Ohio History Journal

JAMES E. HANEY

Blacks and the Republican

Nomination of 1908

Theodore Roosevelt's decision not to seek the Republican presidential nomina-

tion in 1908 left the field open to several Republican hopefuls, but his influence in

the party and control of its machinery made it clear that the candidate he sup-

ported would win the nomination as well as the national election that followed.

This was especially important when it is remembered that national politics dur-

ing the first decade of the twentieth century was dominated by the Republican

party. As a minority party, the Democrats offered the American people only sec-

tional candidates with little or no national appeal.

There were several Republicans whose national reputations and positions on

the major issues of the day caused Roosevelt to consider them as serious con-

tenders for the party's nomination in 1908. The leading contenders were Charles

E. Hughes, governor of New York, and two members of the Cabinet, Secretary

of State Elihu Root and Secretary of War William H. Taft. Hughes, Root, and

Taft were followed by Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio whose presidential

ambitions were on the rise with the approach of the party's national convention in

June.

Hughes, one of the leading reform governors of the nation, first gained na-

tional attention in 1905 as counsel for the "Armstrong Committee," a legislative

committee of the New York State Senate investigating insurance and related

frauds. Partly as a result of the diligent work he performed as counsel, the As-

sembly passed a number of laws which extended greater protection to insurance

policy holders, attempted to prohibit corporations from making political contribu-

tions and influencing the outcome of elections, and curtailed the activities of

lobbyists and special interest groups. More important for the nomination in 1908,

however, was the fact that Hughes was able to parlay his role in these investiga-

tions into a victory over the New York Republican machine of Benjamin Odell

for the party's gubernatorial nomination in 1906. As a candidate for governor,

Hughes had the support of the national administration; President Roosevelt sent

Secretary Root to Utica to deliver an address in Hughes' behalf which some his-

torians contend played an important role in the outcome of the election.1

Although he had helped to elect Hughes governor of New York in 1906, Roose-

velt felt he would not make a good presidential candidate and could not compare

1. Harold Gosnell, Boss Platt and His New York Machine; A Study of the Political Leadership of

Thomas C. Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, and Others (New York, 1924), 277-284; Philip C. Jessup,

Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New  York, 1938), 118-123.

Dr. Haney is Assistant Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.

Blacks and Republicans                                                    209

25th Infantry whom Roosevelt had dishonorably discharged in November 1906,

for their alleged involvement in a disturbance in Brownsville, Texas. The en-

suing controversy between the two men over what became known as the "Browns-

ville Affair" made it unlikely that Roosevelt would endorse Foraker for the nomi-

nation. He believed Foraker had little or no moral scruples and was simply play-

ing the Brownsville incident for its sensationalism and the mileage he could get

out of it for the nomination in 1908. Roosevelt's energies before the convention in

June were directed more at trying to keep Foraker from receiving the nomination

than they were in having his own man selected. Despite this, Foraker's candidacy

remained strong, especially among blacks who regarded him as their agent in

repudiating Roosevelt's summary dismissal of their soldiers.⁴

With Hughes and Foraker eliminated as candidates he could possibly support

for the nomination, Roosevelt's choice boiled down to Root or Taft. Root, he be-

lieved, would make the best President, but Taft the best candidate.⁵ While Root

might have been his first choice for the nomination, Roosevelt was convinced, as

was Root, that he would make a poor candidate because of his image as a "Wall

Street Lawyer." His candidacy, the President feared, would not be acceptable

to many Republicans in the West who were injured in the general economic re-

cession of 1907.6 Taft, like Root, supported Roosevelt's policies but was less than

enthusiastic about the prospects of seeking the nomination. Contending that he

was not a politician in the traditional sense of wishing to become President, he

said he wanted to avoid the rough and tumble of convention politics and longed

to retire to "a contemplative position," perhaps as a member of the Supreme

Court (a position he would later hold) after his tenure in the War Department.⁷

Taft was unduly modest. It was generally known after 1906 that President

Roosevelt was grooming him as his successor, although he received no "absolute

commitments" from the President to that effect until May of that year. This oc-

curred following a long conversation at the White House on the party's prospects

in 1908. After his talk with Roosevelt the secretary wrote his wife that during

their interview he had found Roosevelt "full of the presidency and wanted to talk

about my chances." He went on to delight her by noting Roosevelt thought he was

the one "to take his mantle" and believed he could be nominated and elected

with few difficulties.⁸

After Roosevelt decided on Taft as his successor, arrangements were made to

increase his support in the South. Both men knew an important ingredient in win-

ning the nomination was the control of the Southern delegations from the eleven

former Confederate states that attended the national convention. These states

at times controlled as many as one-third of the votes necessary for a victory in

the convention. Since the disputed Hayes-Tilden election in 1876, when the Re-

publican party agreed to an official end of Reconstruction in the South, almost all

Republican presidential hopefuls wrote off the South as far as its support in the

national election was concerned, conceding the entire section to what was de-

veloping into a "solid South" where the Democrats controlled practically the

4. Cleveland Gazette, December 8, 15, 29, 1906, January 19, 26, March 9, 16, April 13, 20, 1907.

5. Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 123. President Roosevelt was quoted as saying that if he "had the power

of a dictator he would appoint Elihu Root President, and Secretary of War Taft as Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court." Herman H. Kohlsatt, From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Our

Presidents (New York, 1923), 161-162.

