Ohio History Journal

ANDREW BIRTLE

Governor George Hoadly's Use of the

Ohio National Guard in the Hocking

Valley Coal Strike of 1884

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the

United State experienced a large number of labor strikes that in-

volved outbreaks of violence. While the causes of this violence are

both numerous and varied, some students of labor history cite the

intervention of police forces as a major catalyst.¹ Indeed, the list of

clashes between police and labor during this period is long. In many

studies of strikes and industrial violence, the police and military

forces called in to protect life and property are depicted as partisan

forces which worked to aid industry against labor. The extent to

which the police are viewed in this manner varies from author to

author. Some, such as H. M. Gitelman and John Fitch, argue that

while police forces often acted as adversaries of labor, they were also

at times neutral and completely non partisan. Others, such as

Samuel Yellen and Sidney Lens, tend to view government and its

police forces as having been actively allied with business against

labor. Lens goes so far as to make the accusation that

In reality, however, the lawlessness was usually created by the troops and

by the government's own denial of civil liberties. The real purpose, thinly

disguised in phrases of "impartiality," was to aid management in emascu-

lating unions.2

Andrew J. Birtle is a Ph.D. candidate in American Military History at The Ohio

State University.

1. Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character

and Outcome," The History of Violence in America, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and

Ted Robert Gurr, (New York, 1969), 281 (hereafter cited as Taft and Ross. "American

Labor Violence"); H. M. Gitelman, "Perspectives in American Industrial Violence,"

Business History Review, 47 (Spring, 1973), 10, 17, 19, 20.

2. Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars, (Garden City, N.J., 1973), 6; See also Samuel

Yellen, American Labor Struggles, ((New York, 1936).

38                                              OHIO HISTORY

Even Fitch, who mentions in passing that there were many cases

in which police forces remained neutral, concentrates his study on

several cases in which the police acted as a partisan force against

labor.³ That violence and police/military intervention generally

weakened labor's position is fairly evident. It is also true that gov-

ernors during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

sometimes called out the National Guard in order to suppress

strikes rather than to maintain peace and order.⁴ However, it is a

misconception to view the intervention of state forces solely as an

act designed to subvert labor. Unfortunately, those who write on the

history and causes of violent strikes in America recount only those

instances in which the arrival of the National Guard led to blood-

shed, while they ignore those cases where the militia was employed

successfully as a nonpartisan force. The Hocking Valley Coal Strike

of 1884 is one such example of a strike in which the National Guard

was not merely a pawn of industry.

Ohio's coal fields in the Hocking Valley region have long been the

site of violent confrontations between labor and management. Dur-

ing the nineteenth century, poor working conditions, low pay, and

exploitative company stores often sparked violent strikes in the

Hocking Valley. One of the worst strikes to hit the valley occurred

between June 23, 1884, and March 18, 1885, when miners refused to

accept a reduction in wages amounting to ten cents for every ton of

coal mined. When violence erupted in late August 1884, Governor

George Hoadly reluctantly decided to send in the National Guard to

restore order and to protect life and property. The Guard was quite

successful in achieving these goals. Governor Hoadly's use of the

Ohio National Guard deserves to be studied in order to counterba-

lance the all too prevalent view of the National Guard as an instru-

ment to break strikes rather than to preserve peace.5

The Hocking Valley is located approximately sixty miles south-

east of Columbus and extends through parts of Hocking, Athens,

and Perry counties. The central coal mining area lies along a twen-

ty-mile long and fifteen-mile wide stretch of the Hocking River.

During the early 1880s, a depressed national economy reduced the

demand for coal, causing prices to drop.⁶ This, in turn, led to signifi-

3. John A Fitch, The Causes of Industrial Unrest, (New York, 1924), 243-44.

4. Taft and Ross, "American Labor Violence," 297, 317, 382.

5. Frank R. Levstik, "The Hocking Valley Miner's Strike, 1884-1885: A Search for

Order," The Old Northwest, 2 (March, 1976), 55, 61.

6. Delmer Trester, "Unionism Among Ohio Miners in the Nineteenth Century"

(M.A. thesis, The Ohio State University, 1947), 18 (hereafter cited as Trester,

"Unionism Among Ohio Miners").

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                39

cant levels of unemployment in the valley, and by 1884 most miners

worked only three days a week. In addition to the overall depres-

sion, stores owned by the mine operators persisted in charging min-

ers prices 10 to 20 percent higher than those of local stores not

owned by the operators. These unfair practices of the company

stores were a major cause of discontent among miners.

Responding to the difficulties of the early 1880s, both miners and

mine operators organized. In 1882 the Ohio Miners' Amalgamated

Association was founded, with John McBride as president. The fol-

lowing year several operators responded by forming an association

whose goal was to eliminate costly price wars and present a strong,

united front to the newly organized miners. This organization, enti-

tled the Columbus and Hocking Coal and Iron Company and often

referred to as the "Syndicate," consisted of the owners of 18 mines, 5

furnaces, 570 houses (company-owned housing for miners), and 12

company stores.⁸. The Syndicate was further augmented by the crea-

tion of the Ohio Coal Exchange, a marketing organization for inde-

pendent coal operators. Thus, by 1884 both miners and operators

were organized.

