"SUNSET" COX, OHIO'S CHAMPION
OF COMPROMISE IN
THE SECESSION CRISIS OF 1860-1861
by DAVID LINDSEY
Associate Professor of History,
Baldwin-Wallace College
Among the political leaders of the
"blundering generation" of
1860-61, no one deplored the tragic
drift of events toward armed
conflict more than Samuel Sullivan Cox
of Ohio. Son of a pioneer
printer from New Jersey, Cox had been
born and reared in Zanes-
ville, and schooled at Ohio University
and Brown University.1 Mar-
ried to the daughter of a well-to-do
grain merchant, Alvah T. Buck-
ingham, he had practiced law briefly in
partnership with George E.
Pugh in Cincinnati before moving to
Columbus, where he became
editor and part owner of the Daily
Ohio Statesman in 1853.2 Here
with a florid, front-page editorial
describing a spectacular sunset, he
won for himself the nickname
"Sunset," which not only fitted exactly
his initials but also proved a useful
handle for the voters to attach
to an aspiring politician.3
A lifelong Democrat, Cox in 1856 was
first elected to congress
from Ohio's twelfth district, which
then included Licking, Franklin,
and Pickaway counties. At the national
capital he immediately
identified himself with the Douglas
wing of the Democratic party
in the struggle over the admission of
Kansas.4 As the storm clouds
of impending conflict thickened in 1859
and 1860, Cox urged mod-
eration, a conciliatory spirit, and
full respect for the rights of all
1 William V. Cox and Milton H. Northrup,
Life of Samuel Sullivan Cox (Syracuse,
1899), 22-39, 43-46, 54-56; Norris F.
Schneider, Y Bridge City: The Story of Zanes-
ville and Muskingum County (Cleveland, 1950), 78-115; General Catalogue of the
Ohio University 1804-1857 (Athens, 1857), 12-13; personal interview with the late
Professor Thomas N. Hoover, historian of Ohio
University; Brown University records
in the registrar's and alumni offices. The John Hay
Library of Brown University has a
substantial collection of Cox's
correspondence written in later years.
2 James Buckingham, The Ancestors of
Ebenezer Buckingham . . . and His Descend-
ants (Chicago,
1892), 96-98; Cox and Northrup, Samuel Sullivan Cox, 59; S. S. Cox,
The Scholar as the True Progressive
and Conservative (Columbus, 1852).
3 Ohio Statesman, May 19, 1853.
4 Charles J. Foster (Democratic national
committeeman) to Cox, August 21, 1856,
William Bell to Cox, May 20, 1856, in
Cox Papers, Brown University Library; Ohio
Statesman, September 21, 23, October 4, 1856; Ohio State
Journal (Columbus), Octo-
ber 11, November 10, 1856.
348
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 349
sections of the country. Extreme and
radical agitation of the slavery
question he deplored as not only unwise
but dangerous in that it
tended to make any kind of working
arrangement to hold the sec-
tions together difficult if not
impossible.5
It was in this spirit of considerate
moderation that Cox went to
Charleston, South Carolina, in April
1860 as a delegate to the Demo-
cratic national convention. An
ill-starred decision of the Cincinnati
convention four years earlier had
settled on Charleston as the 1860
convention city. No worse selection
could have been made. Con-
vening at any other place, the party
might yet have saved itself from
disruption. At Charleston, however,
crowded living quarters for the
delegates, inadequate facilities at the
meeting place in the South
Carolina Institute Hall, and
oppressively hot, damp weather all
conspired against party harmony and for
disruption.6
The bitter struggle that would split
the party and practically
eliminate the chance of preserving the
Union was not long in com-
ing. Delegates from northwestern
states, including Cox, were vir-
tually solid in their support of
Senator Stephen A. Douglas for the
nomination, while southern delegates
were determined not to have
Douglas. Men of the Northwest found it
especially discouraging to
face hostile galleries that cheered
wildly for southern speeches but
sat on their hands when northern men
spoke. Cox thought that
Douglas' chances of winning southern
support and with it the nomi-
nation would have been better had
Douglas accepted the English
compromise bill on the admission of
Kansas two years before.7
Northwest Democrats realized clearly
that their political survival
depended on the nomination of Douglas
and the adoption of a
Douglas-made platform. Only Douglas, of
all Democratic aspirants,
could win in their section in the face
of the rising tide of Republican-
ism there. Since only by carrying some
northern states could a
Democrat win the election, it seemed
only reasonable and smart
party strategy to select a candidate
who could make a strong appeal
in the North. But southern extremists
were neither in a reasonable
5 Congressional Globe, 35 cong., 2 sess., 396-397; 36 cong., 1 sess., 74-80, 581, 619.
6 Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York,
1948), 288-
297; Allan Nevins, The Emergence of
Lincoln (2 vols., New York, 1950), II, 204-212.
7 S. S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation (Providence, R.
I., 1885), 95.
350
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
mood nor were they concerned with smart
party strategy at this
juncture. The willingness to
compromise, so apparent four years
earlier, now was absent. Some southern
leaders like William L.
Yancey seemed determined on breaking
the party and the Union.
Although the immediate occasion of the
floor fight was the mak-
ing of the platform, the real issue was
Douglas. The Douglas
managers, ably led by William A.
