BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT
by JOHN SCHLEBECKER
Hiram College
One of the things with which the reader
of early American
history is most impressed is the
remarkable courage and wisdom
of the American soldier. The Europeans
it seems just did not
understand the ins and outs of forest
fighting. Only the American
seemed to know that effective fighting
on the frontier was by neces-
sity done from behind trees. History
books are full of pictures of
minute men shooting redcoats, but they
do not have many pictures
of minute men running away from
redcoats. History books do say
that Von Steuben came to America to
teach Patriot soldiers how
to fight like Europeans, but they do
not point out clearly enough
that fighting behind trees was in those
days a rather silly way to
fight. And this last fact, of course,
explains the first. Part of the
purpose of this paper is to show how
and why fighting from behind
trees was in the early days a poor way
to fight.
From this misconception of forest
fighting has come some
peculiar reports of forest battles, the
most peculiarly reported of
all being Braddock's defeat at the
Monongahela. In this paper the
story of that battle will be retold and
some sort of evaluation of it
will be made. The evaluation will not
be the customary one.
In order that the evaluation of the
battle have validity, there
will be a brief review of the arms,
soldiers, and tactics of the period.
The period to be considered is the last
half of the eighteenth cen-
tury; the date of the battle was July
9, 1755.
The chief weapon of the armies of this
time was the musket.
This weapon was inaccurate at any range
over one hundred yards
and even at that distance or less it
was so inaccurate that individual
firing was relatively harmless.1
Of the other weapons of the period only
two require mention
here. One was the familiar three-sided
bayonet, and the other was
the light field cannon used to fire
upon infantry formations in the
field.
1 Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943), 51.
171
172
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
The typical soldier of this period was
the professional who en-
listed for long terms and who fought as
a business.2 He was
chiefly interested in his pay; he fought
without political passion.
If his food supply was reduced or if
operations should prove to
be unduly strenuous his morale would
drop.3 Under these circum-
stances he would be inclined to desert.
So prevalent was desertion
that men were required to march in close
order when going and
returning from bathing. They could not
be trusted to forage for
food, to pursue an enemy, or even to
take cover in a fight because
in these activities they were liable to
get out of their officer's sight
and desert. Even camping near forests
was dangerous because of
the temptation it offered to deserters.4
The Indian also was a mercenary soldier,
with this difference:
his pay was chiefly in loot and so he
was inclined to stick around
the battlefield a little longer to see
what he could pick up.
Tribal warriors fought under their own
chiefs and generally
near their homes. If a clan or tribe
should be bored or should
think that the fight was not to their
advantage they would take a
rest. They were liable to do this any
time the idea occurred to
them.
Tribal warfare is different from
civilized warfare in that all
men of a tribe are related, and
therefore a casualty is a deep per-
sonal tragedy to all the men of that
tribe.5 Thus any considerable
number of casualties in a tribe may
cause that tribe to withdraw
sooner than a civilized platoon or
battalion would withdraw.
The range and accuracy of the musket
determined the tactics
used by Europeans. Since the musket was
inaccurate and had a
short range the men advanced into battle
shoulder to shoulder and
fire began at only a little over one
hundred yards. Each battalion
fired as a unit at the word of command.
The battalion was usually
three ranks deep and the fire from it
was terrible and deadly.6 The
ultimate object of the fight was to
close with the enemy on a
bayonet charge.7
2 Ibid., 50.
3 Ibid., 51.
4 Ibid., 55-57.
5 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Garden
City, 1938), 194.
6 Earle, op. cit., 51.
7 William Wood and Ralph H. Gabriel, The
Winning of Freedom (The Pageant
of America, VI, New Haven, 1927), 197.
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 173
It took time to draw the armies up into
battle line, and thus
if one side decided to leave while the
other was forming there
could be no real battle.8
The technique of destructive pursuit was
undeveloped at this
time.9
Firing was done by alternating platoons
or battalions. This
was done because the difficulty of
reloading and the nearness of the
troops made bayonet charges particularly
dangerous.10
When troops were marching through woods
the tactics of the
day required that they march in platoon
formation so that they
could be more easily maneuvered in case
of action. In case the
vanguard did meet the enemy the main
force was to be halted until
the commanding officer knew what was
happening. This because
once the troops were formed it was
difficult if not impossible to
rearrange the formation. In addition, a
commanding officer should
know something of the size and
disposition of the forces opposing
him before going into action.11
The tactics of the Indians and colonials
was a hit and run kind
of warfare. The Indians probably used it
because in tribal warfare
(aside from blood feuds) the object is
to sustain minor losses, kill
as much as necessary, and steal
everything that can be stolen.