Citing poor economic conditions and low coal prices, the operators

in the spring of 1884 asked the miners to consider a wage reduction

from 70 cents to 60 cents for each ton of coal mined. On April 30, the

Ohio Miners' Amalgamated Association rejected the reduction. The

Syndicate and the Exchange responded by unilaterally cutting

wages to 60 cents a ton on Friday, June 20. The following Monday

the miners went out of strike.⁹

The first month of the strike was relatively quiet. The introduc-

tion by the operators in mid-July of 250 strikebreakers, many of

whom were foreign-born, and 100 Pinkertons raised tensions, but

not to an appreciable extent. The striking miners peacefully per-

suaded many strikebreakers to leave, while the local inhabitants

took pity on those strikebreakers who were European immigrants

and whom they considered ignorant and exploited.10 Confident that

the unskilled laborers brought in by the operators would fail to run

7. John W. Lozier, "The Hocking Valley Coal Miners' Strike, 1884-85" (M.A.

thesis, The Ohio State Univesity, 1963), 11, 19 (hereafter cited as Lozier, "Hocking

Valley Strike"); Ohio General Assembly, 1885. Proceedings of the Hocking Valley

Investigation Committee (Columbus, 1885), 36-40 (hereafter cited as the Proceedings

of the Hocking Valley Investigation Committee).

8. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 36.

9. Ibid, 54.

10. Ibid., 61.

40                                                  OHIO HISTORY

the mines efficiently, the miners were content to sit back and bide

their time. The valley was so peaceful that the operators even re-

duced the number of Pinkertons.11

As July faded into August, however, the strikers' attitude began

to change. The number of strikebreakers remaining in the mines

steadily increased, while the union's strike fund steadily dimin-

ished. Consequently, the initial sympathy for the exploited foreign

laborers soon changed to disgust towards the "vagabonds" and "dis-

ease producing wretches."¹² Further inflaming the situation was the

fact that by September the operators had hired 113 Pinkertons plus

an unknown number of local civilians to act as guards.13 As early as

July, local authorities protested the arrival of the Pinkertons to

Governor Hoadly. They charged that the Pinkertons had "invaded"

the valley, disregarded civilian authorities, and blocked public

roads where they crossed mine property.¹⁴ While Governor Hoadly

demanded that the roads be reopened, he conceded that the Pinker-

tons were a legal organization and thus could not be expelled as long

as they stayed within the law.¹⁵

The Columbus, Hocking Valley, the Toledo Railroad (CHV&T)-

the major carrier of Hocking Valley coal-hired its own guards

along with a private detective, John T. Norris, to patrol and protect

railroad property in the valley. Unfortunately, Norris was also dep-

utized by county authorites, and he soon became the most notorious

and hated man in the valley. Without regard for legal procedure,

Norris single-handedly arrested more people during the strike than

anyone else. None of Norris's victims were convicted, but he did

manage to arouse much ill will and anger in the valley.16

As tensions increased, stray shots were fired at guards and fights

occasionally broke out between miners and strikebreakers. On Au-

gust 25 a mob of 400 miners almost rioted at Buchtel following a

court ruling which allowed the eviction of strikers from company-

11. George Cotkin, "Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence: Industrial Conflict in

the Hocking Valley,1884-85," Ohio History, 87 (Spring, 1978), 143-44 (hereafter re-

ferred to as Cotkin, "Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence").

12. Hocking Sentinel, August 28, 1884.

13. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 63.

14. See Henry Spurrier to Governor Hoadly, July 14, 1884, and Elias Boudinot to

Hoadly, July 14, 1884, both in The Papers of Governor George Hoadly, 1884-86, MS

Coll. #314, The Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited as Hoadly Papers); Lozier,

"Hocking Valley Strike," 64; New York Times, July 16,1884.

15. Governor Hoadly to Elias Boudinot, July 15, 1884, Hoadly Papers.

16. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 66, 72; Proceedings of the Hocking Valley

Investigation Committe, 314.

42                                                OHIO HISTORY

Whether or not this story was true, the Journal's assertion that

"calmness now prevails among the striking miners" was

premature.²¹ Late that evening and during the early morning of

August 31, striking miners organized several attacks on mine prop-

erty. The miners cut telephone and telegraph lines at several places

in Hocking, Perry and Athens counties, raided a camp of

strikebreakers at Murray City, destroyed a coal hopper at Straits-

ville worth $4,000, and assaulted a mine at Snake Hollow, near

Nelsonville.²² The attack on Snake Hollow was the most violent

event. Twenty-two local citizens from Logan guarded the mine.