Richardson of Illinois, willingly
accepted an early showdown by pushing
for a plank in the platform
that opposed congressional interference
with slavery in the ter-
ritories. "Sunset" Cox, long
an admirer and supporter of the "Little
Giant" from Illinois, went right
down the line for the Douglas
program. But southern
"fire-eaters," who viewed Douglas as no
different from the "black
Republicans" and who therefore would
fight to block his nomination at all
costs, demanded a platform
pledging federal protection of slavery
in the territories. It was to
this demand that Cox's former law
partner, Senator George Pugh,
replied emphatically, "Gentlemen
of the South, you mistake us....
We will not do it."8
When the southern bolt from the
convention followed, Cox was
surely among the many Douglas men who
shed tears over the
failure of their chief and over the
splitting of the American De-
mocracy.9 The subsequent
conventions at Baltimore and Richmond
named Douglas as the northern
Democratic wing's candidate and
John C. Breckinridge as the bolters'
nominee. The fatal breach in
the Democratic party, threatening for
so many years, had now be-
come all too real. Radical extremists,
North and South, had done
their work all too well. The one
remaining national political link
had been severed. Politics, even as the
churches and other institu-
tions earlier, had become
sectionalized.
The split in the Democratic party
filtered down to the state level.
In Ohio the state convention,
assembling on July 4, broke up into
Douglas and Breckinridge factions. In
the twelfth congressional
district, however, Democrats managed to
hang together for the
present, and Cox was renominated with
"grateful acknowledgement
8 Avery O. Craven, The Coming of the
Civil War (New York, 1942), 416.
9 George Fort Milton, The Eve of
Conflict: Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless
War (Boston, 1934), 447-449.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 351
for his eminent service" by a
"most enthusiastic and unanimous dis-
trict convention . . . nothwithstanding
some soi disant Douglas
Democrats" who "tried to get
a cloud over my personal voting for
the English bill."10 The campaign
saw Congressman John Sherman
attack Cox for inconsistency in the
speakership struggle in the last
session of congress. Reply in kind came
quickly from Cox, who held
up to public scorn Sherman's lack of
consistency in failing to vote
for the admission of Oregon. Douglas
visited the state in September
and spoke to a large crowd in Columbus,
urging the voters to re-
elect Cox, whose vote on the English
bill Douglas attributed to "an
honest difference of opinion."11
Despite the late appearance of a
Breckinridge splinter-faction candidate
in the Columbus district, Cox
won handily in October over former
Congressman Samuel Galloway,
although the margin of victory was
slightly smaller than two years
before.12
On the national stage the Democrats
were not without hope,
despite their two candidates in the
field. Douglas had the support
of northern Democrats, of course. He
also had some support in the
South, especially in the border states.
The Illinoisan staged a man-
killing campaign, throwing himself into
it with characteristic energy
and enthusiasm. Nothing like it had
been seen before in American
politics. Breaking with precedent, the
regular Democratic nominee
carried his fight to the people.
Leaving Washington in late July,
he moved through New England, then
south to North Carolina,
back to the middle states and the
Northwest, speaking in Columbus,
as noted above, and concluding with a
push into the deep South just
before election.13
The Republicans, for their part, had
nominated Abraham Lincoln
on a platform opposing slavery in the
territories and advocating
government aid for a Pacific railroad,
a protective tariff, and a
homestead law. They hoped to maintain
their voting strength of
1856 and also to win Pennsylvania and
Illinois, which would provide
them the needed electoral votes for a
majority. The protective tariff
10 Cox to Lewis Cass, July 5, 1860.
James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
11 Ohio Statesman, July 6, 31, August 2, September 26, 1860.
12 Ohio State Journal, October 16, 1860.
13 Milton, The Eve of Conflict, 490-494.
352
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
plank, it was hoped, would swing the
former, and the candidate the
latter. A fourth party appeared in the
Constitutional Union party
standing simply for the constitution,
the Union, and the enforce
ment of the laws, and nominating John
Bell of Tennessee. The
outcome should have been easily
predictable. Lincoln carried the
North and Pacific Coast, Breckinridge
the lower South, and Bell
the upper South; Douglas took only
Missouri and part of New
Jersey's vote. In popular vote, Lincoln
had 1,866,452, Douglas
1,376,957, Breckinridge 849,781, and
Bell 588,879. However the
post-mortems analyzed the election
returns, the country would have
a Republican president come next March
4. Would the southerner
carry out their oft-repeated threat of
withdrawal in the face of a
"black Republican" victory?
Certainly all was not lost for the
Democrats. They had shown surprising
strength and resilience in
the congressional elections and would
likely command a clear ma-
jority in the next house of
representatives, provided they could
unite. The next three months would tell
the story.
Lincoln's election in November and the
threatening moves toward
secession brought alarm to those
Ohioans who had voted for Douglas
and to some who had voted for Lincoln.
As November's weeks
passed, a spirit of compromise and
conciliation seemed to gain
ground.14 For Ohio in
congress, "Sunset" Cox joined with George
Pendleton of Cincinnati and Clement L.
