TOM L. JOHNSON*
by ROBERT H. BREMNER
Instructor in History, Ohio State
University
In 1901 the voters of Cleveland, Ohio,
chose as their mayor
a resourceful and unconventional man,
newly retired from a suc-
cessful business career, who was the
best known American fol-
lower of Henry George. Tom L. Johnson
remained in office for
eight exciting and enlightening years.
Born in 1854 into an aristo-
cratic southern family which was
impoverished during the Civil
War, Johnson had to go to work while
still a child. At twenty-two
he was the successful inventor of the
first coin fare box in use in
the United States, and at twenty-five
he was already a business
rival of Mark Hanna. Converted to the
single tax philosophy of
Henry George at thirty, he was a steel
manufacturer at thirty-
five and had twice been elected to congress by the
time he was
forty. At fifty he had been hailed by
Lincoln Steffens as the best
mayor of the best governed city in
America.1
Throughout his political career Johnson
struck many as a
mysterious and enigmatic figure. The
reason for this was not that
his political views were obscure, for
he never straddled or
avoided an issue, but that they seemed
to contradict his business
interests. The president of street
railways, he advocated munici-
pal ownership of public utilities. A
steel manufacturer, he
nevertheless favored free trade. In
politics a vigorous opponent
of monopoly, as a businessman Johnson
used monopolistic prac-
tices to amass a large fortune. Such a
quixotic figure, his enemies
claimed, was surely a demagog. Johnson
was never able to con-
vince these critics of what his friends
called his "larger moral-
ity." As a matter of fact, Johnson
was not troubled by, nor in-
* This article is a condensation of
material relating to Johnson in Robert H.
Bremner, The Civic Revival in Ohio, a
dissertation presented in partial fulfillment
of the degree of doctor of philosophy at
Ohio State University in 1943.
1 Lincoln Steffens, "Ohio: A Tale
of Two Cities," McClure's Magazine,
XXV (1905), 293-311.
1
2 Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Quarterly
terested in, questions of personal
goodness or badness, and he
felt no compulsion to make excuses for
the manner in which he
made his money. What he was primarily concerned with
was the
advancement of his political and social
program. While a mem-
ber of congress, Johnson expressed his
attitude in a speech to
the house of representatives: "As
far as I am personally con-
cerned I am a thorough-going
monopolist, and would be willing,
outside of this Hall, to take advantage
of any of the bad laws
that you put upon the statute books;
but I will not defend them
here."2 The matter of
Johnson's sincerity, however, ever remained
a doubtful point to many of his
contemporaries. They were simply
unable to understand a man so
emancipated that he did not feel
obliged to defend his business
practices.
But if Johnson and his views were
inexplicable to some
people, the charm of his personality
was irresistible to others.
Brand Whitlock, the literary mayor of
Toledo, once wrote a
short story about the crusading mayor
of a large city. "Is there
anything better in life than to know
you have done a good thing
and done it well?" someone asked
the hero of Whitlock's story.
"Yes, just one," the mayor
replied, "To have a few friends who
understand."3 Johnson was
fortunate in having a great many
friends of that kind. As mayor he
attracted a group of talented
young men into the public service and
communicated to them
his own enthusiasm for civic activity.
Several members of the
group, notably Newton D. Baker, W. B.
Colver, and Frederic C.
Howe, subsequently held important posts
in the Wilson admin-
istration.4 In later years
nearly all of Johnson's associates recalled
their service with him as the most
significant experience of their
lives. "The crusade of my
youth," wrote Frederic C. Howe in
Confessions of a Reformer, "the greatest adventure of my life,
as great a training school as a man
could pass through--this the
decade of struggle in Cleveland from
1901 to 1910 was to me."5
2 Congressional Record, 53 cong., 2 sess., 641, January 10, 1894.
3 Brand Whitlock, "The Gold
Brick," American Magazine, LXVII (1908-9),
42-51.
4
Baker was secretary of war, Colver was chairman of the federal trade
com-
mission, and Howe was commissioner of
immigration for the port of New York.
5
Frederic C. Howe, Confessions of a Reformer (New York, 1925),
115.