6. Jessup, Elihu Root, 11, 123.

7. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William H. Taft, 2 vols. (New York, 1939), 1, 337, 342;

Kohlsatt, From McKinley to Harding, 161-162.

8. William H. Taft to Mrs. Taft, Washington, May 4. 1906, Jessup, Elihu Root, 11, 123; Kohlsatt,

From McKinley to Harding, 161-162.

210                                                             OHIO HISTORY

entire Congressional delegations to Washington by the turn of the century. Never-

theless, they all recognized that, while they stood a chance of winning the na-

tional election without carrying a single Southern state, they could not win the

Republican nomination without strong support from the South in their national

convention.

It was the realization of this political peculiarity that prompted Taft to write in

one of his letters after he admitted his candidacy "that the South has been the

section of rotten boroughs in Republican politics," and it would be a delight to

him "if no Southern state were permitted to have a vote in the national conven-

tion except in proportion to its Republican vote in national elections." But, he

quickly added, "when a man is running for the Presidency...he cannot ignore the

tremendous influence, however undue, that the Southern vote has and he must

take the best way he can honorably to secure it."⁹ It was also the realization of

the "tremendous influence" the South had in the national convention that

prompted Roosevelt to persuade Frank H. Hitchcock, First Assistant Postmaster

General and specialist in the management of Southern delegations, to resign his

position and work full time in the interest of Taft's candidacy in the South.¹⁰

In the meantime, Taft was doing his best to encourage his own candidacy in

the South. In August 1906, he made his first public appeal for Southern support

when he went to North Carolina to address a session of the state legislature at

Greensboro. The national press billed the address as his "keynote" for the Re-

publican nomination. Although addressing a Democratic legislature, he directed

most of his attention to the "lilywhite" Republican sentiment that was rapidly

spreading throughout the Republican party in the South. Lilywhite Republicans

were those Republicans who had cooperated with blacks before the latter were

disfranchised in the various Southern states, but after that event, were willing to

join hands with Southern Democrats who sought to remove blacks from all po-

sitions of influence in Southern politics. Such Republicans were frequently desig-

nated "lilywhites," especially by black newspaper editors, to distinguish them

from "White Republicans" who stood on the same platform of black political

rights as William Lloyd Garrison, Abraham Lincoln, and Charles Sumner. The

lilywhites' influence grew stronger in North Carolina following the constitutional

disfranchisement of more than ninety per cent of the state's black voters in 1901.

Some lilywhite Republicans in North Carolina, like those in several other

Southern states where the black voters were constitutionally disfranchised by

1906 (Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Alabama) favored removing

the remaining small percentages of black voters who still met the suffrage re-

quirements; but most were concerned only with eliminating those influential

black political leaders scattered throughout the state, many of whom had received

presidential appointments for their active support of the party throughout the

North following the general disfranchisement of their people. All who supported

the doctrine of "lilywhitism" agreed that in order for the Republican party to at-

tract more white independent and Democratic support, in the words of one, "the

Negro must go."11

In his address to the North Carolina legislature, Taft took a position on black

suffrage and on the place of the race in Southern politics that was designed to

9. Taft to W. R. Nelson, Washington, January 18, 1908, Pringle, The Life and Times of William H.

Taft, 1, 347.

10. George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York, 1964), 301; Pringle, The Life

and Times of William H. Taft, I, 347.

11. John R. Lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction (New York, 1970), 239-323; Washington Bee,

July 4, 28, 1906; Cleveland Gazette, September 1, 1905; Adams to Roosevelt, July 12, 1906, Theodore

Roosevelt Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as Roosevelt Papers.

Blacks and Republicans                                                        211

please North Carolina lilywhite Republicans. Perhaps he hoped to give encour-

agement to those in Georgia who were working closely with the Democrats to

disfranchise black voters. While Taft did not support black disfranchisement

through the various frauds perpetrated by the disfranchisement constitutions-

he said that he favored a restricted franchise where the educated and property

holding portion of the race would be allowed to vote-he believed their suffrage

would have to be protected through judicial action on the part of the Supreme

Court rather than through any legislative action that might be initiated by Con-

gress.¹² This position placed him in opposition to such earlier efforts as the de-

feated Lodge Federal Election, or "Force Bill," of 1890 where the Republican

party made its last serious attempt to enforce black suffrage in the South through

the use of federal police to protect those who were driven from the polls by fraud,

intimidation, or violence. In addition, many believed the Secretary's position on

black suffrage in the South meant he would not insist on enforcing section two

of the Fourteenth Amendment should he become President. This section required

Congress to reduce the representation in the House of those states that reduced

their voting rolls by disfranchising any portion of their citizens.¹³

In addition to his views on black suffrage and his attitude toward the enforce-

ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Taft's part in the Brownsville Affair also

enhanced his popularity among a large number of Southern Republicans since

Roosevelt's dismissal order and the War Department's issuance of the order

caused many to link their names when they discussed the incident. In all fairness

to Taft, however, it must be noted that he did not initially approve of the order