Vallandigham of Dayton
to express this feeling in an effort to
check the mounting tide toward
secession. Congress convened on
December 3, 1860. Plans were
soon under way for developing a
compromise arrangement, in the
fashion of the compromise of 1850, that
would be acceptable to
southerners and Republicans alike. The
committee of thirteen under
John J. Crittenden in the senate and
the committee of thirty-three
under Tom Corwin in the house labored
hard to find the right
formula. Southern members were
disappointed that no Democrat
from the free West was appointed to the
house committee. As one
of them put it, "I would have been
glad to have seen my friends
from Ohio, Vallandigham and Cox . . .
who have always stood by
14 Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and
the Secession Crisis,
1860-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1950), 13-25.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 353
the South" on this committee.15
By the end of December the failure
of the committee seemed obvious. No
compromise measure had been
produced. South Carolina had already
voted to secede and other
deep South states were moving closer to
taking the fateful step. At
a meeting on December 18 of the entire
Ohio congressional delega-
tion, a Cox-sponsored resolution
calling on the Ohio legislature "to
abrogate all laws in conflict with the
Constitution for the return of
fugitives from justice" was voted
down.16
The men of the border states in
congress still hoped, however.
As the old year waned, a new committee
of fourteen was formed
with John Crittenden as chairman and
Cox as secretary. This group
labored over New Year's day and on
January 4, designated as a day
of fasting and prayer by President
Buchanan, brought out a plan.
This was a modification of the original
Crittenden compromise,
making it practically impossible to
acquire new territory. It defined
more clearly possible boundaries of
future slave states south of the
proposed extension of the Missouri
Compromise line and provided
that a fugitive fleeing from one state
to another to avoid apprehen-
sion must be surrendered on demand of
the executive.17 This pro-
posal was announced as acceptable by
Douglas, border state leaders,
the president, and August Belmont and
other leading New York
businessmen. Since it met Lincoln's
objection to the first Crittenden
proposal by making it difficult to
acquire new territory, Republicans
were urged to support it. But when
submitted to the house, the
proposed compromise was blocked from
consideration by Republican
votes.18
On the last day of the year Cox wrote
home from Washington to
Columbus expressing his hope that the
border states would not
follow the lead of the lower South in
leaving the Union. He de-
clared that South Carolina's position
was indefensible, that cotton
would now be shipped up the Mississippi
and then east to New
15 Cong.
Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess., 36.
16 Ibid.,
37 cong., 3 sess., 1410.
17 Cox,
Three Decades, 28; Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, 440-
441.
18 James F. Rhodes, The United States
from the Compromise of 1850 (8 vols., New
York, 1902-19),
III, 254, 262-263.
354 Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
York, thus bringing a great commercial
boom for cities like Memphis
and Cincinnati.19
Six days later Cox arose in the house
to make a powerful plea for
the preservation of the Union at all
costs despite the already an-
nounced withdrawal of four southern
states. "I speak from and for
the capital of the greatest of the
States of the Great West," which
"has immense interests at stake in
this Union" and "is appalled at
the colossal strides of
revolution." Urging conciliation, Cox pointed
out that although "South Carolina
has been singing her Marseil-
laise, . . . it but echoes the abolition
of the North and West; for
scarcely had the song died away from
the shores of Lake Erie, be-
fore South Carolina took it up in wilder
chorus. .... Extremes north
have aided . . . extremes south in the
work of disintegration." Cox re-
fused to admit the right of secession.
Did South Carolina realize
what she was doing? "Is it a
masquerade to last for a night, or a
reality to be managed with rough
handling?" Was not South
Carolina's action, he asked, "a
plain violation of the permanent
obligation she is under as" a
member of the Union? "Does she not
infringe the rights of Ohio?" Then
putting his finger on the "real
grievance" of South Carolina as
the election of "an Executive . . .
on a principle of hostility to the
social system of the South," Cox
pleaded agonizingly for a return of the
South, since there had been
no aggression by the president-elect.
The South should not with-
draw, for such action would put the
control of congress into the
hands of the very party that the South
feared so much. And what
of the rights of the West in the
disintegrating picture? "With us,
not gold, not cotton, but INDUSTRY IS KING! However homely
its
attire, it wears the purple, and on its
brow the coronal of bearded
grain, impearled with the priceless
sweat of independence ....
Progress itself, which is the life of
the West," demanded that the
Union hold together. The men of the
Northwest, Cox continued,
were true friends of the South, for
"that gallant band of Democrats
and Americans will stand in the next
Congress as a bulwark against
the further advances of
sectionalism." "Let there be sacrifice and
19 Cox to George L. Converse, printed in
the Ohio Statesman, January 31, 1861.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 355
compromise. These words are of honorable import. The one gave
us Calvary, the other the Constitution.
Nothing worth having was
ever won without them." Even the
Republicans were not really as
dangerous as the South feared:
"Mr. Lincoln in the White House
may not be the rail splitter out of it.
Abraham in faith may offer up
his 'irrepressible' offspring. He will
be conservative with a total
oblivion of the radical. The one will
'conflict' with the other."
Moderation was already making headway
in Lincoln's party. The
Republicans "have already proposed
to drop intervention by Con-
gress. They are willing to accept New
Mexico as a slave state.
. . . Under the lead of Bates, Raymond,
Corwin, Ewing, Weed, ay
and Seward and Lincoln," they
"will drown the Giddings crew."
