First, as to the primary handicap, the Democrats held a majority in the

House all four years, and in the Senate for the last two years. Hayes and

Sherman therefore could never plan legislation in easy confidence of a co-

operative push into enactment; compromise skills were prerequisite. This

disadvantage was compounded by the fact that Republicans themselves

were not a unit in response to executive leadership. Some of them openly

fought the Hayes administration in the three fields it sought most to stress

--conciliation of the South, reform of the Civil Service, and strengthening

of the nation's credit. Some of them were ex-Republicans of whom Hayes

sadly observed to Sherman,"New converts are proverbally bitter and unfair

to those they have recently left."⁴⁷ Under such party handicaps executive

achievements could not be numerous or easy of accomplishment.

The lack of Republican cohesiveness was due also, in part, to the second

handicap listed above, the clouded title to the throne. Subsequent advanced

scholarship would conclude that Hayes lost Florida (although he probably

was entitled to a favorable decision in South Carolina and Louisiana) and

that therefore, instead of besting Tilden by 185 to 184, he lost on the over-

all count by 181 to 188. The Democrats during Hayes's administration loud-

ly proclaimed that they had been cheated; they were only too happy to in-

stitute an investigation complete with witnesses, documentation, and a ma-

jority report attesting the election of Tilden. A report by the Republicans

held the contrary. Eager Republicans subpoened Western Union "cipher

dispatches," using and preserving those which revealed Democratic corrup-

tive practices.48 In the course of these exposures Sherman's unwary pledge

to the two Louisiana office-holders was revealed, to the disgust of the Presi-

dent and his Secretary.⁴⁹

Before Democratic efforts to unseat the administration lost momentum,

embarrassments for Hayes and Sherman were further increased by their

own party's attacks upon the third handicap--their conciliatory southern

policy which had included choice of an ex-Confederate, David M. Key, as

Postmaster General. The removal of fulltime troops from the South also

aroused Radical Republicans to blistering denunciation for (supposedly)

undermining the structure of Reconstruction erected by the sacrifice of the

Civil War. Hayes stood his ground, with Sherman's endorsement, and occu-

pation of southern centers by federal troops gradually ended.⁵⁰

By an irony of fate the Hayes administration and the South came to swords

points on a different aspect of federal supervision not confined to the South.

Postwar laws had authorized supervision of presidential and congressional

elections throughout the nation by federal supervisors and marshals. The

136                                               OHIO HISTORY

Democratic majority, seeking local control of elections, attached "riders"

to army and other appropriation bills, prohibiting polling place use of any

part of the army. Hayes and Sherman interpreted the riders as efforts to

reduce their party's influence at the polls. A sharp four years' contest en-

sued marked by eight stout presidential vetoes, none of them overridden.⁵1

Administration confrontation with the other two major handicaps--the

entrenched patronage system and the resistance to strengthening the na-

tion's credit--gave Hayes and Sherman repeated challenges and saddled

Sherman with enmities encumbering his ultimate ambition.

Grantism had made the nation corruption-conscious, and rumors grew

rife and ripe about its pervasive presence. Prominent among proposed tar-

gets for reform were the New York, Boston, and Philadelphia customs

houses, under control of the state machines of Roscoe Conkling, Benjamin

F. Butler, and Simon Cameron. Conkling had been uncooperative on

Hayes's nomination and election and his bailiwick was selected by Hayes

as the first target, against Sherman's wishes.⁵² Apparently it was not as badly

mismanaged as some other centers but a special Jay Commission exposed

the facts with the result that the collector Chester A. Arthur and naval of-

ficer Alonzo B. Cornell were removed. But Hayes was not able to obtain

Senate confirmation of their successors until February of 1879 and then

only through a thorough expose by Sherman of the custom house scandals.⁵³

The intervening period had been characterized by wavering and equivoca-

tion among the principal actors with Secretary of State William M. Evarts

involved in the political scheming. The situation illustrated the great need

for civil service reform, the divisive effect of the issue upon the party, and

the hard alternatives among which Hayes and Sherman sought to make

selections.⁵⁴

While all these hot political chestnuts had to be handled, the fifth prob-

lem--that of the nation's credit--was the hottest of all, particularly as the

nation was just emerging from a serious depression. On this subject Sher-

man possessed a thorough knowledge and broad experience acquired in

sixteen years of congressional handling of it. Intimately involved in the

wartime establishment of the greenback currency and the national banking

system,55 he now was determined to protect the nation's credit by making

the greenbacks redeemable in gold (known as resumption of specie pay-

ments) and by avoiding unlimited coinage of cheap silver dollars.

