Ohio History Journal

MICHAEL J. ANDERSON

McCarthyism Before McCarthy:

Anti-Communism in Cincinnati

and the Nation During the

Election of 1944

The wave of intense anti-communist sentiment that swept over the

United States in the years following the Second World War, sometimes

called the "second red scare,"¹ had a great impact on American

society. Political debate came to be dominated by the desire of both

major parties to appear tough on "international communism." The

political Left, historically not a major force in U.S. politics, was

weakened even further as labor unions, universities, and government

were purged of those people believed to be too closely associated with

communism. Finally, the behavior of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,

along with his popularity, helped to reduce the level of politics to

personal attack and guilt by association. Because this behavior was

tolerated, and even encouraged, by major political leaders and the

press, civil liberties were badly damaged.

For these reasons the second red scare has received a good deal of

attention from historians. In textbooks and general surveys anti-

communist sentiment is seen as growing out of American anxiety over

foreign affairs after the war, especially the growth of Soviet power and

influence and the rise of "Red China." These accounts generally

concentrate on the period of about 1946-54 and identify the phenom-

enon with Senator Joseph McCarthy. In discussing "McCarthyism"

both texts and more specialized historical studies generally focus on

several specific aspects: the personal crusade of the Wisconsin Sena-

Michael J. Anderson is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Cincinnati.

1. Here the term postwar red scare will refer to the anticommunism occurring after

World War II. For information on the red scare of 1919-20, see Robert K. Murray, Red

Scare: A Study in National Hysteria (Minneapolis, 1955).

6                                                          OHIO HISTORY

tor, the hearings before the House Committee on Un-American

Activities, espionage cases, and the prosecution of suspected or actual

communists.² This connection between McCarthy and anti-communism

is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that a recent study of anti-

communism and higher education is subtitled "McCarthyism and the

Universities" even though the author shows that "the largest single

purge of academic Communists in American history" took place in

1941-42, long before McCarthy became prominent.³ While most of the

works on anti-communism, including some textbooks, acknowledge

earlier outbreaks of anti-communism, these are generally seen as

separate from the hysteria that erupted in the years following the

Second World War. Historians searching for the origins of postwar

anti-communism have tended to concentrate on the relationship be-

tween anti-communism and the deterioration of Soviet-American rela-

tions. Works such as Richard Freeland's The Truman Doctrine and the

Origins of McCarthyism (1973) generally attribute the rise of anti-

communist sentiment to the start of the Cold War, and the emergence

of security and loyalty as important issues in domestic politics.

Because of this focus on the link between foreign policy and domestic

anti-communism, most of the studies of "McCarthyism" place the

origins of the phenomenon no earlier than 1945.⁴

2. See, for example, Mary Beth Norton, et al., A People and a Nation (Boston,

1982), 851-56; Frank Freidel and Alan Brinkley, America in the Twentieth Century (New

York, fifth edition, 1982), 379-86; Arthur S. Link and William B. Catton, American

Epoch: A History of the United States Since 1900, Vol. II (fifth edition), (New York,

1980) 667-71. For more specialized studies, see Richard M. Rovere, Senator Joe

McCarthy (Cleveland, 1959); Michael Paul Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The

Radical Specter (Cambridge, 1967). Also Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R.

McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington, 1970). For studies of prosecutions, see Michael

Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and

American Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn., 1977); David Caute, The Great Fear:

Anti-Communist Purges Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York 1978), and Peter L.

Steinberg, The Great "Red Menace": United States Prosecution of American Commu-

nists, 1947-1952 (Westport, Conn., 1984). On the House Committee, see Walter

Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on

Un-American Activities (New York, 1964).

3. Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New

York, 1986).

4. In addition to Freeland, see Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, The Specter:

Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York, 1974);

Alan Harper, The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue,

1946-1952 (Westport, Conn., 1969); and Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S.

Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (Chicago, 1971). Exceptions include Earl

Lathan, The Communist Conspiracy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy

(Cambridge, 1960); Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raub, The Politics of Unreason:

Right-wing Extremism in American, 1790-1970 (New York, 1970); and Ellen W.

Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York, 1986).

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                   7

At the same time, however, a smaller group of historians have

discussed the charges of communism made by various Republicans

against the Democrats during Roosevelt's bid for a fourth term in 1944.

Since a good general study of the 1944 election remains to be written,

however, references to anti-communist rhetoric in the campaign appear

as sections of more general works on the period or in article-length

treatments of the election. James MacGregor Burns claims that as the

election drew close, Dewey sought to narrow FDR's slim lead and

"gravitated more and more toward communism as the issue."⁵ Anoth-

er writer argues that the "Republicans went all out to capitalize on the

leftist issue," but that their efforts merely "made many responsible

Republicans and Independents more sympathetic to Roosevelt," while

Richard Polenberg concludes that "in 1944, at a time when Soviet-

American relations were their most cordial, communism was a highly

charged political issue."6

John Jeffries, in his study of wartime politics and society in

Connecticut, demonstrates that anti-communist rhetoric was wide-

spread in that state. After commenting on the use of the issue in

Connecticut during the campaign, Jeffries maintains that "The com-

munist issue figured prominently in the Republicans' state and national

campaigns,"⁷ and that the issue worried Democrats. Jeffries, however,

like the other writers, fails to chart the development of the issue or to

explain fully how anti-communist rhetoric was linked to other issues of

concern to the Republican party. A closer look at how national and

state politics converged in the anti-communism of heavily Republican

Cincinnati provides some insight into how anti-communism grew and

developed in one locality.

I

The Republicans faced the prospect of the 1944 election with some

amount of hope. Congressional elections in 1942 saw the party perform

impressively all over the country. Republicans gained forty-four seats

in the House and picked up nine in the Senate. Bolstered by these

5. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York, 1970).

528.

6. Leon Friedman, "The Election of 1944," in History of American Presidential

Elections 1789-1968, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Fred Israel eds. (New York, 1971)

3017, 3035; Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945

(Philadelphia, 1972).

7. John W. Jeffries, Testing the Roosevelt Coalition: Connecticut Society and

Politics in the Era of World War II (Knoxville, 1979), 187.

