Ohio History Journal

WILLIAM E. GIENAPP

Salmon P. Chase, Nativism,

and the Formation of the

Republican Party in Ohio

Accounts of the formation of the Republican party traditionally

emphasize the political upheaval of 1854. In this year the party first

took shape in Michigan and Wisconsin, and in several other states fu-

sion anti-Nebraska coalitions, which are often viewed as proto-

Republican organizations, contested the fall elections.¹ Certainly the

momentous political events of that year unleashed forces that eventu-

ally culminated in the formation of the Republican party throughout

the North. Nonetheless, little was accomplished toward estab-

lishing a permanent party organization, and at the end of the year few

competent political observers believed that Republicanism would ei-

ther gain a substantial following in the free states or become a perma-

nent organization. The events of 1854 gave a boost to the Republican

movement, but the first significant steps to organize the party in key

northern states occurred the following year.

Political developments in Ohio in 1855 were particularly significant

in the Republican party's early history. As the nation's third most

populous state, Ohio exercised considerable power in national affairs,

and consequently its politics commanded widespread attention.

Moreover, the drive to launch the party established Salmon P.

Chase as head of the state organization, a development which cata-

pulted him to the front ranks of the Republican national leadership, a

position he occupied for the rest of his life. Under Chase's guidance,

Ohio Republicans would take the lead to organize a national party on

William E. Gienapp is Assistant Professor of History at The University of Wyoming.

Professor Gienapp is grateful to the Mabelle McLeod Lewis Memorial Fund, Stanford,

California, for financial support that allowed him to complete much of the research for

this essay. The University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Wyoming pro-

vided essential computer funds. Finally, he would like to thank Stephen Maizlish for

many fruitful conversations concerning Ohio politics in this period.

1. A good example of this emphasis is Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New

York, 8 vols., 1947-1971), v. 2, 316-46.

6                                                    OHIO HISTORY

the same basis as prevailed in the state. Ultimately, few leaders

would make as significant a contribution to the creation of a national

Republican party.

Anti-slavery extensionism and anti-southernism, revitalized by the

passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May, and nativism, repre-

sented by the Know-Nothing order, combined in 1854 in Ohio to

produce an unprecedented popular revolt against the old parties.² In

July various anti-Democratic elements, including Whigs searching for

a new political home, Free-Soilers eager to form a more powerful anti-

slavery organization, anti-Nebraska Democrats angered by their

party's support of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Germans

alienated from their traditional Democratic allegiance, and Know-

Nothings just beginning to sense their extraordinary power in the

state, all came together in Columbus to form a temporary coalition to

meet the present crisis and to nominate a People's state ticket.³

More a conglomeration of opposition factions than a tightly knit po-

litical organization, the People's party scored an astonishing triumph

in October. It swept the state with an unprecedented majority of al-

most 70,000 votes and won every congressional contest. The badly

battered Democrats managed to carry only eleven counties in the en-

tire state.⁴ Exhilarated by their triumph, opposition leaders immedi-

ately turned their attention to the 1855 state election when the gov-

ernorship would be at stake. In the dizzying political atmosphere

that prevailed following the 1854 election, Salmon P. Chase, the most

prominent Free-Soiler in the state, perceived a glittering opportunity

to recoup his fallen political fortunes and at the same time realize a

long cherished dream of organizing a powerful antislavery party.

The sincerity of Chase's hatred of slavery is beyond challenge. He

had committed himself to the antislavery movement in the 1830s

when it was not respectable; he had braved anti-abolitionist mobs;

he had legally fought for black rights in the face of deeply-rooted

racism; and he had diligently labored since the early 1840s to pro-

mote political antislavery. As his commitment to political activity

grew, however, so too did his ambition. Among the handsomest of

2. Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era: 1850-1873 (Columbus, 1944), 277-94.

3. For the 1854 People's movement, see Stephen E. Maizlish, The Triumph of Sec-

tionalism: The Transformation of Ohio Politics, 1844-1860 (Kent, Ohio, 1983). 188-93,

197-206. Maizlish's account is weakened by a failure to perceive the critical role of the

Know-Nothings in the 1854 contest. For the proceedings of the People's convention,

see the Ohio State Journal, July 14, 1854.

4. The returns are given in the Whig Almanac, 1855. Democratic congressional cand-

idates fared even worse, winning only six counties statewide.

Salmon P. Chase                                                        7

American politicians, over six-feet tall and of sturdy build, he was, in

the words of an Ohio political leader, "as ambitious as Julius Cae-

sar." Chase was also unbearably self-righteous and decidedly du-

plicitious in his political dealings-his enemies called him "a political

vampire" and "a sort of moral bull-bitch."⁵ Ceaselessly pontificating

about his disinterested commitment to the antislavery cause, he dis-

played (like many politicians) an increasing inability to distinguish

between his own political fortunes and its advancement.

Chase was by this time a lame duck. Elected to the Senate in 1849

as the result of a bargain between Democrats and Free-Soilers, he

was due to retire the following March. Never very popular in the

state, Chase craved public adoration, and he found the possibility of

his election as governor particularly attractive. As was his usual mode

of operation, he commenced actively lining up support while denying

that he had any interest in the office.⁶

Despite his eagerness for the governorship, Chase displayed

considerable ambivalence about the Republican movement.⁷ He par-

ticularly feared that his adversaries would control any fusion organi-

zation. Eventually, however, the Ohio leader and his advisers con-

cluded that the drive to organize a Republican party represented the

best chance to unite the opposition under their guidance. Antislavery

Congressman Joshua R. Giddings was especially prominent in pro-

moting this view. When some Free-Soilers proposed beginning anew

in 1855 and holding a separate convention, James M. Ashley, one of

5. Robert Warden, Private Life and Public Services of Salmon P. Chase (Cincinnati,

1874), 329, 529; Albert G. Riddle to Joshua R. Giddings, quoted in David H. Brad-

ford, "The Background and Formation of the Republican Party in Ohio, 1844-

1861" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947), 85; Roeliff

Brinkerhoff, Recollections of a Lifetime (Cincinnati, 1900), 118; James Ford Rhodes,

History of the United Slates from the Compromise of 1850 (New York, 7 vols., 1892-

1906), v. 1, 449. Maizlish, Triumph of Sectionalism, presents considerable evidence of

Chase's duplicity. See in particular his discussion of Chase's election to the United

States Senate in 1849, 121-43, esp. 131-33, 138-39. Peter F. Walker, Moral Choices:

Memory, Desire, and Imagination in Nineteenth-Century American Abolition (Baton

Rouge, 1978), 305-29, presents a stimulating discussion of Chase's character and

thought.

6. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, November 11, 1854, Charles Sumner Papers, Harvard

University; Chase to Hamlin, January 22, 1855, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Library of

Congress; Chase to Oran Follett, February 14, 1855, L. Belle Hamlin (ed.), "Selections

from the Follett Papers," Ohio Historical and Philosophical Society Quarterly Publica-

tions, 13 (April-June, 1918), 64; R. P. L. Baber to John Sherman, October 16, 1854,

Confidential, John Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.

7. Chase to Julian, January 20, 1855, Giddings-Julian Papers, Library of Congress;

Austin Willey to Chase, March 26, 1855, Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Follett, January

1, May 4, 1855, "Follett Papers," 61, 73.

8                                                        OHIO HISTORY

Chase's most trusted lieutenants, anxiously urged him to put an end

to it; instead, the Chase men should continue to push fusion "upon

the same plan of last year." Ashley was confident that the Free-

Soilers could dominate any such fusion convention, and increasingly

Chase and his circle viewed the 1854 People's party as the spring-

board from which to launch a new antislavery party. In the first

months of 1855, the notion that a convention of the anti-Nebraska

forces would be called to organize the Ohio Republican party crystal-

lized. By spring Chase, recognizing the importance of Ohio acting in

concert with other states, was energetically promoting the Republi-

can cause.⁸

The major obstacle confronting Chase's blossoming gubernatorial

ambitions was the power of the Ohio Know-Nothings. So called be-

cause members were instructed to respond "I know nothing" if ques-

tioned about it, this secret nativist society had been organized in

New York City in 1850.⁹ Membership was limited to native-born

males who had no connection with Catholicism. With the slogan

"Americans should rule America," it advocated checking the surg-

ing political power of Catholics and the foreign-born by an extension

of the residency period for naturalization to as long as twenty-one

years. In 1853 the Order embarked on an ambitious national expan-

sion program, and the following year its leaders decided to enter poli-

tics as the independent American party.10

In general the Order was stronger in the East, but Ohio was one

western state where it wielded great power. By the summer of 1854,

despite only a brief existence in the state, the Know-Nothings consti-

tuted a factor to be reckoned with politically, and they played a cru-

cial role in the People's party victory that fall.11 In the three months

8. Ashley to Chase, January 21, 1855, Chase Papers, LC; Ashtabula Sentinel, Janu-

ary 15, May 24, 1855; Chase to [Joseph R. Williams?], January 12, 1855, Chase Papers,

LC.

9. For the origins of the Know-Nothings, see Charles Deshler to R. M. Guilford,

January 20, 1855 (copy), Charles Deshler Papers, Rutgers University; New York Her-

ald, December 20, 1854; New York Tribune, May 29, 1855; and Thomas R. Whitney, A

Defense of the American Policy (New York, 1856), 280-85.

10. For the Know-Nothings' appeal, see Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impa-

tience: The Origins of Know Nothingism," Journal of American History, 60 (Septem-

ber, 1973), 309-31.

