Ohio History Journal

ROBERT L. DAUGHERTY

Problems in Peacekeeping:

The 1924 Niles Riot

On November 1, 1924, Niles, Ohio was the scene of one of the

state's most famous riots. Replete with violence, the riot was

characterized by beatings, overturned automobiles, and even

shootings. Bands of armed men freely roamed the streets of Niles,

meeting with little or no opposition from law enforcement agencies.

Local civil authority in the Niles area-both municipal and

county-had all but evaporated in the face of violence, and Ohio's

state government had refused to involve itself in what it felt to be a

local problem. Thus the forces of law and order had given way to mob

rule, and the result was that for a period of time domestic peace and

public safety ceased to exist. As one contemporary observed, the

situation in Niles was "a damned serious matter."1

Responsible for the "damned serious matter" were two

violence-prone groups who had been waging nearly open warfare for

some time: the Ohio Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and a second

organization which had formed solely to oppose the Klan-the

Knights of the Flaming Circle. The Ku Klux Klan of the early 1920s

was a formidable organization, with estimates of its national

membership ranging around five million. In Ohio alone it numbered

approximately 450,000, with the bulk of its strength centered in

smaller towns and villages. Traditionally anti-Negro, the Klan had

increased its membership by broadening its program of intolerance to

include foreigners, Jews, and Catholics. Added to these warped

appeals was a fondness for secret rituals, burning crosses, outlandish

costumes, and impressive-sounding titles. In the unkind words of

Frederick Lewis Allen, "here was a chance to dress up the village

bigot and let him be a Knight of the Invisible Empire."²

Dr. Daugherty undertook his graduate studies at The Ohio State University and has

taught at Temple University, Morris Harvey College, and Fairmont State College.

1. Ohio, Adjutant General, Transcript of Evidence Taken by Military Investigation

Board Appointed by General Orders No. 7, November 3-12, 1924, 10. This document

may be found in the archives of the Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.

2. Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the

Nineteen-Twenties (New York, 1931), 65. See also John A. Garraty, The American

Nation Since 1865 (New York, 1966), 290-91. For a brief look at the Ohio Klan, see

282                                               OHIO HISTORY

As might be expected, the Klan's intolerance generated opposition.

In this instance the opposition centered around an organization of

Italian-American Catholics who called themselves the Knights of the

Flaming Circle. Holding their first meeting in Steubenville on

September 27, 1923, the Knights virtually declared war upon the Ku

Klux Klan when they publicly and emphatically proclaimed that they

were being organized solely for the purpose of combatting the Klan.

Ironically, their organizational meeting bore a marked resemblance to

a typical Klan rally: a huge circle was burned on a mountain, while

around the circle stood members clad in white robes on which were

painted red circles encompassing the figure of the Statue of Liberty.

In one respect the ritual did differ from those of the Klan: the robes

were hoodless. In any event, there was no mistaking that the Knights

intended to take vigorous measures to halt the Klan's activities.⁴

Open conflict between the two groups broke out in the summer of

1924, with Niles as the focal point. In June the Klan was forced to

postpone a parade at Niles after a two-hour clash with the Knights. A

truce was arranged, the two groups agreeing to forego such

provocative practices as burning crosses or circles. The truce was

short-lived, however, as disturbances broke out again in August,

including the burning of a cross in front of a Catholic church and the

beating of an unfortunate man whose only crime was his refusal to

join either side.⁵

Against this background of mounting disorder, Mayor Harvey

Kistler compounded an already inflammatory situation by introducing

his own one-sided version of how peace should be restored. First of

all, in what appeared to be an impartial effort to maintain order, he

issued a proclamation prohibiting the burning of either crosses or

circles. To enforce the terms of the proclamation, however, he

appointed a number of Klansmen as "special policemen," a move

that in no way could be construed as neutral.⁶ If Kistler thought that

his appointments would intimidate the Knights of the Flaming Circle,

he was mistaken. The Knights, it appears, grew even more

determined in their opposition to the Klan. Furthermore, the Knights

now considered Kistler a member of the enemy camp and would treat

him as such.

4. Columbus Ohio State Journal, September 27, 1923; Cooley, "Use of the National

Guard in Niles," 2-3.