8                                                 OHIO HISTORY

gains, Republicans united with conservative Democrats in both houses

to oppose the administration. This conservative coalition ended certain

New Deal programs, such as the National Youth Administration, the

National Resources Planning Board, and the president's power to

devaluate the currency. The opponents of the President also cut the

budget of the Farm Security Administration and passed the anti-labor

Smith-Connally Act.⁸ Having been out of the White House since 1933,

the Republicans were eager to win in 1944, and somewhat hopeful. All

that remained was to pick a candidate and a strategy.

A major problem, however, threatened to undermine Republican

hopes. The party was split into rival factions due to differences over

both foreign policy and attitudes toward the New Deal. One group was

internationalist in outlook, usually more liberal, and centered largely in

the East. This group had supported Wendell Willkie for the nomination

in 1940 and generally shared his less hostile view of some of the New

Deal. On the other hand, the Old Guard of the party was isolationist,

very conservative, and strongest in the midwest. This part of the party

was exemplified by one of its leaders, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.

He passionately opposed the New Deal in the Senate and, before Pearl

Harbor, had been a supporter of America First.⁹ Another faction of the

party centered around Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York.

Dewey's supporters generally were more liberal on domestic issues

than the party's Old Guard, but balked at Willkie's extreme interna-

tionalism and the fact that his political base consisted largely of

"independents" whose main loyalty was not to the party itself but

to Willkie.

On this last point Dewey's followers and the Old Guard could agree.

Senator Taft disliked Willkie and distrusted the internationalists in the

party. He had lost to Willkie in his bid for the nomination in 1940, and

some hard feelings remained. A staunch party man himself, Taft felt

that Willkie was not really interested in helping the party win, and he

resented the way that party regulars had been treated by Willkie

supporters. He complained in 1942 that many Willkie people had no

"standing in the Republican Party"¹⁰ and that Willkie had supported a

8. James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston,

1972), 259-60; Richard E. Darilek, A Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Republican

Party and the Politics of Foreign Policy From Pearl Harbor to Yalta (Westport, Conn.,

1976), 53. Polenberg, 193.

9. Patterson, 242. See also Friedman, 3017-22, and Eugene H. Roseboom and Alfred

E. Eckes, Jr., A History of Presidential Elections: From George Washington to Jimmy

Carter, 4th ed. (New York, 1979), 192-93.

10. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft, April 27, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, Cincinnati

Historical Society (CHS), (one folder).

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                 9

"purge movement" against certain Republican congressmen who

supported the Old Guard.11 Taft wanted to prevent the nomination of

Willkie or some other internationalist in 1944. He chose not to pursue

the nomination himself, however, possibly because he felt that FDR

could not be beaten while the nation was at war. Instead, he decided to

support Ohio's Governor John W. Bricker. Although he had some

doubts about Bricker, Taft told like-minded Republicans that the

governor could win. But, perhaps more importantly to Taft, Bricker

was clearly the candidate of the party's conservatives.¹²

Taft also had definite ideas about how the campaign of 1944 should

be conducted. He realized that it would be difficult to challenge FDR

in the middle of a popular war. Taft claimed that the party could not

win merely by being "more warlike than Roosevelt."¹³ Always the

skillful politician, Taft also wanted to avoid widening the divisions

within the party by making the direction of postwar foreign policy too

large an issue. Finally, his basic conservatism led Taft to try to

suppress the more liberal elements of the party and wage a strong

fight against the New Deal and the administration's wartime domes-

tic policies.¹⁴ It was this emphasis on domestic issues that would

lead Taft, and some of his followers in Ohio, towards the issue of

communism.

For the Republicans, work on the upcoming election began in

earnest in the late summer of 1943. A meeting of the Republican

Postwar Advisory Council, which both Taft and Bricker would attend,

was scheduled for September in Mackinac, Michigan; Taft hoped to get

the council to take a strong stand on domestic policy and downplay

differences on foreign policy. On September 7, 1943, the council

adopted the Mackinac Declarations. The foreign policy document

reflected a desire to avoid further splitting the party while challenging

FDR during the war. It was short and general, expressing a cautious

internationalism while avoiding any real specifics.¹⁵

The domestic policy declaration, on the other hand, attacked the

administration, using rhetoric that played on wartime fears of fascism

while also stressing threats from the left. It condemned excessive

spending and regulation, claiming that these policies were severely

hurting small businessmen and farmers. The declaration criticized

11. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft, December 18, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, CHS.

12. Patterson, 268-72.

13. Robert A.Taft to Hulbert Taft, April 27, 1942. Robert Taft Papers, CHS.

14. Patterson, 268-84. For a detailed analysis of foreign policy and the Republicans,

see Richard E. Darilek, A Loyal Opposition in Time of War.

15. Mackinac Foreign Policy Declaration (Republican National Committee, 1943).

In John B. Hollister Papers, CHS, Box 38, Folder #1.

10                                               OHIO HISTORY

growing centralization and argued that government should respect "the

independence of Congress and the courts." New Deal policies were

seen as "instruments of Fascism" that would "socialize all business,

agriculture, and the professions." Republican rhetoric also focused on

labor. While warning that labor was being reduced to "a class

conscious, vote shackled, proletariat," the council maintained that the

"destiny of American labor is not Fascist."¹⁶ Interestingly, there was

no specific mention of "communism" in these 1943 documents.

The Mackinac Declarations pleased Taft. He supported the sharp

attack on domestic economic policy and the lack of specifics on foreign

policy. The Ohio senator also wanted these documents to be the basis

for the party platform when the convention rolled around. In January

1944 he got the declarations approved by a resolution at a meeting of

the Republican National Committee, saying that this would "head off

all other resolutions on questions of policy, or at least lay the basis for

referring them to the Republican Postwar Advisory Council for con-

sideration and report."¹⁷

II

For Taft's home city of Cincinnati the election of 1944 promised to

attract a great deal of interest. The city's two incumbent congressmen,

Charles Elston of the first district and William Hess of the second, both

Republicans, had held their seats since 1938. The Republican governor

of Ohio, John Bricker of Columbus, who had carried Cincinnati by a

margin of two to one in 1942, would run for the Republican presidential

nomination, eventually winning the second spot on the ticket.

Bricker's frequent speeches, conservatism, and popularity in the

state increased his coverage in the Cincinnati newspapers. Finally, the

mayor of the city, James G. Stewart, another Republican, sought the

governorship in what promised to be a tough fight. For the strongly

conservative Republicans of Cincinnati much was at stake during 1944.