and had tried to get the President to modify or withdraw it before it was made

public.14

But when Roosevelt insisted on removing the soldiers from the army, Taft sup-

ported the decision through many of his letters and public utterances on the sub-

ject, declaring on one occasion that he believed the order "was fully sustained by

the facts."¹⁵ When Foraker's Senate Investigating Committee on Brownsville

issued its Minority Report on the Affair in April 1908, which criticized the lack of

concrete evidence used by the President and the War Department in dismissing

the soldiers, it was Taft who suggested that Roosevelt send a special team of pri-

vate investigators, at a cost of $1500, to Brownsville to seek out "additional evi-

dence" that might be used to prove a stronger link between the soldiers and the

Brownsville disturbance.¹⁶

If Taft's views on black suffrage, the reduction of Southern representation in

the House, and the Brownsville Affair made his candidacy popular among many

Southern Republicans, these same views caused many black Republicans in the

North, especially those in Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York, to oppose his

selection as the party's nominee. Black opposition to his nomination was strong-

est among black newspapers such as the Cleveland Gazette, the New York Age,

and the Boston Guardian, all of which supported Foraker because of his Browns-

ville stand in defense of the 25th Infantry. These newspapers and their editors

12. Cleveland Gazette, July 21, 1906, New York Age, July 12, 1906.

13. Washington Bee, July 4, 28, 1906; Cleveland Gazette, September 1, March 25. 1905, July 21.

1906.

14. Washington Bee, November 10, December 17, 1906, Cleveland Gazette, July 21, November

21, 1906, January 12, 19, March 9, 16, 30, 1907.

15. Taft to Roosevelt, Washington, July 7, 1907; Pringle, The Life and Times of William H. Taft,

1, 327.

16. Joseph B. Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, 1917), II, 246; Everett Walters,

Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican (Columbus, 1948), 244; James A. Tinsley.

"Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," Journal of Negro History, LV (1956), 43-44.

212                                                            OHIO HISTORY

were joined in their opposition by a number of black protest organizations, in-

cluding the Niagara Movement, the Afro-American League, and the Boston Con-

stitutional League.

The earliest opposition to Taft came from the Niagara Movement, a black pro-

test movement organized in 1905 by W. E. B. DuBois, who, after the 1903 publi-

cation of his Souls of Black Folk, became one of the most persistent critics among

black leaders of the Republican party's attitude toward his race's constitutional

rights. DuBois was also critical of the national leadership of Booker T. Washing-

ton whom he charged was willing to compromise black civil and political rights

for the advancement of his own ideological or personal position within the country

and party. Meeting in their third annual session in Boston in September 1907,

DuBois and members of the Niagara Movement addressed an appeal to the

"500,000 free black voters of the North," giving them political directions in refer-

ence to the Republican nomination in 1908. They were told to work against Taft's

nomination or that of any other "Brownsville Republican" who had supported

Roosevelt's dismissal of the soldiers. Should one of these win the nomination, the

appeal continued, then blacks should work against their candidacy during the

election, even if it meant a Democratic victory. This position supported DuBois'

contention that an avowed enemy of the race was better than a false friend.17

Several leaders of the Niagara Movement continued their organization's oppo-

sition to Taft after their annual session in Boston. The Reverend Reverdy Ran-

som of New York, editor of the A.M.E. Church Review, denounced Roosevelt's

economic policies and warned his people against Taft in an address in 1908.

Speaking before a large gathering in Philadelphia, Ransom accused Roosevelt of

allowing blacks and poor people to suffer during the economic recession of 1907,

stating that because of Roosevelt's economic policies, "starvation stood in the

door of every man and conditions would be no better if Taft were elected in his

place."¹⁸ This same theme was echoed in Boston where William M. Trotter, edi-

tor of the Boston Guardian and one of the founders of the Niagara Movement,

led the way in organizing the National Negro American Political League to op-

pose Taft's nomination and election in 1908.19

Finally, in Taft's own home state of Ohio black Republicans of Cleveland or-

ganized the Ohio branch of the Afro-American Council. This organization best

summarized the race's opposition to Taft as the party's nominee when it included

as one of the first items on its agenda a petition to be circulated among the city's

black population and carried to the convention in Chicago. The petition opposed

Taft because of his Greensboro address dealing with black suffrage and the re-

duction of Southern representation and because of some of his public statements

on Brownsville where he accused the soldiers of being guilty before they were

tried in court. It called upon blacks in Ohio and throughout the nation to join the

League in its efforts to defeat Taft or any other Republican whom Roosevelt sup-

ported for the nomination.²⁰

The opposition to Taft's selection by black newspapers and protest organiza-

tions prompted President Roosevelt to resort to a familiar Republican tactic of

giving a few black politicians a presidential appointment in order to bring the

race back into its traditional alliance with the Republican party. While there were

17. Chicago Broad Ax, September 7, 1907; Baltimore Afro-American, September 15, 1907; see also

Elliott M. Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois: Propagandist of the Negro Protest (New York, 1969), 102-103.

18. New York Age, February 20, 1908.

19. Boston Guardian, April 11, 1908; Washington Bee, April 11, June 13, 1908; see also Stephen

R. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: William M. Trotter (New York, 1971), 110-112.

