McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 135
tional sovereignty."22 In
effect, Spain still clung to sovereignty over
Cuba and autonomy for the island.
At the same time that McKinley was
dealing with the Spanish
minister, he made a final attempt to get
the Cuban Junta to cooper-
ate. Rubens later explained that just
before McKinley's message went
to Congress, the president's emissary
told him that if the Cubans
agreed to the armistice, McKinley would
place a reference to Cuban
independence in his message. If they
refused, there would be no
mention of independence, and Rubens
rejected this half measure.
McCook reported to Elkins that the Junta
had decided to wait to see
what Congress would do, for it might
recognize Cuban independ-
ence as well as declare war on Spain. If
war came, the United States
would expel the Spanish and give Cuba
its independence. If Con-
gress took no action on McKinley's
message, McCook explained, the
Junta would then attempt to come to
terms with Madrid and was
considering paying Spain an indemnity of
up to $200 million to obtain
its independence.23 Thus, the
Cubans at this time would accept
nothing less than independence, while
Spain still provided only au-
tonomy.
The major question before McKinley's
cabinet was whether to ask
Congress for an additional delay in
order to determine what effect
Blanco's action would have on Cuban
events, an issue highlighted
by Woodford, who cabled McKinley
recommending continuation of
negotiations. Woodford believed the
Spanish government had gone
as far and as fast as it could and
predicted that if Spain were not
humiliated, it would provide before
August 1 a settlement either
through autonomy acceptable to the
insurgents, complete independ-
ence, or cession of the island to the
United States.24
McKinley's cabinet labored through the
afternoon and evening at-
tempting to reach consensus. First it
took up the draft message to
Congress which Day and Griggs had
authored and which had been
agreed upon earlier. This was reapproved
without any change of text.
The cabinet divided, however, over how
to treat Spain's ending of
hostilities. At one point McKinley's
cabinet decided to ask Congress
to delay action. McKinley then met with
a delegation of Republican
senators, among them Chairman Davis.
When the senators learned
that the president planned to request a
delay, they argued strenuous-
22. Polo de Bernabe to John Sherman,
Washington, April 10, 1898, Foreign Rela-
tions, 1898, 747-49.
23. Rubens, Liberty, 337-38;
Elkins Journal, April 11, 1898, Elkins Papers.
24. Woodford to McKinley, Madrid, April
10, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 747.
136 OHIO HISTORY
ly against it. They asserted that his
action would divide the Repub-
lican Party, and that failure to act now
would lead to a Republican
defeat in the coming November elections.
After a long discussion,
McKinley gave ground and modified his
message so that Congress
would have the responsibility of
deciding how to respond to the
Spanish armistice.25 The
president finally settled on these addition-
al words for his message to Congress:
"The Queen Regent of Spain
[has directed] General Blanco, in order
to prepare and facilitate
peace, to proclaim a suspension of
hostilities .... [which] will, I am
sure, have your just and careful
attention in the solemn deliberations
upon which you are about to enter."26
In essence, McKinley's at-
tempt to keep the peace had ended.
Unable to bring the Spanish
and Cubans together, he was unsuccessful
in convincing the congres-
sional leadership that he should
continue his efforts.
This day-to-day account shows that
during April McKinley made
a serious and coordinated effort to keep
the peace. When he came to
believe that the Queen Regent might
issue an armistice, he moved
quickly on a broad front to encourage
her. He tried to stop the fight-
ing in Cuba, which he thought would keep
Congress from declaring
war on Spain. It is remarkable that he
entrusted highly confidential
and potentially damaging messages to the
Vatican, particularly since
the Pope favored Spain, and Madrid used
his first message to em-
barrass him. Nevertheless, through the
Vatican backchannel, Mc-
Kinley dropped his demand for
presidential arbitration, gave assur-
ances about transferring the fleet,
promised not to recognize Cuban
independence, and volunteered to
pressure the Cuban Junta.
Although McKinley asked Spain to provide
an armistice, the Span-
ish government spoke of ending
hostilities, and eventually pro-
claimed a suspension of them. The
difference in wording between an
armistice and a suspension of
hostilities may be seen as a substantive
issue dividing the American and Spanish
governments.27 Madrid's
suspension suggested continued
non-recognition of the Cuban insur-
gents, while Washington's armistice
implied negotiation and agree-
ment with the rebels upon the terms of
ending the rebellion. Al-
though Spain announced as early as April
5 that it was considering
25. Cambon to Hanotaux, Washington,
April 11 and 12, 1898, N. S. 22, Espagne, Ar-
chives, Paris; Polo de Bernabe to
Gullon. Washington, April 10, 1898, Documentos
presentados de 1898, 1:171-72.
