Ohio History Journal

THE CHINESE QUESTION                                            145

 

Exchange warned Hayes that if he failed to veto the bill, "the interests of

the trade and commerce of the United States with the Chinese Empire

will be greatly imperilled.^"45 In New York the Chamber of Commerce

condemned the bill "as exposing the merchant in his dealings to the con-

sequences of public dishonor; and finally, as presenting the hasty action

of our Congressional Body in sorry contrast with the more cautious and

dignified wisdom of the Heathen Empire."⁴⁶ Edwards Pierrepont, former

minister to Great Britain, could "imagine no greater folly than to shut

ourselves out from the trade and the reciprocal market of quite the most

populous Empire on earth . . . and how a statesman can be willing to sac-

rifice our great advantage, which England will seize, to a temporary clamor

is inconceivable."47

The Pacific Coast made a valiant, last minute effort to prevent a veto.

'The state of feeling on the Pacific, as I learn from all sources is intense

and universal," Senator Sargent wired Hayes on February 25. He enclosed

a telegram from the editor of the San Francisco Bulletin announcing that

"all prudent men dread Veto as greatest possible calamity."⁴⁸ From the

governors of California and Nevada, and from the mayors of San Francisco,

Los Angeles, and Sacramento, Hayes received telegrams, resolutions, or

memorials hostile to Chinese immigration.49 Even commercial organiza-

tions such as the Portland Board of Trade and the Astoria Chamber of

Commerce favored the bill.50 One exception was provided by some Pres-

byterian, Congregationalist, Methodist, and Baptist clergymen in San Fran-

cisco and Oakland, who preferred "to see at present no Congressional ac-

tion on the Chinese question.^"51 A former employer of Chinese immigrants

praised them as "faithful and industrious" and "plodding and intelligent,"

but a semi-literate ranch hand from Nevada wrote that "able backed men

are beging for bred when all would have employment at good wages if

the Pacific Coasts was not being litery overrun with Chinamen."52

Republican organizations in California pleaded with Hayes to sign the

bill for the future interests of the party on the Pacific Coast.⁵³ A telegram

from the editor of the San Francisco Morning Call warned Senator Sar-

gent that "there are but few persons here now who do not believe the

President ought to sign the bill. The state will go Democratic if the bill

is Vetoed."⁵⁴ By supporting anti-Chinese legislation, California Republi-

cans had hurt the Democratic party. Philip Roach complained to Senator

Bayard that "the Working men have left us to follow the leadership of

Kearney a Republican," who "has carried off two-thirds of our party by

his cry 'the Chinese must go.' "⁵⁵ Republican success depended upon the

party following Blaine on the Chinese issue rather than other easterners,

such as Curtis and Beecher. The Portland Daily Standard praised the

Plumed Knight from Maine: "Let him lay aside 'the bloody shirt,' don the

armor of the warrior in defense of free white labor, and cease not or flag

in the fight until the fiat of the Government shall proclaim that the Chinese

must go."56

With the assistance of the advice he was receiving, Hayes at last made

some conclusions of his own. Aside from the damage that a veto might do

146                                                OHIO HISTORY

 

in the Far West, he undoubtedly realized that it would be politically ad-

vantageous. His own sources of information, editorials, letters, and tele-

grams, enabled him more accurately to assess public opinion than could

Blaine or other eastern Republicans who had supported the fifteen pas-

senger bill at the time of its passage. Blaine seriously miscalculated eastern

opinion. "The sentiment against that bill is growing very strong," Con-

gressman Garfield of Ohio recorded in his Diary. "I am satisfied that Sena-

tor Blaine has made a great mistake in his advocacy of it."⁵⁷ Blaine's error,

in fact, cost him eastern support for the Republican nomination in 1880.58

Even though Hayes did not, like Curtis, think that free immigration was

a basic principle of the Republic, he, unlike Blaine, wished to avoid dras-

tic solutions. Although he had concluded that Chinese immigration was

"pernicious" and he was willing to "consider with favor measures to dis-

courage the Chinese from coming to our shores," he realized that the pres-

ent bill was "inconsistent" with treaty obligations. "We have accepted the

advantages which the treaty gives," he noted in his Diary. "Our traders,

missionaries, and travellers are domiciled in C[hina]. Important interests

have grown up under the treaty, and rest upon faith in its observance."

