Ohio History Journal

THOMAS S. MACH

George Hunt Pendleton, The Ohio Idea

and Political Continuity in Reconstruction

America

The severe defeat of the Democrats in the 1866 election in Ohio and across

the country left some of the party's political positions meaningless. With a

Republican majority in Congress and Reconstruction issues under its control,

the Democratic Party pinned its future on the ideas of a politician in the

throes of resurrecting a political career. George Hunt Pendleton, a leading

Democrat from Ohio, had made a name for himself during the Civil War as a

Peace Democrat representing southwestern Ohio in Congress. He had run

with General George McClellan in 1864 for the vice-presidency, but with the

war won and the Republicans waving the bloody shirt, Pendleton seemed des-

tined for obscurity. Following the war, the Democrats were adrift in terms of

policies, issues and leaders. They had supported President Johnson, but his

growing unpopularity and unwillingness to cooperate with them promised

years of campaign defeats. The Democrats continued to show a lack of imag-

ination in 1866 when they campaigned in opposition to Congressional

Reconstruction. 1

Pendleton initially was no different from other Democrats; he followed the

same obstructionist policies and lost his 1866 bid for Congress.  But

Pendleton realized this approach, however much sense it made in the short

run, was an expedient that failed to rebuild the southern Democracy, did not

restore the prewar party's sectional alignments, and lent credence to

Republican attacks that the Democrats had flirted with treason during the war.

Thomas S. Mach is an Associate Professor of History at Mount Vernon Nazarene

College in Mount Vernon, Ohio. The author would like to thank Professor Jerome

Mushkat for his steadfast encouragement and helpful comments in the completion

of this article.

1. Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1960),

274-325; Robert D. Sawrey, Dubious Victor: The Reconstruction Debate in Ohio

(Lexington, Ky., 1992), 59-67; W. R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and

Reconstruction, 1865-1867 (London, 1963), 105-22; Floyd O. Rittenhouse,

"George Hunt Pendleton: With Special Reference to His Congressional Career"

(Master's thesis, The Ohio State University, 1932), 53-55; Clifford H. Moore,

"Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896," Ohio Archaeological and Historical

Society Publications, 37 (April, 1928), 236-40.

126                                                 OHIO HISTORY

Pendleton had the imagination and drive to propose a new direction through

his sponsorship of the Ohio Idea, also known as the Pendleton Plan. More

than an irresponsible monetarist effort to inflate the currency or harm the na-

tion's credit rating on bonded indebtedness, as critics charged, Pendleton pro-

posed the Ohio Idea to settle lingering wartime issues and to refashion the

Democracy by reviving its Jacksonian heritage. The success of such an ef-

fort, Pendleton assumed, would move the party away from the dead past, ad-

dress new issues popular with voters, and gain the presidential nomination for

himself in 1868. Yet Pendleton faced a difficult task. The Democracy was

rife with competing regional interests and leaders, many of whom for their

own self-interests were more concerned with gaining power as an end in itself

than in setting a fresh course for the future.

A study of Pendleton's Ohio Idea has dimensions beyond a simple narrative

of Ohio and national politics, or his failed bid for the presidency. In one

sense, the internal debate within the Democracy over the Ohio Idea reveals the

continuing divisions among Democrats and their unwillingness to accept

Pendleton's revised interpretation of Jacksonianism in the postwar era. But in

a larger way, this study indicates a basic continuity that existed between both

Democrats and Republicans.  An analysis of the currency question that

Pendleton posed in the Ohio Idea shows that the two major political parties,

led by many of the same men who had dominated partisanship before the war,

debated issues-albeit new ones-within the rhetorical and ideological param-

eters common in antebellum America. In short, an examination of the Ohio

Idea reveals that the Civil War did not destroy the prewar political system, but

rather continued its basic character. As a result, Pendleton's efforts illustrated

the continuity, not change, that determined partisanship in the postwar period.

The Jacksonian Roots of the Ohio Idea

In 1866, both the Midwest and the South were undergoing severe financial

collapse brought on partly by the devastation of the Civil War and two years

of poor harvests, and partly by the Republican policy of deflationary contrac-

tion of the currency. Republicans had created a National Bank System during

the war to provide a mechanism for promoting uniformity of currency and for

selling government bonds. National banks bought bonds and were granted the

privilege of issuing a limited amount of banknotes in return. The govern-

ment also began issuing greenbacks as an additional means of financing the

war. Following the war, Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch began

rapidly removing those greenbacks from the currency in an effort to return to

specie payments.²

2. Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congressional

George Hunt Pendleton                                             127

Pendleton had opposed both of the initial measures. Consistent with his

party's Jacksonian heritage, he neither wanted to see the national government

gain greater power nor to watch capital become increasingly concentrated in

the Northeast portion of the country. Traditionally, Jacksonian Democrats

had opposed a National Bank System on the basis of both of those concerns

and sought a more equitable distribution of capital throughout the country.

To bring change, Pendleton needed to devise a means to make currency more

accessible in the southern and midwestern economies.  While a share of

National bank charters were designated for these regions, the Department of

the Treasury, during the war years, allowed New England and New York City

to claim most of the charters. Most likely it was convenient for Washington

to have the system regionalized as funds were sought for the war effort. In

addition, the South forfeited potential branches during secession. Following

the war, southerners sought ways to keep currency in their section because

Republican economic policies did not provide for their financial needs. Money

that went South chasing cotton and other agricultural crops stayed there as

southern farmers diversified to meet their own needs for foodstuffs and eco-

nomic recovery. The result of the lack of capital and the southern attempt at

self-sufficiency was a declining demand for midwestern farm goods.

Pendleton hoped to alleviate the plight of both sections while rebuilding his

party.³

The money question aroused a host of financial and political issues. In

their April 1867 convention, the State Sovereignty Democrats, an extreme

states' rights group which later encouraged Kentucky to nullify Congressional

Reconstruction legislation, launched the debate. The organization, led by

Henry Clay Dean and Alexander Long, believed that the Democratic Party had

disowned its principles, and they threatened to form a movement calling for

Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869, (New York, 1974), 262-64; Max L.

Shipley, "The Background and Legal Aspects of the Pendleton Plan," Mississippi

Valley Historical Review, 24 (September, 1937), 329-32; Chester M. Destler,

American Radicalism, 1865-1901: Essays and Documents, (New York, 1963), 32-

34; Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of the Civil

War and Reconstruction, (Baltimore, 1959), 56-80.