Where loot rather than murder is the
primary object the tactics are
liable to be so constructed that
efficiency in killing is sacrificed for
safety in getting home with the bacon.
The colonials probably
used this type of warfare because they
were not numerous enough
to put massive armies in the field.12 Most historians hold that
massive armies would not have been
effective anyway. This argu-
ment causes one to wonder why the
colonials were always trying
to raise armies to fight the Indians if
armies were not the answer.
The first thing that Braddock tried to
do upon arrival in
America was to turn the colonial troops
into real soldiers. He had
them drilled in the European manner by
British officers and en-
forced an old regulation that colonial
officers were to have no rank
8 Earle, op. cit., 51.
9 Ibid., 52.
10 Wood and Gabriel, op. cit.,
196.
11 Stanley Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," American
Historical Review, XLI
(1936), 264.
12 Wood and Gabriel, op. cit., 17.
174
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
while regular officers were in the
field.13 These actions only made
the colonials bitter and caused a drop
in morale.
Soon after setting out the troops were
subjected to an epidemic
of fever and dysentery. This naturally
caused a considerable lower-
ing of morale which a lack of sufficient
food only made worse.
The line of march was over rough terrain
which added to the
woes of the British soldiers. These
became disheartened at their
hardships, while the colonials continued
to be soured by army dis-
cipline. The whole army was in a poor
psychological condition.
Engineers preceded the troops, clearing
a roadway twelve feet
wide while squads of men were sent out
in front and on all flanks
to guard against surprise. These squads, however, were not
numerous enough to offer effective
security. The entire length of
the line of march was about four miles.
In order to avoid dangerous defiles on
the route, Braddock
decided to ford Turtle Creek and then
ford the Monongahela a few
miles down. It was on the other side of
this last ford that 1,300
British regulars and colonials met the
French and Indians.
Contrecoeur, the commander of the French
at Fort Duquesne,
was in favor of retreat. However, one of
his captains, Beaujeu,
felt that if he could get the Indians to
come with him he might stop
the English. Three times he tried to
talk the Indians into accom-
panying him, and on the third try he was
successful. His total
force included 230 French and Canadians
(70 of whom were
French regulars), and 637 Indians, a
total of 867 men.14 Of this
force three men were French officers:
Beaujeu, Dumas, and
Ligneris.
The French plan of battle called for an
ambush at the ford
which Braddock was to cross, but at the
crucial moment the Indians
decided to leave. Beaujeu managed to
talk them into continuing
the expedition and had barely managed to
reassemble his men
when he met the advancing British.
Despite this recent disaffection
the morale of the French and Indians was
considerably higher
than that of the British.
Beaujeu, dressed as an Indian, came
walking jauntily over the
13 William M. Sloane, The French War and the Revolution
(New York, 1898),
42.
14.Ibid., 44.
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 175 |
|
176 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY |
|
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 177
brow of a hill. On the other side a
British engineering officer was
mapping the route. Both men were
somewhat startled.
Beaujeu turned and with his hat signaled
his forces which de-
ployed and opened fire. With the
admirable precision and cool
courage of European soldiery the British
advance column under
Gage wheeled into line and fired several
volleys in the general
direction of the enemy. The British
casualties up to this point were
insignificant. Gage's cannon opened fire
quickly and the Canadians
and Indians fell back in confusion while
the British infantry con-
tinued to fire. Beaujeu fell dead.
It was at this point that seventy French
regulars, fighting in
European style, won the battle. With the
courage born of despair
Dumas advanced with the French regulars
and returned a fire which
was sharp enough to halt and surprise
the British.15 It seems
probable that after all of the talk that
they had heard about Indian
ambushes that the last thing the British
had expected to meet was
effective European fighting. They stood
it for about fifteen minutes
and then broke and ran.16 Meanwhile
the Indians and Canadians,
taking heart at the stand of Dumas and
the regulars, were gradually
reassembling behind cover and opening
fire upon the British.17
As the vanguard of the British broke and
fled it ran into the
main body of troops under Braddock which
were advancing to the
front. At this time Braddock had no
clear idea of what was happen-
ing and the troops were in a state of
confusion because the officers,
including Braddock, were not exercising
proper control.18 The sud-
den influx of the advance guard only
increased the confusion. Com-
plicating this confusion was the fact
that the main body was
split in two sections on either side of
the wagon train. This reduced
the mobility of the troops and made it
more difficult for them to
form for action.19 In any
case, the troops under Braddock were
still in column of march rather than in
battle formation because
"the order to form line of battle
had either not been given or had
not been heard."20 This
last fact is particularly important. It means
that the main body of the British at the
time of the encounter was
15 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and
Wolfe (2 vols., Boston, 1899), I, 223.