20. Cleveland Gazette, April 18, 1908.

Blacks and Republicans                                                           213

several instances of Roosevelt's use of this tactic during his first administration,²1

the best illustration in the controversy surrounding Taft's nomination occurred

over the appointment of a black in Ohio, the home state of both Foraker and Taft

where black opposition to the Brownsville decision was perhaps the strongest.

In addition to using his power of appointment to influence black public opinion in

Taft's favor, Roosevelt also attempted to strike at Senator Foraker for his oppo-

sition to the dismissal of the 25th Infantry.

Several days after he delivered his message to Congress on the Brownsville

Affair--where he justified his constitutional authority and defended his moral

position in dismissing the soldiers--Roosevelt wrote Booker T. Washington, the

famous black educator of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Washington had served

as one of his advisors on black patronage since the controversial Washington-

Roosevelt White House Dinner in October, 1901.22 The President requested from

him "the names of two or three first-class men in Ohio, men who were good Re-

publicans, in addition to men of the highest character who would be up to the

standards of an Internal Revenue Collector" in the state. He was explicit in ref-

erence to the location of the proposed appointment, instructing Washington to

send him the name of "a first-class colored man from Cincinnati,"²³ the home

and political base of both Foraker and Taft.

For the prospective appointment in Cincinnati, Washington recommended

Ralph W. Tyler, a journalist from Columbus who had more than twenty years

of work as a newspaper correspondent, including some work on two of the white

dailies of Columbus, the Columbus Dispatch and the Ohio State Journal. Wash-

ington arranged an interview at the White House for Tyler that was attended by

Roosevelt and his Private Secretary, William Loeb.²⁴ During the interview   the

President asked Tyler, as he had asked Washington, for the names of two black

applicants besides himself whom he could nominate and expect the Senate to

confirm as Collector of the Port of Cincinnati. Tyler hesitated before answering,

insisting that the President should not think of nominating any of the black poli-

ticians from Cincinnati for the position since the loyalty of most of them toward

his administration could be questioned. Most of them, he said, were closely con-

nected with Foraker and, for the most part, had supported him on Brownsville.

Roosevelt next wanted to know whether the two Senators from the state, For-

aker and Charles Dick of Akron, would support Tyler's confirmation in the Sen-

ate if he were nominated as Collector of Cincinnati. Realizing that one of the pur-

poses for appointing a black man in Cincinnati was to undercut Foraker's grow-

ing appeal to many blacks in Ohio,²⁵ Tyler replied that while he felt he could get

Senator Dick's endorsement for a position in Cincinnati or Washington, he would

21. Roosevelt used his power of appointment during his first administration to bring blacks around

to support the Republican party in several states including Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North

Carolina, and South Carolina. For additional information see Booker T. Washington to Roosevelt,

November 6, 1901, Roosevelt Papers; J. A. Smythe to George B. Cortelyou, November 10, 1902, E. J.

Scott to W. D. Crum, April 21, 1904, Washington to Charles Anderson, December 23, 1904, Booker T.

Washington Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as Washington Papers.

Washington Bee, January 8, 1905; New York Age, March 9, 16, 30, 1905.

22. When Roosevelt became President after McKinley's assassination in September 1901, he in-

vited Washington to the White House for consultation on various social and political matters in the

South. During their meeting, lunch was served and the President's detractors said that the visit and

lunch were part of an effort by Roosevelt to encourage social equality between the races. Booker T.

Washington, My Larger Education: Being Chapters From My Experiences (New York, 1911), 170-

171, 174-178: Roosevelt to Washington, September 14, 1901, Roosevelt Papers.

23. Roosevelt to Washington, December 25, 1906, Roosevelt Papers.

24. Ralph W. Tyler to Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.

25. Tyler to Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.

214                                                          OHIO HISTORY

not seek Foraker's, although he was certain that Foraker would be less likely to

oppose him for the position than any other black man the President might nomi-

nate. Roosevelt was evidently impressed with Tyler's answers for as the interview

drew to a close he turned to Loeb and said, "Mr. Loeb, I believe we will try to put

it through with Mr. Tyler." But first, he wanted to check with his son-in-law,

Representative Nicholas Longworth of Cincinnati, before he acted on the nomi-

nation.²⁶

Tyler left the White House and went directly to the House of Representatives

to confer with Longworth on the expected appointment. When he informed him

of the interview with Roosevelt and the possibilities he would be made Collector

of the Port in Cincinnati, Longworth expressed surprise, which later changed to

bitter disappointment, that Roosevelt was thinking of naming a black man to one

of the most influential patronage positions in his district, giving Tyler a fore-

warning that he would oppose his selection.²⁷

On his return to Columbus, Tyler wrote to Washington at Tuskegee to bring

him up to date on his interview with Roosevelt and Loeb as well as his talk with

Longworth. He told Washington the President had been impressed with his an-

swers to a number of questions he had asked and that he believed Roosevelt was

ready to make the announcement of his appointment. But Tyler doubted that

Longworth would be willing to go along with the President's choice, or the se-

lection of any black man for that matter, without raising strong objections that

could jeopardize the nomination in the Senate. Tyler felt that Longworth's pos-

sible objection could be overcome by Washington's influence and friendship with

Roosevelt, and he requested the educator "to make a simple phone call to the

President or Secretary Loeb," saying that Tyler was the man for the job and

should be nominated without delay.²⁸ Washington did not think it wise or ex-

pedient to make such a phone call. He wrote Tyler that even if Longworth op-

posed his appointment, or the appointment of any other black man in his district,