Tom L. Johnson 3
Discovering Henry George was the
crucial event in John-
son's life. One day in 1883 a news
vendor on a train sold the
young businessman a copy of George's Social
Problems. After
reading it, Johnson bought a copy of Progress
and Poverty. Dis-
turbed by what he read and hoping that
there were fallacies in
George's reasoning which he had not
been able to discover, John-
son gave Progress and Poverty to
his lawyer and asked him to point
out the errors in the author's logic.
Unconvinced by the attorney's
objections, Johnson declared himself a
convert to the Georgian
economics. Johnson may not have been an
original thinker, but,
as one of his admirers pointed out many
years later, he accepted
new ideas as readily as most men hold
on to old ones.6
At his earliest opportunity Johnson
went to Brooklyn to meet
George. It was George's influence which
induced Johnson to
accept the Democratic nomination for
congressman from a Cleve-
land district in 1888. Up to this time
Johnson had been so pre-
occupied with business that he had
never bothered to vote. De-
feated in his first attempt, he was
elected on the Democratic ticket
in 1890 and again in 1892. Shortly
after leaving the house of
representatives in 1895, Johnson began
gradually to divest him-
self of both his transportation and
steel interests. By 1901 his re-
tirement from business was complete.
From then until his death
ten years later he devoted his energies
almost exclusively to poli-
tics.
The major part of Johnson's four terms
as mayor were con-
sumed in an almost epic struggle with
the street railway com-
panies of Cleveland. Some aspects of
the conflict are still very
pertinent, for the basic issue involved
was a constant in American
history: the delicate adjustment
between public rights and private
economic interests. Johnson's slogan in
his campaigns was "Three
Cent Fares and Universal
Tranfers," but both his supporters and
opponents realized that the dispute
involved something deeper
than rates of fare or conditions of
service on streetcars. The stake
was public control of utilities. If
Johnson succeeded in bringing
street railways under public control,
it was a foregone conclusion
6 Ibid., 129.
4 Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
that gas and electric and telephone
companies would be attacked
next. If Cleveland were successful,
other cities would be en-
couraged to take up the fight. And if
Cleveland were defeated,
the cause of public control of
utilities would be discredited in
other cities throughout the nation.
"You are going to settle our
street railway problems for all
of us," was the word of
encouragement sent to Johnson by the chief
executive of a neighboring city.7 But
the outcome of the struggle
was still undecided when Johnson left
office in 1909. Not until a
year later, and then against Johnson's
opposition, was a compro-
mise settlement adopted. From the
beginning, Johnson contended
that municipal ownership was the only
ultimate solution to the
street railway problem.8 He
looked forward to the day when
streetcars would run free of charge,
"like elevators in buildings,"
with the cost of operation derived from
taxation. He insisted that
he was not an enemy of private property
but that his fight was
waged to help the public regain public
property which had been
appropriated by private individuals.
When Johnson took office, street
railway franchises granted
to private companies about twenty-five
years earlier were be-
ginning to expire. The laws of Ohio
prohibited municipalities from
owning utilities such as street
railways, and state courts had in-
validated attempts by city councils to
regulate rates by ordinances.
Unable to induce the existing companies
voluntarily to accept
lower fares and the degree of municipal
supervision they be-
lieved essential, Johnson and the city
council refused to renew
the expiring franchises. Instead they
issued new grants to com-
peting companies which were pledged by
the terms of their fran-
chises to provide transportation at low
fares and to accept regu-
lation of service by the city.9
In an attempt to prevent these new
franchises from going
into effect, the mayor's opponents secured
almost sixty injunc-
tions against the city. Early in the
fight they secured a court order
7 Brand Whitlock to Johnson, November
19, 1907, in The Letters and Journal
of Brand Whitlock, ed. by Allan Nevins (2 vols., New York, 1936), I, 84.
8 Tom L. Johnson, My Story (New
York, 1911), 25-27.
9 For details of the street railway
controversy in Cleveland see Bremner,
Civic Revival in Ohio, 167-209.
Tom L. Johnson 5
revoking the charter of Cleveland. Once
Johnson was arraigned
for contempt of court. Yet despite all
the obstacles put in their
way, the new lines steadily increased.