3. George H. Pendleton, Payment of the Public Debt in Legal Tender Notes!!

Speech of Hon. George H. Pendleton, Milwaukee, November 2, 1867 (n.p., n.d.),

11-12; George H. Pendleton, "Speech of Hon. George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, at

Grafton, West Virginia, July 16, 1868," in Democratic Speaker's Handbook

(Cincinnati, 1868), 310-15; Cincinnati Enquirer, July 22, 1867; Shipley,

"Background of the Pendleton Plan," 329-32; Destler, American Radicalism, 32-

34; Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 56-80; George L. Anderson, "The South

and Problems of Post-Civil War Finance," Journal of Southern History, 9 (August,

1943), 181-95; Albert V. House, "Northern Congressional Democrats as

Defenders of the South During Reconstruction," Journal of Southern History, 6

(February, 1940), 46-48.

128                                                   OHIO HISTORY

total repudiation of the national debt. In June, Washington McLean of the

Cincinnati Enquirer tempered the proposal by suggesting that the United

States pay the entire federal debt in greenbacks. Traditional hard-money

Democrats rejected that sweeping proposal, believing that dramatic inflation

would result. Long, Dean, and McLean, all former Peace Democrats, were re-

sponding to the cries of midwestern farmers who believed contraction of

greenbacks would cause crop prices to fall, making it more difficult to pay off

their debts.⁴

Hugh J. Jewett, a prominent Ohio Democrat, fearing the extreme nature of

both plans, suggested a conservative alternative that offered bondholders the

choice between repayment in greenbacks or an exchange of their bonds for

taxable securities bearing lower interest rates. Jewett further suggested that

greenbacks replace national banknotes which were secured by government

bonds. The process included withdrawing the banknotes and buying the bonds

back with greenbacks which could then be put in circulation to replace the

notes. The plan provided multiple blessings for midwestern Democrats.

First, it would save the government millions in interest currently being paid

on the bonds. Second, it would maintain currency levels in their section,

preventing crop prices from falling and interest rates from rising too steeply.

The government could then put the income from taxes and savings from

lower interest payments into a sinking fund to pay the outstanding bonds as

they matured.⁵

McLean recognized that these conflicting and often confusing plans were

beyond the understanding of most ordinary voters. Under these circumstances,

he sought an articulate spokesman; Pendleton seemed the logical choice.

During his congressional terms, Pendleton had established a solid reputation

on finance and financial matters. Equally vital, Pendleton continued at the

forefront of Ohio Democratic politics despite his 1866 loss. Nothing better

illustrated his position than his selection as president of the Democratic State

Convention in January 1867, which he controlled along with Clement L.

Vallandigham and Allen G. Thurman. But Pendleton was not yet ready to as-

sume the role McLean desired for him. Rather, Pendleton still hammered at

Congressional Reconstruction.⁶

4. Destler, American Radicalism, 49; Robert D. Sawrey, Dubious Victor: The

Reconstruction Debate in Ohio (Lexington, Ky., 1992), 107-09; Don C. Barrett,

The Greenbacks and Resumption of Specie Payments, 1862-1879, Harvard

Economic Studies, vol. 36 (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), 161-69.

5. Destler, American Radicalism, 37-38; Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 98-

101; Cincinnati Enquirer, Apr. 19, June 6, 1867; Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil

War Era, 1850-1873, vol. 4 of The History of the State of Ohio (Columbus, Ohio,

1944), 459.

6. George H. Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period, Columbia

University Studies in the Social Science (1911; reprint, New York, 1968), 238-

130                                                    OHIO HISTORY

this effort. He first addressed the public debt issue in Minnesota on July 11,

1867. Jewett had given his speech just six days before, but it was not printed

in Cincinnati newspapers until after Pendleton returned from Minnesota.

Whether he had knowledge of the Jewett plan is unclear, but what is clear is

that Pendleton was thinking along similar lines. Pendleton condemned the

federal policy that allowed bondholders to purchase the securities in depreci-

ated currency, receive 6 percent interest in gold, and pay no taxes on the in-

come. Meanwhile, agrarian and trades workers, who could not afford such in-

vestment, struggled under the combined weight of heavy debt loads and high

taxes to pay the excessive interest rate. National banks held a sizable portion

of these bonds as collateral for the issuance of banknotes, thus enhancing

their economic power. The Ohio legislature had expressed similar outrage in

1866 when it called for state taxation of national securities. Bank owners not

only received 6 percent interest on the bonds, but also gained the right to loan

banknotes at rates of 6, 8 or even 15 percent. Pendleton decried this system:

The manifest interest of the people is, that these bonds be redeemed in legal tender

notes. The interest on these bonds would thus be saved, and the currency, if any be

needed, would thus be furnished free of cost to the people.8

Pendleton began to specify the provisions of his plan, while carefully dis-

sociating himself from McLean's inflationary notions, in a speech in Lima,

Ohio.   The total debt, Pendleton said, amounted to $2.2 billion, with

$140,000,000 in interest paid yearly. Half of the debt was in five to twenty-

year bonds, callable after five years and yielding an interest rate of 6 percent

yearly. Pendleton limited his proposal for paying the debt in greenbacks to

these bonds, because purchasers bought them with legal tender and no contrac-

tual stipulation existed regarding their payment. The national banks held

$400,000,000 of these bonds, which Pendleton asserted could be called in at

an annual savings to the government of $24,000,000 in interest payments

without causing inflation. He maintained that the interest saved could be

added to a portion of existing tax revenues and used to create a sinking fund to

pay off the rest of the federal debt over a period of sixteen years. To succeed,

the plan not only required the momentary continuation of high taxes, but also

the reduction of federal spending. The plan would not cause overt inflation of

prices because as bank-held bonds were redeemed, bankers would no longer

8. Cincinnati Enquirer, July 17, 1867; Destler, American Radicalism, 38-39;

New York Times, July 17, 1867; Taxing National Currency, Etc. (16 April 1866),

39th Cong., 1st sess., H. Miscellaneous Document 87, (Serial 1271); Letter of the

Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the Committee on Finance,

Transmitting a Statement Relative to the Apportionment of National Currency (23

April 1866), 39th Cong., 1st sess., S. Miscellaneous Document 100, (Serial

1239); Government Funds in National Banks (9 January 1868), 40th Cong., 2nd

sess., H. Executive Document 87, (Serial 1332).