Roosevelt would still have to make a black appointment from the state to show

the race he was not hostile to their constitutional rights as some of the black news-

papers in Cleveland and other cities in Ohio were charging. Tyler, Washington

believed, was in the best position to receive such an appointment.²⁹

Meanwhile, further complications concerning the appointment developed when

the Cincinnati Enquirer, a newspaper owned and printed by Taft's family, ran a

story which said Roosevelt had intimated to a confidential source that Foraker

would soon give him the name of a black man for an important presidential po-

sition in Ohio, without specifying the Collector's office in Cincinnati. According

to the story, if Roosevelt and Foraker compromised their differences on Browns-

ville, there was a strong possibility that Tyler would not be given the Cincinnati

post since it was believed Foraker favored another black man for the job. Tyler

sent a copy of the story to Washington, but the attempt at a compromise between

Roosevelt and Foraker on Brownsville-if there was ever a compromise in the

making-never matured. Roosevelt put a damper on the story several days after

it appeared by informing Washington he "meant to stand by Tyler" for the Col-

lectorship, but said he was having difficulties and might be forced "to stand by

somebody in Toledo for geographical reasons." It did indeed appear that the

President intended to "stand by Tyler" for he wrote Washington the following

26. Tyler to Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.

27. Washington to Anderson, January 14, 1907, Washington Papers.

28. Tyler to Washington, February 4, 1907, Washington Papers.

29. Washington to Anderson, January 14, 1907, Washington Papers.

Blacks and Republicans                                                         215

week that he would send Tyler's name to the Senate as Collector of the Port of

Cincinnati as soon as the term of the white incumbent expired.³⁰

While Roosevelt believed Tyler's appointment as Collector was one way to in-

fluence black Republicans in Ohio and bring them back into their traditional

alliance with the party, he also believed this nomination, or the nomination of

any black man to such an important patronage position, could stir up strong anti-

black sentiment throughout the state, especially if white Republicans in Cincin-

nati opposed the appointment. As a matter of fact, Roosevelt remembered that

one of the greatest controversies on the race issue during his administration con-

cerned the nomination of a black man, Dr. William D. Crum, as Collector of the

Port of Charleston. White Republicans in the state were able to block Senate

confirmation of Crum's nomination for more than three years.31 With this in mind

Roosevelt let the story out of the White House that he was considering Tyler for

the Collectorship as a feeler to see how white Republicans of Cincinnati would

react.32

The President was correct in his belief that many white Republicans in Cin-

cinnati would react violently to the nomination of a black man to the Collector-

ship. When they heard he was thinking of making Tyler Collector, many reacted

not unlike those in Charleston who had opposed Crum's confirmation in 1902.

In addition to being bitter over the fact that a black man was to be given a post

envied by many politicians in the city, some also complained that Roosevelt was

playing politics with the Collector's office; that Tyler was not from Cincinnati and

would not be familiar with the people with whom he would have to work as Col-

lector. A small group went so far as to vow that if the President nominated Tyler

or any other black man for the Collectorship they would not support Longworth

when he sought reelection to the House in 1908.³³

By this time Foraker was aware of Roosevelt's plans in his home town, and he

attempted to counter them before the President could send Tyler's name to the

Senate for confirmation. Working through one of his black lieutenants in Cin-

cinnati, Robert J. Harlan, he encouraged several other blacks in the city to file

for the position, "thereby bringing discomfiture to the President and forcing him

to abandon Tyler," as one of Washington's informers told him.³⁴ Thus, after more

than seven months of trying to create the proper conditions to appoint a black

man in Cincinnati, white opposition and Foraker's maneuvering forced Roosevelt

to abandon Tyler and reappoint the white incumbent when his term expired. After

considerable indecision he finally named Tyler as the Fourth Auditor of the Navy

Department in Washington where he was confirmed by the Senate in early 1907.35

Instead of regaining the support of Ohio blacks for the party and Taft's nomi-

nation as Roosevelt had anticipated, Tyler's appointment, even as Fourth Auditor

30. Washington to Tyler, January 14, 28, 1907, Tyler to Washington, January 25, 1907, Scott to

Tyler, January 29, 1907, Washington Papers.

31. James F. Rhodes to Roosevelt, December 23, 1904, Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27, 1906,

Roosevelt Papers: William D. Crum to Whitfield McKinlay, October 31, November 3, 1902. Carter

G. Woodson Collection, Library of Congress; August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915;

Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor, 1963), 164, 242.

32. New York Age, March 7, 1907.

33. Newspaper clippings in Washington's Manuscript Collection from the Cleveland Plain Dealer

sent to Washington by Tyler, February 9, 12, 16, 1907; see also Washington Bee, February 9, 16,

1907; New York Age, February 7, 1907.