After citing George Washington's
Farewell Address admonition
against faction, Cox concluded with a
final stirring plea for unity:
"Clouds are about us! There is
lightning in their frown! Cannot
we direct it harmlessly to earth? The
morning and evening prayer
of the people I speak for in such
weakness, rises in strength . . .
that our States continue to be ...
one." 20 The tragedy that Cox
sought to avert, however, moved on
inexorably.21
As a man of moderation in times of
extremes and violence, Cox
anticipated the coming of the war in
1861 with horror. The Union
of Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson,
now as the year 1861 opened,
he saw tumbling down about his head. As
a leader skilled in the
political art of compromise, he strove
anxiously and determinedly
to avert the catastrophe. The pressure
of events, however, and the
rabid determination of extreme, radical
men on both sides of the
Mason-Dixon line were too much for
moderates, like Cox, although
probably in a majority, to hold in
check. In Cox's apt philosophical
phrase, "But it is ever thus.
History shows it. Extreme men drag
moderate men with them."
At the beginning of January 1861 public
sentiment to save the
Union from disaster seemed to grow
throughout the North, espe-
cially in Ohio, as men began to
appreciate the gravity of the crisis.
"Union meetings" were held in
various parts of Ohio where resolu-
20 Cong. Globe, 36 cong., 2 sess.,
372-377.
21
Cox, Three Decades, 67-68.
356
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
tions were adopted offering every
degree of concession. A memorial
signed by 10,000 Cincinnatians was
presented to congress by
"Gentleman" George H.
Pendleton.22 In Columbus, Samuel Medarys
Quaker, Buchanan's former governor of
Minnesota and Kansas ter-
ritories and former proprietor of the Ohio
Statesman, now alarmed
over the widening split in the Union,
founded the weekly newspapers
The Crisis, in January and set forth his plan to reestablish unity
by
"fraternal feeling and
discussion" on the basis of state rights.23 The
circulation of The Crisis grew
rapidly in its first few weeks. The
Ohio Democratic state convention
meeting in Columbus in January
urged acceptance of the Crittenden
compromise or any other plan
that would save the Union, using almost
the exact words that Cox
had used in his congressional speech of
January 5.24 A great mass
meeting of men from adjacent counties
of Ohio, Kentucky, and Vir
ginia met at the mouth of the Big Sandy
River on Washington's
birthday to demand concession and
preservation of the Union.25
Republican opinion, however, was
sharply divided regarding com-
promise. At one extreme stood those
like Horace Greeley and the
Ashtabula Sentinel (voicing Joshua Giddings' views) who in the
first flush of enthusiasm would let the seceders "go in
peace."26
Some held that coercion would be too
costly and impossible to main
tain over the long run.27 At
the opposite extreme stood Republican
who maintained that secession could not
be permitted nor conces-
sions made to secure compromise since
such action might mean the
loss of Republican supremacy and the
spoils of the Novembe
victory.28 In between these
groups a large body of Republicans wa
willing to compromise, and looked to
such men as William H
Seward, John Sherman, Thomas Corwin,
and Thomas Ewing fo
leadership.29
22 Cong. Globe, 36
cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 70.
23 The Crisis, January
31, 1861.
24 Ohio Statesman, January
24, 1861.
25 Henry C. Hubbart, The Older Middle West, 1840-1880 (New York,
1936), 149
152.
26 New York Tribune, November 9, 16, 30, 1860.
27 Ohio State Journal, November 13, 28, 1860, March 27, 1861; Cincinnati Com-
mercial, January
31, February 1, 1861.
28 Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil
War (New York, 1942), 36-39.
29 Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans, 1860-1861: A Study in Public
Opinion
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 357
For their part, northern Democrats
generally favored all efforts
for a compromise settlement, although
on the question of what
compromise and what course of action
should be followed if compro-
mise failed, opinions differed widely.30
It is possible that in January
1861 a majority of the people in the
North would have given their
support to any reasonable compromise,
such as the Crittenden
compromise, had a popular referendum
been held at that time.31
Democratic leaders in the Northwest
were especially concerned
over the developing division of the
United States. This was perhaps
natural, since only with the heavy
Democratic support of the south-
ern states could the Democratic party
hope to control the national
government. But there were reasons
other than political ones for
energetic efforts to hold the Union
together. The upland southern
origin of many of the inhabitants of
Ohio and the Northwest lent
a potent sentimental and personal bond
of friendship with the folk
of the upper South. Long association,
common history, and mem-
ories all worked for effective
conciliation. The danger of economic
isolation of the Northwest from the
Gulf and Atlantic coasts in case
of war, in addition to the close
commercial ties that ran southward
with the Mississippi to New Orleans,
gave men pause before taking
hasty, hostile action and spurred them
toward greater concession and
hope of peaceful settlement. Thus
Stephen A. Douglas in the senate
in December 1860 declared: "We can
never acknowledge the right
of a state to secede and cut us off
from the ocean and the world
without our consent."32 In like vein,
Representative Clement Val-
landigham cried: "We of the
Northwest have a deeper interest in
the preservation of this
government" based on intersectional com-
mercial attachments of the Northwest
running southward.33 Re-
publican Governor William Dennison of
Ohio in his legislative mes-
(Columbia University Studies in
History, Economics, and Public Law, No.
96, New
York, 1921), 13-14; Elbert J. Benton, The
Movement for Peace Without a Victory Dur-
ing the Civil War (Western Reserve Historical Society, Collections, No.
99, Cleveland,
1918), 3; George H. Porter, Ohio
Politics During the Civil War Period (Columbia
University Studies in History,
Economics, and Public Law, No. 40, New
York, 1911),
49.
30 Ohio Statesman, January 2, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, January 9,
10, 1861.