George Hunt Pendleton                                             131

have the required collateral to issue banknotes. In essence, the greenbacks

would replace the banknotes. Nonetheless, Pendleton contended that some

currency inflation was desirable to make capital more available for rebuilding

the South and reviving an economy in recession. He could assure the country

an end to war taxes after a specified time period while providing the necessary

capital for southern agricultural needs and the nation's growing industrial con-

cerns. After all, the gains of paying off the debt, he argued, outweighed any

possible detriment caused by limited price inflation.⁹

In Milwaukee two weeks later, Pendleton contended that his idea would

limit inflation by stabilizing the greenback's value at approximately 71 cents

in gold per dollar as legal tender. The gold in the sinking fund would be con-

verted to greenbacks to redeem the five-twenties when they matured. After

they were retired, the government could gradually lower taxes by

$150,000,000 and still have enough available in 1874 to pay off the gold

bonds. Taxes could again be reduced after 1874, allowing for gradual with-

drawal of the greenbacks. Pendleton estimated that by 1881 the nation could

retire its debt and return to specie payments. Pendleton asserted that by the

time his plan achieved it goals, the Republican method would have paid little

more than the annual interest on the debt.10  In fifteen years, accumulated in-

terest would double the debt, while Republican contraction schemes reduced

the economic base from which taxes were gathered.11

9.  Pendleton argued that the Republican contraction  program  would add

$48,000,000 in yearly interest payments. George H. Pendleton, Speech of Hon.

George H. Pendleton, Delivered at Lima, Allen County, Ohio, Thursday, August

15, 1867 (Columbus: The Crisis Office, 1867), 4-5; Extracts from Hon. George H.

Pendleton's Speeches at Lima and Cleveland (n.p., n.d.), 2-4; Cincinnati Enquirer,

Aug. 16, 1867; New York Times, Aug. 18, 1867; Moore, "Ohio in National

Politics," 250; Benedict, A Compromise of Principle, 262-63. Destler suggests

that Pendleton adopted Jewett's sinking fund idea. Destler, American Radicalism,

39; Pendleton's figures were rounded off estimates, but were reasonably accurate.

Statement of the Public Debt of the United States (3 March 1868), 40th Cong.,

2nd sess., H. Misdoc. 87, (Serial 1350).

10. Pendleton, Payment of the Public Debt, 1-12; Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 7,

1867; Destler, American Radicalism, 39-41.

11. The Times reluctantly accepted the correction of a subscriber that Pendleton

was being misrepresented in the paper. While the paper acknowledged that

Pendleton was not the inflationist that others were, it doubted whether his plan

could be accomplished without some inflation. New York Times, Nov. 18, 1867.

Pendleton wrote to Manton Marble of the New York World hoping he would print a

portion of his Milwaukee speech to respond to the Times. Marble was cordial to

Pendleton and complied with his request, but was not a supporter of the plan.

Nonetheless, Marble defended Pendleton from critics who called him an inflation-

ist. Pendleton to Marble, Nov. 13, 1867, Marble to Pendleton, Nov. 23, 1867,

Manton Marble Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington,

DC; New York World, Nov. 19, 1867, Feb. 1, 4, May 6, 29, 1868; Pendleton to

Horace Greeley, Nov. 13, 1867, Horace Greeley Papers, Manuscript Division,

132                                                 OHIO HISTORY

Pendleton also addressed questions of personal inconsistency about his vote

against the Legal Tender Act in 1862. Congressional Democrats, who had

almost unanimously joined Pendleton then, remained consistent on this issue

until 1866 when they supported McCulloch's monetary contraction program.

Within two years, however, most of them voted to end contraction. The ex-

planation for this reversal, and Pendleton's apparent contradiction, supplies

some insight into the party's reversals. Pendleton initially deemed green-

backs to be an evil, but because the government considered fiat adequate for

the soldier, he believed the same standard ought also to apply to the five-

twenty bondholder. Moreover, manufacturers and laborers in the Midwest

valued greenbacks as the key to prosperity in the postwar recession. Yet they

also viewed bondholders and bankers as the reason for much of their financial

trouble, and saw no reason for them to have favored status in the eyes of the

government. While Pendleton's goal was the resumption of specie, he could

find no reason to scorn the utility of greenbacks to make that transition as

painless as possible.12

There were several threads of continuity within his otherwise seemingly

contradictory position.  Pendleton had long opposed the National Bank

System. Based on his Jacksonian roots, he thought that the National Banks

prevented the Midwest from achieving its economic potential.  Pendleton

played on the midwestern complaint, latent since the days of Jackson's war on

the Second Bank of the United States, that the East monopolized the coun-

try's capital. In addition, Pendleton tried to appeal to a broad constituency by

using Jacksonian methods. His own support base, largely Ohio farmers, tra-

ditionally voted Democratic and blamed Republican financial policies for their

current financial woes. Too, Pendleton attempted to appeal to eastern labor-

ers, much the same way that Jackson had, on the basis of class conflict.

Pendleton railed against the privilege and special status Republicans afforded

to bondholders, reminiscent of Jackson's attack on Nicholas Biddle and eastern

banks. Pendleton capped his argument by returning to Jackson's governmen-

tal philosophy. Pendleton disdained the existing financial system as an auxil-

iary part of the plan of national consolidation which the Republican leviathan

state had created during the war. Through monetary contraction and the main-

tenance of the National Bank System, he further reasoned, eastern Republican

financiers kept the southern states under their thumb. In the end, Pendleton's

goals remained the same even if his methods changed. His plan would de-

stroy the National Bank System and help thwart the Republican power

grab.13

Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Destler, American Radicalism, 40-41.

12. Pendleton, Payment of the Public Debt, 9; Edward McPherson, A Handbook

of Politics for 1868 (1868; reprint, New York, 1969), 354.

13. Ibid.; Pendleton, Payment of the Public Debt, 9; While Sharkey and Sawrey

George Hunt Pendleton                                              133

Pendleton's Presidential Bid

The fall elections gave Pendleton a boost in his marathon effort to employ

the developing Pendleton Plan as the road to the White House. The results in

Ohio, a pleasant surprise for the Democrats, came about only through strenu-

ous efforts; Pendleton alone had visited thirty counties in less than two

months. The Republicans did very poorly, in spite of the fact that Rutherford

B. Hayes won the gubernatorial election. The Democrats gained a majority in

the Ohio legislature, which meant Benjamin Wade, a leading Radical

Republican, forfeited his seat in the United States Senate. In addition, Ohio

voters overwhelmingly rejected   the  Fourteenth  Amendment.     While

Democratic gains in Ohio resulted largely from the widespread use of pure

racism and the opposition to black suffrage, rising support for Pendleton's

debt payment plan played a role as well.¹⁴ The 1867 election represented a

tend to dismiss Pendleton's ideas as politically expedient and philosophically in-

consistent with Jacksonianism, other historians disagree. One of the earliest to

note Pendleton's focus on special privilege was Max Shipley. Chester M. Destler

followed Shipley's work, calling Pendleton "at the worst, ... a re-inflationist."

