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Book Reviews The Howe Brothers and the American Revo- lution. By IRA D. GRUBER. (New
York: Athe- neum, 1972; notes and index, $14.95.) Why, some twenty years after it had won the world's greatest empire, did Great Britain have to admit military defeat to a small number of colonists on the periphery of that empire? This question has perplexed histo- rians for generations and the literature ex- plaining the reasons fills library shelves. Current historiography points to a com- bination of an ideological clash (the British concept of King-in-Parliament contrasted with the American one of imperial feder- alism) and a bungling generation of English leadership. Into this schematic system, Pro- fessor Ira Gruber of Rice University brings his investigation of the two brothers who conducted the military campaigns in North America during the critical years 1776-78. By the time they returned to London, dis- missed but not disgraced, Britain's chances for victory were considerably reduced. Admiral Richard Lord Howe and General Sir William Howe were peaceniks as far as the use of force to suppress the colonies was concerned. But they used their influence (which was considerable since their mother was thought to be the illegitimate daughter of George I and she was a member of George III's household) and their acknowl- edged military competence to secure the naval and army commands in America plus positions on the peace commission that was to resolve some of the differences arising be- tween the colonies and Mother Country. The result was a carrot and stick approach to the conduct of the war. There seems little doubt the brothers received enough military support to destroy the Continental Army in 1776. They failed to do so. Lord Howe did little to blockade colonial ports and instead spent most of his effort supporting his |
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brother's command or issuing peace procla- mations. Even though Washington jeopardized the whole Revolution in his defense of New York, General Howe failed to exploit the opportunity.
He completely out- maneuvered the American commander and then let him escape. Why? In part, be- cause the brothers felt they had accom- plished the essence of eighteenth-century military tactics-maneuver your opponent until he is in such a disadvantageous posi- tion that logic compels him to surrender. Unfortunately for Sir William, neither George Washington nor the American sol- dier fought along such rational lines. Gruber feels the carrot and stick approach might have worked had not Washington de- stroyed the "illusion of British
invincibility" at Trenton and Princeton. This terminated the brothers "delicate experiment in mixing force and persuasion." For 1777, the Howes and the ministry con- trived a number of plans which eventually worked at counterpurposes. There was a lack of comprehensive direction from Lon- don and an acceptance of a piecemeal recov- ery of the middle colonies by the brothers. Not only that, Sir William became so ena- mored with holding land, utilizing loyalist support, and redeeming his loss of prestige after Trenton and Princeton, that he failed to support the expedition from Canada led by General John Burgoyne. All this re- sulted in the taking of Philadelphia and the surrender at Saratoga. It would take the ministry another year to secure the Howes' resignations, by which time the French al- liance turned a civil war into a world conflict. The extraordinary research effort which Professor Gruber has put into this project (he investigated dozens of obscure archives in England) makes it less a study of battles and more an analysis of the interaction of |
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76 British domestic politics with military policy. For this reason, the book constitutes an im- portant lesson tool for students of modern strategy. Gruber is not a representative of the inexorable movement or quantitative analysis schools of historiography. Instead, he sees the British failure as a consequence of personal ineptitude. The Howes and the ministry worked "in separate and mutually destructive ways to- ward the restoration of British government in America." The commanders in chief de- liberately masked their pacifistic views in or- der to secure their commands; the ministry expected military conquest before con- ciliatory efforts began. In conclusion, Professor Gruber argues that competent commanders with no vested interest in conciliation might have destroyed the Continental Army, captured New York and Philadelphia, and isolated New England in 1776. Incompetent commanders without influential friends would have been relieved in the winter of 1776-7. "But the Howes had the competence and influence to make their interest in conciliation truly destructive of the ministry's plans." If this fine work has any weakness, it is the presumption that there was a military solu- tion of the American problem. Eight years of Vietnam should have brought this opin- ion into question. Gruber
assumes the Howes should have sought the conquest of the Continentals and the reimposition of the status quo. All this would have created an- other Ireland-a kind of imperial appendage of which England needed no more. It is possible the Howes were correct in their approach, but they did not possess the tools for a peaceful solution. So long as the ministry would insist on parliamentary su- premacy and the colonialists on legislative autonomy, the area of negotiation was small. This is an excellent study of the American Revolution, demonstrating how the inter- action of ideological mind sets and personal- ities led the British, like the "plunge of lem- mings," toward the sea and the rocks that lost thirteen gems in the imperial crown. DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS Bowling Green State University |
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OHIO HISTORY The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics, 1848-54. By FREDERICK J.