11. New York Times, October 20, 1854; G. W. Lewis to Cyrus Carpenter, October 1,

1854, Cyrus Carpenter Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa; Sidney D. Maxwell, Di-

ary, January 10, 1855, Cincinnati Historical Society. Attributing the 1854 results to

"Anti-Nebraska, Know-Nothings, and a general disgust with the powers that be," fu-

ture president Rutherford B. Hayes concluded: "How people do hate Catholics, and

what a happiness it was to thousands to have a chance to show it in what seemed a

lawful and patriotic manner." Hayes to Sardis Birchard, October 13, 1854, Charles

Salmon P. Chase                                               9

following the October election, the American organization more than

doubled its membership in the state. In January, 1855, the Order's

national secretary reported that there were 830 councils in the state,

and a month later reliable sources placed its strength at 120,000 vot-

ers.¹² Membership still had not peaked. By June, according to the

official report of Thomas Spooner, president of the Order in Ohio,

there were 1,195 councils in the state with an aggregate membership

of 130,000.13

Chase was cognizant of the Know-Nothings' contribution to the

opposition's 1854 triumph. He also believed that a majority of the Or-

der's members were sincerely antislavery, and thus he hoped that

the cooperation which the People's party had brought about be-

tween the nativists and other anti-Democratic groups would continue.

In the wake of the Order's spectacular growth, Know-Nothing

leaders, in contrast, increasingly spoke of nominating an independent

ticket in 1855. Without question, by the spring of 1855 a majority of

the 1854 anti-Nebraska voters had joined the American party. "I am

very, very sorry that the K.N. trouble has come upon us," a worried

Chase told Oran Follett, the editor of the Ohio State Journal. "But

for this the sky of the future would be clear." In an editorial directed

to the Chase men, the Cleveland Express, a Know-Nothing organ,

concisely summarized the situation in the state: "Why, gentlemen,

you can't select enough prominent 'Republicans' in Ohio to act as

delegates to the [state] convention, without having in it a majority of

Know Nothings."¹⁴

Because he naturally wished to be the candidate of a united oppo-

sition party, the former Ohio Senator tried to carve a middle course

between repudiating the Know-Nothings and joining the nativist Or-

der. He was chagrined when the Ohio Columbian, the Free Demo-

cratic organ edited by E. S. Hamlin, launched an attack on the

Know-Nothings after the 1854 election. Although he contributed

heavily to the paper's finances and exercised considerable personal

influence over Hamlin, Chase did not strictly control the Columbian.

Nevertheless, it was widely regarded throughout the state as his

Richard Williams (ed.), Diary and Letters of Rutherford B. Haves (Columbus, 5 vols.,

1922), v. 1, 470.

12. Ohio Statesman, March 8, 1855; Ohio Columbian, June 12, 1855; Deshler to H.

Crane, January 15, 1855 (copy), Deshler Papers. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated,

citations to newspapers and manuscripts are for the year 1855.

13. Spooner's report, dated June 3, is given in the Cincinnati Commercial, June 8.

14. Chase to Follett, January 1, "Follett Papers," 62; Cleveland Express, quoted in

Ohio Columbian, May 30.

10                                                 OHIO HISTORY

personal organ, and therefore he was anxious to disassociate himself

from its assaults on the Know-Nothings. He tried to moderate its

course in order to promote harmony among the opposition. In No-

vember he advised Hamlin not to say anything against the nativist

Order: "Wait until it becomes necessary & it may never become nec-

essary." Chase repeated this advice several times during the follow-

ing weeks. "It seems to me you have said enough agst the Kns, and

had better hold up," he wrote in February. "My idea is fight no-

body who does not fight us." In another letter, Chase endorsed

many of his correspondents' criticism of the Columbian's repeated

denunciations of the Know-Nothings as proslavery. He feared such

aspersions would weaken the influence of antislavery men in the or-

ganization and "make the members of the order less disposed than

they would be otherwise to cooperate with outsiders on the Slavery

issue." Chase assured Follett that the attacks on the Know-Nothings

by Hamlin and other associates did not meet his approval. "My

opinion is that it is best to wait and see, and not precipitate by cen-

sure in advance, a course which prudence and conciliation may pre-

vent."15

In addition to urging Hamlin and others to moderate their criti-

cism, Chase sought to devise a common set of principles upon which

the two groups could unite. Noting that the antislavery idea needed

to be kept "paramount," he urged that "an earnest antislavery tone

should be maintained by our press & that the fire [?] should be sus-

tained." Still, Chase was willing to trim on nativism in order to pre-

serve the unity of the People's party. "It would be better if you ad-

mitted that there was some ground for the uprising of the people

against papal influences & organized foreignism," he suggested to

Hamlin, "while you might condemn the secret organization & indis-

criminate proscription on account of origin or creed." He was particu-

larly anxious not to alienate the foreign-born voters "who stood

shoulder to shoulder with us in the Anti Nebraska struggle of last

fall."16 Chase was not alone in seeking to conciliate the Know-

15. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, November 21, 1854, Private, February 9, January 22,

Chase to A. M. Gangewer, February 15, Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Follett, January 1,

February 14, "Follett Papers," 62, 64.

16. Chase to E. S. Hamlin, January 22, Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Dr. John Paul,

December 27, 1854, Draft, Chase Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. In his let-

ter to Hamlin, Chase adopted the transparent pose that he was merely relaying the

suggestions of friends. He was less ingenuous in his letter to Dr. Paul, in which he as-

serted that in the activities of some Catholics and foreigners "there has been some-

thing justly censurable & calculated to provoke the hostility which has embodied it-

self in the Know Nothing organization."

Salmon P. Chase                                               11

Nothings without endorsing proscription of all immigrants. Senator

Benjamin F. Wade agreed that "hostility to slavery" must be kept in

the political forefront, yet he told William Schouler, the editor of the

Cincinnati Gazette, that "every intelligent man knows full well that

our country has suffered much from the too great influence of foreign-

ers, ignorant of our institutions & that their power for evil ought to be

abridged . . "17

Not all pronounced antislavery men shared Chase's willingness to

unite with the Know-Nothings. One of Chase's correspondents, for

example, opposed "going into partnership" with the Americans in

making nominations. The nativists could support the ticket if they

wanted, "but let us have no entangling alliances." Another Chase or-

ganizer regretted that the Know-Nothings could not be met in an

open fight: "I think there should eventually be no compromise with

them, until they abandon their organization, and their bigoted

creed."¹⁸ The leading voice against any union with the Know-

Nothings was Giddings' mouthpiece, the Ashtabula Sentinel. "We

scorn the idea of a secret political organization," read one editorial,

for it promoted "deception," "false dealing," "trickery and unfair-

ness." Terming nativism "unjust, illiberal and un-American," the pa-

per announced, "We will never unite with such a party, in any com-

pact whatever." It called for no union at the fusion convention unless

the Know-Nothings abandoned their organization and endorsed Re-

publican doctrines. A communication from Giddings was equally

hard-nosed. Opposing any compromise, he called for "a Republican

Convention, a Republican nomination, without surrender, without

compromise." When Chase upbraided Giddings for the tone of the

Sentinel, the Ohio congressman rejoined that it was imperative that

they have a Republican convention that did not recognize the exis-

tence of the Know-Nothings.19

Most Free-Soilers nevertheless rallied behind Chase's candidacy.

By January 1, over six months before the state convention, a number

17. Wade to Schouler, May 3, Confidential, William Schouler Papers, Massachu-

setts Historical Society. Wade's brother Edward, an even more zealous antislavery

man, though he criticized Know-Nothing bigotry, embraced several nativist reforms,

including a church property law, a literacy test for voting, and "requiring a real renun-

ciation of foreign allegiance." Edward Wade to Albert Riddle, January 18, Janes Col-

lection, Henry E. Huntington Library.

18. Aaron Pardee to Chase, May 17, W. H. Nichol to Chase, July 7, Chase Papers,

LC; O. White to Oran Follett, May 3, Chase Papers, HSP.

19. Ashtabula Sentinel, April 26, May 10, 31, letter signed "G." [Giddings], May 17;

Giddings to Chase, May 1, Chase Papers, HSP. Also see Giddings to Julian, May 30,

Giddings-Julian Papers.

12                                               OHIO HISTORY

of newspapers were actively promoting his candidacy. The most

prominent were the Ohio Columbian and the Toledo Blade. Gid-

dings, in contrast, initially criticized the Chase boom; he argued that

there were a number of good men available and did not want to see

the opposition splinter over the question of men. By the end of Feb-

ruary, however, as Know-Nothing hostility to Chase became mani-

fest, the veteran antislavery congressman threw his support to the

former senator. Wade lent his influence as well. Chase also had

strength among the Germans, whom he had long courted and who

were frightened by nativism, and among antislavery Whigs, particu-

larly on the Western Reserve. Backed by this coalition, Chase was

by early spring the only serious candidate of the antislavery forces.²⁰

Other elements of the opposition, however, were less than ecstatic

at the prospect of Chase heading the anti-Democratic ticket. Almost

simultaneously with the beginning of the Chase movement, a group

of opposition leaders promoted another Free-Soiler, Jacob Brinker-

hoff, as a suitable alternative candidate. A former Democratic con-

gressman, Brinkerhoff had played a leading role in the original intro-

duction of the Wilmot Proviso. Whatever the validity of his later

claim to have been the Proviso's real author, he enjoyed a reputation

as a notable antislavery leader, and he had been prominent in the

opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.²¹

Although Brinkerhoff eventually became popularly identified as

the Know-Nothing candidate, the initial movement on his behalf be-

gan outside the Order. R. P. L. Baber, an associate editor of the Ohio

State Journal, the old Whig organ, proposed the idea immediately

after the October 1854 election. He secured an important ally in

Congressman-elect John Sherman, a resident of Brinkerhoff's home-

town who, though not a member, definitely sympathized with the

Order. Follett, while publicly neutral, privately aided the Brinker-

hoff movement as well. Joseph Medill of the Cleveland Leader also

extended support, though he was less desirous of nominating

Brinkerhoff than he was of defeating Chase, whose selection he be-

lieved would imperil the chances of victory. Stressing the necessity of

cooperating with the Know-Nothings, he warned Follett: "We must

20. Chase to [Joseph R. Williams?], January 12, Chase Papers, LC; Giddings' corre-

spondence to Ashtabula Sentinel, February 1, March 1; Bradford, "Background and

Formation of the Republican Party in Ohio," 144.