Irwin Unger echoes Destler's comments noting that while hard-money Democrats

accused Pendleton of inconsistency, their charges that he was an inflationist were

"unfair." One of the most recent studies of the era concurs that Pendleton was es-

sentially consistent to long-held Jacksonian ideals. Gretchen Ritter notes that

under the Pendleton Plan, Jacksonian principle was reinterpreted to advocate paper

money while maintaining the traditional opposition to the banking system and

special status for bondholders. Yet none of these historians takes a strong enough

stand on the basic consistency of Pendleton's plan with Jacksonianism.  Even

Ritter, who speaks the most forthrightly in her comparison of the plan with

Jacksonian ideas, classifies Pendleton as an antimonopolist rather than a conser-

vative. She places Jacksonianism within her "conservative" category but not the

Pendleton Plan, because she fails to emphasize Pendleton's ultimate goal of specie

resumption. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 99-107, 197, 219, 282-85;

Shipley, "Background of the Pendleton Plan," 339; Destler, American Radicalism,

40; Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American

Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton, N.J., 1964), 84; Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and

Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America

(New York, 1997), 1-9, 41-44; Charles H. Coleman, The Election of 1868: The

Democratic Effort to Regain Control, (New York, 1971), 25-33; Cincinnati

Enquirer, Feb. 5, 1868; Benjamin E. Green to Samuel J. Randall, Jan. 2, 1868,

Samuel J. Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library, Philadelphia;

Joseph Medill to Sherman, Jan. 7, 1868, John Sherman Papers, Manuscript

Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

14. Destler, Unger and Benedict emphasize the importance of the currency issue

while Jerome Mushkat and Sawrey point to race issues. Benedict noted, "In Ohio

the money question had damaged Republicans." Benedict, A Compromise of

Principle, 273; Destler, American Radicalism, 32-40; Unger, The Greenback Era,

80-87; Jerome Mushkat, The Reconstruction of the New York Democracy, 1861-

1874 (East Brunswick, N.J., 1981), 113-20; Sawrey, Dubious Victory, 105-07.

134                                                   OHIO HISTORY

very early success in the process of educating the party on Pendleton's finan-

cial ideas. Writing of the party's bright future to New Yorker Horatio

Seymour, Pendleton said, "Our labor will just have begun for there comes the

question of administering the power which will be confided to our hands."¹⁵

Pendleton's plan engendered considerable debate throughout the nation. At

first, both major parties in Cincinnati, represented by the Commercial and the

Enquirer, endorsed the payment of five-twenties in greenbacks.  Ohio

Republican John Sherman asserted that the idea was legal.¹⁶ Some leading

Radical Republicans such as Thaddeus Stevens and Benjamin Bannan pro-

posed similar ideas. The Radical Daily Gazette supported the idea for a time.

The Democratic Enquirer, however, advocated an increase in the number of

greenbacks in circulation to accomplish the goal. Yet the 1867 election re-

sults and the growing midwestern support for Pendleton and his plan caused

the Republicans great consternation and forced them to reassess their initial

approval. Some began to counsel adoption of the payment plan, while others

suggested initiating a federal tax on the bonds to placate those who thought

bondholders had become a privileged class. Joseph Medill, editor of the

Republican Chicago Tribune, warned John Sherman that the Republican

Party could no longer rely on Reconstruction issues to win elections. In or-

der to maintain power, Medill suggested, the Republicans needed to placate

midwesterners on financial issues.17

15. New York Leader, Oct. 12, 1867; New York World, Oct. 14, 1867; New York

Tribune, Oct. 14, 1867; New York Herald, Oct. 7, 9, 10, 12, 1867; Boston Daily

Courier, Oct. 11, 17, 18, 1867; Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 2, 1867; Pendleton to

Horatio Seymour, Oct. 21, 1867, Fairchild Collection, New York Historical

Society, New York. A Sherman correspondent noted that the currency question had

eclipsed the amendment issue by the time of the election. J. C. Devin to John

Sherman, Sept. 30, 1867, Schuyler Colfax to Sherman, Oct. 12, 1867, Sherman

Papers; McPherson, Handbook of Politics for 1868, 354-55; Porter, Ohio

Politics, 235-48; Roseboom, Civil War Era, 457-63; Moore, "Ohio in National

Politics," 240-44.

16. New York Times, Sept. 22, 1867; John Sherman, Funding of the National

Debt, Speech of Hon. John Sherman, of Ohio, in the United States Senate, May

22, 1866 (n.p., n.d.), 1-15; Sherman later recanted, saying he had not favored the

payment of the debt in greenbacks until they were at par with gold, which he said

was stipulated in the original legal tender act. In essence, the bonds were payable

in greenbacks, but only when they were at par. John Sherman, John Sherman's

Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet.   An

Autobiography, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1895), 624-25.

17.  Destler, American Radicalism, 34-35; Shipley, "Background of the

Pendleton Plan," 330-35; Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 96-97; David

Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872,

(Chicago, 1981), 340-56; R. J. to Sherman, Nov. 11, 1867, Joseph Medill to

Sherman, Nov. 22, 1867, Jan. 7, 1868, David Wilder to Sherman, Dec. 20, 1867,

C. Davenport to Sherman, Dec. 27, 1867, Sherman Papers; Samuel S. Cox to

Marble, Oct. 1, 1867, Marble Papers; New York Leader, Aug. 24, 1867;

George Hunt Pendleton                                             135

Some Republicans may have seen in the currency issue a repose from the

dangerous issues associated with Congressional Reconstruction. Indeed, this

popular midwestern question could be a political knife to deflate a Democracy

swelling from the agitation over black suffrage. For the Republicans, how-

ever, this knife would turn into a two-edged sword. They had their own divi-

sions as Radicals attempted to maintain their power in the party.