5. Columbus Ohio State Journal, August 6, 12, 1924; Cooley, "Use of the National

Guard in Niles," 6.

6. Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 13, 1924; Cleveland Plain Dealer,

November 3, 1924.

Problems in Peacekeeping                                  283

Niles remained a powder keg. The Klan persisted in publicly

advertising that a parade would be held in Niles, while opposition

groups headed by the Knights just as stoutly proclaimed that such a

parade would not be allowed. The situation was ripe for violence.⁷

In late October 1924, Mayor Kistler provided the final spark which

set off the Niles riot when he granted the Klan a permit to hold a rally

on a field just outside Niles, and to parade through the city itself on

November 1. Accepting Kistler's act as a challenge, various

Italian-American groups led by the Knights immediately responded

by requesting a permit of their own to stage a counter-demonstration

and parade in Niles on the same day as the Klan rally. Kistler,

reflecting his pro-Klan biases as well as perhaps some common sense,

refused the request; but the Knights, not deterred, announced that

they would nevertheless stage their demonstration.⁸ Mayor Kistler

justifiably interpreted the Knights' announcement as a hostile act,

labeling it an "open declaration of war." Any lingering doubts about

their hostility were dispelled in the early morning hours of October

29, when an attempt was made to bomb his home. Although those

responsible for the bombing were never discovered, under the

circumstances it seems probable that either the Knights or their allies

were guilty. Kistler obviously felt that this was the case, for he spent

the next two nights in Warren at the home of Dr. B. A. Hart,

Trumbull County Cyclops of the Klan.⁹

In the meantime, on October 27 and amidst rumors that as many as

ten thousand Knights and twenty-five thousand Klansmen were about

to gather in Niles, Mayor Kistler had conferred with Trumbull County

Sheriff John E. Thomas about how the impending clash might be

averted. They agreed that outside police help was needed. Answering

their request for aid, Youngstown officials quickly promised to send

police, at the same time suggesting to Kistler that he seek help from

Canton, Akron, and Cleveland.¹⁰ Within two days, however, Kistler

decided that local police, in whatever numbers, would not be able to

prevent a riot. No doubt influenced by the attempted bombing of his

home, he announced on October 29 that he would ask Governor A.

Victor Donahey to send national guard troops. The request was made

on the following day. Thus, unwilling to prohibit the parade by the

Klan, and unable to prevent a counter-demonstration by the Knights,

7. Columbus Ohio State Journal, August 10, 1924.

8. Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 27, 1924. Indicating the tension of the situation,

the Knights publicly urged that "women and children [should] stay at home."

9. Columbus Ohio State Journal, October 30, November 2, 3, 1924.

10. Youngstown Telegram, October 27, 1924; Cooley, "Use of the National Guard in

Niles," 6-7.

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Kistler attempted to pass on to the state the burden of maintaining

peace in Niles.11

There was a recurring theme in the history of Ohio's state-local

relations during the strife-ridden 1920s and 1930s: when faced with

the necessity of preserving law and order, local officials would often

look to the state for help rather than risk alienating members of their

own community by maintaining order with local forces. In fact, the

local officials' desire for state forces to halt disorders often seemed to

increase in direct proportion to the voting strength of the local

disturbers of the peace. The state, however, was not blind to the

possible political repercussions connected with sending armed state

forces into Ohio communities. After all, governors were no more

eager than local elected officials to antagonize voters. Calls for the

national guard, consequently, were seldom answered until the

governor was completely satisfied that local law enforcement

agencies had made a sincere effort to end the disturbances

themselves. The result was a tug-of-war over law-enforcement

responsibility between local and state authorities, with both levels of

government wanting the law maintained, but each expecting the other

to supply the force.¹²

Governor Donahey wanted no part of what he felt to be a local

problem, and Kistler knew it. On October 27, or two days before

announcing that he would ask for the national guard, Kistler had

contacted Donahey concerning the possibility of state aid. Donahey's

reply could not have been more negative: he flatly informed Kistler

that city and county authorities were expected to handle any possible

emergency in Niles. Furthermore, on the evening of October 30,

approximately two hours after receiving Kistler's official request for

troops, Donahey wired to the mayor an even more forceful reply,

telling him, "I stand on my letter to you under date of Oct. 27, and

will hold you to strict accountability."¹³ Donahey's position, then,

was clear. As it stood, the Niles situation was a local problem, and

Kistler and other local officials on the scene were expected to cope

with it.