Fear that all of its fran-
chises would eventually pass to these
three-cent lines, at last led
the old company (the several old lines
having consolidated in
order to present a united front against
Johnson) to seek a settle-
ment with the city. This was in 1907,
six years after the con-
test had begun.
The agreement Johnson and
representatives of the old com-
pany negotiated in the winter of
1907-8, provided for the merg-
ing of all street railway companies in
the city into a new concern
known as the Cleveland Railway Company,
to which the city
awarded a rather liberal franchise. All
of the property and equip-
ment of the Cleveland Railway Company
was then immediately
leased to another company, which was to
operate the street rail-
way system of the city and pay the
stockholders of the Cleveland
Railway Company six percent interest on
the agreed valuation of
the system. The lessor consisted only
of a six-man board of di-
rectors which owned all of the $10,000
worth of stock of the con-
cern. The directors received salaries
and were self-perpetuating
but had no financial interest in the
Cleveland Railway Company.
They were supposed to use any surplus
which might accrue, after
operating costs and interest charges
had been met, for extending
and improving the street railway
system. Johnson regarded the
board of directors of the lessor
company as unofficial public
trustees. Their interest, he said, was
not profit, but good service,
economical operations, and low fares.
He believed that through
them the city could enjoy the substance
of municipal ownership
until the time when state laws made
public ownership legally
possible.
Unfortunately, from Johnson's point of
view, this settlement
was very short-lived. In October 1908,
in a bitterly contested
referendum, the voters of the city
rejected the franchise which
underlay the whole structure. Two years
later, against Johnson's
opposition and after he had been
defeated for reelection to his
fifth term, the city and the street
railway company agreed upon a
6
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
new settlement known as the Tayler
plan. With several later
amendments this agreement remained in
effect until the city pur-
chased the street railway system about
thirty years later.
For its day, the Tayler plan was an
enlightened proposal,
assuring streetcar riders service at
cost, with cost to include a six
percent return to the stockholders on
their investment. The chief
difference between it and Johnson's
plan of several years earlier
was that the Tayler plan abolished the
lessor company and re-
turned control of operations to the
Cleveland Railway Company.
Johnson succeeded in having a number of
important provisions
written into the Tayler plan, but he
regarded it as a defeat for
the cause of public control of
utilities. He and the supporters of
the Tayler plan had radically different
ideas regarding what
constituted a legitimate private
interest. The latter thought of the
money made by a streetcar company
primarily as a return on
the private capital invested in the
company. They believed that
this private interest must be protected
and that the best way to
accomplish that end was to leave the
management of the company
to the investors and their officers.
Johnson, on the other hand,
believed that the profits obtained from
street railway operation
were fundamentally publicly created,
for their source was the
social necessity of transportation.
Consequently he insisted that
the emphasis in any utility settlement
should be on the assertion
of public rights, not on the protection
of the private privilege of
exploiting socially created wealth. He
could have no attitude
other than outspoken opposition to a
plan, which, as he saw it,
left control of the policies of the
utility company to men whose
chief interest was private profit.
Another phase of what Johnson called
his fight against privi-
lege was his attempt to equalize the
burden of taxation in Cleve-
land. He always insisted that taxation
was a human, rather than
a purely fiscal, problem. "Farms,
buildings, personal property,
land pay no taxes," he wrote.
"It is men and women who are
taxed and not things."10 In
his autobiography he defined taxation
as "the rule by which burdens are
distributed among individuals
10 Johnson, My Story, 131.
Tom L. Johnson 7
and corporations" and asserted
that the control of the machinery
charged with assigning the distribution
was a powerful agency of
class rule.11 One of his favorite
observations was that there is no
privilege equal to that of having
somebody else pay your taxes.