31 Gray, The Hidden Civil War, 33-34.
32 Cong. Globe, 36
cong., 2 sess., 137.
33 Ibid., 38.
358
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
sage of January 1861 made similar
point.34 Great excitement swept
the Northwest as men pictured
themselves cut off from the Gulf.
When on January 15 a battery at
Vicksburg fired on a river boat
traveling downstream, people of the
upper Mississippi and Ohio
valleys voiced loud protests.35
In January 1861, then, because of
personal, political, and com-
mercial ties, the Northwest generally
looked fearfully at the rising
tide of secession and urged all means
and measures to avoid the
effects of this calamity. Ohio with the
largest population in the
Northwest expressed herself vehemently
and continuously on the
question, although not always with
unanimity of views. The Demo-
cratic press, while differing as to the
right of secession, generally
concurred in favoring compromise as the
most reasonable and effec-
tive course to avert tragedy. The Ohio
Statesman, for example,
roundly condemned the secessionists but
also took to task the north-
ern abolitionists.36 The Cincinnati
Enquirer also urged measures of
compromise.37 More extreme
Democratic leaders went so far as to
urge noncooperation and possible
secession of the Northwest in case
of war against the South.38 Thus
Congressman Vallandigham and
Senator Pugh had threatened such action
in the bipartisan caucus of
Ohio's congressional delegation the
preceding December.39
Other Democrats, like Stephen Douglas,
Samuel S. Cox, Daniel
Sickles, and George Pendleton, while
not ruling out war as an
ultimate measure to preserve the Union,
worked with skill and vigor
to secure the adoption of compromise
measures in time to avert the
necessity of war. Douglas on January 3
delivered a powerful peace-
at-all-costs speech in the senate.40
Cox had spoken in a similar vein
in the Ohio congressional delegation's
caucus of December and had
34 Ohio Executive Documents, 1860,
part 1, 561-562.
35 Cox to Franklin Pierce, April 24,
1861, in Pierce Papers, Library of Congress;
Frank Moore, Rebellion Record (11
vols., New York, 1861-68), I, 16; George L.
Converse to Cox, January 2, 9, 11, 1861,
Joseph W. Burns to Cox, January 8, 1861,
in Cox Papers, Brown University Library.
36 January 2, 1861.
37 January 9, 10, 1861.
38 Osman C. Hooper, The Crisis and
the Man: An Episode in Civil War Journalism
(Ohio State University, Contributions
in Journalism, No. 5, Columbus, 1929), passim.
39 The Crisis, January 31, February 7, 1861.
40 Douglas to G. H. Lanphier, quoted in
Allen Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas (New
York, 1908), 447-448.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 359
made his eloquent plea on the floor of
the house in early January.
On January 23, Ohio Democrats assembled
in their state convention
at Columbus, as noted above. In
addition to urging acceptance of
the Crittenden compromise, they
declared that a national convention
should assemble to work out a fair
compromise and that "when
the people of the North shall have
fulfilled their duties to the Con-
stitution and the South, then-and not
until then" could they "take
into consideration the right and
propriety of coercion." 41 David
Tod, who had served as chairman of the
Baltimore convention that
had nominated Douglas in 1860 and who
before the current year
was out would be elected governor of
Ohio on the Union ticket,
stated that if the Republicans
attempted to cross the Ohio River for
the purpose of coercing the South they
would find 200,000 Demo-
crats ready to oppose them.42
Meanwhile, efforts at compromise,
although gaining wide popular
support, bogged down before opposition
from Republican leaders.
Thus the Crittenden compromise, which
seemed the best chance to
preserve the Union, was pronounced
unacceptable by President-elect
Lincoln and other Republican leaders.
By New Year's day, 1861,
the only tangible result was a
congressional resolution urging north-
ern states to repeal their personal
liberty laws. A meeting in New
York City of seven northern governors,
including Dennison, called
for the same action.43 When
the Ohio legislature met on January 7,
Governor Dennison laid the matter of
personal liberty laws before
it.44 Democrats in the lower
legislative house supported resolutions
approving the Crittenden compromise and
calling for repeal of the
personal liberty laws.45 By
the end of January the last of these con-
troversial laws had been repealed in
Ohio, as in most other northern
states.46 A more reasonable
frame of mind seemed to be growing.
The call for a peace convention, to
assemble in Washington on
February 4, met a favorable response in
the Ohio legislature. Con-
41 Porter, Ohio Politics, 53-54.
42 Jacob D. Cox, Military
Reminiscences of the Civil War (2 vols.,
New York,
1900), I, 4.
43 Rhodes, The United States from the
Compromise of 1850, III, 252.
44 Ohio Executive Documents, 1861,
part 1, 554.
45 Ohio General Assembly, House Journal, 1861, 4-6.
46 Ibid., 21, 23,
40; Rhodes, op. cit., III, 253.
360 Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
siderable jockeying for position and
control of the Ohio delegation
followed between conservatives who
would go far along the road
toward concession and radicals who
would yield but little. The
radicals won on method of
appointment--by the governor--while
the conservatives secured the
appointments and dominated the dele-
gation itself.47 When the
peace convention met, the hour was late
and little hope for success actually
existed as men waited for the
new administration to take office.