While the governor and mayor were exchanging messages,

Trumbull County Sheriff John Thomas was busy attempting to do

exactly what Donahey expected of him: recruit extra deputies to

11. Canton Evening Repository, October 27, 1924; Youngstown Telegram, October

30, 1924; Columbus Ohio State Journal, October 31, 1924.

12. For examples of local-state frictions, see Robert L. Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers

in Peace: The Ohio National Guard, 1919-1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State

University, 1974), 88, 283, 284.

13. Columbus Ohio State Journal and Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 31, 1924.

286                                               OHIO HISTORY

Henderson. After being assured by Henderson that troops, should

they really be needed, could be quickly transported to Niles,

Donahey wired a refusal to Sheriff Thomas, telling him that he and

Mayor Kistler were responsible for controlling the situation:

Both you and the mayor have had ample warning and ample time to prepare

for any possible emergency. If riot, tumult or disorder develops, every

agency of the state government will be used to quell the same immediately

and restore order. In any event, I will hold you and mayor strictly

accountable.15

Donahey had again stated his position clearly. The Klan-Knights

controversy was a local problem, and thus state forces would be

committed only as a last resort.

On October 31, with a riot all but scheduled for the following day in

Niles, confusion reigned. In Niles Sheriff Thomas frantically sought

to deputize men willing to do possible combat with two

violence-prone extremist groups, while at the same time eight

hundred prominent Niles citizens attempted in vain to persuade

Mayor Kistler to revoke the Klan's parade permit. Viewing the

chaos, Colonel Ludwig S. Conelly and other national guard officers,

who had been in Niles since the night of the attempted bombing of

Kistler's home, reported that the situation was "menacing."

Meanwhile, in Columbus, Governor Donahey remained convined that

Niles authorities could and would cope with any possible trouble. His

view was seconded by Adjutant General Henderson, who publicly

announced that no national guardsmen were being readied for

emergency duty in Niles.16 Against this backdrop, a riot broke out in

Niles early the next day.

Saturday morning, November 1, 1924, was not a pleasant

experience for Ohio Klansmen. Determined to prevent their parade,

the Knights of the Flaming Circle set up roadblocks on the major

streets. All approaching automobiles were stopped and searched by

armed Knights, who unceremoniously removed any Klan costumes or

guns. In some cases the passengers were beaten, while in others the

autos were overturned. Sporadic shooting broke out, for both

Klansmen and Knights were armed; before the day concluded, at

least thirteen people were wounded. Niles had become a battle-

ground. 17

15. Columbus Ohio State Journal and Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 1, 1924.

16. Columbus Dispatch, October 31, 1924; Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 1,

1924.