The Party had, however, some reason to feel good about its position

in the city. Cincinnati had long been the scene of a powerful Republican

organization of which the Taft family was no small part. Despite some

local defections to the progressive Charter Party,¹⁸ the city remained

16. Mackinac Domestic Policy Declaration (Republican National Committee, 1943).

In John B. Hollister Papers, CHS, Box 38, Folder #1.

17. Robert A. Taft to John B. Hollister, January 7, 1944. Hollister papers, CHS,

Box 38, Folder #1.

18. For the origins of Charter, see Ralph A. Straetz, PR Politics in Cincinnati:

Thirty-Two Years of City Government Through Proportional Representation (New York,

12                                                       OHIO HISTORY

the evils of excessive "planning" and government economic interfer-

ence. The Enquirer even had its own regular feature called "This New

Deal," attributed to "Veritas," which regularly attacked, in sarcastic

fashion, the administration's economic policies. Likewise, Times Star

editorials consistently criticized FDR and his economic program.21 The

Cincinnati press, like the rest of the nation' papers, reported regularly

on any changes involving wartime economic regulation, and ration

tables were a daily feature in the Enquirer. Clearly the readers of the

papers were made aware of the wartime relationship between the

federal government and economic life.

There were also certain elements present in Cincinnati which would

contribute to the rise of anti-communist rhetoric. Hysterical anti-

radical or anti-leftist rhetoric had existed long before 1944 in a number

of areas, and Cincinnati had had its share of intolerant episodes. During

the First World War a mob kidnapped and whipped Herbert Bigelow,

a prominent Socialist minister.²² In 1919 area veterans joined a crowd

that attacked the local headquarters of the Socialist party, creating a

controversy that lasted well into the summer of 1920.23

A similar atmosphere pervaded municipal politics. Although only

two Communists ran for city council from 1925 to 1944, and each

received fewer than 500 votes, most council elections brought charges

of some kind of radicalism, usually communism. In 1929, for example,

some warned of "communists, the fascists, the bolsheviks, the social-

ists, the anarchists and various other groups spreading the doctrine that

political parties are a necessary evil."²⁴ Clearly, even in good times

some Cincinnatians expressed fear of a largely nonexistent radicalism.

21. For example of columnists, see Enquirer, Oct. 1, 1944, and Post, Oct. 4. For local

anti-New Deal editorials, see, for example, Enquirer, Oct. 1, 1944. Veritas, for example,

on Oct. 6, 1944, after attacking Federal spending, declared: "It is now perfectly plain to

the thoughtful citizen that control of the individual follows federal handouts as surely as

night follows day." Veritas appeared nearly every day (29 times in Oct. 1944). See also

the Times Star, June 28 and Oct. 10, 1944.

22. Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United

States (New York, 1979), 164-65. See also Daniel R. Beaver, Herbert Seely Bigelow, a

Buckeye Crusader (Cincinnati, 1957), 41-44, and Herbert Shapiro, "The Herbert

Bigelow Case: A Test of Free Speech in Wartime," Ohio History, 81 (Spring, 1972).

23. Cincinnati Enquirer, November 20, 1919. See also Nov. 26, and Dec. 11. Also

Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November 19, 1919.

24. Quoted in Straetz, 201-02. A number of communists did run for Congress in Ohio

during the period 1930-44 but generally did poorly. For example, in the 1934 race for two

at large seats one Communist got 13,942 votes. Each of the winners in the race got over

one million. In addition, from 1928-1944, Communists regularly ran for governor and

secretary of state. Their best finishes were in 1934 when they got 15,854 votes for

Governor and 14,395 for Secretary of State out of a total vote of just over two million.

Sources: Guide to U.S. Elections, 778-79, and Ohio Election Statistics: The General

Election 1944, 13-14.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                     13

In addition, those who sought the repeal of proportional represen-

tation (PR) in the city, established in the 1912 charter as part of

progressive reform, argued that the system made it possible for a small

radical group to gain control of the nine-member city council. During a

1936 repeal campaign supporters of the system were accused of

working with communists. Old Guard Republicans smeared defenders

of PR as the "Charter-Bigelow-Communist party." Another repeal

election in 1939 brought complaints about "the support which the

Communists and every radical group without exception are giving to

PR as a means of boring into the democratic structure which we have

in this country." The generally conservative assumption that certain

political arrangements were suspect led one councilman to attack PR as

"the most un-American and unpatriotic system ever inflicted on the

American people."²⁵ Cincinnati's experience with anti-radical political

rhetoric would make the city fertile ground for negative campaigning

on the issue of communism in 1944.

III

In the winter of 1944 Old Guard Republicans increasingly began to

attack both Roosevelt's domestic policies and his political allies. An

early target was the Congress of Industrial Organization's (CIO)

Political Action Committee (PAC), created in July 1943. Chaired by

Sidney Hillman, the strongly anti-communist leader of the Amalgam-

ated Clothing Workers, CIO-PAC was intended to carry out "a broad

and intensive program of education for the purpose of mobilizing the

five million members of CIO ... for effective labor action on the

political front."²⁶ CIO-PAC supported the administration and a fourth

term for FDR. It organized a massive campaign to get out the vote for

the Democratic ticket in 1944, raised and spent more than half a million

dollars on "political education," and mobilized tens of thousands of

campaign workers.²⁷

25. All quotes in Straetz, 202-03.

26. Speech by Phillip Murray to the Sixth Constitutional Convention of the CIO,

November 1-5, 1943. Reprinted in Joseph Gaer, The First Round: The Story of the CIO

Political Action Committee (New York, 1944), 60; see also 49-53; William Leuchtenburg,

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 188-90; Max M.

Kampelman, The Communist Party Vs. The CIO (New York, 1957), 22-23, and

Friedman, 3033-34. The Republicans also tried to make an issue of the alleged statement

of FDR: "Clear it with Sidney," reportedly made in reference to the choice of a VP

candidate. See Burns, 524.