Hayes stood firmly for resumption but was so completely opposed to sil-

ver dollars that he vetoed the compromise Bland-Allison bill that permitted

a limited issue of them. Not at all to Sherman's surprise, Congress passed

the bill over the veto. This concession to inflationary sentiment contributed

some quota to lessening the opposition to resumption of specie payments

which Sherman achieved on schedule, January 1, 1879, partly by virtue of

improving business trends and partly by his own careful management of

Treasury bond issues and other government resources.⁵⁶

In his expert handling of this fifth and greatest of the administration's

problems Sherman took great pride. He felt that it in no small manner

138                                               OHIO HISTORY

man's support as the state convention had suggested; Sherman unfortunate-

ly selected Garfield (who gained attention this way) as the one to nom-

inate him. Of a middle stance, Sherman had deprived himself by contribu-

tions to the Hayes administration, by his recent opposition to free coinage,

and by insistence upon resumption; all this made the Secretary less "avail-

able" than men not as competent.⁵8

Hayes did not publicly endorse Sherman, feeling that interference by the

President would be "unseemly." Perhaps he, better than Sherman, realized

that the Secretary was not "available." Commenting in his Diary on nom-

ination developments, he casually wrote, after mentioning Grant and Blaine,

"It may be Sherman or a fourth--either Edmunds or Wilson."⁵⁹ Garfield in

nominating Sherman said that he did not present him "as a better man or a

better Republican than thousands of others," and called for Republican

unity. A majority of the convention proceeded (on the thirty-fourth bal-

lot) to unite on Garfield.60

To Hayes the Garfield nomination was "altogether good," being a defeat

for Conkling and others who were pressing a third term for Grant. But this

did not mean that the President was indifferent to Sherman's future wel-

fare. Perhaps he felt that it now was his turn to pay a debt. At any rate,

the final decision of the Ohio legislature to give Sherman the Senate chair

which Garfield was relinquishing (as Senator-elect) seems not to have been

unrelated to Hayes's desire that Garfield should cooperate to that end.61

Sherman was deeply appreciative of his endorsement by the Ohio legisla-

ture, unanimous this time. He went to Columbus to tell them so, and in

so doing the Secretary of the Treasury could be said to be thanking also

the President of the United States:

I can only say then, in conclusion, fellow-citizens, that I am glad that

the opportunity of the office you have given me will enable me to come

back here home to Ohio to cultivate again the relations I had of old.

It is one of the happiest thoughts that comes to me in consequence of

your election that I will be able to live again among you and to be one

of you, and I trust in time to overcome the notion that has sprung up

within two or three years that I am a human iceberg, dead to all human

sympathies. I hope you will enable me to overcome that difficulty. That

you will receive me kindly, and I think I will show you, if you doubt

it, that I have a heart to acknowledge gratitude--a heart that feels for

others, and willing to alleviate where I can all the evils to which men

and women are subject. I again thank you from the bottom of my

heart.62

THE AUTHOR: Jeannette Paddock

Nichols formerly was chairman of the

Graduate Group in Economic History at

the University of Pennsylvania.