34. Anderson to Washington, February 4, 1907, Iyler to Washington, February 22, 1907, Washing-

ton Papers.

35. Washington to Roosevelt, April 11, 1907, Washington to Tyler, April 11, 1907, Tyler to Wash-

ington, April 10, 1907, Washington Papers.

216                                                               OHIO HISTORY

of the Navy in far-away Washington, served only to intensify their opposition to

the administration, since most of them believed with Harry Smith's Cleveland

Gazette that Tyler had been appointed "in an attempt to off-set executive action

in the Brownsville Affair and to win blacks for Taft in 1908."³⁶ Smith's Gazette

was echoed by George Myers, the influential black barber and political jobber of

the famous Hollander House in Cleveland. When he heard President Roosevelt

had nominated Tyler as Auditor of the Navy, Myers declared that "it would not

stop the onward march of the black deluge against him and Taft in Ohio." Roose-

velt's actions in appointing Tyler, Myers said, "were palatable plain to even the

most illiterate Hammite." Blacks in Ohio and throughout the nation were for For-

aker, and there was little Roosevelt could do to alter the fact. In Myers' opinion

Roosevelt had a difficult if not impossible task before him if he wanted to convert

blacks from Foraker to Taft. Myers further believed that Tyler would not be con-

firmed by the Senate, but if confirmed, "would not help the administration against

Senator Foraker."³⁷

Although events later proved Myers to be mistaken about Tyler's cooperation

with the administration against Foraker's nomination, Tyler had said as much

shortly after Washington arranged the White House interview for him. In one of

his several letters to Myers on the subject of federal patronage before he was

nominated as Auditor, and when it looked as if he would not be named as Col-

lector, Tyler had rationalized his position. He wrote Myers he was not enthusias-

tic about being appointed by Roosevelt since he knew that if he were he would

"be expected to fight against Senator Foraker." Under such circumstances, he

had written, "I will say to the President that Senator Foraker is a friend...and I

was not appointed with any understanding that I would fight against him."³⁸

Later after Myers learned the Senate was going to confirm him as Auditor he

wired Tyler and told him "not to sell his birthright for a paltry political office"

and urged him to accept the Auditorship only on condition that he would not

compromise his feelings for Senator Foraker.³⁹

Meanwhile in March 1907, more than a year before the national convention,

Foraker returned to Cincinnati where his organization was waging a frenzied cam-

paign to capitalize on the growing anti-Taft-Roosevelt-Brownsville sentiment that

was sweeping the state and threatening to involve most Northern blacks. After

conferring with several of his more influential supporters in Akron, Marion, and

Xenia,⁴⁰ Foraker issued a statement on his position in reference to the nomina-

tion. He said he would ask the Ohio Republican Central Committee to meet in

Columbus within the immediate future to issue a call for delegates for the na-

tional convention. The purpose was to determine the state's choice for the nomi-

nation, himself or Secretary Taft.⁴¹ With Foraker's announcement of his candi-

dacy and calling for a session of the state's Central Committee he was preparing

himself for a contest with Taft in their home state to determine their respective

36. Cleveland Gazette, April 27, June 8, 1907.

37. George A. Myers to Tyler, April 11, 12, 1907, George A. Myers Manuscript Collection, Ohio

Historical Society. Hereafter cited as Myers Papers.

38. Tyler to Myers, April 13, 1907, Myers Papers.

39. Myers to Tyler, April 12, 1907, Myers Papers.

40. Among those consulted were Senator Charles Dick of Akron, Chairman of the State Central

Committee, Warren G. Harding of Marion, and L. C. Maxwell, a prominent black Republican in

Xenia; see also Anderson to Washington, February 4, 1907, Tyler to Washington, February 4, 22,

1907, Washington Papers.

41. When the Committee assembled Taft won the state's endorsement for the nomination by a vote

of fifteen to Foraker's six. William H. Taft to Roosevelt, June 6, July 23, 1907, Arthur I. Vorys to Taft,

July 24, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.

218                                                           OHIO HISTORY

Brownsville as well as misrepresenting his attitude toward the race.44 The pur-

pose of Tyler's appointment as one of the editorial writers of the Age was to undo

the damage done by Fortune and to help swing black public opinion around to

support the President on Brownsville and Taft's nomination and election.

Tyler began his assignment to influence black public opinion in the interest of

the administration in an editorial which appeared in the October 1907 issue of

the paper entitled "The Brownsville Ghouls." By any account "The Brownsville

Ghouls" was a milestone in scurrilous journalism--in a period when scurrilous

journalism was not unusual and was one of the most controversial pieces of writ-

ings to come out of the entire Brownsville incident. Its purpose was so obvious that

it was almost unbelievable to many of the Age's readers, but moreso to its black

exchanges, which used it over and over again to show the depths their competitor

would sink in its defense of Roosevelt and Taft on Brownsville.