If the United States abrogated the treaty, he feared that American citizens

in China "would be left without treaty protection." Moreover, he believed,

with others, that the Burlingame Treaty was of our seeking. "If we assum-

ing it to have been a mistaken policy. [sic] It was our policy. We urged it

on China. Our minister conducted it."59

Secretary Evarts appears to have had influence with Hayes also. Congress-

man Garfield's Diary records Evarts' participation in a meeting held on

February 23: "I advised him [Hayes] to veto the bill, and point out, fully

the iniquity of its provision -- Secretary Evarts was there and joined in

the discussion. I am sure the bill will be vetoed."⁶⁰ Following this meet-

ing, Hayes set down his decision in his own Diary: "In the maintenance of

the National faith it is in my judgment a plain duty to withhold my ap-

proval from this bill. We should deal with China in this matter precisely

as we expect and wish other nations to deal with us."61

Evarts, even more than Hayes, was aware of the dangers of the unilateral

abrogation of a sacred treaty. The Chinese ministers in Washington com-

plained to him that the bill was offensive to their countrymen. They could

excuse the abusive language of the common people as that of inferior

characters, but were shocked to hear "eminent public men" using similar

words. They also requested protection for the Chinese in San Francisco.

On February 28, Evarts assured them that the United States would observe

its treaty obligations free from popular and political considerations.⁶²

Hayes's veto message, which may have been written by Evarts, was sent

to Congress on March 1. It dealt primarily with the history and provisions

of the Burlingame Treaty, the constitutionality of the treaty-making pro-

cess, and the dangers of unilateral tampering with treaty obligations. Hayes

pointed out that the power to make a new treaty and to modify an exist-

ing treaty, as the fifteen passenger bill proposed to do, was not lodged by

148                                              OHIO HISTORY

 

The bill's supporters in the House immediately put the veto to a test.

A new vote was taken on the bill, but it did not receive the required two-

thirds majority.⁶⁴ Samuel Randall, the Speaker of the House, privately

"denounced the anti-Chinese business as bosh and clap trap," and stated

that he believed many men in the House who voted to pass it over the veto

were glad it had failed.⁶⁵ Even though Congress sustained him, Hayes feared

that his message had been inadequate. "You will approve of what is done,"

he wrote Beecher, "but may think a fuller treatment of the subject ought

to have been given. You must consider how pressed we are for time -- no

time to investigate and an ocean of facts poured on us--"66

The veto was generally approved east of the Rocky Mountains, but was

bitterly denounced in the West, even though The Nation thought it was

based "on grounds to which the 'Hoodlums' of California can take no ex-

ception."⁶⁷ On the following day, with but three exceptions, dispatches

flooded the office of the Associated Press in San Francisco bitterly denounc-

ing Hayes.⁶⁸ In one town he was burned in effigy. Despite the veto, the

people of the Pacific Coast did not fully realize how much he sympathized

with them. They could not read the comments in his Diary about what he

considered to be the perniciousness of a population which could not as-

similate with Americans. "It should be made certain by proper methods

that such an invasion can not," he concluded, "permanently override our

people. It cannot safely be admitted into the bosom of our American So-

ciety."⁶⁹

The following year, Evarts sent a three-man commission to China that

negotiated a new immigration treaty allowing Congress to "regulate, limit,

or suspend" the immigration of Chinese laborers. It provided the legal

basis under which Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of May 1882,

suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years.⁷⁰ By adher-

ing to treaty obligations and resorting to diplomacy, Hayes preserved the

position of American missionaries and merchants in China. William Dean

Howells, the editor of the Atlantic Monthly, praised his decision: "The

Chinese veto-message was everything your friends could have wished in

dignity, humanity and common sense of justice. In that and the silver veto

and the New York Custom House business and your good will to the irre-

claimable South, you have made history of the best kind."⁷¹

The President made history, but history has neglected the President's

achievement. Had he signed the bill, and had China retaliated against

Americans residing in its Empire, there might have been a serious crisis.

By making the right decision rather than the wrong one, he prevented a

possible international conflict. But it does not follow that Chinese immi-

gration was an insignificant diplomatic problem, nor that the public failed

to become excited about it. Even so, Hayes nevertheless listened for three

years to the public debate on the subject before he felt compelled to break

his silence and provide Executive leadership for the nation.

THE AUTHOR: Gary Pennanen is As-

sistant Professor in the History Depart-

ment at Wisconsin State University, Eau

Claire.