27. Friedman, 3026-34. Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: The CIO in

World War II (New York, 1982), 171-77. Matthew Josephson, Sidney Hillman: States-

14                                            OHIO HISTORY

Taft linked the CIO-PAC with communism in the intensely partisan

debate over the issue of a Federal absentee ballot for members of the

armed forces. Many Republicans feared that making it easier for

servicemen to vote would result in more votes for FDR, the commander-

in-chief. Thus they generally favored retaining the current system of

state absentee ballots, which sometimes were difficult, if not impossi-

ble, for those serving overseas to use. The administration, supported

by the CIO, among others, strongly favored the adoption of the new

ballot.

On January 26, during Senate debate on the federal ballot, Taft

attacked the motives of the CIO. He complained that soldier voting

was not a labor issue and that the true concern of the CIO was a fourth

term for Roosevelt. Taft further charged that the CIO was out to purge

Congress, using their "usual propaganda-smear style." Finally the

Ohio Senator argued that "the Daily Worker and the Communist group

are conducting this same kind of propaganda that is being conducted by

the CIO."²⁸

The next day Taft returned to the attack. He cited articles from the

Daily Worker, the Southern Patriot, and a survey by American Youth

for Democracy as examples of "Communist Party" propaganda sup-

porting the administration's position. Taft also claimed that the man

who ran the Southern Patriot, James A. Dombrowski, was a "Com-

munist" who had asked FDR in a letter to "defend the rights of the

Communist Party in the United States." He concluded by repeating his

charge that "the propaganda which has been conducted by the CIO is

also being conducted today by the Communist Party."29 Thus, early in

1944, Taft attempted to discredit the CIO and Roosevelt by linking their

position on the federal ballot bill with that of the Communists.

Taft also continued, throughout the winter and spring of 1944, to

attack Roosevelt's economic policies. He often warned of fascism, and

at times simply attacked centralization, but he increasingly included

references to the threat of leftist totalitarianism. During remarks before

the Boston City Club the Senator proclaimed that continued high

spending and debt would lead to a "socialization of industry in the

United States." He further argued that "a totalitarian state" would

result if the power of state and local government was not restored. Taft

warned that the administration's friendliness towards big business was

no comfort. He claimed that:

man of American Labor (New York, 1952), 587-635.

28. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 1, p. 716-18.

29. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 1, p. 782.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                   15

the easiest road to socialism is through the formation of large business units

which can be easily taken over by the Government. The Communist, the

Socialist, even the New Dealer, has shown at times a strange friendliness to the

biggest units of big business.³⁰

On February 29, Taft expressed his hope that debate over domestic

policy would not be overshadowed by foreign affairs. Speaking to the

American Retail Federation he argued for an end to bureaucratic

controls and said that "we should not permit ourselves to be so

distracted by the war ... that we let the planners concoct for us

post-war arrangements at home likely to destroy the very freedom for

which we fight."³¹ In March, Taft warned that FDR's potential

sixteen-year term and growing executive power were a threat. He

claimed that "nothing is so characteristic of a Totalitarian state today

as the uniting of the legislative and executive functions in one man."³²

Taft clearly kept his options open in the winter and spring, attacking

the administration and its supporters as Communist, Socialist, Fascist,

or simply totalitarian as he felt the occasion warranted. This would

change, however, as the election drew nearer.

The Senator also denounced as communist leaning some of those

who worked to improve the conditions facing American blacks. Taft

complained of "the left wing and Communist newspapers ... whose

stirring up of those who have suffered from intolerant attacks is doing

minority groups more harm than good."³³ In May, Taft was quoted in

an interview in the Baltimore Afro-American as saying the NAACP had

"sold out to the New Deal" and was a "Communist" organization.³⁴

This kind of accusation, smearing liberal activism as communist, would

become all too familiar in the postwar scare.

Ohio's Governor Bricker, hot on the trail of the Republican nomi-

nation, had to be more careful than Taft. Party conservatives believed

that the war was being used by "radical socialists in the government to

impose a totalitarian collectivism on the United States."³⁵ And some

conservatives agreed with one Bricker correspondent that the governor

was the "logical Candidate" to deliver the country from the "Com-

munistic Administration."³⁶ But Bricker, trying not to alienate party

30. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 8, p. A335.

31. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 8, p. A 1180.

32. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 8, p. A1258.

33. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, part 8, p. A1384-85.

34. Baltimore Afro-American, May 6, 1944. Also Cincinnati Sun (CIO weekly), May

19, 1944.

35. Stanley F. Morse to John W. Bricker March 21, 1942, and attached papers.

Bricker Papers, Mss 340, Box 70, Political File. Ohio Historical Society.

36. William Albrect to John W. Bricker November 10, 1943, Bricker Papers, Mss 340,

16                                              OHIO HISTORY

liberals, was a little more restrained than Taft on economic issues. In

a May 31 Pennsylvania speech Bricker complained that the New Deal

was destroying free enterprise and that unless the trend was reversed

the country would "be delivered into the hands of the very type of

totalitarianism we defeated in the war."³⁷ On June 9, he warned that

the people must prevent the "socialization of business, of labor and of

the professions" by voting Republican.³⁸ This relatively mild rhetoric

would soon be replaced by specific charges of links between FDR

supporters and communism.

IV

June brought an escalation in anti-communism, as some Republicans

and their supporters continued to try to connect communism with the

CIO and the Democratic party. Events of the recent past became the

material for this conspiracy theory. Certain CIO unions had employed

communists as organizers throughout the 1930s, and by 1944 some

unions had strong pro-communist sympathies.³⁹ In addition, Republi-

can charges were triggered in part by the events of May, 1944, when the

Communist leader, Earl Browder, dissolved the American Communist

Party and replaced it with the Communist Political Association, which

promptly came out in favor of a fourth term for FDR.⁴⁰ Republicans,

aided by anti-New Deal elements of the press, harked back to

Roosevelt's 1942 pardon of Browder, who had been convicted of

passport fraud in his travels to the Soviet Union, as proof of a

conspiracy.

On June 17, an article entitled "Communist Groups Listed As

Endorsing Democrats Over Own Party Leaders" appeared in the

Enquirer. This nationally syndicated column by Frank Kent claimed,

falsely, that communists had supported the New Deal since its incep-

tion. It also maintained that:

the plain purpose of the Communists today, working through the Congress of

Industrial Organization which they thoroughly permeate ... is to "infiltrate"

the Democratic party and strengthen themselves in the next Roosevelt

administration.

Box 21, Folder A-Am.

37. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 1, 1944.