21. For Brinkerhoffs role in the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, see Eric Foner,

"The Wilmot Proviso Revisited," Journal of American History, 56 (September, 1969),

262-65.

Salmon P. Chase                                                 13

check the movement of the Chase clique or they will get us into a

snarl."²²

Despite such support, Brinkerhoffs candidacy became closely

tied to Know-Nothingism. American leaders actively pushed his can-

didacy within the Order, in part because he was a member, and in

part because they recognized the necessity that the candidate be

satisfactory to antislavery men. Early in 1855, Congressman Lewis D.

Campbell, the most influential Know-Nothing in the state, undertook

to marshall support for Brinkerhoff's nomination, and a subsequent

secret meeting of Know-Nothing leaders designated the former con-

gressman as the Order's choice.²³ Thus, long before a fusion conven-

tion had even been called, the struggle for the gubernatorial nomina-

tion had narrowed to Chase and Brinkerhoff.

The date of this convention became a point of dispute between the

Chase men and the Know-Nothings. Fearful of a separate Know-

Nothing nomination before the fusion convention assembled, a num-

ber of Chase's supporters advocated that the convention be held

early in the year. The Know-Nothings, on the other hand, were anx-

ious to delay the convention as long as possible. Campbell wanted it

held in August, which would give the Order time to perfect its organ-

ization, recruit more members, and, if it wanted, make separate nomi-

nations before the fusion meeting.²⁴ Finally in May a majority of the

state committee appointed by the 1854 convention issued a call for a

Republican convention in Columbus on July 13. The call was worded

to include all opposition elements. It directed the "independent anti-

Nebraska voters of Ohio, who participated in the glorious triumph of

last year, and such others as may sympathize with them," to elect

delegates to a convention to nominate candidates for governor and

the other state offices to be elected in the fall.²⁵ A few antislavery

men, who wanted a more exclusive convention, were unhappy that

the Know-Nothings had been included in the call, but its publica-

22. R. P. L. Baber to Sherman, Confidential, October 16, 1854, May 5, June 28,

Sherman Papers; Ohio State Journal, May 10, 18; E. S. Hamlin to Chase, November 10,

1854, Chase Papers, HSP; Joseph Medill to Follett, December 20, 1854, Confidential,

"Follett Papers," 77-78; J. H. Coulter to Chase, May 27, Chase Papers, LC.

23. Campbell to Schouler, February 15, Schouler Papers; Ohio Columbian, May 2,

9; Cincinnati Commercial, May 12.

24. Ashtabula Sentinel, January 18, 25; Chase to Follett, February 14, "Follett Pa-

pers," 65; Giddings to Chase, April 10, Chase Papers, HSP.

25. The call is in the Ohio State Journal, May 28. It specified the ratio of representa-

tion for the counties and recommended that delegates be elected in each county on

July 7. No doubt because some members of the committee refused to sign the call,

only the committee chairman's (who was a Know-Nothing) and the secretary's names

were affixed to the call.

14                                              OHIO HISTORY

tion signified the agreement of the Free-Soilers, under Chase's lead,

to join the Know-Nothings in a fusion convention.

Despite the appearance of this call, neither side was unqualifiedly

committed to union. Although he agreed to participate in this con-

vention, Giddings nonetheless asserted that if the Know-Nothings

managed to control it, the antislavery men should bolt. Other Free-

Soilers concurred in this strategy. One of Chase's leading supporters

declared, "We had better have it known informally to the Conven-

tion or the Members who compose it that we will not abide its action

unless you are nominated."²⁶ As a guarantee that the convention

would act properly, several antislavery men, including Ashley, urged

that a mass meeting also be called to meet in Columbus on the same

day. If the fusion convention nominated Chase, this mass meeting

could ratify his selection; if, on the other hand, the Know-Nothings

controlled matters, then this meeting could, in the words of one

Free-Soiler, "proceed at once to an independent organization and ac-

tion." Ashley, who believed that a mass meeting "can certainly do

no harm & may save us," actually preferred that it meet before July

13 and nominate Chase on the 1852 Free-Soil platform. This action

might "compell that Convention to adopt our men and platform," he

commented, "and if not have our friends either break up the Con-

vention or withdraw and Resolve to sustain the Ticket" named by

the mass assembly.²⁷

Several advocates of independent action contended that a Repub-

lican ticket free of any Know-Nothing taint would triumph in the fall.

Giddings, for example, argued that such a move would ensure the

support of 30,000 foreign-born voters who supported the anti-

Nebraska ticket the previous fall. Others advanced the even more

far-fetched argument that the Democratic nominee, William Medill,

who was not a strong Nebraska man, would withdraw in Chase's fa-

vor if there were a separate Know-Nothing ticket. The Sentinel pre-

dicted that less than half of the members of the secret Order would

support a separate American ticket in any event. Not misled by these

assessments, Chase knew that his best chance for victory was as

head of a single opposition party and so, while he was careful not to

pledge in advance to support the ticket nominated on July 13, he

26. Letter signed "G." [Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, May 17; Giddings to Chase,

May 1, J. H. Coulter to Chase, May 27, Chase Papers, LC.

27. Ashley to Chase, May 29, June 16, P. Bliss to Chase, June 6, Chase Papers, LC;

N. S. Townshend to Chase, June 9, Chase Papers, HSP; Richard Mott to Giddings,

June 2, Joshua R. Giddings Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

16                                              OHIO HISTORY

resented" on the ticket, the platform had to oppose any more slave

states and slave territory, and the ticket had to be "nominated by a

peoples Convention fairly constituted." He was adamant that Know-

Nothing tenets not be made a test of nomination; the bond of union

must be anti-Nebraska principles, not nativism. Chase blithely an-

nounced that he was quite willing to support Brinkerhoff-provided

that he strictly represented "pure and simple . . . opposition to Slav-

ery extension & slavery domination." If his triumph would be

viewed as the victory of an element other than anti-Nebraska senti-

ment, then he could not support him, Chase declared, secure in the

knowledge that these preconditions could never be met.²⁹ In es-

sence, Chase stipulated that any result except his nomination would

be irrefutable evidence of unfair dealing by the Know-Nothings, and

consequently the antislavery men would not be bound to support the

ticket.

Chase's opponents perceived the implications of these terms.

Brinkerhoff, for example, commented that "the peculiar friends of

Mr. C. have about made up their minds to 'rule or ruin.'" Follett was

equally critical. He warned that the position of the Free-Soilers, if

persisted in, ended all chance for fusion, and he condemned the at-

titude of Chase's friends "that any result contrary to their wishes

must be taken as the secret work of the order: they object to secret

dictation, and fall into [the] mistake of open dictation!" Angered by

the threat of the antislavery men to bolt the convention if Chase were

not nominated, the exasperated Columbus editor momentarily an-

nounced that he would no longer work for fusion with "such imprac-

tical materials." The "course of your friends is open," he repri-

manded Chase, "but it is not free and fair."30

Chase supporters in turn denounced the tactics of their opponents,

particularly the threatened nomination of a Know-Nothing ticket

prior to the Republican convention, which would end any chance for

a successful fusion. Chase alleged that the Americans wanted "ex-

clusive selection of the ticket, leaving to a peoples Convention no

function but that of ratification." If the July 13 convention endorsed

a ticket already selected by the Know-Nothings acting independent-

ly, the Republican party would have no separate identity. With good

reason Chase feared that the Germans would never support such a

29. Chase to James Shepherd Pike, March 22, James Shepherd Pike Papers, Uni-

versity of Maine; Chase to Campbell May 25, (copy), June 2, Chase Papers, LC.

30. Brinkerhoff to Follett, May 21, "Follett Papers," 75; Follett to Chase, May 2, Pri-

vate, Chase Papers, LC.

Salmon P. Chase                                               17

ticket even with the Republican label, and a number of longtime po-

litical associates as well warned him that they personally would never

swallow such a dose. One of Chase's close advisers commented:

"The K.N.'s must not attempt to forestal, or dictate to the rest of this

. . party. Such a move would be very foolish, and fatal to their own

aims and objects."³¹

While Chase scotched plans for independent action within the

Free-Soil ranks, he relied on Campbell to prevent any similar move

by the Know-Nothings. The two men had never been close personal-

ly. Chase's polished, unemotional, and indirect approach contrasted

sharply with Campbell's blustering and agitated manner; whereas

Chase sought to avoid confrontation, Campbell's soaring vanity and

contentious temperament kept him embroiled in never-ending feuds

and controversies.³² Both realized, however, that at this juncture

each was in a position to render valuable assistance to the other.

Since the fall of 1854, Campbell had been running for Speaker of the

next House of Representatives, which would assemble the coming

December. In this crisis Chase skillfully exploited his fellow Ohio-

an's well-known national ambitions. Subtly implying that Campbell's

assistance in promoting the Republican movement in the state would

secure Free-Soil backing in the Speakership contest, Chase urged

the nativist congressman to exert his influence to prevent any separate

Know-Nothing nominations.³³

Chase was particularly alarmed when word leaked out that at a se-

cret meeting in the Cincinnati offices of the Ohio & Mississippi Rail-

road, a group of Know-Nothing leaders along with some outsiders

agreed on a ticket to be presented at the July 13 convention. Late in

life Follett claimed that he, along with Schouler of the Gazette and

George Benedict of the Cleveland Herald, all of whom were actively

promoting union of the opposition, attended this conference in an

unsuccessful attempt to prevent any nominations. As part of the proc-

ess to select a state ticket, the American State Executive Committee

had already instructed the local councils to send their nominations

31. Chase to Pike, March 22, Pike Papers; James T. Worthington to Chase, April 22,

W. H. Nichols to Chase, April 14, Chase Papers, LC.

32. For Campbell's character, see the Cincinnati Commercial, April 18, May 3; note

by Schouler, n.d., on the back of Campbell to Schouler, July 6, 1852, Schouler Papers;

T. M. Tweed to Chase, October 25, Chase Papers, LC. His career is sketched in

William E. Van Home, "Lewis D. Campbell and the Know Nothings," Ohio History,

76 (Autumn, 1967), 202-21,

33. Chase to Campbell, May 29, June 2, Chase to "Gentlemen," Draft, October 23,

Chase Papers, LC; Chase to Campbell, November 8, Lewis D. Campbell Papers, Ohio

Historical Society.