BLUE. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. xii + 350p.; appendices, bibliography, and index. $10.95.) Professor Blue has written a scholarly mon- ograph which is thoroughly and carefully documented. His study effectively supple- ments Rayback's Free Soil, and supplies a much needed background for Foner's Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. The Free Soil party was formed in 1848 by revengeful Democrats, discontented Whigs, and impatient Liberty party men anxious for success after a decade of political failures in their commitment to a moral stand against slavery. Blue correctly refutes the common notion that the Free Soilers were committed to a moral ideology as political purists. He explains that "many of the leaders of the Free Soil movement differed little in motive from the major party politicians they chal- lenged for power" (p. x). While they pro- fessed to be dedicated to the containment of slavery, they were practical politicians determined to seize power by disguising their true motives of political expediency and pa- tronage. Agreeing with Foner, Litwack and Ber- wanger, Blue finds most Free Soilers to be under the influence of a strong anti-Negro sentiment. On the issue of race almost all Free Soilers were similar "to Democrats and Whigs, sharing the racism of northern society, and with it the desire to avoid any contact with the black population" (p. x). The Free Soil movement "was not character- ized by a spontaneous ground swell of popu- lar support" but was dominated by a few at the top who were skilled in the arts of politi- cal compromising and secret bargaining which were used to unify the divergent ele- ments (p. x). The Wilmot Proviso and free soil became the essence of the Free Soil platform and the party's foundation principle. To the Barn- burners of New York, however, it was pri- marily a tool or weapon to be used in intra- party warfare to oust the "Hunkers" from control and to check the influence of the South in the Democratic party. With the |
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Book Reviews Conscience Whigs, political expediency was intertwined with moral principle: they hoped to secure the dual objective of seizing control of the Massachusetts Whig party and preventing the expansion of human bondage to the territories (pp. 91-92, 95). The Lib- erty men had no ulterior motive and were influenced by principle and justice, yet Blue sees them as accepting Negro inferiority and hoping for a separation of the races (pp. 90-91). Blue directs his attention primarily to the national history of the Free Soil party be- cause slavery in the territories was a national controversy. He has little to say about state and local organizations and issues. Impor- tant local questions, however, were before the electorate in 1848 which he failed to con- sider. In both Illinois and Ohio the Black Laws were open questions with which the electorate had to deal. Since the state or- ganizations of the Free Soil party in the Midwest were in the hands of the old Lib- erty organization, an examination of the lo- cal issues in the framework of the new Free Soil connections would have contributed much to an understanding of the interplay of idealism and expediency in politics on these local questions. Blue devotes more attention and space to the activities of the Conscience Whigs and the Barnburners, and less to the affairs of the Liberty men. The movement in Illinois and Michigan where the Liberty element domi- nated is all but neglected, and practically no use is made of the primary sources available for these states, such as the Western Citizen, the Free Soil and Liberty journal of Illinois. Since the Liberty element was the most du- rable and permanent faction of this fragile coalition, more attention could have been given to it. Because no other monograph has been written that deals entirely with the Free Soil party, Blue's study is a welcome and signifi- cant addition to the literature of antislavery politics. His work supplants Smith's Liberty and Free Soil Parties which has been stand- ard since 1897. VICTOR B. HOWARD Morehead State University |
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77 The Cincinnati Brewing Industry: A Social and Economic History. By WILLIAM L. DOWNARD. (Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1973. 173p.; illustrations, notes, bibliogra- phy, and index. $12.50.) Professor Downard has produced an am- bitious yet brief book that traces the history of brewing in the Queen City from the early 1800's through 1960. Naturally, he stresses the years from 1840 to 1920 which were the peak years for both activity and interest in brewing in Cincinnati. This book is typical of many others that have been appearing recently. Social histo- rians who have a special interest in cities or in some particular aspect of city life have be- gun to delve deeply into more minute as- pects of local history in order to produce specialized studies that fill additional gaps in our knowledge. In this instance Professor Downard has relied very heavily on a variety of original source material available in the Cincinnati Historical Society, especially newspapers and rare books as well as the records of local Brewery Workers Unions and United States Government records. The charts, graphs, and illustrations included are valuable and enjoyable. Evaluating the book posed something of a problem. It is obviously an interesting and worthwhile addition to local historical schol- arship. It ties together a variety of loose ends that many historians "knew" about yet no one had bothered to collect in one place. At the same time it is also obviously a Doc- toral dissertation and one that, unfortu- nately, was not changed or polished up very much before being published in book form. There are a number of repetitions from one chapter to the next as well as a number of places where the narration lags. There is one very important question that still is not fully answered. What was the rel- ative "clout" of the brewing industry in
Cin- cinnati in comparison to the soap making, printing, meat packing, or machine tool in- dustries? In other words, though we hear much about the Beer Barons and their im- portance to the economic life of the Queen City, we do not know how they stacked up against various other segments of the busi- |
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78 ness, economic, or even political commu- nities. One gets the feeling on one hand that they were a major pillar of the Cincin- nati business establishment. Yet, their vir- tual demise after Prohibition seems to have caused hardly a ripple on the financial or la- bor scene. This study should appeal to those who |
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OHIO HISTORY have an interest in the local business, social, or ethnic history (especially German) as well as to those persons whose heritage includes some part of what was discussed. The latter will be fascinated and will have their sense of history enhanced. PAUL L. SIMON Xavier University |