WAYNE'S PEACE WITH THE INDIANS OF THE
OLD
NORTHWEST, 1795*
by DWIGHT
L. SMITH
Instructor in History, Ohio State
University
Far from being the least of the many
problems with which
the United States had to contend at its
beginning was the settling
of difficulties between the Indians and
whites on the frontier. If
the new nation were to grow in size, as
apparently it was doing,
the native Indians would have to be
removed, absorbed, or ex-
tirpated, either voluntarily or by
force. The decade from 1783
to 1793 was one in which neither
voluntary nor forcible means
brought a solution. Peace emissaries
and military expeditions
alike suffered defeat, and the Indians
became more and more rest-
less and unsettled. Only after a
carefully planned and executed
campaign by General "Mad
Anthony" Wayne were the Indians
faced with no other alternative but to
make peace. This was ac-
complished by the Treaty of Greene
Ville, August 3, 1795.
When the American Revolution was
officially ended with the
exchange of treaty ratifications by the
United States and Great
Britain on May 12, 1784, the Indians
had neither been consulted
about the treaty nor mentioned in it.1
The war was only sus-
pended in the interior by the peace
between the United States and
Great Britain. A supplementary peace
was necessary, therefore,
to liquidate the war in the West.
Congress attempted to effect a
general settlement, and referred the
problem of conciliating the
* This is the text of a paper given at
the forty-third annual meeting of the
Mississippi Valley Historical
Association, Oklahoma City, April 20-22, 1950.
1 A British officer described the great
disgust which prevailed among the In-
dians when they learned of the proposed
treaty and its boundaries. Allen Maclean
to Frederick Haldimand (abstract), May
18, 1783, in "Calendar of Haldimand Col-
lection," Report on Canadian
Archives (37 vols., Ottawa, 1882-1929), 1886, pp. 32-33.
The Calendar of the Haldimand Collection
is in three volumes scattered through the
Reports for the years 1884 through 1889. The abstract of the
letter referred to above
is in Volume II, which, with its own
pagination, begins at the end of the Report for
1886.
239
240 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
Indians to a special committee for
study. The committee pro-
posed a general boundary line to follow
the course of the Great
Miami River in Ohio from its mouth to
the mouth of the Mad
River in present Dayton, thence
northward to the Maumee River,
and down that river to Lake Erie.2 George Washington suggested
much the same boundary plus the
inclusion of the settlement
at Detroit.3 The report of a
subsequent committee, under Thomas
Jefferson's chairmanship, advocated a
westward shift of the pro-
posed boundary, with the meridian line
"passing through the low-
est point of the rapids of the
Ohio" and extending to the northern
boundary of the United States.
Realizing that congress lacked
the means of raising an overwhelming
force needed to impose the
general settlement envisioned by the
previous committee, it was
now advocated that separate
negotiations and separate treaties be
made with the several tribes "at
different times and places."4
Actually the hardy frontiersmen were
given free reign to
invade the Indian country. They gave no
heed to the unenforce-
able orders of congress against the
private purchase and occupa-
tion of Indian lands. Piecemeal
treaties were negotiated in hopes
that the combined efforts would at
least roughly approximate a
settlement of the problem.5 Peace
became more, rather than less,
tenuous as the Indians observed that
the treaties were not adhered
to by the whites. Sporadically, raids
and depredations continued
and increased on the frontier. The
problem was not being solved.
To survive, the frontiersman had to be
as adept with his gun as he
was efficient with his ax. Nor was the
Indian alone responsible.
Henry Knox asserted that "the
injuries and murders have been so
reciprocal, that it would be a point of
critical investigation to
know on which side they have been the
greatest." He urged upon
2 The full committee report of October
15, 1783, is given in Worthington C.
Ford and others, eds., Journals of
the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (34 vols.,
Washington, 1904-37), XXV, 680-688.
3 Washington to James Duane, September
7, 1783, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,
The Writings of George Washington (39 vols., Washington, 1931-44), XXVII, 133-140.
4 The
full committee report of March 19, 1784, is given in Ford, Journals of
the Continental Congress, XXVI, 152-155.
5 Treaties of Fort Stanwix, October 22,
1784; Fort McIntosh, January 21,
1785; Fort Finney, January 31, 1786; and
Fort Harmar (two treaties), January 9,
1789.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 241
Washington the definite need for
something to be done and pre-
dicted that "unless some dicisive [sic]
measures are immediately
adopted to terminate those mutual
hostilities, they will probably
become general among all the Indians
northwest of the Ohio."6
As early as July 1789 the president
began to collect from all
possible sources information relative
to the situation so that he
might be able to form a just opinion
and reach some definite de-
cisions.7 Three months later
he issued instructions to Arthur St.
