Ohio History Journal

JAMES W. GEARY

Clement L. Vallandigham Views

the Charleston Convention

The Democratic National Convention which opened at Charleston,

South Carolina, on April 23, 1860, provided the setting for one of the

most significant turning points in American history. The delegates who

gathered at this southern city to select a presidential candidate and a

platform failed in both efforts. Radical southerners refused even to

consider a program of "popular sovereignty" as defined by Stephen A.

Douglas, the first choice of most northern delegates.¹ Instead they

insisted on the rejection of Douglas and a legislative policy which would

guarantee the protection of slavery in the territories. Northern men,

particularly those from the Northwest, demonstrated that they were

equally as adamant in their preference for Douglas and in their desire to

confine decisions on the slavery issue to the Supreme Court, not extend

them to Congress. Before the Convention formally adjourned ten days

later, many southern delegates had stormed from the proceedings in

angry protest. Some northern delegates, tired of the irresolution

surrounding the Convention and depressed over the high prices they had

to pay for lodging and meals, simply left for home. Consequently, the

meeting became hopelessly deadlocked over the question of whether

two-thirds of the total number of delegates or only two-thirds of those

present would suffice to nominate a candidate and vote on a platform.

By May 3, 1860, the remaining delegates decided to adjourn and

reconvene at Baltimore on June 18, 1860.

The schism that had characterized the Charleston meeting reappeared

at Baltimore. Although Douglas was selected as the candidate,

Dr. Geary is an Assistant Professor of Library Administration and is also the Archivist

for the American History Research Center at Kent State. He wishes to express his

gratitude to Mr. David E. Estes, of the Special Collections Division at Emory University,

for permission to publish this manuscript.

1. "Popular" or "squatter sovereignty" came into vogue during the debates on the

Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. In essence, this doctrine provided that only the resident

voters of a territory had the authority to determine the nature of their local institutions.

Hence, in adopting a constitution, these individuals had the choice of either accepting or

rejecting slavery. For a discussion of Douglas' deep commitment to this policy, see Robert

W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (New York, 1973), 137-38, 698-99; and Allan Nevins,

The Emergence of Lincoln: Prologue to Civil War, 1859-1861 (New York, 1950), II, 209,

224, 225.

Charleston Convention                                                  129

Clement L. Vallandigham, the secretary of the ill-fated April meeting.⁴

Vallandigham, who became notorious during the Civil War as a

leading "Copperhead," wrote to his old friend Alexander Hamilton

Stephens, who did not attend the Charleston debacle. The future

vice-president of the Confederacy, who ironically was Douglas' first

choice as his running mate, had withdrawn from political life the year

before.⁵ In writing this lengthy letter to Stephens, perhaps

Vallandigham hoped to lure the southerner from his self-imposed

retirement to lend assistance to the Unionist cause in the South, or to

encourage him to use his influence with southern delegates who might

vote for a compromise candidate, if not for Douglas, at Baltimore.

Stephens at least favored the "Little Giant" at this juncture, and would

stump for his election in the months that followed.⁶

This letter is significant for a number of reasons. It contributes yet

another manuscript to the comparatively few extant Vallandigham

letters.⁷ Although it is somewhat routine in its description of the events

at Charleston, it does contain new information. Notably, Vallandigham

emphasized the importance of the discontent that was engendered over

the question of whether New Jersey's delegates could vote as a unit or as

individuals, a divisive issue that historians have often underestimated.⁸

4. This manuscript is part of the Alexander Hamilton Stephens Collection held by the

Special Collections Division of the Robert W. Woodruff Library at Emory University. The

repository probably acquired this letter in 1938, which explains its nonappearance in

Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, ed., The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H.

Stephens, andHowell Cobb (1913; reprint ed., New York, 1970). In addition to the letter of

June 4, 1860, there are at least three other Vallandigham letters in this Stephens Collection

dated May 4, 1859, May 29, 1860, and May 18, 1866, as well as a letter from Stephens to

Vallandigham dated July 23, 1866. See also James W. Geary, "Clement L. Vallandigham

Writes to John H. George, April 27, 1863: His Last Existing Letter before the Notorious

Arrest?", Historical New Hampshire, XXX (1975), 12-19.

5. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 741; Ulrich B. Phillips, "Alexander Hamilton

Stephens," in The Dictionary of American Biography, ed. Dumas Malone (New York,

1935), IX, 571.

6. Phillips, "Stephens," 572. See also Stephens' letters of June 17 and July 2, 1860,

Crawfordsville, Georgia, to J. Henly Smith, in which he referred to his high regard for

Douglas. Phillips, Correspondence, 481-85.

7. Vallandigham's recent biographer located only fifty letters despite several years of

diligent searching. See Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L.

Vallandigham & The Civil War (Lexington, 1970), 326.

8. On April 30, 1860, controversy arose over whether New Jersey's delegates had to

abide by the "unit rule," an issue resolved six days earlier, since the state convention had

only recommended, and not required, that they vote as a bloc. When the Chair decided in

favor of the group vote, members appealed the ruling, which was overturned. See

Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 69, for a brief discussion of this matter. Nevins, Johannsen,

and Nichols do not even mention this dispute in their description of the Charleston

Convention, although Johannsen and Nichols refer to the manner of New Jersey's

suggested voting in their treatment of the various state conventions. See Johannsen,

Stephen A. Douglas, 739; and Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 279-80.

Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 225, merely notes that New Jersey was one of the

130                                                         OHIO HISTORY

He further contended that Douglas could have received the nomination

up through Saturday, April 28, 1860. Others have stressed April 24,

1860, as the day of no return because the delegates, in a rare spirit of

unity, decided to choose a platform first rather than a candidate.⁹

The letter further suggests that despite outward appearances,

Douglas' failure to secure the presidential nomination in April

apparently caused Vallandigham to waver in his support of the "Little

Giant."¹⁰ For the sake of expediency, the Ohioan revealed that he was

open to the possibility of having the party select another candidate,

providing that person received Douglas' blessing.¹¹ He asserted that

"squatter sovereignty" was a relatively unimportant issue in the

Northwest, the heartland of Douglas' constituency.¹² As he placed the

blame for the rupture at Charleston, Vallandigham's insensitivity to the

Douglasites' position became even more apparent, for he was far less

critical of the southern "fire-eaters" than of the "Little Giant's"

followers, who had no choice except to abide by the wishes of their

leader. 13

Despite the problems which confronted the Democrats,

Vallandigham nevertheless conveyed a deep feeling of optimism at the

prospect of success in the coming election, as he discussed various

options open to the party in the following letter.

Washington, June 4, 1860

My Dear Sir:-

I thank you for yours of the 16th of May & shall answer it in the same spirit of

delegations whose members could vote individually, rather than as a unit, for the

Democratic nominee.

9. Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 213; and Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 36. Nichols,

Disruption of American Democracy, 297-98, 300-02, believes that both of these days were

critical turning points.

10. Klement, Limits of Dissent, 18-37, traces the emergence of Douglas' and

Vallandigham's relationship in the decade before the Civil War. By the end of June, 1860,

Douglasites trusted Vallandigham to the extent that they selected him to become the

Chairman of the National Democratic Campaign Committee.

11. Douglas considered withdrawing his name from the candidacy at Baltimore, but his

followers, particularly William Richardson, fervently resisted this course. Johannsen,

Stephen A. Douglas, 769-71.

12. Not all northwestern Democrats agreed with Vallandigham's opinion on this

fundamental principle. See John T. Hubbell, "The Douglas Democrats and the Election of

1860," Mid-America, LV (1973), 108-11, 130.

13. On either April 24 or April 25, 1860, Douglas sent a telegram to his supporters at

Charleston that prohibited them from accepting a program which went beyond an

endorsement of the Cincinnati Platform of 1856. He also restricted them to a policy which

acknowledged the Supreme Court as the sole arbitrator on all questions arising from the

slavery issue in the territories. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 753.