17. See Ohio, Adjutant General, Transcript of Evidence.

Problems in Peacekeeping                                          289

Donahey followed sound riot-control practice by sending enough

troops to guarantee that order would be restored. Some thirteen

hundred men from northeastern Ohio went to Niles.²⁰

In Niles Colonel Conelly assumed temporary command of the

troops, pending the arrival of General Benson W. Hough in whose

hands Governor Donahey had left the entire situation. Conelly, upon

receiving Donahey's proclamation, immediately took over the "police

authority." Unlike strict martial law, qualified martial law did not

supercede civil law in the area. Instead, military orders had to

conform to civil law, and persons arrested had to be turned over to

civilian authorities. Civil courts continued functioning, and it was

clearly understood that law enforcement would revert to local

officials as soon as possible.²¹

Conelly wasted no time in restoring order in Niles. Utilizing the

powers granted him by Donahey, he publicly declared that no more

than three people were to congregate at any one time, and that all

people were to be off the streets by 6:00 p.m. All pool rooms, movie

theaters, restaurants, and other gathering places were closed. In

addition, a national guard intelligence section was established to

gather evidence concerning who was responsible for the riot.²²

Shortly after Conelly's action, the first contingent of national guard

units reached Niles; the rest of the guardsmen arrived sporadically

throughout the day. The appearance of the first troops, coupled with

Conelly's prohibition of the forming of crowds, abruptly ended the

Niles riot. Conelly's declaration cancelled the Klan's parade permit

simply by banning crowds. To enforce Conelly's directives; and to

guarantee that order would be restored, national guard vehicles

conspicuously sported mounted machine guns, while guardsmen on

foot marched through Niles with bayonets fixed. Word was sent to

the Klan that there would be no parade, and troops were stationed at

20. Akron Beacon Journal, November 1, 1924; Columbus Ohio State Journal,

November 2, 1924. The National Guard units included the 145th Infantry companies

from Cleveland, Canton, Akron, Youngstown, Warren, and Berea; four batteries of the

135th Field Artillery, three from Canton and one from Youngstown; the 112th

Engineers battalion from Cleveland; and two troops of cavalry, one from Akron and the

other from Barberton.

21. Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 1924; Canton Evening Repository,

November 2, 3, 1924; and Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 2, 1924. For terms of

qualified martial law, see Ohio, Adjutant General, Regulations for the Ohio National

Guard, 1905, 9; and Ibid., 1913, 12-22, 297-300, 322. See also Howard Foster, "A

History of the Ohio Executive, 1923-1929" (M.A. thesis, The Ohio State University,

1934), 82-83 for the effect of Donahey's declaration.

22. Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 1924; Canton Evening Repository,

November 21, 1924; Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 2, 1924.

290                                                 OHIO HISTORY

the Klan encampment to disperse those who had already gathered for

the parade. Finally, guardsmen prevented a trainload of Klansmen

from Kent and other places from entering Niles. As Klansmen

scattered, so did the Knights of the Flaming Circle; with the parade

cancelled, the Knights no longer had any reason to be in Niles. By the

end of the day a real disaster had been averted. General Hough, after

taking over Colonel Conelly's temporary command, kept the troops in

Niles for several more days although there was no further trouble

worthy of note. Peace having been restored, Governor Donahey

ended qualified martial law an November 5.23

The national guard's performance at Niles merits further comment.

The troops were capably led, first by Colonel Conelly and then by

General Hough. Conelly's performance was especially meritorious.

Serving first as a "scout in civilian clothing" before the riot, he was

Governor Donahey and Adjutant General Henderson's most reliable

source of information. Then, when placed in command of the

guardsmen at Niles, he acted decisively and professionally. Following

generally accepted rules for dealing with rioters, he neither

temporized nor sided with either the Klan or the Knights. His job was

to "absolutely prevent all disorder, no matter from what source," a

duty which he performed in a forceful, no-nonsense manner.²⁴

General Hough's performance also was commendable. By late

November 1, when he assumed Conelly's temporary command, the

riot was over. The possibility of a recurrence existed, however, in the

form of a Klan declaration that another parade was scheduled for

Niles in the near future. Moreover, Mayor Kistler, ever sympathetic

to Klan interests, announced that he "would grant Klansmen a permit

to parade anytime they asked for it." Hough quickly squelched the

idea, bluntly stating that there would be no parades or demonstrations

of any type as long as the national guard was on duty. The Klan did

not parade.²⁵

Not everyone appreciated the national guard's handling of the riot.

Ku Klux Klan officials, led by Ohio Grand Dragon Clyde W.

Osborne, felt that the guard had been anything but neutral in

23. Mercer, Ohio Legislative History, V, 156-57; Columbus Ohio State Journal,

November 2, 1924. See also pages 17-19 of Frank L. Howe, "Fiery Crosses, Flaming

Circles, and Citizen Soldiers," unpublished monograph, 1971, in the possession of Dr.

Allan R. Millett, Ohio State University.

24. See U. S., Department of War, War Plans Division, "The Use of Organized

Bodies in the Protection and Defense of Property During Riots, Strikes, and Civil

Disturbances," Military Protection: United States Guards, War Department Document

No. 882 (Washington, D.C., 1919), 14, 17, 73 for Conelly's adherence to generally ac-

cepted guidelines for dealing with riots.