Clair, governor of the Northwest
Territory, to ascertain whether
the Indians were more inclined to war
or peace. If the latter,
then steps should be taken to secure it
at once. If not peace, and
hostilities should continue against the
frontiers, then "you are
hereby authorized and empowered . . .
to call . . . for such de-
tachments of militia [from Pennsylvania
and Virginia] as you
may judge proper." Washington
thereby committed himself to
whatever decision St. Clair should
make. Knox tempered these
instructions by pointing out to St.
Clair that a general treaty made
with the Indians was greatly to be
desired and that he should bend
every effort towards that end.8
Inasmuch as the government was not yet
ready or prepared
to chastise the "renegades,"
St. Clair was quite willing to attempt
a peaceful solution. He was dubious,
nevertheless, as to whether
this might be obtained at all without
the display and possibly the
use of force.9
In April 1790 St. Clair dispatched
Antoine Gamelin, Indian
agent, trader, and notary public at
Vincennes, to the tribes and
villages of the Wabash River and to the
Miami nations residing
on the Maumee River. He carried a
message which indicated
that the United States desired to
establish a general peace with
6 Knox to Washington, June 15, 1789, in American
State Papers (38 vols.,
Washington, 1832-61), Indian Affairs,
I, 12-14.
7 Tobias Lear to William Jackson, July
22, 1789, in Clarence E. Carter, comp.
and ed., The Territorial Papers of
the United States (14 vols., Washington, 1934-
), II, The Territory Northwest of the
River Ohio, 1787-1803, 199.
8 Washington to St. Clair, October 6,
1789, in American State Papers, Indian
Affairs, I, 96-97; Knox to St. Clair, December 19, 1789, in
Carter, Territorial Papers,
The Territory Northwest of the River
Ohio, II, 224-226.
9 St. Clair to Knox, January 26, 1790,
in William H. Smith, ed., The St. Clair
Papers (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1882), II, 132-133.
242 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
all the neighboring Indians, but which
at the same time firmly
stated that they must abstain from
further depredations. Gamelin
returned from his mission without
having succeeded in making
peace. Upon receipt of this news, St.
Clair decided to carry out
offensive operations against the
Indians. In this he received the
concurrence of Knox, who felt there was
no other alternative but
"to extirpate, utterly, if
possible, the said banditti."10
A punitive expedition was prepared for
early fall by which
the United States was to demonstrate
its power by destroying the
crops and villages of the Indians with
a sudden stroke. General
Josiah Harmar's army of militia and
regulars marched in mid-
October to the principal Indian towns
on the Maumee River only
to find them deserted. Supplies, corn
fields, and five Miami vil-
lages were destroyed. In two encounters
with the Indians under
the leadership of the Miami chief
Little Turtle, however, the
Americans were routed and driven back
in disorder.11 Encour-
aged by this, which they interpreted
from their standpoint as be-
ing a complete failure for Harmar, the
Indians became bolder.
On January 2, 1791, a band of Shawnee
massacred about half
the inhabitants of the Big Bottom
settlement, about forty miles up
the Muskingum River from Marietta in Ohio. Rufus Putnam de-
clared that "the Indians were much
elated with their success &
threatened there should not remain a
Smoak on the ohio by the
time the Leaves put out."12
A congressional appropriation and
provision for an addi-
tional force of men indicated official
reaction to the Harmar de-
feat and the Big Bottom massacre. To do
what Harmar had failed
10 For the journal of Gamelin's mission,
April 5 to May 5, 1790, see American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 93-94; St. Clair to Knox, August 23, 1790, ibid.,
I,
92-93; circular letter, St. Clair to
county lieutenants, July 15, 1790, ibid., I, 94-95;
Knox to Harmar, June 7, 1790, and August
24, 1790, ibid., I, 97-98, 99.
11 Harmar to Matthew Ernest, commanding
at Fort Pitt, August 13, 1790, in
[William H. Denny, ed.], Military
Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny (Philadelphia,
1859), 254-255. A day by day description
of the expedition is given ibid., 140-149.
Denny was Harmar's aide. See also Knox
to St. Clair, September 14, 1790, in Smith,
St. Clair Papers, II, 181-183. Harmar's journal, Captain John Armstrong's
journal,
and other accounts are reproduced in
Basil Meck, "General Harmar's Expedition,"
Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly, XX (1911),
74-108.
12 Rowena Buell, comp. and ed., The
Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain
Official Papers and Correspondence (Boston and New York, 1903), 112, 113.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 243
to do became the task assigned to St.