Although congress did not accept
the proposals of the convention,
approval was given to a proposed
thirteenth amendment to the
constitution, which would forbid con-
gress to abolish or interfere with the
domestic institutions of a state,
namely, slavery. When this amendment
was submitted to the Ohio
legislature, ratification was
forthcoming, and one other state, Mary-
land, followed suit.48
Meanwhile, Ohio legislators adopted
more resolutions calling for
another national convention to consider
further means of saving the
Union through amendments to the
constitution.49 Democrats kept
pushing bills to limit Negro migration
into the state but succeeded
only in passing a bill forbidding
interracial marriage.50 In the
struggle for the United States Senate
seat held by George Pugh, the
Republican party, after an internecine
battle, finally agreed to elevate
Congressman John Sherman to that
position.51
By early February the seven states of
the deep South had not only
announced their withdrawal from the
Union but through their
representatives at Montgomery, Alabama,
had established themselves
as the Confederate States of America.
They were now negotiating
to persuade their sister states of the
upper South to join them. The
creation of the Confederacy was of
course preceded by the with-
drawal of the lower South's members
from congress, a move which
left the Democratic party in a still
weaker position in Washington.
Bills to admit Kansas and to subsidize
a Pacific railroad, both of
which Cox supported, were now rushed
through congress. President
47 Porter, Ohio Politics, 67.
48 Ohio General Assembly, Senate
Journal, 1861, 289; House Journal, 1861, 652.
49 Ohio General Assembly, Senate
Journal, 1861, 177; House Journal, 1861, 346.
50 Laws of Ohio, LVIII, 6.
51 Cincinnati Commercial, March
22, 1861; John Sherman, Recollections of Forty
Years (2 vols., New York, 1895), I, 233.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of Compromise 361
Buchanan labored painfully and futilely
to find a way out of the
dilemma that would not embarrass his
successor. Douglas seemed to
be looking toward a commercial union
between the United States
and the Confederacy that would
eventually ripen into political re-
union. But March 4 came all too soon,
and Buchanan wearily passed
on his burdens to Lincoln.
Even after the Lincoln inauguration,
sentiment in Ohio favoring
reconciliation tended to increase. The
April municipal elections
witnessed Democratic triumphs in
Cincinnati, Toledo, Columbus,
Sandusky, and Cleveland. This was the
first time that a Democratic
mayor had been elected in Columbus. In
Cleveland the Douglas and
Breckinridge Democrats joined with the
Bell men in a "Union"
ticket to carry the election. Wendell
Phillips, attempting to speak
abolitionist views in Cincinnati in
late March, was silenced by a
mob.52 Commercial interests
and the growing conviction that aboli-
tionists were the cause of the
country's troubles worked to keep Ohio
in a conciliatory mood. It seems
probable that had not the South
started hostilities at Fort Sumter in
April, Ohio would have gone
with the conservatives and Democrats in
the 1861 fall elections.53
In partial deference to public
sentiment favoring conciliation, and
desiring to hold the states of the
upper South, the new national ad-
ministration moved with caution.
Lincoln's inaugural statements--
"The Government will not assail
you. You can have no conflict
without yourselves being the
aggressors"--although addressed to
the South, were calculated also to
reassure northern public opinion as
well. But Cox in Washington noted the
apprehension that hung over
the inaugural ceremonies: "For the
first time in the Republic a Chief
Magistrate is installed under the
protection of artillery charged with
grape and cannister."54 The
tension of the winter of 1860-61 had
put men's nerves on edge. Emotionalism
had been stirred to too high
a pitch for moderate men to change the
tune. Events moved too
rapidly. A sense of tragedy and
helplessness overcame Cox. He later
wrote:
When this war appeared as a speck on the
horizon, I pleaded and voted
52 Cincinnati Commercial, March
21, 25, 1861.
53 Porter, Ohio Politics, 72.
54 Cox, Three Decades, 100.
362
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
for every compromise.... I preferred
the bonds of Love to the armor of
Force. I found in the sermon on the
Mount a wisdom beyond that of Presi-
dents or priests.... I hold that in our
land it was the wisest, kindest and
best to agree to any compromise . . .
which would have averted these
calamities.55
But extremists on both sides of the
Mason-Dixon line and Ohic
River were calling for action.
Lincoln continued to move cautiously.
Federal customs houses:
post offices, and forts within the
South had been taken over quietly
and quickly by state authorities since
the end of December until
only Fort Pickens at Pensacola and Fort
Sumter at Charleston re-
mained in Union hands. Bearing in mind
the fate of Buchanan's
ill-starred Star of the West relief
expedition to Sumter, Lincoln
canvassed with his cabinet the possible
courses of action and weighed
carefully the dangers involved. At
length, his determination to
supply Sumter was made public in early
April together with his an-
nouncement of the nonaggressive
character of the relief expedition.
The latter statement was intended to
mollify opinion in the South
and to avoid giving offense to the
border states, which, although
still in the Union, felt strong
state-rights sympathies for their sisters
to the south. The announcement of the
relief expedition, however,
touched off the bombardment on the fort
in Charleston harbor. The
long-awaited and dreaded war had
finally come.56
When Sumter came, the radicals had so
well done their work
of arousing passions that even the
relatively calm Thomas Ewing
exclaimed in a letter to his son:
"I want to see the issue accepted and
fought out."57 The North felt
something of a sense of relief that
now there would be action rather than
delay and endless words.