Conservative Republicans in the Midwest slowly withdrew their support of

the greenback scheme, associating it with the Radicals.  Many eastern

Republicans had never supported the idea. While the issue appeared to have

potential for the Republicans, the Radical viewpoint would ultimately be

squelched in the wake of intraparty squabbles. Because of their lack of consis-

tency on the issue and Pendleton's willingness to make greenbacks his calling

card, Pendleton quickly assumed leadership of the issue. The 1867 election

returns were in part a result of its growing importance. Instead of deflecting

interest from Reconstruction issues and strengthening Republican power in

the Midwest, the Ohio Idea coalesced support around Pendleton. ¹⁸

The Pendleton Plan, or the "Ohio Idea" as it became known, coupled with

the resounding Democratic victory in the October 1867 election, elevated

Pendleton to leading midwestern contender for the presidential nomination.¹⁹

With the New Year came another state convention. The Ohio gathering was

so anxious to become the first state to endorse Pendleton that it set aside the

rules and adopted such a resolution at the outset of the proceedings. The con-

vention then sent for the awaiting Pendleton, who addressed them briefly on

the key issues.²⁰ Before adjourning, delegates adopted a series of resolutions

that reflected Pendleton's ideas.  After restating their opposition  to

Congressional Reconstruction and the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, they

concluded with resolutions on financial questions which echoed the major fea-

Cincinnati Enquirer, May 20, June 3, 6, 26, July 12, 18, 29, Aug. 24, Oct. 17, 18,

Nov. 1, 1867, Jan. 4, 1868.

18. Montgomery, Beyond Equality, 340-56; Benedict, A Compromise of

Principle, 257-78.

19. Pendleton began an extensive letter writing campaign encompassing the

country while the Cincinnati Enquirer boosted him at home in Ohio. Cincinnati

Enquirer, Oct. 22, 25, 28, Nov. 9, 11, 14, Dec. 24, 26, 30, 1867, Jan. 6, 1868;

New York Times, Oct. 24, 1867; New York Herald, Oct. 21, 1867; Roseboom,

Civil War Era, 464-65; Samuel S. Cox to Marble, Nov. 11, 1867, Marble Papers;

Pendleton to M. W. Cluskey, May 24, June 2, 8, 16, 1868, Pendleton

Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Western Kentucky University Library, Bowling

Green; Pendleton to J. Sterling Morton, Dec. 3, 1867, Jan. 23, April 9, 1868,

Morton Family Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago; Pendleton to

Unknown, Dec. 25, 1867, Pendleton Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Boston Public

Library, Boston; Pendleton to Sylvanus Cadwallader, Feb. 2, 1868, Sylvanus

Cadwallader Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

20. Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 9, 1868; New York Times, Jan. 12, 1868.

136                                                   OHIO HISTORY

tures of the Ohio Idea. The Enquirer, though supportive of more inflation,

eventually concurred.²¹

The Pendleton movement swept much of the Midwest and gained enough

support to influence congressional activity. In January 1868, Republicans in

both houses launched a counterattack by voting to end the contraction of

greenbacks.²²  For the time being, however, Congressional Republicans

failed to establish a coherent policy, giving added impetus to Pendleton's can-

didacy. Democrats in Nebraska, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky,

and Minnesota joined with Ohio in declaring their support for him.²³ Fueled

by this groundswell, Pendleton tried to influence the Democratic National

Committee in its decision regarding the location and date for the national

convention. He hoped for an early meeting in a midwestern city. He ob-

tained neither objective. National Chairman August Belmont, the leader of

the eastern Democratic banking interests known as "swallow-tails," blocked

these attempts and convinced the committee to accept the bid of New York

City.²⁴ Belmont's strong-arm tactics indicated the strength of the hard-money

wing of the party, but the selection did not dampen Pendleton's spirits.

Members of his organization in New York had been working hard and re-

mained optimistic. By March, Pendleton could see his support coalescing.

The Midwest was firm, largely due to its agrarian composition, and he was

confident of carrying Oregon, California, Nevada, and hopeful about

Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Indiana. By April all the midwestern states

backed his candidacy except Missouri, but the Enquirer was sure of its support

as well. Based on his experience in 1864, Pendleton believed these states

could create a surge in the early balloting and stampede hesitant delegates.

But he did not delude himself, recognizing that the battle would not be easy.²⁵

21. Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 9, 10, 1868; American Annual Cyclopaedia and

Register of Important Events of the Year 1868, vol. 8 (New York, 1869), 601-03;

Destler, American Radicalism, 41-42; Roseboom, Civil War Era, 466.

22. Barrett, Greenbacks and Resumption, 167-68; Alexander D. Noyes, Forty

Years of American Finance: A Short History of the Government and People of the

United States Since the Civil War, 1865-1907 (New York, 1909), 15-16; James

M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York,

1982), 540-41.

23. Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 11, 14, 20, 31, 1868; New York World, Jan. 8-9,

1868.

24. The "swallow-tail" Democrats were upper-class New Yorkers such as Samuel

Tilden, Samuel Barlow, and August Belmont who favored a hard money policy and

the National Bank System. Mushkat, Reconstruction of the New York Democracy,

34-35, 121; Irving Katz, August Belmont: A Political Biography (New York,

1968), 170-71.

25. Pendleton to J. Sterling Morton, Jan. 23, March 12, 25, April 9, June 20,

1868, Morton Family Papers; New York Herald, June 11, 1868; David Black, King

of Fifth Avenue: The Fortunes of August Belmont (New York, 1981), 303-04;

Destler, American Radicalism, 42.

George Hunt Pendleton                                         137

In an odd twist, the State Sovereignty Democrats supported Salmon P.

Chase for the presidency, despite his long advocacy of universal suffrage, uni-

versal amnesty for southerners, and the National Bank System.  Chase

strongly opposed the Ohio Idea. While remaining anathema to Pendleton and

his supporters, Chase toned down his more prickly positions by arguing that

the suffrage issue should be left to state legislatures. He also expressed his

opposition to the special tax status of bondholders despite his hard-money

stance. Alexander Long, one-time friend of Pendleton, apparently now viewed

him as a political rival and opposed the Ohio Idea. Long was bitter about

Pendleton's rising political fortunes on an issue Long believed was his own.

As a result, he began a petty and personal crusade to take back control of the

Ohio Democracy by insidiously suggesting that Pendleton could help his fu-

ture political prospects by withdrawing as a candidate and leading the Chase

movement at the convention. Unwilling to betray his political philosophy or

his supporters and doggedly determined to maintain control of the Ohio

Democratic machinery, Pendleton refused.²⁶

In this mixture of politics and personality, Clement L. Vallandigham

joined Long in letting personal concerns interfere with party considerations.