Clair.13 As a final attempt
at peace, congress commissioned Colonel
Thomas Proctor to the
Wabash and Maumee regions. Cornplanter
and some of his fel-
low Seneca tribesmen, who were
convinced that the United States
wanted only peace, were also engaged
"to undertake to impress
the hostile Indians with the
consequences of their persisting in
hostilities, and also of the justice
and moderation of the United
States." Proctor's mission came to
naught, because the Indians
refused to have anything to do with the
peace plans. A letter
from St. Clair to the Iroquois, which
urged them to take up arms
against the western tribes, on the one
hand and Proctor's mission
on the other, merely led to confusion
and unbelief in their minds.14
As a preliminary action, St. Clair sent
General Charles Scott
on an expedition against the Wea on the
Wabash River. This and
a second expedition to the same region
under General James Wil-
kinson accomplished little but the
burning of some deserted vil-
lages and corn fields and the taking of
a few prisoners. They did
make the Indians more unitedly
determined against the encroach-
ments on their rights and lands. Peace
had not been brought to
the frontier.15 The
projected expedition under St. Clair would
accomplish the desired end, so it was
hoped. Jefferson epito-
mized this feeling when he said,
"I hope we shall give the Indians
a thorough drubbing this summer."16 At sunrise on
November
4, 1791, a "drubbing" was
given, not by the whites, but by the
Indians to St. Clair's army. They
inflicted a slaughter and defeat
that has often been compared to General
Edward Braddock's de-
feat of 1755.17
13 Ibid., 112-113; "An Act for Raising and Adding Another
Regiment to the
Military Establishment of the United
States, and for Making Further Provisions for
the Protection of the Frontiers,"
March 3, 1791, U. S. Statutes at Large, I, 222-224.
14 Proctor's
journal, March 11 to May 21, 1791, in American State Papers, In-
dian Affairs, I, 149-165; speeches between Washington and
Cornplanter, December
1790, ibid., 145-146.
15 Knox
to Scott, March 9, 1791, ibid., I, 129-130; Scott to Knox, June
28,
1791, ibid., I, 131-133; St.
Clair to Wilkinson, July 31, 1791, ibid., II, 227-229; Wil-
kinson to St. Clair, August 24, 1791, ibid.,
I, 133-135.
16 Jefferson to Washington, April 17,
1791, in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson (10 vols., New York, 1892-99), V, 320-322.
17 See "Winthrop Sargent's Diary
While with General Arthur St. Clair's Ex-
pedition Against the Indians," Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly,
244 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
The two years following St. Clair's
defeat, 1792-94, were
years of negotiations from which peace
failed to materialize.
Several attempts were made, with some
of the American agents
being murdered and some being turned
away. One emissary,
Rufus Putnam, succeeded in negotiating
a treaty of peace and
friendship with the Wabash and Illinois
tribes. The senate re-
fused to give its ratification to the
document, however, because
there was lacking in it a statement
that would recognize the exclu-
sive right of the United States to the
preemption of the Indian
lands.18 Much more so than
any of the previous efforts, a pro-
jected general council of the Indians
for the summer of 1793, to
which the United States had been
invited, promised success. Ben-
jamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and
Timothy Pickering were
appointed commissioners, and careful
plans and instructions were
made to insure the desired outcome. An
understanding was not
reached, because the Indians demanded
the Ohio River as their
southern boundary as the sine qua
non of any treaty of peace.19
In the meantime the Americans were well
aware of the situ-
ation and were amply preparing so that
another defeat such as
St. Clair's in 1791 would not occur
again. Immediately upon the
breakdown of the negotiations of 1793
the three commissioners
notified commanding and responsible
officers on the frontier that
"the Indians have refused to make
peace." Anthony Wayne, who
had succeeded St. Clair to the military
command, was warned that
"a defeat at the present time, and
under present circumstances,
would be pernicious in the highest
degree to the interests of our
country." Since the autumn months of 1792, Wayne had
been
XXXIII (1924), 237-273; Denny, Military
Journal; "Captain Newman's Original
Journal of St. Clair's Campaign," Wisconsin
Magazine of History, II (1918), 44-73;
Frazer E. Wilson, ed., Journal of
Capt. Daniel Bradley, An Epic of the Ohio Fron-
tier (Greenville, Ohio, 1935), 9-34.
18 Treaty
of September 27, 1792, in Buell, Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, 363-366;
Knox to Putnam, February 11, 1793, ibid.,
377; Journal of the Executive Proceedings
of the Senate of the United States of
America, 1-20 cong. (3 vols.,
Washington,
1828), I, 128, 134-135, 144-146.
19 Knox to Lincoln, Randolph, and
Pickering, April 26, 1793, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 340-342; journal of Lincoln, Randolph, and Picker-
ing, ibid., I, 342-360.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 245
organizing and drilling his forces in
adequate preparation for a
decisive victory over the Indians.20
The impetuousness and impatience of the
Indians led them
to attempt a decisive action before
they were properly mobilized
and organized for action. On the
morning of June 30, 1794, a
large force of about two thousand
Indians attacked a train of
packhorses that on the day before had
delivered flour to Fort Re-
covery from headquarters at Camp Greene
Ville. This was fol-
lowed by "a general assault"
on the fort itself. Lack of morale,
organization, and proper leadership
brought about a partial dis-
integration of the Indian forces.