Mingled with relief, however, was a
sense of shame and sorrow that
Americans could not settle their own
differences peacefully by the
democratic process of discussion and
compromise rather than by gun
and sword. Samuel Cox later wrote:
Could not this Union have been made
permanent by a timely settlement,
55 S. S. Cox, Eight Years in Congress (New York, 1865), 7.
56 James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (New
York, 1937), 232-
244.
57 Quoted in Gray, The Hidden Civil
War, 49.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 363
instead of being cemented by fraternal
blood and military rule? By an
equitable adjustment of the territory
this was possible .... The Crittenden
proposition . . . the radicals
denounced. . . . They were determined to
prevent a settlement ... by amendment
and postponement. . . . Those who
sought to counteract the schemes of
secession were themselves checkmated
by extreme men of the Republican party ....
One leading fact will always
stand stark and bold, namely, that with
the aid of a handful of secessionists
per se, the whole body of Republicans were-as Andrew Johnson
later de-
scribed Senator Clark, when the latter
defeated the Crittenden proposition
by his amendment-"acting out their
policy." In the light of subsequent
events, that policy was developed. It
was the destruction of slavery....
Whether a great war with its infinite
and harmful consequences, was the
proper means to such an end, is not for
the writer, but the reader to de-
termine for himself. The general belief
at this time [1885] is, that the war
has given us in a new order full
compensation for its cost in means and
life. Whether this be a correct
estimate or not, the historians and philosophers
of the future can judge better.58
While the appeal to arms drove four
more states out of the Union,
Lincoln's call for volunteers in
mid-April brought an enthusiastic
response in the North for crushing the
rebellion. In Ohio the Demo-
cratic opposition in the legislature,
which shortly before had voted
against strengthening the state
militia, now melted away. Governor
Dennison telegraphed Lincoln on April
15: "We will furnish the
largest number [of volunteers] you will
receive."59 The legislature
passed the militia bill with only one
dissenting vote.60 By April 21
two Ohio regiments were en route to
Washington, while many more
volunteers poured in faster than could
be readily handled.61
In this initial outburst of martial
enthusiasm the basic positions
of those who questioned the rightness,
wisdom, and expediency of
coercing the seceded states were
somewhat obscured. As time
passed, however, various attitudes of
hesitation and opposition be-
came clearer. Some Democratic papers
like The Crisis clung to their
earlier opposition to coercion, while
others like the Columbus Ohio
Statesman and the Cincinnati Enquirer gave a half-hearted
acquies-
58 Cox, Three
Decades, 78-80.
59 Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies: War of the Rebellion
(70 vols., Washington, 1880-1901),
Series III, Vol. I, 70. Hereafter cited as O. R.
60 Cincinnati Enquirer, April 21,
1861; The Crisis, April 25, 1861.
61 O. R., Series III, Vol. I,
84-85, 101-102.
364
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
cence or maintained a stubborn silence.62
Congressman Vallandig-
ham of Ohio openly asserted his
opposition in the Cincinnati
Enquirer: "My position in regard to this civil war is . . .
that in a
little while 'the sober second thought
of the people' will dissipate
the present sudden and fleeting public
madness . . . and will arrest
it speedily."63 Supporting
this view in Ohio were Vallandigham's
paper, the Dayton Empire, and
the Ashland Union, the Coshocton
Democrat, the Circleville Watchman, the Cambridge Guernsey
Jeffersonian, the Lancaster Eagle, and the Canton Stark
County
Democrat.
Samuel Cox apparently made up his mind
reluctantly, but never-
theless certainly, that the right of
secession could not be recognized
and that the use of force, although a
calamity, was necessary under
the circumstances, but that force
should be used for as short a time
as possible and should be accompanied
by continuous, persistent,
and vigorous efforts to arrange a
settlement which would see the
reestablishment of the old Union. In
early March, homeward bound
from the inauguration in Washington,
Cox expressed himself to his
fellow congressman William S. Holman of
Indiana with whom he
spent a day in Wheeling. The Hoosier
later recalled that they both
knew "that war was
inevitable" now and considered "what position
we should take as Democrats in Congress
in relation to the coming
war." For Cox and Holman,
"there was no hesitation. . . . The
Union must be maintained at every
hazard." Nothing would "justify
ever the consideration of the question
of the dissolution of the
Union." Each felt he should
"cordially" sustain the administration
of President Lincoln "in every
measure deemed necessary and proper
to uphold the Federal authority in all
the states of the Union."64
Cox's position of support for the war
was accompanied by
simultaneous urging of measures looking
toward peace. This seemed
paradoxical to some contemporaries and
led to the charge of poli-
tical trimming from his opponents. Upon
examination, however,
the position seems a reasonable,
logical, and humane effort to
62 The Crisis, April 18, 1861; Ohio Statesman, April 15, 18,
1861; Cincinnati
Enquirer, April 17, 18, 1861.