38. Cincinnati Enquirer, June 10, 1944.

39. Leuchtenburg, 281-83.

40. Caute, The Great Fear, 186.

18                                              OHIO HISTORY

New Deal concept that a single group can benefit while the general

economy suffers."⁴²

Convention oratory further increased the level of anti-communism.

Convention Chairman Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, com-

plained that recently the nation had "seen the head of the Communist

political party in this country, Earl Browder, merge his party with

Sidney Hillman's CIO Political Action Committee." The goal of this

alliance, according to Martin, was a fourth term and a Congress

"subservient to the will of those organizations." Herbert Hoover,

during a speech with the theme "freedom," complained that "the

Communists and fellow travelers are spending vast sums to reelect this

regime." But it was Cincinnati's Mayor, James Stewart, who offered to

the convention a formula that would become a standard for Republi-

cans. In seconding the nomination of Bricker for vice-president,

Stewart declared that the election of the ticket would end "the

administration of Sidney Hillman, Earl Browder and Franklin D.

Roosevelt."⁴³ Republicans would repeat variations on this theme

throughout the campaign, as if merely saying the names together would

evoke in the voter's mind the image of a dark conspiracy. This charge

was often bolstered by bringing up FDR's alleged statement "clear it

with Sidney," reportedly made in reference to the choice of Harry S.

Truman as his running mate.⁴⁴

Taft kept up the pressure in September. In a speech before the Ohio

Republican State Convention, he forcefully linked charges of Commu-

nist domination of the CIO with the administration. He claimed that

"the violent support given to President Roosevelt by Sidney Hillman

and Earl Browder" showed the direction of future FDR policy. Taft

complained that Hillman would "predominate in the decision of all

business and economic policy" if the president won. He went on to

attack centralization at the expense of local government, economic

control by executive agencies, and "the belief that we can spend

ourselves into prosperity." Taft christened these the "Hillman-Browder

policy which threatens the freedom of our people."⁴⁵ Bricker, in a late

September speech in Baltimore, hammered at the same theme when he

declared that there was "no middle ground between the free republic

and Communism."46

42. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Republican National Convention (Washington,

D.C., 1944), 138-41.

43. Ibid, 119, 159, 215.

44. Burns, 524.

45. Congressional Record, Vol. 90, Part II, p. A4162-63.

46. Clipping, Baltimore Sun, Bricker Papers, Box 26, Folder A"44".

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                  19

V

During the last five weeks of the campaign Cincinnatians who read

the Enquirer and the Post were exposed to a great deal of anti-

communist rhetoric. From October 1st until the election, an item

dealing with some aspect of the communist issue appeared nearly every

day in the Enquirer. The Post employed similar coverage. During the

period Oct. 1-Nov. 7 more than 100 items dealing with communism and

the election appeared in the two papers. The Times Star ran more than

50 items in the same period, although its stories were generally shorter

and displayed less prominently.⁴⁷ While the newspaper items varied

widely in specifics and length, the majority dealt with the charge that

the communists, working through the CIO, dominated the Democratic

party.

One source of these stories was coverage of Bricker's national

campaign speeches. He spoke frequently, and often his remarks

contained anti-communist rhetoric. In Milwaukee, on October 6,

responding to Roosevelt's specific repudiation of communist support,

Bricker argued that, "the New Deal's tie-in with communists and the

domination by Sidney Hillman and the P.A.C. is too well documented

in public and official records for anyone to deny it." Although Bricker

did not specify what evidence there was, he went on to assert that this

"Communistic domination" of the New Deal began in 1933.48 He

continued his attack in a speech in Tacoma, where he declared that

"the Communists and the radicals of the Hillman-Browder crowd

have taken over the New Deal,"⁴⁹ and one in Dallas on October 25 in

which he declared that FDR was a " 'front' of the Hillman-Browder

communists." 50

Likewise, Thomas E. Dewey's late campaign flights of anti-

communist rhetoric received extensive coverage in Cincinnati's pro-

Republican press. During a speech in Boston he charged that FDR had

sold his party to the "highest bidder" which was "the Political Action

Committee of Sidney Hillman and the Communists of Earl Browder."⁵¹

The next day in Baltimore he charged that the Democratic party had

47. For example, one of the few stories to make the front page headlines besides the

war during 1944 in the Enquirer was its Oct. 7 coverage of FDR's repudiation of

communist support. The Times Star devoted an editorial comment to it on page six but

news coverage was buried on page 36. (Oct. 6).

48. Cincinnati Post, Oct. 6, 1944.

49. Enquirer, Oct. 12, 1944.

50. Enquirer, Oct. 26, 1944. For other Bricker speeches, see Oct. 5, 15, 19, 29.

51. Enquirer, Nov. 2, 1944.

20                                               OHIO HISTORY

been captured by "subversive forces including New Dealers, members

of the Political Action Committee and Communists."⁵²

Some of Cincinnati's Republicans also continued to use the commu-

nist issue. Leading the way was Senator Robert Taft, who took his

anti-communism to the airwaves. During a radio address on October

sixteenth, Taft charged that "Communists control the CIO Political

Action Committee" and that if the president were reelected they would

"control his policy."⁵³ In another radio talk he charged that Hillman

and Browder supported FDR because they knew that "New Deal

policies will lead to a collapse of the private enterprise system"; and,

he concluded, Roosevelt had been nominated by "the Communists."⁵⁴

Taft's wife Martha also got into the act, declaring before a meeting of

Republican women in Columbus that the Democratic National conven-

tion had been "communist ridden."55

Cincinnati's mayor, James G. Stewart, adapted the now familiar

smears to his gubernatorial contest with the popular mayor of

Cleveland, Frank Lausche, a conservative Democrat. Stewart added a

new name to the Republican litany of villains when he asked state

voters not to allow their government to become a "plaything of the

Roosevelt-Hillman-Browder-Lausche machine." Lausche was, ac-

cording to Stewart, "a mere cog" in this vast machine. Even during a

speech in Cleveland, Stewart smeared Mayor Lausche as the candidate

of "Sidney Hillman, Earl Browder, [and] President Roosevelt.^"56

Similarly, on October 6 he asked voters to "save the national govern-

ment from the clutches of Sidney Hillman and Earl Browder." During

a speech before a hometown crowd he declared that the election

represented a clash between two political philosophies: "that of

Jefferson and Hamilton against that of Sidney Hillman and Earl

Browder." Two days before the election Stewart warned in a radio

address that key positions in Washington were filled "with New

Dealers, Socialists, Communists and all their kind."⁵⁷

Cincinnati Congressman William Hess, usually restrained in his

rhetoric, drew upon the long-standing American tradition of linking

52. Enquirer, Nov. 3, 1944. For more Dewey, see Nov. 5, Oct. 7, Oct. 26, and Oct.

21.