As a follower of Henry George, Johnson
looked upon tax-
ation as a weapon of social
readjustment. He sincerely believed
that George had pointed the way to the
destruction of monopoly
and the revival of economic
opportunity. But since Ohio's tax
laws made it impossible to apply the
single-tax remedy, Johnson
never had an opportunity to put his
theories of taxation into full
operation. In practice, his work in
this field was directed toward
two ends: the taxation of railroad and
public utility property on
the same basis as other urban real
estate; and the reappraisal of
all property at its market value.12
The constitution of Ohio provided that
all property should
be assessed at its "true value in
money." Actually, when Johnson
took office in 1901, ordinary real
estate was usually appraised
for tax purposes at about sixty percent
of its current value. The
railroad and utility companies,
however, had won the privilege of
having their properties assessed at a
much lower figure, ordinarily
only about twenty percent of value.
Franchises, the largest item in
the valuation of a public utility, were
not taxed at all. In July
1901, Johnson's appointees to the local
board charged with cor-
recting those inequalities in
assessments which came to light be-
tween the decennial appraisements,
startled the city by increas-
ing the tax valuation of the Cleveland
gas, electricity, and street
railway companies by twenty million
dollars. Meanwhile John-
son was appearing before the county
auditors who were making
their regular yearly assessment of
railroad property. Although
Johnson presented evidence of the
striking under-appraisement
of some railroad lands, the county
auditors disregarded his testi-
mony, accepted the returns filed with
them by the railroad com-
panies, and set the properties down on
the tax books at the usual
low figures.
11 Ibid., 130-131.
12 For details of Johnson's work in the
field of taxation see Bremner, Civic
Revival in Ohio, 210-234.
8
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
Johnson then took his case to the state
tax review board. Not
entirely to his surprise, he received
no assistance from this
quarter: the state board of
equalization refused to act on the rail-
road case; the state supreme court
declined to issue a writ com-
pelling the board to review the
railroad assessments; and the state
legislature rejected proposals for
corrective legislation. But at
the same time that these agencies were
refusing to help the city
increase the assessments of the
railroads, they were proving them-
selves willing allies of the public
utility corporations whose valu-
ations had been raised by the Cleveland
board. First, a board of
tax revision, consisting of high state
officials, remitted the entire
twenty million dollars of increased
assessments. Then, as if to
prevent a recurrence of such an
impertinent increase in appraisal
in the future, the state legislature
passed an act supplanting the
local boards, whose members were appointed
by the mayor, with
county boards, paid from county funds,
but composed of ap-
pointees of state officials.
Johnson's first efforts to obtain
revenue by taxing utilities
and railroads at the same rate as homes
and ordinary business
property thus failed because of the
hostility of men who con-
trolled the state tax machinery.
Further tax reform had to wait
until the friends of the Johnson
movement were more powerful
in the government of Ohio. To hasten
the coming of that day
Johnson early branched out into state
politics. Though never
himself elected to state office, he was
in control of the state Demo-
cratic party organization for several
years and dominated the
Cuyahoga County party organization
throughout his four terms
as mayor. As a kind of political boss,
he was in a position to
foster the candidacy of men who shared
his approach to public
problems. The growing number of his
followers who eventually
obtained seats in the state legislature
provided the leadership of
that body when it at last passed under
the control of the Demo-
crats.
The first fruits of Johnson's agitation
for tax reform came
in 1909 with the passage of an act
partially carrying out the
recommendations of a special tax
commission which had been ap-
Tom L. Johnson 9
pointed several years earlier to study
and suggest improvements
in Ohio's system of taxation. The act
reduced the interval between
the periodic appraisals from ten to
four years. It provided for the
election of the board of appraisers on
nonpartisan ballots and
authorized them to publicize and
distribute their findings to the
taxpayers of the community.
At the November elections in 1909
Johnson was himself
defeated for reelection, but the
majority of tax appraisers
selected to undertake the first
assessment under the new system
were men known to support his tax
policy. They conducted their
appraisal on the principle that all
property should be assessed
at its full market value and that, in
determining value, more atten-
tion should be paid to the worth of the
land site than to the im-
provements on the property. When they
completed their work,
they had raised the total assessment of
all property in the city
from less than 200 million dollars to
500 million. They increased
the valuation on some parcels from
three to ten times. The re-
sults of the appraisement were
published in pamphlets showing
the tax valuation of each piece of land
in the city by street and
number. Evidently the public was
satisfied that a fair appraisal
had been made, for there were fewer
appeals from the assessment
of this board than there had been
following earlier appraise-
ments.