16 Wood and Gabriel, op. cit.,
76.
17 Parkman, op. cit.,
224.
18 Pargellis, loc. cit., 260.
19 Ibid., 269.
20 Wood and Gabriel, op. cit.,
76.
178
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
unprepared to fight in any manner be it
European or American. Too
late they attempted to perform this
complicated maneuver on rough
terrain, but being in disorder
themselves and at the same time meet-
ing the advance guard they never
completed the formation. The con-
sequent panic resulted as much from the
muddling confusion as
from the enemy fire.21
Dumas, noting the position of the
British troops, seized the op-
portunity to send out flanking parties along
both sides of the
enemy column. Had the British been in
line of battle this maneuver
would probably have been impossible due
to the extension of the
flanks and the fire power of the
British. In any case, it would
not have been as effective, because the
British could have launched
bayonet charges from the line of battle.
As it was the British were
nearly defeated already.
Meanwhile the Virginians had dispersed
behind trees and were
wasting their powder on marksmen as
unseen as themselves.22 The
Virginians did not suffer many
casualties, neither did they inflict
many. The total French and Indian losses
were only forty officers
and men.
At this point of the battle the worst
fire was coming from a
hill on the right. This hill should have
been taken as soon as the
action began, or even before, but the
command to take it was
not given until after the army was
helplessly piled up.23 At that
time Braddock ordered Lt. Col. Burton to
take the hill. The colonel
managed to get about one hundred men to
follow him, but upon
being wounded himself his men retreated.
Failure to take the hill
sooner shows Braddock's incompetency;
failure to take the hill at
all shows the complete dependence of the
soldier of the day on his
officers.
For three hours the French and Indians
poured in fire while
the British held. They "formed in
oblique angle lines, twelve or
more deep, while those in the rear
remained in column formation."24
They were never able to form an
effective line of battle. At the
same time the Virginians counseled the
British to take cover, an
action which Braddock refused to permit.
The British made excellent
21
Pargellis, loc. cit., 263.
22 Justin Winsor, The Mississippi
Basin (Boston, 1895), 362.
23 Pargellis, loc. cit., 265.
24 Ibid., 261.
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 179
targets, and at the same time they had
long since ceased firing by
battalions. Their fire power was gone.
After three hours Braddock
ordered a retreat, and soon thereafter
he was mortally wounded. The
retreat turned into a rout, but the
French and Indians did not
pursue. The battle was over.
The British opportunity for victory came
with the advance
of the main body. With the terrific fire
power of the battalions
(and the fire was tremendously effective
and deadly),25 plus the
possible bayonet charges, the enemy
could hardly have held their
ground. Through stupidity or bad luck,
however, the British arrived
in column, and that was that.
Parkman holds that a bayonet charge
would have been futile
against such a lurking enemy who would
dodge from one tree to
another, but his reasoning hardly holds
up.26 Later during the Revo-
lutionary War the British found that the
only way to drive men
from cover was to charge them. The
Americans, on the other hand,
when charged upon soon discovered that
the only way to keep from
being killed in the rush was to stand
like Europeans and fire by
battalions.27 They had to
correct some of the foolish notions that
they had picked up from fighting
Indians, who after all did not
use bayonet charges.
It seems probable that Braddock's
greatest failure was not in
what he wanted to do but rather in what
he did not do. If he had
formed his troops properly he might have
done some effective
damage. His failure to form his troops
might be attributed to the
fact that the murderous fire of an
unseen enemy threw his troops
into confusion and prevented any useful
action. This is undoubtedly
part of the answer, but it is entirely
too pat an answer to be the
complete explanation. Added to the fire
of the enemy was the fact
that the British officers " 'messed
up' their formations and never
gave their soldiers a chance to
demonstrate that Old World methods,
properly applied, might have won the
day."28
Another error of Braddock was this: he
did not observe the rules
of tactics of his own day in the matter
of marching through forests.