132                                                        OHIO HISTORY

opponents.¹⁶ Several other similar movements increased the irritation & finally

the reversal of the Chair on the New Jersey case most of all. The class of men put

forward too, made the matter still worse. Richardson, Stuart, Payne,

Montgomery & others, all anti Lecompton men, taking the lead.¹⁷ This looked

like forcing the old issue upon the Convention & compelling men to take Douglas

in his capacity as anti-Lecompton Leader & thus endorsing his course in that

fight at the expense of the great majority of the party to whom he then stood

opposed. But in spite of all this he could still have been nominated if our side had

been willing to concede something on the Platform-retaining Non Intervention

& acknowledging Equality of Rights in the Territories so long as they remain in

the territorial condition. The Dorr letter & the Harper Article (melancholly [sic]

blunders they were) the South said required the latter in the platform.18 I thought

so too & urged it earnestly as an outsider-I was not a delegate. But with fat

stupidity our side refused every thing & the disruption followed-a miserable

blunder & an act of party mutiny not justified by any thing done or refused by the

Convention, & which precluding any possible compromise, led at last to the

adjournment to Baltimore.

I have carefully observed the course of events since & confess that I never was

so utterly in the dark as to the future. I am anxious for the nomination of

Douglas. The deep feeling in his favor in the West is unmistakeable. It amounts

to a popular furor & with the utter absence of enthusiasm for Lincoln, Douglas'

positive popularity would enable him to sweep all before him. But I see very

clearly that without an addition similar to the "Tennessee Resolution", to the

Platform, his nomination by either two thirds of the electoral votes or two thirds

of the votes cast, is simply impossible.19 Nor would such a platform lose him a

single vote in the West. What we most demand & really must have is Non-

Intervention. That & Douglas is what the people of the West want. The question

16. On April 24, 1860, the convention decided that delegates could vote individually for

the presidential nominee, unless their state conventions had instructed them to the

contrary. This decision represented a clear victory for the Douglasites since it allowed

thirty to forty pro-Douglas men to vote for the "Little Giant." See Nichols, Disruption of

American Democracy, 297; and Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 212-13.

17. William A. Richardson of Illinois, Charles E. Stuart of Michigan, Henry B. Payne of

Ohio, and William Montgomery of Pennsylvania. The Lecompton Constitution

controversy of 1857-1858 centered on the issue of whether Kansas would be admitted as a

free state or a slave state. During this conflict, Douglas emerged as the leader of the

anti-Lecompton forces which opposed this constitution because the dubious methods

used in its adoption had violated the principle of "popular sovereignty."

18. During the summer of 1859, Douglas wrote to J. B. Dorr, editor of the Dubuque,

Iowa, Express and Herald, that he would accept the Democratic presidential nomination

only if the party endorsed "popular sovereignty," and discarded other issues from the

platform to include the re-establishment of the African slave trade and legislative

guarantees that slavery would be protected in the territories. The following September,

Harper's Magazine published Douglas' article "The Dividing Line Between Federal and

Local Authority: Popular Sovereignty in the Territories." In this copyrighted essay,

Douglas provided historical and constitutional precedents for his views. Both pieces

raised a furor among administration and southern Democrats. For a thorough treatment of

their reaction, see Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 704-14.

19. On May 1, 1860, John R. Howard of Tennessee introduced this proposal which

provided for a weak version of a federal slave code for the territories. See Hesseltine,

Murat Halsted, 92-98, 105; Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 757-59.

Charleston Convention                                         133

of Territorial power is an abstraction: it does not come "home to our business &

bosoms" as "Intervention" would. Squatter Sovereignty is sheer nonsense

which many of the best & most intelligent democrats of the West never did

endorse, & which the people would abandon as soon as exposed. At all events

with Douglas they would not hesitate a moment because of the platform. Still

without him, it would perhaps be better to leave the platform unchanged.