"I must observe with grief,"
wrote a British officer in his diary,
"that the Indians had never
[had] it in their power to do more--and
have done so little."21
The Indians gradually reassembled,
after judicious encour-
agement from the British, in
anticipation of what they believed
would mean the defeat of Wayne. As late
as mid-August, Wayne
was still willing to negotiate with the
Indians and sent a message
inviting them to meet with him. "This last overture of Peace"
was rejected and Wayne marched forward
once more.22 On the
morning of August 20, 1794, the
American forces met the Indians
in a field of fallen timber, apparently
selected by the latter be-
cause of the cover it afforded them and
because of the proximity
of the British Fort Miamis, from which
they received more than
moral support. As the tide of battle
turned against them, how-
ever, the Indians discovered a
miscalculation in their hopes. The
fort was not to be permitted to them as
a haven of refuge. In
20 Lincoln, Randolph, and Pickering to
Knox, August 21, 1793, ibid., I, 359-
360; letters to frontier officers, ibid.,
I, 357-359; Knox to Wayne, September 3, 1793,
in [Isaac Wayne], "Biography of
General Wayne," The Casket, V (1830), 113; Wil-
son, Journal of Capt. Daniel Bradley,
51ff. The Casket is one of the titles of the
publication better known as Graham's
Magazine.
21 Wayne to Knox, July 7, 1794, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I,
487-488; "Diary of an Officer in
the Indian Country," June 14 to July 2, 1794, in
Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., The
Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves
Simcoe (5 vols., Toronto, 1923-31), V, 90-94.
22 Alexander McKee to Governor Simcoe,
July 26, 1794, in Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence, II, 344-345; Wayne to the Indians, August 13, 1794, ibid.,
II, 371-372.
See also ibid., II, 373-374,
379-380.
246 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
about two hours Wayne had crushed and
routed the enemy to such
an extent that they were completely
demoralized.23
Wayne exercised great restraint as he
approached the British
Fort Miamis, for he had authority to
take it if he chose. "If . . .
in the course of your operations
against the Indian enemy, it
should become necessary to dislodge the
party at the rapids of the
Miami," wrote Knox in April 1794,
"you are hereby authorized,
in the name of the President of the
United States, to do it." Major
William Campbell, the British commander, and Wayne resorted
to an exchange of notes, which, though
couched in the strongest
terms, failed to produce any dire
results.24 After destroying all
the surrounding fields and villages of
the Indians, and posts and
property of British traders, the
American forces marched back to
Fort Defiance at the mouth of the
Auglaize River, cutting a wide
path of destruction on either side of
the Maumee River while en
route.25 Before moving
farther, Wayne renewed his offer to ne-
gotiate a peace, but with no results.26
He then moved up the
Maumee River to the junction of the St.
Joseph and St. Marys
rivers, where he erected Fort Wayne.
Late in October he returned
to Greene Ville and prepared it for his
winter quarters.27
For a while after Fallen Timbers there
was some reason to
believe that the Indians might collect
their wits sufficiently to con-
front Wayne with a more formidable
opposition than they had
offered him on August 20. John Graves
Simcoe, lieutenant gov-
ernor of Upper Canada, called them
together in council at Browns-
town, a Wyandot village at the mouth of
the Huron River in
Michigan, hoping to recoup the British
losses in prestige with the
Indians and to regain their support.
The closed gates of Fort
Miamis had done something which Simcoe
could not undo. The
23 "Daily Journal of Wayne's
Campaign, from July 28th to November 2d, 1794,
Including an Account of the Memorable
Battle of 20th August," American Pioneer,
I (1842), 315-322, 351-357.
24 Knox to Wayne, [April] 1794, in
Wayne, loc. cit., 115; notes exchanged
between Wayne and Campbell, in
Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, 405-408.
25 Wayne to Knox, August 28, 1794, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs,
I, 491.
26 Wayne to the Indians, September 12,
1794, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Corre-
spondence, III, 79-80.
27 Wilson, Journal of Capt. Daniel
Bradley.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 247
Indians were "very low spirited
and disheartened" and began to
feel that what looked to them as the
inevitable loss of their land
was due to the interference of the
British.28 This discontent was
to be of value to Wayne in his
establishment of a peace with them.
Wayne was now in the position to effect
what his predecessors
had failed to accomplish. Assuredly his
superiority of force
would permit him to dictate any terms
he liked, but such terms
would be honored only so long as this
superiority was present in
the Indian country. Nine months
elapsed, however, from the
initial request for peace by the
Indians before the signing of the
treaty. The Indians acquiesced only
after they were fully satis-
fied in their minds with the
stipulations and provisions of the
agreement.
As early as November 3, 1794, the
Indians began to make
known their desires that a peace be
effected. On that day a Wyan-
dot delegation told Wayne: "We . .