Armed with rifles, shot guns, and revolvers, a force of approximate-

ly 100 miners attacked and routed the Snake Hollow guards at

about 1:30 A.M. August 31, killing one guard and wounding several

others.23

Wild rumors of the assault spread rapidly during the following

day.²⁴ Governor Hoadly, who was in Cincinnati, was informed of the

rioting by his secretary Daniel McConville. Throughout the day of

August 31, the governor was in constant communication with

McConville about the situation. Hoadly issued instructions en-

couraging the sheriffs of Hocking, Perry, and Athens counties to do

all they could to preserve the peace before calling upon the state for

aid. In addition, he ordered Colonel George Freeman, commander of

the National Guard's Fourteenth Regiment in Columbus, to begin

quiet preparations for a movement into the Hocking Valley.²⁵

While the governor made preparations to return to Columbus,

mine operators spent the day telegraphing him for aid, recruiting

civilian guards, and buying weapons in Columbus amid new rumors

of violence in the valley. Meanwhile, an alleged participant in the

Snake Hollow raid was arrested and jailed at Logan.26 An angry mob

seeking the prisoner's release reportedly gathered around the jail,

and when Governor Hoadly arrived in Columbus late in the evening

of August 31, he received a formal request for state aid from Sheirff

T. F. McCarthy of Hocking County:

21. Ibid.

22. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 74; Ohio, Adjutant General's Report, 1884

(Columbus, 1885), 73 (hereafter cited as AG Report).

23. Ohio Eagle (Lancaster), September 4, 1884; AG Report.

24. Athens Messenger, September 4, 1884; Ohio State Journal, September 1 and 3,

1884; Hocking Sentinel, September 4, 1884; Ohio Eagle, September 4, 1884; Co-

lumbus Evening Dispatch, September 1, 1884.

25. AG Report, 268; Governor Hoadly to Daniel McConville, Hoadly Papers.

26. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 1, 1884; Lozier, "Hocking Valley

Strike," 76; Hocking Sentinel, September 1, 1884.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                    43

All means in my power are entirely exhausted to repress disorder and to

protect life and property. The strikers are cutting the telegraph wires. I am

worn out; have been going day and night for two months. Please send

militia immediately and stop further bloodshed. Jail is threatened.²⁷

Upon the receipt of this note, Hoadly telegraphed back around

midnight that troops would be sent and asked Sheriff McCarthy how

many men he thought he needed. McCarthy responded that he

needed ten men immediately that night to guard the jail and 350

men to secure the valley.28 To reinforce McCarthy's appeal, mine

operators kept up their barrage of appeals for troops, warning that

their hired guards were demoralized and would desert unless mili-

tary aid was forthcoming.²⁹

Having made the decision to send in the Guard, Governor Hoadly

sounded the riot alarm in Columbus and sent orders for National

Guard units stationed in Columbus to assemble. But after having

aroused the city's populace in panic and confusion, the governor

suddenly had second thoughts. To begin with, Superintendent Carr

of the CHV&T telegraphed him that it was unwise to move the

militia in at night when it could be ambushed. Carr suggested that

if the governor would ask his officers, they would verify this fact.30

More importantly, State Legislator Allen 0. Myers paid a late night

call upon the governor and purportedly advised him of the political

costs of sending the Guard into the valley. When the governor

emerged from this private meeting, he announced that he would

personally go to the valley and inspect the situation before deciding

whether to employ the militia. Hoadly's decision to travel through

the strike region was wise. Since most of his information came from

rumors or mine operators and railroad men, he needed to form his

own opinion of the situation. Moreover, his inspection tour might

help defuse the situation. Finally, the trip might eliminate adverse

portrayals of him as a heartless, pro-industry and anti-labor gov-

ernor.

27. AG Report, 269; Sheriff T. F. McCarthy to Governor Hoadly, August 31,1884,

Hoadly Papers.

28. Governor Hoadly to T. F. McCarthy, August 31, 1884, Hoadly Papers; McCar-

thy to Hoadly, September 1, 1884, AG Report, 271.

29. W. B. Brooks to Governor Hoadly, September 1, 1884; M. M. Greene to Hoadly,

September 1, 1884; T. F. McCarthy to Hoadly, September 1, 1884. All of the above

telegrams are in AG Report, 272.

30. George Carr to Governor Hoadly, September 1, 1884, Hoadly Papers. The units

called to arms in Columbus were the Fourteenth Regiment, the Governor's Guard,

and the Duffy Guard.

44                                                   OHIO HISTORY

While this was a sensible policy, Hoadly's vacillation did not go

without criticism in the press. The politically independent Co-

lumbus Evening Dispatch commented:

People can not see the necessity of calling the men out at that hour of the

night and throwing the whole city into a state of confusion and excitement

by sounding the alarm if their services in quelling the riot were not needed;

and if there was sufficient cause to call them out why they were not sent to

the point of trouble instead of being quartered in this city, a considerable

distance from the riotous district ... Many members of the National Guard

expressed their indignation this afternoon at being called out at midnight

and forced to remain in the Armory during the day.³¹

Party politics, however, played an important role in press apprais-

als of Governor Hoadly's actions, especially since 1884 was a pres-

idential election year. The Republican press criticized Governor

Hoadly, a Democrat, for his indecision during the early stages of the

"reign of terror," feeling that he should not have delayed at all in

sending the troops. The Cleveland Herald opposed Hoadly's trip into

the valley and queried, "Who is Governor of Ohio, George Hoadly or

Allen O. Myers? The impression gains ground that Hoadly is Gov-

ernor de jure and Allen O. Myers de facto."³²

The Democratic and pro-labor press, on the other hand, praised

Governor Hoadly for his compassion and wise decision in personally

examining the valley before committing the militia. The Democra-

tic press even launched its own political offensive by claiming that

James G. Blaine, the Republican candidate for President, was a

major investor in Hocking Valley mines. All in all, some criticism of

Hoadly's vacillation seems justified. However, as the New York

Times pointed out, Hoadly's ultimate decision was prudent rather

than cowardly.³³

At 2:00 A.M on September 1, Governor Hoadly left on a special

train for the Hocking Valley. He travelled throughout the day and

stopped to address an assembly of citizens at Nelsonville. He stated

that no person-miner or operator-had the right to violate the law,

31. Allen O. Myers was a Franklin County Democratic member of the Ohio House.

For both the meeting and criticism of it, see Columbus Evening Dispatch, September