And yet Douglas' friends are foolishly & bitterly resisting the only means by

which, if at all, his nomination can be secured. No man ever had such ill-advised

& impracticable supporters.²⁰ Still I have no doubt that the addition can &

probably will be made to the platform. But can he be nominated then? If he

cannot then I apprehend that Lincoln's chances for election will be vastly

improved, if not his election rendered certain. But one thing could prevent

it-the nomination of some one with the immediate & cordial approbation of

Douglas-a friend of his & one having his confidence-in other words a

nomination made after his declination, by his friends & almost at his instance

[sic]. Even then the odds would be against us, though we might make a gallant

fight & win it too.

In view, therefore, of the many embarrassments which upon every side

encompass us & the imminent danger of Lincoln's election if Douglas should not

be nominated & in addition a nomination hostile to him be made, it becomes a

very serious & solemn question whether it is not really expedient that Douglas'

nomination should not be allowed at Baltimore, & that the extremists of the

South present a candidate of their own upon a platform of their own, & that thus

we prepare to throw the election into the House as the best which can be done.

Douglas would not be injured in the free states by the refusal of the ultraists of

the South to support him: it would strengthen him. Lincoln could not be chosen

by the electoral colleges in that event, nor could he be chosen by the House.²¹

I would that you were here. Your letter is received most gratefully & cordially

in the West; & you are unquestionably the second choice of our people.

Let me hear from you soon.

Most truly your friend

C. L. Vallandigham

Hon. A. H. Stephens

Crawfordsville,

Geo.

Lincoln dashed whatever hope existed of casting the presidential

contest into the House when he was elected on November 6, 1860, with

20. Throughout the course of the Charleston Convention, Douglas remained in

Washington.

21. Some southern delegates also wanted the election to be decided in Congress in the

belief that either John C. Breckinridge or Robert M. T. Hunter could secure the

presidency. Hesseltine, Murat Halsted, 36; and Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 211.

Stephens speculated that Breckinridge would be the victor in this event, Phillips,

Correspondence, 485.

134                                                   OHIO HISTORY

180 electoral votes.²² Alarmed by the election of the first "black

Republican" President, many southerners began to think seriously of

secession. On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the way in

withdrawing from the Union. Less than four months later, the crisis

reached a climax when the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter plunged

the nation into four long years of civil war.

Throughout the conflict, Vallandigham and Stephens evidently did

not correspond with each other. Nevertheless, they pursued a common

policy of challenging acts of questionable legality much to the

embarrassment of their respective governments. Indeed, Stephens

proved as much of an annoyance to Confederate President Jefferson

Davis as Vallandigham did to Lincoln.²³

In the postwar years, each tried to renew his political career in the

partisan climate of Reconstruction. Both especially sought seats in the

United States Senate. Vallandigham failed, however, even to receive

the endorsement of the Democratic-dominated Ohio legislature in his

bid for this office. Despite this slight, he remained politically active until

his untimely death in 1871.24

Stephens, successful in his quest for the Senate in 1866, encountered

difficulty when that body refused to seat him and other members from

the former Confederate states. After this rebuke, he turned to writing

and publishing. By 1872, he entered politics once again. Though

defeated in the Senate race of that year, he did secure election to the

House of Representatives where he served for the next decade. In 1882,

he became the governor of Georgia, but died after only a few months in

office.²⁵

22. See James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2nd

ed. (Lexington, 1969), 133-34, for the final tally of votes and the argument that Lincoln

would have won even had the Democratic party remained united.

23. For a discussion of their activities during the war, see James Z. Rabun, "Alexander

H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis," American Historical Review, LVII (1953), 290-321;

and Klement, Limits of Dissent, 87-155, 173-89, passim.

24. Klement, Limits of Dissent, 304-13; and William E. Smith, "Clement Laird

Vallandigham," The Dictionary of American Biography, X, 145.

25. Phillips, "Stephens," 574-75.