The OHIO HISTORICAL Quarterly
VOLUME 70 ?? NUMBER 3 ?? JULY 1961
The British Indian Department and
The Abortive Treaty of Lower
Sandusky, 1793
By REGINALD HORSMAN*
IN THE EARLY FALL of 1792 a general
council of the Indian
nations of the Old Northwest was held
at the junction of the
Maumee and the Auglaize rivers in what
is now northwestern
Ohio. The Indians who gathered there
were jubilant, for their
attempts to resist the American advance
into the Old North-
west had met with success. Two major
American attempts to
destroy Indian resistance had failed.
In October 1790 General
Josiah Harmar had suffered humiliating
reverses after burn-
ing Indian villages near what is now
Fort Wayne, Indiana,
and in November 1791 an army under the
command of the
governor of the Northwest Territory,
Arthur St. Clair, had
met complete disaster. St. Clair's
force was overwhelmed by
an Indian attack some one hundred miles
north of Fort Wash-
ington (Cincinnati), and suffered over
six hundred killed. The
crushing defeat of St. Clair filled the
Indians with confidence,
and the American government was now
obliged to pursue two
policies. While on the one hand General
Anthony Wayne was
appointed to build an army for the
defeat of the Indians, on
the other the government made a number
of attempts at con-
ciliation. These attempts served both
to divert the Indians
while Wayne prepared, and to convince
the eastern public
* Reginald Horsman is an assistant
professor of history at the University of
Wisconsin - Milwaukee.
190
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
that everything possible was being done
to avoid an Indian
war. American efforts at conciliation
in 1792 met with fail-
ure, and the general Indian council
gathered on the Maumee in
the fall of that year to decide future
policy in regard to the
American government.1
The Indians were inspired by their
victories to increase
their demands. Since the summer of 1791
they had advocated
a boundary that would run along the
Ohio River from the
mouth of the Tennessee to the mouth of
the Muskingum, up
that river to the portage joining it to
the Cuyahoga, and then
in a direct line across country to Fort
Venango, in northwest-
ern Pennsylvania.2 Now,
under the stimulus of military vic-
tory, the council suggested that the
Ohio River should be the
limit of American expansion. The
Indians were willing to
meet the Americans at Lower Sandusky
(on the site of the
present city of Fremont) in the
following spring to discuss
peace on this basis, and they sent
their decision to the Ameri-
can government. Thus the way was
prepared for a major at-
tempt to achieve peace in the Old
Northwest.3 This develop-
ment was of immediate interest to the
British authorities in
Canada.
The British in Canada had of course
been deeply involved
in the affairs of the Indians south of
the Great Lakes since the
United States had achieved her
independence. In spite of the
treaty of peace the British had
continued to occupy the posts
1 The events of the years from 1789 to
1792 are discussed in Randolph C.
Downes, Council Fires on the Upper
Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the
Upper Ohio Valley Until 1795 (Pittsburgh, 1940), 310-322, and in Beverley W.
Bond, The Foundations of Ohio (Carl
Wittke, ed., The History of the State of
Ohio, I, Columbus, 1941), 319-328.
2 This boundary had been suggested to
the governor-in-chief of Canada, Lord
Dorchester, by deputies from the western
Indians. The British had asked the
Indians to suggest the terms on which
peace with the United States might be
achieved. See Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed.,
The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor
John Graves Simcoe (Toronto, 1923-31), I, 55.
3 See Six Nations to the United States,
November 16, 1792, in American State
Papers (Washington, 1832-61), Indian Affairs, I,
323-324. For the proceedings
of the council, see Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 218-229; also B. H.
Coates, "A Narrative of an Embassy
to the Western Indians from the Original
Manuscript of Hendrick Aupaumut," Memoirs
of the Historical Society of Penn-
sylvania, II (1827), 115-121.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 191
south of the Great Lakes, and were able
to control both the
Indians and the fur trade of that
region.4 British plans be-
came more ambitious in the early
1790's. From the beginning
of 1791 the British in Canada hoped
they would be able to
mediate in the Indian-American
difficulties, and thus secure
British interests. This idea was
elaborated in 1791 and 1792,
and in March 1792 a definite policy was
transmitted to the
British minister in the United States,
George Hammond, by
Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville. In
essence it was suggested
that the Muskingum boundary advocated
by the Indians since
the summer of 1791 should form the
basis of a permanent
American-Indian settlement. The resulting
Indian territory
in the Northwest was to be guaranteed
by both Great Britain
and the United States as a neutral
barrier state. Hammond
did not present this formal offer of
mediation, as he was
certain it would be refused, but the
idea of a neutral barrier
state still remained a definite hope of
the British government.5
The idea of a neutral Indian barrier
state was particularly
desirable to the British authorities in
Upper Canada. The first
lieutenant governor of that province,
John Graves Simcoe, ar-
rived at Montreal in June 1792, and
immediately investigated
the possibility of obtaining a neutral
barrier state. His source
of information was British Indian agent
Alexander McKee,
who was in charge of the vital post of
the Indian department
at Detroit. After McKee had advised
Simcoe at Montreal in
June, the lieutenant governor quickly
assumed direction of
Indian affairs in Upper Canada. It
quickly became apparent
that the British desired to play a part
in any future Indian-
American agreement. In August 1792
Simcoe sent to McKee
a suggestion that had originated with
Hammond in Philadel-
phia, and had been developed by Simcoe.
McKee was to im-
4 A standard modern account of the
reasons behind Great Britain's retention of
the western posts is in Alfred L. Burt, The
United States, Great Britain, and
British North America from the
Revolution to the Establishment of Peace After
the War of 1812 (New Haven, Conn., 1940), 82-105.
5 The hopes of the British government
for mediation, and the project of a neu-
tral barrier state, are treated in ibid.,
106-124, and in Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's
Treaty: A Study in Commerce and
Diplomacy (New York, 1924), 109-133.