1,1884; Cleveland Herald, September 3,1884; Logan Republican Gazette, September

4,1884.

32. Ohio State Journal, September 2, 1884; Athens Messenger, September 4, 1884;

Cleveland Herald, September 2, 3, 1884; Logan Republican Gazette, September 4,

1884.

33. Hocking Sentinel, September 4, 1884; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September

1, 1884; New York Times, September 2, 1884.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                      45

and that he would rather rely upon the good behavior of the citizens

themselves than to call in the militia. When a member of the crowd

asked, "What's to become of the people turned out of houses?" Hoad-

ly responded, "I will send them tents." Tents were sent in early

September, although most of them were returned as evictees had

taken shelter with friends and family.34

After viewing the strike situation, however, Hoadly felt compel-

led to deploy three companies of Guardsmen in the region. The units

employed were probably chosen for their proximity to the valley and

had been notified on August 31 of possible operations. They con-

sisted of companies from Lancaster, Circleville, and New Lexington.

Sheriff McCarthy stationed these units on September 1 at Logan,

Sand Run, and Longstreth, respectively.35 On the following day the

Lancaster Company was moved from Logan to Snake Hollow. Once

in place, all units established defensive perimeters around the des-

ignated mines. The units had been mobilized hastily, and conse-

quently some of the men had only two or three rounds of ammuni-

tion each on the first night.36

The Guard's first night in the valley was spent quietly. In fact, the

situation seemed secure enough that Governor Hoadly dismissed

the troops being held in readiness in Columbus the following day.

Throughout September 2, however, mine operators kept up a bar-

rage of telegrams requesting more troops.37 Even Captain James

Teal of the New Lexington unit at Longstreth requested two to three

companies of reinforcements out of fear that his small company of

thirty-three men might be surrounded. In light of these appeals,

Governor Hoadly decided to send an additional company to the

Hocking Valley. Since Adjutant General Ebenezer Finley was ill,

34. On August 30, George Snowden, a prominent local citizen, had requested that

Governor Hoadly send tents to house-evicted miners at Buchtel. Several other

appeals followed on September 8 and 15. See George Snowden to Governor Hoadly,

August 30, 1884; Hoadly to Snowden, August 30, 1884; Snowden to Hoadly, Septem-

ber 8, 1884; Adjutant General Finley to Snowden, September 15, 1884. All of the

above are in Hoadly Papers; also see Hocking Sentinel, September 4, 1884; Trester,

"Unionism Among Ohio Miners," 22; Ohio Eagle, September 4, 1884; Columbus

Evening Dispatch, September 1, 1884.

35. The companies involved were Company E, Sixth Regiment, Company F, Sixth

Regiment, and Company A, Seventeenth Regiment. See AG Report, 74.

36. Lieutenant L. O. Anderson to Governor Hoadly, September 1, 1884, Hoadly

Papers.

37. The units in Columbus were the Fourteenth Regiment and the Duffy and

Governor's Guards. Colonel Thomas T. Dill to Colonel George Freeman, September 2,

1884. AG Report, 273; M. M. Green to Governor Hoadly, September 2, 1884, and J. R.

Buchtel to Hoadly, September 2, 1884, both in Hoadly Papers. Also see Ohio State

Journal, September 2, 1884; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 2, 1884.

46                                                   OHIO HISTORY

Colonel Thomas T. Dill, the assistant adjutant general, was sent

with the company and was given command of all Ohio Guard units

in the Hocking Valley.38

Governor Hoadly's instructions to Colonel Dill clearly indicated

the moderate tone that would characterize the Guard's occupation.

Dill's primary task was to protect life and property, and he was to

act only under the direction of the civil authorities and in close

consultation with the county sheriffs. While the Colonel could re-

quest reinforcements whenever needed, the governor impressed

upon him that the troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible.39

The Guard was to be neither a long-term garrison nor a private

police force for the operators, but rather an intermediary through

which peace and order could be quickly restored. To reinforce his

desire that the Guard act solely as a nonpartisan peacekeeping

force, Hoadly expressly forbade the Guard to fire weapons unless

fired upon first.⁴⁰

Tension was high the first several days, but rumors of violence

usually proved to be false. Railroad and mine executives often re-

ported "information" on impending riots in efforts to maintain the

National Guard's presence in the valley, but these riots never

occurred.⁴¹ As early as September 3, the Columbus Dispatch sum-

med up the situation with the headline "No Work for Troops," while

Guard Captain Albert Getz described the situation at Snake Hollow

as being "quiet as a graveyard."⁴² Sporadic gunshots at night at or

near National Guard pickets were quite common but posed no se-

rious threat. Such gunfire became so commonplace that eventually

it was not even recorded in the daily reports - in part so that those

at home would not be unnecessarily anxious for the safety of their

friends and relatives in uniform.⁴³

Despite the general calm, pressure from the Syndicate and

CHV&T to maintain and increase militia strength in the valley

38. The new unit was Company K, Fourteenth Regiment. Captain James Teal to

Governor Hoadly, September 2, 1884, AG Report, 274.