Bland, the leading tactical writer of
the period, stated that when
25 Earle, op. cit., 51.
26 Parkman, op. cit., 225.
27 Wood and Gabriel, op. cit., 197.
28 Pargellis, loc. cit., 253.
180
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
marching through woods the army should
be divided into platoons
for easier maneuvering. Whatever
formation Braddock's troops
might have been in, it was not a
formation by platoons.29
When the action first started Braddock
should have halted the
main body until he knew what was going
on at the front. Instead
he went blindly forward.30
In conclusion it should be said that the
error of Braddock was
not that he did not use American tactics,
but rather that he did not
even use good European tactics.
In regard to this battle many historians
make several explicit
or implied contentions which deserve
some notice since they recur
in almost all accounts. Briefly stated
they are five in number and
include the following ideas or notions:
1. The red-coated British in a
huddled mass made excellent
targets. This is certainly true. They were like so many pool
balls
racked up in the middle of the table. A
shot in the general direction
of the mass was sure to hit something.
It is remarkable that in
consideration of this fact some have
attributed a great deal of
marksmanship to the French and Indians.
They may have been
marksmen, but this action is hardly
proof of it. The great losses
in British officers can be attributed
not to sniper activity but rather
to the fact that in those days officers
were accustomed to stand in
front of their troops in order to direct
their movements and fire.
Under these circumstances the officers
were most likely to be killed
by one side or the other.
2. The British volleys were generally
wasted. Actually, the
first volleys of the vanguard were not
wasted. In fact they dispersed
and terrorized the Indians and
Canadians. After the retreat of the
vanguard the British can hardly have
been said to have fired volleys
with any consistency. If the troops had
been properly formed and
had fired by platoons it is not at all
certain that the volleys
would have been wasted.
3. The British should have taken cover
and fired independ-
ently. Usually this is followed by an implied corollary which
is:
Had the British taken cover they
would surely have won the battle.
This brings up the subject of relative
and absolute standards. If a
29 Ibid., 264.
30 Ibid.
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 181
man should bet ten dollars on a losing
horse it might be said that
he would have been better off to have
bet only five dollars. This
is obviously true. Relatively speaking,
however, it would have been
better still if he had bet on the
winning horse. It is hard to say what
the absolute good in this case might be,
but it would probably be
best not to bet anything.
Now a battle is a gamble, so it is
useless to discuss whether or
not it is right to take a chance in war,
because one cannot help but
take a chance. However, there are
intelligent bets and unintelligent
bets, and Braddock made some
unintelligent bets. Relatively speak-
ing, it would have been much better if
he had followed the advice
of the colonials and allowed his men to
deploy. This does not
mean that he would have won the battle
thereby, but only that his
losses in life might have been smaller.
His army would probably
have disappeared in any case. There are
several reasons for this.
In the first place the British soldiers
were fighting for a living,
and after the first few minutes even the
most stupid soldier could
have seen that there were easier ways of
making money. Had Brad-
dock allowed his men to disperse they
would have done just that.
Some may claim that this is mere
speculation, but the history of the
times shows that it is well founded
speculation. From Frederick the
Great to Washington the armies of the
world were cursed with the
tendency of troops to leave the field
when things got rough. The
extreme penalties which Frederick placed
on desertion, and the
difficulties which he encountered toward
the end of his reign in
keeping an army together are examples in
point.31 Another ex-
ample might be the difficulties that the
Americans experienced in the
Revolutionary War in keeping an army in
the field. One of the
reasons for close order fighting of this
period was that in close
order the men could be watched and if
any one tried to desert he was
shot or run through on the spot. It
would have been foolish to expect
the army of Braddock to act any
differently from any other army of
31 Earle, op. cit., 55-57.
182
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
the time.32 Only the
Americans seemed to be too dense to realize
this.
In the second place, if the British had
deployed, the French and
Indians would have had no targets and
the same might be said for
the British. The net result would have
been another backwoods
skirmish with both sides retiring for a
while, and then an ultimate
attack by the British on Fort Duquesne.
All of this presupposes that
the British army would hold together, an
unlikely occurrence. In any
case, the British by frontier methods of
fighting could not hope for
a positive decision until they could
manage to force the enemy into
a battle in the open. The British
soldiers were not trained for fron-
tier fighting, neither were they armed
for it. It took many years of
training to make a good frontier
fighter, and even then the arms of
the period did not allow it to be very
effective fighting. A conclusive
decision could only have been reached by
the use of European
tactics.33
Another reason why Braddock was right in
not following
Virginian instructions was that he had a
superiority in numbers and
in discipline which he would be less
than wise not to use. As long as
he had any chance at all to use this
superiority he would be foolish
to dissipate it by dispersing his men.