A stirring and daring campaigner,
Johnson brought many
innovations to Ohio politics. One of
the first candidates for office
ever to appear in a newsreel, he was
also a pioneer in campaigning
by automobile. Many of his political
appearances were made in
a circus tent. He liked the informal
atmosphere engendered by
the big top and found the tent a
convenient and portable audito-
rium for carrying his ideas to the
people. In an age of flowery
political oratory, Johnson adhered to a
conversational manner and
was most effective in the question and
answer periods which
concluded all of his tent meetings.
Though a hard and resource-
ful fighter and himself subjected to
unbelievably bitter personal
abuse, Johnson avoided personal attacks
on his opponents, for
10
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
it was his conviction that his enemy
was bad conditions, not bad
men.
A Democrat, and even something of a
local boss, Johnson
was not a strict party man. He ranked
loyalty to issues far more
important than allegiance to party. He
put a number of nominal
Republicans in important positions in
his administration and once
undertook a purge of some Democratic
members of the state
legislature whom he considered
reactionary. One of his most
salutary influences on local politics
was his insistence that the
election of municipal officials turn
upon bona fide local issues.
He never allowed his city to become a
mere adjunct of a state
or national political machine, and he
stirred up so much interest
in home-town transportation and tax
problems that, during his
four terms, it was impossible for
candidates to wage a successful
local campaign on extraneous issues
like the tariff, free silver, or
imperialism.13
There is evidence that in attempting to
defeat Johnson's
program the groups which were opposed
to him occasionally em-
ployed violence and bribery. Much more
frequently they relied
on ruses calculated to confuse or
distract the voters, such as ap-
peals to party loyalty, agitation of
the moral issue, or threats of
the dire consequences which would
inevitably follow the dis-
turbance of "business
confidence." No method, however, was more
frequently used to impede the progress
of the Johnson movement
than litigation. Some of Johnson's
followers were of the opinion
that the conservatism of the legal
profession, combined with the
fact that many judges owed their
elevation to the bench to busi-
ness groups, gave the railroads and
utility interests a definite
advantage in court battles. A study of
the history of liberal or
radical movements such as the one
Johnson headed leads to the
conclusion, however, that winning
lawsuits may not be the only,
or even the principal objective
contemplated by those who appeal
to the courts. Even though the final
court decision may be un-
favorable, litigation brings delay,
uncertainty, and expense--all
13 For a discussion of Johnson's
campaign methods see Bremner, Civic
Revival in Ohio, 310-334.
Tom L. Johnson 11
factors of benefit to those who seek to
prevent public interference
with a private monopoly.
A lawsuit growing out of Cleveland's
efforts to oust several
railroad companies from some valuable
lakefront land illustrates
the value of the law's delays. In 1840
city officials sold a number
of railroad companies a strip of land
about one hundred and fifty
feet wide on the lakeshore. In 1893 the
city began a suit to oust
the railroads (i.e., to claim title for
itself) from several hundred
feet of "made" land, the
accretions to the strip the companies
had purchased. The railroads had
appropriated this land, and
their yards and station had been built
upon it. Johnson estimated
that by 1900 the land in dispute was
worth from fifteen to twenty
million dollars. His first service to
Cleveland, as mayor, was to
prevent the execution of an
out-of-court settlement by which the
city would have conveyed the land to
the railroad companies
without compensation. After years of
delay, during which one
judge held the case before him, without
decision, for twelve years,
the case finally was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
In November 1914, twenty-one years
after the suit was begun, the
court ruled in favor of the city.14
The decision represented a
victory for the city, to be sure, but
during all the years of delay
in settling the question the railroads
had been enabled to use the
land without having to pay rent.
In the street railway controversy the
injunction was the legal
device most often used to combat
Johnson's program. The old com-
pany appears to have followed a policy
of dividing each of its
causes of action into the smallest
possible fraction and then of
beginning a suit on each technicality.