26. McKinley, Message to the Congress of
the United States, April 11, 1898, Foreign
Relations, 1898, 760.
27. Gould, The Presidency of William
McKinley, 83.
McKinley's Attempt to Avoid War 137
ending hostilities and did not use
during the following days the
word armistice, American officials never
objected. Woodford, who
was closest to the Spanish, did not draw
any distinction between an
armistice and a suspension of
hostilities, and in his cables used the
terms synonymously. Day also made no
objection, and there was
none recorded from McKinley or his
cabinet officers. Rampolla also
used the term armistice to describe
Spain's suspension of hostilities,
and Ireland always referred to Spain's
action as an armistice. Since
American officials did not rebuke Madrid
for its proposal and even
welcomed the announcement when it came,
it appears that a differ-
ence of substance over Madrid's means of
terminating hostilities in
Cuba did not exist. After all, the
essential point for McKinley was to
stop the fighting in Cuba, which he
hoped would prevent a congres-
sional declaration of war; the
diplomatic realities and final arrang-
ements would follow in direct talks
between the Spanish and the Cu-
bans over the future of the island.
Having encouraged Spain to provide an
armistice, the president
became committed to seeing that Madrid's
action brought peace in
America, which was a more difficult
task. A major problem for Mc-
Kinley was trying to persuade the Cuban
insurgents to stop fighting.
From the start he realized that an
armistice would succeed only if
the Cubans accepted it, and that the
Cuban price for cooperation
was United States recognition of the
island's independence. Never-
theless, McKinley refused recognition
and chose instead to threaten
the Cuban leaders, a stance quite in
contrast to his sympathetic sup-
port of the Spanish Queen Regent.
Underlying McKinley's hard-line
was his conviction that the Cubans were
unfit to govern the island.
He believed the insurgents lacked a
government as defined by inter-
national practice and that they could
not restore order which was es-
sential to protect and promote American
interests. Moreover, he op-
posed placing United States armed forces
in the position of
intervening on the island as an ally of
Cuba or subject to Cuban sov-
ereignty.28 The president's
low opinion of the Cubans and his policy
of coercion rather than recognition
foreshadowed a troubled future
in Cuban-American relations.
McKinley delayed congressional action as
long as he could. He en-
couraged the Great Powers to present a
joint appeal to continue nego-
tiations in an effort to calm public
opinion. Due to Woodford's inept-
ness, the Spanish ministry postponed
suspending hostilities. By April
28. Ibid., 756-59.
138 OHIO HISTORY
10, even though the details were still
unknown, the Cuban insurgents
had rejected Madrid's initiative. As a
result McKinley gained little
support in Congress, and although the
president believed that Spain
should be given more time, he no longer
could prevent congressional
action. Actually, the struggle between
the president and Congress
over Cuban policy was rooted in the
constitutional system. Congress
had the power to declare war, and at
this turn in foreign affairs, it was
prepared to do it. By April 11 the
control of policy passed from
McKinley to Congress, and the Spanish
suspension of hostilities
made little difference.
Thus, McKinley's last attempts to
prevent war failed. Spain's initia-
tive did not come soon enough or go far
enough to win over either
Congress or the Cubans; and the former
asserted its constitutional
right to vote for war. It is ironical
that Spain gained international sym-
pathy and moral support for its actions,
while the president has been
criticized for going to war after Madrid
ordered a suspension of hos-
tilities in Cuba. After all, without
McKinley's efforts there would
have been no Spanish proclamation prior
to his message to Congress.
Moreover, he could have refused to work
with the Vatican or cut his
ties with Archbishop Ireland when the
Spanish cabinet on April 3
sought to embarrass him through his
association with the Pope. It
would have been easy on April 6 for
McKinley to have turned over
the Cuban issue to Congress and never
have had to worry about
Madrid's last-minute suspension of
hostilities. It is remarkable that
McKinley's strenuous attempts to keep
the peace, after many around
him had given up, resulted in lasting
criticism of his presidency.