. now wish for peace, and
are determined to bury the hatchet and
scalping knife deep in the
ground." Wayne complimented them
on their peace overtures
and proposed the Treaty of Fort Harmar
of 1789 "as a prelim-
inary or foundation, upon which a
permanent and lasting peace
shall be established."29 The
efforts of Simcoe and other British
officials perturbed him. That they were
preventing most of the
Indians from coming to him, he was
certain. That the Indians
were exercising duplicity between
Simcoe and himself, he be-
lieved. By mid-December, however, Wayne reported to the sec-
retary of war that he had
"succeeded in dividing and distracting
the counsels of the hostile
Indians," so that he hoped "eventually
to [be able to] bring about a general
peace, or to compel the re-
28 William Chew to Joseph Chew
(extract), October 24, 1794, in "Canadian
Archives, Indian Affairs," Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Society, Historical Col-
lections, XX (1892), 380; Joseph Brant to Joseph Chew (extract),
October 22, 1794,
ibid., XX, 379-380; council proceedings, in "Canadian
Archives, Colonial Office Rec-
ords," ibid., XXV (1896),
40-46.
29 Speech of a Wyandot chief to Wayne, November 3, 1794, in American
State
Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 527; speech of Wayne to the Wyandot, November 4,
1794,
ibid., I, 528; Wayne to -----, November 5, 1794, ibid., I,
549.
248 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
fractory to pass the Mississippi, and
to the northwest side of the
lakes."30
During the winter months, Indian
deputations continued to
appear at Greene Ville bearing
"white flags" and willing to bury
their tomahawks and to make peace.31
These Indian movements
were viewed with misgivings by the
British. "By reports from all
Quarters," wrote the commanding
officer at Detroit, "I am appre-
hensive that the Indians have serious
intentions of making peace
. . . with the United States."32
Indeed, in the first two months of 1795
the American com-
mander and the chiefs of the various
tribes entered into prelim-
inary articles calling for an immediate
cessation of hostilities and
a mutual restoration of prisoners. Most
important, however, was
the fact that June 15 of the same year
was set as a date for the
beginning of a conference for the
purpose of drawing up a peace
treaty.33 Soon after this welcome news
reached Philadelphia, the
secretary of war instructed St. Clair
to relax the American vigil-
ance and defense on the frontier by
dispensing with most of the
militia. In the meantime, more Indians
continued to make their
way to Greene Ville to let it be known
that they too were in favor
of an established peace.34
30 Intelligence report to Wayne,
November 10, 1794, ibid., I, 529; Wayne to
Knox, November 12, 1794, ibid., I,
526-527; Wayne to Knox (extract), December 23,
1794, ibid., 547-548.
31 Entries for November 5 and December,
1794, in Journal, Thomas Taylor
Underwood, March 26, 1792 to March
18, 1800, An Old Soldier in Wayne's Army
(Cincinnati, 1945), 20; Colonel John F.
Hamtramck, commanding, to Wayne, Fort
Wayne, December 29, 1794, in John W. Van
Cleve, "Letters of Colonel Hamtramck,"
American Pioneer, II (1843), 389; speech sent by Wayne to Indians of the
San-
dusky region, January 1, 1795, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 560;
McKee to England, January 27, 1795, in
Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III,
276.
32 Richard England to McKee, January 30,
1795, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Cor-
respondence, III, 279-280.
33 Preliminary articles of a treaty of
peace, Wayne with the Delaware, Miami,
and Shawnee, February 11, 1795, in
"Canadian Archives, Indian Affairs," Michigan
Pioneer and Historical Society, Historical
Collections, XX, 393-394; preliminary ar-
ticles with the Chippewa, Miami,
Potawatomi, and Sauk, no date, in American State
Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 559-560; entry for January 10, 1795, in Underwood
Jour-
nal, 20; Timothy Pickering to Bartholomew Dandridge,
February 28, 1795, in Carter,
Territorial Papers, The Territory
Northwest of the River Ohio, II, 507.
34 Pickering to St. Clair, March 25,
1795, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, II, 338-
339; St. Clair to Colonel Sproat, April
21, 1795, ibid., II, 340; Wayne's proclamation
of February 22, 1795, ibid., II,
343-344, note; Hamtramck to Wayne (extract), March
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 249
It would seem as though the peoples of
the frontier would
have been grateful for the success of
Fallen Timbers and would
have been most ready to do their part
to assure a peaceful settle-
ment with the Indians. It was, however,
the painful task of Knox to
report to the president that "the
desires of too many frontier white
people, to seize, by force or fraud,
upon the neighboring Indian
lands, has been and still continues to
be, an unceasing cause of
jealousy and hatred on the part of the
Indians." He was appre-
hensive as to the probability of
quieting the Indians until the
frontiersmen would cease their conduct.