63 June 27, 1861.
64 Cox and Northrup, Samuel Sullivan Cox, 88.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 365
terminate a dispute among fellow
Americans by the quickest and
most satisfactory means, followed by a
restoration of the old order
that Americans had known before the
war. This is the constantly
recurring theme of Cox's activity
during the war years and in the
reconstruction period that followed. He
mourned the changes that
he saw being made in the old order,
opposed the "second American
Revolution" that was taking place
before his eyes, and sought means
to prevent changes from coming too
rapidly and too radically. In
this view he received frequent support
and encouragement from his
constituents in central Ohio.65
In late April the acknowledged leader
of the Northwest Democ-
racy, who had been showing signs of
increasing friendliness toward
the president, came forward with strong
support for Lincoln's war
policy.66 From Washington,
Stephen Douglas sent out newspaper
statements and letters announcing his
views. On his way home to
Illinois he delivered speeches at
Bellaire and Columbus, Indianapolis
and Springfield. On May 1 in Chicago he
declared: "There can be
no neutrals in this war; only
patriots-or traitors."67 Following
these pronouncements, Democratic papers
like the Chicago Times
and Democratic leaders like William A.
Richardson shifted from
opposition or indifference to support
for the war.68 By July 12 even
Vallandigham announced he would now
vote for whatever money
and men might be necessary "to
protect and defend the Federal
Government."69 The later
elevation of George B. McClellan and
other Democrats to important army
commands no doubt helped
effect this shift in Democratic
opinion.70
With Douglas' death on June 3 the
Democrats lost their most
dynamic leader. "Who can take his
place?" Cox lamented. How
the Democrats would have fared had
Douglas lived is of course im-
65 Thomas G. Addison to Cox, July 11,
1861, Robert W. Fenwick to Cox, July 12,
1861, Charles M. Gould to Cox, March 3,
July 17, 1861, in Cox Papers, Brown Uni-
versity Library.
66 Nichols, The Disruption of
American Democracy, 508-511.
67 Ohio Statesman, April
25, 1861; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 23, 24, 28, May 22,
1861.
68 Gray,
The Hidden Civil War, 46-51.
69 Clement L. Vallandigham, Speeches, Arguments, Addresses, and Letters
of
Clement L. Vallandigham (New York, 1864), 324-325.
70 Cincinnati
Enquirer, July 23, 1861.
366 Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
possible to say. As it was, they
foundered for a time for want of a
program and a leader. Various Democrats
sought to fill the vacancy.
Of these from the Northwest, although
Vallandigham became the
most conspicuous, Cox remained closest
to Douglas' position and
inherited at least a substantial part
of Douglas' mantle. Cox was in
many respects like the "Little
Giant"-small in stature, genial in
nature, bursting with vitality,
powerful of voice, skilled in parlia-
mentary process and debate, experienced
in political maneuvering,
always active, pondering new ideas,
forceful as a stump speaker,
and immensely popular with his
associates. Both held to the suprem-
acy of the Union and the constitution,
popular sovereignty regarding
slavery in the territories and its
kindred doctrine, state rights, but
compromise as the essence of the
democratic political process-in
short, as to the war, a position of
critical support or loyal opposi-
tion. In fact, in the years of the war,
Cox took over as the minority
leader in the house, a position that
Douglas, had he lived, would
have held in the senate.
When the special session of congress
gathered in Washington on
July 4, 1861, Cox was in attendance
"with fear and trembling beyond
all other public experiences." He
received the complimentary Demo-
cratic vote for speaker of the house.71
Although willing to support
a war to restore the Union, Cox did not
want any more of war than
was necessary to that end, nor did he
want the war used for other
purposes, such as strengthening the
Republican party, punishing the
southern states, or freeing the slaves.
"I will vote," he declared,
"what is required to enable the
Executive to sustain the Govern-
ment-not to subjugate the South. ... I
distrust always power
wherever it is delegated. Its tendency
is always to aggrandize it-
self."72 Cox voted for
the Johnson-Crittenden resolutions, which
stated that the war was being fought
"to defend and maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution and . . .
to preserve the Union . ..
that as soon as these objects are
accomplished the war ought to
cease."73 Cox then followed up
these resolutions with a resolution
71 Cong.
Globe, 37 cong., 1 sess., 4-5.
72 Ibid., 95-96.
73 Ibid., 226.
"Sunset" Cox, Champion of
Compromise 367
of his own making. Asserting that
"it is part of rational beings to
terminate their difficulties by
rational methods," his resolution went
on to propose that a northern
commission, composed of such emi-
nent men as Martin Van Buren, Millard
Fillmore, Thomas Ewing,
and Franklin Pierce, meet with a
similar southern commission to
work out a settlement. Although voted
down by a margin of 85 to
41, this resolution most clearly
expresses Cox's position in regard to
the conflict-war as necessary, a
reasonable compromise settlement
as soon as possible.74
Cox's appreciation of compromise as the
essence of practical
politics is best illustrated by his eulogy
of Stephen Douglas, whom
he considered the quintessence of a
politician:
The DOUGLAS
of 1861 was the DOUGLAS of 1850,
1854, and 1858...
History will be false to her trust, if
she does not write that STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS
was a patriot of matchless purity,
and a statesman, who, foreseeing
and warning, tried his utmost to avert
the dangers which are now so hard
to repress....
We
can only worthily praise STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS by doing something
to carry out his will which he left to
his children and his country: "Love
and uphold the Constitution of the
United States." I speak it reverently when
I say that this was his religion.75
Of Cox, too, it may be said that
"history will be false to her trust,
if she does not write" that
"foreseeing and warning," he "tried his
utmost to avert the dangers" of
civil war.
74 Ibid., 331, 448, 458;
Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United
States During the Great Rebellion (Washington, 1864), 286.
75 Cong. Globe,
37 cong., 1 sess., 35-37.