25. Akron Beacon Journal, November 3, 1924.

Problems in Peacekeeping                                 291

cancelling their parade. Miffed, Osborne absolved the Klan of any

blame for the disturbances. The true troublemakers, he asserted,

were outsiders "largely of foreign birth." He went on to say that

"this outrage rests with the confessed enemies of the republic, with

the hidden forces of Societism and anarchy, which acknowledge no

God and look with equal contempt upon the religious faith of Jew,

Catholic and Protestant."²⁶ That Osborne and the Klan were so

concerned about the religious faiths of Jews and Catholics must have

evoked some amazement, especially among those Italian-American

Catholics who largely comprised the Knights of the Flaming Circle.

The national guard had a final role to play at Niles. Angry at being

forced to call out the guard, Governor Donahey established a Military

Investigation Board to discover who was responsible for the riot.

Donahey, still convinced that local authorities had not been

sufficiently energetic in attempting to prevent violence, implied in a

November 2 letter to General Hough that the heads of local officials

would roll:

Civil authorities had ample warning and time to prepare for the threatened

danger. They failed. The reason for this breakdown of civil control must be

ascertained and official derelection, if any, punished, as well as justice meted

out to the criminal assailants against law and orderly society.²⁷

Amid rumors that local officials would be held to "strict

accountability," General Hough ordered Mayor Kistler, Sheriff

Thomas, and Trumbull County Prosecutor Harvey Burgess to his

headquarters at Niles for a conference. Hough, reflecting Donahey's

disgust with the recent behavior of local law authorities, asked: "Will

you make any real attempt to discover and prosecute the persons who

were responsible for the riot?" The three assured him they would.

Mayor Kistler, not short on audacity, added, "I have done my whole

duty and invite investigation." The Military Investigation Board was

established the following day, with the understanding that a special

grand jury headed by County Prosecutor Burgess would act on the

Board's findings.²⁸

The military board consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Wade C.

Christy who presided, two other guard officers, and one enlisted

26. Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 1924.

27. Ibid., November 3, 1924.

28. Howe, "Fiery Crosses," 19-20; Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 3,

1924.

292                                                   OHIO HISTORY

man; it met for ten days, and heard over 125 witnesses.²⁹ It

accomplished nothing other than discovering that those witnesses

summoned suffered terrible lapses of memory. Although their

testimonies abounded with accounts of the events leading up to the

riot, witnesses proved almost totally incapable of making any

identifications more specific than that certain perpetrators of violence

were "foreigners" or "Italians." Apparently, citizens of the 1920s

were just as reluctant to become "involved" as those of a later

date.³⁰

Strangely, those who might have contributed crucial testimony

were never called to testify by the military board. For reasons yet not

clear, Colonel Conelly and other guard officers who were in Niles

before the riot were never questioned. Nor were Mayor Kistler,

Police Chief Rounds, Sheriff Thomas, and prominent Klan and

Flaming Circle leaders.³¹ The absence of such key witnesses suggests

that once the riot had been successfully dealt with, and once tempers

had cooled, Ohio officials-notably Governor Donahey-quickly lost

interest in attempting to fix blame for its outbreak. Governor

Donahey's earlier threats notwithstanding, there was little profit in

prolonging state-local frictions. Moreover, fixing responsibility for the

riot might have proved impossible in any event, given the chaotic

conditions that characterized those days leading up to the final

eruption of November 1. Most riots begin under such confusing

circumstances that holding anyone legally responsible for them is

nearly impossible. The Niles riot of 1924 was probably no exception.

29. The primary source for the investigation is Ohio, Adjutant General, Transcript of

Evidence. The investigation's progress was cited in various newspapers, such as the

Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 4, 5, 1924, and Youngstown Telegram,

November 14, December 9, 1924. See also Howe, "Fiery Crosses," 20.

30. See Ohio, Adjutant General, Transcript of Evidence; and Howe, "Fiery

Crosses," 24.

31. The Columbus Ohio State Journal, November 2, 1924, reported that Sheriff

Thomas had observed Mayor Kistler swearing in Klan members as "special police-

men," yet the military board questioned neither Kistler nor Thomas.