"The encroachment of
white people," he continued,
"is incessantly watched . . . by the
Indians." As late as a few days
before the scheduled council
opening, Wayne complained to St. Clair
of "certain evildisposed
people in the State of Kentucky [who]
are determined to prevent
an amicable treaty from taking
place." Unless effective measures
were adopted to prevent "predatory
parties" from crossing the
Ohio River from Kentucky, not only
would lives and property in
the Northwest Territory be in danger,
but, he feared, peace "will
not only be retarded, but eventually
frustrated." 35
As early as April 1794 Knox had sent
instructions to Wayne
regarding a treaty to be made with the
Indians when the occasion
permitted. For those tribes not parties
to the Treaty of Fort Har-
mar, the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785)
or the Treaty of Fort
Finney (1786) would form the basis. It
was highly important at
the outset that Wayne "ascertain
... what tribes are the allowed
proprietors of the Country"
between the Ohio River and the Great
Lakes. The conditions set forth in
these instructions were essen-
tially the same as those embodied in
the subsequent treaty.36
Timothy Pickering, who had succeeded
Knox as secretary of
5, 1795, in Charles E. Slocum, The
Ohio Country Between the Years 1783 and 1815
(New York, 1910), 135-136; Hamtramck to
Wayne, June 17, 1795, in Van Cleve,
loc. cit., 392.
35 Report respecting United States
frontiers, Knox to Washington, December
29, 1794, in American State Papers,
Indian Affairs, I, 543-544; Wayne to St. Clair,
June 5, 1795, in Smith, St. Clair
Papers, II, 374-375.
36 Knox to Wayne, April 4, 1794, in the
Northwest Territory Collection in the
William Henry Smith Memorial Library of
the Indiana Historical Society, Indianap-
olis, Indiana.
250
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
war, issued instructions to Wayne in
April 1795. These, with
few exceptions, were substantially the
same as those of Knox.
Pickering directed that, in addition to
the main cession, pieces of
land for military posts be obtained
"which you may judge neces-
sary to have established to preserve or
complete a chain of com-
munications" over the length of
the Great Miami, Wabash, and
Maumee rivers. It would also be
desirable to obtain lands on
which trading posts were located or on
which they could advan-
tageously be established.37 In
these instructions and in the draft
of a treaty that he had drawn up,
Pickering also proposed a
boundary line, a line from which there
was some deviation in the
final treaty. From a fork of a
tributary of the Great Miami River
near the site of Loramie's store, the
line was to run down that
stream to the Great Miami River, and
thence down that river to
the Ohio River.38
On June 16, 1795, the Delaware, Eel
River, Ottawa, and
Potawatomi tribes, who had arrived at
Greene Ville within the fort-
night, met with Wayne. The council fire
was kindled and the
calumet or ceremonial peace pipe was
leisurely smoked. After a
speech of welcome by the American
commander and an appropri-
ate response by one of the Indian
chiefs, wampum, presents, and
drink were "judiciously"
distributed. As other delegations and
tribes arrived, a similar pattern of
welcome was carried out. It
was important to the business at hand
that the Indians be made to
feel welcome and at ease. Camp rules
and procedures were ex-
plained so they would not become
alarmed at such military pro-
cedure as reveille, retreat, the fourth
of July celebration, and
various types of formations.39
In the guise of a sermon, on July 5,
the Rev. Morgan J. Rhees,
37 Pickering to Wayne, April 8 and 14,
1795, in Northwest Territory Collection.
38 Ibid.; draft of the proposed treaty in Northwest Territory
Collection; Pick-
ering to Dandridge (abstract), April 13,
1795, in Historical Index to the Pickering
Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th
Ser., VIII, Boston, 1896),
111.
39 Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, June 16 to August 10, 1795, by
H.
DeButts, secretary, September 20, 1795,
in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I,
564-583. See entries for June 16, 17,
21, 23, 25, 26, July 3, 4, and 13, 1795. Dele-
gations continued to arrive even after
the treaty had been voted upon on July 30.
See entries for July 31 and August 3, 1795.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 251
the army chaplain, gave Wayne and his
men some sound advice.
His text was taken from the Book of
Judges. Gideon, "a Noble
Example for all Generals and Commanders
of armies," had not the
"devastation and plunder" of
his enemies as his object, but rather
the defense of the lives, liberty, and
property of his brethren.