From the foregoing statements it is
possible to see that although
deployment would have been better than
what was done, at least
in respect to loss of life, it was not a
good solution.
What then would have been a good
solution? Proper use of
European tactics, which tactics
culminated in the bayonet charge.
There was nothing in America which would
make the bayonet charge
ineffective. In fact, as has been
pointed out, it was the only way of
dislodging men who were hiding behind
trees. And as Revolutionary
experience showed, it was not only
effective in that respect, but it
usually meant defeat for the deployed
forces since at the beginning
of the charge most of the defenders
would be inclined to fire. This
32 There are several reasons why these
same factors did not affect the Virginians,
Canadians, or Indians in the same manner
that they would have affected the British:
(1) these soldiers were not mercenaries
in the same sense as were the British;
(2) in their cases a certain amount of patriotism was involved; (3) they
were used to
this type of fighting; fighting where
every man was a general; (4) they were not
suffering many casualties; (5) on the French side at
least they were winning. On
the other hand, the Indians and
Canadians did start to leave at the beginning of the
fight and there is no sure way of
determining how many if any of these fighters
(including the Virginians) did desert
during the battle.
33 Pargellis, loc. cit., 265.
BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT 183
would leave them with empty guns,
foolish expressions, and a pair
of legs for running.
4. The colonial militia were the
better fighters. They almost
saved the day. The Virginians disrupted the British discipline
further and managed to save their own
skins. There is no reason
to suppose that they did much else. They
did not hold off a charge
by the French and Indians, because these
forces could not effectively
charge from their extended positions,
and besides they were having
too much fun as it was. The colonials
may have covered the retreat
of the British, but this was no great
service since the French and
Indians did not pursue. After all, the
French, Canadians, and Indians
were no great exception to their times;
all of them fought for a
living as a rule. There was no reason
why they should pursue an
enemy when there was so much loot lying
about on the bodies of
the dead who were left behind. Besides,
the idea of pursuit was un-
developed at this time. If the
Virginians covered the retreat, all that
that means is that they were not quite
as fast as the British in leav-
ing the field.
These are the only claims to glory that
the Virginians have,
and it is just as well to leave it at
this.
5. The British were surprised.34 For that matter so were
the
French. During the first few volleys
both sides were surprised. The
French were surprised not only at
meeting the British but also at the
fierceness of the British fire. The
British were surprised on exactly
the same counts. A quotation from
Clausewitz will help explain why
with this double surprise the side with
the fewer forces won the
battle. As Clausewitz said: "If one
side through a general moral
superiority is able to intimidate and
outdo the other, then it will be
able to use the surprise with greater
success, and even achieve good
results where properly it should come to
ruin."35
That is just about the essence of the
matter; the French and
Indians had moral superiority and they
intimidated the British.
British and colonial monkeyshines made
things easier for them, but
the victory went to the side with the
greater confidence and the
34 "We are not now speaking of the
actual raid, which belongs to the chapter on
attack, but of the endeavor by measures
in general, and especially by the distribution
of forces, to surprise the enemy, which
is just as conceivable in a defense, and which
in tactical defense is particularly a
chief point." Karl von Clausewitz,
On War
(Modern Library ed., New York, 1943), 142. Italics are
the author's.
35 Ibid., 645.
184
OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL QUARTERLY
greater daring. It is apparent, then,
that the following conclusions
are justified:
1. During the first few minutes of the
fight it was the French
regulars who saved the French from
defeat. The French counterpart
of the Virginians, that is, the
Canadians, were among the first to leave
the field when the British opened fire.
This fact does not do much to
prove the vaunted superiority of
American militia over European
regulars.
2. Before going forward Braddock should
have found out
what was going on. Then he should have
arrived at the scene of
action in good order and in line of
battle.
3. If Braddock had wanted to win the
battle he should have
formed his troops and eventually ordered
a charge.
4. If he had wanted to lose the battle
or at best gain a stale-
mate, he could either have done what he
did do or else what the
Virginians wanted him to do.
5. The colonial tactics were not good
tactics in an absolute
sense. They were the tactics of men who
could not put a real army
into the field.
6. The tactics used by Braddock were not
good European
tactics.
7. There were two crucial points in the
battle. The stand of the
French regulars and the arrival of
Braddock in line of march. All of
the errors of the British stemmed from
these two points, the genius
of the French consisted in utilizing
them.
8. The morale of the French and Indians
was better than that
of the British.
9. And finally, if the proverb is true,
if desperate strength
does indeed make a majority, then
Braddock can be pardoned for his
defeat. He was outnumbered.