18                                                 OHIO HISTORY

for state candidates to the State Council, which was to meet in Cleve-

land at the beginning of June. Apparently one purpose in naming a

ticket at the Cincinnati meeting was to influence the balloting in the

lodges, for nativist leaders immediately transmitted this slate to local

officers. In publicizing the action of the Executive Committee, the

Cleveland Leader predicted that there would be "a grand smash-up

at Columbus" if the Know-Nothings persisted in their schemes.³⁴

Attention focused on the upcoming State Council. One of Camp-

bell's correspondents, with an eye to promoting harmony, pro-

nounced the call for the Cleveland meeting "a great mistake" and

urged that it be revoked. In a rather acrimonious correspondence,

Chase pressed Campbell hard to block any nominations at Cleve-

land, and the latter finally agreed to attend the State Council meeting

and work against any independent action.³⁵ After a long debate, the

State Council made no nominations and resolved to go into the July

13 convention. The Know-Nothings did not commit themselves to

support Chase, however, and the Cincinnati Commercial contended

prior to the State Council meeting that although no nominations

would be made, the secret ticket selected earlier in Cincinnati would

be pushed by nativist delegates at the July convention. The State

Council agreed to reassemble in August, after the Republican ticket

had been named.³⁶

The State Council also adopted a platform. The Ohio American

platform contained several cardinal nativist doctrines. It called for a

twenty-one-year residency requirement for naturalization, the aboli-

tion of foreign military companies, lauded the public school system,

and denounced all attempts to exclude the Bible from the public

schools. At the same time it endorsed "unlimited Freedom of Reli-

gion disconnected with politics-Hostility to ecclesiastical influences

upon the affairs of Government," and equal rights for all foreign-born

who were thoroughly Americanized and owed no temporal alle-

giance because of their religion to an authority higher than the Con-

stitution, an obvious reference to Catholicism. In a circular to the lo-

34. Chase to Follett, May 4, "Follett Papers," 74; Follett, "The Coalition of 1855,"

Alfred E. Lee, History of the City of Columbus (New York, 2 vols., 1892), v. 2, 431-33;

Joseph Medill to Follett, April 18, "Follett Papers," 71; Cleveland Leader, quoted in

Cincinnati Commercial, May 12. The ticket named by the Cincinnati meeting is given in

the Cincinnati Commercial, May 12.

35. B. Stanton to Campbell, May 14, Campbell Papers; Chase to Campbell, May 29,

June 2, Campbell to Chase, May 28, 31, June 15, Chase Papers, LC.

36. Campbell to Schouler, June 26, (Private), Schouler Papers; letter signed "AN

AMERICAN," Ohio State Journal, October 5; William Gibson to Samuel Galloway,

April 23, Samuel Galloway Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

20                                                 OHIO HISTORY

secrecy and substituted an honorary obligation for its system of

oaths. One plank dealt with the slavery issue. It declared slavery a

local and not a national institution, opposed its extension into any ter-

ritory or the admission of any more slave states, and demanded the

"immediate redress" of the great wrongs of the repeal of the Missou-

ri Compromise and the election frauds in Kansas. Despite the ambi-

guity of this last point, the Know-Nothing platform endorsed the

propositions that Chase specified earlier in discussing the grounds

for fusion.³⁷

The Ohio State Journal was delighted with the Know-Nothings'

action, which it hoped would end "all jealousy and distrust" in the

opposition ranks. "We see no barrier to a full and cordial union of all

the true anti-Nebraska friends of Reform in Ohio. The skies are

bright." Giddings was likewise optimistic following the Cleveland

meeting. In predicting that Chase would be nominated, he declared,

"I think the K Ns will give us no more trouble in this State."³⁸

The Cleveland meeting was the critical turning point in the drive to

unite the opposition in Ohio in a new party. For several months be-

forehand, each side had attempted to intimidate the other. Gid-

dings defended the defiant tone of the Sentinel on the grounds that

if the Know-Nothings felt that they were strong, they would make

separate nominations. One purpose of the talk among the Chase fac-

tion of a bolt and a new convention was to coerce the Know-Nothings

into adopting an acceptable course. This strategy succeeded bril-

liantly. The Know-Nothings suffered a failure of nerve. The question

remains why the American party's leaders, who had been confident

and even arrogant earlier in the year, abandoned their plan to dictate

the fusion ticket.³⁹

Several factors were critical in the Know-Nothings' decision at

Cleveland. Undoubtedly important was the influence of Campbell,

whose personal aspirations led him to oppose separate nominations.

He probably received valuable aid in his efforts from Spooner, who,

though not a supporter of Chase, was personally friendly with the

Free-Soil leader and was overly susceptible to flattery. Before long,

37. The platform is given in the Ohio State Journal, June 7, and the Cincinnati Com-

mercial, June 8. For Spooner's address before the State Council, see the Commercial,

June 8.

38. Ohio State Journal, June 7; Giddings to John Gorham Palfrey, June 29, John

Gorham Palfrey Papers, Harvard University.

39. Giddings to Chase, April 10, Chase Papers, HSP. Another Chase organizer de-

clared, "The course of ... many Free Soilers for the last few weeks has intimidated

the K. Ns." J. H. Coulter to Chase, May 27, Chase Papers, LC. Also see Galloway to

Campbell, June 23, Private, Campbell Papers.

Salmon P. Chase                                                  21

Spooner would become one of Chase's most faithful adherents. As a

nativist and antislavery man, Spooner anxiously wanted a united op-

position party established. Before the State Council met, he warned

his fellow nativists that a split in the anti-Democratic forces assured a

Democratic victory in the fall.⁴⁰

But probably the most critical reason for the change in attitude

among the Know-Nothings was the outcome of the Cincinnati munici-

pal election in April. With anti-Catholic feeling rampant in that com-

munity, the Know-Nothings easily dominated the anti-Democratic

opposition in the Queen City. Confident of their power, they nomi-

nated a disreputable ticket, headed by James Taylor, the rabble-

rousing editor of the Cincinnati Times, for the city election. Taylor's

nomination not only disgusted conservatives in the city, his strident

and indiscriminate attacks on foreign influence alienated Protestant

Germans who had cast opposition ballots in 1854.⁴¹ The municipal

campaign, which was one of the most bitter in the city's history, pit-

ted the foreign-born against militant nativists and greatly exacer-

bated existing tensions. By election day, feelings were at a fever

pitch. With imported nativist toughs roaming the city, fighting even-

tually broke out in the German wards between immigrants and

Know-Nothings. The violence continued sporadically for three days,

and a Know-Nothing attempt the night after the election to storm the

German section of the city left several members of the mob dead. In

addition, Know-Nothings destroyed the ballots in two heavily Ger-

man wards to prevent their being tallied. With both sides claiming

victory and issuing threats, election officials finally declared the

Democratic mayoral candidate victorious.⁴² Republican editor Jo-

seph Medill, long an advocate of using the Catholic issue to gain the

support of Protestant immigrants, looked on with dismay as Germans

were driven back into the arms of the Democrats. He bluntly charac-

40. Letter signed "G." [Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, June 21; Follett, "The Coali-

tion of 1855," 431. Medill claimed that making "such a weak brother as Thos Spooner

at the head of the K.N. order is a horrible political blunder." Joseph Medill to

Follett, April 18, Oran Follett Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society.

41. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, April 8, Diary and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes, v.

1, 481-82; Gazette and Commercial, quoted in the Cincinnati Enquirer, March 24;

Cincinnati Enquirer, March 27, 28, 29, 31; letters signed "Foreign Protestant" and

"German Protestant," in the Enquirer, March 29, 31.

42. The riot is fully covered in the Cincinnati Gazette, Commercial, and Enquirer,

April 3-6. Also see William Baughin, "Bullets and Ballots: The Election Day Riots of

1855," Bulletin of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 21 (October, 1963),

267-73.

22                                               OHIO HISTORY

terized the Cincinnati Know-Nothing leaders as "knaves and ass-

es."⁴³

The rioting was an even more serious blow to the state American

party than Taylor's defeat. It made a mockery of the party's image as

a reform party and discredited it with a sizable segment of the pub-

lic. Campbell tried to minimize the importance of the Cincinnati re-

sult, but its damage was obvious. Know-Nothing leaders' confidence

in their ability to carry the state without antislavery allies suddenly

evaporated. Giddings' informants reported that the Order's state

leaders viewed the Cincinnati election as a disaster to the nativist

cause, and that in its wake they had abandoned the idea of making

separate nominations.⁴⁴

Hard on the heels of the Cleveland meeting came the National

Council in Philadelphia. When the Council took up the question of a

national platform, an acrimonious debate ensued between Southern-

ers and a group of northern antislavery men. After eight days of futile

wrangling, the delegates adopted a southern-inspired statement

which upheld the Kansas-Nebraska Act. A majority of northern del-

egates, including a unanimous Ohio delegation, voted against the

slavery plank. The next morning, these northern delegates approved

an address condemning the action of the National Council. Every

Ohio delegate signed the protest. Some of those present openly

called for the formation of a new party. In accord with this sentiment,

one of the seceding Ohio Americans sent a telegram to an anti-

Democratic convention then assembled in Cleveland which closed:

"May God eternally d- -n slavery and Doughfaceism."⁴⁵

The national schism further sapped the Ohio Know-Nothings'

confidence, while simultaneously it engendered a more favorable

attitude toward reaching agreement with the antislavery forces.