When this was accomplished, he sheathed
his sword. Rhees dis-
played more than a common knowledge of
the workings of prac-
tical diplomacy. "In order to
establish a durable peace," he ex-
horted, "some sacrifices must be
made on both sides." Here was
something for Wayne to think about. One
further stipulation was
made by the minister which undoubtedly
would have changed not
only the present negotiations, but also
the negotiations of most of
the treaties subsequently made with the
Indians. "Dissimula-
lation and intrigue, with every species
of deceptive speculation
and fraudulent practice, ought to be
sacrificed on the altars of
strict honor and inflexible
justice." 40
After a delay of several days, to await
the arrival of some
groups known to be on their way to the
treaty council at Greene
Volle, it was decided to postpone
negotiations no longer. On July
15, Wayne, in a speech to the assembled
council, told the Indians
that the Treaty of Fort Harmar was to
be the basis of the negotia-
tions. For the next week the Indians
accomplished little except
to carry on rather futile discussions
and to tender unacceptable
excuses for the invalidity of that
treaty.41
The upper hand in negotiations was
gained by Wayne on
July 24. In his carefully prepared and
delivered speech before
the council, he reviewed the treaty of
peace of 1783 by which the
British had surrendered the territory
south of the Great Lakes to
the United States. Then he read the
first two articles of Jay's
Treaty, signed on November 19, 1794,
calling for peace and
friendship between the two countries
and for an evacuation of all
the British troops and garrisons within
the boundaries of the
40 Morgan J. Rhees, The Altar of
Peace, Being a Substance of a Discourse
Delivered in the Council House, at
Greenville, July 5, 1795 (Philadelphia,
1798),
5, 9.
41 Entries for July 9, 15, 18, 20, 21,
and 22, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty of
Greene Ville, in American State
Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 566, 567-568, 569-571.
252 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
Northwest Territory before June 1,
1796.42 Whatever had been
the actual or potential aid of the
British in the Northwest, it was
now greatly diminished. Wayne further
refuted arguments the
Indians had presented of their
ignorance of the Fort Harmar
treaty. Negotiations entered a new
phase, that of consideration
of the tentative provisions of the
treaty. "I will order you a
double allowance of drink;
because," Wayne asserted, "we have
now buried the hatchet, and performed
every necessary ceremony,
to render propitious our renovated
friendship." 43
After less than a week of reading,
explaining, and discuss-
ing the proposed articles, they were
voted upon and accepted
unanimously. It is well to note,
however, the statement made by
one of the Potawatomi chiefs in
council. "You know we have all
buried the hatchet, together with our
bad actions," he declared.
"You may depend on our sincerity.
We cannot but be sincere, as
your forts will be planted thick among
us." 44
Aside from some discussion of the
cession of areas for posts
and garrisons, the only important
question of boundary was that
involving the line from Fort Recovery
to a point on the Ohio River
opposite the mouth of the Kentucky
River. Little Turtle, the chief
spokesman, suggested that the road from
Fort Recovery to Fort
Hamilton and the Great Miami River be
used as the boundary.
He was convinced by Wayne, however,
that because of the indef-
initeness of the road, this line would
"certainly be productive of
unpleasant mistakes and
differences." 45
Objection was also made respecting the
tract at the Wabash
terminal of the portage connecting the
Maumee and Wabash riv-
ers. The Miami were afraid they would
lose the rather profitable
income derived from the traffic over
this portage. "Let us both
42 Treaty of peace of 1783, in Hunter
Miller, ed., Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Acts of the United States of
America (7 vols., Washington, 1931- ),
II, 151-
157, especially Article 2; Jay's Treaty,
ibid., II, 245-274, especially Articles 1 and 2.
43 Entry for July 24, 1795, in Minutes
of the Treaty of Greene Ville, in
American State Papers, Indian
Affairs, I, 573-574.
44 Entries for July 27, 28, and 30,
1795, ibid., I, 574-578; draft of Pickering's
proposed treaty, in Northwest Territory
Collection.
45 Entries for July 29 and 30, 1795, in
Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville,
in American State Papers, Indian Affairs,
I, 575-578.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 253
own this place," it was suggested
by Little Turtle, "and enjoy in
common the advantages it affords."
This was countered by
Wayne, who pointed out to them that the
traders merely added
the Miami toll and carrying charges to
the prices the Indians paid
them for their goods. He told them that
the United States was its
own carrier and that the annuity
allocated to the Miami would
repay them many times for any losses
they might sustain from
losing the tract.46
The Treaty of Greene Ville, between the
tribes of the Old
Northwest and the United States, was
signed on August 3, 1795.47
Its significance to most of the 1,130
Indians present was epito-
mized in the remarks made by a Wyandot
chief before the assem-
bled council. Heretofore, the
"Fifteen Fires" had been addressed
as "Brother," but, he said,
"we do now, and will henceforth, ac-
knowledge the fifteen United States ...
to be our father ... [we]
must call them brothers no more."
Equal to the occasion, Wayne
replied, "I now adopt you all, in
the name of the President and
Fifteen great Fires of America, as
their children, and you are so
accordingly."48
By the "Peace of Mad
Anthony," as it is sometimes called,
the Indians surrendered the
northeastern part and the southern
half of Ohio. In this respect the
treaty did not accomplish the
46 Ibid.
47 Entry for August 3, 1795, ibid., I,
579; Treaty of Greene Ville, August 3, 1795,
manuscript (photostat), in the Ohio
State Archaeological and Historical Society
Library, Columbus; Wayne to Pickering
(extract), August 9, 1795, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 564.