39. AG Report, 274, 275; Governor Hoadly to Colonel Thomas Dill, Hoadly Papers.

40. Ohio. Records of the Ohio Adjutant General's Office, Hocking Valley Coal

Strike, 1884, Vol. 154, Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited as Records of AG).

41. AG Report, 75; George Carr to Colonel Thomas Dill, September 3 and 4, 1884,

in AG Report, 276.

42. Captain Albert Getz to Colonel Thomas Dill, September 6, 1884, Records of

AG; Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 3, 1884.

43. Captain Charles Brown to Colonel Thomas Dill, September 3, 1884, 275; Dill to

Governor Hoadly, September 4, 1884, 276, and September 7,1884, 277, all in AG

Report; Lieutenant L. O. Anderson's Report, September 5,1884, Records of AG; Co-

lumbus Evening Dispatch, September 9, 15, 17, 19, 1884.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                     47

continued throughout September.⁴4 Stevenson Burke, vice president

of the CHV&T, sent repeated letters to Governor Hoadly warning

that Ohio's reputation for "lawlessness" would drive business out,

including the CHV&T. Burke criticized Hoadly's "dallying" and

"armed neutrality" and called for an end to mob rule in Ohio.45

Republican papers picked up on this theme. The Ohio State Journal

reported that the miners cursed the military and would rejoice as

soon as it was withdrawn, while the Athens Messenger warned that

violence was still possible "in the absence of a sufficient military

force." Interestingly, the Messenger was not above performing an

about-face in the interest of scoring some political points, for it

reminded miners that it had always been Democratic governors who

had called in troops against strikers.46

The local civil authorities were also apprehensive. Sheriff McCar-

thy and his deputies were easily frightened and constantly feared a

renewed outbreak of violence. Governor Hoadly soon began to dis-

trust McCarthy's judgment. Upon receiving reports from McCarthy

that many railroad bridges in the area were threatened, Hoadly

asked Colonel Dill to give his own assessment of the situation, bear-

ing in mind that "I do not desire troops to remain longer than it is

necessary to preserve order and sustain civil authorities." In reply,

Dill reported that the bridges were not in danger and that the pre-

sent number of troops was adequate.⁴⁷ However, according to Co-

lumbus newspapers, even Colonel Dill believed that while things

currently remained calm, the miners would quickly drive off the

strikebreakers as soon as the troops were removed.48 Nevertheless,

Governor Hoadly was anxious to remove the Guard as soon as possi-

ble. As early as September 3 he indicated his desire to withdraw the

company at New Lexington. He left the decision up to Colonel Dill's

judgment, and on September 9 the unit was pulled out.⁴⁹

44. President of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis Railroad to Governor

Hoadly, September 6, 1884, Hoadly Papers.

45. Stevenson Burke to Governor Hoadly, September 7 and 8, 1884, Hoadly Pa-

pers.

46. Ohio State Journal, September 3 and 4, 1884; Athens Messneger, September 1

and October 9, 1884.

47. Governor Hoadly to Colonel Dill, and Dill back to Hoadly, September 3, 1884,

AG Report, 275; Dill to Hoadly, September 9, 1884, Hoadly Papers.

48. Deputy Sheriff W. E. Hamblin to Sheriff T. F. McCarthy, September 19, 1884,

Hoadly Papers; McCarthy to General Ebenezer Finley, September 11, 1884, Records

of AG.

49. Governor Hoadly to Colonel Thomas Dill, AG Report, 276; Hoadly to Dill,

September 7, 1884, Records of AG; Dill to Hoadly, September 9, 1884, Hoadly Papers;

Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 8, 1884.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                     49

number but the moral effects of the soldiers in the valley is what

preserves the peace."53

As a result of these recommendations, Governor Hoadly decided

to keep a force in the valley by withdrawing the three companies

presently there and replacing them with three other companies. On

September 12, companies from Upper Sandusky, Bucyrus, and Co-

lumbus replaced the garrisons at Snake Hollow, Longstreth, and

Sand Run, respectively.⁵⁴ The rotation of troops went smoothly, and

the new units settled down to the monotonous routine of guard duty.

The valley was now so quiet that marksmanship competitions and

baseball games seem to have been the Guard's main occupation.

Rumors and stories of impending riots were the only things that

broke the monotony.55 The tranquility of the valley, however, raised

the difficult question of when the troops could be withdrawn. If the

region was once again stabilized, why should the Guard remain? On

the other hand, a premature withdrawal might precipitate renewed

violence and the embarrassment and expense of having to return

troops to the area. Throughout September, pro- and anti-labor forces

endeavored to pressure Governor Hoadly into making a decision

favorable to their position.