192
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
press upon the Indians that they should
solicit the good offices
of the British government in securing a
peace: "It is to be
extremely desired that this
solicitation should be the result of
their own spontaneous
Reflections." Simcoe had no doubt of
the ability of McKee to conjure forth a
"spontaneous" re-
quest for British aid. McKee was,
however, to deny any
assertions that Great Britain might go
to war on the side of
the Indians.6
Thus, even before the Indian tribes at
the October 1792
council offered to meet the Americans
for a treaty in the fol-
lowing spring, the British had prepared
to take part in any
such meeting. The British in Canada
were anxious that the
Indians should not achieve a peace
without British mediation,
for this would lessen British influence
among the Indians.
In November 1792, after the Six Nations
of the New York
area returned from the council on the
Maumee, they met in
council at Buffalo Creek, and on behalf
of the Indians re-
quested the British to attend the
coming treaty at Lower San-
dusky with all the records, treaties,
and other documents
pertaining to the Indian claims.7 This
was the "spontaneous"
request that Simcoe had asked McKee to
produce, and on re-
ceiving it Simcoe asked Hammond how he
should reply. Ham-
mond had already sounded out Alexander
Hamilton, and had
received the answer that the United
States would be unwilling
to accept mediation, as this would detract
from the power of
the country in the eyes of the Indians.
However, Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson agreed that
British Indian agents
could attend the treaty to explain
American offers to the In-
dians.8 As it was becoming
obvious that the Americans would
not accept British plans of formal
intervention and a buffer
state, the need to maintain the
strength and unity of the In-
6 For the Simcoe-McKee discussions, see
Simcoe to Henry Dundas, June 21,
1792, and Simcoe-McKee Memorandum in
Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I,
171-174; also Simcoe to McKee, August
30, 1792, ibid., I, 207-209.
7 Ibid., I, 256-260.
8 Simcoe to Hammond, November 17, 1792,
January 21, 1793, Hammond to
Simcoe, November 27, 1792, ibid.,
I, 262, 277-278, 267-269.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 193
dians became increasingly important to
the authorities in Can-
ada.
The permission that had been obtained
for British agents
to be present at Lower Sandusky
simplified matters, and Sim-
coe appointed Alexander McKee and John
Butler to attend on
the British behalf. The British also
intended to use more
than moral suasion on the Indians, for
Simcoe refused Ameri-
can agents permission to purchase
supplies in Canada for the
use of the Indians at the coming
treaty. Instead, Great Brit-
ain would supply the tribes with the
necessary provisions.9 For
a treaty between the Americans and the
Indians on American
soil, Britain intended not only to have
her agents present but
also to supply the Indians with all
they needed during the pro-
ceedings.
The Indians also laid their plans
during the winter. For-
tunately for the American settlers, the
frontier was for the
most part quiet, for the chiefs were
restraining their warriors
until they knew America's decision
regarding the invitation to
Lower Sandusky.10 The
American secretary of war, Henry
Knox, replied in December 1792 to the
Indian request for a
treaty. He said the United States would
be happy to meet
the Indians, but did not mention the
boundary for which the
United States would be prepared to
treat.11 The Indians now
spent the winter in making arrangements
for the coming
treaty negotiations. The western tribes decided that they
would meet in council before the
gathering at Lower Sandusky
in order to confront the Americans with
an appearance of
complete unity. As early as February
1793 the western tribes
informed the Six Nations that they
would meet in council at
the foot of the rapids of the Maumee in
the spring, and they
9 Simcoe to Hammond, January 21, 1793,
Simcoe to McKee (extract), January
23, 1793, Requisition for Supplies,
February 21, 1793, ibid., I, 277-279, 296.
10 See McKee to Simcoe, January 30,
1793, ibid., I, 282.
11 Knox to the Western Indians, December
12, 1792, ibid., I, 270. In this reply
the United States agreed to meet the
Indians at the rapids of the Maumee rather
than at Lower Sandusky as requested by
the Indians. This offended the Indians,
and the United States claimed that it
was owing to an interpreter's mistake. Knox
corrected the error, and it was agreed
to meet the Indians at Lower Sandusky.
Ibid., I, 283-284, 295.
194
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
requested the Six Nations to attend.
Yet, even in this mes-
sage calling for unity before the
treaty, there were distinct
signs that the Indians would be unable
to maintain it. The
western nations expressed surprise that
the reply of the
Americans agreeing to the treaty made
no mention of the In-
dian sine qua non -- the Ohio
boundary -- and they there-
fore suggested that the Six Nations had
not understood, or
had not well explained to the
Americans, the result of the
Indian council during the previous
fall. They wanted the Six
Nations to come to the rapids to
concert ideas, and to ensure
that even before the Indians went to
the treaty council they
could ascertain whether the American
commissioners had the
power to make peace on the terms
required.12
The Six Nations on their part were not
at all happy with
the manner in which the western Indians
were directing the
affairs of the Indian confederacy. In a
letter to McKee late
in March 1793 their spokesman Joseph
Brant expressed the
view that the Americans genuinely
desired peace, and thought
that the western nations should be most
careful to restrain
themselves.13 Moreover, the
Six Nations themselves held a
council at Niagara before Brant, their
representative, and his
entourage departed for the Maumee, and
came to the conclu-
sion that a reasonable line would be
that suggested to Lord
Dorchester at Quebec in August 1791 --
the Muskingum line,
which would yield land to the north of
the Ohio. Brant also
expressed the very reasonable point of
view that places already
settled by the Americans, such as
Gallipolis or Marietta, could
be yielded to the United States even
though they were not
within the general boundary, so long as
the permanent bound-
ary was definitely marked.14 Plans
for the Indian council at
12 Western Indians to the Five Nations,
February 27, 1793. Claus Papers, MG
19, Series F 1, Vol. 5, Public Archives
of Canada, Ottawa. All subsequent refer-
ences to the Claus Papers are to this
volume.
The Six Nations had given the request
for a treaty to the Americans. See
Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I,
256-260.
13 Brant to McKee, March 23, 1793. Claus Papers.
14 Simcoe
to Alured Clarke, April 1, 21, 1793, Simcoe to McKee, April 29,
1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 308-309, 317-318, 322-324.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 195
the rapids thus matured in an
atmosphere of distrust and dis-
agreement between the Six Nations and
the western tribes.