In this way, fifty-eight
delay-producing injunctions were issued
against the city and the
low-fare companies. No matter what the
final disposition of a
case, the streetcar company's attorneys
could usually wangle a
temporary restraining order from the
lower courts. This continual
litigation was expensive to the company
of course, but it was
14 Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,
235 U. S. 50. For a history of the case
see Cleveland Plain Dealer, November
17, 1914.
12
Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly
less expensive than surrendering its
monopoly without a fight. The
injunctions delayed the building of the
three-cent line, thus pro-
longing the time when the old company
could charge high fares.
If one of the purposes of the
litigation was to wear down the
public enthusiasm for a municipally
controlled street railway
system, it was partly successful. After
nine years of struggle the
people were more willing to accept a
compromise leaving the
management of the streetcar system in
the hands of the old com-
pany than to continue a fight which
threatened to go on indefi-
nitely.
Johnson was active in Cleveland at
approximately the same
time that leaders in a number of other
American cities were
striving to purify municipal politics
and to improve the admin-
istration of local affairs. Johnson,
however, was not a typical
municipal reformer. His aim was not
primarily to expose graf-
ters and bribetakers, and he had only a
subordinate interest in
revising his city's charter. Actually
what he was attempting was
to effect far-reaching changes in the
economic bases of urban
society. He and his supporters proposed
to accomplish their ob-
jective by the destruction of a
condition they called "privilege."
As a follower of Henry George, Johnson
used the word priv-
ilege to indicate a method of obtaining
wealth either through the
control of resources and facilities
whose values were socially
derived or by the private enjoyment of
law-made economic ad-
vantages. He identified privilege both
with monopolies fostered
by private ownership or control of
land, mineral deposits, trans-
portation systems, communication lines,
and electric power serv-
ices and also with the type of
monopolies sheltered by such po-
litical spoils as franchises,
protective tariffs, and tax exemptions.
He felt impelled to destroy privilege
because he was convinced
that the monopolistic control of the
basic material requirements
of everyday life by private interests
was bound to produce dis-
astrous economic and political
consequences. He believed that
the struggle for private monopolies
tended to corrupt politics and
also had the effect of removing actual
political sovereignty from
the mass of men and of vesting it in
the hands of a small group of
Tom L. Johnson 13
privilege holders or seekers. He
believed that the existence of priv-
ilege constituted a burden on the
economic life of the nation be-
cause the private control of natural
resources and essential serv-
ices curtailed opportunities for
economic expansion, thus pro-
ducing unemployment and poverty.
The movement which Johnson led was one
of those local
experiments in a democratic revolt
against plutocracy which,
taken together, comprise the larger
whole we call the Progressive
movement. Johnson's fight against urban
utility interests may be
likened somewhat to the battle against
the trusts which was oc-
curring simultaneously on the national
scene. Many of the ideas
he espoused had found earlier
expression in such manifestations
of economic radicalism as the
Greenback, Granger, and Populist
movements. But Johnson owes his
significance less to his con-
nection with the past than to his
import for the future. Leaders
like Johnson shifted the center of
radical activity from the
agrarian to the urban frontier.
Previously the city had been re-
garded almost universally as the
problem of American democracy.
Johnson and some of his contemporaries
like Golden Rule Jones,
Brand Whitlock, and Frederic C. Howe
showed that the city might
well be, not the problem, but the hope
of democracy. His career
furnishes evidence of the American
liberal's growing interest in
social instead of strictly individual
rights. He was a harbinger
of the liberals who were to demand the
expansion of governmental
activity into new fields, in contrast
to earlier radicals' insistence
upon curbing the power of the state.
Johnson accompanied his
emphasis on the extension of
governmental activities with a vig-
orous agitation for the adoption of
measures to strengthen popular
control of government. Thus Johnson
illustrates the growing tend-
ency of Americans to supplant their
traditional fear of govern-
ment with the belief that the state is
the common man's best friend.
As plainly as any other American
political leader of the last half
century Johnson voiced an economic
interpretation of politics.
And, especially in these days, it is
worth emphasizing that this
economic interpretation was a
home-grown variety, arising from
observation and study of American
conditions, not from adherence
to Marxian theory.