140                                                OHIO HISTORY

of William Maxwell Evarts, Secretary of State under Hayes, have added

more detail about specific incidents.² Alexander DeConde concluded in a

recent comparison of American Secretaries of State that Evarts "in fact, is

one of the lesser-known Secretaries, one who dealt with no great interna-

tional problems."³ Judging from the scant space devoted to foreign rela-

tions by Hayes's most recent biographer, he too agreed with the Williams

assessment.⁴

Conclusions relating to the insignificance of diplomacy during the Hayes

administration depend, in part, on the assumption that the American public

did not become excited about foreign policy. Allan Nevins stated that the

Virginius affair of 1873 "was the last formidable storm on the sea of foreign

relations that [Hamilton] Fish had to confront. Thereafter, no important

group of Americans were to become aroused over any international prob-

lem until, more than a decade later, Grover Cleveland threatened condign

[appropriate] action against Canada in the fisheries dispute."⁵ Nevins' re-

mark was based upon a grossly distorted image of public reaction to foreign

policy in the late 1870's and early ¹⁸⁸0's. In The Awkward Years, David M.

Pletcher has shown how public pressure for foreign markets shaped the

diplomacy of the Garfield and Arthur administrations.⁶ No overall study of

comparable depth exists for the problems in foreign affairs during the Hayes

administration, but there is evidence that during this period the public be-

came aroused by border troubles with Mexico, a French attempt to con-

struct a canal through the Isthmus of Panama, and Chinese immigration

that seemed to threaten the western labor force.⁷

On no issue did Hayes and Evarts feel the effect of public opinion as

much as that of Chinese immigration. Although Chinese immigrants gen-

erally had been welcomed to the United States in the 1850's and 60's to

assist in railroad building and mining operations, a movement for their

exclusion made rapid headway during the depression of the ¹⁸⁷⁰'s, especial-

ly on the Pacific Coast. Even before the Panic of 1873, Chinese were dis-

liked in California. Beginning as early as 1850, California discriminated

against the immigrants by a number of means, including special mining

taxes, passenger taxes, head taxes, school segregation, and laws forbidding

them to testify against white men.⁸

The chief restraint to the anti-Chinese movement was the Burlingame

Treaty of 1868, which contained liberal immigration provisions. Article V

permitted the free immigration of the citizens of China and of the United

States "from the one country to the other for the purposes of curiosity, of

trade or as permanent residents," and for those purposes both nations

reprobated "any other than an entirely voluntary emigration." Article VI,

moreover, gave Americans visiting or residing in China and Chinese sub-

jects visiting or residing in the United States "the same privileges, immuni-

ties and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be en-

joyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." Because the

Supreme Court ruled that state legislation designed to restrict Chinese im-

migration violated these provisions, it was necessary for the exclusionists

to seek revision of the treaty.⁹

THE CHINESE QUESTION                                          141

Hayes first became fully aware of the Chinese issue during the campaign

of 1876. At the Republican convention in Cincinnati, western delegates de-

nounced the evils of the Chinese labor invasion and demanded a congres-

sional investigation of it. Although a group of easterners led by George

William Curtis opposed the least effort to interfere with the principle of

free immigration, the Republican platform announced "the immediate duty

of Congress fully to investigate the effect of the immigration and importa-

tion of Mongolians on the moral and material interests of the country."¹⁰

The Democratic platform was more forthright. It criticized a policy which

"tolerates the revival of the coolie trade in Mongolian women imported for

immoral purposes, and Mongolian men, hired to perform servile labor con-

tracts." As a solution, it demanded "such a modification of the treaty with

the Chinese Empire, or such legislation by Congress within constitutional

limitations as shall prevent the further importation or immigration of the

Mongolian race."11

As the Republican candidate, Hayes found himself caught up in the

controversial Chinese question. A typical West Coast Republican summed

up his own reaction to the Chinese plank in the platform: "It is just enough

to stir up the missionary and humanitarian element of New England. Yet

not enough to conciliate the laboring classes of the Pacific Coast."¹² Some

Republicans advised Hayes to take a strong stand against Chinese immigra-

tion if he wished to win votes in the West,13 but others opposed such a