The British in Canada were of course
most interested in the
development of the Indian plans for the
1793 treaty, and they
decided to provide the provisions for
the preliminary Indian
council as well as for the treaty at
Lower Sandusky. When
Simcoe at the end of April 1793
reported to McKee on Brant's
ideas for a Muskingum boundary, he
expressed the opinion
that Brant's ideas seemed just, and
that this arrangement
could form the basis of an Indian
barrier state. He also warn-
ed, however, that no hint of this
should be given until the
American commissioners had left Lower
Sandusky with a
signed treaty.15 Simcoe
ignored the fact that Brant's line
disregarded the Ohio boundary decided
on by the general In-
dian council in the previous fall.
While the British and the Indians
matured their plans, the
United States had no great hopes for
the coming council at
Lower Sandusky. Jefferson later said
that the negotiations of
1793 were only entered into "to
prove to all our citizens that
peace was unattainable on terms which
any one of them would
admit."16 The United
States would have liked peace in the
Northwest, but the government did not
believe they could ob-
tain the land they wanted until they
had defeated the Indians
in battle. The problem of instructions
for the American com-
missioners was a difficult one, and it
was not until after cabinet
discussions that this question was
finally resolved. The great
problem was whether the United States
would consider re-
treating from the boundaries obtained
during the 1780's. In
essence these boundaries had given the
United States a good
part of what is now the state of Ohio
-- everything east of the
Cuyahoga and Muskingum, and southern
Ohio west to the
Great Miami. The United States did in
fact retreat a little in
the instructions finally given to the
commissioners. At the
15 Simcoe to McKee, April 29, 1793, ibid.,
I, 322-324.
16 Jefferson to Charles Pinckney, November 27, 1793, in H. A. Washington,
ed.,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1854), IV, 85-86; see also Wash-
ington to Charles Carroll, January 23,
1793, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The
Writings of George Washington (Washington, 1931-44), XXXII, 312-313.
196
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
end of April 1793 Benjamin Lincoln,
Beverley Randolph, and
Timothy Pickering, the distinguished
trio who were to repre-
sent the United States, were told that
the United States would
be happy if they could obtain
confirmation of the boundaries
established in the 1780's. If this were
accomplished the United
States was prepared to confirm the
Indian right of soil to the
remaining lands in the Northwest, and
to pay liberally for the
agreement. The commissioners could even
consider retreating
slightly from the line confirmed at the
treaty of Fort Harmar
in 1789 if this would establish peace.
They could not retreat
too far, for the United States had
already sold much of the
land gained in the 1780's. The
commissioners were to treat as
much as possible with the separate
tribes, in order to dis-
courage the idea of an Indian
confederacy. They were also
told to try to complete their
negotiations by August 1, and
immediately to inform General Anthony
Wayne of the re-
sult.17 In this way the
military campaign could be carried out
if, as expected, the negotiations
should fail. Wayne himself
was ordered to have everything ready
for a campaign by
July 20 or, at the latest, August 1.18
By the spring of 1793 the participants
in the proposed treaty
of Lower Sandusky were seeking at least
four different ob-
jectives. The western Indians hoped to
secure a boundary that
would give them permanent possession of
the lands northwest
of the Ohio. Joseph Brant and the Six
Nations hoped to
secure a boundary that would give the
Indians possession of
most of the Northwest, but would yield
land in what is now
southeastern Ohio. The Americans hoped
to secure a treaty
17 The instructions to the commissioners, dated April 26, 1793, are in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 340-342. For cabinet discussions preceding the
sending of instructions to the
commission, see Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
XXXII, 348-349; Washington, Writings
of Jefferson, IX, 136-138; Clarence E.
Carter, comp. and ed., The
Territorial Papers of the United States (Washington,
1934-), II, The Territory Northwest
of the River Ohio, 1787-1803, 440-441,
447-449.
18 Knox to Wayne, April 20, 1793, in Richard C. Knopf, ed., Anthony
Wayne--A
Name in Arms; Soldier, Diplomat,
Defender of Expansion Westward of a Nation:
The Wayne - Knox - Pickering -
McHenry Correspondence (Pittsburgh,
1960),
221-225.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 197
that would bring peace to the
Northwest, and that in essence
would confirm to them the boundaries of
the treaty of Fort
Harmar--that is, give the Americans
much of what is now
eastern and southern Ohio. The British
would have been
happy with either the Muskingum or the
Ohio boundary for
the Indians--the essential condition
being Indian unity on one
or the other--and it was hoped that the
creation of this bound-
ary would prepare the way for the
establishment of the
remaining lands of the Old Northwest as
a permanent Indian
preserve. Moreover, a broad difference
was that both the
Indians and the British hoped in the
coming treaty to gain
acceptance of the idea that the Indians
could treat as a united
confederacy holding their lands in
common, while the Ameri-
cans hoped to emphasize the idea of the
different Indian
tribes having rights to particular
tracts of land.
The American commissioners finally
arrived at Niagara
on their way west in the latter part of
May 1793. There they
were to stay for six weeks, until
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe
informed them that they could go
forward.19 The delay was
made necessary by the long drawn out
preliminary proceedings
on the part of the Indians. McKee had
already expressed the
fear that the Indians would not be
ready to meet the com-
missioners until "after
June,"20 and this fear was borne out
in the following months. Until past the
middle of May the
Indians were in their villages engaged
in the planting of corn
and in other preparations for the
summer. Though Joseph
Brant arrived at Detroit with
representatives of the Six Na-
tions and the Delawares from the Grand
River in the middle
of May, and was at the foot of the
rapids of the Maumee by
May 22, it was not until the first two
weeks in June that the
19 See American State Papers, Indian
Affairs, I, 342-348; also Benjamin Lin-
coln, "Journal of a Treaty Held in
1793, with the Indian Tribes North-West of
the Ohio, by Commissioners of the United
States," Collections of the Massachu-
setts Historical Society, Third Series, V, (1836), 122-137.