Chase's optimism soared in the aftermath of the Cleveland and

Philadelphia meetings. He told Pike that "the political atmosphere

has cleared somewhat," and went on to predict that Know-

Nothingism in Ohio would "gracefully give itself up to die." Believ-

ing that victory was within his grasp, the former Senator adopted a

conciliatory tone toward the Know-Nothings. Most members were

43. Joseph Medill to Follett, April 18, Follett Papers.

44. Campbell to Isaac Strohm, April 21, Isaac Strohm Papers, Ohio Historical Socie-

ty; letter signed "G." [Giddings], Ashtabula Sentinel, June 21; Ashtabula Sentinel,

June 7.

45. For the proceedings of the National Council, see Samuel Bowles' reports in the

New York Tribune, June 6-16, and his account published in the same paper, October

31.

Salmon P. Chase                                              23

"honest men . . . sincerely opposed to slavery," he asserted, who

"adhere but slightly to their order," especially since the adoption of

the Philadelphia platform. Chase was certain that the platform of the

July 13 convention would not "contain a squint towards Knism." By

the end of June, he predicted to James Grimes that he would be

elected by a majority of at least 20,000.46

Nevertheless, the results of the election of delegates in the first

week of July disquieted the Free-Soilers. In spite of all the difficulties

the American party had recently experienced, it displayed remarka-

ble strength in the voting for county delegates. When the July 13 con-

vention assembled in Columbus, all sides agreed that a majority of

the delegates were Know-Nothings.⁴⁷ Any triumph by Chase and

the antislavery forces could be achieved only with nativist votes.

Although the Free-Soilers did not control a majority of the dele-

gates, the Chase forces had several advantages. One was their un-

shakable commitment to Chase's candidacy. Led by Giddings, anti-

slavery men argued that Chase's nomination would make an "issue of

Slavery and freedom more distinctly the question" in the upcoming

election than would any other choice. In their eyes, Chase's selec-

tion would assure that antislavery was the party's paramount princi-

ple. They refused to consider suggestions that Chase and Brinker-

hoff both yield to another individual. The Know-Nothings' resolve,

on the other hand, was weakened by the defection of some of the

northern delegates to Chase and by the eagerness of their leaders,

particularly Spooner and Campbell, to promote harmony in the con-

vention.⁴⁸

The composition of the Cincinnati delegation also gave Chase's

prospects an unexpected boost. Politicians were especially sensitive

to the situation in Hamilton County, the state's most heavily popu-

lated county. The opposition was badly factionalized in the county,

however, as divisions between the Know-Nothings and Whigs on

the one hand, and Germans and old Liberty party men on the other,

threatened to send rival delegations to Columbus. After what Ruth-

erford B. Hayes described as some "very squally times," negotia-

46. Chase to Pike, June 20, Pike Papers; Chase to Grimes, June 27, Chase to [N.S.

Townshend?], June 21, Chase Papers, HSP; C. K. Watson to Chase, June 25, Chase

Papers, LC.

47. Ohio State Journal, July 13, 14; R. B. Pullan, Origins of the Republican Party,

Ohio Historical Society; letter signed "AN AMERICAN," Ohio State Journal, Octo-

ber 5; Address of Thomas Spooner, July 23, Cincinnati Commercial, July 24.

48. Ashtabula Sentinel, April 19; Campbell to Schouler, May 22 (Strictly Confiden-

tial), Schouler Papers; Follett, "The Coalition of 1855," 432-33; Spooner to Editor of

the Cincinnati Times, quoted in Ohio State Journal, July 12.

24                                                     OHIO HISTORY

tions among the various factions led to acceptance of a single delega-

tion which represented a wide variety of political viewpoints yet

was largely composed of moderates. Chase had disproportionate

strength among these delegates, as supporters of two local candidates

who were seeking nominations for lesser state offices agreed to vote

for Chase in exchange for support in these other races.⁴⁹

The greatest advantage of the Chase forces at Columbus, however,

was the determination of his more ultra supporters to bolt if their fa-

vorite were rejected. To reinforce this threat, the old Independent

Democrat State Central Committee, which had been moribund since

1853, issued a call for a mass convention on July 13 to ratify the nomi-

nations or take appropriate action. On the day of the fusion Republi-

can convention, perhaps as many as 400 outsiders were present, ready

to give Chase an independent nomination if he failed to receive the

Republican designation.⁵⁰ Opposition leaders, aware that Chase and

his followers had bolted parties several times in the past, knew that

this was no idle threat.

As the date of the convention neared, Columbus overflowed with

visitors. Giddings journeyed to the capital several days early for con-

sultations, and Chase was also present beforehand. In hotel rooms,

parlors, and on the streets men exchanged opinions about the proba-

ble course of the convention. One moment Chase's stock seemed up,

the next moment down. The Know-Nothing delegates caucused sep-

arately Thursday night, but failed to reach any agreement; those

from the southern counties, in particular, voiced a strong desire that

Chase be defeated. By the time the convention assembled, excite-

ment was intense.⁵¹

On Friday the thirteenth, at 10:30 in the morning, the first Ohio

Republican state convention convened in the Town Street Methodist

Church. The morning session was devoted to the appointment of

49. Hayes to William H. Gibson, June 18, 23, 25 (copies), Hayes to Lucy Webb

Hayes, June 24, Rutherford B. Hayes Papers, Hayes Memorial Library; Pullan, Origins

of the Republican Party; Chase to [?], June 23, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Cincinnati His-

torical Society. Because Chase was a resident of Cincinnati, overwhelming opposition

to his nomination among the Hamilton County delegates would have hurt his chances.

50. Ashtabula Sentinel, June 28, July 12; Giddings to Chase, May 1, Chase Papers,

HSP; R. P. L. Baber to Sherman, June 28, Sherman Papers. Chase was secretly in-

volved in preparing plans for independent action if the July 13 convention did not nom-

inate him. See J. H. Coulter to Chase, June 1, Chase Papers, LC. The Ohio State Jour-

nal, June 29, censured this action by the antislavery element as "calculated to repel

instead of inspiring confidence."

51. See Giddings' history in the Ashtabula Sentinel, July 19, and the account of the

Cincinnati Commercial's reporter (probably Murat Halstead), July 14. A number of

Know-Nothing delegates, especially from the northern counties, were for Chase.

Salmon P. Chase                                               25

committees and listening to speeches.⁵² Behind the scenes, howev-

er, party managers frantically labored to preserve the fragile spirit of

goodwill which existed on the convention floor. Follett, in particular,

sought an acceptable compromise. Prior to the convention, the Ohio

State Journal sounded the theme of "union, harmony, every thing

for the cause." Follett had been lukewarm toward Chase's candida-

cy, but he realized that the Free-Soilers were unbending. Believing

that Chase's rejection would precipitate the nomination of a third

ticket and thus rupture the anti-Democratic coalition and ensure de-

feat, the Columbus editor urged Brinkerhoff to withdraw from the

gubernatorial contest and accept instead the nomination for Supreme

Court judge. Several weeks earlier, the idea of running for the judge-

ship had been broached to Chase, but the antislavery leader had

flatly rejected the proposition.⁵³ An earlier attempt to get Brinkerhoff

to retire had also failed, but now, with the battle at hand, he agreed

to Follett's proposal, declaring that he was not rich enough to be

governor and that the judgeship was more in line with his talents.

How sincere Brinkerhoff was in this explanation is unclear, but he

probably recognized that his position was untenable.⁵⁴ A week

earlier, Michigan Governor Kinsley Bingham concluded after an in-

terview that the former congressman expected to be defeated at the

Columbus convention.⁵⁵

Brinkerhoffs acceptance of Follett's offer climaxed the sharp

struggle between the Americans and the Free-Soilers for control of

the Republican party. With this stumbling block eliminated, the pro-

ceedings were remarkably harmonious. The Committee on Resolu-

tions reported a platform that opposed the further extension of slav-

ery, came out against the admission of any new slave states, and

condemned the violence in Kansas. Another plank made a vague ref-

erence to states' rights and a section on state issues called for re-

trenchment, a just taxation system, and the election of legislators

from single districts. The platform passed over nativism in complete

silence. Giddings was the only committee member to criticize the res-

olutions. He labeled them "milk for babes," but somewhat incon-

52. The convention proceedings are in the Ohio State Journal, July 13, 14. Also see

the accounts cited in the previous note.

53. Ohio State Journal, July 12; Edward Wade to Chase, April 14, Chase Papers,

HSP; James A. Briggs to Chase, May 5, Pike Papers; letter from Campbell, dated Octo-

ber 1, in the Ohio State Journal, October 2.

54. C. K. Watson to Chase, June 25, Chase Papers, LC; Follett, "The Coalition of

1855," 431-33; Brinkerhoff, Recollections of a Lifetime, 92.

55. Bingham to Chase, July 7, Chase Papers, LC.

26                                                     OHIO HISTORY

gruously admitted that they might be sufficient and called for their

adoption.⁵⁶ Campbell spoke in their favor, and the delegates unani-

mously approved them.

Once the platform had been adopted, the anti-Chase forces made

one last attempt to prevent his nomination by proposing that both

Chase and Brinkerhoff be withdrawn. Chase's supporters shouted

their disapproval, and some threatened to retire from the hall. Final-

ly the delegates laid the motion on the table. At this point Campbell

withdrew Brinkerhoffs name as per arrangement, and Chase was

nominated with 225 votes to 144 for two last-minute stand-in candi-

dates. In a speech to the delegates following his nomination, Chase

declared that "there is nothing before the people but the vital ques-

tion of freedom versus slavery. ..." Know-Nothings received all of

the eight remaining positions on the state ticket. Most prominent of

these nominees were Brinkerhoff, who was unanimously selected for

Supreme Court judge, and Thomas Ford, whose widely publicized

speech at the recent Philadelphia convention in opposition to the ma-

jority platform helped him win the nomination for lieutenant gover-

nor. When the nominations were completed, Spooner urged support

for the entire ticket, and the convention adjourned. Afterwards

Chase praised his fellow nominees, but more perceptive was the

comment of one observer that other than Chase the ticket was a

group of mediocrities and "very weak."⁵⁷

Predictably, reaction to the outcome of the convention varied. The

Ashtabula Sentinel admitted that "the platform might have been

more strongly worded for our taste," but it pronounced Chase's nom-

ination as "itself a platform that will not be mistaken by the South."