The editorial issued a blanket indictment by condemning all those, black and

white, who had spoken out against the President because of the Brownsville in-

cident as "human ghouls who preyed upon the death and suffering of others for

their own financial or political gains." It characterized the black supporters of

Senator Foraker as "buzzards," and attempted to convince blacks that color

prejudice had nothing to do with Roosevelt's decision to dismiss the soldiers of

the 25th Infantry from the army without honor. In Tyler's opinion the color ques-

tion in the Affair was a stone around the race's neck. It had not been raised by

President Roosevelt, "whose many brave and helpful acts have proved him to be

a real friend of the Negro"; or by Secretary Taft, "another true friend of the race";

or by Senator Foraker, "who, after all, simply raised a legal question in his de-

fense of the soldiers in the Senate." Nor was the color issue raised by "the many

white friends of the race, in and out of Congress." The color question in the

Brownsville Affair, said Tyler, "was raised by black ghouls who were as much

enemies of Senator Foraker as they were of President Roosevelt and Secretary of

War Taft and until the Satanic regions open wide and swallow them we will

always have our human ghouls black and white."⁴⁵

From the printing of "The Brownsville Ghouls" editorial in October 1907, until

Taft's convention victory in June 1908, Tyler wrote and the Age printed similar

editorials in defense of Roosevelt on Brownsville and in favor of Taft's nomina-

tion and election. Throughout this period the Age played an important part in

helping to beat down all black newspaper opposition to the administration, mak-

ing it the most outspoken supporter of the administration among black news-

papers throughout the country.⁴⁶

The initial reaction of many black editors to the Age's campaign to influence

black public opinion was so intense and hostile that Tyler suggested to Washing-

ton the establishment of what he called a "Colored Press Bureau" under the di-

rections of R. W. Thompson. The bureau would help control and influence these

editors in the interest of the administration and generate greater support and

enthusiasm among those who were non-commital or lukewarm to Taft's nomi-

nation. As envisioned by Tyler, the bureau would gather favorable news items

of interest to blacks concerning the administration's attitude toward the race and

dispatch them to most of the black newspapers throughout the country. Tyler be-

lieved that by putting the relatively obscure Thompson in charge of the bureau

44. New York Age, October 31, 1907, May 21, 1908; Cleveland Gazette, November 16, 30, 1907.

45. New York Age, October 17, 1907.

46. R. W. Thompson to Washington, October 3, 1908, Anderson to Washington, September 10, 11,

1908, Scott to Tyler, March 26, 1908, Washington Papers.

Blacks and Republicans                                                   219

such news items could be "incorporated judiciously" into opposition newspapers

without arousing the suspicion of many of their editors. He said he would notify

the editors that he could cut their expense by sending them weekly syndicated

letters from Washington covering all news of interest to the race. Tyler realized

some of the editors might still be suspicious of the project, and to encourage their

support he contemplated "mailing them six or seven weeks of the letters free,"

believing this would at least temper their criticism of the project until it could be

launched. Later a nominal fee of fifty cents per newsletter would be charged

which would be used to cover Thompson's salary as director of the Bureau.⁴⁷

While Washington saw some advantages in the project, he believed it was much

too risky. From his experiences with many of the black editors, he wrote Tyler,

"some of those hostile to the administration would find out about the project and

fire would come from them." While Thompson was "a good and loyal friend,"

Washington feared he did not have "the capabilities to handle such an extreme

and delicate matter." He was "a bit enthusiastic and would therefore spoil

things."⁴1

Nevertheless, three weeks after Washington vetoed the project the office of

the New York Age was visited by the New York member of the Republican Na-

tional Committee along with one of Taft's campaign managers who had made the

trip from Washington with Tyler for the purpose of consulting with Moore and the

editorial staff concerning additional black newspaper support for Taft's nomi-

nation and election. Following this meeting it was decided to organize a "Na-

tional News Bureau," looking toward supplying black newspaper editors with the

same kind of news that Tyler had outlined in his earlier letter to Washington.

Thompson was to be named director of the bureau.

Washington's reactions to all of this can only be guessed, but it is doubtful the

change of names from the "Colored Press Bureau" to the "National News Bu-

reau" made the project any more palatable to him. At any rate, Thompson was

given the additional responsibility of making a canvas among black editors to

encourage their interest in the project and after his survey reported to Washing-

ton that most of the editors contacted "signified their desire for the services of-

fered by the bureau." But he feared "the administration would not look good to

many of them until something was done about Brownsville." He closed on an

optimistic note, however, feeling that the situation was improving.⁴⁹

If the Age's account of its own campaign to influence black public opinion in

favor of Roosevelt and Taft can be believed, the campaign has to be crowned one

of the most successful of its kind in the annals of black journalism. Between the

establishment of the "National News Bureau" and the party's national conven-

tion the newspaper ran a column entitled "What the Negro Press Has to Say," in

which it reprinted comments and observations from black editors throughout the

country concerning Taft's candidacy and Roosevelt's Brownsville decision. Many

of these came from newspapers that had been antagonistic or lukewarm toward

the administration because of the Brownsville Affair. Many ran syndicated news

stories supplied by Thompson's bureau and favorable to Roosevelt and Taft.⁵⁰

47. Tyler to Washington, October 5, 1907, Washington Papers.

48. Washington to Tyler, October 7, 1907. Washington Papers.

49. Thompson to Scott, October 25, November 3, 1907, Thompson to Washington, October 25,

1907. Washington Papers.

50. Washington to Frank Hitchcock, March 1, 3, February 1, 27, 1908, Hitchcock to Washington

February 27, 1908, Washington Papers. Some of these newspapers included the Atlanta Independent,

the Savannah Tribune, the Topeka Plain Dealer, the Birmingham Reporter, the Richmond Planet,

the Chicago Conservator, and Augusta Baptist (Georgia), the Charleston Southern Reporter, and the

Cleveland Journal.