20 R.
G. England to E. B. Littlehales, April 16, 1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 314.
198
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
other Indians at last started arriving
at the rapids.21 By the
second week most of the important
chiefs from the Glaize
(the junction of the Maumee and the
Auglaize rivers) had
arrived, and the British Indian
department at Detroit was
busily engaged in sending not only
provisions but also Indians
down the Maumee. McKee had left his old
friend Matthew
Elliott in charge at Detroit, and he
had the task of ensuring
that the Indians were well supplied. He
also sent for Indians
who had not yet arrived, and as they
came to Detroit tried
to send them on their way without
incident. On June 19
Elliott informed McKee that he had sent
tobacco and wam-
pum to the Saginaw Indians to hurry
them along as quickly
as possible--he had already sent to the
Indians in the region
of Michilimackinac. In these councils
of the early 1790's
Indians attended from all over the
Northwest--the Maumee,
the Sandusky, the Wabash, Canada, the
Saginaw Bay region,
and the vast area west of Lake
Michigan. The success of
such general councils depended a great
deal on the fact that
the British would supply the Indians
when they arrived, and
on the fact that the British agents
helped to summon the
Indians to the place of meeting.
Moreover, the provisions that
were issued were not always the
ubiquitous pork and peas.
The boat that left Detroit for the
rapids of the Maumee on
June 19 carried, among other supplies,
five barrels of powder,
and one thousand pounds of ball and
shot.22 This was required
by the Indians for hunting, but it
naturally also proved a great
aid in establishing a stock of weapons
with which to resist
the American advance. The facility with
which the provisions
could be supplied increased as the
summer progressed. The
commander at Detroit, Lieutenant
Colonel Richard England,
informed McKee on June 20 that he now
had been given a
21 See McKee to England, May 16, 1793,
Brant to McKee, May 17, 1793, Claus
Papers; Joseph Brant's Journal, in
Cruikshank, Sincoe Correspondence, II, 5-6;
Chiefs at the Glaize to McKee, May 27,
1793, Indian Affairs, Superintendent Gen-
eral, RG 10, Vol. 8, Public Archives of
Canada, Ottawa. All subsequent references
to documents of the department of Indian
Affairs are to this volume.
22 Elliott to McKee, May 20, June 5,
1793, Claus Papers; Elliott to McKee,
June 11, 14, 19, 1793, England to McKee,
June 10, 18, 1793, Indian Affairs.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 199
latitude that would enable him
"with some ease" to attend to
McKee's requisitions, and Simcoe told
McKee on the twenty-
second that he had informed England to
lose no time in sup-
plying McKee with provisions for the
Indian councils.23
Provisions and Indians passed in
considerable numbers
along the Detroit River, into Lake
Erie, and up the Maumee
in June of 1793. Elliott was able to
inform McKee on June
24 that all the Indians were now past,
or would be the next
day, except for some of those from the
Saginaw and Michili-
mackinac regions. On the twenty-ninth
McKee wrote from
the foot of the rapids to tell Simcoe
that the number of Indians
"from distant quarters" now
amounted to nearly one thou-
sand.24 At the end of June
and the beginning of July practi-
cally every day saw supplies leave
Detroit for the provisioning
of the Indians on the Maumee.25
While the Indian department ensured
that the Indians
would actually gather for the council,
and would be well sup-
plied, the council itself was not
proceeding smoothly. From
the point of view of the British and
the Indians the most un-
fortunate development was an increasing
rift between the Six
Nations and the western Indians. Brant
was not pleased that
the Indians had not gathered when he
arrived, and he became
less pleased as time went on. In the
first two weeks in June
he recorded in his journal that evil
reports were being spread
against him to the effect that he was a
traitor, and had only
attended the council to receive money.
Though on June 15 he
called a council with the Shawnees,
Delawares, Miamis, Wy-
andots, and some of the Lake Indians
(Ottawas, Chippewas,
and Potawatomis) in order to try to
remove the bad impres-
sion, the evil reports continued. He
was particularly perturbed
that the Shawnees, Delawares, and
Miamis were on many
nights holding councils to which the
Six Nations were not
23 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, 361; Claus Papers.
24 Indian
Affairs; Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, 371-372.
25 Elliott to McKee, June 25, 28, 1793, England to McKee, June 26, 1793,
Indian
Affairs; England to McKee, June 29,
1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence,
I, 372-373; Thomas Duggan to McKee, July
3, 1793, England to McKee, July 5,
1793, Elliott to McKee, July 13, 1793,
Claus Papers.
200
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
invited. Though Brant was being
excluded from the secret
deliberations, there seems little doubt
that the British Indian
department was in the confidence of the
western tribes. Mc-
Kee and his chief assistant Elliott had
spent a lifetime among
the Shawnees, their wives came from
that tribe, and their
whole sympathy was with the western
Indians rather than
with the Six Nations. McKee eventually
approached Brant
to ask him if he would agree to the
idea of a deputation going
to meet the American commissioners at
Niagara to ask them
if they had the power to establish a
new boundary. Brant
expressed his approval, adding that the
principal chiefs
should go, and on July 1 the chiefs of
the other nations came
to Brant to make a formal proposal for
a deputation. On the
following day the deputation set out
for Niagara.26 McKee
explained in letters to Simcoe that the
general confederacy
was anxious to know whether the
commissioners had the nec-
essary authority to draw a new boundary
(in particular one
along the Ohio), and the Indians were
also concerned at the
presence of a powerful body of troops
in the Northwest
(Wayne's force). McKee's opinion was
that the Indians
would not make peace unless the Ohio
boundary was given,
and all the American forts to the north
of the Ohio were
demobilized. He expressed the fear that
if the commissioners
came to Sandusky without the authority
to conclude an agree-
ment in this form it might incite the
tribes to hostile action.27
McKee's fears of the outcome of the
treaty council had
already been voiced by Simcoe. During
the weeks in which the
American commissioners were detained at
Niagara, it became
very apparent that the United States
was not prepared to
deviate to any great extent from the
boundary that had been
established at Fort Harmar in 1789.
Simcoe became con-
vinced that there was little likelihood
of a peace, and he
realized that neither the commissioners
nor Wayne really
26 Joseph Brant's Journal, in
Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, 5-7.