Vallandigham remained upset over his 1867 defeat for a Senate seat by Allen

G. Thurman, whom Pendleton had eventually supported. Pendleton may have

believed that Thurman was a better leader for a party trying to move beyond

the war. Thurman's early acceptance of the Ohio Idea played a role, too. The

fact that delegates to the Ohio convention supported Thurman over

Vallandigham undoubtedly influenced Pendleton as well, because he was seek-

ing the support of those same people for the presidential nomination. More

importantly, although he had originally endorsed Vallandigham for the seat at

the 1867 state convention, Pendleton realized that public support for him now

would create too close an association with a man many eastern Democrats

considered a political pariah. Such a mistake would affect his chances for

nomination. Vallandigham remained a nominal advocate of Pendleton, but

made Chase his second choice. Belmont joined Vallandigham in favoring

Chase. Belmont saw his opposition to the Ohio Idea as more important than

26. Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase: A Life of Politics (Kent, Ohio, 1987),

286-91; Coleman, Election of 1868, 68-80, 119, 129-40; J. W. Schuckers, The

Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, United States Senator and

Governor of Ohio; Secretary of the Treasury, and Chief-Justice of the United States

(New York, 1874), 578, 589; New York World, June 9, 1868; Alexander Long to

Salmon P. Chase, April 6, 11, 1868, Chase to Long, April 8, 19, 1868, J. W.

Schuckers to Long, April 30, June 15, 1868, M. S. Hawley to Long, June 18,

1868, Alexander Long Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati. In spite

of his outspoken dissent, the Pendleton Escort invited Long to join them in their

trek to the convention. He undoubtedly declined. Invitation, May 22, 1868,

Long Papers.

138                                                   OHIO HISTORY

the need to aid the party in developing its southern strength. Challenged by

Tammany Hall and the New Albany Regency, two competing interests within

the New York Democracy, Belmont and the swallow-tails sought to gain con-

trol of the party in their home state. Perhaps Chase was just a diversion who

would draw attention away from the Pendleton Plan and open the door for an-

other candidate more to the liking of Belmont. Whatever his intent, Belmont

was cautious and did not wish to open the party up to new potent leaders.²⁷

Pendleton also faced several other serious contenders for the presidential

nomination.  Some Indiana Democrats pushed Thomas Hendricks even

though he had publicly stated he preferred the Senate. Hendricks was con-

nected to the National Bank System, having sat on the board of directors of a

branch in his home state. General Francis P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, who had

previously been a Republican, was also supported by some Democrats, but

Chase seemed the more obvious choice should the convention decide to go

outside the party. Many southerners favored General Winfield S. Hancock be-

cause of his friendly administration of Louisiana and Texas following the war.

Governor Horatio Seymour of New York was the strongest possibility for the

hard-money men. Seymour opposed the Ohio Idea, but was conservative on

Reconstruction issues and had a war record that attracted former Peace

Democrats. As in 1864, he repeatedly declined to have his name used, but

left the door open just enough to keep his supporters interested. Pendleton

respected Seymour as a politician and as an administrator, but did not agree

with his financial policies. In Seymour, eastern Democrats found a logical

compromise candidate, though no single strong alternative surfaced against

Pendleton. The Buckeye's prospects looked good.²⁸

Newspapers were rife with rumors about various machinations before the

convention. Amidst all of the hearsay, it was obvious that the party remained

deeply divided. Ultra-inflationists and Belmont's swallow-tails comprised the

extremes, with Pendleton in the middle. While those who favored extreme in-

flation probably could ultimately support Pendleton, the eastern hard-money

advocates, with money and influence to employ against him, could not.

Though Pendleton entered the convention with 149 convention votes in his

27. Moore, "Ohio in National Politics," 258-60; James L. Vallandigham, A Life

of Clement L. Vallandigham (Baltimore, 1872), 422-24; Cincinnati Enquirer, May

13, 1923; Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 7, 1868; New York World, Feb. 5, 1868;

Katz, August Belmont, 167-71; Mushkat, Reconstruction of the New York

Democracy, 113-42; Horace Samuel Merrill, Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleveland

and the Democratic Party, The Library of American Biography, ed. Oscar Handlin

(Boston, 1957), 24-46; Montgomery, Beyond Equality, 351.

28. Coleman, Election of 1868, 21-35, 149-86; Montgomery, Beyond Equality,

346; Blue, Salmon P. Chase, 292; Stewart Mitchell, Horatio Seymour of New York

(New York, 1970), 383-411; DeAlva S. Alexander, A Political History of the State

of New York, vol. 3 (1909; reprint, Port Washington, N.Y., 1969), 89-97; New

York Times, July 10, 1868.

George Hunt Pendleton                                             139

pocket, more than any other candidate, his organization suffered from an ab-

sence of efficient leadership because of the struggle between Pendleton,

Vallandigham, and Long. As one Chase booster noted, these personality dif-

ferences enhanced the Chief Justice's prospects since the divisions prevented

Pendleton from trading and bartering with other delegates. In spite of decided

opposition, his supporters, in the form of the "Pendleton Escort," were ready

to take New York by storm.29

In the sweltering heat of July, Democrats from all across the nation de-

scended on New York City. In spite of Belmont's influence and Seymour's

early convention speech blasting paper currency, soft money men controlled

the platform committee. On older issues, the party acknowledged that slavery

and secession were casualties of the war, pleaded for the immediate restoration

of the southern states, and asked for amnesty for the former Confederates.

The platform also railed against the Congressional Republican plans for

Reconstruction while reiterating the partisan position on states' rights and

African-American suffrage. Turning to the new and important issues of na-

tional finance, the members of the committee espoused four separate resolu-

tions. First, they called for the rapid payment of the national debt with the

"lawful money of the United States," unless specifically designated in coin.

Second, they demanded equal taxation of all types of property including gov-

ernment bonds. In the third resolution, the delegates advocated one currency

for all Americans, further solidifying the party's stance in support of paying

the five-twenty bonds in greenbacks. Finally, they insisted that the govern-

ment stop the high expenditures presently being committed to support the

armed forces still active in southern states and through appropriations for the

administration of the Freedmen's Bureau.    Economy in government,

Democrats believed, was the quickest route to debt payment and lower taxes.

The platform did not directly call for the destruction of the National Bank

System, nor did it include a provision to return the country to specie pay-

ments within fifteen years. The planks could be associated, however, with no

candidate more than Pendleton.³⁰

29. Marble to Pendleton, Nov. 23, 1867, Pendleton to Marble, Dec. 5, 1867,

March 3, 1868, Marble Papers; Samuel Ward to Salmon P. Chase, June 26, 1868,

Salmon P. Chase Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,

DC; Boston Daily Courier, June 11, 22, 1868; New York Evening Post, Feb. 13,

1868; New York Leader, March 28, April 11, 18, 1868; New York Herald, Jan. 10,

27, April 25, 1868; New York World, Feb. 1, May 9, June 1, 9, 26, July 2-4, 22,

1868; Cincinnati Gazette, Feb. 27, July 1-3, 6, 1868; Cincinnati Enquirer, May 2,

21, 29, June 1, 10, 1868; Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 8, July 2-4, 1868.