Chase, too, professed pleasure and minimized the importance that all

of his running mates were nativists.58 Moderates and old-line Whigs,

56. Giddings wanted stronger resolutions condemning Pierce for the situation in

Kansas, presumably similar to the resolutions he drafted which were adopted by a

Republican meeting in Ashtabula County. Those resolutions declared that, if necessa-

ry, force should be used to defend the free state men in Kansas, condemned Pierce's

treasonable failure to use the army to provide such protection, and called on the free

states to protect Kansas emigrants. Ashtabula Sentinel, June 14.

57. Chase to Kinsley S. Bingham, October 19 (copy), Chase Papers, HSP; William

B. Fairchild to Isaac Strohm, October 12, Isaac Strohm Papers, Cincinnati Historical

Society. One exception to this analysis might be Brinkerhoff, who had political ability

though his legal attainments were modest.

58. Ashtabula Sentinel, July 19; Chase to Kinsley S. Bingham, October 19 (copy),

Chase Papers, HSP. Favorable comments in the Ohio press on Chase's nomination are

given in the Ashtabula Sentinel, August 2. The conservative Cleveland Herald hesi-

tated for some time before endorsing Chase. See Maizlish, Triumph of Sectionalism,

217.

Salmon P. Chase                                                  27

on the other hand, were sorely disappointed, for Chase was, in the

words of one, "an awfully bitter pill." Admitting that it had hoped

to avert Chase's selection, the Cincinnati Gazette frankly com-

mented, "Few of our public men could have so many bitter preju-

dices to   contend  with."⁵⁹ Nor were die-hard      Know-Nothings

pleased with the results. After the convention adjourned, the Execu-

tive Council met in a room above the office of the Ohio State Journal

until six in the morning considering a motion to expel Spooner for not

resisting Chase's selection more vigorously. The American president

claimed that he loyally supported Brinkerhoff, but others accused

him of double-dealing. In the end, the motion lost and Spooner, now

solidly in Chase's camp, remained the president of the Order in

Ohio.⁶⁰

Historians have traditionally cited Chase's nomination as a great

victory over nativism.61 In one sense, of course, it was. Chase was not

a member of the Order, and the Know-Nothings had devoted con-

siderable energy during the past months in a vain effort to prevent his

nomination. But the results of the convention hardly represented an

unbroken defeat for the Americans. If the Republican platform con-

tained no nativist planks, it raised not even a whisper of condemna-

tion of the Know-Nothings either, and the demands of German

leaders for an endorsement of the existing naturalization laws were

completely ignored. Moreover, the Republican and American state

platforms exhibited no significant differences on the slavery issue. In-

deed, the most radical proposition in the Republican platform-

opposition to the admission of any more slave states-had previously

been endorsed by the American party in Ohio. Nor did the call for

the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, long a key issue among Free

Soilers, find a place in the Republican platform.⁶² In addition, the

convention paid no heed to the proposal of some anti-Know-Nothing

leaders to place a foreigner on the ticket, while the Americans gar-

59. William B. Fairchild to Isaac Strohm, September 6, Strohm Papers, CinHS;

Cincinnati Gazette, July 14.

60. Pullan, Origins of the Republican Party; Circular of Thomas Spooner, July 23, in

Ohio State Journal, July 25.

61. Eugene H. Roseboom, "Salmon P. Chase and the Know Nothings," Mississippi

Valley Historical Review, 25 (December, 1938), 349-50. This idea is also implicit in

Maizlish's analysis, though he views nativism as ultimately untenable in any event be-

cause of America's liberal tradition. Triumph of Sectionalism, 214-17.

62. The doctrine of barring any more slave states might be considered radical, al-

though it enjoyed considerable support in the North and was becoming standard Re-

publican dogma in many states. The address of the bolters at Philadelphia did not en-

dorse this principle, but the Ohio American platform did.

28                                              OHIO HISTORY

nered eight out of nine nominations, certainly a significant accom-

plishment.⁶³ If Chase could go before the electorate unhindered by

a nativist platform, he also was running on a preponderately Know-

Nothing ticket. As the extensive nativist participation at Columbus

dramatized, the Republican party in Ohio rested on a substantial

Know-Nothing foundation.

Much the more numerous faction in the new party, the Know-

Nothings were confident after the convention that they would domi-

nate the Republican party. Time revealed, however, how serious was

their miscalculation. Support for Chase and the Republican platform

made it impossible for the Know-Nothings to maintain their distinc-

tive political identity. At its August meeting the State Council freed

individual members to decide how to vote; with this decision it was

inevitable that most nativists would be absorbed into the Republi-

can ranks.64 The intimidation tactics of the Chase forces, who were

willing to see the Democrats triumph rather than tolerate Know-

Nothing control of the Republican party, reaped handsome divi-

dends. Failure to defy the Free-Soilers doomed the American party

in Ohio to a rapid death. In the final analysis, the Know-Nothing

leaders sacrificed the party's future for entirely modest immediate

gains. Their ineptness contrasted sharply with the brilliance of the

Chase managers, who, by a dazzling mixture of conciliation and in-

timidation, forced the nativist majority to abandon their organization

and accept the nomination of one of the least popular politicians in the

state.

Not all conservatives, either inside or outside the American Order,

were willing to acquiesce in Chase's nomination. Discontent was espe-

cially strong in Cincinnati. The frequently heard prediction before

the convention that Chase's selection would produce a third ticket

was soon fulfilled. Anti-Chase dissidents made overtures to J. Scott

Harrison, the Whig-Know-Nothing congressman from Cincinnati, but

he had no interest in being a third-party candidate; he contended

that this would only reelect Governor Medill, the Democratic nomi-

nee. Eventually a small convention of dissatisfied Whigs and Ameri-

cans nominated former Governor Allen Trimble, who was over seven-

ty and obviously could not actively run. The participants approved a

platform that denounced sectional parties, called for restoration of

63. Letter signed, "JUSTICE," Ashtabula Sentinel, May 10; Ashley to Chase, May

29, Chase Papers, LC; Richard Mott to Giddings, June 2, Giddings Papers.

64. The proceedings of the State Council are given in the Ohio State Journal, August

9.

Salmon P. Chase                                                      29

the Missouri Compromise, upheld unspecified American principles,

and endorsed reform of the state's banking and tax systems. Al-

though the meeting designated itself the American party in Ohio, in

truth it represented only a small fraction of the Know-Nothings, and

furthermore many present were not even affiliated with the Order. In

fact, Trimble himself had never been a member of the Order.⁶⁵ That

the intent of this group was solely to defeat Chase was transparent as

the convention made no other nominations. Thus, of the Republican

nominees only Chase faced a third-party challenge. Gleeful Demo-

crats secretly funded the Trimble campaign.⁶⁶

From the start Chase was the central issue of the campaign. Sens-

ing Chase's vulnerability, Democrats concentrated on his alleged

abolitionism and on nativist influence in the Republican party. The

Republican standard-bearer found himself damned from both

sides: Germans denounced his association with Know-Nothings on

the state ticket, while ardent nativists refused to support him be-

cause of his tempered opposition to Know-Nothingism. With Trimble

now in the field and the charge that he was a Know-Nothing widely

circulated among Germans, the contest proved much more difficult

than Chase had originally anticipated.⁶⁷ The center of the great dis-

affection against Chase was Cincinnati. Here conservative business-

men fearful of Chase's radicalism, Americans angry over what they

believed to be the sellout of the Order in Columbus, and old-line

Whigs still indignant about the 1849 senatorial election unleashed

their hostility on the Republican nominee.⁶⁸ Assailed from all direc-

65. William B. Thrall to Strohm, July 8, Strohm Papers, CinHS; Ohio State Journal,

August 9; J. Scott Harrison to Benjamin Harrison, July 28, August 2, Benjamin Harrison

Papers, Library of Congress. For Whig opposition to Chase, see William Johnson to A.

Banning Norton and others, August 18 (copy), Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of

Congress; Ohio State Journal, quoted in Ashtabula Sentinel, August 2; T. G. Jones to

Ewing, July 28, R. P. L. Baber to Ewing, August 16, Thomas Ewing Family Papers, Li-

brary of Congress; letter signed "FEDERALIST," Cincinnati Commercial, July 27.

66. Newton Schleick to William Medill, August 14, William Medill Papers, Library

of Congress; David Chambers to Allen Trimble, September 26, Allen Trimble Papers,

Western Reserve Historical Society; Ashtabula Sentinel, August 9; Ohio State Journal,

October 1. At the beginning of the year a Democrat told Medill that things looked

bleak in the state, and "the only hope we have, is in the bust up and division of the

incongruous mass which was united against us last election." Matthews Martin to

Medill, January 10, William Medill Papers.

67. Follett to Chase, September 9, Chase Papers, LC; Herman Kreismann to Sum-

ner, September 18, Sumner Papers. Republican strategists felt it necessary to publish a

letter from Chase declaring that he was not a Know-Nothing. In this letter Chase also

denied that his fellow Republican nominees were hostile to the foreign-born. See

Chase to Homer Goodwin, August 24, Cincinnati Commercial, September 12.