27 McKee to Simcoe, June 29, July 1,
1793, ibid., I, 371-372, 374.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 201
expected one.28 Simcoe's
desire to make the forthcoming treaty
greatly to the advantage of Great
Britain was undoubtedly
increased when in May 1793 he received
and proclaimed the
news that England and France had been
in a state of war
since February.29 From this
time the efforts of the British
authorities in Canada to bolster Indian
resistance, and to
secure an Indian-American agreement to
Britain's advantage,
became far more overt.
Simcoe placed great faith in Alexander
McKee, and the
letters that passed between the two men
clearly indicated the
extent to which Simcoe entrusted power
into the hands of the
Indian department. On June 22 Simcoe
sent to McKee and
John Butler the instructions to guide
them during the pro-
ceedings at Lower Sandusky. He told
them that they were
not to act as mediators, but that on
the request of the Indians
they should interpret maps and
treaties. They should also
make use of their influence over the
Indians by inclining them
to accept offers if they were of
benefit to the Indians, and to
reject them if they were contrary to
their real interests. They
should of course be cautious, and as
had been usual in the
Indian department in the past it was
preferable that they
should give advice privately to some of
the chiefs. If it be-
came necessary to express disapproval
at a general meeting, it
was better to do this by silence rather
than by words. Simcoe
expressed the desire for a safe and
solid peace, and for the
complete attachment of the Indians to
Great Britain.30 In
his instructions to the Indian
interpreters who were also going
to Lower Sandusky, Simcoe added a
little more. He told them
that "the union of the Indian Nations"
was the great object
of their being sent to Sandusky. They
should work for this
end, and were to persuade the Indians
"to adopt such meas-
ures as Col. McKee shall from time to
time direct as necessary
for their common benefit and
preservation."31
28 Simcoe
to McKee, June 2, 1793, Claus Papers; Simcoe to Alured Clarke,
June 14, 1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 354-355.
29 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence,
I, 329.
30 Ibid., I, 365-366.
31 Ibid., I, 368.
202
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
It is striking how under the pressure
of events in the spring
of 1793, and with the news of the war
against France, Simcoe
more and more moved into the position
of using the Indian
department as a direct organizer of the
Indians within
American territory. Undoubtedly his
main object was still
peace, but it was a peace which would
leave the Northwest as
a British and Indian preserve. On June
23 Simcoe wrote a
confidential letter to McKee in which
he expressed the hope
that if a treaty was signed the
confederacy would guarantee
the boundaries of the Indian buffer
state sketched by McKee
and Simcoe in Montreal in June 1792.
Five days later he
expressed the opinion that detaching
Kentucky from the
Union, and attaching it to Canada,
would give the Indians
perfect security, and that though this
might prove difficult
the attempt should not be for a moment
out of sight.32
The deputation of Indians from the
rapids quickly pro-
ceeded to Niagara, and on July 7 in the
presence of Simcoe
met with the commissioners of the
United States. Brant spoke
on behalf of the confederacy. He asked
why the United States
was presenting a warlike appearance in
the Northwest, and
whether the commissioners had the power
to settle a boundary.
The commissioners replied that
Washington had forbidden
hostilities until the result of the
treaty was known, and that
they had been given the authority to
draw a boundary line.
Brant promised that the deputation
would take this message
to the confederacy on the Maumee.33
Brant was by no means
a good spokesman for the confederacy at
this point--his will-
ingness to give up land to the north of
the Ohio was not
matched by his western brethren. McKee
wrote to Simcoe
on July 5 that unless the American
commissioners would
agree to an Ohio boundary it was likely
that war would ensue.
Simcoe himself was concerned about the
apparent disagree-
ment between the Six Nations and the
other tribes, and while
32 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence,
V, 50-53. Simcoe and McKee not only
envisioned an Indian buffer state
northwest of the Ohio but also thought Great
Britain should retain Detroit. Ibid.,
I, 173.
33 Ibid., I, 377-382.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 203
Brant was at Niagara, Simcoe tried to
impress upon him the
necessity for a strong union of the
Indians.34
In the middle of July both the
commissioners and the Indian
deputation set off west along Lake Erie
to the vicinity of the
Indian council. The American
commissioners had grown in-
creasingly impatient at the delay, and
had requested permis-
sion to go to Detroit to be nearer the
Indian gathering.
Simcoe had refused this request, but he
did grant them
permission to go to the mouth of the
Detroit River, some
eighteen miles south of Detroit.35
From there they could easily
communicate with the Indians on the
Maumee, and it was
presumed that they would travel from
there to Lower San-
dusky when the Indians were ready. The
commissioners ar-
rived at the mouth of the Detroit on
July 21, and were
accommodated in the home of British
Indian agent Matthew
Elliott. Elliott himself had left for
the rapids of the Maumee
four days before with provisions. The
American commis-
sioners immediately informed McKee of
their arrival--they
had become accustomed to the idea of
dealing with the Indians
through the British Indian
department--and once again set-
tled down to wait for the news that the
Indians would proceed
to Lower Sandusky.36
At the foot of the rapids all was not
well. On July 21 the
deputation that had been to Niagara
returned to the Maumee,
and it immediately became apparent that
the rift in the Indian
confederacy was becoming a gulf--with
Brant and the Six
Nations, joined by the Ottawas,
Chippewas, and Potawatomis
on one side, and the Shawnees, Miamis,
Wyandots, and Dela-
wares leading the opposition. Many
thought that the deputa-
tion to Niagara had not presented the
Indian case with suffi-
cient force. They resented Brant's
reluctance to insist on the
34 Ibid., V, 55-56, I, 383.
35 Thomas Talbot to McKee, June 30,
1793, ibid., I, 373-374; Simcoe to England,
June 28, 1793, Joseph Bunbury to McKee,
July 16, 1793, Claus Papers.
36 American State Papers, Indian
Affairs, I, 351; Lincoln,
"Journal of a Treaty
Held in 1793," 141-143; Elliott to
McKee, July 16, 1793, Thomas Duggan to
McKee, July 17, 1793, Claus Papers;
Commissioners of the United States to
McKee, July 21, 1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 395.