53. Enquirer, Oct. 17, 1944.

54. Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1944.

55. Enquirer, Oct. 7, 1944.

56. Enquirer, Oct. 13, 1944; second quote Oct. 17. Ironically, at the same time

Bricker was trying to link Lausche with the Communists, he also tried to make an issue

of Lausche's connection with anti-New Deal former Governor Martin L. Davey.

57. Enquirer, Oct. 31, 1944; second quote Nov. 5.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                   21

radical beliefs to ethnic origins. In late October he claimed that the

President was merely a "puppet of a seeker of power," Sidney

Hillman. Hess charged that Hillman "had studied the Bolshevik

methods of seizing power." This was because, according to Hess,

Hillman

came from Russia where they play politics for blood and have only profound

contempt for the effete Anglo-Saxon tradition of debating political questions

with words instead of weapons.⁵⁸

These politicians avoided linking the communist issue to the Soviets

or to American foreign policy. The Republicans hoped to avoid

highlighting differences within the party over the direction of postwar

foreign policy, although there was some discussion of foreign affairs

during the campaign.⁵⁹ Taft distrusted both the internationalism of

FDR and Stalin's motives,⁶⁰ but, as he noted privately, felt that

criticizing the President's foreign policy would not bring political

success.⁶¹ He maintained publically that "the parties are in substantial

accord on foreign policy" and that FDR was ducking the "real issue"

of the New Deal.⁶² Dewey was even more explicit. In a speech in

Boston on November 1, after accusing FDR of selling out his party to

"Communists," he went on to declare "In Russia a Communist is a

man who supports his government" and insisted that "the question of

Communism in our country has nothing to do with our allies."⁶³

Mayor Stewart was also willing to do his part to promote wartime

unity with the Soviets. His domestic anti-communism had not prevent-

ed him from declaring June 22 as "Russia Day" in Cincinnati. The

action honored "the magnificent services that Russia has rendered in

her valiant war." Stewart expressed hope that "our common efforts

may soon bring ... a lasting peace and brotherhood for mankind."⁶⁴

Likewise, the newspapers generally portrayed Russia favorably in

stories about the war.⁶⁵ This fact did not, as we have seen, prevent the

Enquirer and Post from giving full coverage to the anti-communist

rhetoric associated with domestic politics.

58. Enquirer, Oct. 26, 1944.

59. Enquirer, Nov. 4, Oct. 2, 3, 9, 1944.

60. Congressional Record Vol. 90, Part 9, pp. A1586, A2293, and Enquirer, June 19,

1944.

61. Robert A. Taft to Hulbert Taft April 27, 1942, Robert Taft Papers CHS.

62. Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1944.

63. Enquirer, Nov. 2, 1944.

64. Enquirer, June 20, 1944.

65. See for example: Enquirer, Oct. 5, June 3, and Post, Oct. 10, 1944.

22                                              OHIO HISTORY

Not content, however, with merely reporting on domestic anti-

communism, the newspapers added their own editorial comments to

the crescendo of anti-communism. The Enquirer, for example, en-

dorsed Dewey on October 8 in a page-one editorial titled "President's

Aims Communistic Dewey Says." The paper went on to say that

Dewey's approach to the postwar economy "is not communistic, no

dreamy head in the clouds approach."⁶⁶ Its regular commentator,

Veritas, in a variant on Emile Coue, wrote: "Day by day in every way

Sidney Hillman and Earl Browder are tightening their grip on the New

Deal." The Times Star also mentioned communism in a number of

editorials and political cartoons, but its endorsement of Dewey did not

make sensational use of the issue.⁶⁷

Some Enquirer pieces managed to say what the politicians would

not. Veritas, for example, asserted that Stalin had made Browder his

"head propagandist in the United States" and claimed that the aim of

the Communist Party was to "destroy our constitutional form of

government and set up the Soviet system." He went on to say that

Hillman had joined with Browder in an "unholy alliance" and that the

PAC had "virtually taken over the fourth-term campaign."⁶⁸ Similarly,

conservative columnist Westbrook Pegler directly linked the commu-

nist issue to the Soviet Union. In a column on November 1, he

complained:

Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee represent the Communist

conspiracy in the United States ... both the Roosevelts have actively helped

union politicians of the CIO whose own colleagues . . . never bother to deny

that they are Communists, enemies of the United States and loyal only to

Russia.⁶⁹

The Cincinnati Post, using a series of special commentaries and its

own editorials, also tried to offer its readers the cutting edge of

anti-communism. The paper ran a six-part series on various aspects of

communist activities in the United States by Frederick Woltman, a

Scripps-Howard feature writer and anti-communist specialist. Editori-

als that accompanied, and recommended, this series warned of the

"seriousness of the American Communists' revolutionary intentions"⁷⁰

and argued that "communists in America ... want a Sovietized

America."⁷¹ Woltman himself expressed concern that Roosevelt was

66. Enquirer, Oct. 8, 1944.

67. Enquirer, Oct. 18, 1944, and Times Star, Nov. 6, Oct. 25, and Oct. 7, 1944.

68. Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1944.

69. Enquirer, Nov. 1, 1944.

70. Post, Oct. 17, 1944.

71. Post, Oct. 20, 1944.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                   23

going easy on Communists, claiming, falsely, that the president had

eliminated the "Communist desk" at the Office of Naval Intelligence.⁷²

The Post used ex-radicals to level charges of an international

conspiracy. An editorial proclaimed that guest columnist Max Eastman

"Knows the Communist Plan" and emphasized his travel in Russia.

Eastman stressed that "You can't back democracy and Communism"

and said there was

little reason why any man loyal to the American Republic should employ a

Communist, or an accomplice of Communists ... in any governmental

position, or in any position of power or influence anywhere in the land.⁷³

Another columnist heavily promoted by the Post, William H.