68. Free Soilers held the balance of power in the 1849 state legislature. After a

30                                                     OHIO HISTORY

tions, Chase took to the stump and waged a strenuous campaign,

delivering 57 major addresses in 49 counties. Although his lead-

ing theme was always Kansas, in Cincinnati and other conservative

strongholds he was also careful to identify himself with preservation

of the Union. He received loyal support from Campbell, Ford,

Spooner, and other Know-Nothing leaders. Campbell, in particular,

threw himself into the contest with unusual vigor and labored to

keep the Know-Nothings and former Whigs from voting for Trim-

ble.⁶⁹

With Chase the symbol of the new Republican party, the guberna-

torial election was unusually hard fought. "Every School-house was

a hall for political discussion and declamation, night after night and

indeed I might say every night, in this and other Counties for weeks

prior to the election," one Ohio voter reported. "Our court-house

and public halls and even the Streets" became arenas for political

debate as "ordinary business and the predilections of party yielded

to the behests of public duty." As the campaign progressed and

summer faded into fall, Chase remained confident. "Hamilton Coun-

ty is the only really dark spot," he informed Schouler. Reassured by

party strategists who minimized the importance of Trimble's candi-

dacy, the Republican nominee held firm to his earlier prediction that

his majority would be 40,000 votes.⁷⁰

When the ballots were counted, the entire Republican ticket had

triumphed. Chase's margin, however, hardly equaled his expecta-

tions. Although he defeated his Democratic opponent by 15,000

votes, he secured only a plurality as Trimble polled over 24,000 votes.

In the remaining state contests in which the Republican candidates

were also Know-Nothings, the margin of victory was more substan-

tial. Ford, for example, won the lieutenant governorship by a clear

majority of almost 36,000 votes.⁷¹ The Republican gubernatorial can-

drawn-out series of negotiations in which Chase played a leading role, the Free-Soilers

agreed to give the Democrats control of the legislature and block the Whigs' recent re-

apportionment plan in exchange for Chase's election to the Senate and repeal of the

state's discriminatory black laws. To indignant Whigs, this outcome smacked of a cor-

rupt bargain. See Maizlish, Triumph of Sectionalism, 135-46.

69. Samuel Galloway to Chase, August 16, Chase Papers, HSP; Ashtabula Sentinel,

July 26; Campbell to Chase, August 6, Chase Papers, LC; Cincinnati Commercial, Oc-

tober 2; Chase to Pike, October 18, Pike Papers.

70. Abel Rawson to William Penn Clarke, October 18, William Penn Clarke Papers,

Iowa State Department of History; Chase to Schouler, September 3, Schouler Papers;

Chase to E. S. Hamlin, August 27, Chase Papers, LC.

71. The official vote was Chase, 141,641 (48.6 percent); Medill, 131,091 (43.4 per-

cent); and Trimble, 24,310 (8.1 percent). In the lieutenant governor's race, Ford polled

169,439 votes (55.9 percent) to his Democratic opponent's 133,485 votes (44.1 percent).

Salmon P. Chase                                               31

didate's weakness was most apparent in Hamilton County, which

had been a cause of great Republican concern throughout the cam-

paign. Trimble received over one-quarter of his entire statewide tally

in this one county. In fact, Chase finished a distant third there, with

only 19.4 percent of the popular vote. He received less than half the

number of votes Winfield Scott polled in the county in 1852, and the

falloff was especially noteworthy compared to 1854, when Hamilton

provided the largest anti-Nebraska majority in the state. Chase's

abysmal showing in Cincinnati and its environs almost cost him the

governorship.⁷²

Chase was badly hurt by Trimble's candidacy, which appealed

primarily to old-line Whigs and nativists who would not support so

radical an antislavery man, yet voted for the rest of the Republican

ticket. Although very few traditional Whigs defected to the Democ-

racy even in the face of Chase's candidacy, his weakness among

these voters was obvious. Substantially less than half of those who

backed the Whig ticket in the 1852 state election, the last such con-

test in which the Whig party mustered respectable strength, voted

for Chase in 1855 (Table 1).⁷³ He performed even more poorly among

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

SUPREME COURT 1852

AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO

Party in 1855 (Governor)

Party in 1852                                                                                                                                        Not      %

(Sup. Court)      Republican  Democrat  Trimble                    Voting  Electorate

Whig                                     14                     0                     7                 11                           33

Democrat                              15                     26                                  -4                                -1                             37

Free Soil                               5                       0                     -1                               2             6

Not Voting                           1                       5                     3                 15            25

% Electorate                         35                     31                                  6  28

N = 88.

Note: Rounding sometimes produces sums slightly different from the mar-

ginals. For interpretive purposes, negative estimates can be consid-

ered as essentially zero.

72. The official tally in Hamilton County was Chase 4,516 votes (19.4 percent); Me-

dill. 12,226 votes (52.5 percent); and Trimble, 6,538 votes (28.1 percent).

73. The tables presented in this essay are based on the statistical procedure known

32                                                       OHIO HISTORY

Scott voters in the 1852 presidential election, over two-thirds of

whom either voted for Trimble or simply abstained (Table 2). Even

conservatives who voted for Chase considered him a bitter dose.

Chase's father-in-law, United States Supreme Court Justice John

McLean, for example, revealed that he voted for the Republican

nominee only "under protest."⁷⁴ At the same time, virtually all of

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

PRESIDENT 1852

AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO

Party in 1855 (Governor)

Party in 1852                                                                                       Not        %

(President)         Republican    Democrat    Trimble               Voting   Electorate

Whig                                      13               -1  9                     18               38

Democrat                               18                    31                   -4            -2                                43

Free Soil                                7                      0                     -1               2              8

Not Voting                             -3                     1                     2                 11            11

% Electorate                          35                    31                   6             28

N = 88.

Trimble's adherents supported Ford in the lieutenant governor's race

(Table 3). For a minority of voters at least, the election had devolved

into a personal referendum on Chase.

Chase's post-election analysis combined both accurate and inac-

curate judgments. The Republican leader admitted that he had "a

hard canvass." "Never was such an effort made to kill off a man as to

kill off me," he complained to Grimes. The Democrats combined

with the "proscriptive & proslavery Kns to annihilate me, & I was fa-

as ecological regression. For discussions of this technique, see E. Terrance Jones, "Ec-

ological Inference and Electoral Analysis," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2 (Win-

ter, 1972), 249-62; J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past

Politics," ibid., 4 (Autumn, 1973), 237-62; and W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological Infer-

ence': The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," American Political Science

Review, 63 (December, 1969), 1183-96. Ecological regression analysis requires that per-

centages be in terms of eligible voters rather than votes cast. For the number of voters

in each county, I used the figures given in the Auditor's Report for 1855 and 1863 and

extrapolated between end points. All statewide estimates are at the county-level.

74. John McLean to John Teesdale, November 2, John McLean Papers, Ohio His-

torical Society. Also see Sidney D. Maxwell, Diary, ca. November 1.

Salmon P. Chase                                              33

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

GOVERNOR 1855

AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO

Party in 1855       Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)

Party in 1855

(Governor)       Republican     Democrat   Not Voting   % Electorate

Republican                            36                       -1                       0                        35

Democrat                              -1                        32                      0                        31

Trimble                                 6                         0                        0                        6

Not Voting                            0                         1                        28                      28

% Electorate                          41                       32                      28

N = 88.

vored with a vigor & ferocity of detraction and vituperation almost

without parallel." He believed that he lost "on both sides-on the

American because not a member of the order & the naturalized be-

cause connected with Kns on the ticket." On the bright side, he

contended that he had received many Democratic votes.⁷⁵ Cheered

by his narrow victory and conveniently overlooking his earlier pre-

dictions of probable strength, Chase angrily criticized the assertion

of the New York Tribune that a more suitable candidate would have

scored a decisive victory. He boasted to Pike that "no other man

could have carried the State at all under existing circumstances."⁷⁶

More detached observers, however, provided a rather different as-

sessment. Immensely pleased by the result, Wade nevertheless con-

ceded that "we were . . . forced into the canvass with the most un-

popular candidate, probably, that could have been started in Ohio

. . . because of prejudices growing out of old conflicts."⁷⁷

Chase's belief that he polled a number of Democratic votes was

not without substance (Table 1). In fact, it appears that a somewhat

larger proportion of 1854 Democratic voters supported Chase than re-

turned to their party after joining the anti-Nebraska revolt (Table 4).

75. Chase to Sumner, October 15, Sumner Papers; Chase to [Grimes], October 17,

Chase Papers, HSP; Chase to E. L. Pierce, October 20, Edward L. Pierce Papers,

Harvard University.

76. Chase to Pike, October 18, Pike Papers.

77. Benjamin F. Wade to Israel Washburn, Jr., October 13, Israel Washburn, Jr. Pa-

pers, Library of Congress.

34                                                OHIO HISTORY

TABLE 4

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS 1854

AND GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO

Party in 1855 (Governor)

Party in 1854                                                                                                                                          Not      %

(Public Works)   Republican  Democrat                               Trimble                    Voting  Electorate

Democrat                              8                       23                   -3                              -2              27

People's                                22                     5                            7                        10             45

Not Voting                            4                       3                            2                        21             29

% Electorate                          35                     31                          6                        28

N = 88.

Chase's difficulties stemmed instead from his weakness among anti-

Nebraska voters. Only about half of the voters who supported the

People's state ticket in 1854 backed Chase in 1855. The return of some

Democrats to their traditional loyalty was expected in Republican cir-

cles, yet fully one-sixth of the anti-Nebraska force voted for Trimble

in preference to Chase, and an even larger group simply sat out the

election. Bolstered by his Know-Nothing ties, Ford, in contrast, gar-

nered over two-thirds of the anti-Nebraska vote, and an even higher

proportion of earlier nonvoters (Table 5). Trimble's strength came ex-

clusively from traditional nonvoters and former Whigs. He won al-

TABLE 5

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS 1854

AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855: OHIO

Party in 1854       Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)

Party in 1854

(Public Works)   Republican  Democrat    Not Voting  % Electorate

Democrat                              5                       23                   -2            27

People's                                30                     6                            9                        45

Not Voting                            6                       3                            20                       29

% Electorate                         41                     32                          28

N = 88.

Salmon P. Chase                                                 35

most no support from former Democrats and Free-Soilers (Tables 1

and 4).