On September 28 a large sympathy rally was held for the miners

at the Columbus City Hall. The meeting passed a resolution that

denounced the employment of militia in the Hocking Valley as not only

without justification but a perversion of our constitution and laws and

'calculated to subvert our free institutions and hand our state over to the

keeping of a corporate oligarchy whose only idea of right is its power to

compel obedience to its monstrous demands'; and demands, in the name of

the laboring masses of Ohio, the immediate withdrawal of the militia from

the valley . . .56

The Columbus Dispatch reported a "deep disgust" among the

population in the valley towards the needless presence of the militia

and wondered, considering the reported cost of $400 per day, how

long the idle Guardsmen would be employed, while the pro-labor

53. General E. Finley to Governor Hoadly, September 11, 1884, Records of AG.

54. The units involved were Company B, Second Regiment, Company A, Eighth

Regiment, and Company B, Fourteenth Regiment; see AG Report, 75.

55. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 18, 19, and 20, 1884; the Hocking

Sentinel made fun of the army of "war correspondents" that had descended upon the

valley eager for action, but who were now disappointed. See Hocking Sentinel,

September 11, 18, and 25, 1884.

56. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 29, 1884.

50                                              OHIO HISTORY

Hocking Sentinel assured its readers that all would remain quiet if

the militia were withdrawn.⁵⁷ Even the Republican Ohio State Jour-

nal, which had strongly attacked Hoadly for his delay in sending

troops, and then praised him for keeping the troops in the valley,

now turned about once again to question Hoadly's policy. On

September 24 the paper stated that men of the Guard unit at Sand

Run felt that their presence was no longer needed and that many of

them were losing valuable work days while on duty. Three days

later the Journal reported that while Syndicate representatives

were asking the governor for the retention of troops in the valley,

many people were beginning to wonder if the troops were still neces-

sary. Thus even one of the Syndicate's strongest supporters was

beginning to question the value of maintaining troops in the valley.

The Journal stopped short of actually calling for a withdrawal, but

demanded that the governor soon make up his mind so that those on

duty could return to their homes. Meanwhile, the Republican New

Lexington Tribune went so far as to accuse the governor of main-

taining a standing army in the valley "because of the fearful soul of

the Democratic Sheriff down there that imagines that deviltry of

some kind or other will be perpetrated unless he has an army at his

heels."58

On September 17 General Finley informed Hoadly that he felt all

the troops could be withdrawn within the next two days. The gener-

al wrote, "There must come a time when we must leave, and in my

judgment a week or two weeks hence will find affairs in the same

condition as they are now, if the soldiers remain."⁵⁹ Finley admitted

that violence might reemerge once the soldiers left, but with no end

to the strike in sight, he questioned how long the retention of troops

could be justified when there was no longer any disorder. Rather

than the operators utilizing the state, Finley felt that they should

pay for their own protection.60 Finally, he recommended that all

three Guard companies be removed at the same time-withdrawing

one unit at a time would tend to cause dissatisfaction in the remain-

ing units, without offering any greater security. Since the Guard's

four outposts-Murray City, Sand Run, Snake Hollow, and Long-

57. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 23,1884; Hocking Sentinel, September

25, 1884.

58. Ohio State Journal, September 2, 10, 14, 24, and 27, 1884; New Lexington

Tribune, September 25, 1884.

59. General Ebenezer Finley to Governor Hoadly, September 17, 1884, Records of

AG.

60. Ibid.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                               51

streth-were not mutually supportive, the withdrawal of one com-

pany would leave that particular area exposed to attack. That

Snake Hollow had no Pinkertons, and Sand Run only three, meant

that the removal of one company would effectively undermine the

entire defense of the valley. Thus, if withdrawal were to be the

policy, Finley recommended withdrawing all of the units simul-

taneously.⁶1

Governor Hoadly, whose policy had always been to remove the

troops as soon as possible, did not accept Finley's last suggestion.

Perhaps out of caution, or in consideration of the appeals from the

mine operators, the governor chose to withdraw the Guard in

piecemeal fashion. When the Guard company from Bucyrus, after

fourteen days service, heard rumors that it would be held in the

valley for an extra week, both the Guardsmen and businessmen

from Bucyrus lodged a formal protest with the governor. In re-

sponse, the governor immediately replaced the Bucyrus company

with one from Chillicothe on September 23.62

The permanent withdrawal of units began on September 27, when

General Finley returned the Guard detachments at Murray City to

their respective companies and removed the troops from Sand Run.

Two days later the garrison at Snake Hollow was relieved. Finally,

on October 3 the last National Guard unit, the Chillicothe unit

which had replaced the Bucyrus company on Setember 23, was re-

moved from Longstreth.⁶³ The occupation of the valley had lasted

slightly over one month.

The strike, however, dragged on. As many had feared, the miners

renewed their campaign of violence two weeks after the National

Guard withdrew. On October 12, strikers set a mine at Shawnee

ablaze, and three days later six more mines and a hopper were set on

fire. Then on November 5, three railroad bridges were destroyed and

three hundred miners unsuccessfully attacked mine property at

Murray City.⁶⁴ Sheriff McCarthy wired the governor and requested

the return of the militia. Governor Hoadly, familiar now with

McCarthy's excitability, refused to believe that the sheriff had done

all in his power to prevent disorder. Instead, Hoadly made another

appeal to the local citizens to restrain themselves and foresake vio-

61. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 15, 1884; General Ebenezer Finley to

Governor Hoadly, September 17, 1884, Records of AG.