Chamberlin, in an article entitled "Red Peril," called the American

communists "A Foreign Fifth Column ... trying to swing a presiden-

tial election."⁷⁴ These types of charges, along with anti-communist

cartoons, gave lie to the paper's promise to try to cover the communist

issue "without screech or hysteria." The Times Star, alone of the three

major newspapers, generally failed to link communism at home to

foreign policy or the Soviets.⁷⁵

VI

Whether or not anti-communist rhetoric involved foreign policy, the

charges of communism were used, almost exclusively, by Republicans

and their sympathizers against the Democrats and their allies. The

response by the Democrats, the CIO, and their supporters is instruc-

tive. With the major Cincinnati newspapers all supporting the Repub-

licans, what can properly be called the Democratic response is a bit

more elusive. There was a response, however, and it displayed certain

patterns that would emerge even stronger in the postwar years.

In some ways the response of local Democrats and their allies

followed the tone set by FDR. The president tried to maintain that

communism simply was not a legitimate issue. He denounced the

attacks of Republicans as simply partisan politics, and late in the

campaign claimed Dewey was "talking out of both sides of his mouth"

72. Post, Oct. 23, 1944. In reality the Office of Naval Intelligence expanded its efforts

against communists and other "threats" to domestic security at this time. See Jeffrey M.

Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945 (Annapolis,

1983) pp. 71-85, 113-24, and 222-27.

73. Post, Oct. 25, 1944.

74. Post, Oct. 24, 1944.

75. Ibid. For a cartoon see Post, Oct. 25, 1944, and Times Star for Oct. 1944.

24                                               OHIO HISTORY

by charges of both communism and monarchy.⁷⁶ Likewise, a June 2

editorial in the local Catholic weekly, the Telegraph-Register, com-

plained that Republicans always organized to raise money, and went on

to dismiss charges of communism leveled at the CIO by saying that

"we cannot but observe that the [Republican] old guard 'doth protest

too much.' "77

The response of the Catholic paper reveals something about the

complexity of anti-communist politics, since back on February 18 the

same paper carried an editorial asserting that "The Communist influ-

ences in our own country are destructive of everything that is true and

generous and noble in Americanism."⁷⁸ In addition, throughout the

winter and spring the Telegraph-Register had published stories and

editorials dealing with communism, and was especially vocal about

Soviet expansionism and suppression of religious freedom.⁷⁹ Yet when

Republicans began linking the CIO's political efforts to communism,

the paper recognized, and rejected, these charges as a partisan effort to

divide Democratic support over the issue of communism.

The weekly paper published by the local CIO, the Sun, was more

direct in hitting back at Republican charges. It attacked Stewart's

charges as "mud-slinging"80 and claimed that the Republican National

Committee was a "smear mill.^{"81  The} Sun at one point endorsed the

view that Republican charges were merely "partisan animosity,"⁸² but

at other times compared the effort to "Nazi Propaganda"⁸³ and

claimed it was "the very trick Hitler used ... to distract ... the

German people from the Evils of his own regime."⁸⁴

The Sun slung some mud of its own, claiming that "Hitler-admiring

native Fascists are supporting Thomas E. Dewey.^"85 It even used a

variation of the Republican formula in talking about a "Gerald K.

Smith-Dewey-Bricker marriage."⁸⁶ Finally, on November 3, in the last

pre-election issue, the Sun ran a page-one headline story, complete

with photograph and reproduction of a letter, that attempted to link

Senator Taft with native fascist Edward J. Smythe, who was under

76. Friedman, 3093.

77. Cincinnati Telegraph-Register, June 2, 1944.

78. Cincinnati Telegraph-Register, February 18, 1944.

79. See Telegraph-Register, Feb. 25, March 31, and May 19, 1944.

80. Cincinnati Sun, July 7, 1944.

81. Sun, Sept. 8, 1944.

82. Sun, June 9, 1944.

83. Sun, Oct. 6, 1944.

84. Sun, Aug. 11, 1944.

85. Sun, Oct 6, 1944.

86. Sun, Aug. 18, 1944.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                     25

indictment for sedition.⁸⁷ Along the same line was a pamphlet pub-

lished by the Ohio CIO Council in the middle of Senator Taft's close

race for reelection which bore the bold title "HE WANTED TO DO

BUSINESS WITH HITLER AND HIROHITO. THE AMAZING

STORY OF SENATOR TAFT." The pamphlet played upon a state-

ment Taft had made in Congress in May of 1940. Taft said that, if peace

were restored, he did not see why "we could not trade as well with

Germany as with England."⁸⁸ These incidents show that the CIO could

dish out what it was getting. The Sun also answered charges against

Hillman⁸⁹ and defended the legitimate right of the CIO to participate in

politics.90

More importantly, the local CIO followed the lead of FDR by trying

to distance itself, and the Democratic party, from the communists.

Roosevelt had, in 1940, defended the right of Americans to advocate

"certain ideals of theoretical Communism,"⁹¹ but on October 6, 1944,

as we have seen, he repudiated communist support for his reelection.⁹²

Late in the campaign he declared, in response to Dewey's charges, that

"we want neither communism nor monarchy."⁹³

In a similar fashion the Sun claimed in an editorial that the American

people wanted "neither fascism nor communism." Therefore, accord-

ing to the Sun, it should not be "held against Franklin D. Roosevelt

that the communists have declared for him." The paper also main-

tained that communists always seek to "attach themselves to the

movement representing the working man" and argued that "Roosevelt

can hardly be expected to abandon his espousal of the common man

because it attracts communist support."⁹⁴ In another editorial the Sun

even attempted to place the communists closer to the critics of the

CIO. On October 20, it claimed that Republican isolationists "saw

eye-to-eye with the native brand of communists in those days after

87. Sun, Nov. 3, 1944. The letter from Taft to Smythe that was reproduced in the

paper was rather routine and clearly failed to support the kind of charges being made by

the Sun. The photograph, of a Klan meeting, also seemed irrelevant to the charges made

and only added to the sensational nature of the story.

88. Pamphlet, Ohio War History Commission Records. Mss 852, Box 11, Item 26,

CHS.

89. Sun, May 26, Oct. 6, Oct. 13, 1944.

90. See for example Sun, June 9, 30, July 21, 1944.

91. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.

Roosevelt (New York, 1941), 1940 Volume, 93.