220                                                           OHIO HISTORY

Others, such as T. Thomas Fortune's Fortune Freeman and W. Calvin Chase's

Washington Bee, also switched their support from Foraker to Taft, but more out

of what appeared to be the hopelessness of Foraker's chances of winning the

nomination than because of anything Washington, Tyler, or the National News

Bureau said or did. Indeed, the attitude of these editors best summarized the pre-

dicament that many of the black editors found themselves in. Fortune had drifted

back into the newspaper business shortly after he sold his interest in the New

York Age to Washington and by the beginning of 1908 edited a struggling paper

out of Red Bank, New Jersey, called Fortune's Freeman. He wrote in the Free-

man that "after mature reflection on President Roosevelt and the Brownsville

decision," he had come to the conclusion that his earlier attitude toward Taft's

part in the Affair had been harsh. He now felt Taft had no alternative save to

follow Roosevelt's order to dismiss the soldiers or resign from his Cabinet. Had he

chosen to resign (as Fortune had suggested as editor of the Age shortly after the

War Department made the dismissal order public) he would have "deprived the

country of his services" over a matter in which he had little or no control.

From a political point of view, Fortune continued, Taft stood an excellent

chance of winning the nomination, and like Senator Foraker, "his friendship

toward blacks could not be doubted." Thus he concluded, "Taft's record was

good, and if he win the nomination," as it appeared he would, "the Freeman is

going to support him." W. Calvin Chase's Washington Bee also saw the political

side of the issue, adding that all signs pointed to Taft's victory at the convention

and if blacks shared in his success by supporting him they would be rewarded. If

they should withhold their support and Taft were nominated and elected with

the race arrayed against him, then they could not expect any consideration dur-

ing his administration.⁵1

By the time of the national convention most black Republicans had drifted

back to support the party and Taft's nomination, if for no other reasons than those

outlined by Chase and Fortune. The Foraker movement was proportionately

weakened as they came back to the administration and collapsed when most of

the thirty odd black delegates who attended the Chicago convention climbed

aboard Taft's band wagon.⁵² When the balloting was over Taft had received 702

of the 980 votes to Foraker's 16, 11 of which came from Northern black delegates

in appreciation of his stand in defense of the Brownsville soldiers. The convention

not only decisively nominated the secretary of war as Roosevelt's successor, but

it also adopted a platform committing him to the President's policies.⁵³

Among later significant developments, however, was the fact that in his con-

tinued eagerness to remove Brownsville from any serious consideration on Taft's

candidacy among blacks during the election, President Roosevelt accepted full

responsibility for the dismissal order and ordered the War Department to release

all pertinent information on the incident which showed that Taft had tried to have

him withdraw the order.⁵⁴ In addition, in a special message to Congress after the

election in December 1908, he made a suggestion that many interpreted as a

tacit admission that he had been wrong in dismissing the soldiers, the closest he

was ever to come to admitting that some of the soldiers might not have known

anything about the disturbance at Brownsville, and were consequently not guilty

51. New York Age, March 12, April 2, 9, 23, 30, May 28, June 4, 18, 1908; Boston Guardian, Jan-

uary 25, 1908.

52. Anderson to Washington, March 24, April 1, 1908, Washington to Taft, June 7, 1908, Washing-

ton to Anderson, March 26, 1908, Scott to Anderson, April 1, 1908, Washington Papers.

53. Henry C. Lodge to Roosevelt, June 22, 1908, Roosevelt Papers.

54. New York Age, March 12, 1908.

Blacks and Republicans                                                221

of a "conspiracy of silence." He suggested that Congress pass legislation that

would allow the soldiers to reenlist in the army "if they produced satisfactory evi-

dence that they were not involved in the Brownsville raid."⁵⁵ As a final note, the

majority of the 167 men dismissed because of the disturbance were never rein-

stated. The Board of Inquiry that was eventually appointed by the War Depart-

ment found only fourteen of the men eligible for reinstatement but gave no rea-

sons why the others who applied were found "unqualified."⁵⁶

Thus despite more than two years of black opposition to the President's Browns-

ville decision and the Taft nomination, the secretary of war was eventually nomi-

nated and elected to the presidency. The efforts of the Washingtonians to control

the dissemination of unpopular views toward the administration were successful

to the extent that it was through their activities that many blacks were convinced

they had little alternative save to support Taft and the Republican party. Even

though Taft won the election against William Jennings Bryan and the Democrats,

with the support of most black voters in the North, the Brownsville Affair would

return eventually to haunt both him and Roosevelt when they opposed each other

for the nomination in 1912. It helped to fuel the conflict between the two men and

to aggravate a split in the Republican party which finally led to the election of

the first Democratic presidential candidate in twenty years.

55. New York Age, March 12, 1908.

56. Walters, Joseph Benson Foraker, 246.