62. The new unit was Company A, Sixth Regiment; See AG Report, 75.

63. Ibid., 76.

64. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 79; AG Report, 79; Athens Messenger, Novem-

ber 13, 1884.

52                                                OHIO HISTORY

lence, threatening that if they did not, the Guard would indeed

return.65

The last major acts of violence, which included another attack by

strikers at Murray City, occurred in December and January, result-

ing in the destruction of some mining and railroad property. In

mid-December Sheriff John Boden of Athens County requested two

militia companies in response to this violence, but once again the

governor denied that the situation was serious enough to warrant

the introduction of state troops.⁶⁶

These attacks, by and large the last desperate acts of a few trou-

blemakers, were aimed mostly at property, and few injuries re-

sulted. Much more common were acts of petty larceny committed by

miners who were now destitute after months without work. While

there was some criticism of the governor's refusal to send military

aid, most people clearly saw that the situation was moving steadily

against the strikers.⁶⁷ By November, 1500 strikebreakers were at

work in the Hocking Valley, and by January 1885 all the Syndicate

mines but four were back in operation. By the second week of Febru-

ary the last Pinkerton left the valley, and on March 18, 1885, the

miners' union officially accepted the 60 cents a ton rate. After nine

months, the strike was finally over.⁶⁸

With the end of the strike in early 1885 the Ohio Assembly

launched an investigation to determine both the causes of the strike

and the possible means of preventing such a calamity in the future.

The committee conducting the investigation also endeavored to give

both sides a chance to explain their positions to the public. During

the investigation, union president John McBride testified that he

believed that the operators hired Pinkertons to provoke the mines

into a riot, hoping that this would lead to state military interven-

tion. In McBride's opinion, the operators desired the military's pre-

sence in order to demoralize the miners and break the strike.⁶⁹

Whether or not the operators sought to provoke an incident that

would invite military action, there is no doubt that they eagerly

sought large numbers of troops to protect their mines and

strikebreakers. The operators and the CHV&T lobbied for a forceful

reaction from Governor Hoadly after the Snake Hollow assault, and

65. AG Report, 79.

66. Lozier, "Hocking Valley Strike," 84; Athens Messenger, December 25, 1884.

67. H. B. Payne to Governor Hoadly, November 6, 1884, Hoadly Papers.

68. Lozier, "Hocking Vslley Strike," 61, 83, 87, and 89.

69. Proceedings of Hocking Valley Investigation, 314.

54                                               OHIO HISTORY

for any loss of life or property due to inadequate troop strength,

warned the Athens Messenger, rested solely with Governor Hoadly. 71

Except for Governor Hoadly's initial indecision whether to send

the Guard and his premature mobilization of the Guard at Co-

lumbus during the night of August 30-31, he responded effectively

to the situation in the valley.⁷² The manner in which he inter-

vened-both his trip to the valley and his subsequent judicious use

of the Guard-demonstrated to the miners that he was not a tool of

big business, but rather a man of moderation whose primary goal

was to restore peace and order. The governor's actions during the

strike, including his providing tents for evicted families, indicate

that he was in fact sympathetic to the plight of the miners.

Although the miners protested the Guard's presence, they seemed

satisfied with the individual conduct of the Guardsmen. Indeed, the

very absence of press coverage of the Guard's activities during the

occupation indicates that the Guard acted prudently. Not once did

the Guard openly clash with strikers, nor did it injure any miners.

The Guard itself, however, suffered three casualties during its

month-long occupation-one trooper died of typhoid, a second was

accidentally shot and killed by another Guardsman, and a third shot

himself in the leg.⁷³

Commenting on the conduct of the Guard, the pro-labor Hocking

Sentinel praised the departing Lancaster company on September 25:

They are friendly fellows and performed not very agreeable work with

kindness. Though sympathizing with the strikers, yet allegiance to their

State compelled them to erect breastworks to protect life and property, and

the miners, realizing their situation, treated them respectfully.74

Upon the withdrawal of the last troops from the valley in October,

the Sentinel reiterated this theme:

The soldiers acted as mild conservators of the peace, protecting life and

property, respecting alike the rights of miners and operators. They did no

harm. They imposed upon no one. They insulted nobody ... they did their

duty in orderly, gentlemanly style, leaving a kindly opinion upon the minds

of all with whom they came in contact.75

71. Ohio State Journal, September 2, 1884; Athens Messenger, September 4, 1884.

72. Ohio Eagle, September 11, 18, 1884; New Lexington Herald, September 11,

1884.

73. AG Report, 76.

74. Hocking Sentinel, September 25, 1884.

75. Hocking Sentinel, October 9, 1884.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                                  55

The Guardsmen, many of whom were common workers, artisans,

and farmers, generally sympathized with the plight of the strikers.