204
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
Ohio River boundary. Moreover, in
council on July 26, an-
other clash developed because the Lake
Indians thought it
would be better to hold the council
with the Americans at the
mouth of the Maumee rather than at
Lower Sandusky. Brant
was willing to go along with this idea,
but it was strongly
opposed by the Wyandots, who had their
main villages in the
Sandusky region. The threatened impasse
was avoided when
Captain Johnny, the Shawnee chief in
whom McKee and
Elliott placed their main trust, spoke
on behalf of the Shaw-
nees and urged that the Indians should
complete the business
of the meeting and prepare a message
for the commissioners.
It is not difficult to see McKee's
urging behind this request.
Yet, when in answer to this plea the
tribes withdrew to con-
sult, they formed two separate
councils: the Six Nations with
the Lake Indians, and the Shawnees,
Miamis, Wyandots, and
Delawares in another group. After this
separate consultation
Captain Johnny again spoke, and said
that the boundary
would have to be that of the treaty of
Fort Stanwix in 1768
(the Ohio River). The opinion of the
Six Nations was not
asked, and a Wyandot chief proceeded to
frame the message
while Lieutenant Prideaux Selby, who
was attached to the
Indian department as an aide to McKee,
wrote it down.
Brant did not agree with the message
and would not sign it.
The message reflected the confidence of
the western tribes
after the defeat of St. Clair. It told
the commissioners that if
the United States wanted a lasting
peace, she should imme-
diately remove all her people from the
Indian (north) side
of the river. The Indians asked the
commissioners whether
they were authorized to fix the Ohio as
a boundary, explaining
that the deputation which had gone to
Niagara had failed to
give adequate expression to the desires
of the confederacy.37
On July 28 a deputation of between
twenty and thirty
Indians--including principal chiefs of
the Shawnees, Dela-
wares, and Wyandots--set off for the
mouth of the Detroit
37 Brant's
account of the council is in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II,
7-12; see also Western Indians to the
Commissioners of the United States, July 27,
1793, ibid., I, 401-402.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 205
River. They were accompanied by Matthew
Elliott and
Simon Girty. At the mouth of the
Detroit River they en-
camped on Bois Blanc Island; Elliott's
farm (where the
American commissioners were staying)
faced the island on
the Canadian side of the river. On July
30 the deputation
crossed to deliver the message
demanding an Ohio River
boundary, and on the following day the
American commis-
sioners delivered their answer. They
told the Indians that an
Ohio River boundary was impossible, and
that the United
States required approximately the
boundary agreed on at Fort
Harmar in 1789. They did, however, now
concede that the
right of soil to the rest of the land
in the Northwest belonged
to the Indians, and that the United
States had been wrong in
the 1780's when she had claimed all the
Northwest by right of
conquest from Great Britain. Yet the
commissioners would
not concede the Indian right to all the
land beyond the Ohio.38
On August 1 a Wyandot chief, speaking
through interpreter
Simon Girty, said the deputation would
lay the reply of the
commissioners before the warriors
gathered on the Maumee,
but to the consternation of Matthew
Elliott he also added
that the commissioners might as well go
home and tell the
Indian decision to President
Washington. The Moravian mis-
sionary John Heckewelder recorded in
his journal that Elliott
immediately exclaimed, "No, no,
they was not to have said
(the last Words)," and turned to a
Shawnee chief and told
him that the last part of the speech
was wrong. It would seem
that the Wyandot had forgotten his
lines, or had at least ad-
libbed a little too freely. Simon Girty
insisted he had trans-
lated the Wyandot's statement
correctly, but eventually after
some discussion it was announced to the
commissioners
through Girty that they should wait for
an answer while the
deputation returned to consult the
council on the Maumee.39
38 Accounts
of the proceedings from July 28 to August 1 are in American State
Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 352-354; Paul A. W. Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand
Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh, 1958), 315-318; Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, I, 405-409, II, 29-30.
39 Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles
with John Heckewelder, 318; also Cruik-
shank, Simcoe Correspondence, II,
29-30.
206
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
While the deputation had been away, the
council had become
even more disunited. On the day the
message was sent to the
commissioners, July 28, Brant had
written to Simcoe saying
that affairs had taken a turn which was
not approved by a
great part of the Indians. This change
had taken place, he
argued, while he had been away with the
deputation at
Niagara. Though the Ottawas, Chippewas,
and Potawatomis
approved of its actions, many argued on
its return that the
group should have insisted on the Ohio
River boundary.
Brant still expressed the opinion that
the Muskingum not the
Ohio would be a just and moderate line,
though the whole
question should be discussed at the
Sandusky treaty, not
definitely resolved beforehand. He
expressed the opinion that
some of the tribes had not the least
inclination for peace, and
that the message sent to the
commissioners made it almost
certain that peace would not be
achieved. In this letter Brant
only hinted at the reasons for the
attitude of the western
tribes. He said the great change might
have occurred owing
to advice received from the Creek country.40 Two weeks
before, a British trader had arrived
from the South with the
news that the Creeks and Cherokees were
at war with the
Americans. This trader later informed
Simcod that though
the Shawnees had been sent by the
confederacy last fall to
invite the southern Indians to join
them, they had not told the
southern Indians of the coming treaty,
and had in fact assured
them that in the event of war the
British government would
supply arms and ammunition.41 The
Shawnees were of course
the tribe most closely connected with
McKee, Elliott, and the
British Indian department at Detroit.
Though Brant was reluctant to ascribe
specific blame in the
middle of the council, he became less
reticent in the fall and
in the years to follow. At the end of
September, after he had
returned disgusted from the council, he
gave as a reason for
the failure of peace hopes, that
"the three Nations, Shawonoes,
40 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, 402-403.
41 England to Simcoe, July 18, 1793, Simcoe to Clarke, July 29,
1793, ibid., I,
391-393; Simcoe to McKee, July 23, 1793,
Claus Papers.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 207
Delawares, & Twightwees
[Miamis]," were in his opinion,
"too much under the guidance &
influence of some white peo-
ple, who have advised them to adhere to
the old boundary line
as fixed in the year 1768."42
Two years later the accusation
was made even more explicit. It was
reported that it was very
difficult to persuade Brant to
entertain a favorable opinion of
McKee, to whose interference he
publicly attributed the failure
of peace negotiations with the commissioners.43
Certainly
Simcoe showed no willingness to
interfere with McKee's ac-
tions in the spring and summer of 1793.