30. The National Labor Union endorsed these principles. Official Proceedings

of the National Democratic Convention, held at New York, July 4-9, 1868

(Boston, 1868), 22-30, 58-59; New York World, July 8, 1868; Coleman, Election

of 1868, 200-02; Katz, August Belmont, 172-73; Black, King of Fifth Avenue,

303-05.

140                                                    OHIO HISTORY

The platform was a clear victory for Pendleton and illustrated the strength

of his support base.³¹ As a midwesterner, Pendleton represented many farm-

ers who saw in the Ohio Idea a means to easier debt repayment through main-

tenance of an expanded currency. Yet Pendleton undoubtedly hoped to appeal

to another growing group of voters-labor. The platform echoed Pendleton's

often repeated sentiments for "one currency for the government and the peo-

ple, the laborer and the office-holder, the pensioner and the soldier, the pro-

ducer and the bond-holder."³² Edward Kellogg, a merchant turned author and

financial expert after the Panic of 1837 ruined his business, had begun the

process of influencing trade unionists to support greenbacks as early as

1848.³³ Moreover, Pendleton realized the practical necessity of recognizing

the growing laboring element in his hometown of Cincinnati, and perhaps

more importantly in New York City where much of his strongest political

opposition resided. Representing an early response by labor, the fledging

National Labor Union supported many of the principles on currency delineated

in the Democratic platform of 1868. Though Tammany Hall needed to main-

tain the support of tens of thousands of immigrant workers, the political ma-

chine was still too powerful to be forced to capitulate to labor demands. The

other powerful factions within the eastern Democracy had economic interests

that ran contrary to those of labor and farmers. In the end, the Ohio Idea was

ahead of its time politically and economically. Labor was not yet organized

enough to exert the pressure necessary to overcome the competing political

elements in New York that controlled so much of the Democracy. Bringing

laborers and farmers together in political concert awaited another day, and an-

other platform.³⁴

31. Official Proceedings, 59-61; Coleman, Election of 1868, 201-05; Mitchell,

Horatio Seymour, 417-20; Roseboom, Civil War Era, 466-67; Cincinnati

Commercial, July 6, 1868; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 7, 1868.

32. Official Proceedings, 58.

33. In the years prior to 1837, land speculation expanded due to a flurry of rail-

road and canal building. Banks fueled this growth with expanded credit. President

Andrew Jackson, fearing runaway speculation, issued the Specie Circular in 1836

requiring all public lands to be purchased in gold. Jackson's action, combined

with tightened credit in Europe and poor harvests among American farmers, created

a significant depression in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Kellogg's writings

encouraged some Americans to view paper currency as the means of preventing

such economic problems.  See also Reginald C. McGrane, The Panic of 1837:

Some Financial Problems of the Jacksonian Era (Chicago, 1965).

34. Barrett,Greenbacks and Resumption, 161-73; Destler, American

Radicalism, 44-49; Unger, The Greenback Era, 81-91; New York World,

September 22, 25, 30-31, 1868; T. V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor, 1859-

1889, In Which the History of the Attempts to Form Organizations of

Workingmen for the Discussion of Political, Social, and Economic Questions is

Traced, The National Labor Union of 1866, The Industrial Brotherhood of 1874,

and the Order of the Knights of Labor of America and the World, The Chief and

George Hunt Pendleton                                           141

Yet Pendleton's appeal to labor went well beyond the confines of his own

party. Indeed, Radical Republican leaders such as Thaddeus Stevens had

sought to tap into a traditional support base, the trade unionists, by propos-

ing the end of the National Bank System and the redeeming of five-twenties

in greenbacks. Conservatives within the Republican Party, however, were no

longer willing to subject themselves to Stevens' Radical leadership. The

National Bank System represented the successful war effort against the seces-

sionist South. To disband it would be to turn their backs on their greatest

achievement. Moreover, many Republicans viewed the bank as a necessary

component in postwar economic development. As a result, Stevens' ideas

were rejected and the Republicans stood for the National Bank System and

hard currency. For labor, this party position was the last straw. Not only

had they been forgotten in the Republican scramble for African-American po-

litical equality, but also, in the waning years of Reconstruction as the politi-

cal system began to focus on other issues, the Republicans dismissed out of

hand labor currency concerns. Disillusioned, trade-unionists sought to foster

an independent party movement (Labor Reform Party) as an offshoot of the

National Labor Union.35

The question facing the convention now was whether the party would learn

from the mistakes of 1860 and 1864, or split its platform and nominee again.

Illinois and Iowa, when called upon for their choice, deferred to the Ohio dele-

gation to name its favorite son. Maine, however, was too anxious and could

not wait. Stealing Ohio's thunder, Marcellus Emory of Maine moved, amidst

great clamor, "in behalf of the laboring masses of Maine" to nominate

Pendleton for President.³⁶ General George W. McCook of Ohio was left to

second the motion. The nominations of President Andrew Johnson, Asa

Packer of Pennsylvania, General Hancock, and Hendricks quickly followed.

The first ballot gave Pendleton a total of 105 votes to 65 for Johnson, his

nearest competitor, but far short of the magic two-thirds. Over the next series

of ballots, Pendleton expanded his vote total to a high of 156 and one-half,

but his hopes plunged when Indiana, which had supported him to that point,

split between him and Hendricks. As weary delegates caucused, Pendleton

knew his time had passed. Prepared for this contingency, he had written a let-

ter of withdrawal to McLean in the spirit of party unity for use if McLean felt

Pendleton's candidacy was doomed. McLean thought the moment had arrived

Most Important Principles in the Preamble of the Knights of Labor Discussed and

Explained with Views of the Author on Land, Labor and Transportation

(Columbus, Ohio, 1889), 48-89; Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: A

History, 3rd ed. (New York, 1966), 109-11; Joseph G. Rayback, A History of

American Labor, 2nd ed. (New York, 1966), 103-28.

35. Montgomery, Beyond Equality, vii-xi, 335-60; New York World, Sept. 22,

25, 30-31, 1868.