In fact, there were some fears that the troops would perhaps be too

sympathetic. On September 1, Superintendent Carr informed Gov-

ernor Hoadly that deputy Sheriff W. E. Hamblin of Hocking County

desired two companies of reinforcements from Columbus because

the troops the governor had sent were largely from coal mining

regions, the implication being that they would not be reliable. Carr

remarked, "I would add that ex-Governor Young had bad results

during the RR Riots in 1877 with companies from large RR

centers."⁷⁶ On the same day, a group of New Lexington citizens

telegraphed Governor Hoadly, suggesting that the New Lexington

company be excused from service because many of its members were

coal miners, including its commanding officer, Captain James

Teal.⁷⁷ Governor Hoadly disregarded these warnings and decided to

employ the New Lexington company.

In fact, an examination of the available Ohio National Guard

rosters for the years before or during the strike shows that the New

Lexington company was actually the only company out of the eight

that saw service in the valley that had any miners at all. Even the

roster of the New Lexington company listed only four miners, be-

sides Captain Teal.78 Eight other men were listed as "laborers," a

title that could possibly include men who worked at mines. Since the

company reported a strength of thirty-three officers and men on

September 1, this would mean that miners and mine workers could

have comprised, at most, 40 percent of the company.79 Thus the fears

seem groundless. However, for some unknown reason Governor

Hoadly was anxious to remove the New Lexington company from

service as soon as possible. Despite its excellent performance, the

company was relieved several days before the withdrawal of any

other troops from the initial contingent. Whether the governor

selected the New Lexington company for early withdrawal because

of pressure from operators concerned with its composition, or merely

by random choice in his urge to bring the troops home as soon as

possible, is not known.80

76. George Carr to Governor Hoadly, September 1, 1884, Hoadly Papers.

77. John W. Free, JF. McMahon, [?] Thacker, [?] Hoffman to Governor Hoadly,

September 1, 1884, Records of AG.

78. Ohio. Records of the Ohio Adjutant General's Office. Roster, 17th Ohio Nation-

al Guard Regiment, 1870-1904, Vol. 162, Ohio Historical Society.

79. Morning Report, Company A, Seventeenth Regiment, September 1, 1884. Re-

cords of AG.

80. Colonel Dill to Governor Hoadly, September 4, 5, and 6, 1884, AG Report,

56                                                OHIO HISTORY

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the Guard's intervention was

the decision concerning its withdrawal. The longer the troops re-

mained, the greater their financial cost to the state. On the other

hand, a premature withdrawal might lead to renewed violence and

the necessity of once again committing troops, with the risk of yet

another confrontation and perhaps even greater expense. By the

time the Guard departed in early October, the occupation had

already cost the state $14,575.78.81 In addition, the Guardsmen, who

traditionally never enjoyed strike duty, wearied quickly of service

and lamented lost wages they would have earned on their civilian

jobs. Many of them began to petition for relief after about two weeks

service. Since the Guardsmen received full pay only during the first

seven days of service, after which they received only half pay, they

naturally desired to return home to job and families as soon as

possible.⁸² According to the Ohio State Journal, the state, on the

other hand, preferred to maintain individual units in the valley as

long as possible rather than rotate them more frequently; because

fresh units would have to be given full pay for their first seven days

of service, it was less expensive for the state to retain an already

emplaced unit on service for more than seven days.

Whether to remove the troops was not an easy choice. The valley

was quiet and union officials promised that it would remain so.

Military and police officials, on the other hand, believed that vio-

lence might occur anew after the removal of the militia, and the

events of the following months verified their judgment. But as

General Finley had queried, how long could the Guard remain in

the peaceful area? By mid-September, newspapers of both political

parties were beginning to report the cost the state had to bear in

order to keep idle soldiers in the Hocking Valley.

Governor Hoadly, who had repeatedly informed civilians and sol-

diers alike of his desire to make the Guard's intervention as brief as

possible, decided to pull out the Guard gradually in late September

and early October. This was probably the wisest decision. The vio-

lence and destruction of property that occurred from October 1884

through January 1885 was sporadic and largely at a level that could

be controlled by local officials. Considering the desperation of the

miners and their hostility towards the operators, as well as the large

276-77; See also Hoadly to Dill, September 3, 1884, Records of AG.

81. Ohio, Adjutant General's Report, 1885, (Columbus, 1886), 55.

82. Colonel John C. Entreken to General Ebenezer Finley, October 1, 1884, Re-

cords of AG.

Hocking Valley Coal Strike                               57

number of potential targets, only a long military occupation could

have prevented such attacks, an option neither politically nor

economically feasible.

The proper function of the National Guard in strike situations is

to restore peace, order, and civil authority. Under the leadership of

Governor Hoadly, the Ohio National Guard accomplished this quite

effectively. The Guard's intervention resulted in the immediate res-

toration of peace and order and succeeded in keeping violence and

property damage to a minimum. After an uncertain start, Governor

Hoadly managed the Guard efficiently; under his direction, its in-

volvement was brief and its peacekeeping efforts moderate. Unlike

many publicized instances in which civil authorities blatantly used

state forces to crush strikes, Ohio's Governor Hoadly did an admir-

able job of utilizing the Ohio National Guard in an impartial man-

ner in the Hocking Valley strike of 1884.