To Brant's letter
asking for advice on the matter of the
split in the council and
on the boundary question, Simcoe
replied rather vaguely that
he could not give an opinion as to the
precise boundary, as
this was a matter for the Indians.44
This did not help Brant,
whose whole point was that some of the
tribes were far too
much under the influence of McKee.
The deputation to the commissioners,
delayed by contrary
winds, did not return to the rapids
until August 5. The Brant-
McKee split had become even wider on
the previous day.
Brant protested that the Six Nations
were being left out
of the decisions, and that too many
private discussions
had taken place. "We are not told
anything," he asserted.
"Our opinion and that of three
respectable Tribes [Ottawas,
Chippewas, and Potawatomis] has not
been attended to."
When the deputation arrived
and gave an account of the
meeting, Brant and the Six Nations
decided to go home.
Brant stated that from the actions that
had been taken it
appeared that no treaty was intended.
The Shawnees, however,
now pressed the Six Nations to stay a
few days. This was in
all probability McKee's desire, as he
had been urged to main-
tain as much unity as possible. The
council showed signs of
complete disintegration when on August
7 the Creeks made
a formal announcement that they were at
war with the Ameri-
42 Brant
to Joseph Chew, September 26, 1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Corre-
spondence, II, 68-69; also Brant to Simcoe, September 2, 1793, ibid.,
II, 47.
43 William
J. Chew to Joseph Chew, November 26, 1795, ibid., IV, 145.
44 Simcoe
to Brant, August 8, 1793, ibid., II, 4-5.
208
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
cans, were driving them back, and
wanted the aid of the
confederacy. The Six Nations, and the
Seven Nations of
Canada, who had arrived late for the
council, argued that
the business for which the council had
been called should be
completed before the Creek request was
considered. The argu-
ment continued for several days. On
August 9 Captain
Johnny again spoke for the Shawnees.
Though he acknowl-
edged that the confederacy had been
started by the Six
Nations, he made it quite evident that
he considered the
Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis had
taken it over since the
treaty of Fort Harmar in 1789. He
asserted yet again that
though the Indians were willing to meet
the commissioners,
the Ohio River would have to be the
boundary. Brant op-
posed him. He acknowledged that the
western tribes had led
the confederacy since Fort Harmar, but
pointed out that the
confederacy itself had originally
suggested a boundary along
the Muskingum River to Lord Dorchester
in 1791. On the
part of the Six Nations, Brant urged
the tribes to yield land
to the Muskingum rather than insist on
the Ohio River
boundary. The Seven Nations of Canada
did not agree with
this, and their spokesman delivered a
revealing speech regard-
ing the British attitude: "My
opinion when I left home was
that we were to defend the Old Boundary
which is the Ohio,
and in this opinion I was confirmed by
the English as I passed
their Posts." He announced,
however, that the Seven Nations
would abide by whatever the confederacy
decided.45
At this point the attitude of the
British Indian agents
became even more apparent. The chiefs
of the Shawnees,
Wyandots, and Seven Nations of Canada,
apparently won by
Brant's arguments, told him that they
would follow his opin-
ion regarding the boundary because he
knew more about the
whites. This opinion was soon changed.
Brant reported in
his journal that at midnight on the
same night, McKee held
a private meeting with these chiefs,
and apparently changed
their opinion. There seems no reason to
disbelieve Brant on
45 See Brant to McKee, August 4, 1793,
Claus Papers; Brant's account of the
council is in Cruikshank, Sincoe
Correspondence, II, 12-15.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 209
this occasion.46 Even John
Heckewelder, the Moravian mis-
sionary, had already heard from various
Indians that Mc-
Kee, Elliott, and others had turned the
Indians against
the deputation which had been to
Niagara.47 In general coun-
cil on the day after the midnight
meeting Captain Johnny
announced that the Ohio River boundary
was the final deter-
mination, and that this would be told
to the commissioners.
The Seven Nations of Canada agreed to
defend this line, but
the Six Nations still insisted that the
Muskingum was a more
reasonable boundary. Buckongahelas, a
Delaware chief, then
spoke, and Brant wrote in his journal
that the Delaware
pointed to McKee and said he was the
person who advised
them to insist on the Ohio line.48
On August 13 the confederacy sent a
message to the com-
missioners, and argued that none of the
cessions made since
1783 were valid, as they had not been
made in general council.
The Indians said money was of no use to
them, and advanced
the ingenious idea that the Americans
should take the money
they were going to give the Indians for
the land, and give it
to the American settlers on the north
of the Ohio as com-
pensation for having to retire beyond
that river. The Indians
pointed out that these settlers must be
poor, otherwise they
would never have entered into such a
dangerous area. As the
message reached its peroration the
language befitted the sol-
emn occasion:
We desire you to consider Brothers, that
our only demand, is the
peaceable possession of a small part of
our once great Country. Look
back and view the lands from whence we
have been driven to this spot,
we can retreat no further, because the
country behind hardly affords
food for its present inhabitants. And we
have therefore resolved, to
leave our bones in this small space, to
which we are now confined.
A resounding list of tribes affixed
their names to this declara-
46 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence,
II, 16. Burt accepts McKee's rather
than Brant's account of these
proceedings. United States, Great Britain, and
British North America, 130.
47 Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles
with John Heckewelder, 315-316.
48 Cruikshank,
Simcoe Correspondence, II, 16-17.
210
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
tion of war--the Wyandots, the Seven
Nations of Canada,
the Delawares, the Shawnees, the
Miamis, the Ottawas, the
Chippewas, the Senecas of the Glaize,
the Potawatomis, the
Conoys, the Munsees, the Nanticokes,
the Mahicans, the Mis-
sisaugas, the Creeks, and the
Cherokees.49 Conspicuous by
their absence were the Six Nations. The
Lake Indians and
the Seven Nations of Canada had
followed the lead of the
council, but the Six Nations would not
sign the message.