36. Official Proceedings, 68.

142                                                 OHIO HISTORY

after the fourth ballot, but the Ohio delegation wished to press ahead. On the

fifth day, Pendleton's total dropped by 100, and Vallandigham presented the

letter. The Daytonite then worked unsuccessfully to get the New York delega-

tion to change its vote to Chase. On the twenty-second ballot, McCook, rep-

resenting Ohio, nominated Horatio Seymour. He said that Pendleton sup-

ported the idea and that Seymour was a man who could unite the divided

party. Seymour won the nomination unanimously.³⁷

Lessons Not Learned

Pendleton's efforts were impaired from the outset by two major factors.

With Grant's selection by the Republicans, Pendleton's association with the

Peace Democrats stirred harmful wartime memories. Nevertheless, Seymour

shared a similar liability. Of greater significance was the Pendleton Plan.

The two largest eastern states worked hard to prevent his nomination. When

Indiana's support wavered, angry Ohio Pendletonians vowed to prevent

Hendricks from winning because some blamed Pendleton's demise on

Indiana's defection. At the same time, most Ohioans, except Vallandigham,

refused to support Chase. He was too identified with the Republicans during

the war and did not represent the views of midwestern Democrats on most

important political issues. With Pendleton's support, Ohio led the charge for

Seymour. An eastern nomination for the second consecutive convention

might open the door for a midwestern candidate in 1872. Though Seymour

did not accept the Ohio Idea, he was more sound than Chase on the other as-

pects of the platform that concerned Ohioans.

The party had learned very little from the 1864 campaign. Though the

midwestern Democracy, with support from the South, had gained strength, it

could not totally direct the convention. Too many southern delegates had fa-

vored candidates to whom they had closer ties such as Johnson and Hancock,

and did not recognize the benefits of the Pendleton Plan for the South.

Because of regional divisions, economic diversity, and intrastate power strug-

gles, the party once again failed to produce harmony. In short, the party did

not understand how to proceed as a minority. Pendleton had hoped that by

winning southern support, he could pull eastern Democrats along kicking and

screaming, and he almost succeeded. The end result, however, was a ticket and

platform representative of a divided and floundering party.³⁸

37. Ibid., 66-174; Coleman, Election of 1868, 208-12; Mitchell, Horatio

Seymour, 422-32; Blue, Salmon P. Chase, 294-95; Cincinnati Enquirer, July 10,

14, 1868; New York Times, July 10, 1868; New York World, July 10, 1868;

Cincinnati Commercial, July 9, 10, 1868; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 9-11,

1868; Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1971), 520-21.

38. Cincinnati Gazette, July 10, 1868; Cincinnati Commercial, July 10-11,

George Hunt Pendleton                                           143

Democratic losses in October elections in Maine, Ohio and Pennsylvania

foreshadowed defeat in November when Grant routed Seymour. The result was

particularly bitter to Pendleton when Seymour lost in Ohio by a margin of

41,090 votes. Intraparty recriminations filled the air immediately.  The

Enquirer tried to soften the drubbing by unearthing the standard Democratic

explanation that Republicans stole the election through fraud. As the editor

of the New York World and spokesman for eastern Democrats, Manton

Marble disagreed. While he acknowledged that Congressional Reconstruction

programs harmed Seymour in the South, the greater fault rested with the Ohio

Idea. In retrospect, each interpretation contained an element of truth. Federal

troops stationed in several unreconstructed states had indeed interfered with the

voting process. Eastern hard-money Democrats either had shunned Seymour

because of the party platform or had not voted in silent protest. Moreover,

the contrast between Seymour's vacillating wartime record and Grant's hero-

ism posed an almost insurmountable barrier to any possible Democratic vic-

tory. Even so, neither McLean nor Marble gave the Ohio Idea its just due.

To have ignored the financial issues would have cost Democrats valuable

support in the Midwest. But Pendleton's innovative program had even larger

dimensions. When the Republicans concentrated on Reconstruction issues

and waved the "bloody shirt," the Democrats were placed on the defensive.³⁹

In that sense, the Ohio Idea implicitly accepted the results of the Civil War,

neutralized any lingering issues connected to Reconstruction, created the

means for Democrats to forge sectional reconciliation, and provided them with

the possibility of formulating fresh programs more in tune with the future

than the past. Yet Pendleton buttressed all of this progress on a new interpre-

tation of the well-worn Jacksonian principle. Pendleton willingly took on

new issues, but preserved the old party ideology in an effort to unite party fac-

tions. Yet not all Democrats were willing to go along. Whatever the reasons

for failure in 1868, Pendleton understood that both he and his party stood on

the threshold of a new political focus.40

The debate over the Ohio Idea and the campaign of 1868 are significant for

more than just what they portray about Pendleton and the Democratic Party.

Indeed, they suggest much about the political arena following the end of the

1868; Cincinnati Enquirer, May 13, 1923; Coleman, Election of 1868, 212-14;

Charles R. Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Rutherford B. Hayes: Nineteenth

President of the United States (Columbus, Ohio, 1926), 3:53-54; Blue, Salmon P.

Chase, 294-95.

39. The Republican practice of equating their party with the Union cause and pa-

triotism and the Democrats with the South's cause and rebellion was known as

"waving the bloody shirt."

40. Letter cited in Coleman, Election of 1868, 336-39, 362-79; Cincinnati

Enquirer, Nov. 22, 1868; Cincinnati Gazette, Nov. 4, 1868; Cincinnati

Commercial. Nov. 4, 1868.

144                                                   OHIO HISTORY

Civil War. The Democratic factionalism which adversely affected the cam-

paign was quite similar to the divisions in the party in antebellum America.

Differences frequently divided the party in the first half of the nineteenth cen-

tury, leading to the rise of various regional political favorites and ultimately

the 1860 schism that precipitated the Civil War. The Republicans remained

largely a northern party while "waving the bloody shirt" and reminding voters

that it was the party of Abraham Lincoln and of the Union.  Little had

changed in terms of the conflict between and within parties as a result of the

war. In fact, most of the antebellum leaders continued to debate similar is-

sues following the conflict. Certainly, as evidenced by the contention over

debt financing, there were new issues, but they were still contested on the ba-

sis of old ideology, even if a man such as Pendleton sought to interpret it dif-

ferently. Consequently, the Democrats continued to experience debilitating

factionalism. Pendleton had attempted to cast an innovative spin on his par-

ty's ideology and failed. Yet he was not one to give up, and in the remainder

of his political career, he continued to seek for that elusive issue upon which

to rebuild the strength of his party. He would eventually find what he

thought was it in civil service reform.