92. Enquirer, Oct. 6, 1944, and Time, 43 (Oct. 16, 1944), 20.

93. Friedman, 3093. For FDR, see also Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner:

Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1952), 203-12.

94. Sun, Oct. 6, 1944 p. 4, col. 1.

26                                                       OHIO HISTORY

Roosevelt's quarantine speech in 1937." The Sun went on to dismiss

the current communist views as just political expediency.⁹⁵

In Cincinnati the local CIO newspaper clearly refused to defend the

right of communists to participate in politics; instead, it simply sought

to avoid guilt by association. There appears to have been no one in

Cincinnati in 1944 willing to defend publicly the right of communists to

support or vote for anyone they wanted to. This foreshadowed labor's

course in the postwar period when old alliances were forgotten in the

face of rising hysteria, and communists were purged by both the unions

and their enemies. The corner had been turned by 1944, as some

elements in the CIO abandoned their former communist allies as

anti-communism increased.

Tracing the development of anti-communism among the press and

politicians of Cincinnati suggests certain conclusions. First, commu-

nism was a prominent issue in the election of 1944, in both Cincinnati

and the country at large. It is also clear that in Cincinnati a specific

combination of political figures and local press coverage shaped the

final form that the issue took in that city. While the effect of

anti-communism on the outcome of the election cannot be known, it

seems important that Republicans used anti-communism despite, or

because of, the fact that the presidential race was seen as very close.⁹⁶

Also, specific charges involving communism were leveled by the

Republicans as a part of their regular strategy at a point when victory

seemed possible. This differs significantly in degree, if not in kind,

from the general murmurings about Roosevelt's alleged radicalism that

were popular in some circles during the 1930s when FDR's popularity

was at its height. In this sense the anti-communism of 1944 can be seen

as focusing a general feeling that existed below the surface of American

politics.

95. Sun, Oct. 20, 1944 p. 4, col. 1.

96. See Enquirer, Nov. 3, 1944. Taft won reelection by a mere 17,740 votes (50.3%,

1,500,809 to 1,483,069). He carried Hamilton County by 11,474 votes (149,226 to

137,752). The Dewey-Bricker ticket won the State by only 11,530 votes (1,582,293 to

1,570,763). The Republicans carried Hamilton county by 10,490 votes (51.8%, 154,960 to

144,470). In Cincinnati itself the Republican ticket got only 50.3% and won by 1145 votes

(104,512 to 103,367). These results for the national ticket do not differ significantly from

those in 1940, when, although they lost the state, the Republicans received 51% of the

Hamilton County vote and won by 5826 (154,733 to 148,907). The Republican ticket

tallied 50.1% of the Cincinnati vote and won by only 575 votes. Stewart lost in 1944 by

112,359 votes. He won Hamilton County with 57.8% of the vote, by 46,331. He captured

57.4% of the Cincinnati vote and won by 30,199. Sources: Robinson, They Voted ...,

139-40, and Ohio Election Statistics (Volume for 1940), 289-94, 1944 Volume, 14,

351-57.

McCarthyism Before McCarthy                                   27

As such, it shares similarities and differences with the postwar

hysteria. Unlike later anti-communism the outbreak in 1944 related

primarily to domestic issues. Republicans feared the CIO's newfound

political organization and disliked certain economic practices, such as

centralization, spending, and government intervention, which charac-

terized the New Deal and accelerated during the war. Therefore the

Republicans used these issues as lenses to focus the general feelings of

anti-communism, which were strongest among the party's conserva-

tive followers. The willingness of the Taft wing of the party to avoid

splitting the party by its recognition of the reality of the alliance with

Russia insured that anti-communism as practiced by politicians would

tend to avoid foreign policy. This is also why anti-communism was

often accompanied by anti-fascism. The Republicans were still uncer-

tain about which rhetorical stand would be more politically effective.

With the end of the war, anti-fascism disappeared as an effective

alternative.

In some ways, however, the anti-communism of 1944 contained

elements that were direct predecessors of the postwar scare. Some

newspapers, seeking readers, and not sharing the restraints of the

politicians, sought to exploit the communism issue in a sensational

fashion by linking it to foreign policy. This kind of anti-communism

seems to have been an attempt to pry loose certain ethnic and religious

groups from the Roosevelt coalition. Also, in 1944, just as during the

postwar period, the intensity of anti-communist rhetoric varied accord-

ing to which newspapers one read. Likewise, Taft's smearing of the

Civil Rights movement would become a regular feature of the postwar

scare. It is also clear that by 1944 some elements of the CIO were

beginning to abandon their communist components in the face of

rapidly intensifying anti-communist feelings. Here we see the begin-

nings of a trend that would further split the labor movement in the

postwar period,⁹⁷ and perhaps contribute to its decline since World

War II.

James Selcraig has argued that the emergence of local postwar scares

in midwestern cities like Cincinnati was the result of a "conservative

movement" that exploited local conditions for political purposes.⁹⁸

97. This in turn was part of a general movement, in the 1930s and early 1940s, of many

liberals toward an anti-Soviet stance. This produced, after the war, the so-called Cold

War liberals. See Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Patterson. "Red Fascism: The Merger

of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism,

1930's-1950's," American Historical Review, 75 (1970), 1046-64.

98. James Truett Selcraig, The Red Scare in the Midwest, 1945-1955: A State and

Local Study (Ann Arbor, 1982), 67.

28                                             OHIO HISTORY

The examination of anti-communism in 1944 in Cincinnati bears out the

existence of a group of conservative politicians who sought to exploit

local and national traditions of anti-communism that long predated the

Cold War. However, in 1944, these people were content to use

anti-communist rhetoric in connection with national and state politics.

The emergence, or in the case of Cincinnati the re-emergence, of

anti-communism connected with local issues would come later. This in

turn suggests that it might be more profitable to consider postwar

anti-communism as part of a larger anti-radical process that has been a

constant in modern American history and which resulted in the

destruction of a truly viable political left in the United States. Only

more studies of anti-communism in 1944, and anti-communist and

anti-radical movements in previous decades, will show if this is in fact

a valuable model to use, and if the situation in Cincinnati is in any way

representative of the country as a whole. In any event, it seems clear

that the historiographical tradition which speaks largely of a "postwar

red scare" and "McCarthyism" should be reexamined.