After it was sent, one more council was
held. Brant announced
that the Six Nations could not at
present assist the confeder-
acy, for they first would have to
remove their people from
among the Americans.50 This
fact alone goes a long way
toward explaining the difference in
attitudes. The lands held
by the Six Nations were on the American
side of the Ohio.
They were already surrounded. To them war was far more
serious than the ceding of an extra
strip of land on a boundary
that had already passed them by. The
rest of the Indians
looked upon the Ohio as the last great
barrier between the
Americans and the Northwest--if that
barrier fell the re-
mainder of the Northwest would be
unsafe. They thought
they could not afford to cede even a
small strip to the north of
the Ohio, and they were right.
Even if Brant and the Six Nations had
carried the council
to their point of view, it is difficult
to see how peace could have
been accomplished. The slight cessions
of land that the Ameri-
can commissioners had been authorized
to make would not
have satisfied even the moderates led
by Brant. There would
have been a council, but it could well
have been a repetition of
Fort Harmar, with the Indians pressed
into yielding more
than they wished, and then revoking the
treaty when it was
completed. But there was not even a
treaty council. The
Indian message reached the
commissioners on August 16, and
they immediately replied that the Ohio
boundary was impos-
sible. The negotiation was at an end.
On August 17 the com-
49 Western Indians to the Commissioners
of the United States, August 13, 1793,
ibid., II, 17-20.
50 Ibid., II, 17.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 211
missioners sailed from Elliott's for
Fort Erie.51 Meanwhile,
though the Lake Indians (whose main
settlements were well
removed from the Ohio) urged Brant to
promote a peace
along the Muskingum, a war feast was
held at the rapids, with
"the Chiefs of the Shawanoes
singing the War Song encour-
aging the Warriors of all the Nations
to be active in defend-
ing their Country, saying their Father
the English would
assist them," and pointing
"to Col. McKee."52
McKee's version of the failure of the
council, in a letter to
Simcoe, was much different from
Brant's. He said that ex-
pectations of peace had been
disappointed because the Indians
insisted on an Ohio River boundary, and
that though he had
tried to maintain unity, the Six
Nations had acted alone, and
had tried to divide the nations by
holding private councils. He
was pleased that the United States had
now acknowledged
the Indian right of soil to land not
yet sold--"these lands will
form an extensive Barrier between the
British & American
Territory." McKee closed by
insisting he had tried to obtain
peace, and had exerted no improper
influence to prevent it.
He warned Simcoe, however, that he
expected to be blamed
for the arguments that the Indians had
adopted.53 The part
that McKee and Elliott played in all
this will never be com-
pletely understood--records of midnight
councils on the
Maumee create few space problems in any
library--but it is
obvious that the British Indian
department at Detroit used
its power, provisions, and influence to
strengthen the resolu-
tion of the Indians to stand firm
against the Americans. They
exerted this influence mainly through
the medium of the
Shawnees, and were to continue to use
this tribe for the next
twenty years. In spite of McKee's
protestations, there seems
good reason to believe that he was
using his influence on the
Maumee in the summer of 1793 to
strengthen the Indian will
against compromise, and against the
concessions advocated
51 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 357; Joseph Bunbury to Doctor
Cole, August 17, 1793, Claus Papers.
52 Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, 17.
53 McKee to Simcoe, August 22, 1793. Indian Affairs.
212
THE OHIO HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
by Joseph Brant. Though Simcoe accepted
the account of the
proceedings given him by McKee, and
assured Hammond, the
British minister in the United States,
that McKee had tried
to use his influence to persuade the
Indians to be content with
more moderate demands,54 even
the British Indian agent John
Butler was not in agreement with
McKee's endeavors at the
1793 council. Some two years later he
wrote that he feared
he had lost his influence in the
department because of his dis-
agreement with McKee at the time of the
attempted Sandusky
treaty: "I thought that the most
favourable Opportunity that
Perhaps would Ever Occur for them [the
Indians] to make an
Advantageous Peace and Save the
greatest Part of their
Country."55
The collapse of negotiations in 1793
made the expedition
of Anthony Wayne inevitable, though the
Indians had de-
layed for so long that it was not
possible for it to take place
until the following year. The attitudes
of the northwestern
contenders had become quite plain in
1793. The Americans,
though more conciliatory in their
negotiations with the
Indians than in the 1780's, were quite
obviously not prepared
to effect any real compromise in regard
to the question of
boundaries. They had little faith in
securing what they wanted
without military victory, and the
failure of the 1793 negotia-
tions was no surprise to the American
government. The
Indians on the other hand had hoped that
their military vic-
tories over Harmar and St. Clair would
enable them to secure
a satisfactory boundary from the
American government. They
were disappointed in their
expectations, not only because of
the internal dissensions of the Indian
confederacy but also
because the United States was prepared
to fight until she did
achieve a military victory rather than
yield territory in the
Northwest. The extent of British
participation in American-
Indian relations is well revealed by
the 1793 negotiations.
Though this was an attempted treaty
between the Americans
54 Simcoe to Hammond, September
8, 1793, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Corre-
spondence, II, 49-50.
55 Butler to Joseph Chew, March 1, 1795, ibid., III, 313.
AN ABORTIVE INDIAN TREATY 213
and the Indians within American
territory, the British au-
thories in Canada supervised and
directed every stage of the
proceedings. The Americans dealt with
the Indians through
the medium of the British Indian
department. Moreover, it
was becoming increasingly obvious that
to talk of a "British"
Indian policy was becoming exceedingly
difficult. The theoreti-
cal policy agreed to in London was not
necessarily that carried
out in detail by the British
authorities in Canada, and the
theoretical policies of the British in
Quebec and Montreal
were not necessarily those carried out
by the Pennsylvania
loyalists, McKee and Elliott, who led
the British Indian
department in Upper Canada. Though the
difference in em-
phasis might be only slight at each
link in the chain of com-
mand, the final shift could be a
decisive one. There is little
doubt that the official correspondence
of the British authori-
ties in Canada gives only an incomplete
picture of the actual
activities of the individual members of
the Indian department.