course. Mild as it was, eastern Republicans resented the admission of the

plank in the platform. John Bingham, the American minister in Tokyo,

wrote Hayes that the platform was all he "could desire save the Chinese

resolution," the objectives of which were sound, but the implementation of

which might lead to accusations that the nation was unjustly treating the

Chinese. 14

Although Hayes avoided the Chinese issue during the campaign, his

election did nothing to change the situation, for anti-Chinese sentiment in-

creased. A joint congressional committee set up to investigate the problem

released its report in February 1877.15 The anti-Chinese character of most

of the testimony taken by the committee provided evidence for critics of

Chinese immigration. During the summer, Chinese were attacked by hood-

lums in San Francisco, and under the leadership of Dennis Kearney, the

California Workingmen's party adopted the slogan, "The Chinese must

go."¹⁶ On August 13, a committee of the California senate submitted a me-

morial to Congress recommending that the United States and Great Britain

act together with China to abrogate all treaties permitting Chinese to im-

migrate to the United States.¹⁷ While the committee publicly denounced

the evils of Chinese immigration, Hayes received information to the con-

trary from a private source. An employer of Chinese labor in California

reported that since the Chinese did not have a friend on the committee,

there could not "have been a more one-sided affair." He also praised the

Chinese for being "docile and easily managed and controlled--while many

of the white laborers when they get a few dollars ahead go off on a drunk."18

142                                              OHIO HISTORY

Critics of Chinese immigration contended that the Chinese competed

unfairly with white labor because they could live more cheaply than whites,

who often had families to support and who were accustomed to better food

and housing. They argued that many Chinese immigrants came to the

United States as coolies, whose passage money was paid beforehand. Such

immigration, being involuntary, was contrary to the Burlingame Treaty.

Socially, the Chinese were condemned for living in crowded hovels, smok-

ing opium, having no wives, and importing prostitutes from China. Politi-

cally, they were considered unassimilable because they lacked experience

with republican institutions.¹⁹ "CALIGULA issued a decree elevating his

horse to the dignity of Roman citizenship," declared the San Francisco

Chronicle. "This was a mild proceeding compared to the proposition of

trying to make American citizens out of the offscourings of China that

have been poured on our shores."²⁰

Despite the pressure, Hayes and Secretary Evarts continued to ignore

the problem. Hayes failed to mention Chinese immigration in his first

annual message,21 and Evarts neglected it in his instructions to George F.

Seward, his minister in Peking.²² Their silence is understandable. Not only

did the issue threaten to split the Republican party, but also it posed a

threat to American relations with China. Probably they hoped that the

agitation would cease as the country returned to more prosperous times.

But their seeming indifference shocked the Pacific Coast. The San Fran-

cisco Chronicle criticized Hayes's message for "the total absence of any

allusion to the urgent demands of the Pacific Coast for relief from the

evils of Chinese immigration." To the Chronicle it appeared "utterly im-

possible to convince the people of the East, or the Executive department of

the Government, that anything needs to be done in the matter."²³

The California legislature instructed the state's representatives and sena-

tors to secure the cooperation of the federal government in stopping Chi-

nese immigration. Accordingly, on December 16, Congressman Horace F.

Page requested Hayes to make Chinese immigration the subject of a

special message to Congress.²⁴ His congressional colleague, Horace Davis,

consulted personally with Hayes²⁵ and with Evarts. He complained that

Chinese immigration violated the involuntary provisions of the Burlingame

Treaty. To stop the flow of coolie labor, he recommended that the United

States pass the same kind of restrictive legislation as the British had in

Australia, the Dutch in Java and Ceylon. Davis estimated that there were

already 30,000 to 35,000 Chinese in San Francisco; 80,000 to 90,000 in all

of California; and 150,000 to 175,000 in the entire country.²⁶ Quite clear-

ly, the majority of Californians wanted an end to the influx of Chinese

labor.

Hayes finally responded with only a statement of sympathy for the people

of the Pacific Coast in their desire to check Chinese immigration.27 The

New York Times predicted that the President would also send a special

message to Congress on the subject. This he failed to do, however, when

it met in January 1878.28 Left without Presidential leadership, both houses

of Congress passed a resolution, first introduced by Senator Aaron A. Sar-