Chase won because he attracted unusual support from traditional

abstainers, and because the Democratic electoral base in the state,

badly shattered by events of the past few years, continued to deteri-

orate. Chase's coalition contained numerous voters from all three par-

ties. As would be expected, the Free-Soil vote was cast solidly in his

favor. More surprising, however, was his appeal among men who

voted Democratic in 1852. In fact, he ran only slightly better among

1852 Whigs (Table 1). Perhaps no development so clearly docu-

mented the devastating impact of nativism and the slavery issue on

the Ohio Democracy as the loss of over one-third of its traditional

loyalists to the Republican party. At least some Democratic leaders

understood that nativism cut both ways, and that this issue held

some antislavery Democrats, who otherwise would have bolted,

within the party. "The Nebraska question was the real rock of dan-

ger here," one Democrat contended after the election, "and if we

had not had Know nothingism to fight, [we] would have been beat-

en badly."⁷⁸

It is difficult to estimate the degree to which Chase owed his elec-

tion to Know-Nothing votes. Afterwards Chase paid tribute to the

significant assistance of the liberal Americans who fought "with us

like brothers." Some of Chase's supporters, however, minimized the

contribution of the Know-Nothings to the Republican triumph, an at-

titude which infuriated at least one American leader who flatly con-

tended that the Order furnished the votes that elected Chase.⁷⁹

The only figures available on Know-Nothing membership are for Oc-

tober 1854 and thus vastly underestimate the Order's strength at the

time of the election.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, confining the analysis to those

counties where the Order was organized in 1854, it appears that the

largest proportion of the American vote went to Chase (Table 6). At

the same time, Trimble's vote represented more than proscriptive na-

78. Jonathan M. Cornell to William Medill, November 28, William Medill Papers.

79. Chase to [Grimes], October 17, Chase Papers, HSP; Chase to Pike, October 18,

Pike Papers; W. C. Howells to Chase, November 5, Chase Papers, LC; John Paul to

Chase, October 24, Chase Papers, HSP; O. F. Fishback to Campbell, October 30,

Campbell Papers. For Campbell's support of Chase, see Campbell to Dear Sir, August

10, quoted in Ashtabula Sentinel, August 30.

80. Know-Nothing membership in the state more than doubled between October

1854 and the summer of 1855. Some of this growth represented expansion into counties

which had no lodges in October 1854, and are thus excluded from the analysis, but

an indeterminate proportion represented additional expansion in counties included in

the analysis.

36                                               OHIO HISTORY

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

GOVERNOR 1855

AND KNOW-NOTHING MEMBERSHIP 1854: OHIO

Party in 1855 (Governor)

Not      %

Membership 1854  Republican  Democrat     Trimble          Voting  Electorate

Know-Nothing         7         6                       1                         3       17

Non-Know-

Nothing                           27                     26                  5                25      83

% Electorate                        35                     32                  6                  27

N = 41.

tivists, as a larger share of his vote came from men who were not

Know-Nothings in 1854 (how many joined the Order afterwards, of

course, is unknown). Not surprisingly, Ford ran better among nativist

voters than did Chase (Table 7).

Contemporaries generally agreed that Chase, hindered by his na-

tivist associates on the Republican ticket, failed to win the foreign

vote. Cincinnati German leader Stephen Molitor, who supported

Chase while repudiating the rest of the Republican nominees, con-

tended that German-born voters generally opposed Chase because

of the presence of Know-Nothings on the rest of the ticket. He

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VOTING FOR

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 1855

AND KNOW-NOTHING MEMBERSHIP 1854: OHIO

Party in 1855 (Lieutenant Governor)

Membership 1854  Republican  Democrat   Not Voting  % Electorate

Know-Nothing         9          6           3          17

Non-Know-

Nothing                           32                     27                       24          83

% Electorate                         41                     32                       27

N = 41.

Salmon P. Chase                                                      37

pleaded for understanding: "that they are anxious not to act treach-

erously against themselves, is I trust not an unpardonable sin." Sev-

eral Chase managers, including Ashley in Toledo, expressed disap-

pointment that the bulk of the foreign vote in their locality went

against the Republicans.⁸¹ In Cincinnati, which had the state's

largest concentration of Germans, the Enquirer estimated that Chase

got no more than one-fifth of the German vote. The four most heavily

German wards, which cast 2,085 votes for the People's ticket in 1854,

gave Chase only 910 votes compared to 2,802 for Medill.⁸² An even

more dramatic example of the failure of the Republican campaign to

overcome German suspicions of nativist influence in the party was the

vote in the strongly German Fifth Ward in Columbus, where Medill

routed Chase with 451 votes to 67 (Trimble polled a meager 20 votes).

Those Germans who voted for Chase were probably overwhelmingly

non-Catholics. The Cleveland Leader asserted that "the Roman

Catholics in Ohio, voted the Locofoco [Democratic] ticket in an undi-

vided body," an assertion unchallenged by other leading Republi-

can journals.⁸³

Despite the narrow margin of Chase's election, Ohio Republicans

were optimistic about the future. To have carried the state in the

party's first campaign, and when saddled with so unpopular a candi-

date, was a remarkable achievement. Giddings believed that the

Know-Nothings' prestige was gone "forever" and discounted Camp-

bell's statement that the Americans would rally next year as a distinct

and independent party. Another Chase supporter predicted that the

Trimble clique would divide hereafter, some going into the ranks of

each of the two major parties. With Republicanism now "on a solid

basis," Chase was certain that the liberal Americans would remain

81. Molitor to Chase, February 25, 1856, Ashley to Chase, October 21, J. Walkap to

Chase, November 8, Chase Papers, LC.

82. Regression estimates for Cincinnati indicate that approximately 10 percent of the

German voters who went to the polls voted for Chase; less than 1 percent voted for

Ford in the lieutenant governor's contest. More striking still was the rate of non-voting

among Germans. An estimated 46 percent did not participate, a rate that was signifi-

cantly higher than for Irish voters (28 percent) and British voters, who evidenced a

full turnout. An additional 1 percent of the Germans who cast ballots for governor ab-

stained on the lieutenant governor's race. These estimates are at the ward level. Ethni-

city figures are derived from the 1860 census sample compiled by Carl Abott for his

study, "Economic Thought and Occupational Structure in Four Middle Western Cities

1850-1860," and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political

and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Neither he nor the Consortium bear any

responsibility for the interpretations presented here.

83. Cincinnati Enquirer, n.d., quoted in Illinois State Register, June 25, 1856; Ohio

State Journal, October 13, 15; Cleveland Leader, quoted in Ashtabula Sentinel, Octo-

ber 25, November 1.

38                                                   OHIO HISTORY

within the Republican ranks, and he anticipated additional Demo-

cratic defections as well. Henceforth the party "shall be stronger

than ever."⁸⁴ Chase and his circle had risked their future power in

the state party in a bold bid for control, and their audacity had been

rewarded. They had killed the American party in Ohio by subsum-

ing it into the Republican movement.

Without question Chase's triumph was a great Republican victory.

Elsewhere, and especially in the most important northern states, the

1855 elections constituted an inauspicious beginning for the sectional

party. Taken together, the meaning of these fall elections was unmis-

takable: in order to be victorious, Republicans had to reach some

agreement with the Know-Nothings that would ensure cooperation

between the two groups, such as had occurred in Ohio. Wherever

the Republicans openly challenged the nativist Order, such as in

Massachusetts and New York, they met defeat. Without a significant

influx of Know-Nothings into the party's ranks, the idea of building a

Republican majority coalition in the North was utterly futile.

In the face of the numerous setbacks the Republican cause suf-

fered, Chase's election in Ohio, which Governor Bingham of Michi-

gan termed "the only real Anti Slavery victory that has been

achieved this fall," took on added importance. Henry Wilson voiced

a similar viewpoint when he told Chase after all the state contests

were concluded, "Your election is the only bright spot in the political

sky of this autumn."⁸⁵ The Ohio result encouraged Republicans in

other states while it intensified Chase's drive already under way to

establish a national Republican organization on the so-called Ohio

plan-half Republican, half Know-Nothing. In urging support for this

movement, Chase pointed to his election as demonstrating the pos-

sibilities of such a fusion and stressed that a Republican-Know-

Nothing coalition could carry a presidential contest as early as

1856.86

Chase's hopes for a presidential nomination were destined to be

84. Giddings to Chase, October 16, F. D. Parish to Chase, November 5, Chase to

[Grimes], October 17, Chase Papers, HSP; Sidney D. Maxwell, Diary, ca. November 1;

Chase to Gideon Welles, October 26, Gideon Welles Papers, Library of Congress.

85. Kinsley S. Bingham to Chase, November 16, Chase Papers, LC; Henry Wilson

to Chase, November 17, Chase Papers, HSP. For similar evaluations, see Edward L.

Pierce to Chase, October 13, Thomas F. Withrow to Chase, October 12, Chase Papers,

LC; Benjamin F. Butler to Chase, November 12, Chase Papers, HSP.

86. Chase's correspondence at the Library of Congress and the Historical Society of

Pennsylvania contains extensive evidence of his efforts to promote a national Republi-

can organizing convention. Cf. Robert F. Horowitz, "James M. Ashley and the Presi-

dential Election on 1856," Ohio History, 83 (Winter, 1974), 4-16.

Salmon P. Chase                                          39

disappointed. Yet the relationship between the resurgent nativist

crusade and Republicanism that evolved in Ohio was of vital signifi-

cance for the party's future. In the course of the next few years,

Chase's vision of the nature of the Republican coalition would essen-

tially be realized. Without losing sight of sectional issues, Republi-

cans throughout the decade overtly appealed to nativists for support

and recognized former Americans in making nominations and distrib-

uting patronage. By the time of Lincoln's election in 1860, a substan-

tial majority of one-time Know-Nothings had entered the Republican

ranks, and as a result the party won its first national triumph. Chase's

victory in Ohio in 1855 blazed a trail that ultimately led to the crea-

tion of a northern Republican majority.