The tribes that signed the treaty were
the Chippewa, Delaware, Eel River,
Kaskaskia, Kickapoo, Miami, Ottawa,
Piankashaw, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Wea, and
Wyandot.
48 Enumeration of the tribes and numbers of Indians present at the
negotia-
tions, August 7, 1795, in American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 582; entry for
August 7, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty
of Greene Ville, ibid, I, 579-580. See also
a speech by Joseph Brant, a half-breed
Indian leader present at the signing, made
in later life, in William L. Stone, Life
of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea (2 vols.,
Cooperstown, 1844), II, 395. See also
England to Simcoe, Detroit, August 20, 1795,
in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence,
IV, 71-72. This letter gives an opposite pic-
ture of the negotiations. Just how much
credence can be placed in it is impossible
to determine. Quite probably, however,
it contains an element of truth.
Trading interests present at the
negotiations in one role or another, were not
successful in having the treaty altered
to their private benefits. This factor led to
unfavorable reports. For example, see
John Askin to John Askin, Jr., July 5, 1795,
in Mary A. Burton, ed., Manuscripts
from the Burton Historical Collection (Detroit,
1918), 31-32; and John Askin, Jr., to
England, August 19, 1795, ibid., 34-37.
254 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
goals set by the two committees of the
congress a little over a dec-
ade before. One had asked for all but a
narrow strip of western
Ohio, while the other had called for
all of Ohio and approximately
the eastern half of Indiana and
Michigan as well.49
Beyond the committee
recommendations, however, much
more was accomplished in a more
important respect. In addition
to the general cession of land, sixteen
tracts comprising all the
principal portages, heads of navigable
streams, and trading posts
were ceded, embracing, among others,
the sites of present-day
Loramie, Defiance, Fremont, and Toledo
in Ohio, Fort Wayne in
Indiana, Detroit in Michigan, and
Peoria and Chicago in Illinois.50
Besides, the people of the United
States were to be permitted free-
dom of passage through the Indian
country along the principal
rivers and their connecting portages
and over the road from San-
dusky to Detroit via Fort Miamis. Also,
the use of mouths of
rivers and of harbors along lakes
adjoining Indian lands was
granted the Americans for purposes of
shelter and safety.51
The United States relinquished claims
to all other Indian
lands north and west of the Ohio River
with four important ex-
ceptions: Clark's Grant of 150,000
acres near the rapids of the
Ohio River; Vincennes and adjacent
lands to which the Indian
title had previously been surrendered;
all other lands "in posses-
sion of the French people & other
white Settlers Among them, of
which the Indian title has been
extinguished"; and Fort Massac
on the Ohio River in Illinois, not far
from a point opposite the
mouth of the Tennessee River.52
The United States was now virtually in
control of the entire
Old Northwest. The Treaty of Greene
Ville liquidated the war
49 Article
3, Treaty of Greene Ville, manuscript; Homer C. Hockett, The Ex-
tinction of the Indian Title in Ohio
Beyond the Greeneville Line (unpublished manu-
script loaned by the author). This
boundary line is shown in Charles C. Royce,
comp., Indian Land Cessions in the
United States (Bureau of American Ethnology,
Eighteenth Annual Report, Part 2, Washington, 1899), plates CXXVI and CLVI.
50 Article
3, Treaty of Greene Ville, manuscript. The approximate locations
of these cessions are shown in Royce, Indian
Land Cessions, plates CXXIV-CXXVII,
CXXXVI, CXXXVIII, CLVI-CLVII.
51 Article 3, Treaty of Greene Ville,
manuscript.
52 Article 4, ibid. These
exceptions, other than the third which was never
more specifically defined, are shown in
Royce, Indian Land Cessions, plates CXXIV
and CXXVI.
Wayne's Peace with the Indians 255
and accomplished the peace between the
Indians and the United
States. These matters had been omitted in the 1783 settle-
ment of the United States and Great
Britain, and only after a
dozen years of almost chronic failure
was the new nation able to
assert itself and to deal with the
Indians in an adequate manner.
The Treaty of Greene Ville
disintegrated Indian unity,
opened most of Ohio for settlement, and
became the first of a se-
ries of cessions that extinguished the
Indian title to the greater
part of the Northwest Territory. This
was indeed necessary to
bring about any satisfactory settlement
of the land question be-
tween the native inhabitants and the
Americans who were literally
beginning to crowd them out. The
American government could
now safely survey and open much new
territory for settlement by
its pioneers and at the same time make
substantial advances by
additional treaties. The United States
had the upper hand by
virtue of superiority of military
force, demonstrated at Fallen
Timbers, and of written commitments in
the Greene Ville docu-
ment. Though not unopposed, it
continued to hold its dominant
position until the Indian had been
replaced by the white man
throughout the Northwest Territory.